UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25
UUI Alm.del Bilag 67
Offentligt

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)

Thematic COI REPORT

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25

UUI Alm.del - Bilag 67

Offentligt

January 2025

Russia

Conscription

us.dk – migrationsverket.se

us.dk

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey

of all aspects of the issues addressed. It has to be weighed against other country of

origin information available on the topic.

The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information

does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service or of the

Swedish Migration Agency.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any

particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be

regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

The Danish Immigration Service

Farimagsvej 51A

4700 Næstved

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

us.dk

January 2025

Agency.

The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk or

migrationsverket.se

The Danish Immigration Service’s and The Swedish Migration Agency’s publications can

be quoted with clear source reference.

The Swedish Migration Agency

Migrationsverket

60170 Norrköping

Sweden

+46 77 123 52 35

migrationsverket.se

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Executive summary

The most significant legislative changes regarding conscription since December 2022 include

extending the age range from 18-27 to 18–30 years, amending the criminal code to allow

earlier contract signing, and introducing electronic summonses. However, the electronic

system launch has been postponed to 1 January 2025 due to technical challenges.

At 18, Russian men become eligible for conscription. If drafted, they undergo medical exams,

and the Voenkomat decides whether to conscript, defer, or exempt them. Military

representatives select conscripts based on needs or technical expertise. Every arm of service

receives a number of conscripts. Whether or not a conscript’s preferences, as to in which arm

of service he will serve, are taken into consideration depends on the personnel at the

Voenkomat.

Summonses can only legally be delivered in person or via registered post. Furthermore, the

authorities are in the process of implementing a system of electronic summoning of conscripts.

Formally once summoned, citizens cannot travel abroad and must surrender passports within

five days. However, even after having received a physical summons, it is still possible for a

person to leave Russia.

Academic studies are a common reason for deferral. Furthermore, corruption plays a

significant part in the number of men, who have been exempted from military service for

medical reasons.

Draft evasion is common but has not risen significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of

Ukraine. Annually, several hundred cases are opened, most resulting in fines. However, draft

evasion does not exclude individuals from future drafts. In general, there is no punishment for

family members to draft evaders.

Conditions for conscripts vary; the army offers poorer conditions than the air force or navy.

New conscripts receive six to eight weeks of training, with 65 percent performing manual

labour, such as construction or cleaning. Conscripts also support the war effort in Ukraine

through logistics or border defence.

Hazing of junior conscripts, once widespread, has declined due to the shortening of service

from two years to one. Conscripts are encouraged to sign contracts with financial rewards,

though authorities also apply pressure, driven by a “blame and shame” culture.

Prior to the invasion, conscripts from the North Caucasus queued to enlist, seeing military service

as a path to social mobility. They served under the same conditions as others, although they

often faced prejudice within the ranks.

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Table of contents

Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 1

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 5

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 7

Glossary ............................................................................................................................... 8

Legal framework ........................................................................................................... 9

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

New legislation after December 2022 ......................................................................... 10

Electronic summons .................................................................................................... 11

Centralised database ................................................................................................... 13

2. Recruitment of conscripts ............................................................................................... 15

2.1. Screening at the Voenkomat ............................................................................................ 16

2.2. Quota for conscripts ......................................................................................................... 19

2.3 Receiving a summons ........................................................................................................ 20

2.4. Leaving Russia after being summoned ............................................................................. 22

2.4.1. Leaving Russia after receiving an electronic summons ............................................. 23

3. Exemptions, deferrals and Alternative Civil Service (ACS) ................................................ 25

3.1. Exemptions and deferrals ................................................................................................. 25

3.1.1. Deferral due to academic studies .............................................................................. 26

3.1.2. Deferral due to medical reasons ................................................................................ 26

3.1.3. Temporary deregistering from the military registry due to living outside of Russia . 27

3.1.4. Tightened possibilities for exemption and deferrals ................................................. 27

3.2. Alternative Civil Service (ACS)........................................................................................... 28

3.3. Exemptions for vulnerable Groups ................................................................................... 31

3.3.1. Jehovah’s Witnesses .................................................................................................. 31

3.3.2. LGBT persons ............................................................................................................. 32

4. Draft evasion, absent without leave (AWOL) and desertion ............................................. 35

4.1. Draft evasion..................................................................................................................... 35

4.1.1. Legal framework ........................................................................................................ 35

4.1.2. Development in number of draft evaders ................................................................. 36

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

4.1.3. Legal repercussions .................................................................................................... 37

4.1.4. Regional differences .................................................................................................. 39

4.1.5. Socio-economic differences ....................................................................................... 39

4.1.6. Sentenced in absentia ................................................................................................ 39

4.2 Absence without official leave (AWOL) and desertion ...................................................... 40

4.2.1. Development in number of criminal cases ................................................................ 41

4.3. Consequences for family members .................................................................................. 41

5. Material conditions for conscripts during service............................................................. 44

5.1.

Access to health care services ..................................................................................... 45

5.2. Hazing and “dedovshchina” .............................................................................................. 45

5.2.1. Conscripts belonging to the LGBT community........................................................... 47

5.2.2. Conscripts from North Caucasus................................................................................ 48

6. Tasks performed by conscripts ........................................................................................ 49

6.1. Refusal to perform a task ................................................................................................. 49

6.2. Tasks related to the war effort in Ukraine........................................................................ 50

6.3. Conscripts in the Kursk region .......................................................................................... 51

7. Signing contracts with the MoD ...................................................................................... 53

7.1. Persuasion to sign contracts ............................................................................................. 54

7.2. Pressure to sign contracts................................................................................................. 56

8. Conscripts from the Russian Caucasus regions ................................................................. 59

8.1. The situation for Chechen conscripts ............................................................................... 59

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 61

Annex 1: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................. 64

Annex 2: Meeting minutes ................................................................................................. 65

Meeting with Claus Mathiesen ................................................................................................ 65

Meeting with Mark Galeotti .................................................................................................... 74

Meeting with Huseyn Aliyev .................................................................................................... 82

Meeting with Novaya Gazeta Europe ...................................................................................... 97

Meeting with Sergey Krivenko, director of the Human Rights Group "Citizen. Army. Law" . 102

Meeting with OVD-Info.......................................................................................................... 114

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Meeting with Pskovskaya Gubernia ...................................................................................... 119

Meeting with Irina Novik, Russian Journalist......................................................................... 122

Meeting with Freedom House ............................................................................................... 127

Meeting with Mediazona....................................................................................................... 133

Meeting with A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights ................................................... 136

Meeting with a human rights lawyer..................................................................................... 139

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Introduction

This report at hand is a product of a joint mission to Latvia and Lithuania undertaken by the

Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and the Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) from 4-7 November

2024. The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information on conscription in Russia.

The report includes a description of new legislation after December 2022, the conditions for

Russian conscripts in practice, including where conscripts are posted and the extent to which

they are under pressure to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence. Furthermore,

the report covers exemptions and the extent to which conscripted are punished for evading

conscription.

DIS and SMA drew up the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the report after consultation with the

target users of the report, in particular the Secretariat of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board

and the Asylum Division of DIS as well as a Danish advisory group (Referencegruppen) on COI.

The results of the consultations with the Danish target users corresponded with the findings of

a needs analysis carried out by the SMA. The ToR is included in Annex 1 of this report. In the

process of compiling information for this report, the delegation interviewed 12 sources

comprising nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), journalists, human rights defenders,

lawyers, analysts and researchers. The delegation selected the sources interviewed based on

their expertise, merit and experience relevant for the ToR.

Multiple sources with a variety of expertise have been interviewed to ensure that the collected

information is precise and balanced. The objective is to present a comprehensive and up-to-

date picture of the issues relevant to the ToR at the time of publication. The minutes of the

meetings with the consulted sources are listed in Annex 2. In addition to the information

gathered from the interviews, the report is also based on available reports as well as articles in

English and Russian of relevance for the ToR. The interviews were conducted in either English

or in Russian with an interpreter present. Some interviews were conducted during meetings in

Latvia and Lithuania, while others were conducted via Skype.

Prior to the interviews, all interlocutors were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the

mission and the fact that their statements would be included in a report made publicly

available. The interlocutors were asked how they wished to be introduced and quoted, and all

sources are introduced and quoted according to their own wishes. 2 out of 12 sources

preferred anonymity. All meeting minutes were forwarded to the interlocutors for their

approval and amendment, allowing them the opportunity to offer corrections or make

comments on their statements. All sources responded and approved their statements.

Care has been taken to present the views of the interlocutors as accurately and transparently as

possible. For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the

minutes of the interviews in Annex 2 have been numbered in a consecutive order, used in the

report when referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes. The quotation marks

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

(“) are not used in the report whenever the text is a copy of the meeting minutes, however, a

reference is made in the footnotes to the paragraphs where the text is cited from.

During the interview, the source may have highlighted issues that are not addressed in the ToR.

As these issues could be relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the

meeting minutes in Annex 2, but not in the report.

The report has been externally peer reviewed in accordance with the EUAA COI Report

Methodology.

The research and editing of this report was finalised on 27 January 2025.

EUAA,

Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology,

February 2023,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Abbreviations

ACS

AWOL

COI

EUAA

DIS

FSB

HRW

LGBT

MoD

MVD

NGO

SMA

SCP

ToR

USSR

VDV

Alternative Civil Service

Absence without official leave

Country of Origin Information

European Union Agency for Asylum

Danish Immigration Service

Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)

Human Rights Watch

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (persons)

Ministry of Defence

Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs)

Non-governmental organisation

Swedish Migration Agency

Single Conscription Point

Terms of Reference

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (paratroopers)

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Glossary

Dedovshchina

Dedovshchina, meaning "reign of the grandfathers/old-timers", refers to the informal practice

of hazing and abusing junior conscripts, a practice that originated in the Soviet Armed Forces

and continued in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Gosuslugi

Gosuslugi is a digital platform operated by the Russian government. The platform provides

individuals and legal entities with online access to information about state and municipal

services in Russia.

Krysha

Krysha, which translates to "roof", is used in Russia to describe individuals or organisations that

offer a variety of services, often informal and illicit, such as protection and patronage.

Refusenik/otkaznik

Refusenik/otkaznik referes to Russian servicemen and National Guard fighters who refused to

participate in the invasion of Ukraine.

Ryadavoy

Rydavoy is the lowest initial military rank in the Armed Forces of Russia, belonging to the

category of soldiers (sailors) – equivalent to a private (soldier).

Spetsnaz

Spetsnaz – Special purpose (forces) – is the name of Russia’s military special forces.

Uchastkovy

Uchastkovyi – often translated into district police officer – is a police officer that carries out

official activities aimed at protecting the rights of citizens living in the relevant administrative-

territorial area.

Voenkomat

Voenkomat (in English: military Commissariat) – often translated into English by military

enlistment office or draft board – is a government institution under the Ministry of Defence,

which is given the role to recruit conscripts and mobilised personnel to the Russian military.

Furthermore, the Voenkomat chooses who is eligible and ineligible for military service.

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1. Legal framework

Pursuant to article 59 of the Russian Constitution of 1993, Russian citizens have a duty and an

obligation to defend the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the article specifies that any Russian

citizen is obliged to carry out military service, according to the federal law.

The main piece of Russian legislation that regulates conscription is the federal law “On Military

Duty and Military Service” (N53-FZ), which has been effective since 1998 and amended several

times since. This law contains the details for both conscription, contract soldiers and

mobilisation.

The right for Russian citizens to serve alternative civil service is also stated in article 59 of the

constitution, if the citizen’s convictions or religion contradict military service. For more

information on Alternative Civil Service, please see

chapter 3.2.

The Russian constitutional law on Martial Law defines a number of measures that can be

activated in times of war. These measures may limit the civil rights of the Russian population, as

the authorities may implement curfews or establish visitation zones. These measures have

been fully effective in the Russian regions bordering Ukraine. The further away from Ukraine a

Russian region is located, the fewer measures have been put into force.

According to Freedom House, the legal framework related to conscription and the

implementation are different. The implementation and application of the existing legal

framework related to conscription is carried out in a selective manner. The selective application

of the laws implies that the same rules do not necessarily apply to all regions, all social groups

or people with different ethnic backgrounds. Conscription can also be used against political

opponents, and people and businesses that the authorities feel negatively about.

The source at Freedom House stated that Russia cannot be described as a country of ’rule of

law’, but rather as a country of ’rule by law’. Comprehensive legislative frameworks are in place,

but laws, legislations and regulations are made up and applied in a weaponised way to harm

certain groups of society. This selective implementation of laws leads to difficulties in

judgement when representatives from foreign countries that are more inclined to follow their

’rule of law’ apply their view on Russia, as if Russia technically should operate in the same

manner.

Gosudarstvennaya Duma,

Ко�½ституция РФ, Статья 59,

1 July 2020,

url;

Claus Mathiesen: 2

Consultant,

Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и вое�½�½ой службе" от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ,

March 1998,

url;

Claus Mathiesen: 1

Gosudarstvennaya Duma,

Ко�½ституция РФ, Статья 59,

1 July 2020,

url

Consultant,

Федераль�½ый ко�½ституцио�½�½ый зако�½ от 30.01.2002 N 1-ФКЗ "О вое�½�½ом положе�½ии",

November 2023,

url;

Claus Mathiesen: 8

Freedom House: 2

Freedom House: 4

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1.1. New legislation after December 2022

The most important legislative changes regarding conscription since December 2022 are the

following:



Extension in draft age to 18 - 30 years

Amendments of the criminal code

Amendments allowing contracts to be signed sooner

Electronic summons (in process)

The largest change in legislation has been the amendment of article 22 in The Federal law “On

Military Duty and Military Service”, where the age of conscription has been extended from 18-

27 years to 18-30 years.

The new amendment came into effect 1 January 2024, meaning that

the spring draft of 2024 was the first draft, in which the change in legislation was

implemented.

Once a man turns 30, he can no longer be drafted for conscription service, but if a man is

summoned for instance two weeks before he turns 30, he is obligated to serve.

The change in

the age of conscription does not affect those, who have already served as conscripts. However,

it does affect a person who has previously had his military service deferred for instance due to

being enrolled at university.

According to associate professor Claus Mathiesen at the Royal Danish Defence College, the

reasons for extending the age of conscription are not fully transparent, but most likely there is

an ongoing attempt to broaden the pool of potential conscripts. The duration of the spring

draft has also been extended in order for the

Voenkomat

to draft men, who have completed

their studies in the preceding summer.

The Russian authorities did not change the duration of the conscription period,

but there has

reportedly been talks about prolonging the duration of conscription service from one to two

years, according to two of the interviewed sources.

However, according to the observations of

Mark Galeotti, this change in age range of conscripts has only been welcomed by the military

whereas the Kremlin see this as politically unpopular, although the military would welcome

such a step. The reason for this divided popularity is that at the time, when conscripts have

Consultant,

Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и вое�½�½ой службе" от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ,

Статья 22. Гражда�½е, подлежащие призыву �½а вое�½�½ую службу,

2 October 2024,url; Huseyn Aliyev: 1; Claus

Mathiesen: 20; A human rights lawyer: 1; Freedom House: 1; Sergey Krivenko: 3

A human rights lawyer: 1

Claus Mathiesen: 22

A human rights lawyer: 2

Russian military enlistment office. For further, please see

glossary

Claus Mathiesen: 21

Sergey Krivenko: 3; Claus Mathiesen: 26

Mark Galeotti: 1; Huseyn Aliyev: 23

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completed their basic training and their unit training, they are only fully usable in the last three

or four months of their conscription cycle. If there were to be added an additional six months,

this could be useful time, according to the Russian military.

Further to the change in age of conscripts, there has also been approved new amendments of

the criminal code, harshening the punishment for rejecting military service (for further

information see

chapter 4).

The amendments consist of an increase in fines and the

introduction of restrictions on those subjected to conscription.

These restrictions include a

ban on leaving the country, driving, buying or selling real estate, taking out loans, and

registering a small business. Additionally, regional governments can expand the list by

introducing measures like suspending social benefits.

The legal amendments in 2023 allow the police to search for draftees (e.g. to search phone bills

and films from CCTV cameras) and demand that employers inform the authorities about

changes related to potential conscripts. Consequently, the possibilities to leave the country and

to hide in order to avoid conscription have become substantially limited.

In the spring of 2023, the State Duma passed amendments allowing contracts to be signed with

the MoD immediately after completing 11

grade. Recent school graduates, along with other

contract soldiers, can now be sent to the front just four weeks after beginning their military

service.

1.2. Electronic summons

One important change in legislation regarding conscription is the introduction of the electronic

mobilisation and electronic conscription, which should have been operational from 1

November 2024.

However, the launch of the electronic system has faced technical and

logistical issues, which has meant that it has not been implemented as of December 2024. The

date has been postponed until 1 January 2025.

The electronic system is designed to prevent summoned individuals from receiving travel

documents as well as from leaving the country, thereby preventing them from evading

conscription (see

chapter 2.4.

for further information).

One source opined that the electronic

Mark Galeotti: 1

Mediazona: 2

Sergey Krivenko: 2; И�½струкции «Призыва к совести»,

Что поме�½ялось для призыв�½иков к 1 октября 2023

года и как это влияет �½а защиту права �½е воевать,

17 January 2024,

url

Carnegie Politika,

Russia’s New Conscription Law Brings the Digital Gulag Much, Much Closer,

17 April 2023,

url

;

Sergey Krivenko: 19

BBC News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 14.04.2023 N 127-ФЗ "О

в�½есе�½ии изме�½е�½ий в отдель�½ые

зако�½одатель�½ые акты Российской Федерации",

Статья 3,

url;

BBC News,

Повестка �½а «Госуслуги»,

мг�½ове�½�½ый запрет выезда для укло�½истов: что в России изме�½ится в системе призыва с 1 �½оября,

30 April

2024,

url;

Huseyn Aliyev: 1, 9; Journalist Irina Novik: 1; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 2; Mark Galeotti: 17; OVD-Info: 2

Sergey Krivenko: 8; A human rights lawyer: 7; Mediazona: 7; Claus Mathiesen: 35

Freedom House: 7; OVD-Info: 2; Sergey Krivenko: 6

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system would also offer possibilities of summoning people living in the diaspora.

However, the

source had not encountered any Russian citizens abroad who have been summoned through

the digital system yet.

Pursuant to Russian Federal law № 127-FZ article 3, electronic summons uploaded to individual

accounts on the Russian public service platform

Gosuslugi

are deemed delivered after seven

days, regardless of whether the conscript in question accesses the Gosuslugi website or

receives a copy by mail.

A person can find out whether they are summoned via the Russian

webpage:

https://реестрповесток.рф.

The Voenkomat is the only legal authority that is allowed to summon a person. Therefore, the

use of Gosuslugi is simply the most efficient way of actually accessing all potential conscripts.

According to Mark Galeotti, the electronic summons is first of all intended to be used for

mobilisation. Therefore, this source opined that any new system will most likely only be

effective when a new wave of mobilisation occurs.

The electronic system has been tested in 2024 in the regions of Sakhalin, Ryazan and Mari El.

According to the chair of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, Andrei Kartapolov, there will be

a mixed approach in these three regions, where both physical paper and electronic summons

will be sent.

In the other regions of Russia, summonses are still delivered physically to

conscripts either by registered post or by a home visit from the Voenkomat personnel.

Mark Galeotti stressed that the new electronic summons are primarily intended for

mobilisation and not for conscription. Galeotti explained that people do not flee Russia in the

same manner to avoid conscription, as they do to avoid mobilisation. The last wave of

mobilisation of 300 000 men in the autumn of 2022 resulted in approximately 900 000 men

fleeing the country.

Freedom House: 7

Freedom House: 9

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 14.04.2023 N 127-ФЗ "О

в�½есе�½ии изме�½е�½ий в отдель�½ые

зако�½одатель�½ые акты Российской Федерации",

Статья 3,

url;

Huseyn Aliyev: 3-4; A human rights lawyer: 6;

Sergey Krivenko: 8; Journalist Irina Novik: 1; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 4-6; Claus Mathiesen: 29-30

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 4

Mark Galeotti: 20

RTVI,

Осе�½�½ий призыв-2024: сроки, цифровые повестки, отсрочки и меры против укло�½истов,

25 September 2024,

url;

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 3; Claus Mathiesen: 35; Huseyn Aliyev: 9; A human

rights lawyer: 6; Sergey Krivenko: 8

Interfaks,

Картаполов заявил, что ос�½ова�½ием для призыва в армию этой осе�½ью будут

бумаж�½ые повестки,

23 September 2024,

url

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 8; Claus Mathiesen: 35-36; Huseyn Aliyev: 9; Sergey Krivenko: 8; Freedom

House: 8; A human rights lawyer: 8

Mark Galeotti: 18

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Given that there is not yet any signs of a mobilisation wave happening despite the fact that the

military continues to push for it (as of December 2024), the implementation of the electronic

summons for conscripts seems to be unrolling slightly more relaxed.

1.3. Centralised database

The Russian authorities have also established a centralised database containing information on

potential conscripts.

The central database consists of two registers:

1. A digital register of individuals accounted for conscription or military service in general

(men from category A and B between 18-55 years). For further information, see

chapter 2.

2. A register of summons.

According to the law, all state agencies and departments, such as healthcare institutions, tax

agencies, employers (both public and private), educational institutions and the police should

provide updated information about every person, who is subject to be in this register. The idea

behind it is that all information should be available in one joint digital register, for the

Voenkomats to be able to see a complete picture of every person subject to conscription or

military service. As of December 2024, different agencies have kept their own registers of

information in different forms, and it has proven problematic to unify these registers.

The digital military register is a uniform system, to which every Voenkomat is entitled to have

access. The registry contains all the information available to the Russian authorities on each

individual eligible for conscription or mobilisation. The database will contain the following:

•

a person’s home address

phone numbers

email addresses

places of residence

employment status and

educational history.

In regard to the register of summons, the intention is that a summons should be included in a

special digital register, after the Voenkomat sends a summons to an individual. State bodies

have a formal right to restrict the rights of summoned individuals, such as banning them from

Mark Galeotti: 19

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 14.04.2023 N 127-ФЗ "О

в�½есе�½ии изме�½е�½ий в отдель�½ые

зако�½одатель�½ые акты Российской Федерации",

Статья 1,

url;

Freedom House: 13; Sergey Krivenko: 5; Claus

Mathiesen: 32; Huseyn Aliyev: 5; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 7

Sergey Krivenko: 5; Claus Mathiesen: 32

Sergey Krivenko: 5; Huseyn Aliyev: 6

Huseyn Aliyev: 5

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

leaving the country. With this digital register, the border police can automatically stop a person

included in the register from leaving the country.

Both electronic registers are nationwide, and the information from them become immediately

available to the FSB border service, once a summons has been sent.

For further information

on leaving Russia, please see

chapter 2.4.

Previously, much of the personal information on conscripts functioned in a rather old-fashioned

way, so, this new single database is perceived to be an advantage for the Voenkomats and for

the Ministry of Defence by one of the interviewed academic experts.

Huseyn Aliyev, Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, also opined that the introduction of

a new database is likely to simplify the retrieval of data on individuals when conducting

conscription campaigns and when possibly conducting mobilisation campaigns for reservists.

There are mixed information about the functionality of this centralised database as of

November 2024. A number of sources opined that the database is neither complete, nor

functional.

However, two sources opined that the personnel at the Voenkomat is not

interested in this register, as it would make it more difficult to use means of corruption, which

are largely prevalent today.

On the other hand, one source opined that the centralised database where conscripts and

persons eligible for mobilisation is active. Such a database has been in place for a long time.

However, historically it has been much more effective on conscripts than on reservists. The

database is quite good at knowing where the 17-year-old boys are and where they live.

Nevertheless, its capacity to track reservists was always much worse.

Until 2022, the reserve system had fallen into disarray and the Russian authorities have

attempted to strengthen the reserve system. This attempt has been carried out primarily by

leveraging the national tax and residence registration database, rather than by creating an

entirely new system from scratch. However, it is hard to tell, how effective this database on

reservists is.

Sergey Krivenko: 5

Claus Mathiesen: 33

Huseyn Aliyev: 7

Sergey Krivenko: 5; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 7

Sergey Krivenko: 7; Freedom House: 13

Mark Galeotti: 21

Mark Galeotti: 22

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

2. Recruitment of conscripts

There have been no changes regarding the number of people conscripted over the past years.

This number is still approximately 300 000 annually, which constitutes roughly one third of the

total population of men turning 18 per year.

Pursuant to article 25 in the Federal law On Military Duty and Military Service, summons for

conscription are sent out twice a year; during spring (from 1 April to 15 July) and during

autumn (from 1 October to 31 December).

The plan for the autumn draft of 2024 was to draft 133 000 conscripts, which is a slight increase

of about 3 000 compared to the draft in 2023. The spring draft of 2024 consisted of 150 000

conscripts.

Although the conscripts are an integrated part of the military, the military does not

independently decide how many shall be drafted. The army will forward their request to the

Kremlin, but it remains a political decision by the Kremlin as to how many shall be drafted.

Previously, observers speculated about an increase in the number of conscripts for the autumn

draft of 2024, which, however, did not occur. The Russian military has suffered huge losses, and

recruitment of contract soldiers is not going well.

However, the Russian military authorities’

main task is to ensure an increase in the number of contract soldiers rather than in the number

of conscripts. Since issues concerning conscripts are sensitive to the Russian public, the Russian

authorities are unwilling to increase the number of conscripts.

If the authorities are unable to recruit sufficient numbers of contract soldiers, they only have

two other means left to increase the number of military personnel; either via increasing the

draft of conscripts or via mobilisation. Both of these options are politically unpopular decisions.

However, the risk of a second wave of mobilisation is prevalent, according to Sergey Krivenko.

Although President Putin announced an expansion of the military on 16 September 2024, this

has not affected the conscript force. Now it may be that in the next autumn and spring drafts,

the numbers change to try to reflect this new expansion.

Sergey Krivenko: 4; Mark Galeotti: 5; Huseyn Aliyev: 23

Sergey Krivenko: 4

Consultant,

Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и вое�½�½ой службе" от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ,

Статья 25,

28 March 1998,

url;

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 9; Mediazona: 7; A human rights lawyer: 3; Claus

Mathiesen: 19

A human rights lawyer: 3

Mark Galeotti: 4

Sergey Krivenko: 4

A human rights lawyer: 4

Sergey Krivenko: 4

Mark Galeotti: 3; The Moscow Times,

Putin Orders Russian Army to Increase Troop Size by 180K,

16 September

2024,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

2.1. Screening at the Voenkomat

The regional Voenkomat manages the screening process of conscripts. The process of

conscription is twofold. The year a Russian man turns 17, he is summoned at the Voenkomat

where his documents will be checked and for a preliminary conscription evaluation, during

which he will be assessed by medical doctors, specialists and psychologists before being

evaluated for service by the Voenkomat. This preliminary evaluation is mandatory for every

man once he turns 17.

The person would then have a brief interview with the Voenkomat personnel for them to get

the information they need to assign conscripts, according to their skills. This is done because

some arms of service are prioritised over others. The Voenkomat personnel will double check if

the person has some kind of sporting achievement or if the person has IT skills, etc. that can be

useful for the particular arm of service. Furthermore, during this interview, the potential

conscript will get a chance to state if he qualifies for exemption or deferral (see

chapter 3.1.

for

further).

After this evaluation, the young men are placed in to one of five categories.

Category A (A) is for those deemed fit for military service.

Category B (Б) is for those who are fit to serve with minor limitations.

Category V (В) is for those who are deemed fit to serve with limitations.

Category G (Г) Men who are temporarily unfit to serve are put in to the fourth

category. Usually, these are men with treatable health conditions, and they are

then given 6-12 months to undergo treatment after which they will be re-evaluated

by the Voenkomat.

Category D (Д) is reserved for men deemed unfit for military service.

Those assessed in category V (3) are not called up during peacetime but may be called up

during wartime. As they have no prior military training, they must undergo a shorter or longer

training programme to perform service during wartime, likely in roles that are not particularly

demanding.

Those assessed in category G (4), are referred for treatment lasting between 6 to 12 months.

Following this, a new health assessment is conducted, which could potentially lead to

placement in any of the other categories, i.e., A, B, V, or D. In the first two cases, individuals are

called up for compulsory military service. In the latter two cases, they are not called up, but if

placed in category V, they are transferred to the mobilisable reserve and may be called up

during wartime. For those initially placed in category G (4), their subsequent category could be

any of the four mentioned. However, the most likely outcome—if no specific treatment is

Claus Mathiesen: 10; Mark Galeotti: 9; A human rights lawyer: 15

Mark Galeotti: 8; Sergey Krivenko: 32

Claus Mathiesen: 11

Claus Mathiesen: 12

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

undertaken during the 6-12 months but recovery from fractures or similar occurs naturally—is

placement in category B (2).

These five categories have remained unchanged for a long time, and may in fact date back to

the time of the Russian Tsars.

In peacetime, only men in category A and B are drafted for military service, but in wartime,

men who have been deemed fit to serve with limitations are transferred to the reserve.

In the

early 2000’s, approximately 30 percent of the young men were deemed unfit to serve. During

recent years, that number has decreased, according to official sources.

After turning 18, Russian men are eligible for conscription and if they are drafted, they will once

again be examined medically for changes in their health condition.

It is then up to the

Voenkomat to decide whether to conscript the person or grant him a deferral or an

exemption.

Assuming that the person will pass, he will be handed a new summons, in which it is stated

when the person should reappear at the Voenkomat to commence the conscription, usually

within the scope of three to five days.

However, Huseyn Aliyev opined that the conventional

deadline from when a person has received a summons to when he has to appear at the

Voenkomat is approximately 20 days.

Upon reappearing at the Voenkomat, the conscript is transferred to a so-called regional

collection point. Each region in Russia has one regional collection point.

Here the person

would be subjected to the so-called BIOS criteria, which means that the representatives of the

various arms of service will be going through the personal files of the conscripts.

Representatives from different military units meet at the regional collection point and choose

conscripts. The selection can be based on qualifications such as special technical competence.

Every arm of service will receive a number of conscripts. Broadly speaking there are the

following arms of service:

The strategic rocket forces

The air forces

The navy

Claus Mathiesen: 12

Claus Mathiesen: 13

Claus Mathiesen: 14

Claus Mathiesen: 15

Claus Mathiesen: 17; Sergey Krivenko: 31

Sergey Krivenko: 31

Mark Galeotti: 9; Mark Galeotti: 9

Huseyn Aliyev: 18

Sergey Krivenko: 31

Mark Galeotti: 9

Sergey Krivenko: 32

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

The army

Some conscripts are serving in the National Guard.

Some conscripts are serving in the border service

The paratroopers (VDV), which are separate from the air force in terms of picking

conscripts. These conscripts could also serve in the Spetsnaz (Special Forces) under the

VDV.

According to Claus Mathiesen, conscripts can also be drafted to serve in Ministry of Civil

Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief.

In the screening process, the strategic rocket forces will be given the right to pick conscripts

first. They would typically choose persons who are technically adept, and then the paratroopers

(VDV) will have their select and typically go for persons who are tougher, which for instance

could be a cross-country runner at school. A person could try to influence this screening, if he

believes he has an advantage somewhere. However, the screening process has been described

as a pretty clumsy and rough process’ by Mark Galeotti. There are cases precisely where a

person has certain skills, but was overlooked by the Voenkomat or where the person in

question did not bother mentioning his skills to the Voenkomat.

As Russia is experiencing more military training at schools again similar to what happened in

the USSR, it is becoming easier for persons who wish to join the

Spetsnaz

to distinguish

themselves there. A young man who already has experience with parachute jumping may be

more likely to be selected by the Spetsnaz.

Whether or not a conscript’s preferences as to in which arm of service he will serve are taken

into consideration depends on the personnel at the Voenkomat. In this regard, Mark Galeotti

assesses that there are no regions where conscripts would be worse off compared to others as

it all depends on the competence and the care of the individual Voenkomat personnel.

However, corruption could play a role in whether a conscript would be assigned to the region

he wishes. Firstly, corruption plays a role in terms of bribing a doctor enough to obtain a

medical certification stating that the person in question cannot serve. Secondly, corruption

could play a role at a Voenkomat where a person might pay to be registered as exempted from

conscription. Thirdly, a person may pay the Voenkomat in order to get into a particular arm of

service or to get a particular assignment.

With regard to the geographical deployment of conscripts, it is important to note that at the

Voenkomat level, a conscript would not be assigned to a specific unit, but he will be assigned to

Mark Galeotti: 14

Claus Mathiesen: 48

Mark Galeotti: 10; Sergey Krivenko: 32

Mark Galeotti: 15

Mark Galeotti: 11

Mark Galeotti: 12

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

an arm of service. For example, at the Voenkomat level a person could influence whether he

will serve as part of the army or rather would join the navy.

Before 2022, when the Spetsnaz was decimated, the Russian military sought to professionalise

the Spetsnaz, which meant that the proportion of conscripts in the Spetsnaz decreased and the

Spetsnaz stopped having units in all of the Russian regions.

So-called “one-day drafts” are illegal ways of drafting conscripts. "One-day drafts” is a process

where individuals show up at the Voenkomat for a specific purpose (e.g. to collect documents)

and once there, are conscripted and sent to military service the very same day. This practice

constitutes a violation of Russian law and was previously uncommon. However, an increase in

this practice has been noted since 2022. The practice is more common in bigger cities, since

people in rural regions usually adhere to their summons to a greater extent than in larger and

more densely populated places.

In October 2023, at the beginning of the autumn conscription

campaign, there were also examples of forced one-day conscription through raids conducted in

Moscow where young people were conscripted from dormitories, apartments, grabbed on the

streets, in the subway, in mosques and in educational institutions.

The authorities have also intensified conscription through the establishment of a Single

Conscription Point

(SCP) in Moscow in March 2024. In the SCP, conscripts’ personal files are

stored centrally and their smartphones are confiscated at the entrance. Freedom of movement

and means of communication is restricted and attorneys are not permitted.

The practice of

SCP is planned to be introduced in other regions.

2.2. Quota for conscripts

Each Voenkomat is assigned a quota of the number of conscripts they each have to deliver

during every draft.

The main goal for the Voenkomat is to fill this quota, and not to conscript

specific individuals.

There is an element of arbitrariness in the way the Voenkomats seek to fulfil their quota with

new conscripts. The quota is basically driven by demographics. In other words, it is a roughly

analogous portion of how many 18 year olds, the military will have at their disposal, once the

persons with exemptions and deferrals are taken out of the equation.

Mark Galeotti: 13

Mark Galeotti: 16

Sergey Krivenko: 11

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4

In Russian called: Еди�½ый призыв�½ой пу�½кт

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, Обзор �½аруше�½ий прав и сопротивле�½ия в весе�½�½ий призыв 2024

года, [undated],

url

Mediazona: 8; A human rights lawyer: 9; Sergey Krivenko: 17; Mark Galeotti: 6; Freedom House: 5

A human rights lawyer: 13; Sergey Krivenko: 17

Mark Galeotti: 6

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

However, if a Voenkomat does not meet its draft quota, the Voenkomat’s personnel may resort

to patrolling the streets alongside local police in search of young men, who are on the list of

drafted conscripts. If a person is wanted, he may be detained and brought to the Voenkomat. In

this case, the conscript has no choice but to join the military, as he cannot avoid going by

refusing to sign his summons at this point.

The authorities become more aggressive in

patrolling for evaders towards the end of the drafting period, if the quota has not been met.

In rural regions such, as the North Caucasus, there does not seem to be issues with filling

quotas, due to the high level of unemployment and an apparent willingness to join the

military.

However, patrolling is reported to be more aggressive in the larger cities, where

people are better educated and enjoy higher living standards, and therefore are less motivated

to join the military. Furthermore, quotas are higher in bigger cities. The police do not have the

authority to hand over a person to the Voenkomat without a representative of the Voenkomat

also being present.

If draft quotas are not met in the cities or in densely populated urban areas, the authorities can

increase quotas in rural provincial regions. Consequently, the draft percentage of people from

e.g. Buryiatia is relatively higher than that from e.g. Moscow.

Even private companies are

given quotas to fill with conscripts, according to one source. The source opined that although

these quotas constituted the basic premises of how the conscripts system worked, these

assigning predetermined quotas to private companies have not been an efficient way of

identifying more conscripts.

2.3 Receiving a summons

If not handed out electronically via Gosuslugi, the summons for conscription or for mobilisation

could only legally be distributed in two ways:

Handing the summons in person to a potential conscript.

Sending the summons by registered post, in an envelope.

The typical way to draft Russian citizens for conscription is for Voenkomat staff to show up at

the person’s place of residence or to approach the person at their place of education (high

school or other) handing him the summons, which the recipient then has to sign.

The Federal law “On Military Duty and Military Service” does not mention that delivering

summons to family members/other individuals living at the registered address is illegal or

invalidates the summons. In fact, the Federal Law “On Enforcement Proceedings” Art.27 (point

A human rights lawyer: 9

A human rights lawyer: 10

A human rights lawyer: 11

A human rights lawyer: 12

Sergey Krivenko: 18

Freedom House: 5

Huseyn Aliyev: 2; Sergey Krivenko: 8

Huseyn Aliyev: 10; EUAA,

The Russian Federation – Military service,

December 2022,

url,

p. 16; Sergey Krivenko: 8

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

2), states that in case of the absence of a recipient, a summons can be handed over to any adult

family member.

Huseyn Aliyev noted that some Russian lawyers argue that delivering summons to family

members is illegal and the same lawyers have encouraged conscripts to initiate court cases.

However, these cases have often resulted in court verdicts against the complainants.

If the Voenkomat personnel for some reason are unable to deliver the summons in person, they

can send the summons by registered post, depending on the particular region and on the

particular Voenkomat.

In certain cases, some of the Voenkomats are in favour of sending out

summons by registered post. If a particular Voenkomat lacks staff, it would be time-consuming

to go door by door.

The delivery of summons is usually different in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and

Novosibirsk compared to other areas as these are larger cities, which have quite large

populations and insufficient staff for the Voenkomat to hand-deliver summons. Some

Voenkomats delegate the summons delivery duty to the district police sheriff (in Russian called

uchastkovyi).

In the cities, the new electronic system will be a huge relief for the Voenkomat, so

they no longer have to rely on sending summons by registered post.

Sending summons by registered post is also a widespread practice in the far northern regions,

where there are large distances to cover for one Voenkomat. In these regions, the Voenkomat

will rely more on the postal service rather than sending their own people out.

100

One source stated, however, that there were no regional differences when it comes to which of

the two mentioned methods is applied when summoning conscripts.

101

According to the law, the conscripted person has to recognise reception of the summons by

signing the letter in order for it to be valid.

102

However, in reality, if somebody else signed the

registered letter for him or if the courier simply throws the letter into a post box the

Voenkomat will consider it as a delivered summons.

103

In practice, a postal worker has to deliver that letter, with a summons inside to the potential

conscript in person and that person has to sign for it. However, delivering summons by

registered post has not worked in reality. Therefore, in most cases, postal workers do not chase

Consultant,

Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 02.10.2007 N 229-ФЗ "Об испол�½итель�½ом производстве, Статья 27.

Вруче�½ие повестки, и�½ого извеще�½ия,

23 November 2024,

url;

Huseyn Aliyev: 13

Huseyn Aliyev: 14

Huseyn Aliyev: 11

Huseyn Aliyev: 20

Huseyn Aliyev: 21

100

Huseyn Aliyev: 22

101

Sergey Krivenko: 9

102

Huseyn Aliyev: 11-12

103

Huseyn Aliyev: 12

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

down the potential conscript. Instead, they are more likely to hand over this letter to somebody

at this address in order for them to give it to the person in question.

104

According to one of the interviewed experts, propaganda plays a part in convincing people who

are generally unaware of their rights and the conscription procedure that they must serve.

Many believe that the state has unlimited rights to send a person to conscription and that once

a person is informed about a summons, they must adhere to it, no matter how it is delivered.

105

The current situation of summoning conscripts is described as a “huge mess”, where personnel

from the Voenkomat use several mixed methods; by sending formal summons, SMS-

messages

106

, and messages through the official service Gosuslugi, all while the media informs

people that all of these methods are valid even though they are not. Hence, even an SMS from

the Voenkomat risks being perceived as a legally valid summons, although it is in fact not.

Legally, only the traditional means of summoning in person or by registered post are

compulsory. However, people are generally unaware of their rights and the procedure, and

hence are not able to defend their rights.

107

2.4. Leaving Russia after being summoned

Pursuant to the amendments of the Russian Federal law № 127-FZ article 2 and 3, citizens who

are subject to military conscription and who have received a summons from the Voenkomat are

prohibited from leaving the Russian Federation from the day a summons is deemed delivered,

in accordance with federal law. This restriction remains in effect until the obligation to report to

the Voenkomat as per the summons has been fulfilled,

108

or when the drafting period in which

they received the summons has ended. The person will thereafter be able to legally leave the

country unless the authorities have opened a criminal case due to draft evasion.

109

Prior to the abovementioned amendments in May 2023, a summons from a Voenkomat did not

restrict the rights or freedoms to travel abroad. The summons merely informed the recipient of

their obligation to be at a specific place at a specific time. Until that moment, the conscript was

free to travel abroad. However, travelling abroad did not exempt the person in question from

their obligations stated in the summons.

110

104

105

Huseyn Aliyev: 11

Huseyn Aliyev: 12

106

Mediazona,

Московские призыв�½ики, которые �½е явились в вое�½комат по повестке, получили СМС с

и�½формацией о запрете покидать Россию,

12 November 2024,

url

107

Sergey Krivenko: 10; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 10

108

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 14.04.2023 N 127-ФЗ "О

в�½есе�½ии изме�½е�½ий в отдель�½ые

зако�½одатель�½ые акты Российской Федерации",

Статья 2,

url;

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 14.04.2023 N

127-ФЗ "О

в�½есе�½ии изме�½е�½ий в отдель�½ые зако�½одатель�½ые акты Российской Федерации",

Статья 3,

url;

Journalist Irina Novik: 2

109

Sergey Krivenko: 6

110

Tinkoff journal,

Мож�½о ли уехать из России, если получил повестку в вое�½комат?,

7 July 2022,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

In practice, however, it is still possible for a person to leave Russia after having received a

physical summons.

111

When summoned, the conscript is given a deadline to appear at the

Voenkomat. It is unlikely that the conscript will be stopped by the authorities if he flees the

country prior to his deadline.

112

Although the system is electronic, it still requires Voenkomat

staff to manually enter a code to register that this person has not turned up.

113

If a person

refuses to sign a summons, he is able to leave the country, as a person is only obliged to appear

at a Voenkomat, after they have signed the summons.

114

According to Journalist Irina Novik, conscripts are required to hand over their passport to the

Ministry of Internal Affairs within five days. In reality, however, conscripts will first be barred

from leaving the country legally only after a decision has been made about conscription for

military service or about sending him to alternative civil service (ACS).

115

In November 2024, news emerged that Moscow conscripts who failed to report to the

Voenkomat after receiving a summons received SMS messages informing them of a travel ban

from leaving Russia. However, this might be merely an act of intimidation.

116

When a person is enrolled into the military, they are already barred from leaving the country

legally. Basically, the point at which a person actually turns up at the Voenkomat, assuming they

are not exempted or deferred, he would be barred from leaving the country legally and if the

person shows up at a border checkpoint, he will appear in their system.

117

2.4.1. Leaving Russia after receiving an electronic summons

The summoning by electronic register of summons is not yet operational and as a consequence

a person who has been summoned to conscription can still leave the country.

118

Once the electronic system of summoning is effective, the idea is that a person will no longer

be able to leave the country after being summoned.

119

The electronic system is designed to

prevent summoned individuals from receiving travel documents as well as leaving the country,

thereby preventing them from evading conscription.

120

Although, it is currently unclear what

happens after the implementation of the electronic system.

121

Therefore, a draftee cannot legally leave Russia the moment the electronic summons has been

sent to him, as the FSB will receive a notification if his passport is scanned at the border. Claus

111

112

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 10; Mark Galeotti: 23; OVD-Info: 5; Sergey Krivenko: 6; Freedom House: 10

Mark Galeotti: 23; OVD-Info: 5; Freedom House: 10

113

Mark Galeotti: 23;

114

A human rights lawyer: 8

115

Journalist Irina Novik: 2

116

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 10; Mediazona,

Московские призыв�½ики, которые �½е явились в вое�½комат по

повестке, получили СМС с и�½формацией о запрете покидать Россию,

12 November 2024,

url

117

Mark Galeotti: 24; Claus Mathiesen: 27

118

Sergey Krivenko: 6

119

Freedom House: 10; A human rights lawyer: 7; Sergey Krivenko: 6

120

Freedom House: 7

121

A human rights lawyer: 14

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Mathiesen assessed that this applies to all types of passports including non-biometric

passports.

122

Both electronic registers are nationwide, and the information from them become

immediately available to the FSB border service, once a summons has been sent.

123

122

123

Claus Mathiesen: 34

Claus Mathiesen: 33

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3. Exemptions, deferrals and Alternative Civil Service

(ACS)

3.1. Exemptions and deferrals

Traditionally, there have been five main ways in which to avoid military service in Russia:



by hiding

by leaving the country

by being granted exemption due to health conditions

by being granted deferral due to studies, or

by applying for alternative civil service.

124

The grounds for exemption and deferral from conscription in Russia are regulated in articles 23

and 24 of the Federal Law “On Military Duty and Military Service” from 1998.

125

Exemption from military service means the cancellation of a citizen’s obligation for compulsory

military service based on legitimate reasons.

126

Exemption can be granted for persons

recognised as unfit for military service due to health reasons, persons who have previously

completed military or ACS, persons who have completed military service in a foreign state,

127

if a person’s father or brother has died in the course of their military service. Furthermore,

convicts serving a sentence, persons with an outstanding criminal record, and persons under

criminal investigation can also be exempted from conscription.

128

Deferral from conscription means delaying a person’s call to conscription based on legitimate

reasons.

129

Deferral can be granted to persons recognised as temporarily unfit for military

service due to health reasons, elected deputies in e.g. legislative or representative bodies,

persons employed in public agencies, or persons with specific family situations as regulated in

the law. Deferral can also be granted to full-time students.

130

Furthermore, certain groups can

be granted deferral by a presidential decree. This has typically been applied to particularly

124

125

Sergey Krivenko: 19

Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и вое�½�½ой службе" от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ

(послед�½яя редакция), Article 23 and 24,

url

126

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Draft exemptions and determents, [undated]

url

127

In specific cases provided for by international treaties of the Russian Federation

128

The reasons stated are not an exhaustive account of the reasons for exemption from conscription. For a

comprehensive overview, see: Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и вое�½�½ой службе" от

28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ (послед�½яя редакция) ), Article 23,

url;

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Draft

exemptions and determents,

url

129

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Draft exemptions and determents, [undated]

url

130

The reasons stated are not an exhaustive account of the reasons for deferral from conscription. For a

comprehensive overview, please see: Consultant, Федераль�½ый зако�½ "О вои�½ской обяза�½�½ости и

вое�½�½ой

службе" от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ (послед�½яя редакция) ), Article 24,

url;

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence,

Draft exemptions and determents,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

talented people, such as talented ballet dancers.

131

In recent times, the president has signed a

decree granting deferral for young IT-specialists.

132

Claus Mathiesen explains that many of the grounds for deferral of military service have carried

over from the Soviet era, although the number of grounds for exemption has been reduced.

133

In order to apply for exemption or deferral from conscription, a person has to contact

Voenkomat and provide their grounds for exemption or deferral.

134

The procedure of providing

grounds for deferral or exemption to the Voenkomat is nowadays possible to do over e-mail or

through Gosuslugi.

135

3.1.1. Deferral due to academic studies

One of the primary, if not the foremost, reasons for deferral of military service is the pursuit of

academic studies. According to Claus Mathiesen, being enrolled in an educational institution

would more or less automatically lead to a deferral from military service until the completion or

termination of the studies.

136

Due to the widespread prevalence of corruption in Russia, it

would also be possible for a person to pay a lower quality university for enrolment despite not

intending to fulfil the studies.

137

However, the rules have become stricter and any documents supporting grounds for deferral

due to e.g. studying will likely be checked thoroughly at the Voenkomat. A person who was

granted deferral from conscription due to studying one subject, would not be granted deferral

should he change the subject of his studies.

138

3.1.2. Deferral due to medical reasons

Legally, conscription is limited to individuals whose health status is recognised as fit. The

military authorities have a list of medical illnesses, which disqualify a person from military

service.

139

Upon conducting a medical assessment, a person is marked in a category depending

on the level of fitness for military service (see

chapter 2.1.

for further).

140

Traditionally, corruption has played a significant part in how many men have been exempted

from military service for medical reasons.

141

Bribing doctors to falsify medical certificates

stating that one is unfit to serve is prevalent amongst young people. However, the doctors at

131

132

Claus Mathiesen: 24-25

The Economic Times, Russia ’postpones’ military service for IT-specialists, 29 March 2022,

url;

Oreanda News, The

President of the Russian Federation signed a decree on autumn conscription, 30 Septemer 2024,

url;

Acsour

accounting outsourcing, Deferment of IT-specialists under the age of 30, 21 September 2023,

url

133

Claus Mathiesen: 50

134

Huseyn Aliyev: 15

135

Huseyn Aliyev: 15

136

Claus Mathiesen: 51

137

A human rights lawyer: 32

138

Claus Mathiesen: 52

139

Al Jazeera,

Explainer: How does conscription work in Russia?,

5 May 2022,

url

140

Fontanka.ru, Болез�½ь по расписа�½ию. Рассказываем, что дает отсрочку от мобилизации и кто приз�½ается

год�½ым к службе, 23 September 2022,

url

141

Claus Mathiesen: 16

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the Voenkomat will conduct their own medical examination of each conscript. These doctors

have extended experience with people falsely claiming to suffer from health issues, and

therefore it is rather difficult to get out of military service due to feigned medical problems.

142

3.1.3. Temporary deregistering from the military registry due to living

outside of Russia

According to the law, a person leaving to stay outside of Russia for more than six months may

be temporarily removed from the military register for the time of the stay abroad. During this

period, the person cannot be summoned for conscription.

143

A person travelling abroad for work or for studies would have to provide legal grounds for the

stay, such as e.g. the pursuit of academic studies or having been granted a work permit.

144

The

Voenkomat would then remove the person’s name from the military register.

145

While abroad, the person cannot be summoned and is thus not obligated to serve as a

conscript. Upon immediate return to Russia, the person must re-appear at the Voenkomat and

re-register. Failure to register for travelling abroad or to re-register upon return could lead to an

administrative fine.

146

The procedure of registering for an abroad stay must be carried out in person or by an

authorised family member with a legal notarised document to act on behalf of the person in

question. With the implementation of the new electronic system, it will also be possible to do it

electronically.

147

3.1.4. Tightened possibilities for exemption and deferrals

According to Sergey Krivenko, the Russian state has become more cautious about bribes, and

therefore the possibility of bribing one’s way out of conscription has become more difficult.

148

The authorities have also become less lenient when granting deferral to persons already

employed by the Russian state.

149

Furthermore, Russian authorities have tightened their efforts to draft conscripts, partly by

breaching several of their rights, making it more difficult for people to use their legal rights to

avoid performing military duty.

150

The Russian authorities have reportedly isolated and

detained conscripts in Voenkomats, ignored deferrals due to studies and ignored applications

142

143

A human rights lawyer: 33

Consultant, Поста�½овле�½ие Правительства РФ от 27.11.2006 N 719 (ред. от 16.05.2024) "Об утвержде�½ии

Положе�½ия о вои�½ском учете"), IX,

url;

ПризываНет, Как с�½яться с вои�½ского учета за гра�½ицей?, 15 November

2024,

url

144

A human rights lawyer: 31

145

Huseyn Aliyev: 16-17

146

Huseyn Aliyev: 16-17; A human rights lawyer: 31

147

Huseyn Aliyev: 16-17

148

Sergey Krivenko: 20

149

Claus Mathiesen: 24

150

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, Обзор �½аруше�½ий прав и сопротивле�½ия в весе�½�½ий призыв 2024

года, [undated]

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

for alternative civil service.

151

Furthermore, according to human rights defenders, the

conscription through the SCP structure creates a potential for violating the rights of citizens to

legally refuse military service.

152

There is reporting of medical personnel at the Voenkomats disregarding medical conditions of

persons who are unfit for service, leading to them being drafted despite having legal reasons

for deferral.

153

There have also been cases of men who have been previously confirmed unfit

for military service being drafted through the practice of so called forced ‘one-day’

conscription.

154

3.2. Alternative Civil Service (ACS)

The right to conscientious objection to military service and participation in military activities is

guaranteed by the Russian Constitution, which establishes that citizens have the right to

replace military service with ACS if military service contradicts their convictions or religion.

155

ACS can be performed at e.g. hospitals, boarding schools, kindergartens, retirement homes,

factories, cultural institutions or state owned enterprises.

156

The term for serving ACS exceeds

the term of compulsory military service by 1.75 and is either 18 or 21 months, depending on

the placement.

157

Before the full-scale war, approximately a thousand young people underwent ACS, which

constitutes less than one percent of the total number of persons conscripted yearly.

158

Based

on federal statistics, in 2023 the number of people under ACS in Russia increased by almost 40

percent, from 1 199 in the first half of the year to 1 645 in the second half of the year.

159

Interest in ACS has however increased tenfold compared to before the full-scale war, which

leads to obstacles in the procedure for ACS, even though the procedure itself is still available.

160

151

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, Обзор �½аруше�½ий прав и сопротивле�½ия в весе�½�½ий призыв 2024

года, [undated]

url,

Novaya Gazeta: 12

152

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4

153

Al Jazeera, Explainer: How does conscription work in Russia?, 5 May 2022,

url;

Ostorozhno Novosti,

В Москве

призыв�½иков стали задерживать и увозить �½а сбор�½ый пу�½кт в 2,5 раза чаще по срав�½е�½ию с прошлым

годом,

30 November 2024,

url;

Journalist Irina Novik: 26

154

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4

155

Russian Federation, Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993.12.25 (КОНСТИТУЦИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ

ФЕДЕРАЦИИ от 1993.12.15), chapter 59, Article 3,

url

156

Claus Mathiesen: 54-57; Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Alternative Service in the Armed Forces of the

Russian Federation,

url;

Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто выбирает и как

добивается альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 15 May 2024,

url

157

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Alternative Service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,

url

158

Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто выбирает и как добивается

альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17 May 2024,

url

159

Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто выбирает и как добивается

альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17 May 2024,

url

160

Sergey Krivenko: 24-25

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Human rights defenders have also noted an increase in questions on how to apply for ACS, and

what to do if this right is denied. In addition, human rights defenders note an increase in

refusals from the Voenkomat and a decrease in the number of successful cases brought by

conscientious objectors in the courts.

161

For a person to apply for ACS based on religious beliefs, their religious organisation must be

legally registered in the Russian Federation, and the person must prove that they are a

registered member of that community.

162

ACS is further regulated in the Federal Law ”On Alternative Civilian Service”, which stipulates

that a citizen also has the right to replace military service by ACS if he belongs to the

indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation, leads a traditional way of life, carries out

traditional economic activities and is engaged in traditional crafts of the indigenous peoples of

the Russian Federation.

163

There are multiple cases of men living a traditionalist way of life in hunter, gathering and

reindeer herding communities in the far north and Siberia, applying for alternative military

service on these grounds.

164

Being disabled does not constitute eligible criteria to apply for ACS. Disabled individuals

(depending on their degree of disability) have to apply for regular exemption from military

service.

165

The system of ACS has existed in Russia for more than 20 years. It comes with a special

procedure, which requires the potential draftee to apply for ACS actively.

166

The application is

to be submitted to the Voenkomat and the decision is made by the draft commission.

167

The

law does not state which specific conditions will qualify a person for ACS and there is no

predetermined criteria. However, there is an application form that needs to be filled out and

the most important thing is doing this correctly and on time.

168

An application for AСS must be

submitted to a Voenkomat six months before the start of the draft period, however there is a

possibility to be granted extension to this time limit.

169

161

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4; Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто

выбирает и как добивается альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17 May 2024,

url

162

Huseyn Aliyev: 27

163

Russian Federation, Federal Law of July 25, 2002 No 113-FZ “On Alternative Civilian Service” (Федераль�½ый

зако�½ от 25 июля 2002 г. № 113-ФЗ «Об альтер�½атив�½ой гражда�½ской службе»), Article 2,

url

164

Huseyn Aliyev: 28

165

Huseyn Aliyev: 28

166

Sergey Krivenko: 24-25

167

Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence, Альтер�½атив�½ая служба в Вооруже�½�½ых Силах Российской

Федерации, [undated],

url

168

Novaya Gazeta: 21-22; Claus Mathiesen: 54-57

169

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 4-5

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

In practice, the right to ACS often has to be sought through court, as employees of the

Voenkomat and the commission often refuse to accept applications, or make unjustified

refusals to ACS.

170

There is a problem with acceptance of ACS in the Russian society, which predates the full-scale

invasion of Ukraine.

171

Performing ACS is not popular due to the ‘masculinity’ of the Russian

culture. Russian propaganda has proven effective in convincing people to serve in the military,

both as conscripts and as contract soldiers.

172

To be considered for ACS in Russia, a person needs to know the rules and their rights. It is

difficult to prove that you fulfil the requirements for ACS and the process requires weighty

arguments, a lot of work and preparing documents in order. Usually it also requires the

assistance of lawyers and specialists.

173

General negative trends in the legal field and the weakening of control over Voenkomats affect

the enforcement of the constitutional right to ACS for conscripts. ACS applicants must be

persistent, but also constantly monitor developments, be aware of any legal changes and new

practices and to take timely action.

174

Acceptance will also depend on the goodwill of the Voenkomat personnel that review the

application. Furthermore, the applicant will most likely be under attempts of persuasion from

the commissariat to enrol into the military instead of performing ACS.

175

One interviewed source conveys that courts in Russia do not respect the principle of a fair trial

and are siding with the military. However, with legal assistance it is possible to win an ACS case

in court. A human right’s organisation claims to have a high percentage of court victories in ACS

cases.

176

Additionally, two interviewed sources convey that most people are not aware of the right to

refuse regular conscription due to one’s personal beliefs, and therefore do not claim it.

177

Furthermore, many people are not aware of the legal possibility to appeal a decision of denial

and take it to court.

178

170

Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто выбирает и как добивается

альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17 May 2024,

url

171

OVD-Info: 13-14

172

Novaya Gazeta: 21-22

173

Journalist Irina Novik: 6; OVD-Info: 13-14; Claus Mathiesen: 54-57

174

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url, p. 4

175

OVD-Info: 13-14

176

Novaya Gazeta: 17-19

177

Mediazona: 34; Novaya Gazeta: 17-19

178

Novaya Gazeta: 17-19

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The introduction of articles regarding ‘discrediting the armed forces of the Russian Federation’,

into the Criminal Code

179

and the Code on Administrative Offences

180

since the start of the full-

scale war in Ukraine, has led to risks for legal repercussion when applying for ACS. Even though

anti-war beliefs is one of the legitimate reasons for being granted ACS, if a conscript declares

that he does not want to serve in the military because Russia is waging an war of aggression, an

administrative protocol might be drawn up for this person. As of May 2024, human rights

defenders knew of two such cases.

181

According to senior lecturer Huseyn Aliyev, indigenous ethnic communities with a traditionalist

way of life are the only groups that can reasonably apply for alternative military services.

182

For someone already conscripted, there is no mechanism for transferring to ACS or early

dismissal from military service due to the formation of beliefs contrary to military service. Early

dismissal is possible only for health reasons and under certain social circumstances.

183

3.3. Exemptions for vulnerable Groups

3.3.1. Jehovah’s Witnesses

Members of Jehovah's Witnesses do generally not wish to serve in the military, due to their

religious beliefs as pacifists.

184

Previously, it was sufficient for a summoned person to state that he belongs to Jehovah’s

Witnesses and almost automatically, he would be granted ACS instead of ordinary military

service.

185

Since 2017, Jehovah’s Witnesses is labelled an extremist movement in Russia and

being a member is illegal. Therefore, a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses would likely face

criminal charges rather than conscription if his affiliation to this denomination becomes known.

However, the person would still be eligible for conscription as soon as cleared of criminal

charges or in case no charges are raised.

186

According to Sergey Krivenko, there is no longer an easy way for religious minorities such as

Jehovah’s Witnesses to avoid conscription. It is however still possible to claim that a person has

ideas and beliefs that are contrary to the purpose of the military (e.g. being a pacifist), and

apply for ACS on these grounds.

187

179

Consultant, "Уголов�½ый кодекс Российской Федерации" от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 30.11.2024), article

280.3,

url

180

Consultant, "Кодекс Российской Федерации об адми�½истратив�½ых право�½аруше�½иях" от 30.12.2001 N 195-

ФЗ (ред. от 13.12.2024), article 2.3.3,

url

181

Настоящее Время, "Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это работает". Кто выбирает и как добивается

альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17 May 2024,

url

182

Huseyn Aliyev: 28

183

Memorial, rapport ACS.

184

OVD-Info: 12

185

Sergey Krivenko: 24-25

186

Huseyn Aliyev: 26; Sergey Krivenko: 24-25

187

Sergey Krivenko: 24-25

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3.3.2. LGBT persons

Formally, there are no exemptions from military service or conscription for persons belonging

to the LGBT community.

188

According to two sources, before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, belonging to the LBGT

community was often considered a mental illness, and thus members of this group could be

exempted on the grounds of mental health issues.

189

The list of illnesses does not categorise

non-conventional sexual orientation itself as a health disorder, and hence being e.g.

homosexual will not in itself be a formal reason for exemption from conscription.

190

It would,

however, be possible to get an exemption on medical grounds if diagnosed with a personality

disorder related to one’s sexual orientation. The diagnosis would have to be concluded by a

psychiatrist.

191

As of 30 November 2023, the Russian authorities have labelled the so-called ‘international

LGBT movement’ an ‘extremist organisation’ in Russia.

192

Consequently, LGBT members are

generally reluctant to reveal their sexual orientation, including to military officials.

193

Many members of the LGBT community try to leave Russia or hide somewhere within the

country to avoid being conscripted into the armed forces.

194

According to a Russian lawyer

specialising in LGBT rights, they could also try to be exempted through medical examination

and depending on their illness, be considered unfit to serve in the military.

195

It is possible for members of the LGBT community in Russia to be granted ACS, although they

would have to convince the Voenkomat that they fulfil the legal requirements and that

performing military service contradicts their religion or convictions. According to a Russian

lawyer specialising in LGBT rights, they knew of about 100 cases of LGBT members accepted for

ACS.

196

Mark Galeotti opines that the Voenkomat personnel do generally not care about someone

being a member of the LGBT community, as long as they can make a good soldier out of that

person and the enlisted conscript meets the necessary health requirements. He elaborates that

they may very well think that “he might get that kicked out of him”.

197

188

189

Sergey Krivenko: 22, OVD-Info, 10; Journalist Irina Novik: 4-5

Sergey Krivenko: 22; Novaya Gazeta: 13-14

190

ПризываНет,

Гомосексуализм

и армия, November 15 2024, url; Consultant, Поста�½овле�½ие Правительства РФ

от 04.07.2013 N 565 (ред. от 17.04.2024) "Об утвержде�½ии Положе�½ия о вое�½�½о-врачеб�½ой экспертизе", article

18,

url

191

ПризываНет,

Гомосексуализм

и армия, November 15 2024; url

192

Meduza, Верхов�½ый суд России объявил «экстремистским» и запретил «движе�½ие ЛГБТ», 30 November

2023,

url,

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 17

193

Sergey Krivenko: 22; Novaya Gazeta, 13-14; OVD-Info: 10

194

OVD-Info: 10

195

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 1-3

196

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 21

197

Mark Galeotti: 25

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

There is no statistics regarding members of the LGBT community in the military, as people do

not openly talk about their sexual orientation.

198

As for trans persons, a new law came into force in 2023, which outlawed gender affirming

procedures and changing one’s legal gender in official documents.

199

Trans women who have

transitioned to women prior to this law, but did not change their legal gender status in their

documents, were obliged to be conscripted into the military, as they were legally perceived as

male and thus obliged to adhere to summons and go through medical examinations at the

Voenkomats.

200

Nevertheless, if a trans woman managed to change their legal gender prior to

the new law of 2023, they would be legally perceived as female, and hence removed from the

military register and not be obliged to serve in the military.

201

After the introduction of the law

in 2023, it is no longer possible to be exempted due to being a trans woman.

202

For a person changing their legal gender from female to male in their documents before the

new law of 2023, they would be subject to military registration. However, the medical

commission could “reject” him on the grounds of not being “a full-fledged man”. The case

would depend on the medical commission, who could issue a military card with the person in

category D (unfit), as being transgender is considered a mental illness within the Russian

military.

203

Russia has not accepted the 11

edition of the International Classification of Diseases and

Related Health Problems (ICD-11), which removed gender incongruence from the chapter of

“mental and behavioural disorders”.

204

According to article 18 of the list of illnesses, personality

disorders related to gender identity would categorise a person as unfit for military service.

205

Consequently, the Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights conveys that trans men and trans

women are considered mentally ill in Russia and are therefore not allowed to serve in the

military. A trans woman who is still legally perceived as male would hence be claimed unfit for

military service due to her transition.

206

According to a medical source interviewed by Meduza,

the diagnosis and declaration of fitness depends locally on the Voenkomat.

207

198

199

Mediazona: 35

Amnesty International, Russia: Adoption of transphobic legislation a horrendous blow to human rights, 14 July

2023,

url;

Open Democracy, Russia’s draconian new law is forcing trans people to flee the country, 26 July 2023,

url

200

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 5-6

201

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 8; Daily Storm, Тра�½сге�½деры смогут избежать мобилизации.

Юрист рассказал о «вое�½�½ых» особе�½�½остях сме�½ы пола, 7 October 2022,

url

202

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 6

203

Daily Storm, Тра�½сге�½деры смогут избежать мобилизации. Юрист рассказал о «вое�½�½ых» особе�½�½остях

сме�½ы пола, 7 October 2022,

url

204

WHO, WHO/Europe brief – transgender health in the context of ICD-11, [undated],

url;

A Russian lawyer

specialising in LGBT rights: 10

205

Consultant, Поста�½овле�½ие Правительства РФ от 04.07.2013 N 565 (ред. от 17.04.2024) "Об утвержде�½ии

Положе�½ия о вое�½�½о-врачеб�½ой экспертизе", article 18,

url

206

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 6, 12

207

Meduza, «Пусть лучше о�½а там где-�½ибудь умрет» «Медуза» рассказывает о первой открытой

тра�½сге�½дер�½ой же�½щи�½е в российской армии. Ее собираются отправить �½а вой�½у с Украи�½ой (и это еще �½е

вся история), 9 November 2022,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

In the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, it is still legal to change one’s gender. Therefore,

lawyers are trying to help trans persons to change their documents in this region. However,

these cases are very few and the majority of Russian transwomen are leaving the country to

avoid conscription.

208

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 10

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4. Draft evasion, absent without leave (AWOL) and

desertion

4.1. Draft evasion

4.1.1. Legal framework

The definition of draft evasion is the failure, without a valid reason

209

to attend a medical

examination, a psychological assessment, and a meeting at the Voenkomat; or by failing to

appear at the time and place specified in the summons of the Voenkomat.

210

Pursuant to article 21.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the failure of a citizen to appear

without a valid reason at the time and place specified in the summons of the Voenkomat is an

offence punishable with a fine in the range of 10 000 to 30 000 rubles [92 to 277 euros]. The

same law stipulates that men who are subject to conscription must notify their local

recruitment office about their place of residence. Failure to do so is also punishable with a

fine.

211

Draft evasion is further regulated under article 328 of the Criminal Code, which stipulates that

illegal evasion of conscription is punishable by a fine of up to 200 000 rubles [1 769 euro], the

amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to 18 months,

forced labour for up to two years, arrest for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two

years.

212

Equally, evasion of ACS is punishable by a fine to up to 80 000 rubles (739 euro], the amount of

the wages or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to six months,

compulsory labour for a term of up to 480 hours, or by arrest for a term of up to six months.

213

For criminal liability to arise in an evasion case, the attempt to evade military service has to be

intentional.

214

The prevalence of intention must be proved in court, which can be done for

example by showcasing repeated failures to appear at the Voenkomat without valid reasons.

215

209

A valid reason could be e.g. illness or injury, severe health condition or funeral of a close relative, or unforeseen

circumstances beyond a person’s control. For further information, see: Consultant,

Какие причи�½ы �½еявки в

вое�½комат являются уважитель�½ыми?,

22 July 2020,

url

210

2 Interfax, ВС разъяс�½ил, кто �½е подлежит призыву �½а вое�½�½ую службу и что по�½имать под укло�½е�½ием, 18

May 2023,

url

211

Consultant,

"Кодекс Российской Федерации об адми�½истратив�½ых право�½аруше�½иях"

от 30.12.2001 N 195-

ФЗ (ред. от 13.12.2024)), Article 21.5,

url;

The Moscow Times, Russia Ramps Up Fines for Draft Dodging, 31 July

2023,

url;

A human rights lawyer: 21

212

Consultant, ”Уголов�½ый

кодекс Российской Федерации"

от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 30.11.2024)), Article

328, 9 December 2024,

url

213

Consultant,

”Уголов�½ый кодекс Российской Федерации"

от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 30.11.2024)), Article

328, 9 December 2024,

url

214

2 Interfax,

ВС разъяс�½ил, кто �½е подлежит призыву �½а вое�½�½ую службу и что по�½имать под укло�½е�½ием,

2023-05-18,

url

215

Sergey Krivenko: 48

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In cases of criminal proceedings on draft evasion, the court must also prove that the person has

received proper notification regarding the duty to report to a military recruitment office.

216

The standard time from when a person has received a summons to when he has to appear at

the Voenkomat is around 20 days. Without a legitimate reason for not adhering to the

summons, he could potentially be considered a draft evader.

217

The possibilities of leaving the country or hiding in order to avoid conscription have become

more limited due to legal amendments, which impose restrictions on draftees and provide the

authorities with more efficient methods of searching for draft evaders (see

chapter 1.1.).

218

4.1.2. Development in number of draft evaders

Several of the interviewed sources conveyed that draft evasion is moderately widespread in

Russia and that there has been no major increase in the numbers of draft evaders since the

beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

219

Mark Galeotti stated that although there

has been a slight increase in persons avoiding conscription, the majority of draft evaders tend

to evade through the means of corruption or by enrolling themselves into higher education to

get a deferral without the intention of fulfilling the studies.

220

According to Freedom House, there was an initial increase of young men leaving Russia in the

early stages of the full-scale invasion and later on during the first wave of mobilisation. As of

December 2024, the outflow of men leaving Russia is rather steady and in general, individuals

potentially vulnerable for conscription are taking preparatory measures rather than dodging

military service.

221

The reasons behind the limited number of draft evaders can partly be explained by the fact that

conscription has traditionally not been considered dangerous in Russia, rather something every

young man should perform in order to become a ‘real man’.

222

Mediazona corroborates this

picture by explaining that conscripts are not generally active in combat operations.

223

Another

source states that yet one reason is the fact that the conditions for conscripts are more or less

the same as in the beginning of the war.

224

However, the dynamics in Kursk where conscripts have been serving on the frontline since the

Ukrainian incursion in August 2024 have changed the view on conscription, and it is increasingly

perceived as dangerous.

225

According to Huseyn Aliyev, potential conscripts are now aware that

216

2 Interfax, ВС разъяс�½ил, кто �½е подлежит призыву �½а вое�½�½ую службу и что по�½имать под укло�½е�½ием,

2023-05-18,

url

217

Huseyn Aliyev: 18-19

218

Sergey Krivenko: 19

219

Mediazona: 28; Mark Galeotti, 52; Freedom House: 33; A human rights lawyer: 27

220

Mark Galeotti: 52

221

Freedom House: 33

222

Novaya Gazeta; 31

223

Mediazona: 28

224

A human rights lawyer: 27

225

Novaya Gazeta: 31-33

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

they can end up in border regions such as Kursk and actually risk participating in combat

operations, which he estimates will lead to a higher number of draft evaders.

226

During the last ten years, several hundred criminal cases of draft evasion were opened under

article 328 per year, which constitutes less than 0.2 percent of the total. Almost all cases

concluded with a fine.

227

In 2023, there were 901 such cases, out of which 894 resulted in fines.

Three cases ended with a suspended sentence, and three persons were acquitted. The rest of

the cases were dropped for undisclosed reasons.

228

Additionally, there were several thousand administrative fines for not adhering to the

summons. In these cases, the offence did not amount to draft evasion, but was rather classified

as failure to fulfil obligations connected to the drafting procedure.

229

In the first six months of 2024, Russian courts issued 427 sentences in draft evasion cases, out

of which 423 resulted in fines. Three persons received suspended sentences, one person was

acquitted and 15 cases were dropped.

230

4.1.3. Legal repercussions

If a person refuses to adhere to the military procedure and appear at the Voenkomat, it is very

unlikely that it will end up as a criminal case, as this will happen only after repeated refusals to

show up.

231

Mostly, fines are handed out to draft evaders following the second or third

summons that they have received.

232

Huseyn Aliyev explains that if an evasion case passes on to criminal investigation, the case will

be handed over to a police investigator and it will be up to the police investigator to decide on

the severity of the punishment. In the very few cases of draft evasion that actually go to court,

it is very likely that the person in question would be fined, although it will most likely be a

higher fine than in administratively settled cases – probably the double of the administrative

fine.

233

Huseyn Aliyev has not seen any evidence of anyone actually being imprisoned for the evasion

of conscription.

234

Similar statements are conveyed by two other sources.

235

According to

226

227

Huseyn Aliyev: 35

The ”Call to Conscience” coalition et. al, The Right to Consciencious Objection to Military Service in Russia During

Full-Scale War, 31 May 2024,

url,

p. 2

228

A human rights lawyer: 23; Huseyn Aliyev: 39

229

Sergey Krivenko: 47-48

230

OVD-Info: 17

231

OVD-Info: 17; Sergey Krivenko: 47-48

232

Huseyn Aliyev: 40

233

Huseyn Aliyev: 32, 33

234

Huseyn Aliyev: 32, 33

235

OVD-Info: 17; A human rights lawyer: 18-19, 22

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Sergey Krivenko, one or two cases have led to prison sentences in 2023, but this is a rare

punishment for evaders.

236

Traditionally, men who do not wish to be drafted have tried to avoid receiving their summons,

for example by pretending not to be at home if visited by representatives of the Voenkomat.

237

If a person evades summoning and the Voenkomat drafts another person to fill the quota, the

consequence for the originally summoned individual would depend on whether the Voenkomat

has filled out all the proper paper work and sent the case to an investigative committee or not.

Sergey Krivenko opines that this is rarely done.

238

According to two sources, the Russian authorities have no interest in searching for or

prosecuting every man who has evaded military service, as they would rather put their efforts

into filling their quota.

239

Paying a fine for draft evasion does not mean that a person would be excluded from future

drafts. A person evading one draft risks being summoned again in future drafts, provided he is

still within the age of conscription.

240

Yet, every draft is decided upon by a presidential decree.

Consequently, a conscript evading the draft in the autumn and subsequently caught after the

quota of that draft is filled would not necessarily be given a summons in the next draft.

241

Huseyn Aliyev explains that there are cases of persons who have been fined and were given a

new summons basically the next day. Furthermore, a summons can also be handed out at the

point of entry to Russia, such as international airports.

242

The Voenkomat searches for evaders in collaboration with local police.

243

Once a person has

signed the summons, the Voenkomat has the right to detain the person in question.

244

At the

same time, according to Freedom House, Russia is a large country, so if a person wants to evade

conscription and hide this is possible inside the country. Life would be rather difficult and

limited (e.g. trying to avoid leaving digital footprints), but it would be possible. Equally, it is

possible to leave the country to evade conscription and the source dismisses the narrative of

the ‘iron curtain.’

245

The authorities would not use extrajudicial punishments outside the ranks against draft

evaders. If they catch a draft evader, they will prosecute him.

246

As for political opponents to

the regime, Mark Galeotti states that if a person evades conscription, he will be prosecuted

236

237

Sergey Krivenko: 47-48

Claus Mathiesen: 28

238

Sergey Krivenko: 47-48

239

A human rights lawyer: 18-19; Mediazona: 32

240

A human rights lawyer: 18-19, 24; Mark Galeotti, 55

241

A human rights lawyer: 24-25

242

Huseyn Aliyev: 42

243

Claus Mathiesen: 61; OVD-Info: 18

244

OVD-Info: 18

245

Freedom House: 34

246

Mark Galeotti: 58

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

accordingly. Although, a judge may be more likely to rule against a person, if they come to court

wearing for example a Navalny t-shirt.

247

4.1.4. Regional differences

For the past decade or more, draft evasion has typically been more prevalent in cities like

Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the central regions of Russia. The trend is more pronounced in

these areas compared to regions like North Caucasus, though it does not necessarily extend to

areas bordering Ukraine. In North Caucasus, jobs in the state service and in security services

are popular, and since these require a person to have completed military service, cases of draft

evasion are limited in these regions. The same goes for regions in the far north and the Siberian

regions.

248

4.1.5. Socio-economic differences

Draft evasion is more prevalent among the Russian middle class, which means one would see

proportionately more draft evaders in richer regions than in poorer regions. However, draft

evasion through corruption tends to be more of a social phaenomenon than a geographical

one. A family in Moscow is more likely to have the money to bribe a doctor, or is more likely to

attend university.

249

4.1.6. Sentenced in absentia

Several of the sources consulted claimed they had not heard of draft evaders being sentenced

in absentia.

250

Instead, a draft evader would be put on a wanted list and the criminal

proceeding suspended until he reappears.

251

Huseyn Aliyev claims that there is a tendency in

Russia to charge an individual when they actually have the person in question arrested or the

authorities have access to this individual. If a person has left the country in order to avoid

conscription, he will likely only be charged once he returns to Russia. The border officials will

have all the necessary information and data to detain the person.

252

The source from Freedom House elaborates that applying sentences in absentia for draft

evaders would lead to a delicate situation as many from the Russian elite have their young

family members abroad. Sentencing draft evaders in absentia would create a precedence,

which would have to be applied to everyone. The source therefore doubts that sentencing draft

evaders in absentia will be implemented. Also, the source was not aware of draft evaders

residing abroad who were deported back to Russia solely on the basis of draft evasion.

253

247

248

Mark Galeotti: 59

Huseyn Aliyev: 38

249

Mark Galeotti: 53-54

250

A human rights lawyer: 23; Claus Mathiesen: 62-63; Mediazona: 30

251

A human rights lawyer: 23

252

Huseyn Aliyev: 41-42

253

Freedom House: 35-36

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Claus Mathiesen claimed not to have encountered any cases of draft evaders being sentenced

in absentia, although he estimated that it is likely to have happened.

254

According to Mark

Galeotti, there have been cases of conscripts being sentenced in absentia although it is very

difficult to truly tell the numbers.

255

Sergey Krivenko conveys that there are no public systems allowing persons outside of Russia to

know if their case has been sent to criminal investigation.

256

4.2 Absence without official leave (AWOL) and desertion

Absence without official leave (AWOL), or unauthorised abandonment of a military unit or

place of service is regulated under article 337 of the Criminal Code, and is punishable with

arrest, detention in a disciplinary military unit or imprisonment. The term of detention, arrest

or imprisonment depends (however not exclusively) on the time a person has been absent.

257

The most severe article in this regard is applied when a person has been absent for more than a

month, which can be punished with five to ten years of imprisonment.

258

Desertion, unauthorised abandonment of a unit or place of service in order to evade military

service, is regulated under Article 338 of the Criminal Code and is punishable with

imprisonment for up to fifteen years.

259

Legally, desertion can only occur within a designated

combat unit. Therefore, only contract soldiers can be punished as deserters.

260

According to Claus Mathiesen, the penalty for AWOL, even from a non-combat military unit, is

more severe than for draft evaders, and would usually consist of detention at the military

barracks. This penalty will be decided administratively and not by a court of law. Mathiesen

noted that more and more people within the Russian military are given the mandate to reach

administrative decisions.

261

If a conscript were to leave their unit in the Kursk region, Sergey Krivenko is not aware if this

would legally be considered desertion or AWOL, as conscripts are involved in active fighting

there. Leaving one’s military unit is a crime, but the severity of the crime is worse when it takes

place during fighting or in a territory where there is declared a state of war. Therefore, leaving

one’s military unit as a conscript in the Kursk region would be more severe than leaving ones

military unit in e.g. Siberia or elsewhere in Russia. Potential punishments will also be higher. A

person leaving his military unit in e.g. Novosibirsk, and returning after a month, could be

254

255

Claus Mathiesen: 62-63

Mark Galeotti: 57

256

Sergey Krivenko: 49

257

Consultant, "Уголов�½ый кодекс Российской Федерации" от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 30.11.2024), Article

337,

url

258

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 8

259

Consultant, "Уголов�½ый кодекс Российской Федерации" от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 30.11.2024), Article

338,

url

260

Claus Mathiesen: 59

261

Claus Mathiesen: 60

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

sentenced to two years in prison. If a person does the same in the Kursk region, he could be

sentenced to up to ten years in prison.

262

According to OVD-Info, courts have mainly applied suspended sentences for cases related to

AWOL, which enables the soldier to be sent to the front after the punishment.

263

4.2.1. Development in number of criminal cases

Before the announcement of mobilisation and tougher punishment in the fall of 2022, Russian

soldiers were practically not prosecuted for refusing to serve. In May 2024, records were set in

such cases. In one month, 829 criminal cases of AWOL, 43 cases of failure to comply with an

order and 42 desertion cases came to the courts.

264

Statistics from June 2024 showed that there have been more than 10 000 cases of persons who

have been charged for refusing military service. The number might be even higher as of

November 2024.

265

According to Mediazona, by late summer there were about 12 000 criminal

cases against conscripts and contract soldiers.

266

It is worth noting however, that both

Mediazona and Irina Novik mention that it is not possible to tell from the statistics whether

cases on AWOL and desertion refer to contract soldiers or conscripts.

267

4.3. Consequences for family members

The sources interviewed for this report hold different perspectives on the prevalence and

severity of the consequences family members of draft evaders in Russia may face.

Claus Mathiesen stated that it is possible for family members to be prosecuted as accomplices

to evasion if they have actively participated in the avoidance of conscription. This would likely

be punished with a fine. He further stated that in other cases, evading the draft would most

likely have no consequences for a person’s family members.

268

According to Aliyev, evading a draft will most likely have no legal consequences for the person’s

family members, as there is no law delegalizing assistance to draft evaders.

269

However, there

were proposals by members of parliament to introduce such a law by supplementing the

Criminal Code with provisions on liability for those who help Russians illegally evade military

262

263

Sergey Krivenko: 46

OVD-Info: 18

264

Mediazona, Более 10 тысяч российских вое�½�½ых обви�½или в отказе от службы с �½ачала вой�½ы в Украи�½е, 18

Junel 2024,

url

265

Mediazona,

Более 10 тысяч российских вое�½�½ых обви�½или в отказе от службы с �½ачала вой�½ы в Украи�½е,

18 June,

url;

Important Stories, A Runaway Regiment, 19 November 2024,

url;

Journalist Irina Novik: 24

266

Mediazona: 1, 3

267

Mediazona: 1, 3; Journalist Irina Novik: 24

268

Claus Mathiesen: 62-63

269

Huseyn Aliyev: 43

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

service.

270

In reality, there have been no reports of family members being charged with

assisting somebody to evade conscription or for leaving false testimonies.

271

Several of the interviewed sources opined that family members risk being subjected to

questioning, harassment or different forms of pressure by the authorities in their search for

draft evaders.

272

Huseyn Aliyev mentioned that there is large-scale prevalence of cases of harassment by the

Voenkomats, with officials asking family members for bribes or pressuring them to deliver

information about their sons.

273

There have also been cases of local police officers (in charge of

delivering the summons) threatening and harassing families to draft evaders.

274

Another source conveyed that there have been cases of officials from the Voenkomat, the

police or FSB calling family members of ‘refusniki‘ and asking for the whereabouts of their son.

The same source mentioned how military officials threatened one family with withholding their

son’s college diploma if they did not comply and make their son adhere to his summons.

275

One source explained that the policy may confront family members of a draft evader in their

search for the person at the very beginning if the conscript refuses to receive his summons, but

it is rare. It would not happen after the person has evaded.

276

If a drafted person is not at home when visited by representatives of the Voenkomat, other

family members eligible for conscription would not be taken in his stead.

277

According to Mediazona, evading a draft is unlikely to have any consequences for the

conscript’s family members.

278

However, the authorities might talk to the conscript’s family and

try to make them convince him to perform his duty.

279

There is anecdotal evidence of parents or other family members trying to pressure their own

draft evading family member to appear at the Voenkomat, as they do not want him to break

the law.

280

270

Парламе�½тская газета, Сухарев предложил ввести ответстве�½�½ость за помощь в укло�½е�½ии от призыва,

2023-08-31,

url

271

Huseyn Aliyev: 43; Journalist Irina Novik: 27, -29

272

Huseyn Aliyev: 44, 55; Journalist Irina Novik: 27- 29; A human rights lawyer: 28; Freedom House: 38; Mediazona:

273

Huseyn Aliyev: 44

274

Huseyn Aliyev: 55

275

Journalist Irina Novik: 27- 29

276

A human rights lawyer: 28

277

Claus Mathiesen: 62-63

278

Mediazona: 33

279

Freedom House: 38; Mediazona: 33

280

OVD-Info: 16

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Relatives of draft evaders might be visited by the police in the authorities’ search for the

evaded person

281

, but in general, according to two sources, there is no pressure or punishment

upon family members to draft evaders.

282

As explained by Huseyn Aliyev, pressure on family members of draft evaders is more

widespread in regions where Voenkomat officials actually go door-to-door. In larger cities

where the summons often are sent by post, there is not much contact between the military

officials and the family members. In these cases, there are fewer opportunities for the

Voenkomat to put pressure on family members.

283

However, Mark Galeotti mentioned that in rural communities, where there is still more of a

sense of a collective unit, the local mayor or village ‘leader’ could tell the family that their son is

letting the country down by speaking to their patriotic feelings. This sort of social pressure

could happen, although the family would not be ostracised or prosecuted for the son’s

evasion.

284

281

282

Sergey Krivenko: 50

Sergey Krivenko: 50; Psovskaya Gubernia: 13

283

Huseyn Aliyev: 45

284

Mark Galeotti: 56

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

5. Material conditions for conscripts during service

Conscripts are used in every arms of service within the Russian military – in the army, the air

force and the navy,

285

and the general conditions under which conscripts serve do to some

degree vary depending on the arms of service.

286

Generally, the conditions for a conscript

serving in the army is worse than for a conscript serving in the air force or in the navy.

287

Most

conscripts are drafted to serve in the army.

288

Certain common standards are in place in every region.

289

Furthermore, one of the main

priorities of the Russian military is to make it more appealing to serve as a conscript and

subsequently signing a contract with the military. To accomplish this, efforts have been made to

improve the quality of military barracks and the quality of food.

290

The general conditions for conscripts have not changed since the beginning of the war.

291

Mark

Galeotti agrees, that the Russian military are making efforts to retain conscripts, but mentions

that the general situation for conscripts was fairly miserable prior to 2022.

292

There are regional differences in the general conditions for conscripts, and the conditions tend

to be better in the more wealthy regions like for example Moscow.

293

The practice of paying a

bribe to serve under better general conditions, in better barracks with better food, is also more

prevalent in the larger cities.

294

Conscripts serving in the larger cities can use a complicated

system of bribery to pay for e.g. more comfortable living conditions.

295

The general conditions for conscripts are the harshest in the regions of Kursk, Bryansk and

Belgorod, which border Ukraine. In these regions, conscripts are more likely to be stationed

outside in the fields, where they among other jobs are tasked with erecting defensive

fortifications.

296

In the regions of Kursk and Belgorod there have been cases of conscripts

complaining about being served expired food and complaints about the lack of proper

weapons.

297

285

286

A human rights lawyer: 35; Sergey Krivenko: 26; Huseyn Aliyev: 48; Mark Galeotti: 14

Clause Mathiesen: 65

287

Mark Galeotti: 30

288

Huseyn Aliyev: 48; Mark Galeotti

289

Sergey Krivenko:30

290

Mark Galeotti: 27; Claus Mathiesen 66

291

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 1; A human rights lawyer: 37; Sergey Krivenko: 29

292

Mark Galeotti: 26

293

Journalist Irina Novik: 7; Claus Mathiesen 67; A human rights lawyer: 41

294

Huseyn Aliyev: 59; Journalist Irina Novik: 7

295

Huseyn Aliyev: 59

296

Huseyn Aliyev: 54

297

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 1

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

According to a human rights lawyer, there have not been any widespread complaints over

health conditions, maintenance or related issues from conscripts. The source would most likely

have heard of these problems, if they were indeed widespread.

298

5.1. Access to health care services

In theory, conscripts do have access to health care services. However, medical resources are

becoming scarce, as military hospitals are increasingly receiving wounded soldiers,

299

and the

general quality of the health care system within the Russian military is not high.

300

Conscripts are under the jurisdiction of The Ministry of Defence during their time of service. In

case of injury or illness, they will therefore be treated at designated military hospitals and not

at public hospitals. In the regions near Ukraine, temporary military hospitals have been

constructed to offer further support to the war effort. Conscripts serving in these regions will

be treated at these temporary hospitals, if need be.

301

The quality of medical services varies from region to region and the lack of medical personnel is

more prevalent in the far east and in the more remote areas of Russia.

302

. Since the full-scale

invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the need for medical personnel to support the forces operating in

Ukraine has increased, leading to an overall lack of medical personnel everywhere in Russia

proper.

303

However, there are means of transportation available to conscripts serving in regions

with a poorer quality of medical services.

304

Huseyn Aliyev agrees that the quality of medical services depends on the individual unit and

that generally the quality is higher in the bigger cities, where conscripts can also be allowed to

use public medical facilities.

305

The scarcity of medical resources has led to cases where soldiers, despite being diagnosed and

recommended for treatment by a doctor, have been denied referral to a hospital by the

commanding officer. In other cases, doctors failed to diagnose a soldier correctly.

306

5.2. Hazing and “dedovshchina”

Historically, the practice of hazing junior conscripts – subjecting to violence – has played a

major role in the Russian military. During the Soviet era, the concept of ‘dedovshchina’, was

conceived. The classic notion of dedovshchina was a hierarchical system within the military,

where order within military units was kept by senior conscripts who subjected junior conscripts

298

299

A human rights lawyer: 40

Sergey Krivenko: 27

300

OVD-Info: 27

301

A human rights lawyer: 39

302

Sergey Krivenko: 28

303

Huseyn Aliyev: 63

304

Sergey Krivenko: 28

305

Huseyn Aliyev: 61

306

Journalist

Irina Novik: 12

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

to hazing and violence.

307

Dedovshchina consists of both physical and verbal abuse as well as

the practice of extracting money from junior conscripts by threatening to assign them to very

undesirable tasks.

308

The practice of dedovshchina, in this traditional sense, has since become much less prevalent.

This is partly due to the shortening of conscription service from two years to one year, which

has significantly reduced the seniority gap between conscripts compared to the Soviet era.

309

The Russian military has taken steps to reduce the prevalence of dedovshchina.

310

Dedovshchina does however, still exist in Russian military units, where the general level of

violence is still relatively high,

311

but is now more a concept of just violence and the prevalence

of dedovshchina depends on the culture within the individual military unit and its commanding

officers. It also depends on the geographical location of the military unit. For instance,

conscripts serving in more remote regions like Kamchatka could be more likely to be subjected

to dedovshchina, as there are fewer opportunities for conscripts to ”blow off steam” and as the

posting is further away from the view of higher authorities.

312

As stated by one source, a bored

soldier is more likely to participate in dedovshchina than a soldier with a meaningful

existence.

313

Dedovshchina exists in every arm of service, although it is less prevalent in the more specialised

units like the Spetznaz.

314

Due to dedovshchina being somewhat arbitrary in nature, it is difficult to identify certain

profiles who would be more at risk of being subjected to this practice than others.

315

Certain ethnic groups such as those from Buryatia, members of the LGBT community and

conscripts who do not align with traditional notions of masculinity may, however, face an

increased risk of experiencing dedovshchina.

316

Specifically, conscripts belonging to ethnic minorities not native to the territory of the Russian

Federation are more likely to be subjected to harassment, hazing and discrimination. This could

be the case for conscripts from Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) many of whom hold Russian citizenship.

317

307

308

Sergey Krivenko: 38

Huseyn Aliyev: 56

309

Claus Mathiesen: 68; A human rights lawyer: 42; Irina Novik: 8, Pskovskaya Gubernia: 3; Sergey Krivenko: 38

310

Mark Galeotti: 28

311

Sergey Krivenko: 38; Freedom House: 27

312

Mark Galeotti: 31; A human rights lawyer: 41 -42

313

Claus Mathiesen: 71

314

Huseyn Aliyev: 57

315

Sergey Krivenko: 41

316

Irina Novik: 9; A human rights lawyer: 43; Huseyn Aliyev: 69

317

Huseyn Aliyev: 68

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Despite the prevalence of dedovshchina, there are no recent reports of serious injuries or

death caused by this practice. However, traditionally death by suicide has been used within the

Russian military to explain death caused by hazing.

318

A conscript who has been subjected to dedovshchina does have the formal right to file a

complaint to

the military prosecutor’s office

or to

the military investigation department.

Doing

so does, however, inherently comes with a risk, especially if the complaint is directed at the

commander of the military unit, as the conscript risks returning to that same military unit if his

complaint is unsuccessful.

319

A conscript facing abuse may also seek a transfer to a different military unit, but this typically

requires legal assistance, as securing a transfer independently is highly challenging.

320

The best way for a conscript facing abuse is to flee his military unit. Although fleeing is a

criminal offence. However, if the conscript promptly files a complaint citing abuse as the

reason for his actions, he will not be prosecuted should his complaint be successful.

321

5.2.1. Conscripts belonging to the LGBT community

Members of the LGBT community are especially at risk of being subjected to dedovshchina or

abuse in general,

322

and a conscript belonging to the LGBT community would normally try to

hide his sexual orientation. There are cases of LGBT members being sexually assaulted by other

soldiers in the Russian military.

323

LGBT persons who are subjected to abuse would likely be unable to obtain assistance within

their military units, and asking fellow soldiers for help would more likely than not make the

situation even worse.

324

Being a member of the LGBT community is not illegal in itself in Russia as long as the person

does not propagate the LGBT community. Therefore, a conscript who has been sexually

assaulted by other soldiers could in theory file a complaint. However, no statistics exist on such

cases.

325

There are cases of members of the LGBT community serving in the military without any

incidents, as they successfully managed to hide their sexual orientation.

326

318

319

A human rights lawyer: 44

Sergey Krivenko: 42

320

Sergey Krivenko: 43

321

Sergey Krivenko: 44; Huseyn Aliyev: 58

322

Freedom House: 28; A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 13

323

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 13

324

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 15

325

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 17

326

A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights: 14

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

5.2.2. Conscripts from North Caucasus

Russian military units are comprised of conscripts from different regions, and there are no units

comprised of conscripts from one single region. This mixture of regions and ethnicities could

lead to clashes and problems with discipline.

327

Conscripts from the regions of North Caucasus, including Chechnya, overall serve under the

same conditions as conscripts from any other region.

328

However, Mark Galeotti opines, that

conscripts from the regions of North Caucasus do risk facing prejudice within the military.

329

Prejudice against conscripts from North Caucasus is more prevalent the further away from their

home region a conscript is posted. This is, however, also the case for conscripts from other

regions as well.

330

Claus Mathiesen notes that it is in fact the practice of the Russian military to post conscripts far

away from their home region.

331

327

328

Sergey Krivenko: 56

Mark Galeotti: 50

329

Mark Galeotti: 51

330

Huseyn Aliyev: 64, 65

331

Claus Mathiesen: 45

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

6. Tasks performed by conscripts

All new conscripts are given six to eight weeks of basic military training upon joining the

military only after which they will be given the actual rank of ‘ryadavoy’ (equivalent to

private).

332

A conscript that performs well, may eventually be promoted to the rank of

“efreytor” (equivalent to the rank of private first class), but a conscript can no longer advance

to the rank of a non-commissioned officer.

333

Being promoted to the rank of efreytor is desirable, as efreytors are exempted from performing

the more mundane tasks in the military.

334

Huseyn Aliyev approximates, that 65 percent of the tasks performed by conscripts involve

manual labour. A conscript could for instance be tasked with constructing both military and

civilian facilities or with cleaning the base.

335

Other tasks could be related to logistics,

communication and supply lines.

336

The overall quality of the basic training given to conscripts is relatively low, but conscripts

drafted into more elite units in the military are given better training.

337

6.1. Refusal to perform a task

Since September 2022, refusing to obey a military command formally constitutes a punishable

crime. However, a conscript is only obliged to carry out lawful orders. A conscript is therefore

for example not obliged to obey an order to wash his commanding officer’s car, and he cannot

formally be prosecuted for not doing so.

338

Disobeying an unlawful order, however, could result in the conscript being subjected to physical

violence.

339

In reality, refusing such an illegal order is difficult.

340

According to Huseyn Aliyev, the reality of the Russian military is, that conscripts have been

perceived as a free labour source for the past 30 years, and that conscripts must perform

whatever tasks given to them by their commanding officers.

341

Huseyn Aliyev further

elaborates, that some conscripts are even threatened or beaten pre-emptively if they show a

lack of disposition towards these extracurricular activities.

342

332

333

Claus Mathiesen: 40

Claus Mathiesen: 41, 43

334

Claus Mathiesen 42

335

Huseyn Aliyev: 50

336

Huseyn Aliyev: 49

337

Huseyn Aliyev: 50,51; Freedom House: 24

338

Sergey Krivenko: 45; Mark Galeotti: 44

339

Claus Mathiesen: 72;Mark Galeotti: 45; Huseyn Aliyev: 66

340

A human rights lawyer: 48

341

Huseyn Aliyev: 52

342

Huseyn Aliyev: 53

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

A conscript, who has been given an unlawful order, can in theory file a complaint. However,

doing so firstly requires the conscript to actually know what his rights are, and in Russia, many

people are unaware of their rights. Secondly, the process of filing such a complaint is difficult

and doing so could lead to even more problems for the conscript.

343

6.2. Tasks related to the war effort in Ukraine

Conscripts support the war effort in Ukraine through logistical tasks, i.e. as drivers, mechanics,

or as delivery staff, etc. Additionally, conscripts have operated checkpoints, have forwarded

observation posts and have assisted FPV drone teams. Rear artillery positions are also staffed

by conscripts.

344

Conscripts have been actively used to guard the Russian-Ukrainian border since the autumn of

2022.

345

By Russian law, conscripts can only be posted inside Russian territory,

346

and most

sources agree that conscripts do not serve in Ukraine proper.

347

Russia considers the annexed Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia

part of the Russian territory. The question of whether conscripts serve in these regions is

debated among the interviewed sources. Some sources believe that conscripts are not posted

in the annexed regions.

348

Other sources believe that conscripts are in fact posted in the

annexed regions.

349

Russian law prohibits using conscripts in combat units,

350

and the majority of sources believe,

that conscripts are therefore not used for combat duties including in the annexed regions.

351

the initial stages of the full-scale invasion, there were reports about conscripts having taken

part in combat duties in Ukraine, as well as being taken as prisoners of war (POWs) by the

Ukrainian military. This was also acknowledged by the Russian MoD.

352

According to more

recent reporting from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian officials have assured

the Russian public that conscripts will not be deployed to most of occupied Ukraine or

participate in combat operations in Ukraine, although they will likely attempt to coerce

and deceive conscripts into signing contracts with the Russian military in order to fight in

Ukraine.

353

According to sources who believed that conscripts are posted in Ukraine, these

343

344

Journalist Irina Novik: 16; A human rights lawyer: 48

Claus Mathiesen: 91; Huseyn Aliyev: 72

345

BBC News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

346

Claus Mathiesen: 86

347

Mediazona: 10; Huseyn Aliyev: 82; Mark Galeotti: 39

348

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 7; A human rights lawyer: 54; Novaya Gazeta 37; Mediazona: 10; Mark Galeotti: 39

349

Claus Mathiesen: 86; Huseyn Aliyev: 82; Journalist Irina Novik: 19;Sergey Krivenko: 37

350

Claus Mathiesen: 86

351

Huseyn Aliyev: 82; Journalist Irina Novik: 18

352

Reuters,

Russia Acknowledges conscripts were part of Ukraine operation, some are POWs,

9 March 2022,

url;

Politico,

What the use of Russian conscripts tells us about the war in Ukraine,

17 March 2022,

url

353

Institute for the Study of War (ISW),

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 16, 2024,

16 June 2024,

url;

Institute for the Study of War (ISW),

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2024,

28 December

2024,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

conscripts are performing duties supporting the Russian war effort such as constructing

defensive fortifications or digging trenches.

354

Despite not being deployed for active combat,

conscripts serving near the front lines do however still risk being subjected to Ukrainian drone

attacks or missile attacks.

355

According to Huseyn Aliyev, ending up in one of the annexed regions would put a conscript in a

desperate situation, as he would be at much higher risk of sustaining life threatening injuries

there than in any other part of Russia. Huseyn Aliyev further elaborates, that there have been

cases where military barracks housing conscripts have been hit by long-range Ukrainian missiles

in Luhansk and Donetsk, but conscripts serving in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be less likely

to be hit.

356

6.3. Conscripts in the Kursk region

The situation for conscripts in the Kursk region is unique compared to Russian conscripts

deployed to other regions. Prior to the Kursk incursion, the majority of Russian forces on the

border with Ukraine was made up of conscripts. When the offensive commenced, conscripts

therefore took the heaviest blows.

357

There are no official numbers of casualties of conscripts in the Kursk region

358

, nor is there a

consensus on this matter among the consulted sources. According to Huseyn Aliyev, more than

a thousand conscripts have lost their lives and many have been taken prisoner since the

beginning of the Kursk incursion.

359

Irina Novik is aware of at least 13 conscripts being killed in

the region of Kursk.

360

According to an article from the BBC, at least 159 Russian conscripts have

been confirmed dead since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

361

According to Russian law, conscripts may only be deployed for combat in peacekeeping

operations or in anti-terrorist operations. The Ukrainian presence in Kursk has, however, been

classified as a terrorist incursion by Russian officials, meaning that conscripts may in fact be

deployed for combat in Kursk. Refusing to fight in Kursk, therefore also constitutes a criminal

offense.

362

Since most conscripts have only had very basic military training, they generally make for poor

combat soldiers,

363

and they are most likely used only defensively in Kursk and not used to

attack Ukrainian positions. Conscripts in the Kursk region could, however, be posted in the

354

355

Huseyn Aliyev: 72

Huseyn Aliyev: 82

356

Huseyn Aliyev: 82-84

357

Huseyn Aliyev: 74; A human rights lawyer: 55

358

Huseyn Aliyev: 74

359

Huseyn Aliyev: 74

360

Journalist Irina Novik: 17

361

BBC News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

362

Huseyn Aliyev: 80

363

Novaya Gazeta: 36; Freedom House: 24

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

second line of defence holding, improving and expanding these positions and thereby

supporting the regular troops and their assault operations.

364

Once source, however, opines that conscripts are used offensively as well as defensively in the

region of Kursk.

365

The Russian casualties in the Kursk region are high, and a conscript initially serving somewhere

else in Russia, does risk being transferred to a military unit in the Kursk region to replenish the

ranks.

366

Freedom House

367

opines that although Russian law prohibits the deployment of conscripts on

the front line, there are cases of junior conscripts being sent to the front line without any

proper training to be used as “cannon fodder”.

368

This source as the only one among the

interviewed sources opined that conscripts are not only used on the front line in the region of

Kursk but also inside Ukraine proper,

369

and that military commanders try to avoid casualties

amongst their more qualified soldiers by using conscripts in areas under heavy Ukrainian fire.

370

However, there is a level of uncertainty and it is not possible to know in advance, who is going

to be sent to the frontline.

371

None of the consulted sourced had heard of incidents, where conscripts were used to guard or

transport Ukrainian prisoners of war.

372

364

365

Huseyn Aliyev: 78; Claus Mathiesen: 89

Sergey Krivenko: 35

366

Sergey Krivenko: 36

367

It should be noted that Freedom House is the only of the interviewed sources who conveys that conscripts are

used actively in combat activities on the front line in Ukraine.

368

Freedom House: 17

369

Freedom House: 20

370

Freedom House: 23

371

Freedom House: 22

372

A human rights lawyer: 56

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

7. Signing contracts with the MoD

Until April 2023, it was not possible to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in

Russia immediately after finishing school – first, a person had to serve at least three months as

a conscript or graduate from a technical college or university.

373

Any conscript who has served for at least one month can legally sign a contract with the

MoD.

374

In some cases, conscripts can become contract soldiers after even less than a month's

military service.

375

Conscripts can sign contracts within the first days or months of their mandatory service.

376

This

practice emerged after the start of the offensive in the Kursk region.

377

Thus, one year of

conscription service becomes two years of contracted service, meaning that the soldier is paid

a one-time sum for signing up and a monthly salary.

378

Prior to the Kursk Incursion, human rights organisations had only recorded isolated cases of

such early contract signing.

379

By law, conscripts are required to undergo training for several

months before entering into a contract.

380

There are no statistics yet, but there are similar cases

where relatives already have taken legal action.

381

It is still technically possible to sign a fixed term contract with the understanding that the

authorities can choose not to let the person go.

382

Actually, some contract soldiers are being

discharged at the end of their contract period. Although, most contract soldiers would not be

released after the end of their contract, in accordance to the presidential decree on partial

mobilisation.

383

Whether or not the Russian military will in fact respect that a contract has been

signed for a fixed period is not clear.

384

Contract soldiers who have been released from their contracts are more likely to be perceived

by the authorities as either not being very good soldiers or having paid off their commanding

officer.

385

If a soldier is released from their contract, they can trade every two days of

373

374

BBC News, Их там есть.

Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

Huseyn Aliyev: 86; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 24; Telegram,

МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ I Новости I Сроч�½ики - Очеред�½ых

сроч�½иков заставили подписать ко�½тракт,

21 November 2024,

url

375

Huseyn Aliyev: 86

376

Claus Mathiesen: 82; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 26

377

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 26

378

Claus Mathiesen: 82

379

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 26; Sever Realii,

"Мы в ужасе, воевать �½е хотим". Сроч�½икам платят по

фальшивым ко�½трактам,

20 October 2024,

url

380

Claus Mathiesen: 82; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 26

381

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 26; Sever Realii,

"Мы в ужасе, воевать �½е хотим". Сроч�½икам платят по

фальшивым ко�½трактам,

20 October 2024,

url

382

Mark Galeotti: 47; Claus Mathiesen: 84

383

Consultant, Указ Президе�½та РФ от 21.09.2022 N 647 "Об

объявле�½ии частич�½ой мобилизации в Российской

Федерации",

21 September 2022,

url;

Mark Galeotti: 47

384

Claus Mathiesen: 84

385

Mark Galeotti: 48; Claus Mathiesen: 83

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

contracted service with one day of served conscription service. The reason for this being that a

contract soldier is obliged to serve.

386

It is estimated that approximately 40 to 50 percent of any group of conscripts will sign contracts

with the MoD.

387

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the military authorities reported that

almost 50 percent of conscripts signed a contract.

388

In 2022, and even in 2023, there were

apparently still quite a significant number of conscripts who willingly signed military

contracts.

389

Although, the numbers have been fewer after the incursion in the Kursk Region

started.

390

There are no available statistics revealing how many persons have signed contracts with the

MoD according to Russian law, contract soldiers can only become so by voluntarily signing their

contracts.

391

In a number of cases, the MoD has assured relatives of deceased contract soldiers

that they had signed their contract voluntarily, coincidentally, just weeks or even days before

their deaths.

392

The proportion of conscripts who have signed contracts with the MoD after or during their

conscription period has decreased since 2022. Although, it is difficult to know with certainty

due to the fact that conscripts are now given the choice of being a professional soldier and thus

receive bonuses and other benefits.

393

The proportion of conscripts, who initially refuse to sign

contracts, but eventually do, is high, but not has high as it has been.

394

Conscripts serving in units with lenient enforcement mechanisms are less likely to avoid signing

contracts with the MoD.

395

However, in 2024, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the

number of those who willingly sign contracts is exceptionally small.

396

7.1. Persuasion to sign contracts

There is no standard procedure for how conscripts sign contracts. The procedure varies from

region to region and in each military unit.

397

It depends on the military commander and in some

cases, conscripts are persuaded to sign contracts.

398

386

387

Claus Mathiesen: 83

Huseyn Aliyev: 96; Journalist Irina Novik: 23

388

Sergey Krivenko: 53

389

Huseyn Aliyev: 94

390

Journalist Irina Novik: 20

391

Sergey Krivenko: 53; Journalist Irina Novik: 23; Nastoyashee Vremya,

Убежде�½ие и соблаз�½е�½ие де�½ьгами.

Правозащит�½ик – о том, как призыв�½иков заставляют подписывать ко�½тракт с Ми�½оборо�½ы РФ,

October 2024,

url

392

BBC News, Их там есть.

Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

393

Mark Galeotti: 46

394

Mark Galeotti: 46

395

Huseyn Aliyev: 96

396

Huseyn Aliyev: 94

397

Huseyn Aliyev: 87; Mediazona: 21;

398

Huseyn Aliyev: 87; Freedom House: 29; Mark Galeotti: 49

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The average salary for a conscript is approximately 2 000 rubles a month (the equivalent of 19

euro), which include free accommodation and food rations. The low salary is one of the reasons

why conscripts may want to sign contracts with the MoD.

399

Conscripts are often incentivised to sign contracts through financial rewards.

400

Among these

incentives are high salaries and large one-off payments.

401

A person can for instance get a

onetime sum of 3 million rubles (app. 28 130 euro) for signing up to the military and after that

he will be paid 2 500 to 3 000 euro every month. This is a considerable amount of money

compared to a Russian with an average income, and the authorities therefore have no need for

violence or pressure to persuade people to sign contracts with the military.

402

The authorities’ main objective is to sign up as many soldiers as possible. Therefore, pay-outs

are continuously rising to incentivise contract signing.

403

The amount of money one can get for signing a contract varies from region to region. Some of

the wealthier regions are even able to attract men from other regions to sign contracts. One

source had heard of people being paid up to 50 000 euro to sign a contract.

404

The regions compete with each other to sign up soldiers as each region has a quota of contract

soldiers to fill.

405

The military officials can also be rewarded for their recruitment effort through

various ways including financial rewards. This leads commanders to being innovative when it

comes to signing up contract soldiers.

406

The border regions of Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk and the regions in the North Caucasus are

the regions who offer the highest financial incentives for signing a contract. Regions such as

Rostov region are perceived to be a near border region, and thus slightly safer. However, it is

expected that there will be more efforts to recruit military persons from Rostov region rather

than somewhere further into Siberia or the far north.

407

Financial rewards are more effective for recruiting reservists or individuals of older age, due to

their poorer financial situation. Many of them have taken loans or have mortgages, lack

employment, etc.

408

399

Journalist Irina Novik: 19; Verstka,

Правозащит�½ики сообщили о росте числа жалоб от сроч�½иков �½а

при�½ужде�½ие к ко�½тракту с Ми�½оборо�½ы,

13 November 2024,

url

400

A human rights lawyer: 49; Huseyn Aliyev: 88; Claus Mathiesen: 80

401

Huseyn Aliyev: 88

402

A human rights lawyer: 49; Huseyn Aliyev: 88

403

A human rights lawyer: 5; Claus Mathiesen: 49; Huseyn Aliyev: 92

404

A human rights lawyer: 50

405

A human rights lawyer: 50; Mark Galeotti: 49

406

Huseyn Aliyev: 92

407

Huseyn Aliyev: 99

408

Huseyn Aliyev: 95

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Soldiers are also promised various social benefits and a stable career in the military. Many

conscripts are also convinced by various patriotic slogans such as “serve your country”, “be a

real man”, etc.

409

State propaganda plays an important part in this narrative.

410

Conscripts from poor or remote regions of Russia are more likely to sign contracts due to

patriotic fervour than those from wealthier regions of Russia.

411

Contract soldiers come in great

numbers from the regions of Buryatia, Tuva and Chukotka. However, the reasons for this are

mainly financial and less patriotic.

412

7.2. Pressure to sign contracts

The Russian authorities exercise pressure over conscripts to convince them to sign contracts

with the MoD.

413

Much of such pressure is driven by cultures within the military. The military

has been told that they have to persuade a certain amount of people each month to sign

contracts and then they find ways of doing that.

414

Pressure exercised by the authorities takes place in nearly every military unit and the forms of

the pressure can differ. Sometimes the command seeks to convince the conscript by using

moral pressure. Physical violence in order to pressure a conscript to sign a contract is rare, but

according to Sergey Krivenko, such cases do occur.

415

The units posted in the border regions with Ukraine are under the most pressure to sign

contracts, as the governors of the regions and the local military officials are under considerable

pressure from the Kremlin to recruit more people into the Armed Forces. They are quite heavily

reliant on these forcible methods of attracting conscripts and they are the ones that are

increasing the amounts of financial rewards.

416

Some conscripts can be forced to sign a contract.

417

There is a so-called blame and shame

culture meaning that not signing a contract in front of the other soldiers could be considered

shameful.

418

In some military bases, some conscripts are labelled as cowards by having their

photographs pinned on boards for all to see (for an example of this method please see the

interview in

Annex 2 Aliyev).

419

409

410

Huseyn Aliyev: 88; Claus Mathiesen: 80

Claus Mathiesen: 80

411

Freedom House: 29

412

Claus Mathiesen: 81

413

Mark Galeotti: 49; Mediazona: 20; Claus Mathiesen: 77; Sergey Krivenko: 52-53; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 23;

Huseyn Aliyev: 86; Pskovskaya Gubernia: 14; Journalist Irina Novik: 19+21; Verstka,

Правозащит�½ики сообщили о

росте числа жалоб от сроч�½иков �½а при�½ужде�½ие к ко�½тракту с Ми�½оборо�½ы,

13 November 2024,

url;

BBC

News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

414

Mark Galeotti: 49

415

Sergey Krivenko: 52

416

Huseyn Aliyev: 97

417

Huseyn Aliyev: 86; Pskovskaya Gubernia: 14

418

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 14; Huseyn Aliyev: 90

419

Huseyn Aliyev: 90

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It is possible to refuse to sign a contract.

420

Doing so could, however, cause problems with the

officers, who can make life very difficult for the conscript in question.

421

Furthermore, his fellow

soldiers would not see him as a real man.

422

This type of peer pressure can be psychologically

tough for many conscripts.

423

A more widespread approach for the authorities to make conscripts sign contracts with the

MoD seems to be a forcible approach, where conscripts are threatened with physical

punishment. They could for instance risk being locked in the basement until they sign a

contract. According to Huseyn Aliyev, there are various reports that hundreds of conscripts

have been locked in facilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions for months.

424

There have been cases where a conscript’s signature has been falsified, and as a result, the

conscripts are being sent as contract soldiers to Ukraine.

425

If this happens, it is possible for the

conscript to file a complaint through his family or relatives, although it is rather difficult.

426

In other cases, conscripts have received the one-time pay-off that a soldier receives upon

signing a contract with the military before actually having signed the contract.

427

In these cases,

the pressure on the conscript to sign up is immense, and in fact not actively returning the

money could be considered as acceptance of contract duty by default.

428

There have been cases of contracts being written and presented to conscripts without any prior

indication that they wanted to sign up.

429

In one particular case, the authorities persuaded a

conscript to sign an initial report about whether one would sign a contract or not. However, the

report that he was forced to sign, was in fact not an initial report, but an actual contract with

the MoD.

430

In other cases, contracts have been signed by a conscript’s commander without

the consent or knowledge of the conscript.

431

One source stressed that signing up as a contract soldier is not a one-step procedure; rather it

requires at least two steps. Firstly, one should sign an application on one’s desire to join the

contract service. Sometime later, the person will sign the contract itself, and there is still a

possibility to refuse in the second step of this procedure. The source is aware of situations

420

421

Mediazona: 20; Novaya Gazeta Europe: 25; Pskovskaya Gubernia: 15

Mediazona: 20

422

In Russian called: Muzhik (Мужик)

423

Pskovskaya Gubernia: 15; Journalist Irina Novik: 21

424

Huseyn Aliyev: 89-90

425

Sergey Krivenko: 54; Huseyn Aliyev: 91; Freedom House: 6; Kholod,

«Я вроде терпилой �½икогда �½е был, �½о

ме�½я как будто зомбировали»,

27 July 2023,

url;

Meduza,

На вой�½е в Украи�½е погиб 20-лет�½ий сроч�½ик с

Сахали�½а. О�½ утверждал, что его подпись под ко�½трактом с Ми�½оборо�½ы подделали — теперь это

подтвердила экспертиза,

11 December 2024,

url;

BBC News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают

�½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

426

Sergey Krivenko: 54; Huseyn Aliyev: 91

427

Claus Mathiesen: 79; Telegram,

Новая газета Европа - Россия�½е продолжают получать де�½ьги за

ко�½тракты с Ми�½оборо�½ы, которые �½е заключали,

October 2024,

url

428

Claus Mathiesen: 79

429

Claus Mathiesen: 78

430

Journalist Irina Novik: 22; Novaya Gazeta Europe,

«М�½е бы хотелось остаться в России»,

14 March 2024,

url

431

Telegram,

Сахали�½ против вой�½ы,

22 October 2024,

url;

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 23

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

where people have changed their minds, and with the help from human rights defenders, they

managed to halt the procedure so that these persons managed to avoid contract service.

432

If a person has already signed a contract, the only way to avoid fulfilling the contract is by

taking the case to court. The chance of getting out of the contract is about 50/50, and human

rights organisations try to help conscripts in these cases.

433

432

433

Sergey Krivenko: 55

Novaya Gazeta Europe: 25

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8. Conscripts from the Russian Caucasus regions

In general, the North Caucasian regions are poorer than the other regions of Russia with low

wages compared to the rest of the country. Employment in the military is thus considered an

attractive job opportunity by many in these regions.

434

Prior to the full-scale invasion,

conscripts from the North Caucasus regions queued to be enrolled into military, as they saw

serving in the military as a social lift with good salaries.

435

In terms of the institutional structures, conscripts from the North Caucasus regions would serve

under the same conditions as any other conscript.

436

However, persons from North Caucasus

may face a certain amount of prejudice in the ranks.

437

This means that if a conscript from an

ethnic minority in the North Caucasus were to end up in a military unit consisting solely of

ethnic Russians, they might face a certain degree of discrimination due to their ethnic and

religious background.

438

There is always a chance that this person will actually be posted in his

own home republic. This happens frequently with individuals from North Caucasus, for

example, from Dagestan, Ingushetia or Chechnya, where they can rely on a certain degree of

protection (krysha).

439

Traditionally, the narrative within the Russian military has been that the practice of

dedovshchina

to some extent has been due to ethnic differences. Consequently, the military

now aims to keep different ethnic groups apart from one another.

440

This means that conscripts

from the North Caucasus will usually serve with other conscripts from the same region.

441

If a person is posted close to their hometown, they are more likely to be safe and they would

serve under better conditions. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, their conditions depend to

some extent on their ability to pay bribes and to use their connections in order to serve in their

home regions and possibly closer to their hometowns.

442

8.1. The situation for Chechen conscripts

Chechens are being conscripted for military service, and they might be sent to any part of

Russia to serve. Chechen conscripts serve in many different units including in the National

Guard.

443

According to Mark Galeotti, there still seems to be evidence that Chechen conscripts

434

435

OVD-Info: 25

OVD-Info: 26

436

Mark Galeotti: 52

437

Mark Galeotti: 52

438

Huseyn Aliyev: 65+69

439

Huseyn Aliyev: 69

440

Claus Mathiesen: 75

441

Claus Mathiesen: 76

442

Huseyn Aliyev: 64

443

A human rights lawyer: 51; Claus Mathiesen: 75; Mediazona: 13

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tend to be deployed to Chechen units.

444

However, it is difficult to tell in practice, as the data is

not fully transparent.

445

When the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, wants to express his loyalty to Kremlin, local

municipalities are directed to fill specific quotas with men to the military. According to Freedom

House, many people from Chechnya become elite contract soldiers to ensure the safety of their

families. Pressure on families is used as a weapon to exercise control over unwilling family

members in Chechnya. Although this source was not certain that these practices applied to

conscripts, however, it is probable.

446

The situation for Chechens is different compared to the situation of other Russians, because

most officers in the Russian military dislike Chechens and Kadyrov. Chechens do not fight in

Ukraine with the regular Russian military. They only fight in local Chechen groups.

447

The vast majority of Chechens have not been required to undertake conscription since 1991,

even though Chechnya officially resumed conscription on a limited scale in 2014. In 2024, only

500 Chechens were drafted in each conscription cycle, representing a mere 0.33 percent of the

total number of conscripts in the military's latest intake, which is a proportion that has

remained unchanged even after the full-scale invasion began in Ukraine.

448

444

445

Mark Galeotti: 51

A human rights lawyer: 51

446

Freedom House: 32

447

Mediazona: 12; see

Russia - Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

for further on this topic.

448

Novaya Gazeta Europe,

An army of one,

4 September 2024,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Legislation



New legislation since December 2022

Recruitment of conscripts



Situation for conscripts (nutrition, physical conditions, tasks)



Places of posting (frontline, border area, Ukraine)



Prevalence of pressure on conscripts to sign contracts with the MoD



Situation of conscripts from the Caucasus regions of Russia



Prevalence of work tasks related to the Russian war effort in Ukraine

Draft evasion and desertion



Enforcement of legislation



Possibility to exit Russia after receiving call-up/summons



Consequences for family members to draft evaders/deserters



Sentenced in absentia



Extrajudicial punishments

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Annex 2: Meeting minutes

Meeting with Claus Mathiesen

Associate professor in Russian, Royal Danish Defence College

Legislation

1. The main piece of legislation when it comes to understanding Russian military service

is the

law on conscription and military service,

which was implemented in 1998 and

amended several times since. This law contains the details for both conscription,

contract soldiers and mobilisation.

2. Conscription is part of

the Russian constitution’s article 59.

3. After 4-6 weeks of basic training, new conscripts are required to take an oath swearing

their allegiance to Russia. Basic training teaches conscripts to behave as soldiers, for

instance: How to correctly wear their uniform.

4. Conscription is a broad term, as former conscription soldiers are subject to mustering.

This means, that conscripts who during their conscription service have been trained for

a specific function, may be summoned for mustering, if the Russian authorities deem it

necessary. During mustering exercises, the military checks, if the summoned soldiers

still have the expertise to carry out the duties for which they were trained.

5. There are two kinds of reservists in the Russian military. The first kind, in Russian called

Zapas,

consist of former conscripts trained for specific functions within the military.

These former conscripts are listed as reservists eligible for being summoned for a

number of years.

6. The other kind of reservist, in Russian called

Reserv,

which is a broader term as it

includes all people who would be obliged to serve in the military if summoned. This

could for instance be a nurse or a doctor, who never previously had served in the

military.

7. Russia has activated a state of war, in Russian called

voennoe polozhenie,

which means

that reservists can legally be called in for duty. The state of war is activated to a

different degree in different regions.

The Russian constitutional law on Martial Law

contains a number of different

measures that can be activated in times of war, limiting the rights of the Russian

population, as the authorities can for instance implement curfews or visitation zones.

These measures have been activated in full in the regions bordering Ukraine. The

further away from Ukraine a region is located, the fewer measures have been put into

force.

9. The obligation for the abovementioned reservists to appear for service if summoned

also apply during times of mobilisation. The only official mobilisation of 300 000 men

was announced by President Putin in the autumn of 2022.

Draft procedures

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10. The process of conscription is twofold. The year a Russian man turns 17, he is

summoned for a preliminary conscription evaluation during which he will be assessed

by a number of doctors, specialists and psychologists before being evaluated for

service by the Voenkomat in Russian called Voenkomat. This preliminary evaluation is

mandatory for every man once he turns 17.

11. After this evaluation, the young men are put in to one of five categories.



The first category (category A) is for those deemed fit for military service.



Category B is for those who are fit to serve with minor limitations.



The third category (category V) is for those who are deemed fit to serve with

limitations.



Men who are temporarily unfit to serve are put in to the fourth category.

Usually, these are men with treatable health conditions, and they are then

given 6 months to undergo treatment after which they will be re-evaluated by

the Voenkomat.



The fifth category is reserved for men deemed unfit for military service.

12. Those assessed in category V (3) are not called up during peacetime but may be called

up during wartime. As they have no prior military training, they must undergo a shorter

or longer training programme to perform service during wartime, likely in roles that

are not particularly demanding. Those assessed in category G (4), are referred for

treatment lasting between 6 to 12 months. Following this, a new health assessment is

conducted, which could potentially lead to placement in any of the other categories,

i.e., A (fit), B (fit with minor limitations), V (limited suitability), or D (unfit). In the first

two cases, individuals are called up for compulsory military service. In the latter two

cases, they are not called up, but if placed in category V (limited suitability), they are

transferred to the mobilisable reserve and may be called up during wartime. For those

initially placed in category G (4), their subsequent category could be any of the four

mentioned. However, the most likely outcome—if no specific treatment is undertaken

during the 6-12 months but recovery from fractures or similar occurs naturally—is

placement in category B (2).

13. These five categories have remained unchanged for as long as the source remembers,

and may in fact date all the way back to the time of the Russian Tsars.

14. In peacetime, only men in category A and B are drafted for military service, but in

wartime, men who have been deemed fit to serve with limitations are transferred to

the reserve.

15. In the early 2000’s approximately 30% of the young men were deemed unfit to serve.

During recent years, that number has become lower and lower, according to official

sources.

16. Traditionally, corruption has played a significant part in how many men were

exempted from military service for medical reasons. Conscripts have also used bribery

to influence where they would be eventually posted as it may be more appealing to

serve close to their home region than very far away from it.

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17. After turning 18, Russian men are eligible for conscription and if they are drafted, they

will once again be examined medically for changes in their health condition.

18. The draft is handled by the regional Voenkomat, the Voenkomat.

19. During the first three months of the year, the Voenkomat conducts the preliminary

screenings of young men, and from April to the end of July the first draft for

conscription service of the year is conducted. From October until the end of the year,

the Voenkomat conduct the second draft of the year.

20. The age of conscription has recently been raised from 18 -27 to 18-30.

21. The reasons for extending the age of conscription are not very transparent, but most

likely it is an attempt to broaden the pool of potential conscripts. The duration of the

spring draft has also been extended in order for the Voenkomat to draft men, who

complete their studies in the summer.

22. Once a man turns 30 he can no longer be drafted for conscription service, but if a man

is summoned for instance two weeks before he turns 30, he is obligated to serve.

23. A man who manages to evade the draft will not be subject to the next draft round, if

he has turned 30 in the meantime. He would most likely be fined.

24. Other particular circumstances could also merit a deferral of military service. This could

for instance be the case for men already employed by the Russian state. In the past,

even working with maintenance at the local police station would be sufficient grounds

for deferral. However, according to the source, the Russian authorities are now less

lenient when applying this potential reason for deferral.

25. Certain groups could also be exempted from military service by presidential decree.

Mainly this has applied to particularly talented people like for instance a very talented

ballet dancer.

26. There have been considerations as to if the length of military service should be raised

from one year to two years. However, for the time being it remains at one year.

27. Once drafted, a conscript may not leave the country.

28. Traditionally, men who do not wish to be drafted have tried to avoid receiving their

summons in Russian called povestka – for example by pretending not to be at home if

visited by representatives of the Voenkomat.

29. A summons was previously only considered legally delivered to the conscript once

delivered physically to and signed by the conscript. This has, however, been changed

with the introduction of an electronic draft system that can forward summons to

conscripts via a digital service platform called

gosuslugi,

30. With the implementation of the gosuslugi a summons is considered legally delivered to

the conscript one week after having been sent regardless of whether the conscript has

actually read it or not.

31. According to the source, a person would be barred from leaving the country from the

moment the summons has been digitally delivered to him.

32. In order for these limitations to actually work, two additional databases have also been

created. The first database contains the names of every young man who after his

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33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Tasks

preliminary evaluation was deemed fit to serve (category A and B). The second

database is a database for the digital summons.

Both databases are nationwide, and the information from the databases become

immediately available to the FSB border service, once a summons has been sent.

In practice this means, that a drafted conscript cannot legally exit Russia the moment

the summons has been sent to him, as the FSB will receive a notification if his passport

is scanned at the border. The source assessed that this applies to all types of passports

including non-biometric passports.

The electronic system is being tested in 2024 in the regions of Sakhalin, in Ryazan and

Mari El. However, most conscripts will still receive their summons physically in 2024,

and a full implementation of the electronic system is expected to happen in 2025 if not

further delayed.

Therefore, exempt in the three-abovementioned regions, a summons would be handed

over to a person in question either personally by a Voenkomat personnel or by

registered letter. The summons would be considered received by the Russian

authorities from the moment it is sent by registered letter, regardless of the actual

reception by the conscript in question.

Members of the opposition could be targeted for military service, although this could

most likely only happen on legal grounds.

Convicts may be offered amnesty if they agree to sign a contract with the military, and

people charged with a crime could have their charges dropped if they agree to sign.

39. Generally, the conscripts perform relatively simple functions.

40. Only after a conscript has completed the basic 6 – 8 week military training course and

has taken his oath to serve Russia, the conscript is given an actual rank. Until then, the

conscript is only considered a recruit.

41. After taking the oath, conscripts obtain the rank of private in Russian called ryadavoy

or the rank of ”efreytor”

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, which they can only become later, when they have shown

good results in their education.

42. The rank of efreytor is reserved for conscripts who are deemed more suitable for

combat and who are therefore exempt from performing the more mundane tasks like

guard duty or peeling potatoes.

43. It is no longer possible for a conscript to advance to the rank of non-commissioned

officer.

44. After completing the basic training course and taking the oath, conscripts are then

trained for their specific function such as rifleman or mortar crew member. About half

way through their period of conscription, the conscripts can be transferred to the

actual unit, in which they are to serve, and where they will be further trained.

449

Efreytor can be translated to a senior private.

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45. Traditionally, Russian conscripts are posted far from their home region. There has

however been a number of unfortunate incidents related to this practice. The source

recalls one such incident, where two or three conscripts died of pneumonia due to

them waiting for their transport outside an airport not properly dressed to handle

temperatures of 30 degrees Celsius below freezing. This led to the process being

changed, so that new conscripts are equipped for the further travels to their place of

posting at a military barracks or another suitable building in their city. During their stay

at this facility, which usually lasts two or three days, the conscripts undergo another

health evaluation to ensure, that they are still fit to serve.

46. Conscripts are also issued a credit card, because conscripts are paid approximately 3

000 rubles a month for their service.

47. The source noted, that conscripts are no longer allowed to bring their mobile phone

while serving in the military. This is due to the risk of the location of their place of

service being revealed.

48. Conscripts do not only serve in the military. Some may also serve in the Ministry of the

Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of

Natural Disasters or in the Border Guard Service under the FSB. The current draft

consists of 130,000 conscripts twice a year, and the source estimates that only about

100,000 – 110,000 of these new conscripts will serve in the military.

49. The National Guard also still takes a certain amount of conscripts. They have, however,

undergone a professionalization, as the Russian authorities aim to sign up as many

soldiers as possible as contract soldiers.

Deferral and exemption

50. The rules regarding exemption and deferral of military service are also covered in the

law on conscription and military service. Many grounds for deferral of military service

have carried over from the Soviet era, although the number of grounds for exemption

has been reduced. For instance, being the caregiver for ones parents in need of care

could lead to that person having his military service deferred.

51. One of the primary, if not the foremost, reasons for deferral of military service has

been the pursuit of academic studies. Being enrolled at an institution of education

would more or less automatically lead to a deferral of that person’s military service

until the completion or termination of his studies. Therefore, a man would have to be

able to continuously document that he is an active student until he turned 27, which

was the age at which the age of conscription used to end. However, the age of

conscription has recently been extended to the age of 30.

52. Any documents supporting that a person should have his military service deferred due

to, for example, studying will likely be checked thoroughly at the Voenkomat. The rules

have been made more strict. For instance, a person who has had his military service

deferred due to studying one subject, cannot get another deferral should he change

the subject of his studies.

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53. Members of the LGBTQ community or members of Jehovah’s witnesses would most

likely keep their sexual orientation and their religious beliefs private at the Voenkomat,

rather than trying to use these as a way to be exempted for military service.

54. It is, however, possible to be approved for alternative military service for certain

people whose religious beliefs prevent them from serving as soldiers in Russian called

alternativnaya grazhdanskaya sluzhba.

Only few such cases are known to the source.

55. Alternative military service could be performed at a kindergarten or at a theatre, etc.

56. The law does not directly state which specific conditions that will qualify a person for

alternative military service. However, it is the estimation of the interviewed source,

that a person would need very weighty arguments to be approved.

57. Only a relatively low number of people have been approved for this alternative military

service. The source has not seen the numbers of overall applications, only the numbers

of approvals.

Draft evaders

58. The definition of a draft evader is someone who avoids being summoned for service.

Initially, the penalty for evading being drafted is a fine.

59. Desertion in wartime is punishable by death, and will most likely be carried out

extrajudicially. Legally, desertion can only occur within a designated combat unit.

Therefore, only contract soldiers will be punished as deserters.

60. Absent without official leave (AWOL) from a non-combat military unit is also

punishable. The penalty is more severe than for draft evaders, and would usually

consist of detention at the military barracks. This penalty will be decided

administratively and not by a court of law. The source noted, that more and more

people within the Russian military are given the mandate to reach administrative

decisions.

61. The Voenkomat does search for people who have ignored their summons. This is done

in collaboration with a local police officer.

Family members of draft evaders

62. Evading the draft will most likely have no consequences for the person’s family

members, unless they actively participate in avoiding his conscription. A family

member could in this case be punished as an accomplice to evasion, which would most

likely lead to a fine.

63. If a drafted person is not at home when visited by representatives of the Voenkomat,

any other family member eligible for conscription would not be taken in his stead.

64. The source has not heard of draft evaders being sentenced in absentia, although it is

likely to have happened.

Conditions for conscripts

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65. The general conditions for conscripts vary depending on in which arm of service they

serve.

66. The general conditions for conscripts have improved in recent years. The quality of the

military barracks has improved significantly, which has also been a priority for the

Russian authorities. Certainly there are however still barracks of very low quality in

Russia.

67. The general conditions vary from region to region and are also linked with cultural

differences. The army probably has the harshest culture within the different branches

of the Russian military.

68. The practice of dedovshchina is still used in the army but less prevalent than when the

duration of conscription service was two years. This is due to the fact that

dedovshchina is the concept of older soldiers hazing newer soldiers. Due to the

duration of conscription service being shortened from two to one year, the experience

gap within units of conscripts is smaller which in turn makes dedovshchina less

prevalent.

69. The life of a conscript has to some extent become more meaningful.

70. The general physical conditions have improved, and the tasks conscripts are ordered to

perform are also less mundane than in the past. Having meaningful tasks also plays a

role in dedovshchina being less prevalent.

71. The source estimated, that dedovshchina is more prevalent the further away from

Moscow a unit is located. Basically, a bored soldier is more likely to participate in

dedovshchina than a soldier with a meaningful existence.

72. A conscript who refuses to carry out an order could risk being subjected to physical

violence. Orders must be lawful, although the definition of what constitutes a lawful

order within the Russian military is defined broad. A conscript could still be ordered to

wash his commander’s car, but tasks of this nature are used less than in the past. A

conscript can try to file a complaint afterwards, if he has been forced to carry out an

unlawful order.

73. In the beginning of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, many experts believed, that the

Russian military had become more professional than it used to be. However, the level

of corruption within the military was not properly taken into account. Many

warehouses intended to store explosives are now empty or filled with wooden blocks,

because the explosives has been sold or traded.

74. The Russian military equipment has proven to be much less effective than estimated by

the Russian military itself.

75. Traditionally, the narrative within the Russian military has been that the practice of

dedovshchina to some extent has been due to ethnic differences. As a consequence,

the military now aims to keep different ethnic groups apart from one another. On the

other hand, Chechen conscripts serve in many different units including in the National

Guard.

76. Conscripts from the North Caucasus will therefore usually serve with other conscripts

from the same region.

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77. The focus within the Russian military has increasingly shifted towards the recruitment

of conscripts as contract soldiers. To achieve this goal, a considerable amount of

pressure is applied to conscripts.

78. The source had also heard of cases of the contract being written and presented to the

conscript without any prior indication that he wanted to sign up.

79. In other cases, the conscript had received the one-time sum of money that a soldier

receives upon signing a contract with the military before actually having signed the

contract. In these cases, the pressure on the conscript to sign up is immense, and in

fact not actively returning the money could be considered an accept of contract duty

by default. The source has no knowledge of the scope of this practice.

80. The source, however, did suspect, the financial rewards associated with signing a

contract are appealing to many Russians. In addition to the financial appeal, the

patriotic idea of serving ones country is also still a factor when signing up as a contract

soldier. State propaganda plays a big part in creating this narrative.

81. The contract soldiers come in great numbers from the regions of Buryatia, Tuva and

Chukotka. The reasons for this are mainly financial and less so patriotic.

82. Previously, a conscript needed to serve for six months before being allowed to sign a

contract, which was subsequently reduced to three months. This has now been

changed, and a conscript soldier is now able to trade his service as a conscript soldier

with that of a contract soldier from day one. Thus, one year of conscription service

becomes two years of contracted service, meaning that the soldier is paid a one-time

sum for signing up and a monthly salary.

83. Contract soldiers will however highly likely be posted in Ukraine. In the event that the

contract is terminated, which would most likely be due to the contract soldier being

incompetent, the soldier can trade every two days of contracted service with one day

of served conscription service. The reason for this being that a contract soldier is

obliged to serve.

84. Whether or not the Russian military will in fact respect that a contract has been signed

for a fixed period of two years is not clear to the interviewed source.

85. The Russian military is in dire need of personnel as casualties are high.

The war effort in Ukraine

86. In principle, conscripts cannot be used for combat and cannot be posted outside

Russian territory. However, in practise Russia has annexed the Ukrainian regions of

Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia meaning that Russia consider these

regions part of the Russian territory.

87. By Russian definition, it is therefore legal to post conscripts in these regions. These

regions are listed in the Russian constitution as part of Russian territory.

88. Conscripts have also been used in the border regions of Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk.

Conscripts are sent to these regions, which the Russian authorities consider part of the

Russian territory. However, the source is not sure, if conscripts are posted inside

Ukraine proper.

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89. As conscripts have had very little military training, they are most likely only being used

defensively in the annexed regions.

90. Conscripts are now also being drafted in the annexed regions. As for Crimea, this is not

a new practice.

91. Conscripts do also contribute to the war effort in Ukraine without actually being in

Ukraine. Conscripts could for instance perform logistical tasks supporting the war

effort in Ukraine.

92. The conscripts in the contested regions considered Russian territory by the Russian

state would most likely perform duties supporting the war effort rather than being

directly involved in combat. However, some conscripts in these regions do in fact end

up at the front line, although the front line is mainly staffed with contract soldiers.

93. The situation is different in Kursk and Belgorod, where advancing Ukrainian units have

met units of Russian Conscripts. According to Ukrainian reports, these Russian units

have been inclined to surrender, as they have been ill equipped to fight or had not

been under the leadership of commanders capable of making the right decisions.

94. It is difficult to estimate how big a percentage of conscripts end up supporting the war

effort in Ukraine in some way or another. However, the Russian military is large and

has many different branches, so the source’s estimation is that only a smaller

percentage of conscripts end up supporting the war effort in the army. The navy, for

instance, manly consist of contract soldiers, but conscripts do also serve in the navy.

Many conscripts also perform guard duties all across the Russian territory.

95. If the source was to venture an estimate, 20-30% of the conscripts perform duties that

support the war effort in the Ukraine.

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Meeting with Mark Galeotti

Executive Director, Mayak Intelligence, Honorary Professor, UCL School of Slavonic & East

European Studies and Senior Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute.

Legislation

1. In terms of the overall structure, there has been no changes in the legislation regarding

conscription in 2024. However, there has been talks about prolonging the duration of

conscripts from one to two years, but this change is politically unpopular, although the

military would welcome such a step. This is because at the time when conscripts have

completed their basic training and after that the unit training, the conscripts are only

fully usable in the last three or four months of their conscription cycle. If there were to

be added an additional six months, this could be useful time, according to the Russian

military.

2. There has been no changes in the numbers drafted at the biannually conscription cycle.

There are always some minor variation. However, what is actually striking is that there

has not been any dramatic change given the current situation.

3. Although President Putin just announced an expansion of the military, this has affected

the overall armed forces rather than the conscript force. Now it may be that in the next

autumn and spring drafts, the numbers change to try to reflect this new expansion, we

have to see.

4. Although the conscripts are an integrated part of the army, the army does not decide

how many it is going to draft. The army will put in their request, but it is a political

decision by the Kremlin as to what size a conscript draft will have.

5. According to Mark Galeotti, there has been no changes in the formal tasks that a

conscript will perform during his military service.

Recruitment of conscripts

6. There is an element of arbitrariness in the way the Russian Voenkomats

450

are picking

new conscripts. As every Voenkomat is given a quota of how many young men, they

are to draft. The quota is basically driven by demographics. In other words, it is a

roughly analogous portion of how many 18 year olds the military will have at their

disposal, once the people who have exemptions and deferments are taken out of the

equation.

7. There are exit national databases where people are registered as being enrolled into

higher education, which is a reason for getting conscription deferred. If a 17-year-old

person in Russia has viable grounds for exemption or deferral, he will have quite an

incentive to go and pre-emptively get registered as exempted or deferred at a

Voenkomat.

8. A person summoned will first have to receive a summons, which requires him to attend

at the Voenkomat. Here he will have a medical check, and a document check. Then the

450

Voenkomat (Voennyj Kommisariat/Bое�½�½ый коммисариат): military enlistment office

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

person would have a brief interview, where the Voenkomat personnel can get a sense

of who the person is. This is done, because there are some arms of service that have

priority over others. The Voenkomat personnel will double check if the person has

some kind of sporting achievement or if the person has IT skills etc. that can be useful

for the particular arm of service. Furthermore, during this conversation, the

conscripted will get a chance to say if he thinks that he qualifies for exemption or

deferral.

A person has to attend the Voenkomat twice before he is posted. The first stage is a

very quick and cursory attendance, where the medical condition and documents are

checked. Then assuming that the person will pass, he will then be told to report in

usually a few days later. Here the person would be subjected to the so-called BIOS

criteria, which means that the representatives of the various arms of service will be

going through the files.

In the screening, the strategic rocket forces will be getting the first pick of conscripts.

They would typically pick persons who are technically adept, and then the

paratroopers (VDV) will have their pick and typically go for persons who are tougher,

which for instance could be a cross-country runner at school. A person could try to

influence this screening, if he believes he has an advantage somewhere. However, it is

a pretty clumsy and rough process. There are cases precisely where a person has

certain skills, but was overlooked by the Voenkomat or where the person in question

did not bother mentioning his skills to the Voenkomat.

Whether or not a conscript’s preferences as to which arm of service he will serve is

dependent on the personnel at the Voenkomat and this could differ from Voenkomat

to voenkomet. In this regard, there were no regions were conscripts would be worse

off than others would. It all depends on the competence and the care of the individual

Voenkomat personnel.

However, corruption could play a role in this regard. First, corruption plays a role in

terms of paying off a doctor, who can give a person a certification stating that the

person in question cannot serve. Second, corruption could play a role at a Voenkomat

where either a person might pay to register the person as exempted for conscription.

Third, a person may pay the Voenkomat in order to get into a particular arm of service

or to get a particular assignment.

It is important to note in this regard that at the Voenkomat level, a conscript would not

be assigned to a specific unit, but he will be assigned to an arm of service. So a person

can at the Voenkomat level influence whether he for instance will serve as part of the

infantry or rather would join the navy.

Every arm of service will receive a number of conscripts. Broadly speaking there are

the following arms of service:

- The strategic rocket forces

- The air forces

- The navy

- The ground forces

- Some conscripts are serving in the National Guard.

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15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

Some conscripts are serving in the border service

The paratroopers (VDV), which are separate from the air force in terms of

picking conscripts. These conscripts could also serve in the Spetsnaz (Special

Forces) under the VDV.

As Russia is experiencing more military training at schools again similar to what

happened in the USSR, it is getting easier for persons who want to join the Spetsnaz to

distinguish themselves there. Perhaps they have already done a parachute jump or

similar tasks of interest.

As the Russian military was trying to professionalise the Spetsnaz, before they were

decimated in 2022, the proportion of conscripts was going down. Therefore, it did not

make sense to actually have Spetsnaz units in all of the Russian regions.

In terms of the new law on electronic summons, it is ready to go. However, it does not

seem to have been implemented quite yet. It seems like the authorities are trying to

work out the interconnection between the different databases and such like. However,

the entire legal basis is in place and the time line for whereby things are meant to

work.

It is important to stress that the new electronic summons are primarily made for

mobilisation and not conscription. This is because people are not fleeing the country in

the same manner to avoid conscription, as they do to avoid mobilisation. The last

wave of mobilisation of 300 000 men in the autumn of 2022 resulted in approximately

900 000 men fleeing the country.

Given that there is at present not yet the signs of a mobilisation wave happening

despite the fact that the military continues to push for it. The implementation of the

electronic summons for conscripts is unrolling slightly more relaxed.

It is only the Voenkomat that has the legal authority to summon a person. Therefore,

the use of Gosuslugi

451

is simply because it is the most efficient way of actually

accessing all these potential people. Again, it is not really a problem with conscription.

The electronic summons is really meant for mobilisation. Therefore, Mark Galeotti

opined that we would probably first see the new system in use when there is a new

wave of mobilisation.

Regarding the centralised database where conscripts and persons eligible for

mobilisation is active, Mark Galeotti noted that such a database has been in place for a

long time. However, historically it has been much more effective on conscripts than on

reservists. The database is quite good at knowing where the 17-year-old boys are and

where they live. Nevertheless, its capacity to track reservists was always much worse.

The reason for this is that the reserve system until 2022 had fallen into disarray.

Therefore, Russian authorities are attempting to strengthen the reserve system

primarily by leveraging the national tax and residence registration database, rather

than creating an entirely new system from scratch. However, it is hard to tell at this

point in time, how effective this database on reservists is.

451

Gosuslugi is a Russian electronic platform providing Russians with access to government information and

services.

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

23. According to the interlocutor, there is a window of opportunity to leave the country

after having been summoned. When summoned, the conscript is given a deadline to

appear at the Voenkomat. It is unlikely that the conscript will be stopped by the

authorities if he flees the country prior to his deadline, as conscripts are only banned

from leaving the country after having failed to appear at the Voenkomat. Although, the

system is electronic, it still requires a person to enter a code to register that this person

has not turned up.

24. When a person is enrolled into the army, they are already barred from leaving the

country. Basically, the point at which a person actually turns up at the Voenkomat,

assuming they do not exempt or defer that person, then he would be barred from

leaving the country legally. This means that if a person show up at a border checkpoint,

it should come up on their system.

25. The source was not aware of any informal exemptions to members for the LGBT+

community. Personnel at a Voenkomat do generally not care about whether they can

make a good soldier out of a person, as Long as the enlisted conscripts meet the

necessary health requirements. The personnel could very well just think well, he will

get that kicked out of him soon enough, once he is in the ranks.

The general situation for conscripts

26. The general situation for Russian conscripts before 2022 is pretty miserable, but

miserable within the terms of an austere environment. However, because the military

was looking much more carefully about retention. Therefore, they wanted conscripts

to then sign up as kontraktniki

452

after the end of their conscription term.

27. There has been some awareness of the fact that the life of a conscript was miserable,

which also contributed to people trying to dodge the draft. Therefore, a lot of effort

actually had been put in to try to improve barracks, certainly improve food service, and

basically to try and make conditions a little bit less dire.

28. The notion Dedovshchina

453

still exists within the Russian military. Although, efforts

have been made by the authorities to try to combat it. However, the success of those

efforts was very patchy. It depended a lot on the unique culture. Nonetheless, what

had for a long time been essentially illegal but tolerated was increasingly actually being

not tolerated. The recent creation of a specific military police force actually had a real

impact, as up to that point investigations of misconduct were done in the units

themselves, and the outcome was typically that nothing happened.

29. Most of what we hear these days is about what is happening to the people in the

actual Ukraine war. It is a lot harder for the military police to report about what is

actually happening in the conscript body now, because of the press being under

452

453

Kontraktniki: Contract soldiers

Dedovshchina is an informal practice of hazing and abuse of junior conscripts

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30.

31.

32.

33.

increasing constraints. However, that said Mark Galeotti still believed that nowadays

the Dedovshchina was at a much lower level than it used to be.

The general situation for conscripts would differ to a degree, depending on under

which arm of service a person was serving. Generally speaking, the ground forces tend

to be worse off, as they have larger concentrations of people. Within the Air Force and

in the Navy, there is a slightly higher technical expectation.

However, the prevalence of Dedovshchina is much more about individual unit cultures

and it often comes down to, what the Colonel and the Lieutenant Colonels tolerate.

But also a matter of location, for example if a conscript is posted in some distant base

somewhere in Kamchatka, where there is no opportunities for letting the conscripts

blow off steam in some local town or whatever else, it could be more prevalent.

Furthermore, at such remote postings weather conditions tend to be worse, which also

tend to encourage Dedovshchina. This is also because these postings are further away

from the view of the higher authorities.

As mentioned before, the ground forces are typically worse off. However, there is no

demarcation in barracks between the tank crew and the infantry platoon. These are all

combined armed forces. Even tank units also have infantry with them.

There also exits a “macho paratrooper culture” that can be more vicious, but that is

just general macho building sort of culture. This specific Dedovshchina – this kind of

seniority based harassment is more likely to be found in the ground forces.

Physical conditions for conscripts

34. Each arm of the service has a different level of priority when they pick conscripts. The

least prioritised service is the construction and railway troops. This job is a lot of hard

labour.

35. Therefore, the strategic rocket forces pick conscripts with technical skills, but above all,

they value stability and maturity. In terms of conditions, given that conscripts are less

likely, for example, to be fighter plane pilots, they are more likely to be technical

ground crews and such like. Conscript serving in the more technical arms of service

usually serve under better conditions. However, Mark Galeotti did not believe that one

could actually say that a particular arm of service has better conditions than other

arms.

Tasks of the conscripts

36. The largest single deployment of conscripts is to the ground force. Here the conscripts

do a lot of drills and training. Furthermore, in a very Soviet/Russian style, the

conscripts probably also do work perceived as pointless, like washing things so they

look pretty when the general visits etc.

37. The Russian military also firmly believes that an exhausted soldier is a controllable

happy soldier. However, there is not really a difference between the current conditions

for a conscript soldier compared to their condition in non-wartime.

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38. The source did not have information on the particular number of conscripts posted at

the borders of Russia. It is rather difficult to get the numbers of conscripts in each

regiment or brigade and different units have different proportions of contract vs.

conscript soldiers.

Tasks of conscripts related to the Russian war effort in Ukraine

39. First of all, by law conscripts cannot be sent abroad except if they volunteer or in a

time of actually formally declared war. At this point in time, there is no evidence to

suggest that conscripts are being used in the annexed territories. If anything, the

Russian authorities are actually showing rather more restraint there for political

reasons.

40. So actually in terms of the ongoing Kursk conflict, the responsibilities that the

conscripts had have been precisely backfilling along the Ukrainian border areas. So that

kontraktniki had been taken out to form a battalion tactical group to be send into the

war which led predominantly conscript units to just sit at the border more or less just

performing statically guard assignments.

41. The more logistically oriented forces clearly had been involved in moving military

equipment etc. to the vicinity of the war zone, but even then, the conscripts will stay

within Russia. In some situations, an ammunition train would be handled by forces that

comprised conscripts, but they would never actually be taking it into Ukraine.

42. On the other hand, the logistics require specialists as well, and conscripts are not

necessarily going to be driving trains for example. Nevertheless, what we see now in

wartime is a disproportionate role for conscripts outside of Ukraine to allow for the use

of professionals inside Ukraine.

43. The only other area where conscripts are used in connection to the war effort in

Ukraine would be air defence in terms of shooting down drones and missiles coming

from Ukraine. The air defence units that are based in Russia have conscripts. There are

conscripts in every single arm of service including even the presidential regiment.

44. It is possible to reject to perform a task if it is an illegal order. However, a conscript

cannot say that he is not fit for a certain task and be released from that. If a person is

conscripted, he is basically for the next year a serf of the state. However, Mark Galeotti

did not think that it is generally different from other countries.

45. If a person disobeys an illegal order, then he might in some cases receive an

extrajudicial punishment, which basically means that the rest of his squad is told to

give him a beating. Otherwise, depending on the nature of the breach, the conscript

would get a punishment permissible under the military regulations.

Conscripts signing contracts with the MoD

46. The proportion of conscripts signing contracts with the MoD after or during their

conscription period has gone down since 2022. Although, it is difficult to answer due to

the conscripts now being given a choice of being a professional soldier and get bonuses

and other benefits. The proportion of conscripts, who refuse at the beginning but at

end up accepting the end of the conscript cycle, is still high, but it has gone down.

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47. It is still technically possible to sign a fixed term contract with the understanding that

the state can choose not to let the person go. Actually, some contract soldiers are

being discharged at the end of their contract period. However, most contract soldiers

would not be released after the end of their contract.

48. Mark Galeotti opined that contract soldiers who are released from their contract

would probably be soldiers who are perceived by the authorities of either not being

very good soldiers or they paid off their commanding officer.

49. It is clear that there is a pressure from the Russian authorities for conscripts to sign

contracts with the MoD. At the very least, the authorities try to emphasise the great

advantages of signing a contract and try to encourage conscripts to sign contracts.

Much of such pressure is driven by cultures. The military has been told that they have

to persuade a certain amount of people each month that want to sign a contract and

then they will find ways of doing that.

Conscription in the Caucasus region

50. There still seems to be evidence that Chechen conscripts tend to go into Chechen

units. But, aside from that, essentially conscripts from the Caucasus region in Russia

will have to serve under the same terms as any other conscript in Russia.

51. In terms of the institutional structures, Conscripts from the Caucasus region would

serve under the same conditions as any other conscript. However, persons from north

Caucasus may face a certain amount of prejudice in the ranks.

Draft evasion and desertion

52. Draft evasion is still moderately widespread and has increased since 2022. However,

the majority of draft evaders tend to evade through the means of corruption or

enrolling themselves into higher education to get a deferment, although the person

may well not have any real intention of actually studying.

53. Draft evasion is more prevalent among the Russian middle class, which means one

would see proportionately more draft evaders in rich regions as Moscow than in poor

regions of Russia. However, draft evasion through corruption tends to be more of a

social phaenomenon more than a geographically one.

54. A family in Moscow is more likely to have the money to bribe a doctor and a Moscow

family is more likely to go to a university. One can maintain ones university exemption,

if the person in question goes on to a protected profession after university.

55. If a person at some point was sentenced for draft evasion, they would still be obliged

to serve after their sentence. Furthermore, there has been cases of doctors being

sentenced for taking bribes in connection to evasion from military service. However,

those cases have not been recent.

56. Mark Galeotti has never come across cases in Russia, where family members to draft

evaders faced problems with the authorities. However, in rural communities, where

there is still more of a sense of a collective unit, the local mayor or the sort of leader of

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57.

58.

59.

60.

village could tell the family that their boy is letting the country down speaking to their

patriotic feelings. This sort of social pressure could happen. Although, the family would

not be ostracised or prosecuted for the son’s evasion.

There have been cases of conscripts being sentenced in absenita. Although, it is very

hard to truly tell the numbers. A person could evade conscription by not turning up at

the Voenkomat and instead move to a different city. At some point, the person would

come to the attention of the authorities, whether it is through his residence

registration or Gosuslugi etc. So actually, sentences in absentia are only for people who

have left the country to avoid conscription or mobilisation.

When asked if the authorities would use extrajudicial punishments against conscripts,

the interlocutor replied that there was still a kind of bullying taking place within the

ranks. However, in terms of outside the ranks, draft evaders etc. the authorities would

not use extrajudicial punishments against them. If they catch a draft evader, they will

prosecute him.

When asked whether persons in opposition to the government were more at risk of

being targeted, Mark Galeotti replied that on the whole, the state follows its own

rules. No one can question those rules. But if a person evades conscription, he will be

prosecuted accordingly. Although, a judge may be more likely to rule against a person,

if they come to court wearing for example a Navalny T-shirt.

There are no signs of what we perceive as a state level and institutionalised targeting

of conscripts, just because they are from a particular ethnic group. If a person is

conscripted, he will be targeted because the authorities want to fil their quota, but

there is no suggestion that the authorities will target a person because he has a

particular affiliation. Not least because many of the ethnic groups that tend to feel

persecuted, tend to also be more impoverished and actually have experienced much

higher levels of volunteering into the ranks.

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Meeting with Huseyn Aliyev

Senior Lecturer in Security Studies at University of Glasgow

New Legislation and recruitment of conscripts

1. There has been a number of legislative changes over the past one year when it comes

to the conscription. The age of conscription has been extended from 18-27 years to 18-

30 years. However, the most important change in legislation is the introduction of the

electronic mobilisation or electronic conscription, which should come into force from

the 1 November 2024.

2. Previously the summons for conscription or for mobilisation could only be distributed

in two acceptable ways:

1. handing the summons in person to a potential conscript,

2. sending the summons by registered post, in an envelope

3. With the implementation of the new system, summons can be distributed through

electronic means, which could be through an email sent through Gosuslugi, which is a

Russian public service platform. Even in the case, where a person does not have an

account at Gosuslugi, the summons can still be sent via Gosuslugi and will be

considered as a received summons.

4. On this regard, it does not really matter if an individual actually opens his account on

Gosuslugi, reads the summons and takes it into consideration. As long as the summons

has been issued through this electronic portal, it is considered delivered to the

individual by the Russian authorities.

5. Another change related to conscription concerns the introduction of a new online

military register or electronic military register. This is a uniform system, to which every

Voenkomat (Voenkomat) will get access. It contains all the information available to the

Russian authorities on each individual eligible for conscription or mobilisation. The

database will contain the following:



a person’s home address,



phone numbers,



Email addresses,



places of residence,



employment status and



education history.

6. Thus, all information that is available to the Russian authorities will be accumulated

within this joint military register to which the MoD and consequently all Voenkomats

will have access.

7. Previously, much of this information functions in a very old-fashioned way, so, this new

single database should be an advantage for the Voenkomats and for a Ministry of

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10.

11.

12.

13.

Defence, making it easier to retrieve data on individuals when conducting conscription

campaigns and when possibly conducting mobilisation campaigns for reservists.

There is also a new piece of legislation, which was signed last month by President

Putin. This new law will suspend criminal investigations and criminal sentences to

individuals who voluntarily will be mobilised to participate in the so-called special

military operation in Ukraine. Although, this has been done since 2022 on the large

scale, it is only as of now that there is a legal basis to mobilise convicted individuals.

Legally the Russian authorities should only start using the new electronic summons

from 1 November 2024. However, there are already some reports that the authorities

are testing the system. Basically, it is just less than a month before it comes into Force,

officially. So officially, if you are summoned now, as of the 8 October, you will receive a

registered post, which you will have to sign, or receive a visit from the Voenkomat

personnel.

The most common way to draft Russians for conscription is for a person from the

Voenkomat to show up at the person’s place of residence or personnel from the

Voenkomat approaching a person at a high school or another educational facility

handing him the summons, which he then has to sign.

If the personnel for some reason are unable to deliver the summons in person, they

could send the summons by registered post, which the person in question then has to

that letter, with a summons inside to the potential conscript in person and that person

has to sign for it. However, delivering summons by registered post has not worked in

reality. Therefore, in most cases, the people at the post offices do not feel that they

actually have to chase down the potential conscript. Instead, they would just hand over

this letter to somebody at this address in order for them to give it to the person in

question.

Legally, the conscripted person has to sign that he has received the registered letter.

However, in reality, if somebody did sign that registered letter for him, as a family

member, the Voenkomat will consider it as a delivered summons. A summons send by

post is also considered as delivered as long as the courier signs that he/she delivered it

to the addressee even if it was handed over to another person at this address, or

simply thrown into a post box. In this regard, there has been this big gap in the legal

implementation of this regulation and unfortunately, it has never worked in favour of

the conscripts.

The Federal law

“On Military Duty and Military Service” (N53-FZ)

does not mention

that delivering summons to family members/other individuals living at the registered

address is illegal or invalidates the summons. As a matter of fact, the Federal Law

“On

Enforcement Proceedings” Art.27 (point 2),

states that in case of the absence of a

recipient, a summons can be handed over to any adult family member. In which case

“a receipt is considered as informed.”

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14. The assumptions that delivering summons to family is illegal are made by some Russian

lawyers, encouraging conscripts to start court cases, which usually result in court

verdicts against them.

15. If a person for some reason is not able to serve as a conscript due to work, due to

studying or due to other reasons, that individual can call up the commissariat and ask

for deferral or exemption for conscription. Actually, nowadays it is also possible to do

this over email through Gosuslugi.

16. If a Russian man of conscription age is traveling abroad for study or for work, they need

to go to their local Voenkomat and register as living abroad. This could be done with

the implementation of the new electronic system. However, until now it has to be

done in person. However, a family member who is authorised by this potential

conscript could with a legal notarised document act on their behalf. In such a case, the

Voenkomat will remove the name from the military register. As soon as they return

back to Russia, completed their study or they just do not live abroad anymore, they

have to show up at the Voenkomat again and re-register.

17. If a person does not register that they travelled abroad, they could be fined. However,

the fine is not particularly high approximately 100 euros.

18. The standard deadline from when a person has received a summons to he has to

appear at the Voenkomat is around 20 days. If the person has no legal reason not to

show up, he could potentially be considered as a draft evader. However, it depends on

the individual circumstances.

19. For instance, the commissariat might be aware, that they are in fact sending summons

to a wrong address or maybe they need to check up with the family members and

relatives. Hence, it does depend on the particular situation.

20. Furthermore, it depends on the particular region and on the particular Voenkomat. In

some cases, some of the Voenkomats are in favour of sending out summons by

registered post. If a particular Voenkomat lacks staff members, it would be more

difficult to go door by door.

21. It is usually different in larger cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok and

Novosibirsk as these have quite big populations and not enough staff for the

Voenkomat to go door by door. Some Voenkomats delegate summons delivery duty to

the district police sheriff (in Russian called uchastkovyi).In the bigger cities the new

electronic system will be a huge help for the Voenkomat, because previously, they

would rely heavily on sending summons by registered post.

22. Sending summons by registered post is also a widespread method in the far northern

regions, where there are large distances to cover for a Voenkomat. In these places, the

Voenkomat will rely more on the postal service rather than sending their own people

out.

23. There has been no changes in the duration of the conscription service, although there

had been talks about prolonging it from 1 year to 2 years, it is still at one year. There

has also been no change in the numbers of summoned men, which has more or less

stayed the same throughout the course of the war.

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24. In the beginning of the full-scale war, some conscripts were sent to the area of the so-

called Special Military Operations. However, that did not happen systematically and did

not happen on scale. After what happened in the Kursk region in August 2024, it is

happening on a grander scale and there are possibly thousands and thousands of

conscripts involved in the battles in the Kursk region as of now.

Vulnerable groups and groups eligible for alternative military service

25. In terms of vulnerable groups in Russia, members of the LGBT community come with a

stigma that could lead to negative consequences for them if their affiliation was

revealed. Therefore, members of the LGBT community would not explicitly indicate

that they belong to this community.

26. Jehovah’s Witnesses is perceived as an extremist movement in Russia and being a

member is illegal. Therefore, a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses would be more likely to

face criminal charges than conscription if his affiliation became known. However, they

would still be eligible for conscription as soon as cleared of criminal charges or in case

if no charges raised.

27. However, members of other religious communities and sects can apply for alternative

military service, based on their religious beliefs as long as their religious organisations

are legally registered in the Russian Federation, and as long as they can prove that they

are registered members of these communities.

28. There are multiple cases of men living in the far north, where a number of reindeer

herding communities live, applying for alternative military service because they belong

to these indigenous ethnic communities with a traditionalist way of live, including

hunter and gatherer communities of the Far North and Siberia. However, these are the

only groups that can reasonably apply for alternative military services. Furthermore,

the federal law

on alternative military service

does not list disable individuals as one of

the categories eligible to apply for alternative service. These individuals (depending on

degree of disability) can apply for exemption from mandatory military service.

29. According to the source, it is not very likely that members of opposition groups or

somebody who has a reputation or any prominent supporter of Navalny for instance

will be conscripted into military services, as most of these individuals have tried to

leave the country or tried to use other routes to avoid military service.

Draft evasion

30. Legally a person is not allowed to leave the country from the moment they receive the

summons. However, it takes about a week for the information that a person has been

summoned to arrive at the border officials.

31. If a drafted person wishes to leave the country, he could use this seven-day gap to do

so. It would however still be considered an illegal exit.

32. Normally evasion of conscription is punished by a relatively small fine. A fine will be

between 10,000-30,000 rubles. There have been very few cases, which have gone to

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33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

court, even since the start of Russian invasion of Ukraine. In most cases, the individuals

who avoid conscription will be charged with a fine.

If an evasion case goes to criminal investigation, the case will be passed over to a

police investigator and it will be up to the police investigator to decide on the severity

of the punishment. In the very few cases of draft evasion that actually go to court, it is

very likely the person in question would be fined, although it will most likely be a

higher fine than in administratively settled cases – probably the double of the

administrative fine. This would probably be the harshest sentence for draft evasion.

The source had not seen any evidence of anyone being actually imprisoned for the

evasion of conscription.

The situation is, of course, very different with the evasion of mobilisation for reservists.

In these cases, people have received relatively long prison sentences. There were cases

of individuals being sentenced up to 10 years imprisonment, although, 3-5 year

sentences are more common. There many criminal cases were launched against those

who tried to avoid being mobilised back in 2022.

Prior to the Kursk offensive, the number of draft evaders since 2022 has not differed

particularly from previous years, but the source expects that the recent conscription

period, would likely lead to a higher number of draft evaders. This is because potential

conscripts are now aware that they can end up in the border regions such as Kursk and

actually risk participating in combat operations.

There is a lack of information available to a large number of Russian citizens.

Therefore, all the reports about conscripts being forced to sign contracts in Russian

language would appear in media outlets of the opposition such as Meduza or

mediazona etc. There are certainly a number of Russians who read such news reports.

If a person were aware about the actual situation then they would obviously try to

avoid being conscripted in the first place.

On the other hand, large numbers of young men in Russia do not read these news

reports and they are not aware of the situation. They are not aware about the forced

contracts. However, they might have heard some rumours about it, but the perception

among the majority of Russians still is that conscription service is necessary.

Conscription is something every man has to do in order to have a good career further

on and potentially get a job in government bodies.

For the past decade or more, draft evasion has typically been more prevalent in larger

urban centres, particularly in cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the central

European regions of Russia. This trend is more pronounced in these areas compared to

regions like the North Caucasus, though it does not necessarily extend to areas

bordering Ukraine. In north Caucasus, jobs in the state service and in security services

are popular, and since these require a person to have completed military service, there

is very limited draft evasion. The same goes for the far north regions and the Siberian

regions.

Fines are the most widespread punishment for draft evasion. As registered by the

Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, there were 901 court cases on the draft

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evasion article (Art.328) in 2023. 894 of these resulted in fines. 3 offenders were either

acquitted or received probation terms. The rest of the cases were closed.

454

However,

the source has not seen a single court case of draft evasion since 2016. There might

have been one or two cases that have not emerged anywhere in open source, although

this was doubtful because normally this sort of information would leak onto the

regional news websites

40. There were significant numbers of individuals who were charged with fines and who

have paid those fines without the case being transformed into a criminal case as draft

evasion cases are charged with administrative fines. Mostly fines are handed out to

draft evaders following the second or third summons that they have received.

41. There were not many draft evaders who had been sentenced in absentia. However,

there are many cases of evasion of mobilisation. There is a tendency in Russia to

charge an individual when they actually have the person in question arrested or the

authorities have access to this individual. So, if that individual, for example, has left the

country in order to avoid conscription, he will likely only be charged once he returns to

Russia. This is because the border officials will have all this information and all this data

to detain a person.

42. Depending on the circumstances, the person in question who have evaded

conscription and subsequently left the country would likely be fined upon his return to

Russia. There are cases of persons who has been fined and were given a new summons

basically the next day. Furthermore, a summons can also be handed at the point of

entry to Russia, such as international airports.

Consequences for family members of draft evaders

43. There is no law delegalising assistance to draft evaders yet. However, there were

proposals by members of parliament to introduce such law.

455

It is the same article as

its article on military service. The punishment will be a fine. In reality, there has been

no reports of any family members being charged with assisting somebody to evade

conscription.

44. Nonetheless, there have been cases of harassment by the Voenkomats on a large scale.

The Voenkomat are actually harassing family members by threatening them, asking

them for bribes, pressing them to either deliver information about their sons, or to

solve the situation informally, which is offering them, some sort of a bribes.

45. Pressure on family members to draft evaders is more or less universally widespread

particularly in those regions where Voenkomat officials actually go door-to-door. In

addition, there were also cases of local police staff (in charge of delivering summons)

threatening and harassing families of draft evaders. In larger cities where the summons

454

For further useful statistics for previous years, including graphs, please see:

https://paperpaper.io/v-

rossii-stali-chashe-sudit-uklonistov/

455

For further reading on this subject please see:

https://www.pnp.ru/social/sukharev-predlozhil-vvesti-

otvetstvennost-za-pomoshh-v-uklonenii-ot-prizyva.html

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

often are being sent by post, there is not much of a contact between the military

officials and the family members. In these cases, there are fewer opportunities for the

Voenkomat to press family members.

46. The source was aware of one case from Khabarovsk, where family members to a draft

evader actually tried to sue a member of the Voenkomat, for asking a bribe, but the

case was dropped due to lack of evidence. Launching corruption cases against

government officials are rarely successful.

47. There are plenty of cases, where family members of individuals who are eligible for

partial mobilisation, have been targeted and charged.

General tasks for conscripts

48. The majority of conscripts are drafted into the ground forces, but a high number also

goes to the Navy and the Air Force units, as well as elite formations such as Airborne

troops (VDV). The tasks in the ground forces are usually of a manual nature, and the

conscripts there only receive minimal and basic military training. Some conscripts in

infantry units do not receive the basic training in using the weapons, they are supposed

to use.

49. Conscripts also participate a lot in other tasks such as logistics, communication, supply

lines and construction work among other things. In this regard, conscripts are now

actively involved, particularly in around the Kursk region, but also in the regions that

border Ukraine.

50. Approximately 60% of the tasks involve manual labour, which could be the

construction of military or civilian facilities. Their tasks could also be various cleaning

jobs conducted on their bases or outside of it. Their tasks depend on the particular

region and the unit’s particular economic situation. The military element is relatively

limited. Although, it is likely to be higher in the more elite units. Conscripts who have

been involved in sports and the likes are more likely to be drafted into these more elite

units and they are more likely to receive better military training with the expectation

that they will eventually sign contracts with the ministry of defence and that they will

serve as reservists.

51. However, the overall standards of the tasks and the training that they receive are quite

low and an average infantry soldier in the ground forces is likely to have very limited

military training, and thus would spend most of the time performing tasks that have

very little to do with the actual military service.

52. If a conscript is given an illegal order, he can refuse to obey. However, in reality

conscripts have been doing whatever their commander tells them to do for the past 30

years, including building dacha

456

s for the officers, private villas for the Russian officials

and for members of political parties. Conscripts have been used as a free labour force

in all sorts of informal jobs, as well as in formal jobs, such as construction of roads and

other infrastructure programmes.

456

Dacha is a Russian summer/holiday cottage

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

53. There are legal consequences under

Art.332 (Criminal Code of RF),

punishable by up to

2 years in prison. However, the consequences of refusing an order could be all sorts of

physical and verbal abuse. Most likely, the person in question would be threatened

with being taken to the basement by the officers and severely beaten. This is a normal

occurrence in the Russian army, all conscripts are well aware of the scope of such

punishments, and some of them might even be subjected to them pre-emptively, if

they show a lack of disposition towards these extracurricular activities.

General conditions for conscripts

54. In general, conditions of service for conscripts including treatment, nutrition etc. are

not necessarily particularly different across the country. However, the conditions for

conscripts are worse in Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod regions, which are the regions that

border Ukraine. In these regions, conscripts could face shortages of many things. This is

because in many cases, conscripts posted in these regions have to be stationed

somewhere outside in the fields, where they have to work on building defensive

fortifications and other tasks, that would be rather abnormal for conscripts in other

parts of the country. Other than that, the general situation for conscripts is similar to

what it used to be.

55. In the past couple of decades, hazing has been widespread and the living conditions

are very basic and to some extend harsh compared to European standards. The food is

limited and of low quality, and the barracks are usually semi-heated or in some cases

not really heated.

56. The so-called dedovshchina is widespread among conscripts in Russia. Dedovshchina is

a historical practice of hazing that goes back to the Soviet Army, and became

widespread in the Russian army, over the past 30 years. Dedovshchina is a part of the

Russian military tradition where the older conscript soldiers, contract personnel and

the officers would make every effort to either verbally or physically abuse or make use

of conscripts such as extracting pocket money from them or force them to do all sorts

of dirty jobs.

57. Dedovshchina is present in every military arm of service, from the ground forces to the

fleet, in the Air Force and National Guard. However, Dedovshchina is less prevalent in

special forces (spetsnaz) and elite units, as these groups have fewer conscripts.

Although Dedovshchina is mostly applied to conscripts it can also be applied to

reservists and to individuals who have just started as contract soldiers

58. Dedovshchina could be more prevalent in certain regions compared to others.

However, it also depends on the status, financial ability and the connections of the

conscript or reservist to provide protection from Dedovshchina.

59. In larger cities, there is an extremely complicated system of bribery, where individual

soldiers can more or less bribe their way into more comfortable living conditions or

bribe their way into a better military unit or into more comfortable barracks where

they have access to better food etc.

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60. Conscripts can also bribe their way into serving in the Moscow region or in the larger

cities such as Moscow or St. Petersburg city, rather than being dispatched somewhere

in Siberia or in the far north. There is a very complicated system of bribery, which could

enable a certain soldier better living conditions. A conscript can also buy themselves

better serving conditions by simply paying the officer and offer him protection money

(known as krysha) in which case nobody would ever touch them.

61. The access to proper healthcare depends heavily on the military unit as some units

have relatively decent medical facilities. Especially in those units based in and around

larger cities. In these cities, conscripts can also use civilian Medical Services. Although,

in most cases, they do have their own relativity, well-developed medical healthcare

services.

62. The situation is more dire in the more remote regions of the Russian Federation. In the

far north and in the north Caucasus federal district, the health services have

deteriorated. However, the healthcare situation for normal civilians in these areas are

also worse than in the cities.

63. There is a lack of medical personnel in the remote areas of Russia, where there are also

fewer medical facilities. Since 2022, there has been a rising demand for military

medical services for Russian military forces that are based in Ukraine. Therefore, there

is an overall lack of military medical staff available everywhere in Russia because many

of the medical personnel has now been posted in Ukraine. Due to this high demand,

the already scarce medical resources in the provinces have been further drained.

Although, the situation is still reasonable in the larger cities of Russia.

64. In Chechnya, conscription was re-introduced in 2022, but being a conscript in the other

regions in the north Caucasus, is more challenging if they have been posted far away

from their home region. If a person is posted close to their hometown, they are likely

to be more or less safe. They would serve under better conditions. Nevertheless, as

mentioned before, their conditions depend to some extend on their ability to pay

bribes and to use their connections in order to serve in their home regions and possibly

closer to the hometowns.

65. However, conscripts from these regions are likely to face a higher degree of

discrimination if they serve elsewhere in Russia because of the ethnic and religious

background. However, the case with mobilisation of reservists is very different.

66. Extrajudicial punishments can be used in cases where conscripts refused to perform

the orders that they receive – especially orders that they should not be doing such as

extra or dirty jobs. In this case, they can face extrajudicial punishments. There is a

whole system of punishments that exists in the military structure of Russia.

67. More privileged soldiers can participate in hazing others who are less privileged,

regardless of their time in the military, or their military rank. So there are several layers

in this hierarchy and layers of discrimination and therefore it's impossible to say that all

Russian conscripts are subjected to the same level of harassment, discrimination or

extrajudicial punishments.

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68. Particularly the members of ethnic minorities who are non-native to the territory of

the Russian Federation are more likely to be subjected to harassment, hazing and

discrimination. For example, individuals, from the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan). Many of them have acquired Russian

citizenships.

69. However, there is potentially always the chance that someone from an ethnic minority

for example from Buryatia could end up in the military unit where there are only ethnic

Russians. Here he could face a degree of discrimination. There is always the chance

that this person will actually be posted in his own home republic. This happens

frequently with individuals from North Caucasus, for example, from Dagestan,

Ingushetia or Chechnya, where they can rely on a certain degree of protection (krysha).

70. In some cases, even senior officials from these republics would come over and sort of

the talk to military officials that you cannot touch people and so on. So they can they

can be subjected to discrimination and their chances are higher to be subjected to

discrimination as compared to it. But they still can rely on this informal mechanisms of

protection.

71. This krysha is more difficult to obtain for a person who originates from the Central

Asian republics or South Caucasus as they do no enjoy support from official

administrative structures within the Russian Federation. They can potentially face

discrimination based on their ethnicity or religious identity.

Tasks for conscripts relating to the war in the Ukraine

72. Conscripts have been deployed in logistics tasks (i.e. as drivers, mechanics, delivery

staff, etc.), also actively used in construction of defence fortifications (digging trenches,

preparing sand bags, etc.). There are a lot of conscript soldiers at the second and third

lines of defence, manning check points, forward observation posts and assisting FPV

drone teams (such as retrieving drones). Rear artillery positions are also heavily staffed

by conscripts, assisting with maintenance and operation of artillery guns.

73. There is a lot of information and evidence indicating that the Russian authorities use

extrajudicial punishments, when it comes to mobilising reservists for the participation

in the so-called Special Military Operation. However, the situation is different when it

comes to conscripts.

74. After the Kursk incursion, the Russian conscripts have played both an active and a

supporting role. Prior to the Kursk offensive, conscripts made up the majority of the

Russian forces on the border with Ukraine. Therefore, they have taken the heaviest

blows, when the Kursk offensive commenced. Many conscripts have been taken as

prisoners and probably over a thousand conscripts lost their lives since the start of the

Kursk incursion. However, there are no official numbers available, which can

corroborate this.

75. The conscripts were used as the major military force in the initial phase of the

incursion. However, eventually, they were to some extent replaced by regular troops.

Some of replacements came from the Donbas region and some came from other

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76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

regions of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to estimate the exact

involvement of conscripts in the combat roles in the Kursk region currently, because

there is no official or verifiable information on this matter. The source estimated that it

was likely 50/50, which means half of the combat tasks are to this day still performed

by conscripts in the Kursk region.

This was actually the official message of Russian military authorities, both from the

Ministry of Defence and at the local level. A number of Russian military commanders

have claimed that conscripts actually have to be involved in the Kursk operation.

Furthermore, conscripts were involved actively in supporting roles such as in the

construction of defensive fortifications around Kursk and Belgorod regions.

Initially when the Kursk incursion started in the early August 2024, most of the Russian

military positions in the Kursk region i.e. trenches, block posts and strongholds were

predominantly staffed by conscripts. The conscripts were obviously led by professional

officers and their job was to hold these positions.

Conscripts are not involved in offensive operations in the Kursk region. Therefore, one

will not find conscripts in the first line of assault troops to retake those positions from

the Ukrainians. However, they would be supporting regular troops and their assault

operations, probably in the second line of defence or holding the positions, improving

and expanding them. In this regard, conscripts in the Kursk region will be in the line of

fire, as they will be within the range of Ukrainian artillery and drones.

It is very much doubtful that conscripts would take part in assault operations, because

many of them have absolutely no military experience and have had only very basic

military training. Therefore, they will not be very efficient as combat soldiers, although

there has been reports of conscripts being used in the start of the Kursk incursion. They

were sent into assault missions in August 2024. However, there have not been reports

of such missions recently.

According to Russian law, conscripts can only be deployed for combat in peacekeeping

operations, or in anti-terrorist operations. However, the official Russian discourse has

described the current situation in Kursk region as a counterterrorist operation. Russian

officials have classified the Ukrainian presence in these areas as a terrorist incursion

into Russian territory, which meant that Russian MoD needed to conduct an anti-

terrorist operation. In this way, the conscripts would legally be put into the category of

military personnel that actually have to participate in military actions. Thus, conscripts

serving in Kursk cannot legally refuse any orders from the commanders as part of this

operation.

The situation is obviously very different in the Russian occupied territories of Ukraine,

where there is no legal ongoing anti-terrorist operation meaning conscripts should not

be involved in any military operations there. In these regions, conscripts can legally

refuse to be deployed in dangerous operations. This could for instance be the case in

Crimea.

Russian conscripts are engaged in Ukraine proper. They serve in Crimea and they also

serve in the four annexed regions: Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk.

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Officially, conscripts should not be involved in combat operations. They also should not

be anywhere close to the area of military activities. In Crimea there is obviously no risk

of being close to the front lines, as there are no front lines in Crimea. However, they

are still subjected to the Ukrainian drone attacks and Ukrainian missile attacks. There

were a number of cases where barracks with conscripts were hit by the Ukrainian

long-range weapons in Crimea, as well as in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

83. It is more doubtful that conscripts have been hit in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, but there

are conscripts stationed in these regions nevertheless. These annexed regions are not

very preferential regions for conscripts, unless a conscript is a local person and he

wants to serve in his own home region, for example, around Donetsk. However, if a

conscript is from somewhere else in Russia, from Novosibirsk for example, he certainly

would not want to serve in the occupied areas of Ukraine.

84. The source assessed that it would be a desperate situation for a conscript to end up in

the occupied territories because the life-threatening risks are much higher in these

regions in comparison to postings elsewhere in the Russian Federation.

85. Occasionally there has been reports of conscripts who ended up somewhere on the

front lines and were captured. However, many conscripts do eventually end up on the

front lines due to signing contracts with the MoD to become contract soldiers.

Pressure to sign a contract with the Russian military

86. The above-mentioned practice started in 2022 and in 2024, it has acquired a massive

scale. Any conscript who has served for just one month can legally sign a contract with

the MoD. In some cases, conscripts can become contract soldiers after even less than a

month's military service. Some conscripts can be pressured or even forced to sign a

contract.

87. There are no standards for how conscripts sign contracts. It differs from region to

region. It is done differently in each military unit. It depends on the military

commander and in some cases, conscripts are more or less persuaded to sign

contracts.

88. Conscripts have often been persuaded to sign a contract through financial rewards.

They are offered high salaries and large one-off payments. In some cases, for example

in Belgorod region, the Russian authorities offer three million Rubles as a one-off

payment to anyone signing a contract, which is over 20,000 US dollars. Furthermore,

soldiers are offered all sorts of social benefits and a stable career in the military. Many

conscripts are also convinced by various patriotic slogans such as “serve your country”,

“be a real man” etc.

89. A more widespread approach for the authorities to make conscripts sign contracts with

the MoD seems to be a forcible approach, where conscripts are threatened with

physical punishment. They could for instance risk being locked in the basement until

they sign a contract. There are various reports that hundreds of conscripts have been

locked in facilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions for many months for this purpose.

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90. There are other types of punishments that the authorities can utilise. It could be

beatings or naming and shaming. In some military bases, there have been examples of

posters and photographs of individuals on boards for everyone to see and label these

conscripts as cowards.

457

91. Additionally, there have been a few reports that contracts have been signed on behalf

of conscripts by their commander without the consent or even knowledge of the

conscript.

92. There is a whole set of different practices, that the Russian military officials use, which

would depend on the individual military commander. The military officials want to

recruit as many soldiers as possible for the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The military

officials can then be rewarded for their recruitment effort through various ways

including financial rewards. This leads commanders to being innovative when it comes

to signing up contract soldiers.

93. In this regard, there is no need for the Russian military to send the actual conscripts to

the front lines, as they have plenty of previous conscripts, who have signed contracts

with the MoD.

94. In 2022 and even in 2023, there were apparently quite a significant number of

conscripts who willingly signed military contracts. They were attracted by the financial

rewards and by the opportunities of a stable job within the military etc. As of today in

2024, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the number of those who willingly

sign contracts is exceptionally small. Therefore, most of the contracts have to be

enforced and that is why there seems to substantial evidence of how these contracts

are being forced upon conscripts. Previously – especially in 2022 – the practice of

enforcing contracts was rather bizarre and the cases were unusual.

95. Financial rewards, are more effective for recruiting reservists or individuals of older

age, due to their financial situation. Many of them have taken loans or have

mortgages, lack employment etc. However, conscripts probably hope to get

employment somewhere else in civilian jobs.

96. The source estimated that approximately 40-50% of a conscript cycle would end up

signing contracts with the MoD. It depends on their personal circumstances. If the

conscripts serve in a unit where they are offered a choice and where the enforcement

mechanisms are not so harsh, they are more likely to avoid signing contracts.

97. The units posted in the border regions with Ukraine are under the most pressure to

sign contracts, as the governors of the regions and the local military officials are under

a lot of strain and pressure from the Kremlin to recruit more people to attract more

individuals into the Armed Forces. They are quite heavily reliant on these forcible

methods of attracting conscripts and they are the ones that are increasing the amounts

of financial rewards.

98. Furthermore, the local Governors of the north Caucasus are also under pressure to sign

up soldiers. For example, the head of Chechnya always promises the Kremlin that he

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Please see photos from Telegram channels at the end of the minutes.

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will bring the highest number of military volunteers for the so-called Special military

Operation.

99. The border regions (Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk regions) and the regions in north

Caucasus are the regions who offer the highest financial incentives for signing a

contract. Regions such as Rostov region are perceived to be a near border region, and

thus slightly safer. However, it is expected that there will be more efforts to recruit

military persons from Rostov region rather than somewhere further into Siberia or the

far north.

100.

Below are two photos of naming & shaming posters. Both of these photos are

taken from various Telegram channels. The first is of a board with names and photos of

personnel disobeying orders during the so-called special military operation, and the

second is a poster for shaming individual soldiers and designed to be send by post

(supposedly to families, work places, etc.).

The DIS and SMA have decided not to include one of the photos due to reasons related to the

privacy of the individuals portrayed on the photo.

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Meeting with Novaya Gazeta Europe

Novaya Gazeta Europe was founded in April 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine six

weeks earlier and the subsequent introduction of wartime censorship that forced most of

Novaya Gazeta’s editors and journalists to leave the country.

New legislation

1. The Russian authorities are trying to control channels on Telegram and are marking

everyone with more than 10,000 subscribers on a special bloggers list.

2. There are not a lot of cases in the media concerning electronic summons. The use of

electronic summons was supposed to be implemented by 1 November. However, the

electronic summons system is not fully used as of the date of this interview, 7

November 2024.

3. As far as the source knows, the use of electronic summons is being tested in three

regions, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin and in the Republic of Mari El. Unfortunately, There

are no accurate information about whether the system is functioning properly in these

regions. As reported on 1 November 2024, by Andrey Kartapolov, Chairman of the

State Duma Defence Committee, electronic summonses will only be tested in these

three regions for now.

4. There is little available data on this subject, but the Russian authorities have stated on

their official website, that the registry would be operational by November 1, 2024.

However, it has not yet started functioning. The website is connected to the electronic

platform Gosulugi. The link:

https://реестрповесток.рф

5. When drafted electronically, the conscript will receive his summons through Gosulugi.

6. When summoned electronically, the summons is considered delivered. A summons will

be considered delivered 7 days after it is posted in the electronic registry. (whether the

drafted person opens the summons or not).

7. The Russian authorities are collecting data for a centralised database with potential

conscripts, but this database has not been created yet.

8. In the other regions of Russia, summons are still delivered physically to conscripts by

the Voenkomat (draft office).

9. Summons for conscription service are sent out twice a year. During spring and during

autumn.

Possibility to leave Russia after being summoned

10. It is still possible to leave Russia after haven been summoned for military service by a

physical summons. As far as the source knows, the Russian military authorities do not

share information about drafted conscripts with the border authorities the border

authorities of the other countries. So, this works if a person exits through Belarus,

Kazakhstan, etc. When crossing the Russian border without involving third countries,

problems may arise. After our conversation,

news

emerged that Moscow conscripts

who failed to report to the military enlistment office after receiving a summons

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

received SMS messages informing them of a travel ban from leaving Russia. However,

this might be merely an act of intimidation.

11. One option is to travel to Belarus, as being barred from leaving Russia does not prevent

you from traveling to Minsk and cross the border here.

Exemption, deferral and alternative military service

12. The source knows of a number of cases related to 10 – 20 students who should not be

drafted due to being active students or being disabled. Despite this, they were

detained at the Voenkomat and most of them now serve in the army as conscripts

despite their families hiring lawyers to help them with their rights.

13. Previously people belonging to the LGBT community could be exempted from military

service on the grounds of mental health issues, as their sexuality was perceived as a

mental illness.

14. As of November 2024, members of the LGBT community risk being prosecuted and

sent to jail if their sexuality becomes known. This change in the treatment of LGBT

persons happened in the spring of 2024 and came about both through new legislation

and in practice.

458

15. Several videos of LGBT persons being subjected to abuse have come to light since.

There are cases of persecution described in human rights communities.

459

16. Jehovah’s witnesses are categorised as an extremist organisation and their members

might be sent to prison. Such cases could be found, but detailed information about

Jehovah's Witnesses and the war can be read

here.

17. In theory, a member of a religious minority could refuse military service due to their

religious beliefs, for instance pacifism, and instead serve alternative civil service.

However, many people do not know of this right and therefore do not claim it.

18. When the Voenkomat refuses to grant alternative civil service, many people do not

know of the option to take this decision to court.

19. The courts in Russia do not respect the principle of a fair trial. The courts are on the

side of the military. However, with the help of human rights lawyers, it is possible to

win such a case in court, and in fact one human rights organisation claims to have a

high percentage of court victories. There is no unified statistics, but human rights

activists from various organizations mention the number of successful court cases. See

footnote.

460

458

Meduza, Верхов�½ый суд России объявил «экстремистским» и запретил «движе�½ие ЛГБТ», 30

November 2023,

url

459

Telegram, Кризис�½ая группа СК SOS, 4 September 2024,

url;

Telegram, ДСО — Движе�½ие

соз�½атель�½ых отказчиков, 6 August 2024,

url

460

Telegram, Призыв к совести, 31 July 2024,

url;

Current time, Для вое�½�½ослужащих по призыву это

работает". Кто выбирает и как добивается альтер�½атив�½ой службы в России во время вой�½ы, 17

May 2024,

url,

Current Time, Призыв�½икам в России отказывают в альтер�½атив�½ой службе. Советы

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20. There are a number of human rights organisations who can help persons who have

deserted, had gone AWOL or do not want to serve. These organisations are: Идите

Лесом, Движе�½ие Соз�½атель�½ых Отказчиков and Призыв к Совести.

21. There are no set and predetermined criteria for being granted alternative civil service.

There is an application form that needs to be filled out, and the most important thing is

doing this correctly and on time.

22. Russian culture is a masculine one, and doing alternative civil service is not a popular

choice in Russia. Russian propaganda has proven effective in convincing people to

serve both as conscripts and as contract soldiers.

Pressure to sign a contract with the military

23. A lot of pressure is put on conscripts to sign contracts with the military, and there are

cases where the one time sum for signing a contract has been paid out without a

contract actually having been signed.

461

In other cases, contracts have been signed by a

conscript’s commander without the consent or knowledge of the conscript.

462

24. Contracts can now be signed early into conscription service. The source believed, that a

contract could be signed within the first month of service.

463

25. It is possible to refuse serving as a contract soldier in these cases. Although, only by

taking the case to court. The chance of getting out of the contract is about 50/50, and

human rights organisations try to help conscripts in these cases.

26. The trend of forcing conscripts to sign contracts within the first days or months of their

mandatory service only emerged after the start of the offensive in the Kursk region.

Prior to this, human rights organizations recorded only isolated cases of such early

contract signing (by law, conscripts are required to undergo training for several months

before entering into a contract). There are no statistics yet, but it is known that

relatives are already taking legal action in similar cases.

464

27. Both physical and psychological pressure is applied to conscripts to try to make them

sign a contract. The military use both the carrot and the stick to make people sign

contracts.

28. The source opined that LGBT persons have been forced to sign up as contract soldiers

and have been sent to the front line.

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юриста, как отстоять свои права, 22 September 2024,

url;

Telegram, Призыв к совести, 13 September

2024,

url

461

Telegram, Новая газета Европа - Россия�½е продолжают получать де�½ьги за ко�½тракты с

Ми�½оборо�½ы, которые �½е заключали, October 2024,

url

462

Telegram, Сахали�½ против вой�½ы, 22 October 2024,

url

463

Telegram, МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ I Новости I Сроч�½ики - Очеред�½ых сроч�½иков заставили подписать

ко�½тракт, 21 November 2024,

url

464

Sever Realii, "Мы в ужасе, воевать �½е хотим". Сроч�½икам платят по фальшивым ко�½трактам, 20

October 2024,

url

465

OVD-Info, «Будешь у ме�½я род�½ую землю в окопах целовать!» Как за окраше�½�½ые волосы

получить протокол о «дискредитации» и повестку в вое�½комат, 17 May 2024,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

Draft evasion, etc.

29. There are three levels of punishments for soldiers who do not wish to serve in the

military:

1. The first level is for people who refuse service. The punishment in these cases is a

fine of 300 euros, which is ten times more than the former fine for the same

offense.

2. People who leave their military unit without permission (going AWOL) risk up to

five years in prison. However, in practice, these people will instead be sent to the

front line even though they would prefer to go to prison. These soldiers were

mobilised, and not conscripts.

466

3. Deserters are soldiers who leave a front line unit without permission.

4. The sentences for AWOL and desertion range from 5 to 15 years, depending on the

time spent away from the military unit and the circumstances.

467

30. A Russian citizen residing outside Russia can hire a lawyer to check, if they have

any criminal cases against them. It is also possible to check online. In fact,

information about whether a person is on the wanted list can be found on the

official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Information about whether a

criminal or administrative case has been initiated against a person can be obtained

by searching on the regional courts' websites

Tasks of conscripts

31. Traditionally, conscription service has not been considered something dangerous in

Russia. Rather, conscription service is seen as something every young man should do to

become a real man.

32. However, the cases of conscripts serving at the front have increased. This is primarily

due to the situation in the region of Kursk, where conscripts do serve and where some

have been taken prisoners of war.

33. The situation in the region of Kursk has changed the view on conscription service, as it

is now considered dangerous.

34. The source’s most popular video on their Youtube-channel is about a young conscript

who served near the border to Ukraine and who were killed in a drone strike.

35. Conscripts serve as combat soldiers in the region of Kursk where they defend their

country. However, they do not, as far as the source knew, serve in the occupied

regions of Ukraine.

36. The source was not aware of whether conscripts were used both defensively and

offensively in the region of Kursk. Conscripts have only had very basic military training

466

467

Verstka, Служба по ко�½тракту без альтер�½атив: при�½ужде�½ия, угрозы и штурмы, 27 May 2024,

url

Consultant, УК РФ Статья 338. Дезертирство, 23 November 2024,

url;

Madiazona, К августу 2024

года в российские суды уже поступило больше дел о бегстве из армии, чем за весь 2023‑й, 12

August 2024,

url

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and are not trained to fight and to kill. Statistics about conscript casualties are not

publicly available.

37. The reason why conscripts do not serve in the occupied regions of Ukraine is that

conscripts are not allowed to take part in the special military operation. They do,

however, serve in the region of Kursk, due to the activities in the region being labelled

as an anti-terror operation. They also serve in Crimea, as this is considered a part of

Russia. Despite the fact that, from the perspective of Russian law, the "newly"

occupied territories of Ukraine are considered part of the Russian Federation,

conscripts are not sent there.

38. Conscripts defend the borders to Ukraine and they could be tasked with assembling

drones. They also perform supportive duties such as digging trenches.

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Meeting with Sergey Krivenko, director of the Human Rights Group

"Citizen. Army. Law"

Sergey Krivenko, director of the Human Rights Group "Citizen. Army. Law", which is a Russian

non-profit and non-governmental organization created in 2010 in Moscow based on many years

of work to protect the rights of conscripts and military personnel, as well as to promote

alternative civilian service (ACS) in Russia. In December 2021, the Russian Ministry of Justice

added the Human Rights Group to the so-called register of "foreign agent NGOs". After the start

of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the main focus of the

organization's work became supporting those Russian citizens who consciously refuse military

service and participation in the war (see https://t.me/peaceplea). In August 2023, the Russian

Ministry of Justice added the director of the human rights group "Citizen. Army. Law" Sergei

Krivenko to the register of foreign agents in an individual capacity.

New legislation

1. There have been two waves of legal amendments relating to conscription rules, which

according to the source have become generally toughened. We explain how the law

on military service was changed in April 2023 and how to now fight for the right not to

fight.

468

2. The amendments consist of the introduction of an electronic register of those who are

subject to conscription, and increase in fines and the introduction of restrictions on

those subjected to conscription (please see an overview of what has changed in the

end for the autumn 2023 draft in the footnote).

469

3. With regards to duration of the conscription period, no changes have been made.

However, the age of conscription has been increased from 18 to 30 years, compared to

the previous 18 to 27 years. For persons in the reserve, mobilisation age was increased

to 55 years.

4. There have been no changes regarding the annual number of people to be conscripted.

This number is still about 300,000, which constitutes approximately one third of the

total population of men turning 18 per year. There were previous speculations that the

number of conscripts would be increased for the present autumn draft period, which

however did not occur. The Russian army has suffered huge losses to be compensated,

and volunteer involvement in contract service is not going well. The authorities

therefore has two means to increase the number of military personnel; either via

increasing the draft or via mobilisation. Both of these options are difficult and come

468

И�½струкции «Призыва к совести», Сбор да�½�½ых о вое�½�½ообяза�½�½ых, огра�½иче�½ие прав и

облегче�½ие вербовки — объяс�½яем, как изме�½или зако�½ о вои�½ской службе и как теперь бороться

за право �½е воевать, 7 April 2024,

url;

И�½струкции «Призыва к совести», Штрафы, запрет �½а выезд,

повыше�½ие призыв�½ого возраста и предель�½ого возраста запаса — что изме�½или в правилах

призыва и мобилизации за лето и как теперь бороться за право �½е воевать, 7 January 2024,

url

469

И�½струкции «Призыва к совести», Что поме�½ялось для призыв�½иков к 1 октября 2023 года и как

это влияет �½а защиту права �½е воевать, 17 January 2024,

url

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RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

with a set of problems; however, the source opines that the risk of a second wave of

mobilisation is prevalent. The number of citizens called up for military service per year:

297,245

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Central database

5. As for the planned central database, the source clarifies that it consists of two

registers:

1. A digital register of those individuals accounted for conscription or military service

in general (men between 18-55 years). This database also includes women who are

registered for military service. These are women who previously served in the army

and have already left, these are women who have no connection with the army,

but who have specialties that can be used in the army, for example, doctors, and

signalmen.

According to the law, all state agencies and departments, such as e.g, healthcare

institutions, tax agencies, employers (both public and private), education institutions

and the police should provide updated information about every person who is subject

to be in this register. The idea behind it is that all information should be available in one

joint digital register, for the Voenkomat (the ‘Voenkomat’) to be able to see a complete

picture of every person subject to conscription or military service.

Up until today, different agencies have kept their own registers of information in different

forms, and it has proven problematic to unify these registers. At the moment, the joint digital

a. A register of summons.

After the Voenkomat sends a summons to an individual, the summons should be

included in a special digital register. State bodies have a formal right to restrict the

rights of summoned individuals, such as e.g. banning them to leave the country. With

this digital register, the border police can automatically stop a person included in the

307,000

276,000

260,500

267,000

263,000

262,150

254,500

277,000

283,000

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summoned individuals such as the prohibition to drive a car and to take financial loans.

Formally, the ban on leaving the country comes into effect immediately from the

moment the summons is placed in the register and remains in effect until the citizen

appears at the Voenkomat. Other restrictions on rights may be imposed on the citizen if

he fails to appear at the Voenkomat within 20 days after the summons is placed in the

6. The digital register of summons does not work yet, meaning that a person who has

been summoned to conscription can still leave the country. Once the register comes

into force, this possibility should no longer exist. The prohibition to leave the country

applies to those subjected to conscription during the drafting period in which they

received the summons. After the drafting period has ended, that person will again be

legally able to leave the country unless the authorities has opened a criminal case due

to draft evasion.

7. The source is unaware of when the digital register of summons is expected to start

working. Theoretically, the authorities could announce within the next year that it is

working. The source opines, however, that employers at the Voenkomat are not

interested in this register, as it would make it more difficult to use means of

corruption, which are largely prevalent today.

Summoning

8. Russian authorities are working on introducing electronic summons for conscription

through the official service

Gosuslugi

and the system has been tested in some regions.

The website of electronic summonses is being checked in the Ryazan region, Mari El

and Sakhalin.

470

However, the launch of the electronic system failed and therefore the

changes have not yet come into full effect. The source opines that creating a “good

quality data base” is a common problem in Russia. The president initially ordered

departments and ministries to prepare for both the electronic register and the

electronic summons system by 1 October 2024. Since the launch failed, the date has

been postponed until 1 January 2025. Therefore, the old rules and measures for

summoning conscripts are still applied. These consist of the three following practices:



Summoning by handing a summons in person to the recipient, who then has to

sign the summons for it to legally count as having been delivered, or the

summons may be handed to the citizen personally by military registration and

enlistment office employees.



Sending the summons by registered post. If the summons is sent by registered

post it does not have to be signed by the recipient.



The summons may be served to a citizen at work or at an educational

institution through the management of these organisations.

470

RTVI, В трех регио�½ах России �½ачалась проверка реестра электро�½�½ых повесток, 18 September

2024,

url

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9. There are no regional differences when it comes to which of the two-abovementioned

methods is applied when summoning conscripts.

10. Propaganda plays a problematic part, convincing people who are generally unaware of

their rights and the conscription procedure that they must serve. The source states

that many believe that the state has unlimited rights to send a person to conscription

and that once you are informed about a summons, you must adhere to it, no matter

how it is delivered. The source describes the current situation as a “huge mess”, where

servicemen from the Voenkomat use several mixed methods for summoning

conscripts; by sending formal summons, SMS-messages, and messages through the

official service

Gosuslugi,

all while the media informs people that all of these methods

are obligatory even though they are not. Hence, even a SMS from the Voenkomat risks

being perceived as a legally valid summons, although it is in fact not. Legally, only the

traditional means of summoning in person or by registered post are obligatory. The

source opines that only a minority of young people understand their rights and the

procedure, and are able to defend their rights.

11. Illegal so-called “one day drafts” also occur, are described as the process when an

individual turns to the Voenkomat for a different purpose (e.g. to collect paperwork)

and once there, he is conscripted and sent to military service the very same day. This

practice constitutes a gross violation of Russian law and was previously a rare situation,

however an increase has been noted since 2022. The practice is mainly a problem in

bigger cities, since people in rural regions usually adhere to their summons to a greater

extent than in larger and more densely populated places.

12. According to the source, once a person is formally conscripted, it is impossible to

revoke the process and be returned, even if the conscription was done through

violations of draft procedures.

13. A citizen is considered officially called up if the draft board makes a decision to call him

up. At this stage, it is still possible not to go to the army if you appeal the decision of

the draft board to a higher draft board of the region or to the court.

14. The formal procedure of conscription, which is fixed in the law, consists of the fact that

after the decision of the conscription commission, the citizen is given a summons to

appear at the assembly point to be sent to the army. The time between these

moments is usually several days. This time is necessary to resolve personal issues if the

citizen intends to go to the army. Or to file a complaint if the citizen does not want to

go to the army.

15. A gross violation of the law would be if a citizen is forcibly taken to a collection point

immediately after the draft board and from there forcibly sent to the army. This is the

so-called violation of "one-day conscription". A citizen receives the legal status of

"military serviceman" at the collection point. It is impossible to resign from the army

because the conscription was in violation of the law. There is no such ground for

dismissal in Russian law.

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16. The source has seen many cases where someone struggles for their rights, they will be

taken aside by the Voenkomat. There are cases of forced conscription and cases where

a citizen wanted to leave the military registration and enlistment office, but he was

forcibly sent to the army.

471

See also "Overview of Rights Violations and Resistance

During the 2024 Spring Conscription."

472

17. Every Voenkomat has a predetermined quota to fill with conscripts and the main goal

for the Voenkomat is to fill this quota, not to conscript specific individuals.

18. If draft quotas are not met in the big cities or in densely populated urban areas, the

authorities can increase quotas in rural provincial regions where it is easier to draft

conscripts. Consequently, the draft percent of people from e.g. Buryiatia is higher than

that from e.g. Moscow.

19. Traditionally there have been five main ways to avoid military service; to hide, to leave

the country, to be granted exemption due to health conditions, to be granted deferral

due to studies or applying for alternative civil service (ACS). With legal amendments in

2023, a ban for summoned individuals to leave the country was introduced.

Furthermore, the amendments allow the police to search for draftees (ex. by using the

possibility of searching through phone bills and films from CCTV cameras) and demand

that employers inform the authorities about changes related to potential conscripts.

Consequently, the possibilities to leave the country and to hide in order to avoid

conscription have become more limited.

20. There is also a theoretical possibility to bribe your way out of conscription, but also this

has become more difficult today as the state is more cautious about bribes.

21. As for the possibility to forge a summons document, the source opines that this would

not be too difficult. According to the source there is a market of fake stamps.

Additionally, it is possible to forge a summons via e.g. IT methods as there are many

copies of summons circulating online. This means that forging summonses can work for

migration services of foreign countries.

LGBT

22. Formally, there are no exemptions for LGBT persons when it comes to conscription.

Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, LGBT persons were often considered mentally ill

and therefore they would easier meet the grounds for exemption. Today however, the

so-called international LGBT movement has been declared an extremist organisation in

Russia, meaning that openly declaring e.g. homosexuality could lead a person to face

criminal prosecution. Even though there is no real existence of an international LGBT

movement as portrayed by the Russian state, any person claiming to belong to the

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Telegram, Призыв к совести - В Москве запас�½ика попытались призвать �½а сроч�½ую службу, �½о

отпустили, 3 December 2024,

url

472

И�½струкции «Призыва к совести», Обзор �½аруше�½ий прав и сопротивле�½ия в весе�½�½ий призыв

2024 года, 30 October 2024,

url

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LGBT group could be prosecuted for being a member of this so-called organization.

Therefore, people are generally not revealing their sexual orientation.

23. If e.g. a homosexual person serves as a conscript and their sexual orientation is

revealed, the source opines that consequences may differ broadly. In some cases,

there might be no consequences, and in other cases, the individual might be subjected

to e.g. bullying and pressure. The source is aware of such cases from the period before

the full-scale war, but there are no statistics on the matter as this is not an officially

existing problem in Russia.

Religious minorities and ACS

24. Earlier, it was sufficient for a person to state being a Jehovas Witness and almost

automatically he would be permitted to perform ACS instead of ordinary military

service (as a conscript). In 2017, Jehovas Witnesses were outlawed in Russia, so a

person can no longer publicly admit that they belong to this denomination out of risk

of being prosecuted. According to the source, there is therefore no longer an easy way

for religious minorities to avoid conscription.

25. It is still possible to claim that one has ideas and beliefs that are contrary to the

purpose of the military (e.g. being a pacifist), and apply for ACS on these grounds. The

system with ACS has been prevalent in Russia for more than 20 years, and comes with

a special procedure, which involves applying actively to a special commission. The

procedure is still available but comes with many obstacles, even more so since 2022 as

the interest in ACS has increased at least ten times compared to before the full-scale

war. For further information on ACS there is a special report "THE RIGHT TO

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE IN RUSSIA DURING FULL-SCALE

WAR

473

" (May 2024); it is posted on the website

https://peaceplea.org.

Postings

26. In general, every arm of service of the Russian military has conscripts serving in it. Most

military units are combined, consisting of both conscripts and contract soldiers. Larger

military units may sometimes consist of smaller units, with some of them being

comprised only of contract soldiers. The conscription period is only one year and some

specialities within the military require longer time for preparation. Conscripts can,

therefore be offered to sign a contract before deployment into these special military

units. It is, according to the source, the units consisting of only contract soldiers that

are being deployed to the war.

Healthcare

473

The report in Russian:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jt0_YiXqwPTS60DyKL6VOg8XVTYNCi7Y/view?pli=1

The report in English:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1X3Zq2l66jUnnQTnotL8Q8eDGozJ90gNC/view

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27. Medical service is available in the army and conscripts formally have access to

healthcare. In practice however, there is a lack of medical personnel and it happens

that paramedics replace doctors. In order for a conscript to be sent to the hospital he

should have a referral from a local paramedic. As military hospitals are increasingly full

of wounded soldiers, a conscript or a soldier with a minor illness or health condition

will have reduced access to the hospitals. The lack of medical capacity within the

military has led the MoD to sign contracts with civic hospitals in order to send military

personnel there for treatment, however this has not worked well so this possibility is

usually not available to conscripts.

28. As far as potential differences in conscripts’ access to healthcare between different

regions, on one hand there are less medical institutions e.g. in the far east and in more

remote parts of Russia. However, there are many means of communication and

transport. No comparative studies or analysis has been done on this topic and there is

no available statistics.

General physical conditions

29. The source is not aware of any special complaints with regards to the general

conditions for conscripts and the source states that the physical conditions for

conscripts have improved. During the mobilisation campaign in 2022, temporary

logistical problems arose however.

30. The source estimates that there are regional differences regarding the general

conditions for conscripts, but at the same time highlights that there are standards in

place which are the same for all the army and all regions in Russia.

Process

31. When a person appears at the Voenkomat after being summoned, he goes through a

medical check. This process starts after receiving an initial summons – in person or via

registered post. It is then up to the conscription commission to decide whether to

conscript the person or grant him a deferral or an exemption. According to standard

procedure, the person is released after this commission, however with a new

summons in which it is stated when the person should reappear at the Voenkomat to

commence the conscription, usually within the scope of e.g. three or five days. Upon

reappearing at the Voenkomat, the conscript is transferred to a so-called regional

collection point. Each region in Russia has one regional collection point.

32. Representatives from different military units come to the regional collection point and

chose conscripts. The selection can be based on e.g. qualifications such as special

technical competence. As for special competences, this could already have been

screened at the Voenkomat level. Aside from this, the source states that the selection

procedure is quite random and it is not possible to predict where in the military the

individual conscript will end up.

Tasks and postings in Ukraine

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33. Conscripts’ tasks consist of fulfilling routine obligations of the military, to be trained

militarily and to participate in military preparations. The tasks are similar in the

different arms of service.

34. Prior to 2024, conscripts had not been participating in active military actions, but

rather served in border regions near the Ukrainian territory such as Belgorod, Crimea,

Bryansk and Kursk. In these regions, due to the proximity of Ukraine, there have been

many recorded casualties amongst conscripts because of e.g. shellings etc. Many

conscripts serving in the navy were also killed when the flag-ship Moscow was sunk..

35. However, since august 2024 the tasks for conscripts have changed. Conscripts are now

participating in the fighting in Kursk in full scope. The source conveys that conscripts

are used for both offensive and defensive activities there. In Kursk, a conscript could be

ordered to invoke in the main military activity, which usually takes place during the

fighting.

36. If a conscript is posted somewhere else in Russia, and the casualties in Kursk are high,

there is a possibility that the conscript can be sent to Kursk according to the law. After

four months of military service he could legally be sent to engage in fighting.

37. The source does not have much information about conscripts in the annexed

territories (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizjzja) but there are reports about

conscripts being sent there in order to participate in construction work or perform

logistical tasks, however not in fighting.

Hazing and ‘dedovshchina’

38. According to the source, the level of violence in the Russian military is relatively high,

although the classic notion of ‘dedovshchina’ does not exist anymore. The source

points at two notions of ‘dedovshchina’. The first was a system of administration in the

military unit where more senior conscripts who were drafted earlier were responsible

for the order and for commanding junior conscripts. This system of administration was

maintained by violence and took place under the era of the Soviet Union and in Russia

until 2010. In 2010, a reform led to the reduction of the term for conscription leading

to a situation where there were no longer “senior” or “junior” conscripts. There were

also steps taken towards so-called humanization of the military service. As a result,

‘dedovshchina’ as a system of administration has disappeared.

39. The second notion of ‘dedovschina’ is just violence. According to the source, violent

offences are still committed inside the army, but today the violence is not a part of the

formal system of administration. Hence, the prevalence and use of violence within the

military today has different reasons and sources. Officers can e.g. apply violence to

soldiers. Violence could also be related to conflicts between different groups, e.g.

between contract soldiers and conscripts or between ethnic groups.

40. Corruption is another source of violence, where e.g. personnel in the military demand

money from those who have financial resources. There is a prevalence of internal

bribes where you can buy your way out of specific duties. If a person pays for not

having to serve specific duties, this means that somebody else should serve them, and

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41.

42.

43.

44.

this person could be forced. Therefore, it becomes a source of violence. Violence is also

often used to force conscripts to sign contracts with the MoD, and the source states

that this is a widespread problem.

The source states that it is difficult to for see and distinguish special groups who would

be more vulnerable or at a higher risk to be subjected to violence. There are random

processes inside the units and barracks where the source of violence could be either an

officer, a contract soldier, conscripts united in a group or e.g. a national or ethnic

group. Classical ‘dedovshchina’ was a hierarchical system, but as this does not exist

anymore it has become more unpredictable how violence is applied and who is

subjected to it.

A person subjected to violence can file a complaint to the military prosecutor's office

(https://gvp.gov.ru/) or to the military investigation department (http://gvsu.gov.ru/).

It is also possible to convey information about the violations to relatives or friends, so

that they in turn can file a complaint to the MoD or make the situation public. Even

though there is a system for filing complaints, it comes with difficulties, especially if the

commanding officer is the source of violence. In this case, it would be better to deliver

information to family members or relatives for them to file a complaint to the

authorities. If the source of violence is someone else, it is easier for the conscript to

use formal procedures and file the complaint himself.

Formally there is also a possibility to apply to serve in another military unit, but in

practice not many people use this possibility. It is unrealistic for a serviceman to be

transferred to another unit on his own initiative. Lawyers try to apply this procedure in

another case. When a serviceman in one unit is subjected to violence and his

complaints do not work. Then he can run away from this military unit. Then contact the

military prosecutor's office and ask there to be sent to another military unit, reporting

the violence that was used against him. Sometimes this procedure works.

Another instrument to defend your rights is to flee your military unit. Fleeing your

military unit is a criminal offence, but a person would not be subject to criminal

responsibility if he flees and within a few days appeals to the authorities through a

complaint and explains that the reason for fleeing was violations of your rights. If the

violations are confirmed, this person will not be prosecuted. However, the source

underlines that this relates to drafted conscripts and military personnel stationed on

Russian territory, not to soldiers who participate in the war in Ukraine.

Draft avoidance, draft evasion and refusals

45. After September 2022, refusal to obey to a military command is a formal crime

according to the criminal code.

Military personnel may be subject to criminal punishment:

- for refusing to participate in combat operations (Article 332 of the

Criminal Code of Russia);

474

Consultant, УК РФ Статья 332. Неиспол�½е�½ие приказа, 23 November 2024,

url

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for unauthorized abandonment of a military unit (Article 337 of the

Criminal Code of Russia);

475

- for desertion from the army (Article 338 of the Criminal Code of

Russia).

476

As such, this offence could lead to prosecution. However, refusal to obey to an

unlawful command, e.g. washing a command’s car, is not an offence and would not

lead to formal repression.

46. If a conscript were to leave their unit in Kursk, the source is not aware if this would

legally be considered desertion or absence without leave (as conscripts are involved in

active fighting there). Leaving ones military unit is a crime but the responsibility is

higher when it takes place during fighting or in a territory where there is declared a

stage of war. Therefore, leaving ones military unit as a conscript in Kursk would be

more severe than leaving ones military unit in e.g. Siberia or elsewhere in Russia.

Potential punishments will also be higher. A person leaving his military unit in e.g.

Novosibirsk, and returning after a month, could be sentenced to two years in prison. If

a person does the same in Kursk, he could be sentenced to up to ten years in prison.

47. Prison is very rare punishment for draft evaders. Out of a few hundred criminal cases

related to draft evasion in 2023, only one or two cases led to prison. The rest ended

with fines. Additionally, there were a few dozens of thousands of administrative fines

for not adhering to the summons. In these cases, the offence did not amount to refusal

to serve, but was rather classified as failure to fulfil obligations connected to the

drafting procedure. The source wished to underline that one has to take into

consideration that out of 1 million men summoned to military facilities each year, and

300 000 summoned to conscription, only a few hundred were subjected to criminal

prosecution.

48. If a person leaves the country after being summoned, and instead they draft another

person to fil the quota, the consequence for the originally summoned individual would

depend on whether the Voenkomat has sent the case to an investigative committee or

not. The crime of draft evasion does not take place if you fail to adhere to your

summons once, but at least two draft campaigns. If a person fails to adhere to his

summons, the Voenkomats rarely decide to fill out all the proper paper work and send

it to an investigative committee.

Article 328 of the Criminal Code of Russia defines criminal liability for conscription into

military service.

477

Evasion of conscription for military service means failure to appear for a medical

examination and a meeting of the draft board without a valid reason. But, as the

475

Consultant, УК РФ Статья 337. Самоволь�½ое оставле�½ие части или места службы, 23 November

2024,

url

476

Consultant, УК РФ Статья 338. Дезертирство, 23 November 2024,

url

477

Consultant, УК РФ Статья 328. Укло�½е�½ие от прохожде�½ия вое�½�½ой и альтер�½атив�½ой

гражда�½ской службы, 23 November 2024,

url

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Supreme Court of Russia recently (in the spring of 2023) clarified, criminal liability

occurs if the conscript intends to avoid the obligation to perform military service by

conscription and the presence of his intention must be proven in court. For example,

repeated failures to appear at the Voenkomat without valid reasons may indicate the

presence of intention.

49. If a person is outside of Russia, there are no public systems allowing you to know if

your case has been sent to criminal investigation.

50. Relatives to draft evaders are at risk for being visited by the police in the authorities’

search for the evaded person, but in general, there is no pressure or punishment upon

family members to draft evaders.

51. The situation for soldiers who are in in Ukraine is tough, as they are forbidden to leave

the army since 2022. Since they cannot leave the military legally, the number of cases

of people fleeing from military service has been increasing since 2022. Before the full

scale war, there were a few hundred cases of persons illegally leaving their military

unit annually, and now there are about 10,000 criminal cases.

478

This includes both

desertion and refusal to obey an order. Those who refuse to serve on the frontline and

leave their units are subject to prosecution according to criminal law. However, these

persons are only contract soldiers.

Pressure to sign contracts

52. Pressure on conscripts to sign contracts with the MoD is widespread and takes place

nearly in every military unit. The forms of the pressure can differ. Sometimes the

command convinces the conscript by using moral pressure. Physical violence in order

to pressure a conscript to sign a contract is rare, but the source is aware of such cases

and claims that they do occur.

53. Nearly all relatives of draftees who contact the source’s organization inform them

about pressure to sign contracts, but the forms of the pressure are sufficiently

different. The source does not have any relevant statistics on the matter, neither is

there available statistics regarding how many of the 300 000 drafted conscripts per

year that sign a contract. Before the full-scale war, conscription service was the main

source for contract service. Some years before the war, the military authorities

reported that almost 50 % of conscripts signed a contract, but today such statistics is

lacking. It is still the status in Russian law that contract soldiers volunteer to sign

contracts.

54. There are also cases where somebody else signs the contract instead of the conscript,

and as a result, the conscripts are being sent as contract soldiers to Ukraine. If

someone else signs a contract in a forged matter, it is possible for the conscript to file a

complaint through his family or relatives, although it is rather difficult.

478

Mediazona, Более 10 тысяч российских вое�½�½ых обви�½или в отказе от службы с �½ачала вой�½ы в

Украи�½е, 18 June 2024,

url

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55. Signing up as a contract soldier is not a one-step procedure; rather it has at least two

steps. Firstly, one should sign an application about the desire to join the contract

service. Sometime later, the person will sign the contract itself, and there is still a

possibility to refuse in the second step of this procedure. The source is aware of

situations where people changed their minds, and with the help from human rights

defenders, they managed to halt the procedure so that these persons managed to

avoid contract service.

On conscription from the North Caucasus

There are no ethnic military units in Russia, meaning that conscripts from e.g. Dagestan and

Chechnya would not be subject to specific postings or tasks. The source conveys that there

could be problems with discipline due to the mixture and clashes of different cultures inside

the barracks, but that there are no national ethnic military units when relating to conscripts.

Further,

There was no conscription in Chechnya for a long time, but in recent years it has

been resumed, with several hundred people conscripted, serving mainly in the southern

regions of the country.

56.

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Meeting with OVD-Info

OVD-Info is an independent human rights defence and media group established in 2011,

focusing on the rights to freedom of assembly and expression. OVD-Info works on the ground in

Russia and globally aiming at putting an end to political persecution in Russia. For this purpose,

they collect data and produce content about political repressions in Russia, coordinate legal aid

to unjustly persecuted people and work towards a systemic change in the human rights field.

OVD-Info is also people helping in courts and prisons, who are persecuted due to freedom of

speech, freedom of assembly and anti-war speeches.

New legislation

1. Many laws in Russia are so broadly written or in so low quality that judges can

interpret the laws in completely different ways. Therefore, the many laws make room

for a very broad interpretation of that law, which one can observe in the way judges

are ruling. In a way, the laws are written so that everybody feels guilty. In this way the

laws is an instrument of self-censorship.

2. The source stated that electronic summons started to work this autumn. The source

opined, however, that the electronic summons and the centralised database of

persons eligible for military service will likely not be as effective as the Russian

authorities claim. It would be interesting to monitor in the near future. The electronic

system is partly introduced to make it easier for the Voenkomat to find draft evaders.

3. In spring 2023 the notorious law imposing administrative and criminal charges for

«discrediting the military» or spreading «fake news» about the Russian army has been

updated to include

volunteer battalions, organisations or individuals assisting in

completion of the objectives set for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,

meaning that spreading «fakes» about mercenary groups, such as Wagner PMC, could

constitute a punishable offence. In April 2023, a law

was passed

to allow military

summonses to be sent out electronically through the public services website Gosuslugi,

a unified registry of citizens eligible for military service was established, and restrictive

measures have been put in place concerning people evading conscription, such as a

prohibition on operating vehicles and conducting real estate transactions after twice

failing to report to a military recruiting office once a summons has been received.

4. New, harsher punishments have been added to the law for desertion, going absent

without leave and opposing a superior. A new crime of “voluntary surrender” has also

been added. Reports suggest that torture and illtreatment are used by Russian army

commanders as punishment against servicemen who refuse to obey orders, including

locking soldiers in pits in the ground, called “zindan”, without food or water.

Recruitment of conscripts

5. When a person receive a summons for conscription, he will still have some time to

leave the country. The source assessed that this window would be approximately one

week. It is much easier for those who want to leave the country after receiving a

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summons to Kazakhstan, Armenia or Belarus, as one can travel to these countries on a

Russian internal passport. From these countries, it would be easier to travel to other

countries.

It is, however, quite dangerous for Russians to stay in Belarus, if a person had broken

the law in Russia because the Russian and the Belarusian authorities are working close

together and have interconnected systems for wanted persons. On the other hand, the

problem for Russia is that Belarusian officers are not very interested in taking Russians.

The source mentioned that there has been some cases where people were stopped by

Belarusian authorities.

In 2023 and 2024, mobilisation

focused

on recruiting specific groups, including

socioeconomically vulnerable people, prisoners, Indigenous Peoples, Russian citizens

who had recently acquired citizenship, men with military-related specializations and, in

some cases, migrants with temporary residence. Physical violence and underhanded

tactics have been used to force men into signing contracts to join the war. Individuals

who avoid mobilisation can be prosecuted.

Military recruitment offices have been opened in migration processing offices; in the

Kaluga region, officials demanded signed military contracts as a precondition for

applying for naturalisation, contrary to Russian law. Migrants, in particular from

Central Asia, have been targeted by police raids, forcing them into signing contracts to

join the war.

This year, the autumn draft for the first time

included

conscripts from the occupied

Zaporizhzhia region. Ukrainian men aged 18 to 30 who obtained Russian passports are

required to report for conscription.

Vulnerable groups

10. There are no exemptions for members of the LGBT community in Russia for

conscription. The LGBT members are therefore afraid to go to Army officials and say

openly that they are gay. They have to hide their sexual identity for the Voenkomat.

Many members of the LGBT community are trying to leave Russia or to hide

somewhere inside Russia in order to avoid being conscripted into the army.

11. Members of the LGBT community are more afraid to serve as conscripts than

heterosexual Russian citizens, because the Russian army culture is very masculine and

patriarchal in its structure. People working in the army from conscripts to army officers

in general do not believe in rights of LGBT people. Many of them actually believe that

LGBT is something one has to cure with medicine. It is psychological illness in the eyes

of many Russia army employees.

12. Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses do not want to serve in the army, because they

are pacifists. So they are approaching conscription in the same way as members of the

LGBT community. Therefore, they will not go and tell members of the Voenkomat that

they are members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, as Jehovah's Witnesses like the LGBT

community is deemed as an extremist organisation in Russia.

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Access to Alternative Civil Service

13. There are problems with acceptance of alternative civil service in Russia, which

predates the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Some people are allowed to serve

Alternative Civil Service in Russia. However, these cases are few in numbers.

14. To be approved for Alternative Civil Service in Russia, a person needs to know the rules

and their rights on this matter to be even considered. A person need to do a lot of

work, prepare documents in order to be considered for alternative civil service and the

acceptance will also depend on the goodwill of the Voenkomat personnel that has to

review the application for alternative civil service. Furthermore, the personnel of the

Voenkomat will most likely try to persuade the person in question to be enrolled into

the army instead of alternative civil service.

15. The source opined that the best thing a person who do not want to be conscripted can

do is not to appear at the Voenkomat. Therefore, when a person receive a summons,

the best thing to do is to do nothing. In this case, there probably will be opened an

administrative case against that person. However, such a case will take a long time

before it is completed. Most likely to will take several months for the case to be closed

and then the person will have to pay around 300 euros in fine.

Draft evasion and avoidance of conscription

16. There are many stories about society trying to pressure draft dodgers to appear at the

Voenkomat. Typically, this would be their parents or other family members. The

parents do not want their kid to break the law, and because it is against the law to

evade conscription, they will try to persuade their son to go to the Voenkomat.

17. If a person refuses to go to the Voenkomat and he subsequently pays the fine, he will

eventually at a future point in time face a criminal case. However, this will happen

after he has refused to show up at a Voenkomat many times. It is very seldom that a

draft evasion case will end up as a criminal case.

18. If a person has not acted in the summons he received, the Voenkomat personnel

would in some cases try to find the person. However, it is hard for the Voenkomat to

find a particular person. However, if a person has signed the summons, the Voenkomat

personnel have more rights to detain the person in question.

19. All NGOs that work with Russians who do not want to go to the army advise the

following steps to avoid the army:

1. Do not sign the summons

2. If the summons is signed, do not go to the Voenkomat. Send a representative in

your place instead.

15. The Voenkomat personnel is doing a lot to apply pressure on a person to make them

sign a summons. They use psychological tricks such as blackmail and bullying, saying:

you don't sign we will address your work or your university.

It is not possible for the

person in question to know whether these threats are empty threats or if they actually

will go and tell the person’s employee.

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16. Then again, the main effort for the Voenkomats will be to make people sign contracts

with the Ministry of Defence, as it is much preferable for the authorities to get contract

soldiers into the army than conscripts. In particular, the authorities is encouraging

immigrants or to sign contracts with the MoD, especially migrants from Central Asian

countries. These migrants are not citizens of Russia, but the moment they receive

Russian documents they try to get them to sign contracts with the MoD, although

many of these migrants do not speak Russian and hence do not know what type of

documents they are signing.

- Enforcement of legislation

17. In both 2023 and 2024, no prison sentences that include deprivation of liberty as

punishment

were issued

for draft evasion (Article 328, Part 1 of the Russian Criminal

Code). In the first six months of 2024, Russian courts issued 427 sentences, of which:

423 conscripts received fines; 3 conscripts were given suspended sentences; 1 case

resulted in an acquittal. In addition, 15 cases filed under this article were dismissed.

18. For cases related to unauthorized absence (Article 337 of the Criminal Code), courts

also mainly issued suspended sentences. However, the rate of cases under this article

is unprecedented. According to

Mediazona,

the number of cases against refusers

increased significantly after mobilization was announced in September 2022, but the

pace in 2024 is like never before. Only in March 2024, Russian military courts carried

out 684 sentences in such cases.

19. There are no detailed statistics on desertion cases. However, OVD-Info

is aware

of at

least 10 people prosecuted under Articles 337 and 338 of the Russian Criminal Code

who are in custody. We only count those who openly expressed anti-war motives in

their actions, so the actual number of those imprisoned under these articles is likely

higher.

- Extrajudicial pressure

20. In Moscow, conscripts are being widely

required

to fill out forms that include a clause

on non-disclosure of state secrets. “Getting clearance for state secrets means that

military enlistment offices will have one more reason to threaten conscripts. They’ll

say, ‘If you publicly report any violations during conscription, we’ll charge you with

disclosing state secrets,’” lawyers explain. Additionally, clearance for state secrets

means a travel ban from Russia for up to five years after the clearance is revoked.

Attempting to leave Russia with such clearance is also a crime.

- Possibility to exit Russia

21. On October 13, the first known case since the beginning of the war occurred in which

an EU country responded positively and agreed to

issue

travel documents to several

Russian servicemen and mobilized soldiers who

decided

to escape from the war.

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22. This is an important precedent. In visa-free and bordering countries for Russians, such

Armenia

and Kazakhstan, former military personnel and conscripts have been

detained and

extradited.

For instance, former FSO Major Mikhail Zhilin, who opposed

the war and fled from mobilization to Kazakhstan, was extradited to Russia, where he

was

sentenced

to six years in prison.

23. The first fine for not showing up was 3,000 roubles (ca 30 euro). This was the fine

before October 2023. After October 2023, it became 10,000-30,000 rubles.

24. There are a couple of dozen cases of draft evasion in a day in Russian. In March 2024,

Russian military courts carried out 684 sentences in cases of absence without official

leave (AWOL). In the first six months of 2024, Russian courts carried out 427 sentences

of which 423 conscripts received fines. Three conscripts were given suspended

sentences.

The situation for conscripts in North Caucasus

25. The North Caucasus regions are quite poor and thus people living in these regions see

it as a big opportunity to serve in the army. This is because that job opportunities in

these regions has been quite limited.

26. Before the full-scale invasion many people in big cities, did not want to serve in army.

They had a variety of means to avoid being conscripted. For example to study or to

make the Voenkomat believe that the person had medicine issues. However, in the

Northern Caucasus regions there was a queue to be enrolled into army, as they saw

serving in the army as a social lift with good payment.

27. In general, the health care system in the Russian army is not very good. If a soldier

suffers with some kind of mobility issues or have difficult cases if health, then the

soldier can rely on the medical system. However, in a standard situation, like if a

soldier gets a fever, infections or problems with his teeth, there is not much help to get

in the military health system. On the other hand, there are examples where soldiers

from the Wagner Group had access to special clinics in Saint Petersburg and these

clinics were actually quite good.

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Meeting with Pskovskaya Gubernia

Pskovskaya Gubernia is an independent Russian regional media from the Pskov region, where

there is a large military base and recruitment to the army is very active in this region.

Pskovskaya Gubernia was established in 2000.

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022, Pskovskaya gubernia left

Russia. Since the partial mobilisation in the autumn of 2022, the organisation have received

requests from the relatives from mobilised personnel and from conscripts.

The general conditions

1. The general conditions for Conscripts have not changed since February 2022. However,

the source was aware of cases from Kursk and Belgorod regions, where conscripts had

complaint about the quality of the food given to them in these regions, as the food was

expired. Furthermore, there has been complaints from conscripts about the lack of

proper weapons.

2. The source had not heard of any problem concerning health care among conscripts in

Russia.

3. The notion of dedovshshina is not prevalent anymore in the Russian army. However,

the most pressing problem within the Russian army would be harassment and hazing

from the officers, not from elder conscripts hazing younger conscripts. The source has

not heard of such cases for a long time.

4. There is not so many information about conscripts, as the Russian authorities try to

make them sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence very early during their

conscription period. There was a big scandal in Russia at the beginning of 2022, when

conscripts were sent into Ukraine. The Minster of Defence, Sergey Shoigu, declared

that conscripts were mistakenly send to Ukraine, and it would not happen again.

However, many relatives to conscripts complained about this, which is why the

authorities want all conscripts to sign contracts before sending them to Ukraine.

Conscripts involved with the war effort

5. It is already known that several conscripts from Pskov region have died in the war.

These conscripts died in Kursk region. The source did not know how many conscripts

from Pskov that were posted in Kursk region only that some conscripts were just given

the task to work in this particular region.

6. According to the source, it is now more mobilised personnel that are sent to Kursk

oblast to replenish the losses the Russian army have suffered after the Ukrainian

incursion. In September and October 2024, those mobilised personnel who refused to

go to war the so-called refuseniki/otkazniki were forced to go to the Kursk region.

7. The source did not assess that conscripts were sent into Ukraine proper. They can be

sent to border areas to Ukraine such as Kursk and Belgorod, but not into the Ukrainian

regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson or Zaporizhzhia.

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Soldiers refusing to take part of the war against Ukraine

8. The Russian criminal code contains a number of articles in regards to absent without

official leave (AWOL) in the military, depending on the term a person has been absent.

The harshest article in this regard is applied when a person has been absent for more

than a month, which can give 5-10 years of imprisonment. However, many people are

now willing to go to prison than fighting in Ukraine.

9. As of November 2023, there are 67 criminal cases for refuseniki in Pskov region. New

information about criminal cases for refuseniki is 102 cases. This applies to contract

soldiers and mobilised. These cases are, however, not only refusenikis from Pskov

region, but also from other Russian regions. This is because the 76 airborne division is

based in Pskov Oblast.

10. The 76 airborne division used to be an elite unit within the Russian armed forces.

However, there has been a lot of influx from the Caucasian regions, mainly from the

Dagestan region, to this unit, which has somewhat changed the dynamics in the unit.

These soldiers from Caucasus are contract soldiers.

11. Nevertheless, the 76 airborne division also comprise conscripts and as previous

mentioned some of these conscripts have died in Kursk. A 19 years old conscript form

the city of Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk region, was serving as a conscript in Pskov, but was

sent to Kursk and subsequently died there.

12. The source opined that most soldiers who are refusing to fight do it on the front line,

not at the Voenkomat or when they receive their summons.

Draft evasion and consequences for family members

13. According to the source, there has been no consequences for family members of

conscripts, who refuse to serve in the Russian army. There has been no pressure

observed from the authorities, not even on the family members of the mobilised

soldiers, who refuse to serve. According to the source, there were no criminal cases

against conscripts in Pskov region.

Pressure to sign contracts with the MoD

14. There is a lot of propaganda in Russia aiming to make Russians join the army. However,

if a person refuses to be conscripted, he will receive a fine. Furthermore, if a person is

serving as a conscript in the army, there would be pressure for him to sign a contract

with the Ministry of Defence. Usually there are forcing conscripts and mobilised

persons to stand in one line, and then the officers are trying to convince them to sign a

contract with the ministry of Defence. They were forced to sign contracts with the

ministry of Defence. If they did not sign the contract, it became shameful not to sign in

front of all the others – the so-called blame and shame method.

15. The source advised that it is possible to refuse to sign, although, the other fellow

soldiers would not see you as a real man (muzhik). This type of peer pressure can be

tough psychologically for many conscripts.

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16. When asked if the Russian authorities would use other masseurs to pressure conscripts

into signing contracts, the source opined that the psychological pressure would be

enough. There were no need to use any other methods in this regard.

LGBT persons in the army

17. The source had never heard of any cases where a person who is openly gay has been

drafted into the army at any point. The source had heard from mobilised persons that

they did not want to be in a unit with members of the LGBT community. In the other

hand, the source had never heard of a case where a person was exempted from

serving in the army, due to being a member of the LGBT community.

18. In Pskov, there has been some issues with conscripts from the Caucasian regions of

Russia. These conscripts had very limited education and some of them saw electricity

for the first time. However, Chechens do not serve in Pskov. They have their own units

where they serve.

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Meeting with Irina Novik, Russian Journalist

New legislation

1. This autumn (from November 1, 2024), the Russian authorities started using electronic

summons to draft conscripts in Russia. However, the authorities are also using paper

summons as they did prior to the introduction of electronic summons. Furthermore,

according to the source, there was a centralised database on conscripts in place

through the online portal Gosuslugi.

2. Formally, from the moment of receiving the summons, the Russian citizen is prohibited

from traveling abroad. In addition, within 5 days he is required to hand over his

passport to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In practice, everything is different. Even if a

person can be served with a summons: in person, by registered mail or electronically,

this will not affect your departure from the country. Conscript will not be able to leave

the country legally only after a decision has been made about your conscription for

military service or about sending him to alternative civilian service.

3. The source knows of cases where a person had tried to leave Russia after receiving a

summons. In this regard, there has not been a record of people trying to leave, but was

unable to do so. There is simply no statistics in this subject at this point in time.

Vulnerable groups

4. There are no exemptions from conscription for members of the LGBT community. In

some cases, the members of the LGBT community try to convince the Voenkomat

personnel not to be conscripted, but it does not matter. They will be drafted anyway,

as there are no laws of exemption for conscription on grounds of one’s sexual

orientation.

5. There has been an example, where a transwoman has been drafted for conscription, as

the person had not changed the legal gender marker in their documents. In the

documents, the person was marked as a male, and hence was conscripted.

479

6. Members of the Jehovah Witnesses or other religious groups can in theory be

exempted from conscription. However, it is difficult to prove that you fulfil the

requirements for exemption as a pacifist. Usually it requires lawyers and specialists.

Furthermore, it does not completely cancel the necessity of serving, although, it is a

different service than military service — alternative civilian service.

General conditions

7. The physical conditions for conscripts, much depends on how rich the region of posting

is. This means that the condition would in general be better in barracks in Moscow

than in Sakhalin.

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Radio Svoboda, Тра�½сже�½щи�½а пытается уволиться из российской армии, 9 November 2022,

url

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8. The notion of dedovshchina has been less prevalent among conscripts in the Russian

army compared to previous years. This is because the service period for conscripts

were reduced to one year instead of two years. The officers were ridiculing the new

conscripts, but now it is not as much ridiculing from the management but among the

conscripts.

9. The source noted that conscripts more in risk of being subjected to dedovshchina

would be ethnic groups from Buryatia, Tuva and members of the LGBT community as

well as men who do not conform to generally accepted concepts and masculinity.

Access to proper health care

10. There are access to health care for conscripts in the Russian army. Medical support is

accessible at every usual military base with conscripts. However, The Ministry of

Defence seems to pay less attention to serious medical issues at this point in time and

just brushing it off and explaining that maybe the conscripts are just trying to get out of

their conscription. Therefore, in cases where conscripts are in need to go to a hospital

outside of the barracks, the military leadership would hesitate to allow this not always

but in many cases.

11. The source mentioned a case where a person at the Voenkomat deemed fit for fight at

the medical examination even though there are criteria for when a person should be

deemed fit for fight. But, the medical commission would pass people that should not

have been deemed fit for fight. There was a case from the end of October, where a

person had been in a car crash and got his head cut off. However, he was still declared

fit for fight although he was dead.

480

12. There are cases where the doctors had diagnosed soldiers to hospitals, but

subsequently the commander of the soldiers denied them proper medical treatment

anyway. But, there are also cases

481

where doctors not even diagnosing soldiers

properly even though they had symptoms that needed to be treated properly. But

because there has been a ruling from upper management the doctors did not diagnose

those soldiers properly. Many of these cases has been cases of soldiers with PTSD.

13. At least 159 Russian conscripts have died during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

482

There was a case from Crimea, where a soldier was beaten and he did not get access to

a hospital in due time, and subsequently died in the hospital of his

wounds.

483

Furthermore, a conscript was killed during shelling in Crimea.

484

480

Lenta.ru,

Россия�½и�½а без головы приз�½али огра�½иче�½�½о год�½ым к вое�½�½ой службе,

5 November

2024,

url

481

More about such cases can also be found here:

https://stoparmy.org/

and @netprizyvu

482

BBC News,

Их там есть. Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с Украи�½ой,

August 2024,

url

483

Nastoyashee Vremya,

Сроч�½ик из Карелии умер в Крыму от тяжелой травмы головы. Его могли

жестоко избить за отказ подписывать ко�½тракт и ехать �½а вой�½у,

25 November 2023,

url

484

Sibir.Realii,

Сроч�½ик из Новосибирска погиб после обстрела Крыма,

9 October 2023,

url

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Tasks performed by conscripts

14. Starting from February 2022, the tasks done by conscript has to some extend been less

obvious. There has been cases where persons were supposed to be snipers, but all

they did was office work or the other way around. Due to the fact that many soldiers

had left for Ukraine, the man power to do all other tasks including administrative work

has lessened. Therefore, people have been given a variety of different tasks, which

they were not supposed to do initially.

15. If a soldier refuses to an order given by the senior Commander, there could be

consequences for this. The soldier could have his salary taken from him or there could

be other punishments, which are also classified as extrajudicial punishments.

16. In theory, a soldier could file a case against an illegal order given to him. However, first

of all, many Russians do not know their rights and the procedure to file a case against a

senior officer is long and difficult. It could end up giving the person more problems

within his unit, than if he had filed a lawsuit.

Conscripts involved with the war effort

17. The Russian authorities have promised that conscripts will not take part in the special

military operation in Ukraine. However, conscripts are being used in Kursk region. In

this region, conscripts has been killed and taken as prisoners of war by the Ukrainian

armed forces. At least 13 Russian conscripts killed in Kursk region.

485

18. According to the source, conscripts could also be posted into Ukraine proper, which

means in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. However, they are not engaged

at the front line. The source had not heard of conscripts being posted in Zaporizhzhia

or Kherson regions. In Ukraine, conscripts would have practical tasks such as digging

trenches, doing repairs of buildings and military vehicles. The source had not heard of

conscripts handling Ukrainian Prisoners of war.

Conscripts signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence

19. The average salary for a conscript is approximately 2,000 rubles a month (19 euros),

but then you get free accommodation and food rations. However, the low salary as

one of the reasons why conscripts want to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, conscripts also sign contracts under psychological and sometimes

physical pressure.

486

20. The source did not have any concrete numbers of how many conscripts would sign a

contract with the ministry of defence. Although, the source noted that the numbers

have been fewer after the incursion in the Kursk Region started.

485

Verstka,

Как ми�½имум 13 российских сроч�½иков погибли в Курской области после прорыва ВСУ,

14 November 2024,

url

486

Verstka,

Правозащит�½ики сообщили о росте числа жалоб от сроч�½иков �½а при�½ужде�½ие к

ко�½тракту с Ми�½оборо�½ы,

13 November 2024,

url

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21. Given the circumstances that conscripts are working under and especially with their

salary in mind, many conscripts feel pressure to sign contracts with the Ministry of

Defence. The authorities are using all available methods to attract as many conscripts

as possible. Which includes propaganda, promising that they are becoming, but also

peer pressure and stigmatising that they are not patriotic if they do not sign contracts.

22. The source mentioned a case where a conscript refused to sign a contract. The

authorities then persuaded him to sign an initial report about whether one would sign

a contract or not. However, the report that he was forced to sign was not this initial

report, but an actual contract with the Ministry of defence.

487

23. Before the start of the current autumn draft in Russia, almost half of the conscripts (i.e.

approximately 65,000 people) signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence. There is

no exact data on this now, but the flow of requests from conscripts on this matter is

not weakening.

488

Draft evasion and absent without official leave

24. Statistics from June 2024 state that more than 10,000 cases of people in the Army who

have been charged for refusing military service. However, there might be even a few

more thousands as of November 2024. It is not stated whether these 10,000 are

contract soldiers, mobilised or conscripts.

489

25. In Moscow, conscripts have started being detained and taken to collection points 2.5

times more frequently in 2024 compared to 2023. Last year, 87 men of conscription

age faced detention and subsequent transfer to collection points, from where they

were sent to mandatory military service. Out of these, 23 managed to leave the facility

and remain free. In 2024, 225 people have been detained—2.5 times more than last

year. Of these, 66 were able to leave the collection points.

490

26. A person who suffered from bronchial asthma (a non-conscription condition), was

declared fit for service. The young man appealed this decision in court and later

returned to the Voenkomat to receive a summons for a follow-up medical

examination—where he was detained and taken to a collection point. Another person,

who had long been declared unfit for service, was taken this year directly from his

workplace to the Voenkomat and then to a collection point.

491

Consequences for family members

487

488

Novaya Gazeta,

«М�½е бы хотелось остаться в России»,

14 March 2024,

url

Nastoyashee Vremya, Убежде�½ие и соблаз�½е�½ие де�½ьгами. Правозащит�½ик – о том, как

призыв�½иков заставляют подписывать ко�½тракт с Ми�½оборо�½ы РФ, 11 October 2024,

url

489

Mediazona,

Более 10 тысяч российских вое�½�½ых обви�½или в отказе от службы с �½ачала вой�½ы

в Украи�½е,

18 June,

url;

Important Stories, A Runaway Regiment, 19 November 2024,

url

490

Ostorozhno Novosti,

В Москве призыв�½иков стали задерживать и увозить �½а сбор�½ый пу�½кт в

2,5 раза чаще по срав�½е�½ию с прошлым годом,30

November 2024,

url

491

Ostorozhno Novosti,

В Москве призыв�½иков стали задерживать и увозить �½а сбор�½ый пу�½кт в

2,5 раза чаще по срав�½е�½ию с прошлым годом,30

November 2024,

url

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27. There has been cases of personnel from the Voenkomat, the police or the FSB who has

called family members of the refusnikis and asked where their son is? Most family

members normally answer that they have no clue of the whereabouts of the person in

question.

28. The source knew of a case where a conscript’s parents have been told by the

Voenkomat personnel that the person needs to come to the Voenkomat. If they did

not comply, the Voenkomat personnel will seek to withhold the son’s college

degree/diploma, although he had finished his education.

29. Although, in the beginning of November, there was a case with a woman who had

been called as a mother for questions with the police. The police threatened her that

they might start a criminal case against her because she has been given false

testimony. However, when the mother consulted with her lawyer there that it is

impossible to prove that she has been given this false testimony. Nothing happened

afterwards. The source has not heard of any cases where family member had been put

in jail due to false testimonies in such cases.

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Meeting with Freedom House

Freedom House is a non-profit organisation. It is best known for its political advocacy on

matters of democracy, political freedom, and human rights.

Legislation

1. The source is not aware of any fundamental changes in legislation regarding

conscription, other than the decision to raise the upper age for conscription from 27 to

30 years.

2. The legal framework related to conscription and its implementation are two different

things. The implementation and application of the existing legal framework related to

conscription is done in a selective manner. The selective application of the laws means

that not necessarily the same rules apply to e.g. different regions, different social

statuses and people with different ethnic backgrounds. Conscription can also be used

as a weapon against political opponents, and people and businesses that the

authorities do not like.

3. The source opines that the selective application of legislation is carried out on many

different levels, not only on the state level. A former business ombudsman claimed in

a recently conducted interview that business people of e.g. big factories and

companies were trying to find an algorithm as how to manage to save valuable high

qualified engineers from being conscripted, while at the same time ”send” 10-15 other

workers who are less qualified.

4. Russia is not a country of ’rule of law’, but rather a country of ’rule by law’.

Comprehensive legislative frameworks are in place, but laws, legislations and

regulations are invented and written to be weaponized against certain groups of

society. This leads to difficulties in judgement when representatives from countries of

’rule of law’ apply their view on Russia, as if Russia technically should operate in the

same manner. In this sense, it is important with contacts on the ground who have

knowledge about how specific laws and regulations are being implemented in reality.

Summoning of conscripts

5. Local authorities and even companies are given quotas to fill with conscripts. Although

this constitutes the basic premises of how the system works, the source opines that

these quotas are not very effective.

6. Bias and selective application of laws and regulations has led to a pattern of

characteristics of those who are recruited to the war, such as e.g. certain ethnicities,

which some having a higher percentage of enrolment into the military. At the same

time there are certain regions which have higher number of military draftable men (for

instance, Dagestan), thus the quota is going to be higher there The more socially

vulnerable you are, the bigger the risk that you will be enrolled into the military, which

goes for both conscripts and contract soldiers. Persons living in remote regions are in a

more vulnerable position than in e.g. people living in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The

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10.

11.

12.

13.

line between conscripts and contracts might also be thing, given the recent reports on

conscripts who were forced/whose contracts were falsified

492

or about recently killed

conscript whose contract was allegedly falsified.

493

The source is aware of there being plans on introducing digital methods of summoning

conscripts. The digital system is designed to prevent summoned individuals from

receiving travel documents as well as leaving the country, thereby preventing them

from evading conscription. The digital system would also offer possibilities of

summoning people living in the diaspora.

The digital system is not fully functional yet, as it is being tested. The source explained.

Hence, conscripts are still summoned in the traditional ways.

The source has not encountered any Russian citizens abroad (in Lithuania) who have

been summoned through the digital system yet. Discussions are taking place on a

theoretical level within the Russian community abroad on how to prepare for this

potential scenario.

According to the source’s knowledge, there is still a time lap after a person has been

summoned to conscription when he can leave the country. For someone who received

a summons for conscription, the time lap is at least two to three days under which it is

possible to leave Russia. Once the digital system of summoning is in place, the idea is

that, you will no longer be able to leave the country after being summoned. However,

it is not entirely clear if the system is going to work that way, but on politically

motivated persecution cases, this is the pattern.

As for the possibilities to evade conscription, the advice given to young Russian men

from human rights defenders is to get their documents in place before being

summoned to conscription. The second advice is to not adhere to the summons nor go

to the conscription point. For young Russian citizens living abroad, the advice is to

obtain a passport and keep it abroad, and try to look for options of studying.

The best option for a summoned person is to leave as fast as possible via e.g. Belarus,

as there are no border controls between Russia and Belarus. From there, the person

can travel to a third country. This route works in both ways; Belarusians are fleeing via

Russia, and Russians are fleeing via Belarus. There is also a certain time span before the

relevant authorities’ travel bans are being applied to the entire region. Even persons

with criminal cases and persons under house arrest who are mandated to go to the

police station regularly have an option to leave via Belarus.

The source is also aware of plans of establishing a centralized database containing

information on potential conscripts, however he doubts that it has been established

and activated, mostly due to practical reasons. Once a database like that is established,

it will become more difficult for the authorities to be selective in applying laws and

492

493

Kholod,

«Я вроде терпилой �½икогда �½е был, �½о ме�½я как будто зомбировали»,

27 July 2023,

url

Meduza,

На вой�½е в Украи�½е погиб 20-лет�½ий сроч�½ик с Сахали�½а. О�½ утверждал, что его

подпись под ко�½трактом с Ми�½оборо�½ы подделали — теперь это подтвердила экспертиза,

December 2024,

url

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regulations. Further, the Kremlin and the Russian authorities are in the epicentre of a

disinformation war affecting all layers of society, so the authorities’ talk about this

database could be seen as a tool of intimidation.

14. As for extrajudicial methods to summon conscripts, the source again raises the issue

with selective application of legislation. Legally, the only measure of category for

conscription is a person’s age. Still, there is a widespread picture that e.g. family

members of MP or oligarchs in the right age category not being conscripted. There are

also certain regions with a higher density of people being conscripted than e.g.

Moscow, which can be explained by the fact that the population in Moscow is to a

larger extent Caucasian and privileged. There is no specific data on conscripts, but this

map is providing you with a general view which is very telling.

494

15. According to the source, it would be possible to validate the authenticity of a military

summons. There are verification processes in place with networks of investigative

journalists and human rights defenders who know have local knowledge.

Postings and tasks

16. The source’s perception of postings and tasks for conscripts is based on bits and pieces

shared in the independent media and from the human rights defenders community.

17. Conscripts cannot legally be deployed to the frontline and president Putin claims that

this is not done. Yet, according to the source, there are instances where young

conscripts without proper training and equipment were sent immediately to the

frontline to be used as “meat on the fire” (Russian

saying, our interpretation would be

‘cannon fodder’).

The source conveys that there is a pattern with conscripts being used

as live shields to push the front and to push back Ukrainians, and consequently the

survival rate amongst these conscripts is not high. This is the usual pattern, but as the

reporting goes, given that conscripts are not very well trained/experienced, their

survival rate would be smaller.

495

18. The placement of conscripts on the battlefields might be legally excused by e.g.

claiming that there was a lack of manpower for logistical tasks, which the source

opines constitutes a cover-up in order for prosecutors not to start investigations, plus

forcing them to sign contracts. Even though some conscripts are in fact performing

logistical tasks, they are under permanent risk of being sent to the battlefield.

19. Laws are applied selectively also in relation to the tasks and postings of conscripts. The

situation on the front is intense and the military needs to fill the “holes”. The source

lifts an example of an 18-year old conscript that died within the very first month of his

conscription period.

496

494

495

Mediazona,

Russian losses in the war with Ukraine,

n.d.,

url

Youtube,

Потери России в вой�½е с Украи�½ой. Сколько сроч�½иков погибло за время вой�½ы,

August 2024,

url;

BBC News, Их там есть.

Как российские сроч�½ики умирают �½а вой�½е России с

Украи�½ой,

9 August 2024,

url

496

Sever.Realii,

На вой�½е в Украи�½е погиб 18-лет�½ий российский ко�½тракт�½ик,

1 January 2024,

url

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20. In the Kursk region, conscripts were responsible for protecting certain facilities, and

upon Ukraine’s incursion, they were captured as POWs. As for the situation in Kursk, it

could partly be explained by Putin not having an initial intention to send them to the

battlefield, but the battlefield instead came to them. However, the case with

conscripts on the battlefield has not been seen only in Kursk, but also in Ukraine.

21. The source speculates that the dynamics of the war can explain the occurrence of

conscripts on the battlefields. Russia’s initial goal was to take Kyiv in three days, and

hence mobilisation and the use of conscripts in the war was not the initial plan.

However, as Russia did not achieve their initial military goal, they started the

mobilisation and also conscripts suddenly started to appear on the battlefield. This was

not the pattern during the first days of the full-scale war, but certainly as of late 2022

conscripts have been seen in the media appearing on the battlefields. However, the

cruiser Moskva included a significant number of conscripts as reported by media when

the cruiser was taken down during the early phase of the full-scale invasion.

497

22. However, not all conscripts are sent to the battlefield. As for conscripts not

participating in combat, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that they are involved

in logistical work. There is a level of uncertainty and it is not possible to know in

advance, who is going to be sent to the frontline.

23. The source refers to a cynical approach in the Russian army, where high ranking

officers would avoid risking their most qualified soldiers to be heavily under fire on the

frontline in e.g. Donbass, and rather send the unexperienced persons first to ensure

that the Ukrainians become out of their ammunition. There is also reporting in

independent media about the use of alcohol and drugs to encourage folks to go to the

frontline. It is hardly specific to conscripts, but especially social networks (and media)

were reporting on alcohol & drug abuse among the Russian soldiers.

24. Conscripts are generally poorly trained, so they would firstly be part of the infantry, as

opposed to something more sophisticated in the Russian military. The source doubts

that conscripts would be placed in the air force, but clarifies that this statement is

based on common sense, not on any particular information. The source is not aware

about any specifics related to potential differences in the situation for conscripts

within the different arms of service (e.g. the army, the fleet or the air force).

25. Levels of experience, education, and literacy would affect whether the Russian public is

aware of the rules for conscripts being ignored. There is a prevalence of propaganda,

and if Putin says that Russia is not sending conscripts to the battlefield, this is widely

believed by the public. Elements of e.g. the Bucha massacre was shown to the public,

but due to propaganda many refuse to acknowledge the events that took place there.

When conflicting messages are circulating, it is often claimed to be propaganda from

the West, which includes staged information and discreditation. As there are now

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Cherta, «Все,

паца�½ы, едем умирать». История солдата-сроч�½ика, воевавшего в Украи�½е,

June 2022,

url

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specific laws against discreditation of the Russian army, it is easy for the Russian army

to e.g. label a media outlet a foreign agent outlet and thereby counteracting the truth.

26. The source does not have any statistics on the number of casualties amongst

conscripts.

‘Dedovshchina’/hazing and vulnerable groups

27. There is a prevalence of misconduct and mistreatment amongst conscripts. As for the

notion of ‘dedovshchina’, this is not an uncommon practice. ‘Dedovshchina’ was

common in the soviet army and the source opines that the same traditions apply

today. There are such stories presented in independent media, and even though they

most commonly portray individual cases, it shows that the general pattern of

‘dedovshchina’ is there.

28. LGBT individuals would be specifically vulnerable in terms of being subjected to

‘dedovshchina’, and also constitutes one of the most evident examples. Anyone who

stands out of the male standard in the Russian army is already vulnerable. As for abuse

of LGBT individuals within the military, the problem is that there is no functional

system of checks and balances or a functioning system of reporting. If a conscript

reports harassment and abuse, he would risk being subjected to even more

mistreatment. Hence, for a person belonging to the LGBT community it would be safer

to avoid conscription.

Pressure to sign contracts

29. The source does not know how widespread it is for conscripts to sign contracts with

the MoD during or after their conscription and has no statistics on the matter. Based

on status, money and making ones family proud and the fact that you would risk being

deployed to the battlefield either way, the assumption is that signing contracts is

rather common. The source assumes that conscripts are persuaded to sign contracts by

arguments and motivation, which would be especially applicable on conscripts from

poor or remote districts of Russia.

30. At the same time the source lifts a cynical approach among the authorities, explained

as “why would we give them the money if we can use them for free”. Although, money

has not been an issue for Kremlin and Russia has two strategic advantages;

unaccounted money and brutal force.

On conscripts from northern Caucasus

31. The regions in northern Caucasus are different in the sense that if a person evades

conscription, then he would be putting the entire family at risk. In general, families are

large in northern Caucasus and the issue of persuasion differs from in the rest of

Russia.

32. Kadyrov’s army does not need additional convincing, however. When Kadyrov wants to

express his loyalty to Kremlin, local municipalities are directed to fill specific quotas

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with men to the military. The source conveys that in Chechnya, there is a prevalence of

lawlessness, where one man points his finger and there is no space for resistance.

Many people from this region would become elite contract soldiers for the safety of

their family, and going into hiding would put the family at risk. Families are

weaponised in Chechnya. Although the source is not certain that these practices apply

to conscripts, it is probable. Chechnya is highly militarized.

Draft evasion and draft avoidance

33. There has been no visible increase in the numbers of draft evaders in Russia. There was

an initial first chock of young men leaving Russia in the early stages of the full-scale

invasion, as there was another increase in people leaving during the first wave of

mobilisation. Today, the outflow of men is rather steady and in general, individuals

potentially vulnerable for conscription are instead taking preparatory measures.

34. Russia is a large country, so if a person wants to evade conscription and hide this is

possible even inside the country. Life would be rather difficult and limited (e.g. trying

to avoid leaving digital footprints), but it would be possible. Equally, it is possible to

leave the country to evade conscription and the source dismisses the narrative of the

‘iron curtain.’

35. The source is not aware about draft evaders sentenced in absentia for evading

conscription. Applying sentences in absentia for draft evaders would lead to a delicate

situation as many from the elite have their sons etc. in Europe. Doing so in on case

would create a precedence, which then has to be applied to everyone. The source

doubts that sentencing draft evaders in absentia will be implemented.

36. There are not many examples of conscripts being deported back to Russia, with a few

exceptions in Central Asia. These cases were related to absence of proper documents.

Other than that, the source is not aware of any such cases.

37. There are cases of criminal prosecution of persons not adhering to their summons for

conscription. The number of these criminal cases have not been very high, which the

source claims is due to Russia applying their laws selectively.

Family members of draft evaders

38. Families can be used to convince the draft evaders to return and fulfil their

conscription. The source has not heard of other ways families to draft evaders are

affected. If the family members were educated, they would more likely encourage

their sons to avoid conscription and flee to save their own lives. The massive number

of men in conscription age that left early after the full-scale invasion and who are now

residing abroad shows that there is a portion of the society well aware of the risks.

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Meeting with Mediazona

Mediazona was founded about 10 years ago and mainly deals with justice in Russia, criminal

cases in Russia and statistics. Russian court statistics are open for Mediazona and they follow

them closely. This includes military courts.

New legislation

1. Mediazona sees many criminal cases against Russian soldiers and Russian conscripts.

More and more soldiers are rejecting to fight in Ukraine. These cases started in

September or October 2022 during the partial mobilisation.

2. To battle the many who rejected to fight in Ukraine, the Russian government decided

to amend the criminal code, so that rejecting military service became punishable from

3-10 years in prison.

3. There has been many cases against conscripts. In July-August, there were about 12,000

cases against conscripts and contract soldiers for 2024. It is impossible to separate

these two groups within the statistics.

4. Some of the sentences have been very strict – for instance six or seven years in prison

for rejecting to fight in the war. Furthermore, there are about 1,000 political prisoners

in total.

5. The majority of these cases have been against contract soldier, but based on personal

stories, the source knew, that the 12,000 people persecuted as deserters alone. The

source estimated that 5- 10% of these cases have been against political opponents of

the Russian authorities.

6. The numbers of cases are most likely higher now in November 2024. People with

criminal cases are often given the choice to fight in the war as an alternative to being

sentenced.

7. The source only follows court statistics and statistics on administrative fines are not

available to the source.

8. The use of electronic summons through the Gosuslugi-system has not been

implemented yet. Summons for conscription are sent out twice a year. During spring,

and during autumn. The summons are delivered to the conscript who has to sign the

summons.

9. Each individual Voenkomat has a quota for how many conscripts they each have to

deliver each draft.

Tasks

10. Conscripts do not serve in Ukraine proper or fight in combat units. They do, however,

serve in the border regions such as Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk. They do not serve in

the regions of Kherson or Zaporizhzhia. The source did not believe that conscripts

would be posted in Crimea. However, men in Crimea will be drafted.

11. In Kursk, conscripts do risk participating in combat with Ukrainian forces.

Conditions for conscripts

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12. The source did not know of any big conflicts in the army due to ethnic clashes. The

situation for Chechens is different, because most officers in the Russian army dislike

Chechens and Kadyrov. Chechens do not fight in Ukraine with the regular Russian

army. They only fight in local groups.

13. Chechen conscripts serve in regular Russian groups in all parts of Russia.

14. Conscripts do not have big problems in regard to health care, food and housing. The

conditions do vary from region to region and are usually better in bigger urban centres

such as Moscow.

15. There are no specific statistics about conscript casualties. The source suspected that

casualties of conscripts are higher in the Kursk region then in any other region.

16. Each Voenkomat has its own quota for how many contract soldiers they should sign up

for contract duty.

17. The salary for a conscript is about 500 euros pr. month, whereas a contract soldier

earns about 2,000 euros pr. month. This makes it appealing to sign a contract.

18. The monthly salary is the same in every region. However, there is also a one-time sign-

up fee for a contract soldier, which varies from region to region. In Moscow, this fee is

about 25,000 euros. The fee can be much lower in other regions, meaning people are

eager to sign up in Moscow. A man is qualified to sign a contract in Moscow, if he has

been employed by a company in Moscow for even just one day. The sign-up fee is paid

to the soldier upon the signing of the contract.

19. Many people who are addicted to narcotics or alcohol sign contracts due to the

financial benefits.

20. Conscripts are pressured to sign contracts. It is possible to reject signing a contract, but

doing so will potentially create a problem with the officers, who can make life very

difficult for the conscript.

21. The number of soldiers who sign up for contract duty varies from region to region. It is

easier to avoid conscription and to refuse contract duty in the bigger cities.

22. Many people sign up for contracts in Chechnya.

23. Contracts formally last for one year, but in practice, they are open ended.

Draft evasion

24. At the moment, it is possible to leave the country after having been summoned. This

will most likely change when the electronic summons are implemented.

25. The borders to Armenia, Kazakhstan and Belarus are open, and Russian citizens can use

their internal passports to cross the borders. This is significant, as most conscripts do

not have an international passport.

26. Russian citizens do not need visas to travel to for example Georgia or Türkiye making

these destinations a possible way out of Russia.

27. The source was not aware of whether the information that a conscript had failed to

show up at the Voenkomat was shared with the FSB who controls the border.

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28. The fines for evading the draft as a conscript have been raised to 500 euros. However,

the source had not seen such cases as of November 2024. The source also did not see a

lot of people fleeing Russia to avoid serving as a conscript. This is due to conscripts not

fighting in the war, and they therefore mainly see front line soldiers fleeing the

country.

29. Corruption and paying a bribe to avoid serving as a conscript soldier is more prevalent

in the bigger cities.

30. The source had seen no cases of conscripts being sentenced in absentia.

31. The source did not recall any cases regarding the use of extrajudicial punishments of

conscripts, although, he opined that such punishments did occur. There are no

statistics about this.

32. The priority of the Voenkomat is to fill their quota rather than searching for the draft

evaders.

Consequences for family members

33. Evading the draft will have no consequences for the conscript’s family members.

However, the Russian authorities might talk to the conscript’s wife and try to make her

convince him to do his duty.

Alternative service and vulnerable groups

34. It is technically possible to refuse to serve due to a person’s personal beliefs. However,

most people do not know about this option.

35. There are no statistics regarding members of the LGBT community in the army, as

people do not openly talk about their sexual orientation.

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Meeting with A Russian lawyer specialising in LGBT rights

The source did not have specific numbers of how many LGBT persons that are being drafted as

conscripts in into the Russian army, as there no existing statistics on this field. However, there

exists a service where people could apply for legal support, which include cases of LGBT in the

army.

Recruitment of LGBT persons to conscription

1. LGBT persons in Russia try to avoid being conscripted into the army. This is because it

is dangerous for them to go to the army. Therefore, LGBT persons often try to be

exempted for military service through medical examination and depending on the

illness the person has he can be considered unfit to serve in the army. However, it is

harder to prove that you are unfit in rural areas compared to in bigger urban centres.

2. It is not possible to be exempted for military service at a Voenkomat by stating that

you are a member of the LGBT community. There exist NGOs who are helping LGBT

members by suggesting how a LGBT person can avoid being conscripted.

3. There are four ways to avoid military conscription for LGBT persons:

1. Exemption by medical examination

2. Deferment by studying

3. Being accepted to serve alternative civil service

4. Leave the country after receiving the summons

4. Many LGBT persons who chose to leave Russia would eventually not return to Russia.

Most of them will leave for Armenia or Georgia, and to a less extend to Kazakhstan.

Transgender persons as conscripts

5. According to this source, it is even more difficult for transgender persons. In 2023, a

new Russian law was introduced. This law made it illegal to transition to another

gender, than the one a person had from birth. This means that transwomen who

transitioned prior to this law, but did not change their legal gender status in their

documents, where obliged to be conscripted into the army, as they were perceived to

be males.

6. Before the 2023 law, a transwoman was legally perceived by the Russian authorities to

be a male and should therefor appear in front of the Voenkomat and subsequently

undergo a medical examination. The doctors would then claim the transwoman unfit

for military service, due to their transition. However, after the introduction of the law

in 2023, it is not possible anymore to be exempted due to being a transwoman. The

exemptions made prior to the 2023 law is, however, still enforced.

7. Did this apply to transwomen who had not changed their legal sex, or also to those

who had their legal sex changed in their documents? Our initial perception was that if

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10.

11.

12.

you had changed your legal sex to woman, you would not even be summoned to the

Voenkomat.

Nevertheless, if a transwoman managed to change their legal gender marker prior to

the new law of 2023, they would not be obliged to serve in the army, as they are legally

perceived to be a woman.

There exist two large organisations in Russia, which mainly are focusing on helping

transgender persons. These organisations also help transgender persons to leave

Russia. The main focus of these organisations is not assessing whether the transwomen

are applicable for military service or not, but it is helping them leave the country, as

this is believed to be the safest method to avoid military service.

In the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, which is a Russian annexed region of

Ukraine, it is still legal to change gender. Therefore, lawyers are trying to help

transpersons change their documents in this region. However, it is very few cases of

this in Russia, the majority of transwomen are leaving the country to avoid

conscription.

The source was aware of one case, where a transwoman ended up serving in the army.

This person was not a conscript but signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence. The

persons was immediately sent to the front and was killed. The source was not aware of

any cases of transwomen serving as conscripts in the Russian army.

Transmen, who changed their legal gender marker in their documents prior to 2023,

are legally exempted from serving in the army in Russia. These persons do cannot serve

in the army, as trans persons are subjected to the so-called MKB-10

498

(ICD-10). Trans

persons are, according to MKB-10, not allowed to serve in the army. Transgender is

perceived as an illness in Russia, as Russia did not accept the MKB-11, which removed

transgender as an illness.

General conditions for LGBT persons in the Russian army

13. LGBT persons who end up serving in the Russian army would try to hide their sexual

identity. However, if it is found out that the person is a member of the LGBT

community, he could face sexual abuse by other soldiers. In some cases, this could end

up in rape. Unfortunately, there is no existing statistics of rape within the armed forces

of the Russian Federation.

14. The source was only aware of those cases, where soldiers approached these support

organisations and told them their stories. The source was aware of cases where LGBT

persons had served in the army without anything happening to them, while serving.

However, these are all cases where the persons managed to hide their sexual identity

during their service.

15. According to the source, the military society is to a large extend based in discrimination

of fellow soldiers. This means that if a soldier is asking for help, his fellow soldiers

498

International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems

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16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

would likely make the situation even worse for the person needing help. This is how

the military environment works in general.

According to Russian law, it is illegal to rape another person in the army. Therefore, in

theory a LGBT person who has been raped can file a complaint to the military

investigative comity. However, there has been no cases of rape within the Russian

army, as the system is so closed, which make it near impossible to reach out for help if

a LGBT person has been raped in the army.

The source noted that it is not in itself a criminal offence to be a member of the LGBT

community in Russia. It is, however, illegal to propagate the LGBT community. The

international LGBT community has also been deemed an extremist organisation in

Russia be the Supreme Court.

It is more difficult to understand what propaganda of LGBT really means, according to

Russian law. The source mentioned the famous Russian television presenter, Anton

Krasovsky, who was suspended for saying that Ukrainian children who hate Russia

should be drowned and burned, is openly gay. He has no problem living in Russia as an

openly member of the LGBT community in Russia.

There are now five cases of extremism on grounds of LGBT in Russia. However, these

cases has nothing to do with the army.

If it becomes known during to the Voenkomat that a particular conscript is a member

of the LGBT community, this knowledge would not effect where he would be posted.

However, in the army there is a working caste system like in Russian prisons, so after

arriving at a posting, a new conscript is likely to end up at the very lowest level, and

consequently could face being targeted by soldiers higher op in the military hierarchy.

Therefore, a low-level conscript can end up doing all the dirty work such as washing

toilets all the time. This is based in the notion of dedovschina and applies to all low-

level conscripts whether LGBT member or not. Low-level conscripts will typical include

physical fragile persons.

LGBT persons accepted into alternative civil service

21. It is possible to be accepted into serving alternative civil service for members of the

LGBT community in Russia. Although, a LGBT member has to convince the Voenkomat

that they are fulfilling the requirements for alternative civil service, which is based in

the person’s religious or other views. According to the source, there was a few 100

cases of LGBT members who was accepted for alternative civil service.

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Meeting with a human rights lawyer

Legislation

1. The only major change in legislation regarding Russian conscripts since 2023 is that the

age of conscription has been raised from 18-27 to 18-30. As far as the source

remembers, this came into effect 1 January 2024, meaning that the draft in the spring

of 2024 was the first draft, in which the change in legislation was implemented. During

this draft, people aged 28 and 29 were drafted.

2. The change in the age of conscription does not affect those, who have already served

as conscripts. It does, however, affect somebody who has previously had his military

service deferred for instance due to being enrolled at university.

3. 133,000 conscripts will be drafted in the autumn draft of 2024, which is a slight

increase of about 3,000 compared to the draft one year ago. This draft will cover the

period from October 2024 to the end of the year. The spring draft of 2024 consisted of

150,000 conscripts, but it also covered a longer period, from April to 15 July 2024.

4. The interviewed source doubts that there will be a change in the amount of time

conscripts are required to serve. The Russian military authorities’ main task is to

increase the number of contract soldiers and not the number of conscripts.

Furthermore, issues concerning conscripts are sensitive to the Russian public, and the

Russian authorities are unwilling to go into these issues.

5. The source therefore doubts that conscription soldiers will have to serve for 2 years.

The task is very clear now, the Russian authorities are paying more and more to the

people, who sign contracts, which is the main objective.

Recruitment of conscripts

6. The electronic register for summons to conscription is being tested during the current

draft in the fall of 2024. New conscripts will get their summons through the Russian

public service platform called Gosuslugi.

7. A separate website with the register of summons will be launched, where everyone

can go to check, if they have been drafted. If they are on the list of conscripts, they

cannot cross the Russian border as they are barred from exiting the country. The

launch of the electronic system has faced some technical and logistical issues,

although, the Russian authorities are paying a lot of attention and using many

resources to make the new system work.

8. Until the electronic system is implemented, summons are still delivered physically to

the conscript who is required to sign the summons. If he refuses to do so, he is able to

leave the country, as a person is only obliged to appear at a voenkomat, after they

have signed the summons.

9. In practice, every military commander has their own quota to fill by any means, and

may enlist persons with the help of the police to round up drafted conscripts. They

may patrol the streets in the area together and look for young men, who are on the list

of drafted conscripts. If a person is wanted, he may be detained and brought to the

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military commissariat. In this case, the conscript has no choice but to join the military,

as he cannot avoid going by refusing to sign his summons at this point.

10. The authorities become more aggressive in patrolling for evaders towards the end of

the drafting period, if the quota has not been met yet.

11. This could happen in any region. It all depends on the quota. In regions such as north

Caucasus, where there is a willingness to come and fight, and in Dagestan, where the

unemployment rate amongst young people is high. Overall numbers are 15% officially

unemployed, 55% of the unemployed are people from 15 to 30 years old. Therefore,

about 100,000 young people out of 300,000 are unemployed, it's about 33-35%.

12. The patrolling is more aggressive in the bigger cities, where people are better educated

and have higher living standards, and therefore are less willing to join the military.

Furthermore, the quota is higher in the bigger cities. The police, however, does not

have the authority to hand over a person to the voenkomat without a representative

of the voenkomat also being present.

13. The military commissariats generally do not care who they draft, as long as the person

is on the list so that they can fill their quota.

14. If a conscript manages to avoid attention, he does not have to leave the country to

avoid serving as long as the quota is met – usually less than 3 months until an ongoing

draft is over. What happens after the implementation of the electronic system is

currently unclear.

15. As of October 2024, a young man being summoned for conscription needs to sign the

summons and then report to the voenkomat where he will undergo a medical

examination. If he is fit to serve, he will then be given his posting. The conscript has no

say as to where he is to be posted and can be sent to any part of the country. The

Russian military uses an extraterritorial principle when assigning postings, meaning

that few conscript serves in his own home region. However, it might happen, as there

is no ban to serve in a person’s home region, although, there is no rule or a right for a

conscript to serve in their home region.

16. Some conscripts are even sent to south Ossetia and Abkhazia despite it not being

formally recognised as part of Russia. According to the source, there are two Russian

military units present there.

17. The legal grounds for this might be due to military agreements between Russia and

these two regions. It has been the practice for many years and was renewed in 2008.

The same applied in Tajikistan due to an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan that

Russia should control the border to Afghanistan. This is a normal practice based on

bilateral agreements.

Draft evasion

18. According to the source, the justice system in Russia has no interest in prosecuting

every man who has evaded military service despite being drafted for conscription, as

the ministry of defence will be busy filling their quota.

19. A person evading one draft will, however, risk being summoned again in future drafts,

provided he is still within the age of conscription.

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20. There will also be a centralised database that will store the pool of potential conscripts.

The database could also be used in case of a new wave of mobilisation, although, the

source did not see any indication of this happening in the near future.

21. The punishment for evading military service as a conscript is usually a fine of 150

euros/15,000 rubles, which is an increase, as the fine used to be around 30

euros/3,000 rubles. This is the fine given to a person that has been served the

summons, but who fails to show up at the voenkomat (the recruitment office).

22. The interviewed source had not heard of any cases of conscripts being sentenced to

incarceration for evading military service. There has been criminal cases and the law

does allow for sentencing the conscript to imprisonment. However, in practice every

case has ended with a suspended sentence or a fine.

23. No statistics regarding the criminal cases concerning draft evasion for 2024 has been

published yet. In 2023, there were 901 such criminal cases, 894 of which were closed

with a fine. Three cases ended with a suspended sentence and three persons were

acquitted. The rest of the cases were dropped for other undisclosed reasons.

24. Paying a fine for draft evasion does not mean that a person would not be part of future

drafts. However, paying a fine still does allow a person to leave the country.

25. A conscript evading the draft in the autumn and subsequently caught after the quota

of that draft is filled would only risk to be fined and would not necessarily be given a

summons in the next draft. This is due to every draft being decided by presidential

decree.

26. As far as the source is aware, conscripts who fail to answer their summons are not

convicted in absentia. This is due to the penalty being very minor, and is the authorities

are not trying to make the penalty more severe. Instead, an evader would be put on

the wanted list and the criminal proceeding suspended until he reappears.

27. There has been little change in the numbers of cases against draft evaders since the

beginning of the war. The conditions for conscripts are more or less the same as in the

beginning of the war.

Consequences for family members of draft evaders

28. Family members of a draft evader can be visited by the police searching for the person

at the very beginning if the conscript refuses to receive his summons, but it is rare. It

would not happen after the person has evaded.

29. It happened to a person known to the source a year ago in Moscow. The person did

not go to the voenkomat despite being drafted. He was visited at his apartment by a

police officer and two representatives from the military commissariat at 6 am who

served him the documents and took him to the commissariat. Only two days later, the

person was sent to a unit 1,000 km from Moscow. This puts a certain amount of

pressure on the family members, because in this situation there is nothing left to do to

avoid serving except trying to influence where to be posted. Once the police is

involved, it does not matter whether the person signs the summons or not. The Police

has the authority to detain the person.

Exemption and deferral of military service

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30. There are three main ways to avoid military service as a conscript.

31. The first way is to get out of the country, in which case a person is not obliged to serve.

A person, living abroad, is not obliged to serve. Formally, he should notify the military

authorities (the voenkomat) that he lives abroad by providing legal grounds for this. A

student at a university or a worker may provide residence permit or a statement from

a university. While he is outside of the Russia, he cannot be handed over the summons.

Therefore, he does not have an obligation to appear at the voenkomat and serve.

When he comes back to Russia, however, he has to notify the voenkomat again and

put himself back to the long list of conscripts. Lack of doing this may lead to the

administrative punishment (a fine).

32. A conscript can have his military service deferred if he is a student. Many people enrol

at for example university to have their military service deferred. Corruption in Russia is

widespread, and it is possible to pay for example a lower quality university to enrol a

person despite the person having no intention of attending classes.

33. It is also possible to be exempted for medical reasons, and people do bribe doctors for

fake medical notes stating that they are unfit to serve. However, the doctors at the

voenkomat will check themselves. The doctors have a lot of experience with people

claiming to suffer from fake health issues, and therefore it is very difficult to get out of

military service due to fake medical problems.

34. There are no special conditions for the LGBT+ community, but the source stated, that

members of the LGBT+ community were better off not revealing their affiliation, as the

LGBT+ community is now considered an extremist organisation by decision of the

Russian Supreme Court in 2023.

The general situation for conscripts

35. Conscripts are used in every arms of service within the Russian military – both in the

army, the air force and the navy. In fact, almost 50 conscripts died during the sinking of

the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, Moskva, in the spring of 2022. Conscripts also serve

in the national guard. The borders are controlled by the FSB who do not use

conscription soldiers.

36. The source had not heard of the Russian authorities using extrajudicial punishments for

conscripts. Targeted opposition groups would generally be more at risk of extrajudicial

measures, for instance if the conscript is a supporter of Navalny. A known supporter of

Navalny was in fact specifically targeted, arrested and sent to a very remote military

unit in Novaya Zemlya.

Physical conditions for conscripts

37. The conditions for conscripts are more or less the same as in the beginning of the war.

38. Conscripts are given four months of military training before being deployed.

39. During service, conscripts are under the ministry of defence’s juristriction and have

access to hospitals in case of injury or illness. They will be treated at designated

military hospitals not used by the civilian population. For those deployed closer to

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40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

Ukraine, temporary military hospitals have been erected to which the conscripts have

access instead.

The source has not heard of any widespread complaints over the health conditions,

maintenance or related issues from conscripts. If there were widespread problems in

this area, the source would have heard about it.

There are regional differences in the treatment of conscripts. For instance, a conscript

serving in Moscow may have better physical conditions than one serving in Kamchatka

or Kursk. Ultimately, it all depends on the specific unit and the commander in charge.

The two main problems in the Russian conscription army are corruption and hazing.

Hazing, including dedovshchina

499

, has been a problem in the army for decades, and is

particularly used in units, in which the commander has no control over the situation or

the unit. However, dedovshchina originates from the era when military service lasted

for two years, where the more senior conscripts would haze the newer conscripts.

Since military service for conscripts is now 12 months, dedovshchina is less prevalent

although it still occurs.

Hazing is particularly widespread due to ethnic factors. For instance, it is a part of the

culture in Dagestan, and hazing often occurs in Dagestani units. It happens if the

commander is not strong enough to control the situation. Hazing could, however,

happen anywhere including in Moscow.

There are no recent reports of serious injuries due to hazing. However, such incidents

may not become public knowledge. In the past, death by suicide in the army has been

used as an explanation for deaths caused by hazing., The numbers regarding suicides in

the army are now kept secret, and in fact looking into these numbers could lead a

person to be charged with treason.

Generally, ethnic groups are not especially vulnerable. However, Russian nationals

considered migrants do have to serve and thery are pushed to sign contracts.

Tasks of the conscripts

46. The tasks of a conscript consist of whatever their commander orders them to do.

47. Conscripts are usually used for logistical tasks. Conscripts serving near the Ukrainian

border supply the contract soldiers fighting in Ukraine and perform maintenance tasks.

48. A conscript soldier can only refuse an order if he is threatened or assaulted. In these

cases, he can go to the prosecutor’s office and file a complaint. For instance, an officer

may order a conscript to paint his fence, which is technically against the law. However,

in practice, the conscript cannot refuse such an order, but he may file a complaint.

49. The Russian authorities are trying to make signing a contract appealing to conscripts.

Historically, the Russian authorities have used violence and fear to solve a given task.

However, they are now trying to make signing a contract financially appealing. A

person can for instance get a onetime sum of 30,000 euros/3 million rubles for signing

up to the military and after that he will be paid 2,500-3,000 euros every month. This is

a lot of money, and the authorities, therefore, have no need to use violence or

499

Dedovshchina is an informal practice of hazing and abuse of junior conscripts.

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UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 67: Orientering om rapport om værnepligt i Rusland, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

RUSSIA – CONSCRIPTION

50.

51.

52.

53.

pressure to persuade people to sign contracts with the military. Nobody is

complaining.

The amount of money one can get for signing a contract varies from region to region.

Some of the wealthier regions are even able to attract men from other regions to sign

contracts. The source had heard of people being paid up to 50,000 euros to sign such a

contract. The regions compete with each other to sign up soldiers as each region has a

quota of contract soldiers to fill.

Chechens are also being conscripted for military service, and they might be sent to any

part of Russia to serve. However, it is hard to tell in practice, as the data is not

transparent. According to the source, no one in the military cares about ethnic balance

within the different units.

Desertion amongst conscription soldiers is rare unlike desertion amongst soldiers

fighting at the front line, which happens every day. Desertion and evasion rates

amongst conscripts does not vary much from region to region, as the numbers are very

low.

Conscripts see very little action. They have four months of basic training at the very

beginning. Then they are transferred to their military unit to serve for another nine

months where the conditions are generally acceptable.

Tasks of conscripts related to the Russian war effort in Ukraine

54. Conscripts are not being used for active combat duties. Conscripts are regularly posted

in the border regions close to the front line, but they are never posted on the actual

front line or inside Ukraine proper. The conscripts do not serve in the newly occupied

territories, including Donetsk, Luhansk Kherson and Zaporizhzha. The source was not

sure about Crimea, although, there are conscripts from Crimea serving in the Russian

army. Being close to the front line, they do however still risk being injured or indeed

killed during service. There are cases of conscripts being injured or killed during

service.

55. The Kursk region is a little different, because parts of the region is occupied by the

Ukrainian army. Conscripts are being sent to Kursk to serve, and they risk being

captured there and then being taken to Ukraine as POWs. The source knew of at least

one exchange of prisoners of war involving Russian conscripts.

56. The source had not heard of any conscripts being in charge of Ukrainian prisoners of

war and doubts that this could be the case. This is due to prisoners of war being

considered a valuable asset and therefore would be guarded securely by more

experienced soldiers. The source doubted Russian conscripts were being used in Syria.

False summons

57. There are stories of people falsifying their entire files, but the source doubted, that it

would be worthwhile to falsify a military summons. It is much easier to falsify a political

motive.

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