L 106 Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om anvendelsen af visse af Det Europæiske Fællesskabs retsakter om økonomiske forbindelser til tredjelande m.v. og lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere.

(Forbud mod transport af visse produkter og teknologi med dobbelt anvendelse m.v.).

Af: Økonomi- og erhvervsminister Lene Espersen (KF)

Udvalg: Erhvervsudvalget

Samling: 2009-10

Status: Stadfæstet

Lovforslag som fremsat

Fremsat: 20-01-2010

Fremsat den 20. januar 2010 af økonomi‑ og erhvervsministeren (Lene Espersen)

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Fremsat den 20. januar 2010 af økonomi- og erhvervsministeren (Lene Espersen)

Forslag

til

Lov om ændring af lov om anvendelsen af visse af Det Europæiske Fællesskabs retsakter om økonomiske forbindelser til tredjelande m.v. og udleveringsloven

(Forbud mod transport af visse produkter og teknologi med dobbelt anvendelse m.v.)

§ 1

I lov om anvendelsen af visse af Det Europæiske Fællesskabs retsakter om økonomiske forbindelser til tredjelande m.v., jf. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 474 af 14. juni 2005, som ændret ved § 5 i lov nr. 490 af 17. juni 2008, foretages følgende ændringer:

1. I § 1 a, stk. 1, indsættes efter »biologiske«: », radiologiske«.

2. Efter § 1 a indsættes:

»§ 1 b. Det er forbudt at transportere produkter og teknologi, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med udvikling, fremstilling, håndtering, anvendelse, vedligeholdelse, oplagring, sporing, identificering eller spredning af kemiske, biologiske, radiologiske eller nukleare våben eller andre nukleare sprænglegemer eller til udvikling, fremstilling, vedligeholdelse eller oplagring af missiler, der skal fremføre sådanne våben.

Stk. 2. Forbuddet i stk. 1 omfatter med de begrænsninger, der følger af straffelovens §§ 7, 10, 10 a og 10 b, også handlinger foretaget i udlandet.

Stk. 3. Forbuddet i stk. 1 omfatter ikke transporter, der gennemføres uden for Danmark, i det omfang transporten sker i overensstemmelse med internationale aftaler om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Stk. 4. Forbuddet i stk. 1 gælder ikke for danske militære myndigheder.«

3. I § 2 indsættes efter stk. 7 som nyt stykke:

»Stk. 8. Med bøde eller fængsel indtil 2 år straffes den, der forsætligt overtræder forbuddet efter § 1 b, stk. 1, eller stk. 2.«

Stk. 8-10 bliver herefter stk. 9-11.

§ 2

I lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere, jf. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 833 af 25. august 2005, som ændret ved § 11 i lov nr. 538 af 8. juni 2006, § 6 i lov nr. 542 af 8. juni 2006, § 1 i lov nr. 394 af 30. april 2007, § 2 i lov nr. 347 af 14. maj 2008 og § 2 i lov nr. 99 af 10. februar 2009, foretages følgende ændring:

1. § 5, stk. 3, nr. 5 og 6, ophæves, og i stedet indsættes:

»5) artikel 2, jf. artikel 1, i FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af nuklear terrorisme,

6) artikel 7 i Det Internationale Atomenergiagenturs konvention om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer, som ændret ved ændringskonvention af 8. juli 2005 til Det Internationale Atomenergiagenturs konvention om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer eller

7) artikel 3 eller artikel 3 b, 3 c eller 3 d i konventionen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod søfartssikkerheden, som henholdsvis ændret og indsat ved protokollen af 1. november 2005 til konventionen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod søfartssikkerheden, eller artikel 2 eller artikel 2 b eller 2 c i protokollen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod sikkerheden for fastgjorte platforme, der befinder sig på kontinentalsokkelen, som henholdsvis ændret og indsat ved protokollen af 1. november 2005 til protokollen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod sikkerheden for fastgjorte platforme, der befinder sig på kontinentalsokkelen.«

§ 3

Stk. 1. Loven træder i kraft den 1. juli 2010, jf. dog stk. 2.

Stk. 2. Udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, nr. 7, som affattet ved denne lovs § 2, finder anvendelse på anmodninger om udlevering efter konventionen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod søfartssikkerheden eller protokollen af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod sikkerheden for fastgjorte platforme, der befinder sig på kontinentalsokkelen, der fremsættes, efter at ændringsprotokollerne af 1. november 2005 er trådt i kraft mellem Danmark og vedkommende fremmede stat.

§ 4

Stk. 1. Loven gælder ikke for Færøerne og Grønland.

Stk. 2. Lovens § 2 kan ved kongelig anordning helt eller delvis sættes i kraft for Færøerne og Grønland med de afvigelser, som de færøske eller grønlandske forhold tilsiger.

Bemærkninger til lovforslaget

Almindelige bemærkninger

Indholdsfortegnelse

1. Indledning og formål med lovforslaget

2. Baggrund

2.1. Den gældende SUA-konvention og 1988-protokollen

2.2. Ændringsprotokoller til SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen

2.2.1. Strafbare handlinger i ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen

2.2.2. Udlevering og retshjælp

2.2.3. Øvrige bestemmelser

2.2.4. Ratifikation af ændringsprotokoller

2.3. FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 (2004) om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben

3. Gældende lovgivning

3.1. Eksportkontrol med dual-use produkter

3.1.1. Det internationale samarbejde om eksportkontrol

3.1.2. Det fælles EU-retsgrundlag for eksportkontrol af dual-use produkter

3.1.2.1. Dual-use forordningen

3.1.2.2. Rådets fælles aktion om kontrol med teknisk bistand og sanktioner over for Iran og Nordkorea

3.1.3. Den danske bemyndigelseslov og administration af eksportkontrolreglerne

3.1.4. Dansk straffemyndighed

3.2. Udleveringsloven

4. Lovforslagets indhold

4.1. Forbud mod transport af dual-use produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben

4.2. Forbuddets geografiske afgrænsning

4.3. Straf

4.4. Undtagelser fra transportforbuddet

4.5. Udleveringsloven

5. Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for det offentlige

6. Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for erhvervslivet

7. Administrative konsekvenser for borgerne

8. Miljømæssige konsekvenser

9. Forholdet til EU-retten

10. Hørte myndigheder og organisationer

11. Sammenfattende skema

1. Indledning og formål med lovforslaget

Lovforslaget har til formål at gennemføre to protokoller af 1. november 2005 om ændring af konvention af 10. marts 1988 til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod søfartssikkerheden (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation), i det følgende benævnt "SUA-konventionen", og den tilhørende protokol til bekæmpelse af ulovlige handlinger mod sikkerheden for fastgjorte platforme, der befinder sig på kontinentalsokkelen, i det følgende benævnt "1988-protokollen".

Med henblik på at kunne ratificere ændringsprotokollerne er der behov for at ændre bemyndigelsesloven, jf. lov om anvendelsen af visse af Det Europæiske Fællesskabs retsakter om økonomiske forbindelser til tredjelande (lovbekendtgørelse nr. 474 af 14. juni 2005 med senere ændringer), og udleveringsloven, jf. lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere (lovbekendtgørelse nr. 833 af 25. august 2005, som senest ændret ved § 2 i lov nr. 99 af 10. februar 2009).

Lovforslaget gennemfører for det første SUA-konventionens artikel 3 b (3 bis), stk. 1, litra b, iv), som ændret ved ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen, idet der indføres et forbud mod transport med skib af produkter og teknologi med dobbelt anvendelse, herefter benævnt dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben. For at opfylde forpligtelserne i FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 af 28. april 2004 om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben, omfatter forbuddet alle former for transport, herunder også transport med fly eller lastvogn m.v.

Lovforslaget gennemfører for det andet bestemmelserne i artikel 11 b (11 bis), stk. 2, i SUA-konventionen og artikel 1, stk. 1, i 1988-protokollen, begge som ændret ved ændringsprotokollerne af 1. november 2005, hvorefter ingen af de forbrydelser, der er omfattet af SUA-konventionen eller 1988-protokollen, anses for en politisk forbrydelse.

Lovforslaget sikrer endvidere, at Danmark opfylder de forpligtelser i FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540, der vedrører kontrol med transport af dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Vedtagelsen af lovforslaget indebærer samtidig meddelelse af det i henhold til grundlovens § 19 fornødne samtykke fra Folketinget til, at Danmark ratificerer de to ændringsprotokoller af 1. november 2005 til henholdsvis SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen.

2. Baggrund

2.1. Den gældende SUA-konvention og 1988-protokollen

SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen indeholder regler i forhold til ulovlige handlinger, som bredt truer sikkerheden på skibe og faste platforme. Baggrunden for konventionen og 1988-protokollen var bl.a. kapringen af den italienske luksusliner Achille Lauro i oktober 1985. Konventionen og 1988-protokollen opregner således en række kriminelle handlinger, herunder med terrorforsæt at anvende skibe eller platforme til at forårsage død eller omfattende ødelæggelse bl.a. på miljøet eller at anvende atomvåben m.v. fra eller mod skibe eller platforme.

Konventionen blev vedtaget på en diplomatkonference i Rom den 10. marts 1988 og trådte i kraft 4 år senere. Danmark ratificerede konventionen og 1988-protokollen ved kgl. resolution af 7. september 1995. Både konventionen og den tilhørende protokol er i dag ratificeret af mere end 140 lande.

2.2. Ændringsprotokoller til SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen

På baggrund af terrorangrebene i New York den 11. september 2001 blev der i 2002 igangsat forhandlinger i FN's internationale søfartsorganisation IMO (International Maritime Organisation) om ændring af SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen.

Forhandlingerne blev blandt andet igangsat med henvisning til FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolutioner 1368 (2001) og 1373 (2001) om bekæmpelse af terrorisme samt resolution 1540 (2004) om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

De to ændringsprotokoller til henholdsvis SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen blev vedtaget i oktober 2005 på en international diplomatkonference i IMO i London. Danmark undertegnede ændringsprotokollerne den 9. februar 2007 med ratifikationsforbehold. Det bemærkes, at ændringsprotokollen til 1988-protokollen i vid udstrækning afspejler ændringerne til SUA-konventionen, hvor dette er relevant.

Ændringsprotokollerne indeholder en række ændringer og tilføjelser til SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen, der vedrører handlinger foretaget med terrorforsæt på og mod skibe eller faste platforme samt transport af våben og produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben.

2.2.1. Strafbare handlinger i ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen

De væsentligste ændringer i ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen består i en betydelig udvidelse af konventionens kriminaliseringsforpligtelser. Ændringerne medfører således en pligt til at kriminalisere en række handlinger, hvor f.eks. skibet eller dets last benyttes med terrorforsæt.

En central del af ændringerne består af særskilte transportbestemmelser, hvis hovedformål er at forhindre spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben (artiklerne 1, 2 b, stk. 3, 3 b, stk. 1, litra b, og 3 b, stk. 2, i SUA-konventionen, som ændret ved ændringsprotokollen). Disse ændringer er tæt knyttet til FN's traktater og konventioner om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben (FN's konvention om forbud mod kemiske våben (CWC, 1997), FN's konvention om forbud mod biologiske våben (BTWC, 1975) og Traktaten om ikke-spredning af atomvåben (NPT-Traktaten, 1970) samt FN's resolution 1540 (2004) om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben).

Ændringerne indebærer, at de deltagende stater forpligter sig til at kriminalisere transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben, herunder nukleare, biologiske og kemiske våben, samt transport af dual-use produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben. Ved dual-use produkter forstås produkter, der både kan anvendes til civile og militære formål samt anvendes til udvikling og produktion af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Ændringsprotokollen fastsætter, at transporten af de omhandlede produkter dels skal være ulovlig og dels ske med forsæt. Det er således ikke nok, at selve transporten objektivt set er ulovlig, f.eks. fordi der ikke foreligger en tilladelse til udførsel. Der skal også foreligge viden eller formodning om, at de transporterede produkter skal anvendes ulovligt til udvikling eller produktion m.v. af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Det fremgår imidlertid af den nyindsatte artikel 3 b, stk. 2, at transporter foretaget i overensstemmelse med Traktaten om ikke-spredning af atomvåben (NPT-traktaten) er at betragte som lovlige transporter, som er undtaget fra ovennævnte forbud mod transport af produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben. Formålet hermed er at sikre, at de lande, der har tiltrådt NPT-traktaten, lovligt kan transportere f.eks. nukleart materiale og på vilkår, der ikke er i strid med staternes rettigheder og forpligtelser i medfør af denne traktat.

Herudover indeholder ændringsprotokollens artikel 5 en bestemmelse om, at de deltagende stater skal gøre overtrædelser af bl.a. artikel 3 b strafbare med straffe, der modsvarer overtrædelsernes alvor. Desuden indeholder artikel 6 en konsekvensrettelse til SUA-konventionens artikel 6. De deltagende stater forpligtes således til at etablere passende straffemyndighed i forhold til overtrædelser af bl.a. artikel 3 b. Efter regeringens opfattelse indeholder straffelovens bestemmelser om dansk straffemyndighed, jf. straffelovens §§ 6-9, de nødvendige bestemmelser for at opfylde SUA-konventionens og ændringsprotokollens krav om at etablere passende straffemyndighed. Der henvises til pkt. 3.1.4. om dansk straffemyndighed.

Det bemærkes, at forpligtelsen til at kriminalisere transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben, som indsat ved ændringsprotokollens artikel 3 b, stk. 1, litra b, i), ii) og iii), er opfyldt via et forbud mod transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben, der er gennemført ved en ændring af våbenloven i 2006, jf. § 5 i lov nr. 503 af 7. juni 2006.

2.2.2. Udlevering og retshjælp

Ændringsprotokollerne fastsætter endvidere bestemmelser om udlevering og retshjælp i forbindelse med handlinger, som SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen forpligter de deltagende stater til at kriminalisere. Protokollerne indeholder bl.a. bestemmelser om, at forbrydelser omfattet af SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen ikke kan anses som politiske forbrydelser i forbindelse med udlevering. En begæring om udlevering kan således ikke afslås med den begrundelse, at forbrydelsen er politisk.

2.2.3. Øvrige bestemmelser

Herudover indeholder ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen detaljerede bestemmelser om adgang til at borde skibe, der befinder sig uden for eget eller andre landes søterritorium. Ligeledes er der bestemmelser, der skal sikre, at der tages fornødne hensyn til søfarende, og at disse sikres en behandling i overensstemmelse med gældende ret. Endelig er der indsat en bestemmelse om erstatning til rederen i tilfælde, hvorefter medlemsstaterne er ansvarlige for skader/tab som følge af uberettigede eller uproportionale indgreb.

2.2.4. Ratifikation af ændringsprotokoller

Ændringsprotokollerne er endnu ikke trådt i kraft. Det fremgår af artikel 18, at ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen træder i kraft 90 dage efter, at 12 lande har tiltrådt protokollen. Ændringsprotokollen til 1988-protokollen træder i kraft ved 3 staters ratifikation, dog først når ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen er trådt i kraft.

Ændringsprotokollerne var åbne for undertegnelse med ratifikationsforbehold i perioden 14. februar 2006 til 13. februar 2007. Følgende lande har i den forbindelse undertegnet protokollerne: Australien, Bulgarien, Danmark, Estland, Finland, Frankrig, Grækenland, Italien, Nederlandene, New Zealand, Norge, Portugal, Spanien, Sverige, Tyrkiet, Storbritannien, USA og Østrig.

8 lande har pr. 1. oktober 2009 ratificeret eller tiltrådt tillægsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen: Cook Island, Estland, Fiji, Marshall Island, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Schweiz, Spanien og Vanuatu, og 6 lande har ratificeret eller tiltrådt tillægsprotokollen om faste platforme: Estland, Fiji, Marshall Island, Schweiz og Vanuatu.

Folketingets Retsudvalg og Folketingets Erhvervsudvalg blev den 5. februar 2007 orienteret om de lovgivningsmæssige konsekvenser af de to ændringsprotokoller (Retsudvalget, Alm. del - Bilag 352, folketingsåret 2006-2007, og Erhvervsudvalget, Alm. del - Bilag 127, folketingsåret 2006-2007). Det fremgår heraf, at en ratifikation af ændringsprotokollerne vil nødvendiggøre en ændring af udleveringsloven. Herudover anføres det, at det vil blive overvejet, hvorledes dual-use transportforbuddet kan implementeres i dansk ret.

Danmark vil med de foreslåede lovændringer af bemyndigelsesloven og udleveringsloven opfylde kravene i ændringsprotokollerne.

De to ændringsprotokoller til henholdsvis SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen er optrykt som bilag 2 til lovforslaget.

2.3. FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 (2004) om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben

FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben til ikke-statslige aktører indebærer bl.a. en folkeretlig forpligtelse for Danmark til at vedtage og håndhæve national lovgivning, der forbyder ikke statslige aktørers, herunder terroristers, adgang til masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Desuden pålægger resolutionen alle stater at gennemføre og håndhæve nationale kontrolforanstaltninger med henblik på at forhindre ulovlig spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben, herunder relateret udstyr. Det bemærkes, at det nævnte "relaterede udstyr" omfatter dual-use produkter.

Efter resolutionens pkt. 3, litra d, er staterne bl.a. forpligtede til at etablere passende love og regler om kontrol med udførsel, transit, omladning ("trans-shipment") og genudførsel af dual-use produkter. Reglerne skal herunder omfatte kontrol med tilvejebringelse af kapital og tjenesteydelser, som relaterer sig til sådan eksport og omladning, samt transport, som kan medvirke til spredning.

Lovforslaget indebærer, at Danmark ligeledes opfylder kravet i sikkerhedsrådsresolutionen om kontrol med transport af dual-use produkter, der skal anvendes i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben.

FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 er optrykt som bilag 3 til lovforslaget.

3. Gældende lovgivning

3.1. Eksportkontrol med dual-use produkter

3.1.1. Det internationale samarbejde om eksportkontrol

Grundlaget for eksportkontrol er et uformelt internationalt samarbejde mellem ca. 40 hovedsagelig vestlige lande. På linie med de fleste EU-medlemsstater deltager Danmark i de fire internationale eksportkontrolregimer for samarbejde om eksportkontrol. Formålet med samarbejdet er at sikre, at eksport af produkter ikke medvirker til udvikling eller spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben. Samarbejdet skal ligeledes forhindre, at der sker eksport af produkter, der helt eller delvis skal anvendes militært af lande, der udgør en risiko for den internationale sikkerhed og stabilitet. Samarbejdet er udelukkende politisk forpligtende, og de deltagende stater træffer politiske aftaler om eksportkontrol samt udveksler vurderinger og erfaringer om kritiske lande og kritiske slutbrugere.

De fire internationale eksportkontrolregimer er:

- Wassenaar Arrangementet (WA). Samarbejdet omfatter konventionelle våben samt produkter og teknologier med dobbelt anvendelse (dual-use).

- Australiengruppen (AG). Samarbejdet omfatter kemiske og biologiske produkter og produktionsudstyr, der kan anvendes til udvikling og fremstilling af kemiske og biologiske våben.

- Missil Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Samarbejdet omfatter produkter og teknologier, der kan anvendes til udvikling og fremstilling af missiler, der kan fremføre masseødelæggelsesvåben.

- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Samarbejdet omfatter produkter og teknologier, der anvendes i forbindelse med udvikling af kernekraft, men som også kan anvendes i forbindelse med udvikling af atomvåben.

3.1.2. Det fælles EU-retsgrundlag for eksportkontrol af dual-use produkter

3.1.2.1. Dual-use forordningen

Inden for EU er det internationale samarbejde om eksportkontrol af dual-use produkter via fælles retsakter formaliseret og gjort juridisk bindende. De fælles EU-regler findes i Rådets forordning nr. 428/2009/EF af 5. maj 2009 om en fællesskabsordning for kontrol med udførsel, overførsel, mæglervirksomhed og transit i forbindelse med produkter med dobbelt anvendelse, herefter benævnt dual-use forordningen.

Dual-use forordningen fastlægger, hvilke dual-use produkter der er underlagt eksportkontrol. Produkterne vedrører ikke alene fysiske produkter, men også software og teknologi, der kan anvendes til såvel civile som militære formål.

Forordningen regulerer eksportkontrol med dual-use produkter på to måder:

1) Den såkaldte kontrolliste, jf. forordningens bilag I, indeholder en liste over de produkter, der er underlagt eksportkontrol. Hvis et produkt er omfattet af kontrollisten, skal eksportøren søge om udførselstilladelse hos myndighederne, hvis produktet udføres af EU.

2) De såkaldte catch-all bestemmelser, jf. forordningens artikel 4, som fastsætter de nærmere betingelser for eksportkontrol med øvrige dual-use produkter, som ikke er opført på kontrollisten. Formålet med disse bestemmelser er at sikre, at der ikke sker eksport af produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsvåben, eller som skal anvendes militært af et land, der er underlagt en våbenembargo. Hvis et produkt er omfattet af catch-all bestemmelserne, skal eksportøren ligeledes søge om udførselstilladelse hos myndighederne.

Ved en ændring af dual-use forordningen i 2009 er der indført kontrol med mæglervirksomhed og transit.

Ifølge dual-use forordningens artikel 9, er det de nationale myndigheder i medlemsstaterne, i Danmark økonomi- og erhvervsministeren, der har kompetence til at træffe den konkrete afgørelse om, hvorvidt bestemte udførsler kan tillades eller ej, eller om en konkret transit skal forbydes. Administrationen af regelsættet er henlagt til Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen.

3.1.2.2. Rådets fælles aktion om kontrol med teknisk bistand og sanktioner over for Iran og Nordkorea

Udover dual-use forordningen vedtog Rådet i 2000 en fælles aktion (Rådets fælles aktion af 22. juni 2000 vedrørende kontrol med teknisk bistand i forbindelse med visse former for militær endelig anvendelse (2000/401/FUSP)). Den fælles aktion pålægger medlemsstaterne at gennemføre national lovgivning i overensstemmelse med aktionens bestemmelser. Den fælles aktion komplementerer således reglerne i dual-use forordningen, idet der stilles krav om kontrol, herunder forbud eller krav om tilladelse til teknisk bistand, der ydes uden for EU, hvis den tekniske bistand er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Der er desuden i EU vedtaget særlige restriktive foranstaltninger over for Iran, jf. Rådets forordning 423/2007, Rådets forordning 1110/2008, Rådets forordning 1228/2009 samt Kommissionens forordning 116/2008. De særlige restriktioner har til formål at forhindre Irans opbygning af atomvåben og fremføringsmidler hertil. Tilsvarende er der vedtaget særlige restriktioner over for Nordkorea, jf. Rådets forordning 329/2007, Kommissionens forordning 689/2009 og Rådets Fælles holdning 2009/573/FUSP.

3.1.3. Den danske bemyndigelseslov og administration af eksportkontrolreglerne

Bemyndigelsesloven indeholder de danske administrative bestemmelser og straffebestemmelser, som er nødvendige for at anvende og håndhæve de fælles EU-regler om eksportkontrol. Bemyndigelsesloven supplerer således dual-use forordningen på de områder, hvor dette er nødvendigt af hensyn til den praktiske gennemførelse, og hvor forordningen i øvrigt overlader valgmuligheder til medlemsstaternes afgørelse. Bemyndigelsesloven indeholder endvidere gennemførelsesforanstaltninger i forhold til Rådets fælles aktion vedrørende kontrol med teknisk bistand som nævnt i punkt 3.1.2.2.

3.1.4. Dansk straffemyndighed

Dansk straffemyndighed omfatter alle handlinger, der foretages i den danske stat, jf. straffelovens § 6, nr. 1. Dansk straffemyndighed omfatter endvidere handlinger foretaget på danske fartøjer (dvs. skibe, der sejler under dansk flag, og luftfartøjer, som er dansk indregistrerede), jf. straffelovens § 6, nr. 2 og 3. Bestemmelserne er udtryk for et udvidet territorialprincip (flagstatsprincippet) og bygger på en antagelse om en nær sammenhæng mellem et fartøj og den stat, fartøjet er registreret i (flagstaten). Flagstaten antages således at være nærmest til at have straffemyndighed i forhold til handlinger, der foretages på et fartøj, som er registreret i den pågældende stat.

Bestemmelserne i straffelovens § 6, nr. 2 og 3, indebærer med andre ord, at handlinger foretaget på et dansk fartøj ligestilles med handlinger foretaget i den danske stat (nr. 1), selv om fartøjet befinder sig inden for en anden stats sø- eller luftterritorium (nr. 2) eller i internationalt farvand eller luftrum (nr. 3). Det betyder, at ulovlige transporter, der foretages med dansk indregistreret skib eller fly, kan strafforfølges i Danmark, uanset hvor det befinder sig.

Dansk straffemyndighed omfatter endvidere handlinger foretaget i udlandet af personer, der har dansk statsborgerskab eller bopæl i Danmark, jf. straffelovens § 7, stk. 1, (personalprincippet). Hvis handlingen foretages inden for et folkeretligt anerkendt statsområde, er det dog som altovervejende hovedregel en betingelse, at handlingen er strafbar både efter gerningsstedets lov og dansk lov (princippet om dobbelt strafbarhed), og at den pågældende danske straffebestemmelse ikke efter sit gerningsindhold er territorialt begrænset til forhold begået i Danmark.

Hvis handlingen er foretaget uden for et folkeretligt anerkendt område (f.eks. om bord på et fremmed skib, der befinder sig på åbent hav), hører handlingen kun under dansk straffemyndighed efter straffelovens § 7, hvis handlingen kan medføre højere straf end fængsel i 4 måneder, jf. straffelovens § 7, stk. 2, og der er tale om en handling begået af en person, der på tidspunktet for sigtelsen har dansk indfødsret, er bosat i den danske stat eller har lignende fast ophold her i landet.

Straffelovens §§ 6 og 7 suppleres af § 8, hvorefter der efter omstændighederne er dansk straffemyndighed i forhold til udlandshandlinger uden hensyn til, hvor gerningsmanden hører hjemme. Dette gælder bl.a. i tilfælde, hvor handlingen er omfattet af en international bestemmelse, ifølge hvilken Danmark er forpligtet til at have straffemyndighed, jf. § 8, nr. 5.

Spørgsmålet om dansk straffemyndighed i forhold til juridiske personer afgøres efter de samme regler, som gælder i forhold til fysiske personer. Ifølge straffelovens § 9, stk. 1, 2. pkt., gælder for juridiske personer, at handlinger anses for foretaget, hvor den eller de handlinger, som medfører ansvar for den juridiske person, er foretaget. Det vil således være muligt at straffe f.eks. danske selskaber, der er ansvarlige for transporter foretaget i udlandet med udenlandsk fartøj, der er registreret i en anden stat end Danmark.

3.2. Udleveringsloven

Reglerne om udlevering af lovovertrædere findes i udleveringsloven.

Efter udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 1, må udlevering for en politisk lovovertrædelse ikke finde sted. Omfatter handlingen tillige en lovovertrædelse, som ikke er af politisk karakter, kan udlevering ske for denne lovovertrædelse, såfremt handlingen overvejende er af ikke-politisk karakter, jf. § 5, stk. 2. Om en lovovertrædelse er politisk, afhænger af en konkret helhedsvurdering, hvor der navnlig lægges vægt på arten af den eller de interesser, der er krænket af lovovertrædelsen, og på gerningsmandens motiv.

Udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, indeholder en række undtagelser til forbuddet mod udlevering for en politisk lovovertrædelse, der er blevet indført som led i et styrket internationalt samarbejde om bekæmpelse af international terrorisme. Det følger af bestemmelsen, at forbuddet mod at nægte udlevering for politiske lovovertrædelser ikke finder anvendelse, når handlingen er omfattet af følgende internationale konventioner: Den europæiske konvention om bekæmpelse af terrorisme, Europarådets konvention om forebyggelse af terrorisme, FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af terrorbombninger, FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af finansiering af terrorisme, FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af nuklear terrorisme eller Det Internationale Atomenergiagenturs konvention om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer.

Udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, blev senest ændret ved lov nr. 99 af 10. februar 2009.

Udleveringslovens § 5 finder ikke anvendelse på anmodninger om udlevering til medlemsstater i Den Europæiske Union. Sådanne anmodninger reguleres af reglerne i kapitel 2 a i udleveringsloven, der gennemfører EU-rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre i dansk ret. Det er efter kapitel 2 a i udleveringsloven ikke muligt at afslå udlevering med henvisning til, at handlingen betragtes som en politisk forbrydelse.

Tilsvarende gælder der som udgangspunkt særlige regler for udlevering til de øvrige nordiske lande. På nuværende tidspunkt gælder der en fællesnordisk udleveringslovgivning. Med henblik på at gennemføre Konventionen om overgivelse for strafbare forhold mellem de nordiske lande (Nordisk arrestordre) blev der ved lov nr. 394 af 30. april 2007 bl.a. indsat et nyt kapitel 3 b i udleveringsloven om behandling af sager om udlevering til de nordiske lande. Kapitel 3 b i udleveringsloven er endnu ikke trådt i kraft.

4. Lovforslagets indhold

4.1. Forbud mod transport af dual-use produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben

Den foreslåede § 1, nr. 2, gennemfører bestemmelsen i artikel 3 b, stk. 1, litra b, iv), som indsat ved ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen, der kriminaliserer transport med skib af dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben.

For at opfylde forpligtelserne i FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution 1540 (2004), der vedrører kontrol med transport af dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til masseødelæggelsesvåben, omfatter forbuddet alle former for transport, herunder også transport med fly eller lastvogn m.v.

Det forudsættes, at transport omfatter såvel indgåelse af og instruktion om indgåelse af aftale om transport, som faktisk udførelse af og instruktion om faktisk udførelse af transport. Dette muliggør, at både det firma, der står bag en transport, og f.eks. den skibsfører, pilot eller chauffør, der udfører transporten, selvstændigt kan straffes, forudsat at den pågældende efter de almindelige strafferetlige principper kan anses for ansvarlig for den ulovlige transport.

Det bemærkes, at hovedparten af den internationale regulering om spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben, herunder FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution 1540 (2004) opregner kemiske, biologiske og nukleare våben og fremføringsmidler hertil, som masseødelæggelsesvåben. Det samme gælder ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen og det fælles EU-retsgrundlag for eksportkontrol af dual-use produkter. Radiologiske våben er dog reguleret i FN's konvention om nuklear terrorisme (2005). Det er Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriets opfattelse, at radiologiske våben også må henregnes til masseødelæggelsesvåben, idet radiologiske våben i lighed med kemiske, biologiske og nukleare våben må anses for særdeles farlige og egnede til at skabe omfattende ødelæggelser. Det bemærkes, at radiologiske våben indgår i opregningen af masseødelæggelsesvåben i det forbud mod transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben, der er gennemført med en ændring af våbenloven i 2006, jf. lov nr. 503 af 7. juni 2006.

4.2. Forbuddets geografiske afgrænsning

Ud over dansk straffemyndighed forudsætter idømmelse af straf ved danske domstole for handlinger foretaget i udlandet, at den pågældende handling er omfattet af en dansk straffebestemmelse, hvis anvendelsesområde omfatter handlinger foretaget i udlandet.

Som de fleste særlove finder bemyndigelseslovens bestemmelser alene anvendelse på handlinger, der foretages på dansk område. Dog finder bemyndigelseslovens bestemmelser om forbud mod teknisk bistand også anvendelse på handlinger, der foretages uden for EU, jf. lovens § 1 a, stk. 1, og § 2, stk. 9.

Under hensyn til at ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen indeholder en forpligtelse til at kriminalisere ulovlige søtransporter, samt at FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution 1540 (2004) indeholder en generel forpligtelse til at føre kontrol med transport af dual-use produkter, foreslås det i § 1, nr. 2, at forbuddet udstrækkes til også at omfatte handlinger, der begås i udlandet, dog med de begrænsninger, der følger af straffelovens §§ 7, 10, 10 a og 10 b.

Dette indebærer navnlig, at danske statsborgere og personer med fast bopæl i Danmark, der f.eks. befinder sig ombord på et fremmed skib, efter omstændighederne vil kunne straffes for at overtræde forbuddet, når skibet befinder sig inden for en anden stats søterritorium, hvis handlingen også er strafbar efter den dér gældende lovgivning, eller i internationalt farvand, hvis handlingen kan medføre mere end 4 måneders fængsel.

Det bemærkes, at forbuddet hermed vil have samme geografiske rækkevidde som det tilsvarende forbud mod transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben, der er gennemført ved en ændring af våbenloven i 2006, jf. lov nr. 503 af 5. juni 2006.

Undtaget er dog transporter, der gennemføres uden for Danmark i overensstemmelse med internationale aftaler om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben, jf. den i § 1, nr. 2, foreslåede § 1 b, stk. 3. Der henvises til bemærkningerne under punkt 4.4.

4.3. Straf

Det foreslås i § 1, nr. 3, at overtrædelse af forbuddet i den foreslåede § 1 b, stk. 1, eller stk. 2, mod transport af dual-use produkter, der skal anvendes i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben, straffes med bøde eller fængsel indtil 2 år.

Efter straffelovens § 19 omfatter særlovgivningens straffebestemmelser både forsætlige og uagtsomme forhold (grov og simpel uagtsomhed), medmindre andet er særligt fastsat.

I følge ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen er der imidlertid udelukkende krav om at kriminalisere forsætlige overtrædelser (dvs. ved en konkret viden eller formodning om, at de pågældende produkter, der transporteres, skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben). Endvidere fastsætter FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 (2004) alene, at der skal etableres passende sanktioner i forhold til overtrædelse af eksportkontrolreglerne på dual-use området.

I praksis vil det næppe være muligt for en transportør ud fra transportdokumenterne alene at vurdere, om der er tale om dual-use produkter, og om disse produkter eventuelt vil skulle anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben. Samtidig foregår de fleste transporter, og i særdeleshed containertransport, ud fra standardiserede og mere eller mindre fuldautomatiserede processer, der vanskeliggør, at transporterhvervet vil kunne afdække kritiske situationer i forhold til transport af dual-use produkter, uden at dette samtidig indebærer indførelse af forskellige nye kontrolforanstaltninger for ikke at ifalde strafansvar. Sådanne kontrolforanstaltninger vil kunne have konkurrenceforvridende effekter i forhold til udenlandske transportører, der ikke er undergivet et sådant krav.

På denne baggrund foreslås, at alene forsætlige overtrædelser af transportforbuddet straffes. For at sikre at sanktionerne bliver så effektive som muligt, vil økonomi- og erhvervsministeren følge udviklingen på området, herunder også hvordan andre lande implementerer transportforbuddet i SUA-konventionen. Hvis der på et tidspunkt viser sig behov for stramning af reglerne, vil økonomi- og erhvervsministeren herefter overveje at fremsætte forslag om ændring af bemyndigelsesloven, så også groft uagtsomme overtrædelser af forbuddet straffes.

4.4. Undtagelser fra transportforbuddet

Det fremgår af SUA-konventionens artikel 3 b, stk. 2, som ændret ved ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen, at transporter foretaget i overensstemmelse med Traktaten om ikke-spredning af atomvåben (NPT-traktaten) er at betragte som lovlige transporter, som er undtaget fra forbuddet mod transport af produkter, der skal anvendes til masseødelæggelsesvåben. Traktaten forpligter de 5 anerkendte atomvåbenmagter (USA, Rusland, Kina, Storbritannien og Frankrig) til ikke at overføre atomvåben til ikke-atomvåbenmagter og til ikke at bistå disse med at fremstille eller erhverve atomvåben. Ikke-atomvåbenmagterne, herunder Danmark, forpligter sig bl.a. til ikke at modtage eller fremstille atomvåben. Traktaten tillader overførsel af nukleart materiale, der skal anvendes fredeligt til udnyttelse af atomenergi, såfremt der er indgået sikkerhedsaftaler med Det Internationale Atomenergiagentur (IAEA).

Ud over NPT-traktaten har Danmark tiltrådt en række andre konventioner, der har til formål at modvirke spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben m.v., herunder bl.a. FN's konvention om forbud mod kemiske våben (CWC) og FN's konvention om forbud mod biologiske våben (BTWC).

Efter disse konventioner er der i visse situationer mulighed for lovligt at transportere produkter, hvis transporten sker med henblik på destruktion eller med henblik på f.eks. en offentlig forskningsindsats. FN's konvention om forbud mod kemiske våben giver f.eks. adgang til at overføre visse giftige kemikalier med dobbelt anvendelse, hvis de skal anvendes til forsknings-, medicinske, farmaceutiske eller beskyttelsesesformål.

På denne baggrund foreslås det at indsætte en undtagelsesbestemmelse i bemyndigelseslovens § 1 b, stk. 3, jf. den foreslåede § 1, nr. 2, således at forbuddet mod transport af visse dual-use produkter ikke finder anvendelse, såfremt transporten sker i overensstemmelse med de forpligtelser, som Danmark har påtaget sig i forhold til internationale konventioner og aftaler om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Da det ikke kan udelukkes, at det danske forsvar i forbindelse med træning og oplæring af soldater vil kunne have behov for at transportere dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til masseødelæggelsesvåben, foreslås det endvidere at indsætte en undtagelsesbestemmelse i § 1 b, stk. 4, for danske militære myndigheder, jf. den foreslåede § 1, nr. 2. En tilsvarende undtagelse findes i våbenlovens § 8, stk. 1, for så vidt angår forbud mod transport af masseødelæggelsesvåben.

4.5. Udleveringsloven

Efter artikel 11 b, stk. 2, i SUA-konventionen og artikel 1, stk. 1, i 1988-protokollen, begge som ændret ved protokollerne af 1. november 2005, må ingen af de forbrydelser, der er omfattet af SUA-konventionens artikel 3, 3 b, 3 c og 3 d (artikel 3, 3 bis, 3 ter og 3 quater) eller 1988-protokollens artikel 2, 2 b og 2 c (artikel 2, 2 bis og 2 ter), anses for en politisk forbrydelse eller for en forbrydelse, der har forbindelse med en politisk forbrydelse, eller for en forbrydelse, der udspringer af politiske motiver. En anmodning om udlevering eller retshjælp på grundlag af en sådan forbrydelse må derfor ikke afvises alene med den begrundelse, at den angår en politisk forbrydelse m.v. De nævnte bestemmelser i SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen opregner en lang række kriminelle handlinger, herunder med terrorforsæt at anvende skibe eller platforme til at forårsage død eller omfattende ødelæggelse bl.a. på miljøet, eller at anvende atomvåben m.v. fra eller mod skibe eller platforme.

Det må antages, at ikke alle de handlinger, der med ændringsprotokollerne vil være omfattet af de nævnte bestemmelser i SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen, f.eks. transport af dual-use produkter, jf. ovenfor i afsnit 2.2.1, tillige vil være omfattet af én eller flere af de konventioner, som i dag er omfattet af undtagelserne i udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, om undtagelser til forbuddet mod udlevering for en politisk lovovertrædelse. På denne baggrund foreslås det, at bestemmelsen i udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, udvides til at omfatte alle handlinger, der er omfattet af SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen.

Med hensyn til ændringsprotokollernes krav om kriminalisering af forskellige nærmere angivne handlinger bemærkes, at handlingerne, herunder trusler om med terrorforsæt at begå de handlinger, der med ændringsprotokollerne vil være omfattet af SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen, efter regeringens opfattelse i praksis må anses for at ville være omfattet af bestemmelserne i havmiljøloven, våbenloven eller straffeloven.

Ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen indeholder i artikel 4, stk. 6, et krav om kriminalisering af personer, som retsstridigt og forsætligt på et skib transporterer en person, som har begået en handling omfattet af konventionen m.v., for at unddrage denne person strafforfølgning. Efter regeringens opfattelse må denne bestemmelse anses for opfyldt i dansk ret ved straffelovens § 125, stk. 1, nr. 1, hvorefter den, som for at unddrage nogen fra forfølgning for en forbrydelse eller straf holder ham skjult, hjælper ham til flugt eller udgiver ham for en anden, straffes med bøde eller fængsel indtil 2 år.

Efter straffelovens § 125, stk. 2, straffes den, der foretager de nævnte handlinger for at unddrage sig selv eller nogen af sine nærmeste fra forfølgning eller straf, dog ikke. Efter artikel 21, stk. 3, i ændringsprotokollen kan staterne tage forbehold i forhold til artikel 4, stk. 6, således at hjælp til familiemedlemmers flugt fra strafforfølgning kan undtages fra straf i overensstemmelse med den enkelte stats strafferetlige principper. Hvis lovforslaget vedtages, agter regeringen i overensstemmelse hermed at tage et forbehold i medfør af artikel 21, stk. 3, ved ratifikation af ændringsprotokollen.

5. Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for det offentlige

Lovforslaget har ingen økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for det offentlige af betydning.

6. Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for erhvervslivet

Lovforslaget har ingen økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for erhvervslivet.

7. Administrative konsekvenser for borgerne

Lovforslaget har ingen administrative konsekvenser for borgerne.

8. Miljømæssige konsekvenser

Lovforslaget har ingen miljømæssige konsekvenser.

9. Forholdet til EU-retten

Lovforslaget indeholder ingen EU-retlige aspekter.

10. Hørte myndigheder og organisationer

Advokatsamfundet, alle byretter, Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd, Beredskabsstyrelsen - Center for Biosikring og -Beredskab, CO-industri, Danmarks Eksportråd, Danmarks Rederiforening, Danmarks Vækstråd, Dansk Eksportforening, Dansk Erhverv, Danske Advokater, Danske Speditører, Den Danske Dommerforening, Dommerfuldmægtigforeningen, Domstolsstyrelsen, Foreningen af offentlige anklagere i Danmark, Institut for Menneskerettigheder, DI - Organisation for erhvervslivet, Danske Maritime, Dansk Navigatørforening, Dansk Transport og Logistik, Erhvervsflyvningens Sammenslutning, Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Fagligt Fælles Forbund, Finansministeriet, Forsvarsministeriet, Justitsministeriet, Landsforeningen af Forsvarsadvokater, Maskinmestrenes Forening, Politiforbundet i Danmark, Retspolitisk Forening, Rigsadvokaten, Rigspolitiet, Rigspolitichefen Afd. G, Rigsombudsmanden i Grønland, Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, Rigsrevisionen, Scandinavian Airlines, SKAT, Statens Institut for Strålebeskyttelse, Statens Luftfartsvæsen, Statsministeriet, Søfartsstyrelsen, Vestre Landsret, Udenrigsministeriet og Østre Landsret.


11. Sammenfattende skema
	Positive konsekvenser/mindre udgifter	Negative konsekvenser/merudgifter
Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for stat, kommuner og regioner	Ingen	Ingen af betydning
Økonomiske og administrative konsekvenser for erhvervslivet	Ingen	Ingen
Administrative konsekvenser for borgerne	Ingen	Ingen
Miljømæssige konsekvenser	Ingen	Ingen
Forholdet til EU-retten	Lovforslaget indeholder ingen EU-retlige aspekter

Bemærkninger til lovforslagets enkelte bestemmelser

Til § 1

Til nr. 1

Der er tale om en ændring af bemyndigelseslovens § 1 a, stk. 1, der vedrører forbud mod teknisk bistand, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med udvikling, fremstilling m.v. af kemiske, biologiske eller nukleare våben, idet § 1 a, stk. 1, bør omfatte den samme afgrænsning af masseødelæggelsesvåben, som den foreslåede § 1 b, stk. 1, der henregner radiologiske våben til masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.1.

Til nr. 2

Den foreslåede § 1 b har til formål at gennemføre bestemmelsen, som indsat ved artikel 3 b, stk. 1, litra b, iv), i ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen, der forbyder transport med skib af dual-use produkter og teknologi, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben.

Forslaget indebærer endvidere, at Danmark vil opfylde et generelt krav om kontrol med transport af dual-use produkter, der er indeholdt i FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution nr. 1540 (2004). For at opfylde forpligtelserne i resolutionen omfatter forbuddet alle former for transport, herunder også transport med fly eller lastvogn m.v.

Forbuddet omfatter dual-use produkter og teknologi, der skal anvendes i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben. Ved masseødelæggelsesvåben forstås i den forbindelse kemiske, biologiske, radiologiske og nukleare våben samt missiler, der skal fremføre sådanne våben.

Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.1.

Det foreslås i § 1 b, stk. 2, at forbuddet mod transport af dual-use produkter i § 1 b, stk. 1, også omfatter handlinger foretaget i udlandet, dog med de begrænsninger, der følger af straffelovens §§ 7, 10, 10 a og 10 b. Dette indebærer navnlig, at danske statsborgere og personer med fast bopæl i Danmark, der f.eks. befinder sig ombord på et fremmed skib, efter omstændighederne vil kunne straffes for at overtræde forbuddet, når skibet befinder sig inden for en anden stats søterritorium, hvis handlingen også er strafbar efter den dér gældende lovgivning, eller i internationalt farvand, hvis handlingen kan medføre mere end 4 måneders fængsel.

Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.2.

Det foreslås i § 1 b, stk. 3, at transporter, der gennemføres uden for Danmark, undtages fra forbuddet i stk. 1, i det omfang transporten sker i overensstemmelse med internationale aftaler om ikke-spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben. Da det endvidere ikke kan udelukkes, at det danske forsvar i forbindelse med træning og oplæring af soldater vil kunne have behov for at transportere dual-use produkter, der er bestemt til masseødelæggelsesvåben, foreslås det endvidere i § 1 b, stk. 4, at indsætte en undtagelsesbestemmelse fra transportforbuddet for danske militære myndigheder

Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.4.

Til nr. 3

Det foreslås at indsætte et nyt § 2, stk. 8, hvorefter forsætlige overtrædelser af transportforbuddet i den foreslåede § 1 b, stk. 1, eller stk. 2, straffes med bøde eller fængsel indtil 2 år. Det foreslås alene at straffe forsætlige overtrædelser af transportforbuddet. Ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen indeholder således alene en forpligtelse til at kriminalisere forsætlige overtrædelser (dvs. ved en konkret viden eller formodning om, at de pågældende produkter, der transporteres, skal anvendes i forbindelse med masseødelæggelsesvåben). Endvidere foregår langt de fleste transporter ud fra standardiserede og mere eller mindre fuldautomatiske processer. Dette vanskeliggør, at transporterhvervet vil kunne afdække kritiske situationer i forhold til transport af dual-use produkter, uden at dette samtidig medfører indførelse af nye kontrolforanstaltninger for ikke at ifalde strafansvar. Sådanne kontrolforanstaltninger vil kunne have konkurrenceforvridende effekter i forhold til udenlandske transportører, der ikke er undergivet sådanne krav. Økonomi- og erhvervsministeren vil dog følge udviklingen på området, herunder også hvordan andre lande implementerer SUA-konventionens transportforbud. Hvis der på et tidspunkt viser sig behov for en stramning af reglerne, vil økonomi- og erhvervsministeren overveje at fremsætte forslag om ændring af bemyndigelsesloven, så også groft uagtsomme overtrædelser af forbuddet straffes.

Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.3.

Til § 2

Efter udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, finder forbuddet mod at nægte udlevering for politiske lovovertrædelser ikke anvendelse, når handlingen er omfattet af de internationale konventioner, som er opregnet i bestemmelsen. Det foreslås derfor at indsætte et nyt nr. 7, der udvider denne undtagelsesbestemmelse til også at omfatte handlinger omfattet af artikel 3 eller artikel 3 b, 3 c eller 3 d i SUA-konventionen, som henholdsvis ændret og indsat ved protokollen af 1. november 2005 til SUA-konventionen, eller artikel 2 eller artikel 2 b eller 2 c i 1988-protokollen, som henholdsvis ændret og indsat ved protokollen af 1. november 2005 til 1988-protokollen. De nævnte bestemmelser i SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen opregner en lang række kriminelle handlinger, herunder med terrorforsæt at anvende skibe eller platforme til at forårsage død eller omfattende ødelæggelse bl.a. på miljøet eller at anvende atomvåben m.v. fra eller mod skibe eller platforme.

Der tilsigtes ikke i øvrigt ændringer i anvendelsesområdet for § 5, stk. 3. Der henvises til lovforslagets almindelige bemærkninger pkt. 4.5.

For så vidt angår de foreslåede ændringer af den gældende § 5, stk. 3, nr. 5 og 6, er der alene tale om redaktionelle ændringer.

Til § 3

Det foreslås, at loven træder i kraft den 1. juli 2010, men at udleveringslovens § 5, stk. 3, nr. 7, som affattet ved denne lovs § 2, finder anvendelse på anmodninger om udlevering efter SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen, der fremsættes efter at ændringsprotokollerne af 1. november 2005 er trådt i kraft mellem Danmark og vedkommende fremmede stat. Ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen træder i kraft 90 dage efter, at 12 lande har tiltrådt protokollen. Ændringsprotokollen til 1988-protokollen træder i kraft ved 3 staters ratifikation, dog først når ændringsprotokollen til SUA-konventionen er trådt i kraft.

Til § 4

Bestemmelsen fastsætter lovens territoriale gyldighedsområde. Bestemmelsen indebærer, at lovens § 2 (ændring af udleveringsloven) kan sættes i kraft for Færøerne og Grønland ved kongelig anordning.

Bilag 1

Loven sammenholdt med gældende ret

Gældende formulering

Lovforslaget

§ 1

§ 1 a. Det er forbudt uden for Det Europæiske Fællesskab at yde teknisk bistand, jf. stk. 2 og 3, der er bestemt til anvendelse i forbindelse med udvikling, fremstilling, håndtering, anvendelse, vedligeholdelse, oplagring, sporing, identificering eller spredning af kemiske, biologiske eller nukleare våben eller andre nukleare sprænglegemer, eller til udvikling, fremstilling, vedligeholdelse eller oplagring af missiler, der kan fremføre sådanne våben, jf. dog stk. 4 og 5

1. I § 1 a, stk. 1, indsættes efter »biologiske«: », radiologiske«.

2. Efter § 1 a indsættes:

Stk. 2. Forbuddet i stk. 1 omfatter med de begrænsninger, der følger af straffelovens §§ 7, 10, 10 a og 10 b, også handlinger foretaget i udlandet.

Stk. 4. Forbuddet i stk. 1 gælder ikke for danske militære myndigheder.«

3. I § 2 indsættes efter stk. 7 som nyt stykke:

»Stk. 8. Med bøde eller fængsel indtil 2 år straffes den, der forsætligt overtræder forbuddet efter § 1 b, stk. 1, eller stk. 2.«

Stk. 8-10 bliver herefter stk. 9-11.

§ 2

§ 5. Udlevering for en politisk lovovertrædelse kan ikke finde sted.

Stk. 2. Omfatter handlingen tillige en lovovertrædelse, som ikke er af politisk karakter, kan udlevering ske for denne lovovertrædelse, såfremt handlingen overvejende er af ikke-politisk karakter.

Stk. 3. Stk. 1 og 2 finder ikke anvendelse, når handlingen er omfattet af

1) artikel 1 eller 2 i den europæiske konvention om bekæmpelse af terrorisme som ændret ved ændringsprotokol af 15. maj 2003 til den europæiske konvention om bekæmpelse af terrorisme,

2) artikel 6 og 7 og artikel 9, jf. artikel 6 og 7 i Europarådets konvention om forebyggelse af terrorisme,

3) artikel 2, jf. artikel 1, i FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af terrorbombninger

4) artikel 2, jf. artikel 1, i FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af finansiering af terrorisme,

5) artikel 2, jf. artikel 1, i FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af nuklear terrorisme eller

6) artikel 7 i Det Internationale Atomenergiagenturs konvention om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer som ændret ved ændringskonvention af 8. juli 2005 til Det Internationale Atomenergiagenturs konvention om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer.

1.§ 5, stk. 3, nr. 5 og 6, ophæves, og i stedet indsættes:

»5) artikel 2, jf. artikel 1, i FN-konventionen til bekæmpelse af nuklear terrorisme,

§ 3

Stk. 1. Loven træder i kraft den 1. juli 2010, jf. dog stk. 2.

§ 4

Stk. 1. Loven gælder ikke for Færøerne og Grønland.

Stk. 2. Lovens § 2 kan ved kongelig anordning helt eller delvis sættes i kraft for Færøerne og Grønland med de afvigelser, som de færøske eller grønlandske forhold tilsiger.

Bilag 2

Ændringsprotokoller til SUA-konventionen og 1988-protokollen

PROTOCOL OF 2005 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF

UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION

Text adopted by the Conference

Preamble

THE STATES PARTIES to this Protocol,

BEING PARTIES to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation done at Rome on 10 March 1988,

ACKNOWLEDGING that terrorist acts threaten international peace and security,

MINDFUL of resolution A.924(22) of the Assembly of the International Maritime

Organization requesting the revision of existing international legal and technical measures and

the consideration of new measures in order to prevent and suppress terrorism against ships and to

improve security aboard and ashore, and thereby to reduce the risk to passengers, crews and port

personnel on board ships and in port areas and to vessels and their cargoes,

CONSCIOUS of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,

annexed to United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which,

inter alia, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal

condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable,

wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations

among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States,

NOTING United Nations General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 and

the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International

Terrorism annexed thereto,

RECALLING resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) of the United Nations Security

Council, which reflect international will to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

and which assigned tasks and responsibilities to States, and taking into account the continued

threat from terrorist attacks,

RECALLING ALSO resolution 1540 (2004) of the United Nations Security Council,

which recognizes the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent

the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

RECALLING FURTHER the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts

Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Tokyo on 14 September 1963; the Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970; the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at

Montreal on 23 September 1971; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes

against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; the International Convention against the

Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on

17 December 1979; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at

Vienna on 26 October 1979 and amendments thereto adopted on 8 July 2005; the Protocol for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,

supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of

Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; the Protocol for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at

Rome on 10 March 1988; the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose

of Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991; the International Convention for the

Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on

15 December 1997; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999, and the

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted by the

General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 April 2005,

BEARING IN MIND the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea done at Montego Bay, on 10 December 1982, and of the customary international law of

the sea,

CONSIDERING resolution 59/46 of the United Nations General Assembly, which

reaffirmed that international co-operation as well as actions by States to combat terrorism should

be conducted in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international

law and relevant international conventions, and resolution 59/24 of the United Nations General

Assembly, which urged States to become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its Protocol, invited States to

participate in the review of those instruments by the Legal Committee of the International

Maritime Organization to strengthen the means of combating such unlawful acts, including

terrorist acts, and also urged States to take appropriate measures to ensure the effective

implementation of those instruments, in particular through the adoption of legislation, where

appropriate, aimed at ensuring that there is a proper framework for responses to incidents of

armed robbery and terrorist acts at sea,

CONSIDERING ALSO the importance of the amendments to the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and of the International Ship and Port Facility

Security (ISPS) Code, both adopted by the 2002 Conference of Contracting Governments to that

Convention, in establishing an appropriate international technical framework involving

co-operation between Governments, Government agencies, national and local administrations

and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventative measures

against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade,

CONSIDERING FURTHER resolution 58/187 of the United Nations General Assembly,

which reaffirmed that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies

with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee

and humanitarian law,

BELIEVING that it is necessary to adopt provisions supplementary to those of the

Convention, to suppress additional terrorist acts of violence against the safety and security of

international maritime navigation and to improve its effectiveness,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of this Protocol:

1 "Convention" means the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988.

2 "Organization" means the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

3 "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Organization.

ARTICLE 2

Article 1 of the Convention is amended to read as follows:

Article 1

1 For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) "ship" means a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently attached to

the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, submersibles, or any

other floating craft.

(b) "transport" means to initiate, arrange or exercise effective control,

including decision-making authority, over the movement of a person or item.

(i) serious bodily injury; or

(ii) extensive destruction of a place of public use, State or government

facility, infrastructure facility, or public transportation system,

resulting in major economic loss; or

(iii) substantial damage to the environment, including air, soil, water,

fauna, or flora.

(d) "BCN weapon" means:

(i) "biological weapons", which are:

(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever

their origin or method of production, of types and in

quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,

protective or other peaceful purposes; or

(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use

such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed

conflict.

(ii) "chemical weapons", which are, together or separately:

(1) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended

for:

(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical,

pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; or

(B) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly

related to protection against toxic chemicals and to

protection against chemical weapons; or

chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of

the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of

warfare; or

(D) law enforcement including domestic riot control

purposes,

as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such

purposes;

(2) munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death

or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic

chemicals specified in subparagraph (ii)(1), which would be

released as a result of the employment of such munitions

and devices;

(3) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in

connection with the employment of munitions and devices

specified in subparagraph (ii)(2).

(iii) nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

(e) "toxic chemical" means any chemical which through its chemical action

on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent

harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless

of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether

they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.

(f) "precursor" means any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in

the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any

key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.

(g) "Organization" means the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

(h) "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Organization.

2 For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) the terms "place of public use", "State or government facility",

"infrastructure facility", and "public transportation system" have the same

meaning as given to those terms in the International Convention for the

Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, done at New York on

15 December 1997; and

(b) the terms "source material" and "special fissionable material" have the

same meaning as given to those terms in the Statute of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), done at New York on 26 October 1956.

ARTICLE 3

The following text is added as article 2bisof the Convention:

Article 2bis

1 Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and

responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international

human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.

2 This Convention does not apply to the activities of armed forces during an armed

conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law,

which are governed by that law, and the activities undertaken by military forces of

a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by

other rules of international law.

3 Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities

under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at

Washington, London and Moscow on 1 July 1968, the Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington,

London and Moscow on 10 April 1972, or the Convention on the Prohibition of

the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on

their Destruction, done at Paris on 13 January 1993, of States Parties to such

treaties.

ARTICLE 4

1 Thechapeauof article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention is replaced by the following

text:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that

person unlawfully and intentionally:

2 Article 3, paragraph 1(f) of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

(f) communicates information which that person knows to be false, thereby

endangering the safe navigation of a ship.

3 Article 3, paragraph 1(g) of the Convention is deleted.

4 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

2 Any person also commits an offence if that person threatens, with or without a

condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or

juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences

set forth in paragraphs 1 (b), (c), and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the

safe navigation of the ship in question.

5 The following text is added as article 3bisof the Convention:

Article 3bis

1 Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that

person unlawfully and intentionally:

(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a

population, or to compel a government or an international organization to

do or to abstain from doing any act:

(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive,

radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is

likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or

(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other

hazardous or noxious substance, which is not covered by

subparagraph (a)(i), in such quantity or concentration that causes or

is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or

(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or

damage; or

(iv) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under

national law, to commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a)(i),

(ii) or (iii); or

(b) transports on board a ship:

(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to

be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a

condition, as is provided for under national law, death or serious

injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or

compelling a government or an international organization to do or

to abstain from doing any act; or

(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as defined in

article 1; or

(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or

material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or

production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is

intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other

nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA

comprehensive safeguards agreement; or

(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related technology that

significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a

BCN weapon, with the intention that it will be used for

such purpose.

2 It shall not be an offence within the meaning of this Convention to transport an

item or material covered by paragraph 1(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear

weapon or other nuclear explosive device, paragraph 1(b)(iv), if such item or

material is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under

the control of, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons where:

(a) the resulting transfer or receipt, including internal to a State, of the item or

material is not contrary to such State Party's obligations under the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and,

(b) if the item or material is intended for the delivery system of a nuclear

weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a State Party to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the holding of such weapon or

device is not contrary to that State Party's obligations under that Treaty.

6 The following text is added as article 3terof the Convention:

Article 3ter

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that

person unlawfully and intentionally transports another person on board a ship

knowing that the person has committed an act that constitutes an offence set forth

in article 3, 3bis or 3quater or an offence set forth in any treaty listed in the

Annex, and intending to assist that person to evade criminal prosecution.

7 The following text is added as article 3quaterof the Convention:

Article 3quater

Any person also commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person:

(a) unlawfully and intentionally injures or kills any person in connection with the

commission of any of the offences set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, article 3bis,

or article 3ter; or

(b) attempts to commit an offence set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, article 3bis,

paragraph 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) , or subparagraph (a) of this article; or

article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(d) organizes or directs others to commit an offence set forth in article 3, article 3bis,

article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(e) contributes to the commission of one or more offences set forth in article 3,

article 3bis, article 3ter or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article, by a group of

persons acting with a common purpose, intentionally and either:

(i) with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the

group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an

offence set forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter; or

(ii) in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence set

forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter.

ARTICLE 5

1 Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter

and 3quater punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave

nature of those offences.

2 The following text is added as article5bisof the Convention:

Article 5bis

1 Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the

necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized

under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for management or

control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in

this Convention. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.

2 Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals

having committed the offences.

3 Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance

with paragraph 1 are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal,

civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions.

ARTICLE 6

1 Thechapeau ofarticle 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention is replaced by the following

text:

1 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater when

the offence is committed:

2 Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

3 Any State Party which has established jurisdiction mentioned in paragraph 2 shall

notify the Secretary-General. If such State Party subsequently rescinds that

jurisdiction, it shall notify the Secretary-General.

3 Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

4 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater in cases

where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite the

alleged offender to any of the States Parties which have established their

jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

ARTICLE 7

The following text is added as the Annex to the Convention:

ANNEX

1 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at

The Hague on 16 December 1970.

2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil

Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971.

3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally

Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973.

4 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979.

5 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on

26 October 1979.

6 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving

International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression

of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on

24 February 1988.

7 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed

Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988.

8 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by

the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.

9 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,

adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999.

ARTICLE 8

1 Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

1 The master of a ship of a State Party (the "flag State") may deliver to the

authorities of any other State Party (the "receiving State") any person who the

master has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offence set forth in

article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater.

2 The following text is added as article 8bisof the Convention:

Article 8bis

1 States Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress

unlawful acts covered by this Convention, in conformity with international law,

and shall respond to requests pursuant to this article as expeditiously as possible.

2 Each request pursuant to this article should, if possible, contain the name of the

suspect ship, the IMO ship identification number, the port of registry, the ports of

origin and destination, and any other relevant information. If a request is

conveyed orally, the requesting Party shall confirm the request in writing as soon

as possible. The requested Party shall acknowledge its receipt of any written or

oral request immediately.

3 States Parties shall take into account the dangers and difficulties involved in

boarding a ship at sea and searching its cargo, and give consideration to whether

other appropriate measures agreed between the States concerned could be more

safely taken in the next port of call or elsewhere.

4 A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence set forth in

article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed

involving a ship flying its flag, may request the assistance of other States Parties

in preventing or suppressing that offence. The States Parties so requested shall

use their best endeavours to render such assistance within the means available

to them.

5 Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party ("the

requesting Party") encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of registry

of another State Party ("the first Party") located seaward of any State's territorial

sea, and the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a

person on board the ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission

of an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting Party

desires to board,

(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that the first Party

confirm the claim of nationality, and

(b) if nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first Party

(hereinafter referred to as "the flag State") for authorization to board and

to take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may include

stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board,

and questioning the persons on board in order to determine if an offence

set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to

be committed, and

(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take appropriate

measures set out in subparagraph (b), subject to any conditions it

may impose in accordance with paragraph 7; or

(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or

other officials; or

(iii) conduct the boarding and search together with the requesting Party,

subject to any conditions it may impose in accordance with

paragraph 7; or

(iv) decline to authorize a boarding and search.

The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in

subparagraph (b) without the express authorization of the flag State.

(d) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance,

approval or accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that,

with respect to ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the

requesting Party is granted authorization to board and search the ship, its

cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board in order

to locate and examine documentation of its nationality and determine if an

offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is

about to be committed, if there is no response from the first Party within

four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a request to

confirm nationality.

(e) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance,

approval or accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that,

with respect to ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the

requesting Party is authorized to board and search a ship, its cargo and

persons on board, and to question the persons on board in order to

determine if an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been,

is being or is about to be committed.

The notifications made pursuant to this paragraph can be withdrawn at any time.

6 When evidence of conduct described in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater is found as

the result of any boarding conducted pursuant to this article, the flag State may

authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board

pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag State. The requesting

Party shall promptly inform the flag State of the results of a boarding, search, and

detention conducted pursuant to this article. The requesting Party shall also

promptly inform the flag State of the discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that

is not subject to this Convention.

7 The flag State, consistent with the other provisions of this Convention, may

subject its authorization under paragraph 5 or 6 to conditions, including obtaining

additional information from the requesting Party, and conditions relating to

responsibility for and the extent of measures to be taken. No additional measures

may be taken without the express authorization of the flag State, except when

necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or where those

measures derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.

8 For all boardings pursuant to this article, the flag State has the right to exercise

jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items and persons on board,

including seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution. However, the flag State may,

subject to its constitution and laws, consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by

another State having jurisdiction under article 6.

9 When carrying out the authorized actions under this article, the use of force shall

be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of its officials and persons

on board, or where the officials are obstructed in the execution of the authorized

actions. Any use of force pursuant to this article shall not exceed the minimum

degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.

10 Safeguards:

(a) Where a State Party takes measures against a ship in accordance with this

article, it shall:

(i) take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea;

(ii) ensure that all persons on board are treated in a manner which

preserves their basic human dignity, and in compliance with the

applicable provisions of international law, including international

human rights law;

(iii) ensure that a boarding and search pursuant to this article shall be

conducted in accordance with applicable international law;

(iv) take due account of the safety and security of the ship and its cargo;

(v) take due account of the need not to prejudice the commercial or

legal interests of the flag State;

(vi) ensure, within available means, that any measure taken with regard

to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound under the

circumstances;

(vii) ensure that persons on board against whom proceedings may be

commenced in connection with any of the offences set forth in

article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater are afforded the protections of

paragraph 2 of article 10, regardless of location;

(viii) ensure that the master of a ship is advised of its intention to board,

and is, or has been, afforded the opportunity to contact the ship's

owner and the flag State at the earliest opportunity; and

(ix) take reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly detained or

delayed.

(b) Provided that authorization to board by a flag State shall not per se give

rise to its liability, States Parties shall be liable for any damage, harm or

loss attributable to them arising from measures taken pursuant to this

article when:

(i) the grounds for such measures prove to be unfounded, provided

that the ship has not committed any act justifying the measures

taken; or

(ii) such measures are unlawful or exceed those reasonably required in

light of available information to implement the provisions of this

article.

States Parties shall provide effective recourse in respect of such damage,

harm or loss.

Convention, it shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or to

affect:

(i) the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal

States in accordance with the international law of the sea; or

(ii) the authority of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction and control in

administrative, technical and social matters involving the ship.

(d) Any measure taken pursuant to this article shall be carried out by law

enforcement or other authorized officials from warships or military

aircraft, or from other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as

being on government service and authorized to that effect and,

notwithstanding articles 2 and 2bis, the provisions of this article shall

apply.

(e) For the purposes of this article "law enforcement or other authorized

officials" means uniformed or otherwise clearly identifiable members of

law enforcement or other government authorities duly authorized by their

government. For the specific purpose of law enforcement under this

Convention, law enforcement or other authorized officials shall provide

appropriate government-issued identification documents for examination

by the master of the ship upon boarding.

11 This article does not apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any State

Party in accordance with international law, seaward of any State's territorial sea,

including boardings based upon the right of visit, the rendering of assistance to

persons, ships and property in distress or peril, or an authorization from the flag

State to take law enforcement or other action.

12 States Parties are encouraged to develop standard operating procedures for joint

operations pursuant to this article and consult, as appropriate, with other States

Parties with a view to harmonizing such standard operating procedures for the

conduct of operations.

13 States Parties may conclude agreements or arrangements between them to

facilitate law enforcement operations carried out in accordance with this article.

14 Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that its law

enforcement or other authorized officials, and law enforcement or other

authorized officials of other States Parties acting on its behalf, are empowered to

act pursuant to this article.

15 Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession, each State Party shall designate the authority, or, where necessary,

authorities to receive and respond to requests for assistance, for confirmation of

nationality, and for authorization to take appropriate measures. Such designation,

including contact information, shall be notified to the Secretary-General within

one month of becoming a Party, who shall inform all other States Parties within

one month of the designation. Each State Party is responsible for providing

prompt notice through the Secretary-General of any changes in the designation or

contact information.

ARTICLE 9

Article 10, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following text:

2 Any person who is taken into custody, or regarding whom any other measures are

taken or proceedings are being carried out pursuant to this Convention, shall be

guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in

conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present

and applicable provisions of international law, including international human

rights law.

ARTICLE 10

1 Article 11, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are replaced by the following text:

1 The offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater shall be deemed to be

included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of

the States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable

offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

2 If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty

receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no

extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider this

Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in

articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater. Extradition shall be subject to the other

conditions provided by the law of the requested State Party.

3 States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a

treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater as

extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by

the law of the requested State Party.

4 If necessary, the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater shall be

treated, for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been

committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in a place within

the jurisdiction of the State Party requesting extradition.

2 The following text is added as article 11bis,of the Convention:

Article 11bis

None of the offences set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater shall be regarded

for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or

as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by

political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal

assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it

concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an

offence inspired by political motives.

3 The following text is added as article 11terof the Convention:

Article 11ter

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to

extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has

substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set

forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater or for mutual legal assistance with respect

to such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a

person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin,

political opinion or gender, or that compliance with the request would cause

prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons.

ARTICLE 11

1 Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

1 States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in

connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth

in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater, including assistance in obtaining evidence at

their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

2 The following text is added as article 12bisof the Convention:

Article 12bis

1 A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one

State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of

identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence

for the investigation or prosecution of offences set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter

or 3quater may be transferred if the following conditions are met:

(a) the person freely gives informed consent; and

(b) the competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such conditions

as those States may deem appropriate.

2 For the purposes of this article:

(a) the State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and

obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise

requested or authorized by the State from which the person was

transferred;

(b) the State to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement

its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from which

the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed,

by the competent authorities of both States;

which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the

return of the person;

(d) the person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being

served in the State from which the person was transferred for time spent in

the custody of the State to which the person was transferred.

3 Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with

this article so agrees, that person, whatever that person's nationality, shall not be

prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of personal liberty in

the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or

convictions anterior to that person's departure from the territory of the State from

which such person was transferred.

ARTICLE 12

Article 13 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

1 States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in

articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater, particularly by:

(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparation in their respective

territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their

territories;

(b) exchanging information in accordance with their national law, and

co-ordinating administrative and other measures taken as appropriate to

prevent the commission of offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter

and 3quater.

2 When, due to the commission of an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter

or 3quater, the passage of a ship has been delayed or interrupted, any State Party

in whose territory the ship or passengers or crew are present shall be bound to

exercise all possible efforts to avoid a ship, its passengers, crew or cargo being

unduly detained or delayed.

ARTICLE 13

Article 14 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

Any State Party having reason to believe that an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis,

3ter or 3quater will be committed shall, in accordance with its national law,

furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information in its possession to those

States which it believes would be the States having established jurisdiction in

accordance with article 6.

ARTICLE 14

Article 15, paragraph 3 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:

3 The information transmitted in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be

communicated by the Secretary-General to all States Parties, to Members of the

Organization, to other States concerned, and to the appropriate international

intergovernmental organizations.

ARTICLE 15

Interpretation and application

1 The Convention and this Protocol shall, as between the Parties to this Protocol, be read

and interpreted together as one single instrument.

2 Articles 1 to 16 of the Convention, as revised by this Protocol, together with articles 17

to 24 of this Protocol and the Annex thereto, shall constitute and be called the Convention

for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005

(2005 SUA Convention).

ARTICLE 16

The following text is added as article 16bisof the Convention:

Final clauses of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005

The final clauses of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 shall be articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol of 2005 to

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation. References in this Convention to States Parties shall be taken to mean

references to States Parties to that Protocol.

FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 17

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession

1 This Protocol shall be open for signature at the Headquarters of the Organization from

14 February 2006 to 13 February 2007 and shall thereafter remain open for accession.

2 States may express their consent to be bound by this Protocol by:

(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or

(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by ratification,

acceptance or approval; or

3 Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of an

instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General.

4 Only a State which has signed the Convention without reservation as to ratification,

acceptance or approval, or has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Convention

may become a Party to this Protocol.

ARTICLE 18

Entry into force

1 This Protocol shall enter into force ninety days following the date on which twelve States

have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval, or have

deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the

Secretary-General.

2 For a State which deposits an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

in respect of this Protocol after the conditions in paragraph 1 for entry into force thereof

have been met, the ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall take effect

ninety days after the date of such deposit.

ARTICLE 19

Denunciation

1 This Protocol may be denounced by any State Party at any time after the date on which

this Protocol enters into force for that State.

2 Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of denunciation with the

Secretary-General.

3 A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be specified in the

instrument of denunciation, after the deposit of the instrument with the Secretary-General.

ARTICLE 20

Revision and amendment

1 A conference for the purpose of revising or amending this Protocol may be convened by

the Organization.

2 The Secretary-General shall convene a conference of States Parties to this Protocol for

revising or amending the Protocol, at the request of one third of the States Parties, or

ten States Parties, whichever is the higher figure.

3 Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the date

of entry into force of an amendment to this Protocol shall be deemed to apply to the

Protocol as amended.

ARTICLE 21

Declarations

1 Upon depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State

Party which is not a party to a treaty listed in the Annex may declare that, in the

application of this Protocol to the State Party, the treaty shall be deemed not to be

included in article 3ter. The declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as the treaty

enters into force for the State Party, which shall notify the Secretary-General of this fact.

2 When a State Party ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in the Annex, it may make a

declaration as provided for in this article, with respect to that treaty.

3 Upon depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State

Party may declare that it will apply the provisions of article 3ter in accordance with the

principles of its criminal law concerning family exemptions of liability.

ARTICLE 22

Amendments to the Annex

1 The Annex may be amended by the addition of relevant treaties that:

(a) are open to the participation of all States;

(b) have entered into force; and

twelve States Parties to this Protocol.

2 After the entry into force of this Protocol, any State Party thereto may propose such an

amendment to the Annex. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the

Secretary-General in written form. The Secretary-General shall circulate any proposed

amendment that meets the requirements of paragraph 1 to all members of the

Organization and seek from States Parties to this Protocol their consent to the adoption of

the proposed amendment.

3 The proposed amendment to the Annex shall be deemed adopted after more than

twelve of the States Parties to this Protocol consent to it by written notification to the

Secretary-General.

4 The adopted amendment to the Annex shall enter into force thirty days after the deposit

with the Secretary-General of the twelfth instrument of ratification, acceptance or

approval of such amendment for those States Parties to this Protocol that have deposited

such an instrument. For each State Party to this Protocol ratifying, accepting or

approving the amendment after the deposit of the twelfth instrument with the

Secretary-General, the amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit

by such State Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

ARTICLE 23

Depositary

1 This Protocol and any amendments adopted under articles 20 and 22 shall be deposited

with the Secretary-General.

2 The Secretary-General shall:

(a) inform all States which have signed this Protocol or acceded to this Protocol of:

(i) each new signature or deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance,

approval or accession together with the date thereof;

(ii) the date of the entry into force of this Protocol;

(iii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Protocol together

with the date on which it is received and the date on which the

denunciation takes effect,

(iv) any communication called for by any article of this Protocol;

(v) any proposal to amend the Annex which has been made in accordance with

article 22, paragraph 2;

(vi) any amendment deemed to have been adopted in accordance with

article 22, paragraph 3;

(vii) any amendment ratified, accepted or approved in accordance with

article 22, paragraph 4, together with the date on which that amendment

shall enter into force; and

(b) transmit certified true copies of this Protocol to all States which have signed or

acceded to this Protocol.

3 As soon as this Protocol enters into force, a certified true copy of the text shall be

transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for

registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the

United Nations.

ARTICLE 24

Languages

This Protocol is established in a single original in the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish languages, each text being equally authentic.

DONE AT LONDON this fourteenth day of October two thousand and five.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective

Governments for that purpose, have signed this Protocol.

__________

PROTOCOL OF 2005 TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF

UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF FIXED PLATFORMS LOCATED ON

THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

Text adopted by the Conference

THE STATES PARTIES to this Protocol,

BEING PARTIES to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf done at Rome on 10 March 1988,

RECOGNIZING that the reasons for which the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for

the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was elaborated also

apply to fixed platforms located on the continental shelf,

TAKING account of the provisions of those Protocols,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of this Protocol:

1 "1988 Protocol" means the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against

the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome

on 10 March 1988.

2 "Organization" means the International Maritime Organization.

3 "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Organization.

ARTICLE 2

Article 1, paragraph 1, of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

1 The provisions of article 1, paragraphs 1(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and 2(a), of

articles 2bis, 5, 5bis and 7, and of articles 10 to 16, including articles 11bis, 11ter

and 12bis, of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

Safety of Maritime Navigation, as amended by the Protocol of 2005 to the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation, shall also apply mutatis mutandis to the offences set forth in

articles 2, 2bis and 2ter of this Protocol where such offences are committed

on board or against fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

ARTICLE 3

1 Article 2, paragraph 1(d) of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

(d) places or causes to be placed on a fixed platform, by any means whatsoever,

a device or substance which is likely to destroy that fixed platform or likely to

endanger its safety.

2 Article 2, paragraph 1(e) of the 1988 Protocol is deleted.

3 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

2 Any person also commits an offence if that person threatens, with or without a

condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or

juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences

set forth in paragraphs 1(b) and (c), if that threat is likely to endanger the safety of

the fixed platform.

ARTICLE 4

1 The following text is inserted as article 2bis:

Article 2bis

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that person

unlawfully and intentionally, when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to

intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do

or to abstain from doing any act:

(a) uses against or on a fixed platform or discharges from a fixed platform any

explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is

likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or

(b) discharges, from a fixed platform, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or

noxious substance, which is not covered by subparagraph (a), in such quantity or

concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or

commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a) or (b).

2 The following text is inserted as Article 2ter:

Article 2ter

Any person also commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that person:

(a) unlawfully and intentionally injures or kills any person in connection with the

commission of any of the offences set forth in article 2, paragraph 1, or article 2bis;

(b) attempts to commit an offence set forth in article 2, paragraph 1, article 2bis,

subparagraph (a) or (b), or subparagraph (a) of this article; or

subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(d) organizes or directs others to commit an offence set forth in article 2, article 2bis

or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(e) contributes to the commission of one or more offences set forth in article 2,

article 2bis or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article, by a group of persons acting

with a common purpose, intentionally and either:

(i) with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the

group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an

offence set forth in article 2 or 2bis; or

(ii) in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence set

forth in article 2 or 2bis.

ARTICLE 5

1 Article 3, paragraph 1 of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

1 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in articles 2, 2bis and 2ter when the offence

is committed:

(a) against or on board a fixed platform while it is located on the continental

shelf of that State; or

(b) by a national of that State.

2 Article 3, paragraph 3 of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

3 Any State Party which has established jurisdiction mentioned in paragraph 2 shall

notify the Secretary-General. If such State Party subsequently rescinds that

jurisdiction, it shall notify the Secretary-General.

3 Article 3, paragraph 4 of the 1988 Protocol is replaced by the following text:

4 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction over the offences set forth in articles 2, 2bis and 2ter in cases where

the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite the alleged

offender to any of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in

accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2.

ARTICLE 6

Interpretation and application

1 The 1988 Protocol and this Protocol shall, as between the Parties to this Protocol,

be read and interpreted together as one single instrument.

2 Articles 1 to 4 of the 1988 Protocol, as revised by this Protocol, together with

articles 8 to 13 of this Protocol shall constitute and be called the Protocol for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on

the Continental Shelf, 2005 (2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol).

ARTICLE 7

The following text is added as article 4bisof the Protocol:

Final clauses of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005

The final clauses of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005, shall be articles 8 to 13 of the

Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. References in this Protocol to

States Parties shall be taken to mean references to States Parties to the 2005 Protocol.

FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 8

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession

1 This Protocol shall be open for signature at the Headquarters of the Organization

from 14 February 2006 to 13 February 2007 and shall thereafter remain open for

accession.

2 States may express their consent to be bound by this Protocol by:

(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or

(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by

ratification, acceptance or approval; or

3 Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of

an instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General.

4 Only a State which has signed the 1988 Protocol without reservation as to

ratification, acceptance or approval, or has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded

to the 1988 Protocol may become a Party to this Protocol.

ARTICLE 9

Entry into force

1 This Protocol shall enter into force ninety days following the date on which three

States have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or

approval, or have deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession with the Secretary-General. However, this Protocol shall not enter into

force before the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation has entered into force.

2 For a State which deposits an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession in respect of this Protocol after the conditions in paragraph 1 for entry

into force thereof have been met, the ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession shall take effect ninety days after the date of such deposit.

ARTICLE 10

Denunciation

1 This Protocol may be denounced by any State Party at any time after the date on

which this Protocol enters into force for that State.

2 Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of denunciation

with the Secretary-General.

3 A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be

specified in the instrument of denunciation, after the deposit of the instrument

with the Secretary-General.

ARTICLE 11

Revision and amendment

1 A conference for the purpose of revising or amending this Protocol may be

convened by the Organization.

2 The Secretary-General shall convene a conference of States Parties to this

Protocol for revising or amending the Protocol, at the request of one third of the

States Parties, or five States Parties, whichever is the higher figure.

3 Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after

the date of entry into force of an amendment to this Protocol shall be deemed to

apply to the Protocol as amended.

ARTICLE 12

Depositary

1 This Protocol and any amendments adopted under article 11 shall be deposited

with the Secretary-General.

2 The Secretary-General shall:

(a) inform all States which have signed this Protocol or acceded to this

Protocol of:

(i) each new signature or deposit of an instrument of ratification,

acceptance, approval or accession together with the date thereof;

(ii) the date of the entry into force of this Protocol;

(iii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Protocol

together with the date on which it is received and the date on which

the denunciation takes effect;

(iv) any communication called for by any article of this Protocol; and

(b) transmit certified true copies of this Protocol to all States which have

signed or acceded to this Protocol.

3 As soon as this Protocol enters into force, a certified true copy of the text

shall be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of

the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 13

Languages

This Protocol is established in a single original in the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,

Russian and Spanish languages, each text being equally authentic.

DONE AT LONDON this fourteenth day of October two thousand and five.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective

Governments for that purpose, have signed this Protocol.

__________

+++Bilag+++Bilag 3

Resolution 1540 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting,

on 28 April 2004

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as

well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and

security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the

Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January

1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations

in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its

aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to

resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context

threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any

threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its

primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or

prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the

importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to

promote international stability,

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.

Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in

conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.

Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties

and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design,

development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of

delivery.

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which

contribute to non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and

technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be

used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State

actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and

maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267

and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds

a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a

threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national,

subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global

response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under

treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at

preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have

taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive

materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective

measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and

their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties

and agreements to which they are party,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter

of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist

acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in

the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support

to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,

transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures,

shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State

actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear,

chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for

terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities,

participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to

establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or

biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing

appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and

secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through

international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in

such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and

consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national

export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and

regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on

providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as

financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as

establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal

or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of

procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security

Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate

on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the

implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first

report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the

Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;

5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be

interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the

International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons;

6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective

national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at

the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the

provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to

do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States

lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or

resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

8. Calls upon all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where

necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim

is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done,

to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation

treaties;

particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common

objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international

cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the

public regarding their obligations under such laws;

9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation

so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical,

or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with

their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,

to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or

biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this

resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be

required to this end;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Folketinget

Resumé

Om lovforslaget

Fremsættelse af forslag

1. behandling

Udvalgsbehandling

2. behandling

3. behandling

L 106 Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om anvendelsen af visse af Det Europæiske Fællesskabs retsakter om økonomiske forbindelser til tredjelande m.v. og lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere.

(Forbud mod transport af visse produkter og teknologi med dobbelt anvendelse m.v.).

Lovforslag som fremsat

Fremsat: 20-01-2010