Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25
UUI Alm.del Bilag 60
Offentligt
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COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)
THEMATIC COI REPORT
Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25
UUI Alm.del - Bilag 60
Offentligt
January 2025
Security situation in North and East
Syria before the downfall of the
Assad government
us.dk – migrationsverket.se
 UUI, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 60: Orientering om rapporten Security situation in North and East Syria before the downfall of the Assad government, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren
Security situation in North and East Syria before the downfall of the Assad
government
This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey
of all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other
country of origin information available on the topic.
The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information
does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service or the
Swedish Migration Agency.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any
particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be
regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.
© 2025 The Danish Immigration Service and the Swedish Migration Agency
The Danish Immigration Service
Farimagsvej 51A
4700 Næstved
Denmark
+45 35 36 66 00
us.dk
January 2025
All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service and the Swedish Migration
Agency. The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk or
migrationsverket.se
The Danish Immigration Service’s and The Swedish Migration Agency’s publications can
be quoted with clear source reference.
The Swedish Migration Agency
Migrationsverket
60170 Norrköping
Sweden
+46 77 123 52 35
migrationsverket.se
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Executive summary
Prior to the collapse of the Assad government in Syria, the security situation in the Kurdish-
controlled areas of northern and eastern Syria, governed by the Democratic Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), from January 2024 to 14 November 2024, was
characterised by localised instability and regional differences. Areas such as Raqqa have been
relatively stable during the reporting period, supported by a robust Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) presence. In contrast, Deir Ezzour has experienced heightened insecurity due to IS activity,
tribal tensions, and the influence of Iranian-backed militias, which have since withdrawn
following the recent transition of power in Syria.
Leading up to the recent transition of power in Syria, control of Aleppo Governorate was divided
among armed opposition groups, the former Government of Syria (GoS), and the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF). Following the late November offensive in Aleppo Governorate led by
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which resulted in the opposition forces taking control of Aleppo city
and the eventual downfall of the Assad government, the SDF withdrew from the Tell Rifaat
enclave in northern Aleppo. This territory is now under the control of the Syrian National Army
(SNA). Although the long-term effects of the current transition of power in Syria remain unclear,
this advance has significantly shifted the balance of power in northern Aleppo, further
destabilizing the security landscape in northern Syria.
IS activity increased throughout 2024, particularly in Deir Ezzour, where sleeper cells have carried
out frequent attacks on SDF positions, oil infrastructure, and civilians. These incidents often
involve extortion under the guise of religious tax collection, and have increased significantly from
the previous year. In addition, tribal conflicts, sometimes involving Iranian-backed groups, have
resulted in significant casualties and displacement, particularly in areas along the Euphrates
River. Turkish cross-border operations, including drone strikes and shelling, also contribute to the
security issues in border areas such as Ayn Issa, Tell Tamer, and Manbij.
Movement within DAANES-controlled areas was generally possible during the day, although
night-time travel, particularly in parts of Deir Ezzour, remained hazardous due to security threats.
Checkpoints maintained by the SDF also affect mobility, with stricter controls in some areas. The
overall situation reflects the continued fragility of security and stability in northern and eastern
Syria.
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Table of contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 1
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 4
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 7
Glossary ............................................................................................................................... 8
1. Background ...................................................................................................................... 9
2. Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) ..................... 11
3. Main actors .................................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ......................................................................................... 13
3.2 Government of Syria (GoS) ................................................................................................ 14
3.3 Syrian National Army (SNA) ............................................................................................... 15
3.4 Islamic State (IS)................................................................................................................. 16
4. International involvement in North and East Syria........................................................... 19
4.1 U.S.-led international coalition .......................................................................................... 19
4.2 Russia ................................................................................................................................. 20
4.3 Türkiye ............................................................................................................................... 21
4.4 Iran ..................................................................................................................................... 22
5. Security situation in North and East Syria ........................................................................ 24
5.1 Aleppo governorate ........................................................................................................... 24
5.1.1 Geography and demography ...................................................................................... 24
5.1.2 Actors and territorial control ...................................................................................... 24
5.1.3 Recent security trends ................................................................................................ 26
5.2 Hasakah governorate ......................................................................................................... 30
5.2.1 Geography and demography ...................................................................................... 30
5.2.2 Actors and territorial control ...................................................................................... 31
5.2.3 Recent security trends ................................................................................................ 32
5.3 Raqqa governorate ............................................................................................................ 36
5.3.1 Geography and demography ...................................................................................... 36
5.3.2 Actors and territorial control ...................................................................................... 37
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5.3.3 Recent security trends ................................................................................................ 37
5.4 Deir Ezzour governorate .................................................................................................... 41
5.4.1 Geography and demography ...................................................................................... 41
5.4.2 Actors and territorial control ...................................................................................... 42
5.4.3 Recent security trends ................................................................................................ 43
6. Freedom of movement ................................................................................................... 51
6.1 General freedom of movement ......................................................................................... 51
6.1.1 Regional variations and specific challenges ................................................................ 52
6.1.2 Specific groups and restrictions .................................................................................. 53
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 56
Annex 1: Rojava Information Center (RIC) Query Response ................................................. 65
Annex 2: Query Response Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) ................................... 68
Annex 3: Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) Query response ............................. 72
Annex 4: Meeting minutes ................................................................................................. 83
Annex 5: Terms of reference............................................................................................. 162
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Introduction
This report provides an overview of the developments in the general security situation and
freedom of movement in the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria (NES) between 1
January 2024 and late November 2024 and the impact on the civilian population prior to the
downfall of the Assad government. It also provides an overview of the actors and international
stakeholders influencing the security developments in the region during the reporting period
and the period preceding the current transition of power.
The report is written in accordance with the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) COI
Report Methodology and has undergone internal peer reviews within the Danish Immigration
Service and the Swedish Migration Agency.
1
The report is based on information from written sources and data collected through in-person
and online meetings with sources in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and in Europe as well as
written sources and data collected through online meetings with sources in Syria. The majority
of the meetings were conducted during a joint fact-finding mission undertaken by the Danish
Immigration Service and the Swedish Migration Agency to the KRI between 7 and 12 October
2024.
During the mission, the delegation gathered information on the topics addressed in this report.
The purpose of the report is to provide updated information on the issues relevant for the
processing of asylum cases. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the report were drawn up by the
DIS in consultation with the Secretariat of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board. The ToR is
included in the end of the report (Annex IV).
The report is a synthesis of the information obtained from oral and written sources and does
not include all details and nuances provided by the sources. In the report, care has been taken
to present the views of the sources as accurately and transparently as possible. The individual
sources should not be held accountable for the content of the report.
Prior to, during, and following the fact-finding mission to KRI, meetings were held with 16
sources, comprising journalists, human rights organisations, and academics. These meetings
were conducted both online and in person. All consulted sources were selected based on their
expertise in the topics covered in this report. The sources were informed about the purpose of
the meetings and that their statements would be included in a public report. Some sources
requested varying degrees of anonymity. Additionally, three further sources provided written
contributions regarding the topics covered in the report. These contributions have been
attached as annexes to the report (Annexes 1, 2, and 3).
Meeting minutes have been drafted from each meeting. These were forwarded to each source
for approval, providing the source an opportunity to amend, comment, or correct statements
so that the minutes reflect the information shared most accurately. All sources approved their
statements. The meeting minutes are attached as an annex to this report (Annex 4).
1
European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA),
Country of Origin (COI) Report Methodology,
February 2022,
url
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In the interests of transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the meeting minutes have been
assigned consecutive numbers, which are used in the report when referencing the statements
of the sources in the footnotes. During the meetings, sources also discussed topics not included
in the terms of reference (ToR). When such topics could be relevant for asylum cases, the
information was included in the minutes but not addressed in the report. This also applies to
information provided in the written contributions from three sources regarding topics not
included in the ToR, which has been included as part of their contribution in an annex (Annex 5)
but is not addressed in the report.
In this report, we have used conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED). ACLED collects data on political violence, but also on selected political events
that do not necessarily involve violence.
Its statistics are based on data from international, national, and local news sources, but are
supplemented by reports from international bodies and civil society organisations. ACLED also
uses social media sampling and data from local partners.
In the study of political violence, the event/incident is the primary object of study. In ACLED's
terms, incidents involve an actor - such as a named rebel group, state force or unidentified
armed group - committing politically motivated violence. However, incidents do not necessarily
result in deaths; for example, sexual violence, abductions, and injuries are also reported as
incidents. Each incident is linked to a specific place and day and is recorded as a separate event
- even if a battle lasts for several days.
It is also important to note that the documentation of an event or incident does not fully
capture the severity or magnitude of each occurrence. The recorded information provides
insights but may not comprehensively reflect the broader human impact or the scale of
violence involved in individual cases.
Another important aspect related to the number of deaths is that ACLED does not distinguish
civilian casualties from other conflict-related deaths. While they focus on civilians as targets in
their incident reporting, they cannot provide a comprehensive picture of civilian casualties. This
is because their incidents are categorised by actor, target, and modus operandi, but each
category can include civilian casualties. We have used data from three of these categories:
-
-
-
battles
violence against civilians
explosions/remote violence.
Battles are a violent clash between two politically organised armed actors at a given time and
place.
Violence against civilians includes incidents in which an organised armed actor deliberately
directs violence against civilians. In this context, civilians are understood to be non-combatants
and unarmed. It includes, inter alia, armed attacks against civilians, involuntary abductions,
arbitrary arrests, and various forms of sexual violence.
Explosions and remote violence include suicide bombs, mines, improvised explosive devices
and chemical weapons. Incidents involving both civilian targets and combatants are included in
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this category. Thus, suicide attacks against civilians using only explosives are included - while
complex attacks against civilian targets using both firearms and suicide bombs are included in
the category of violence against civilians.
It should be noted that the security situation in Syria, including in North and East Syria, may be
subject to change, and the information provided may therefore become out of date. This was the
case following the recent developments related to the significant offensive launched in late 2024,
during the drafting of this report. While the long-term consequences remain uncertain, these
developments have had a significant short-term impact on the territory under the control of
various parties involved in the Syrian conflict, as well as the broader security situation. It is
therefore essential to monitor the issues addressed in this report on a regular basis and update
them as necessary.
The research and editing of this report was finalised on 15 January 2025. The report can be
accessed from the website of DIS,
www.us.dk,
and on the website belonging to the Swedish
Migration Agency,
migrationsverket.se.
It is available to all stakeholders working within the field
of refugee status determination as well as to the general public.
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Abbreviations
COI
DAANES
DIS
EASO
EUAA
GoS
HPG
HRE
HTS
IS
KRI
MMC
NES
PKK
PYD
RYM
SAA
SDC
SDF
SNA
SNHR
STJ
YPG
YPJ
Country of Origin Information
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
Danish Immigration Service
European Asylum Support Office
European Union Agency for Asylum
Government of Syria
People’s Defence Forces
Afrin Liberation Forces
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Islamic State
Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Manbij Military Council
North and East Syria
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Democratic Union Party
Revolutionary Youth Movement
Syrian Arab Army
Syrian Democratic Council
Syrian Democratic Forces
Syrian National Army
Syrian Network for Human Rights
Syrians for Truth and Justice
People’s Protection Units
Women’s Protection Units
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Glossary
DAANES
A non-state government actor under the effective control of the
Democratic Union Party (PYD). Although the DAANES is officially
separate from the PKK, they are closely linked ideologically.
A jihadist group that gained control over parts of the country
between 2013 and 2019. Although it lost most of its territory, IS
remains active through insurgent operations and sleeper cells.
The Government of Syria (GoS), led by former President Bashar
al-Assad, was the ruling authority in Syria. It operated through
centralized institutions, including the military and security
services, and was engaged in conflict with various
opposition groups since 2011.
A jihadist group that was primarily active in northwestern Syria,
including Idlib. Formed in 2017, HTS emerged from a merger of
factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra, a former al-Qaeda affiliate.
It controlled territory through a governance body, the Salvation
Government, and operated independently of other opposition
groups. HTS has become the dominant actor in the current
transitional government following the downfall of Bashar al-
Assad
Areas in northern and eastern Syria controlled by the DAANES.
The dominant political actor of the DAANES. A Kurdish political
party established in 2003 by the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK). The military wings of the PYD are the
People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection
Units (YPJ), which are key components of the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF).
The main military force of the DAANES comprised of several
armed groups. The military wings of the PYD, YPG and YPJ, are
key components of the Syrian Democratic Forces
A coalition of over 35 armed opposition factions active in
northern Syria, established in 2017 by the Syrian Interim
Government. Supported by Türkiye, the SNA operates in areas
secured through Turkish-backed military operations but lacks
centralized leadership, with individual factions maintaining
independent command structures.
IS
GoS
HTS
North and East Syria
PYD
SDF
SNA
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1. Background
In July 2012, the former Syrian government (GoS) tactically withdrew from northern Syria to
redeploy its forces against the armed Syrian opposition in the Damascus-Aleppo corridor
2
and
Kurdish forces assumed control of the Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria.
3
This also
included control over the mixed areas of Hasakah governorate, which are mainly populated by
Kurds and Arabs.
4
Subsequently, a civilian administration was established, which has since undergone several
name changes.
5
The most recent of these occurred in December 2023 with the adoption of a
Social Contract, resulting in the current designation of the administration as the Democratic
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).
6
The Kurdish forces significantly expanded their area of control between 2015 and 2018.
7
During
this period, they extended their presence well beyond the Kurdish-majority areas with the
assistance of the U.S.-led coalition. They also captured the most significant oil fields in Syria and
almost all territory formerly controlled by the Islamic State (IS) east of the Euphrates River.
8
Until late 2024, the DAANES exercised authority over an ethnically diverse region comprising
approximately 25% to 30% of Syria's territory.
9
This region encompassed the majority of
Hasakah and Raqqa governorates, the eastern part of the Deir Ezzour governorate, as well as
certain parts of the Aleppo governorate.
10
Following the recent developments related to the
significant offensive launched by HTS, which took control of Aleppo city, the SDF withdrew its
forces from the Tall Rifaat enclave.
11
These areas are currently under the control of HTS-led
transitional government and the Turkish-backed SNA, respectively.
12
However, when HTS
2
Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,
The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,
2019, p. 91;
Holmes, A. A.,
Statelet of Survivors,
2024, pp. 40-41; EASO,
Syria: Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 159; DIIS,
Mosaics of Power: Fragmentation of the Syrian state since 2011,
2018,
url,
p. 19
3
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8; EASO, Syria: Security Situation, July
2021,
url,
p. 159
4
EASO,
Syria: Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 159; Balanche, F.,
Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War,
Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2018,
url,
p. 59;
5
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8
6
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8; Kurdistan24,
New administration name
adopted for local administration in northeast Syria,
13 December 2023,
url
7
EASO, Syria:
Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
pp. 159 - 160
8
EASO, Syria:
Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
pp. 159 - 160
9
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands,
Country of origin information report Syria,
June 2021,
url,
p. 12; Netherlands (The),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Country of origin information report Syria,
August 2023,
url,
p. 14;
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation 2024,
October 2024,
url,
p. 17
10
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 30; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2023,
url,
p. 28; EASO, Syria:
Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 22
11
Kurdistan24,
Kurdish civilians flee as Syrian conflict escalates in Aleppo, Tall Rifat,
3 December 2024,
url;
Shafaq
News,
Kurdish forces withdraw from Aleppo as violence intensifies in Northern Syria,
2 December 2024,
url
12
The Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December 2024,
url
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assumed control of Aleppo city, they allowed the SDF to maintain control of the Kurdish areas
of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh.
13
The security of the remaining territories controlled by the DAANES is primarily managed by the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the internal security forces (ISF), also known as the
Asayish.
14
Although some diplomatic relations have been established with other countries,
neither the former Syrian government nor the opposition, nor any foreign state or international
organization, has formally recognized its autonomy.
15
The term North and East Syria (NES) is
used in this report to describe the territory governed by the DAANES.
Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024, ©UN
Geospatial
16
13
14
Rudaw,
SDF says has deals with HTS, to send a delegation to Damascus,
12 December 2024,
url
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.8; DIIS,
Mosaics of Power: Fragmentation
of the Syrian state since 2011,
2018,
url,
p. 19
15
European University Institute,
The Political Economy of North and East Syria,
2019,
url,
p.2; ECFR,
Syrian
Democratic Forces,
n.d.,
url
16
UN Geospatial,
Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024
[Map], July 2024,
url
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2. Democratic Autonomous Administration of North
and East Syria (DAANES)
The DAANES is a non-state governance actor,
17
structured into seven administrative cantons:
Jazire, Euphrates, Manbij, Deir Ezzour, Tabqa, Raqqa and Afrin.
18
Despite Afrin being classified
as an administrative region of the DAANES, it remained effectively under the control of factions
within the SNA.
19
The administrative region of Jazire is broadly comparable to Hasakah
Governorate.
20
Until late November 2024, civilian authorities affiliated to the DAANES controlled the Kurdish
neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh north of Aleppo city, the town of Tall Rifaat
and several towns and villages in the Tall Rifaat enclave.
21
The SDF has since withdrawn from
the Tall Rifaat enclave, but maintains control of the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo city
following an agreement with the HTS, which assumed overall control of the city in connection
with the offensive in late 2024.
22
Each regional administration is organized into three main councils: Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial.
23
These councils manage four administrative subdivisions: Canton, District, Sub-District,
and Commune. The Communes serve as the foundational and lowest level of civil
administration within neighborhoods. Each level of administration includes ten local
committees.
24
The SDC is the executive body and political leadership of the DAANES. It is a confederation of
multi-ethnic political parties, associations, civil society organisations, and local activists in Syria,
which is dominated by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD; Partiya Yetkîye Demokrat), the
political wing of the People’s Protection Units (YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) and the Women’s
Protection Units (YPJ: Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê).
25
17
USDoS,
2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Syria,
23 April 2024,
url;
Representations of the
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in Europe,
What is the DAANES?,
n.d.,
url;
ICG: 6
18
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 9;
19
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 61
20
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p.9
21
STJ, Aleppo:
Syrian Government Forces Block Essential Supplies to Kurdish Neighbourhoods,
5 april 2024,
url
22
The Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December 2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says has deals with HTS, to
send a delegation to Damascus,
12 December 2024,
url
23
Representations of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in Europe,
What is the
DAANES?,
n.d.,
url
24
Representations of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in Europe,
What is the
DAANES?,
n.d.,
url
25
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 9; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands,
Country of origin information report Syria,
August 2023,
url,
p. 14; Syrian Democratic
Council U.S. Mission,
Fact Sheet – The Syrian Democratic council,
n.d.,
url;
EASO, Syria:
Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 24; EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 29
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The SDC is described by Allsop and van Wilgenburg as the "political wing" of the SDF.
26
It was
responsible for the establishment of administrative councils and governance in non-Kurdish
majority areas, such as Manbij and Raqqa, captured during the SDF's campaign against IS.
27
The PYD was established in Syria in 2003 as a Syrian branch of the The Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: PKK), which had maintained a significant presence in the regions of
Kobane and Afrin until its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was expelled from Syria in 1998.
28
While the
DAANES operates with a high degree of autonomy, its ideologies and organizational structures
are strongly influenced by those of the PKK, with multiple former and current PKK members
holding prominent roles within the DAANES' military and civilian administrations.
29
26
Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,
The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,
2019, p. 96;
EASO, Syria:
Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 24
27
Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,
The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,
2019, p. 96
28
Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,
The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,
2019, p. 61
29
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 29
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3. Main actors
This chapter provides an introductory overview of the key actors controlling territory and
involved in the conflict in northeastern Syria during the reporting period and prior to the recent
transition of power in Syria. The actors discussed include the SDF, the GoS, the SNA, and IS.
However, it should be noted that this overview does not claim to provide a comprehensive
account of their activities.
3.1 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
The SDF was established in October 2015, following Russia's intervention in the Syrian conflict.
It is a Kurdish-led, multi-ethnic coalition comprising several armed groups, including the YPG
and the YPJ.
30
The SDF was established as an alliance between the YPG/J and various groups
affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) from the Euphrates Volcano joint operations room.
31
From 2019, the majority of SDF personnel were of Arab ethnicity.
32
Its current operational
structure also consists of groups with Kurdish, Assyrian/Syriac and Armenian backgrounds.
33
The latest data from the IISS indicates that the SDF comprises approximately 50,000 military
personnel.
34
However, a different source has previously indicated that the SDF consists of more
than 100,000 fighters.
35
Prior to the downfall of the Assad government, the SDF assumed
military control over the region governed by the DAANES, which encompassed Hasakah,
eastern Deir Ezzour, and sections of Raqqa and Aleppo governorates.
36
The YPG is the dominant actor of the SDF and largely exercises control over its leadership.
37
It
was founded in 2012 as the military wing of the PYD by veterans of the PKK.
38
Among them was
the current SDF commander-in-chief, Mazloum Abdi.
39
Prior to the formal establishment of the
YPJ in 2013, there were units in the YPG made up entirely of women.
40
The SDF has been the US's primary ground force partner in the fight against IS.
41
It has a
capable military force, intelligence service and police force, which collectively make it an
effective actor for conducting counter-terrorism operations.
42
From 2014 to 2017, IS held
30
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 24; ECFR,
Syrian Democratic Forces,
n.d.,
url;
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 14
31
Holmes, A. A.,
Statelet of Survivors,
2024, p. 50; Hawar News Network,
Euphrates Volcano... Kurdish-Arab force
and successful experience that led to formation of SDF,
15 September 2023,
url
32
Holmes, A. A.,
Statelet of Survivors,
2024, p. 50
33
EUAA, Syria – Security Situation, October 2024,
url,
p. 30
34
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 388
35
Politico,
There are 13 Guantanomos in the Syrian Desert,
27 March 2023,
url
36
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation
, October 2024,
url,
p. 30
37
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 45
38
ECFR,
Syrian Democratic Forces,
n.d.,
url;
EASO, Syria: Actors, December 2019,
url,
p. 45
39
ECFR,
Syrian Democratic Forces,
n.d.,
url
40
Holmes, A. A.,
Statelet of Survivors,
2024, p. 44
41
EASO, Syria: Actors, December 2019,
url,
p. 46
42
Dino Krause: 26
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considerable territory in northeast Syria but the SDF, supported by the U.S.-led coalition, drove
them out and assumed control of IS territories.
43
The SDF remains a partner of the U.S., which
has provided them with training and equipment, and coalition forces continue to support SDF
counterinsurgency operations against IS in the DAANES-controlled areas.
44
In addition to its status as a U.S. partner, the SDF had established a collaborative relationship
with the GoS and Iran in some areas, particularly in the Hasakah governorate.
45
However, this
did not apply to Deir Ezzour, where the SDF has engaged in armed clashes with tribal militias
supported by the GoS and Iran.
46
The Turkish government has designated the SDF, the YPG and
the YPJ as terrorist organisations, on the assertion that they constitute official Syrian Kurdish
branches of the Turkish Kurdish rebel group, the PKK.
47
3.2 Government of Syria (GoS)
Prior to the downfall of the Assad government, the GoS armed forces were divided into the
following main branches: the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), which includes the Republican Guard; the
Naval Forces; the Air Forces; the Air Defence Forces; and pro-government militias such as the
National Defence Forces (NDF) and the Local Defence Forces (LDF). The LDF, an auxiliary force
established by Iran, was deployed throughout Syrian cities and governorates, with a particular
focus on rural areas of Aleppo Governorate.
48
The latest figures from the IISS indicate that prior to the downfall of the Assad government the
size of the regular GoS armed forces was 169,000 active military personnel.
49
This figure
included 130,000 active personnel in the SAA, 4.000 in the Navy, 15,000 in the Air Forces and
20,000 in the Air Defence Forces.
50
Furthermore, the latest data from the IISS indicates that
prior to the downfall of the Assad government the combined strength of pro-government
militias and gendarmeries stood at 100,000.
51
This figure consisted of approximately 50,000
under the NDF and a further 50,000 with various armed groups aligned with the GoS, including
Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian organisations.
52
However, following recent developments
related to the HTS offensive and the downfall of the Assad government in December 2024, the
strength and capacity of forces affiliatied to the former government of Syria is unclear.
43
44
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 46
EASO, Syria: Actors, December 2019,
url,
p. 46; US Government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S.
Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress January 1, 2024 –
March 31, 2024, 30 April 2024,
url;
p. 24;
US Government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024,
29 October 2024,
url,
p.
33; ECFR,
Syrian Democratic Forces,
n.d.,
url;
Dino Krause: 26
45
TWI,
Iran is Attempting to Push the United States out of Syria via Hasaka Province,
8 March 2024,
url
46
Dino Krause: 26
47
Al Jazeera,
Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces?,
15 October 2019,
url;
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands,
Country of origin information report Syria,
August 2023,
url,
p. 14; ICG: 28
48
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 26
49
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 386
50
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 386
51
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 387
52
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 387
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Until late 2024, the GoS, with the support of Iran, pro-Iranian militias, and Russian forces,
maintained control over approximately two-thirds of the country. This encompassed Damascus
and its surrounding areas, the southern regions, the central governorate of Homs, the coastal
regions, as well as portions of Raqqa, Deir Ezzour, Idlib, and Hama governorates.
53
Following the
collapse of the Assad government in late 2024, the HTS-led transitional government has
assumed control of the majority of Syrian territory previously under the authority of the GoS.
54
Prior to the downfall of the Assad government, the GoS maintained a presence in the Hasakah
Governorate as part of the security coordination with Kurdish forces, which began in 2012. At
that time, the GoS withdrew from the majority of the governorate, allowing Kurdish forces to
gain greater autonomy in the region.
55
The GoS maintained a limited presence in specific
enclaves in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, which have been designated as 'security
squares' (in Arabic:
Al-Morab'at Al-Amniya),
as well as in an unspecified number of villages
south of Qamishli.
56
Russian and Iranian-backed forces are also present in these areas.
57
Furthermore, until recently, the GoS and its Russian allies maintained a presence along the
Syrian-Turkish border and the frontlines between the DAANES-controlled areas and the areas of
northern Syria controlled by Türkiye.
58
In 2022, the GoS reinforced its presence in SDF-held
areas by deploying additional military personnel to eastern Aleppo and Ain Issa in northern
Raqqa.
59
The relationship between the GoS and the SDF in the DAANES-controlled areas was
characterised by limited coordination in terms of security and governance, along with
intermittent episodes of tension.
60
3.3 Syrian National Army (SNA)
The SNA is a broad coalition of non-state armed groups operational in the northern region of
the country. These groups were established in areas that were created as a result of Turkish-
backed military operations in northern Syria between 2016 and 2019.
61
Following the former Syrian government's recapture of opposition-held territories in southern
and central Syria in 2018, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) disbanded in those regions. In northern
53
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 16
Al Jazeera,
Syria war live tracker: Maps and charts,
16 December 2024,
url
55
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 8-11; EASO, Syria: Actors, December
2019,
url,
p. 40; Enab Baladi,
Northern Syria: “Security Squares” manage SDF and regime interests,
9 October 2023,
url
56
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 8-11, 34; Enab Baladi,
Northern Syria:
“Security Squares” manage SDF and regime interests,
9 October 2023,
url;
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands,
Country of origin information report Syria,
August 2023,
url,
p. 14; Alexander McKeever:
16
57
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 103
58
UN Geospatial,
Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024
[Map], July 2024,
url
59
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2023,
url,
p. 26
60
EASO, Syria: Actors, December 2019,
url,
p. 40; DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 33; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
September 2022,
url,
p. 105 EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October
2023,
url,
p. 105; Enab Baladi,
SDF seizes six state buildings in Qamishli,
14 April 2022,
url;
Enab Baladi,
Northern Syria: “Security Squares” manage SDF and regime interests,
9 October 2023,
url
61
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation 2024,
October 2024,
url,
p. 30
54
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and northwestern Syria, where opposition forces still maintained control, former FSA factions
integrated into the SNA after 2018.
62
By 2022, the FSA had ceased to function as a unified
armed faction.
63
The SNA was established in December 2017 by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), an
opposition group operating out of Türkiye and Turkish-held areas in northern Syria.
64
It was
established by consolidating various rebel groups and factions active in Afrin and northern
Aleppo governorate under a unified framework. However, the individual groups retained their
own structures and command hierarchies within the broader SNA framework.
65
This structural model has resulted in persistent internal competition, as well as periodic
mergers and divisions among the factions. While the SNA serves as an overarching entity for
multiple armed opposition groups, it lacks a centralized leadership structure, with each faction
maintaining its own leader and operating independently.
66
The SNA is currently comprised of
over 35 distinct factions,
67
with the latest estimates from the IISS indicating a total of
approximately 70,000 fighters.
68
The SNA exercised control over two areas along the Turkish-Syrian border. The first of these
extends from Jarabulus to Afrin in Aleppo governorate. This area was established through the
execution of Turkish military operations designated Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch.
69
The
second area of control spans between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in Raqqa and Hasakah
governorates. This area forms part of the Operation Peace Spring zone.
70
In connection with the
HTS-led offensive in late 2024, the SNA has since assumed control of the Tell Rifaat enclave and
Manbij.
71
3.4 Islamic State (IS)
IS originated from Al Qaeda in Iraq and several smaller Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups. Leveraging
the Syrian civil war and power vacuums, the group secured significant territorial gains in both
Syria and Iraq by late 2014.
72
However, IS's territorial control was terminated in March 2019,
when the SDF captured its final stronghold in Baghouz, Deir Ezzour.
73
Since 2019, the organisational structure of IS in Syria has undergone significant changes. During
the caliphate period from 2014 to 2018, IS in Iraq and Syria maintained a hierarchical model,
62
63
DIS,
Syria – Recruitment to Opposition Groups,
December 2022,
url,
p. 5
DIS,
Syria – Recruitment to Opposition Groups,
December 2022,
url,
p. 5
64
DIS,
Syria – Recruitment to Opposition Groups,
December 2022,
url,
p. 5
65
DIS,
Syria – Recruitment to Opposition Groups,
December 2022,
url,
pp. 5-6
66
DIS,
Syria – Recruitment to Opposition Groups,
December 2022,
url,
pp. 5-6
67
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation 2024,
October 2024,
url,
p. 29
68
IISS,
The Military Balance 2024,
13 February 2024,
url,
p. 388
69
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 17
70
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 17
71
Kurdistan24,
Kurdish civilians flee as Syrian conflict escalates in Aleppo, Tall Rifat,
3 December 2024,
url;
The
Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December 2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SNA militants take Manbij city from
Kurdish forces,
10 December 2024,
url
72
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 59
73
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 59
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overseeing other provinces elsewhere directly. However, between 2018 and 2019, an internal
restructuring introduced regional offices to manage the various IS provinces globally, creating a
more decentralized framework. While the caliph and the central leadership remain based in
Syria, the Syrian and Iraqi IS branches now maintain a status comparable to that of IS provinces
located other places in the world.
74
Despite losing its territory, ISIL adapted its strategy by transitioning into an insurgency. It
established sleeper cells, concealed weapons, and moved fighters to support zones across
Syria.
75
It has also been able to establish training centres in the central Badia region.
76
Although
IS does not currently control any territory in Syria and has no overt presence in the Kurdish-
controlled areas of Syria,
77
it is present in every governorate and in every major urban area in
the Kurdish-controlled parts of northeastern Syria, both Arab and Kurdish.
78
IS has also been able to establish a presence in most rural areas.
79
The activities of IS across the
governorates and cities in the northeast can be broken down into three main categories:
violent attacks, financial activities, and human smuggling.
80
The U.S. government’s estimate of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria rose from 1,255 in January 2024
to 2,500 in April 2024, while a January 2024 UN estimate suggested between 3,000 and 5,000
fighters in Syria and Iraq.
81
However, these are provisional figures and it is uncertain whether
the increase in IS activity across northeast Syria signals a notable growth in IS capabilities or is
connected to a reduction in the SDF's strength.
82
Gregory Waters has indicated that
circumstantial evidence suggests that IS has rebuilt its militant force over the past two to three
years, thereby enhancing its attack capabilities.
83
Two to three years ago, IS sleeper cells in Syria were small (four to five members) and highly
compartmentalized, with no contact between cells in different governorates, such as Raqqa,
Deir Ezzour, or Hasakah.
84
This strategy minimized risks, as captured fighters could not expose
other cells.
85
Higher-ranking leaders had broader contacts within the organisation; however, the
74
75
Dino Krause: 9
DIS,
Islamic State
in Syria, June 2020,
url,
p. 6; Dino Krause: 11
76
Dino Krause: 4
77
Dino Krause: 6; Gregory Waters: 1 US government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government
Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress April 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024,
1 August 2024,
url,
p. 11; US
Government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress January 1, 2024 –
March 31, 2024, 30 April 2024,
url;
p. 10
78
Gregory Waters: 1, 3
79
Gregory Waters: 1
80
Gregory Waters: 4
81
UNSC,
Letter dated 23 January 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267
(1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and
associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,
29
January 2024,
url,
p. 12; Dino Krause: 3, 7
82
Dino Krause: 25
83
Gregory Waters: 6
84
Gregory Waters: 7; Dino Krause 12
85
Gregory Waters 7: Dino Krause 12
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structure limited communication to reduce vulnerabilities.
86
It is unclear whether this approach
remains in place today.
87
IS leadership has become more localised over the past two and a half years, shifting from
centralised control in the northwest, directing operations in the northeast to command chains
based close to their areas of operation.
88
IS leaders rely more on face-to-face communication,
particularly in Raqqa and the north and east of Syria, although some leaders remain in Aleppo
to manage external activities outside Syria.
89
IS attacks in the Kurdish-controlled areas of north and east Syria were generally carried out by
small groups of fighters, typically belonging to cells of 4 to 8 members, who, for example, attack
a checkpoint and then retreat.
90
Despite significant leadership losses, IS activity increased in
early 2024, suggesting resilience in the northeast command chain. The capture of younger
leaders reflects a generational shift in the command structure, although its impact remains
uncertain.
91
86
87
Gregory Waters: 7; Dino Krause 12
Gregory Waters 7:
88
Greogry Waters: 8
89
Gregory Waters: 9
90
Dino Krause: 5
91
Gregory Waters: 9,10; Dino Krause: 1
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4. International involvement in North and East Syria
4.1 U.S.-led international coalition
The Global Coalition against IS was established in 2014 with the objective of addressing the
threat posed by IS in Iraq and Syria. Since September 2014, the U.S.-led coalition has conducted
military operations in Syria targeting IS and other groups. These operations have been
conducted without the consent of the former Syrian government.
92
In October 2019, the United States initiated the withdrawal of its military personnel from the
northern Syrian border with Türkiye, allowing the Turkish government to proceed with its
planned military operation against the SDF.
93
By late October, the U.S.-led coalition had
withdrawn from almost all its bases in Raqqa and Aleppo governorates.
94
By December 2019,
the United States had finalised its military withdrawal from northeastern Syria, establishing a
more stable presence of approximately 600 troops elsewhere in the country following a
repositioning and reduction of forces.
95
According to the EUAA, approximately 900 U.S. personnel were deployed in northeastern
Syria.
96
However, in December 2024, the U.S. Department of Defence announced that there
were approximately 2,000 U.S. troops deployed to Syria.
97
The U.S. is leading a joint task force
comprising 25 countries, with the objective of continuing to combat IS and supporting the SDF
and other local partners in maintaining the territorial defeat of IS.
98
However, Jusoor For
Studies has indicated that these forces also prevented the former Syrian government and its
allies, particularly Iran, from assuming control of areas currently under SDF control, where the
majority of coalition forces are based.
By mid-2024, the U.S.-led Coalition had operational control of 17 military bases and 15 outposts
across Syria, predominantly located in the areas controlled by the DAANES.
99
These included
installations at the Conoco gas field and the Al-Omar oil field.
100
U.S. forces stationed in Syria
have been the subject of attacks from Iran-backed groups, in turn, prompting a series of
counterattacks. This pattern of retaliatory action has been observed on multiple occasions
during the first months of 2024.
101
Since February 2024, Iran-aligned militias have largely
92
93
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 6
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 6
94
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 6
95
Reuters,
Exclusive: U.S. military completes pullback from northeast Syria,
Esper says, 5 December 2019,
url
96
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 25
97
DoD, DOD
Announces 2,000 Troops in Syria, Department Prepared for Government Shutdown,
19 December 2024,
url
98
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 25
99
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
100
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 25
101
US Government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress January 1, 2024 –
March 31, 2024, 30 April 2024,
url;
p. 12
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refrained from launching attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria.
However, there was an exception in April, when UAV and rocket attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq
and Syria were attributed to Iranian-backed militias.
102
4.2 Russia
In 2015, Russia initiated a military intervention in Syria at the request of the former Syrian
government. The objective was to provide support for the former government's efforts against
the former opposition and IS during the Syrian conflict.
103
The deployment of Russian forces in
Syria was subject to the terms of a bilateral agreement concluded in August 2015.
104
Russia's
intervention was widely regarded as a decisive factor in influencing the course of the Syrian
conflict in favour of the former Syrian government prior to the downfall of the Assad
government.
105
Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, Russia increased its military presence in Syria, adding nine
new positions to the 105 it already held. This expansion signalled a change of strategy following
a reduction in Russian deployments during the initial stages of the Ukraine conflict.
106
Prior to
the downfall of the Assad government, Russia maintained a military presence in Syria
comprising of 21 bases and 93 outposts. The locations of these bases and outposts included the
following governorates: 14 in Hasakah, 12 in Aleppo, and eight each in Raqqa and Deir
Ezzour.
107
There were considerable discrepancies in the estimates of the size of Russian troops in Syria,
with figures ranging from 4,000 to 60,000. The Russian government has stated that 63,000
troops have served in Syria, but the precise number currently stationed in the country remains
uncertain.
108
Jusoor For Studies has stated that prior to the downfall of the Assad government,
Russia continued to maintain a military advantage over Iranian forces in Syria. Russian military
sites were equipped with a range of weaponry and superior aerial and reconnaissance
assets.
109
Following the collapse of the Assad government, the Russian military initiated a
withdrawal of its assets and personnel.
110
However, Russia has not withdrawn completely and
maintains a limited presence in Syria, leading analysts to speculate about the nature of Russia's
relationship with the HTS-led transitional government.
111
102
US government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress April 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024,
1 August 2024,
url,
p. 13
103
Al Jazeera,
Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria,
30 September 2015,
url;
Al Jazeera,
What has Russia gained
from five years of fighting in Syria?,
1 October 2020,
url;
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 9
104
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 9
105
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 9
106
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
107
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
108
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 23
109
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
110
BBC,
Russia moving equipment at Syrian bases, satellite images show,
18 December 2024,
url;
CNN,
Russian
military has begun large-scale withdrawal from Syria, US and Western officials say,
16 December 2024,
url
111
Reuters,
Exclusive: Russia pulling back but not out of Syria, sources say,
15 December 2024,
url;
DW,
Russian
military: Moving from Syria to Libya?,
18 December 2024,
url;
European Interest,
Despite Europe’s displease Russia is
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4.3 Türkiye
Since 2011, Türkiye has been actively engaged in the Syrian conflict, providing support to
former opposition groups with the objective of removing Bashar al-Assad from power. These
groups included factions affiliated with the FSA, as well as various Islamist groups.
112
Türkiye's
primary objective in Syria has been to prevent the YPG from establishing an autonomous region
along its southern border, which the Turkish government considers a significant threat to its
national security.
113
This concern has been further exacerbated by the U.S. decision to form a partnership with the
SDF in 2014, providing them with enhanced military and financial resources. This alliance
between the U.S. and the YPG has been a significant source of contention between the U.S. and
Türkiye.
114
Türkiye has maintained a military presence in northern Syria, particularly in the Aleppo
governorate, since 2016. This followed two military operations: Euphrates Shield and Olive
Branch.
115
In 2016, Türkiye initiated Operation Euphrates Shield in concert with former
opposition groups to neutralise IS and impede the YPG's territorial expansion in northern
Aleppo. The operation resulted in the capture of strategic locations, including al-Bab, Jarabulus,
and several surrounding towns.
116
In January 2018, Türkiye, along with allied local armed groups, launched Operation Olive Branch
against the Kurdish-held Afrin district in the Aleppo governorate. By March 2018, Turkish forces
gained full control off Afrin.
117
Following the US withdrawal of troops from northeastern Syria
on 9 October 2019, Türkiye initiated Operation Peace Spring, targeting Kurdish-held territories.
The objective was to clear YPG and ISIL elements along the border and establish a 32-km-wide
"safe zone". The operation was supported by approximately 14,000 fighters from the SNA.
118
This area is predominantly designated as a military zone, with approximately 50 military
installations under the control of the Turkish military. These installations encompass a range of
facilities, including larger bases and frontline positions held by Turkish commando units.
119
As of mid-2024, the Turkish military maintained 12 bases and 114 outposts across Syria,
including 58 in Aleppo governorate and 10 in Raqqa governorate. Turkish forces conducted
ground and aerial reconnaissance using drones from these positions, enabling them to target
both former government and SDF positions.
120
to keep its military presence in Syria,
23 December 2024,
url;
BBC, Syrians hope for a future without Russia, but it
may not be easy, 13 January 2025,
url
112
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
113
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
114
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
115
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
116
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
117
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
118
EASO,
Syria: Actors,
December 2019,
url,
p. 8
119
Alexander Mckeever: 20
120
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
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4.4 Iran
Prior to the collapse of the Assad government, Iran maintained the largest foreign military
presence in Syria, despite a reduction in the number of military positions under Iranian and
Iranian-backed militia control.
121
Iran's strategy in Syria has been twofold: firstly, to ensure the
survival of the Assad government; secondly, to position Syria as a key partner in its resistance
axis against Israel.
122
In addition to exerting influence over the former Syrian government, Iran
also extended its reach at the local level by providing support to Shia communities and other
minorities, particularly in the western part of Deir Ezzour governorate, which it considered its
primary area of influence.
123
The Iranian government, primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was
actively supporting the former Syrian government and recruiting Shia fighters from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq to fight in Syria. It is estimated that hundreds of IRGC officers have served as
military advisers in the country.
124
As of mid-2024, Iran had maintained 52 military bases and
477 outposts across all 14 Syrian governorates. The number of sites in Aleppo governorate was
117, in Deir Ezzour governorate 77, in Raqqa governorate 14, and in Hasakah governorate
eight.
125
Iranian positions in Syria could be broadly classified into two main categories. The first
comprised positions held by Iran-backed militias under the direct command of the IRGC's Quds
Force, comprising Syrian and foreign fighters from several countries.
126
The second category
represented positions that are controlled by Hezbollah and its local affiliates. These also
operated with the support and oversight of the IRGC, either directly or indirectly.
127
The majority of these sites lacked the capacity to conduct independent military operations for a
number of reasons. These include the absence of an air force, air defence systems and the
necessary military and logistical infrastructure for large-scale operations.
128
Furthermore, the
constant redeployment of forces to evade Israeli and Coalition airstrikes has resulted in a
significant reduction in their combat readiness. Additionally, these sites relied heavily on a
network of cross-border militias.
129
Iran commenced an evacuation of military personnel and
officials from Syria in early December 2024.
130
121
122
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 23
123
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 23
124
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 23
125
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
126
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
127
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
128
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
129
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
130
New York times,
Iran Begins to Evacuate Military Officials and Personnel From Syria,
6 December 2024,
url
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Map 2: Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, mid-2024, ©Jusoor for Studies
131
131
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria, Mid-2024,
2 July 2024,
url
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5. Security situation in North and East Syria
5.1 Aleppo governorate
Following the recent developments in Syria, the conflict dynamics, territorial control, and
consequently the security situation in the Kurdish areas of Aleppo have shifted significantly.
132
The information on the security situation presented below is primarily focused on events and
developments that occurred prior to 27 November 2024.
5.1.1 Geography and demography
Aleppo Governorate, situated in northern Syria, shares a northern border with Türkiye and is
adjacent to the governorates of Idlib to the west, Hama to the south, and Raqqa to the east. It
is divided into eight districts: Jebel Saman, Afrin (Efrin), A’zaz (Azaz), Al-Bab, Manbij (Menbij),
Jarablus, Ain Al Arab (Kobane), and As-Safira, with the city of Aleppo serving as its capital. The
governorate is connected by the M5 and M4 highways, linking Aleppo with Damascus and
western Syria.
133
According to UNOCHA, as of July 2023, Aleppo Governorate had an estimated
population of 4,749,350, including 1,641,306 internally displaced persons (IDPs).
134
Before the conflict, Aleppo governorate was predominantly Sunni, with minorities including
Christians, Kurds, Armenians, Turkmen, and Shia Muslims, the latter concentrated in rural areas
and parts of Aleppo city. In 2012, Aleppo city had 2.5 million residents, with 500,000 living in
the predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh, described as a
"Kurdish city within the city."
135
5.1.2 Actors and territorial control
On 27 November 2024 former rebel forces, led by HTS launched a major offensive in Syria's
northwestern Aleppo province. At the time of writing, the HTS fighters had progressed from
their base in the countryside to the outskirts of Aleppo, and assumed control of the city of
Aleppo.
136
However, the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh remained
under the control of the SDF following an agreement with HTS.
137
At the same time, SNA forces,
132
See Associated Press (AP),
What to know about sudden rebel gains in Syria’s 13-year war and why it matters, 2
December 2024,
url
133
EUAA,
Syria - Security Situation, 22 October 2024,
p. 60,
url
134
UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024: Syrian Arab Republic,
3 March 2024,
url,
p. 9
135
EASO,
Syria – Security Situation,
July 2021,
url,
p. 81
136
The Guardian,
Assault on Aleppo: who are the Syrian rebels HTS and why are they advancing?,
2 December 2024,
url;
The Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December 2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says has deals with HTS,
to send a delegation to Damascus,
12 December 2024,
url
137
The Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December 2024,
url;
Kurdistan24,
Kurdish civilians flee as
Syrian conflict escalates in Aleppo, Tall Rifat,
3 December 2024,
url;
Shafaq News,
Kurdish forces withdraw from
Aleppo as violence intensifies in Northern Syria,
2 December 2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says working to evacuate its
people from Tal Rifaat,
2 December 2024,
url;
The Guardian,
Who controls what territory in Syria?,
3 December
2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says has deals with HTS, to send a delegation to Damascus,
12 December 2024,
url
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who were part of the HTS-led operation,
138
advanced in the northeastern countryside of
Aleppo, eventually taking full control of the Tell Rifaat enclave from the SDF before entering
Manbij and assuming control of it following intense clashes with the SDF.
139
There are reports
of continued fighting between the SDF and the SNA following a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in the
Manbij area.
140
Prior to these developments, the territorial control of Aleppo Governorate was more or less
static,
141
split between former opposition armed groups, the former Syrian government, and
the SDF/YPG.
142
Multiple foreign military forces, including Iranian, Russian, and Turkish troops,
maintained operational sites throughout the governorate, including in areas controlled by
Kurdish forces.
143
Until 27 November 2024, the Kurdish forces held several areas in Aleppo, including Tell Rifaat,
where there was a strong presence of the YPG and the YPJ, but also a presence of GoS and pro-
government forces. In addition, the SDF/YPG controlled the areas of Manbij and Ain Al Arab
(Kobane)
144
. The primary security force for the area of Manbij was the Manbij Military Council,
which was an entity under the SDF.
145
However, according to Fabrice Balanche, Manbij was
jointly controlled by the SDF and the GoS during the reporting period. Furthermore, the SDF
controlled the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo city, which it
currently maintains.
146
Some sources stated that Aleppo served as a vital economic hub for trade, benefiting all actors
operating in the region. This dynamic fosters limited cooperation among various groups, such
as the use of unofficial crossings between the SDF and the GoS to facilitate commerce, with
both sides keen to preserve these arrangements. However, tensions occasionally arise as
different actors seek to push boundaries to gain a competitive advantage in trade.
147
138
139
NPA,
SNA announces launch of “Dawn of Freedom” offensive in Aleppo,
30 November 2024,
url
NPA,
Thousands of Afrin IDPs stranded in northern Syria, besieged by SNA,
2 December 2024,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says
working to evacuate its people from Tal Rifaat, 2 December 2024,
url;
Live Universal Awareness Map (Liveuamap),
Syria,
2 December 2024,
url;
MEMO,
Turkish proxies fight US-armed Kurds in north Syria,
12 December 2024,
url;
NPA,
Fierce clashes erupt as Turkish-backed SNA factions attack Syria’s Manbij,
8 December 2024,
url
140
Reuters,
Ceasefire between Turkey and US-backed rebels extended, State Dept says,
17 December 2024,
url
141
AP,
What to know about sudden rebel gains in Syria’s 13-year war and why it matters,
30 November 2024,
url
142
UN Geospatial,
Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024
[Map], July 2024,
url
143
Jusoor for Studies,
Map of Foreign Forces in Syria,
Mid-2024, 2 July 2024,
url
144
ACAPS,
Northern Syria: key crises to watch,
4 August 2023,
url,
p. 3
145
Institute for the Study of War (ISW),
The Syrian Democratic Forces’ Arab Coalition is Crumbling, Creating
Opportunities for ISIS, Iran, and Turkey,
15 September 2023,
url
146
Enab Baladi,
Northern Syria: “Security Squares” manage SDF and regime interests,
9 October 2023,
url;
Rudaw,
SDF says has deals with HTS, to send a delegation to Damascus,
12 December 2024,
url
147
ICG: 9; A Syrian-Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 6
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5.1.3 Recent security trends
5.1.3.1 ACLED security events in Kurdish controlled areas in Aleppo
The figure below is based on ACLED-data and aims to give an understanding of the level of
violence in the Kurdish controlled areas of Aleppo governorate during the reference period 1
January to 15 November 2024. The types of incidents presented are
explosions/remote
violence, battles,
and
violence against civilians.
148
As mentioned previously, Aleppo
Governorate was divided in various spheres of influence split among various actors whose
spheres often overlapped.
149
The areas presented below are a rough division of the areas under
Kurdish control in Aleppo and should not be considered as exact areas of control (it should be
noted that some of the areas presented below are no longer under Kurdish control), but rather
a point of reference in order to illustrate the violence that occurred during the reference period
in this region, based on ACLED’s data.
Figure 1: Security Incidents in areas under Kurdish control in Aleppo Governorate, 1
January – 15 November 2024
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Azaz (Tall Rifaat)
Ain al-Arab
(Kobani)
Manbij
Battles
Aleppo - Sheikh
Maqsoud
Aleppo -
Ashrafiya
Explosions/remote violence
Source: Data from ACLED compiled by DIS/Lifos
150
Violence against civilians
There has been a total of 484 incidents (out of total 2,689 incidents for the whole governorate)
in the Kurdish areas of Aleppo during the reference period, with Tell Rifaat and Manbij being
the areas where most of the violence took place (total 415 incidents in Manbij and Tell Rifaat).
Most of the incidents reported are categorized as explosions/remote violence (368 incidents),
mostly in the form of shelling/artillery/missile attacks, and most of the incidents are attributed
to the Turkish military forces (351 incidents). Regarding battles, 55 incidents of the type battles
148
149
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),
Codebook,
2023,
url
UN Geospatial,
Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024
[Map], July 2024,
url
150
ACLED,
Data Export Tool,
January-15 November 2024 (data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
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have been reported, most of which took place in Manbij and Ain al-Arab (Kobane). According to
ACLED’s data, the battles have dominantly been armed clashes between various Turkish-backed
factions and Kurdish forces in the areas. There were 61 incidents of violence against civilians,
most of which were cases of abduction attributed to the Revolutionary Youth Movement
(RYM). The few incidents that were documented in the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and
Ashrafiyeh were violence against civilians in the form of abductions linked to the RYM.
151
5.1.3.2 Security situation in the Kurdish controlled areas of Aleppo and impact on civilians
During the reporting period and until the recent developments (January-November 2024),
Aleppo governorate remained a focal point for complex and multi-layered security challenges,
shaped by overlapping control among various actors and persistent fighting. For years Türkiye's
military operations in northern Syria (Euphrates Shield 2016-2017, Olive Branch 2018, Peace
Spring 2019, Spring Shield 2020) have caused considerable humanitarian consequences,
including civilian casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals.
152
Simultaneously, tensions and ongoing clashes between the Turkish-backed SNA and the SDF in
Aleppo have been, according to observers, a significant driver of regional instability,
characterized by intermittent escalations and periods of heightened conflict between the two
actors.
153
According to an assessment by a Syrian-Kurdish journalist, Türkiye, Russia, and the former
Syrian government shared a strategic interest in forcing the SDF to withdraw from Manbij,
though this had not occurred during the reporting period.
154
According to several sources, the
areas of Manbij and Kobane are strategically significant for Türkiye, as these areas form a
critical junction between the Euphrates Shield and Operation Peace Spring area.
155
Clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA
During the reporting period, clashes between SDF and SNA, concentrated along the frontlines
near Manbij, Tell Rifaat, and the Afrin countryside, primarily involved artillery shelling and
small-scale incursions.
156
In Tell Rifaat, the fighting was primarily recurring between YPG-
aligned forces, including the Afrin Liberation Forces (HRE) who was the dominant power in this
area, and Turkish-backed SNA groups
157 158
, and featured frequent small-unit engagements,
151
152
ACLED,
Data Export Tool,
January-15 November 2024 (data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
ACAPS,
Northern Syria: key crises to watch,
4 August 2023,
url,
p. 3, 9
153
NPA,
Syrian Democratic Forces Kill 17 Pro-Turkey Fighters in Aleppo’s Manbij Countryside,
26 November 2024,
url;
Etana Syria,
Syria Military Brief: North-East Syria – October 2024,
13 November 2024,
url;
Fabrice Balanche: 20;
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 23; Alexander McKeever: 1
154
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 22, 23
155
Fabrice Blanche: 24; An organization promoting human rights: 6
156
The Syrian Observer,
To Hinder Damascus-Ankara Rapprochement: SDF Ignites Turkish Occupation Fronts North of
Aleppo,
23 July 2024,
url
157
SNA-alligned groups such as Sultan Murad division, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Faylaq al-Sham, al-Jabha al-Shamiya, 50th
division, the Levant Front, Liwaa al-Shamal, al-Shamat and al-Hamza division. ICG: 1
158
According to alexander McKeever’s recent observations, there has been one particular SNA group called al-Quwa
al-Moushtaraka (Joint Force), affiliated with al-Hamza brigade, carrying out more offensive attacks on SDF/HRE. This
group employs a brigade that seems to have partial Central Asian members (Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kyrgys). This brigade
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artillery exchanges, and incursions across frontlines, especially on the northern border of the
Tell Rifaat enclave, which previously adjoined SNA- and Turkish-controlled areas.
159
In northern Aleppo and its surrounding areas, and along the northern Tell Rifaat frontline, the
majority of civilians have been displaced due to ongoing fighting. According to Jusoor For
Studies, the region can best be described as a military zone and a designated humanitarian
zone.
160
The situation in Manbij was similar to the situation in Tell Rifaat during the reporting
period, with regular clashes between the SDF-affiliated Manbij Military Council and SNA forces,
especially in northern Manbij in the Sarjul Valley. Moreover, both the SDF and SNA attempted
incursions across the frontlines in Tell Rifaat and Manbij during the reporting period.
161
According to Fabrice Balanche, Russian airstrikes deterred an SNA attempt to invade Manbij in
March.
162
Furthermore, in September the SNA mobilized for a large-scale attack on both Tell
Rifaat and Manbij, though these plans did not materialize at that time.
163
Similarly, the SDF
conducted infiltration attacks on SNA positions, most recently in November 2024 when SDF
launched an extensive attack on SNA in northeast Aleppo.
164
According to a representative from a human right’s organization, Manbij was the area most
heavily impacted by clashes along the frontlines between the SDF and SNA groups.
165
There
was also a consistent presence of Turkish drones in this region.
166
During the reporting period,
Turkish forces continued shelling areas in rural Manbij and Kobane.
167
However, Fabrice
Balanche maintained that the city of Kobane and its surrounding villages remained relatively
secure, serving as a stronghold for the PYD. Nevertheless, the area faced a persistent threat
from Türkiye, prompting many residents to leave Kobane out of concern over a potential
Turkish incursion.
168
According to the researcher Alexander McKeever, the events impacting the
security situation in Kobane consisted almost entirely of Turkish drone attacks. The most
prominent attacks on civilian political targets have occurred in Kobane.
169
According to several sources, despite regular clashes in the Kurdish controlled areas of Aleppo,
civilian casualties were reportedly minimal as these confrontations primarily affect combatants
appears to have been active on the frontlines in Afrin against the SDF/HRE for some time, which was confirmed in
October 2024. Individuals involved with the brigade had been in Idlib prior to Afrin. Alexander McKeever: 2
159
Jusoor for Studies: 5
160
Jusoor for Studies: 8
161
Local NGO worker from NES: 25; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 23; ICG: 2; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 3
162
Fabrice Balanche: 25
163
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 23; NPA,
SDF thwarts infiltration attempt by SNA in Syria’s Manbij,
11
September 2024,
url
164
The Syrian Observer,
SDF Attack on National Army Threatens to Ignite Fronts,
26 November 2024,
url
165
An organization promoting human rights: 6
166
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 8
167
SJAC: 19; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 2; An organization promoting human rights: 6
168
Fabrice Balanche: 27
169
Alexander McKeever: 4
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near the frontlines,
170
since many of these frontline areas are effectively military zones.
171
Nevertheless, due to the nature of the fighting between SDF and SNA-groups and Türkiye in this
region, civilians face hard living conditions and many civilians have been displaced.
172
Türkiye has also occasionally supported Arab tribal groups, some of which have recently
launched attacks on Manbij. These groups, formed under the names of tribes from Deir Ezzour,
Manbij, and other Arab-majority regions within Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria, have
carried out multiple assaults along the contact lines in Manbij, particularly amid the heightened
tensions in Deir Ezzour during 2023 and 2024.
173
The human rights organization Syrians for
Truth and Justice also mentioned this occurrence in Manbij, more specifically a coordinated
attack between SNA-groups and Arab tribes in September, causing displacement of civilians.
174
IS insurgency
IS presence in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo governorate is primarily centered around
Manbij, and there was no IS activity in the Tel Rifaat enclave or Kobane.
175
According to sources,
Manbij city is an Arab-majority town where IS occasionally conducts attacks in the form of
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The most recent IS attack in Manbij
occurred between February and April 2024.
176
In total there have been six registered attacks by
IS in the Kurdish-controlled parts of Aleppo in the first nine and half months of 2024.
177
These
attacks have been small-scale shootings targeting vehicles and checkpoints belonging to the
SDF. Overall, this area is not a focal point for IS operations in Syria.
178
On occasion, bombings
are carried out by SNA under the guise of IS to avoid accountability.
179
According to Gregory
Waters, IS has maintained a long-standing presence in Manbij, a critical crossing point linking
northeastern and northwestern Syria. This strategic location suggests that IS likely developed
an infrastructure to exploit existing smuggling routes or establish new ones for transporting
goods and people.
180
Tension between the SDF and the GoS
The relationship between the former Syrian government forces and the SDF in this area was
characterized by limited cooperation. However, the GoS regularly closed roads leading to the
Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo (Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh). These sieges were often
170
Fabrice Balanche: 26; Syrians for Truth and Justice: 4; Alexander McKeever: 7; A Syrian-Arab Journalist from Enab
Baladi: 4
171
Jusoor for Sturdies: 8
172
Jusoor for Studies: 7
173
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 22
174
STJ: 4
175
Gregory Waters: 19, 21; Alexander McKeever: 6
176
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 24;
177
Dino Krause: 13
178
Dino Krause: 14; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 13; Gregory Waters: 19
179
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 13
180
Gregory Waters: 19, 20
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linked to sieges imposed by the SDF on the security squares controlled by the former
government in Hasakah and Qamishli.
181
This occasionally occurred in Tell Rifaat as well.
182
HTS
HTS and the SDF did not share direct frontlines during the reporting period, and no clashes
have occurred between the two groups in the first nine months of 2024 (this does not include
the latest developments).
183
The last recorded confrontation involving HTS took place in
September 2023 during its incursion into Afrin and Azaz. This conflict was against pro-Turkish
militias and occurred outside the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo governorate.
184
Protests in Manbij
Since early October 2024, several sources have stated that widespread anti-SDF protests in
Manbij city and its surrounding rural areas in Aleppo Governorate took place. These
demonstrations, coupled with a general strike across the region, were sparked by opposition to
the Autonomous Administration's 'Education Authority' enforcing its mandatory school
curriculum in local schools. Furthermore, several civilians were arrested/detained for
participation in the anti-SDF popular protests that objected to the school curriculums imposed
by the SDF in its territories. These arrests were concentrated in Manbij city in rural Aleppo
governorate.
185
5.2 Hasakah governorate
5.2.1 Geography and demography
The Hasakah Governorate is located in northeastern Syria.
186
The governorate shares borders
with Raqqa Governorate to the west and Deir Ezzour Governorate to the southwest.
187
Additionally, it has international borders with Türkiye to the north and Iraq to the south. The
governorate is organised into four main districts: Hasaka, Qamishli, Ras Al Ain, and Al-
Malikeyyeh (Al-Malikiyah).
188
As of July 2023, UNOCHA estimated the population of Hasakah Governorate at 1,431,461
people, comprising 1,078,796 permanent residents and 342,701 IDPs.
189
The Hasakah
Governorate has a primarily Kurdish ethnic composition.
190
Areas north of Hasakah city, such as
Qamishli and Al-Malikeyyeh (Derik), are predominantly Kurdish, while others, like Ras al-Ayn,
181
182
A Syrian-Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 6; Alexander McKeever: 5; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 21
An organization promoting human rights: 8; STJ: 3
183
Fabrice Balanche: 23; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 27; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 12; STJ: 6
184
Fabrice Balanche: 23; STJ: 6; Etana Syria,
Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria,
9 October 2023,
url
185
SNHR: 20, 22: SJAC: 5; ICG 6, 7; Syrian-Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 5
186
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 100
187
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 100
188
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 100
189
UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024:
Syrian Arab Republic, 3 March 2024,
url,
p. 9
190
Balanche, F.,
Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018,
url,
pp. 52-56
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feature a mixed population comprising Kurdish and Arab communities.
191
By contrast, the
southern part of the governorate is predominantly Arab.
192
The Tell Tamer region, situated
within the governorate, is home to a considerable Christian population, comprising Assyrians
and Armenians, in addition to a Yazidi community.
193
In the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah,
districts are divided along ethnic lines, with the Kurdish population forming the majority in
Qamishli but a minority in Hasakah.
194
5.2.2 Actors and territorial control
The SDF exercises control over the majority of Hasakah Governorate.
195
However, prior to the
current transition of power the former government maintained a presence in certain areas of
the governorate, including the security squares located in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli.
196
Turkish forces and allied Turkish-backed SNA groups currently control a narrow stretch of
territory along the border with Türkiye. This area, commonly known as the Operation Peace
Spring area, is approximately 120 kilometres in length and 32 kilometres in depth. It extends
from Ras al-Ayn in Hasakah Governorate to Tal Abyad in Raqqa Governorate.
197
There are a
number of SNA factions currently active in this area, including Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya, the Sultan
Murad Division, the Mutasim Division, Jaysh Al-Islam and the Al-Hamza Division.
198
The foreign military presence in Hasakah Governorate included Russian positions at Qamishli
airport and a base near Tell Tamer, in addition to U.S. bases situated near Hasakah city centre,
Tal Baydar, Shadaddy, Malikeyyeh, and the Kharab Al-Jir/Rmelan airbase.
199
Furthermore,
Iranian forces have established posts and training centres in the vicinity of Qamishli prior to the
withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria.
200
Additionally, it has been reported that Lebanese
Hezbollah has operated a recruitment office in the Hasakah security square.
201
IS maintains long-established networks in Hasakah, facilitated by the Al-Hol camp and the
Shaddady countryside, which serve as a key transit route for smuggling and operational
activities.
202
While IS activity in southern Hasakah is less frequent than in Deir Ezzour, the area
still experiences several attacks per month, particularly along the north-south road linking
Shaddady to Deir Ezzour and near Al-Hol.
203
191
192
Balanche, F.,
Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018,
url,
p. 52
Balanche, F.,
Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018,
url,
p. 52
193
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2023,
url,
p. 104
194
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2023,
url,
p. 104
195
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 8-11; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 101
196
DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 8-11; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p.101; Alexander McKeever: 16; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 14
197
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 101
198
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 101
199
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 103
200
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 103; New York times,
Iran Begins to Evacuate Military
Officials and Personnel From Syria,
6 December 2024,
url
201
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 103
202
Gregory Waters: 25
203
Alexander McKeever: 14
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5.2.3 Recent security trends
5.2.3.1 ACLED security events in the Kurdish controlled areas of Hasakah
The figure below is based on ACLED-data and aims to give an understanding of the level of
violence in the Kurdish controlled areas of Hasakah governorate during the reference period 1
January to 15 November 2024. The types of incidents presented are
explosions/remote
violence, battles,
and
violence against civilians.
204
Only the al-Darbasiya subdistrict of Ras al-Ain
district is included below, as the remainder of Ras al-Ain falls outside Kurdish control.
Figure 2: Security Incidents in areas under Kurdish control in Hasakah Governorate, 1
January – 15 November 2024
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
al-Hasakah
al-Malikiya
Battles
Qamishli
Ras al-Ayn (al-
Darbasiya)
Explosions/remote violence
Source: Data from ACLED compiled by DIS/Lifos
205
Violence against civilians
In total there were 516 incidents (out of total 595 incidents) in the Kurdish controlled areas of
Hasakah governorate during the reference period. Most of the incidents were explosions
remote violence (221 incidents), most of which were air/drone strikes conducted by Turkish
forces. Violence against civilians is the second biggest event type (188 incidents) with the
majority attributed to Kurdish forces, mostly being cases of arrests/detention during raids.
Battles in Hasakah were mostly armed clashes between different armed groups operating in
the area (no specific trend). The most affected district was al-Hasakah with 303 documented
incidents, according to ACLED’s data, out of which were 110 explosions/remote violence, 118
violence against civilians, and 75 battles. Looking closer at al-Hasakah district, most of the
incidents occurred in the subdistricts of al-Hasakah (81 incidents, the majority were violence
against civilians), Tel Tamer (73 incidents, the majority were explosions/remote violence), al-
204
205
ACLED,
Codebook,
2023,
url
ACLED,
Data Export Tool, January-15 November 2024,
(data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
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Shaddady (56 incidents, the majority explosions/remote violence), and al-Hol (55 incidents, the
majority violence against civilians). Al-Malikeyyeh district was largely affected by
explosions/remote violence, more specifically air/drone strikes by Turkish forces (35 out of 41
incidents), and much less battles (7 incidents) and violence against civilians (21 incidents)
compared to the other districts. Similarly, the majority of the incidents in Qamishli were
explosions/remote violence in the form of air/drone attacks by Turkish forces (53 out of 64
incidents). Again, the incidents of violence against civilians were largely forced disappearances
by Kurdish forces. In Ras al-Ain (al-Darbasiya) all incidents (14 incidents) were conducted by
Turkish forces and/or Turkish-backed forces.
206
5.2.3.2 Security situation in the Kurdish controlled areas of Hasakah and impact on civilians
The Kurdish-controlled areas of Hasakah governorate are under military control of the SDF and
remain relatively stable in terms of governance,
207
with Hasakah city hosting a significant
displaced population, who have relocated from areas affected by Turkish air strikes or
conflict.
208
Complaints over forced recruitment by the SDF and inadequate service provision
have sparked demonstrations, particularly in the areas of Amuda and Qamishli.
209
In these
cases, the SDF has responded with arbitrary arrests and use of lethal force.
210
The security situation in Hasakah varies across the governorate. The Tell Tamer and Ras al-Ayn
frontlines in northwestern Hasakah (the eastern part of the SNA- and Türkiye-controlled
Operation Peace Spring area) exhibit comparable dynamics to those observed on the northern
frontlines in Raqqa and Aleppo prior to the HTS offensive in late 2024.
211
Clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA
The SDF and Turkish-backed SNA engage in intermittent clashes along the northwestern
frontlines of Hasakah governorate, particularly near Tell Tamer and Ras al-Ayn.
212
These
conflicts entail periodic exchanges of small arms fire, artillery shelling, and sporadic
incursions.
213
While clashes in this area are less frequent than near the frontlines in Aleppo and
Raqqa,
214
and rarely result in significant civilian casualties, they have displaced a considerable
portion of the population and rendered many villages uninhabitable.
215
Schools in affected
areas have been repurposed as accommodations for displaced persons.
216
The intensity of the clashes is contingent upon the prevailing political situation and the military
objectives of the Turkish forces, which are often aligned with developments in northern Iraq,
206
207
ACLED, Data Export Tool, Januarry-15 November 2024 (data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
An organisation promoting human rights: 12; ICG: 29
208
Fabrice Balanche: 10-14
209
SJAC 13, 14; ICG: 30
210
SJAC 13, 14; ICG: 30
211
Alexander McKeever: 15: STJ: 10; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 11
212
Alexander McKeever: 15: Fabrice Balanche: 17: STJ: 10, 13-14; A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 11;
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 29; SNHR: 1
213
Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 11; Heybar Othman (journalist): 5,6; An organisation promoting human rights: 17
214
Aelxander McKeever: 15: STJ: 10; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 28
215
Heybar Othman (journalist): 17; Fabrice Balanche: 7; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 29
216
Heybar Othman (journalist): 17
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where Türkıye is engaged in operations against the PKK.
217
Furthermore, the Turkish military
regularly conducts air and drone strikes in the region, resulting in casualties among both
military personnel and civilians.
218
These strikes frequently affect infrastructure, increasing the
vulnerability of civilians residing near the frontlines, particularly during harvest seasons due to
the presence of mined trenches in agricultural land.
219
The security situation in Hasakah governorate is characterised by sustained Turkish drone and
artillery strikes, as well as air strikes.
220
These operations, concentrated along the northern
border near Qamishli, Amuda, and Al-Malikeyyeh (Derik), primarily target SDF-affiliated
personnel and PKK-linked figures.
221
However, there is regular collateral damage, with strikes
hitting civilian vehicles, markets, and residential areas.
222
In recent cases, Turkish strikes have
resulted in multiple civilian casualties, including women and children.
223
Türkiye has expanded its bombing operations in northern Syria from targeting military targets
within 10 kilometres of the Turkish-Syrian border to deeper strikes in Hasakah (and also Aleppo
and Raqqa), and is now targeting civilian infrastructure such as oil refineries and power plants
in order to disrupt the PKK's sources of funding.
224
Turkish bombardments have had a significant impact on critical infrastructure.
225
In addition,
the Allouk water station, which came under Turkish control in 2019, was a vital source of water
for Hasakah. Its inoperability has resulted in a prolonged water crisis in the region.
226
Furthermore, power stations and oil facilities have also been heavily damaged, which has
217
218
A local NGO worker fron Northeast Syria: 5; STJ: 11; ICG: 28
Alexander McKeever: 18, 19: An organisation promoting human rights: 15-17; A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab
Baladi: 11, 12; Jusoor For Studies: 13, 14; STJ: 12; SJAC: 16, 17; SOHR,
In different areas stretching for 500 kilometres
along border strip | Turkish aircraft attacks 25 vital institutions, destroying many of them,
25 October 2024,
url;
STJ;
“As If an Earthquake Had Struck”: Turkish Airstrikes Are Killing Life in Northeast Syria,
25 June 2024,
url;
HRW,
Türkiye’s Strikes Wreak Havoc on Northeast Syria,
9 February 2024,
url;
SOHR;
Turkish military escalation in 24 hours
| 27 civilians killed in 45 drone attacks in N and E Syria,
24 October 2024,
url
219
SJAC: 16, 17: A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 6-8; Alexander McKeever: 19; ICG: 25-27: A Syrian Arab
journalist from Enab Baladi: 12,13; Heybar Othman (journalist): 2-4; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 25, 27, 29; Hoshang
Hasan (journalist): 14; Heybar Othman (journalist): 1,6
220
SJAC: 17; Fabrice Balanche:13, 16; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 27; Alexander McKeever: 18 An
Organisation promoting human rights: 15; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 12; STJ: 8; NPA,
Turkish airstrikes target 89
sites in NE Syria in 2024,
17 January 2024,
url;
SOHR,
In different areas stretching for 500 kilometres along border
strip | Turkish aircraft attacks 25 vital institutions, destroying many of them,
25 October 2024,
url;
221
SJAC: 17; Fabrice Balanche: 13, 16; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 27: Alexander McKeever: 18; Sherwan
Yousef (journalist): 16; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 12,13; Heybar Othman (journalist): 1; A local NGO worker from
Northeast Syria: 9; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 13; NPA,
Turkish airstrikes target 89 sites in NE Syria in
2024,
17 January 2024,
url
222
SJAC 16; Fabrice Balanche: 16; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 27; Jusoor For Studies: 13; An organisation
promoting human rights: 16; SOHR,
In different areas stretching for 500 kilometres along border strip | Turkish
aircraft attacks 25 vital institutions, destroying many of them,
25 October 2024,
url;
223
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 27; Alexander McKeever: 18; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 6, 16; STJ: 10
224
Diwan,
Why Turkey’s Syria Policy May Be About to Change,
5 February 2024,
url
225
ICG: 25; SJAC: 16; Alexander McKeever: 19; Heybar Othman (journalist): 1,2; STJ: 8; HRW,
Türkiye’s Strikes Wreak
Havoc on Northeast Syria,
9 February 2024,
url;
SOHR,
In different areas stretching for 500 kilometres along border
strip | Turkish aircraft attacks 25 vital institutions, destroying many of them,
25 October 2024,
url
226
A local NGO worker from northeast Syria: 7; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 15; Hoshang Hasan: 14; SJAC: 22; HRW,
Northeast Syria:
Turkish Strikes Disrupt Water, Electricity,
26 October 2023,
url
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resulted in a significant reduction in revenue for the DAANES.
227
This, in turn, has led to fuel
and water shortages, as well as rising local prices.
228
These sustained attacks have had a severe
impact on the region's economy, limiting the DAANES’s ability to maintain services.
229
IS insurgency
Although the intensity of IS activity in the majority of Hasakah is less pronounced than in Deir
Ezzour, the presence of sleeper cells persists in rural areas and on the periphery of urban
settlements, particularly in the southern part of the governorate.
230
IS has been able to conduct
violent incursions in Hasakah and Qamishli, and the SDF has conducted a series of targeted
operations to disrupt the activities of these cells, resulting in numerous arrests in Hasakah and
Qamishli, as well as villages in the vicinity of Shaddady.
231
Hasakah city itself, divided between Kurdish-controlled northern areas and Arab-majority
southern suburbs, experiences distinct security dynamics. While the northern parts are more
stable, the southern areas remain vulnerable to occasional IS infiltration.
232
In southern
Hasakah, the situation is similar to that in Deir Ezzour in terms of IS activity. This is largely along
the road that runs north-south from Shadaddy to Deir Ezzour.
233
IS has primarily focused its attacks on officials affiliated with the DAANES and the SDF.
234
However, the group has also targeted civilians, including small business owners, individuals
with opposing views to those of IS, oil trucks, and SAA personnel in the security squares of
Hasakah and Qamishli.
235
The Al-Hol camp remains a focal point of IS influence in Hasakah.
236
Internally, the camp is
characterised by extremist ideology and violence, with IS-affiliated women enforcing strict
control over its population.
237
Weapons and money are smuggled into the camp, enabling
227
228
ICG: 25; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 8
ICG: 27; Alexander McKeever: 19
229
ICG 27
230
Fabrice Balanche: 18; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 11; Alexander McKeever: 14; Sherwan Yousef: 17;
Dino Krause: 21; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 27; An organisation promoting human rights: 18; Gregory
Waters: 24; Hoshang Hasan: 16; STJ: 15
231
Alexander McKeever: 17; Dino Krause: 22; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 26; Dino Krause: 22; An
organisation promoting human rights: 13; Gregory Waters: 26: A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 7; SJAC: 35;
Enab Baladi,
Islamic State claims operation in Qamishli center for first time since 2019,
18 February 2024,
url;
NPA,
SDF captures 34 ISIS members in two months,
7 September 2024,
url;
NPA, SDF arrests 4 ISIS members in Syria’s
Hasakah,
23 August 2024,
url;
SOHR,
Security operation | SDF special units arrest individual accused of “funding
families of ISIS members” inhabiting camps in Al-Hasakah city,
18 October 2024,
url;
Etana Syria,
Syria Military Brief:
North-East Syria – October 2024,
5 November 2024,
url;
232
Fabrice Balanche: 12
233
Alexander McKeever: 14
234
A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 8; Sherwan Yousef: 17; Hoshang Hasan: 15; STJ: 15; Etana Syria,
Syria
Military Brief: North-East Syria – September 2024,
14 October 2024,
url
235
A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 8 Hoshang Hasan: 15; An NGO operating in Northeast Syria: 30
236
A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 12; Enab Baladi,
Islamic State claims operation in Qamishli center for
first time since 2019,
18 February 2024,
url
237
Fabrice Balanche: 19; Dino Krause: 27-29; An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 26-28
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continued unrest and attempts to liberate detained IS members.
238
While the camp's remote
location limits its immediate impact on surrounding areas, there have been reports of insurgent
activity on the road leading to the camp, which creates tension in the area.
239
Tension between the SDF and the GoS
Tensions between the SDF and the former government’s forces periodically escalated around
the GoS-controlled security squares in Hasakah city and Qamishli.
240
These disputes sometimes
resulted in SDF blockades preventing food, water and fuel from entering the security
squares.
241
There have been reports of civilian casualties, although these incidents rarely
escalated into direct conflict.
242
There have also been reports of intra-factional fighting between
groups allied to the GoS in the security square of Hasakah in late 2023 and 2024.
243
5.3 Raqqa governorate
5.3.1 Geography and demography
The Raqqa Governorate is situated in north-central Syria, with the Aleppo Governorate to the
west, the Hasakah and Deir Ezzour Governorates to the east, the Hama and Homs Governorates
to the south, and Türkiye to the north.
244
The governorate is subdivided into three
administrative districts: Raqqa, Al-Thawra, and Tell Abyad, with Raqqa city designated as its
capital.
245
As of July 2023, UNOCHA estimated the population of Raqqa Governorate at 847,132, including
152,955 IDPs.
246
Approximately 90% of Raqqa's population are ethnic Arabs associated with
local tribes, while the remaining 10% comprises other ethnic groups, including Kurds,
Turkmens, Circassians, and Armenians. The majority of the Arab population adheres to Sunni
Islam. The majority of Raqqa's population and resources are situated in areas under the control
of the SDF.
247
238
Dino Krause: 31-32; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 31-32; Gregory Waters: 32; A Syrian Arab Journalist
from Enab Baladi: 9; Jusoor For Studies: 10
239
Fabrice Balanche: 19; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 33: Alexander McKeever: 14; An NGO operating in
North and East Syria: 29; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 18, 19; STJ: 16
240
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 30; Enab Baladi, Northern Syria: “Security Squares” manage SDF and
regime interests, 9 October 2023,
url;
Enab Baladi, After al-Hasakah, SDF lifts siege on security square in Qamishli, 15
August 2024,
url;
SOHR,
Amid high alert | Internal Security Forces “Asayish” impose siege on security square in Al-
Hasakah city,
7 October 2024,
url
241
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 30; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 10; A Syrian Arab journalist
from Enab Baladi: 10; Jusoor For Studies: 12; Enab Baladi, After al-Hasakah, SDF lifts siege on security square in
Qamishli, 15 August 2024,
url;
SOHR,
Amid high alert | Internal Security Forces “Asayish” impose siege on security
square in Al-Hasakah city,
7 October 2024,
url
242
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 30,21; Jusoor For Studies: 11
243
SJAC: 15; SOHR,
Amid unknown fate of the commander of “NDF” | Regime forces take control of security zone in
Al-Hasakah city,
22 September 2023,
url
244
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 101
245
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 111
246
UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024:
Syrian Arab Republic, 3 March 2024,
url,
p. 9
247
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
September 2022,
url,
p. 159
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5.3.2 Actors and territorial control
The central areas of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the SDF, while the southern
regions were, until recently, under the control of the former Syrian government and its allies.
248
The GoS forces, in collaboration with Russian troops, maintained a presence along the
frontlines, which separated SDF-controlled areas from the Operation Peace Spring zone in the
northern part of the governorate under the control of the SNA and Türkiye.
249
After the recent
developments and shifts in territorial control in November and December 2024, the SDF has
advanced deeper into the southern areas of Raqqa.
250
The northern part of the governorate was predominantly under the control of the Turkish
armed forces and the SNA, belonging to the area known as Operation Peace Spring.
251
The
Turkish zone of influence, 120 kilometres long and 32 kilometres deep, stretched from Tell
Abyad in the west to Ras al-Ayn in the east. It is bordered by Türkiye in the north and the M4
motorway in the south.
252
The Operation Peace Spring area was the base of operations for several factions of the SNA,
including the 20th Division, Faylaq Al-Majd, Ahrar Al-Sharqiya, and the Al-Hamza Division.
Military police affiliated with Türkiye operated sub-branches in cities under the control of the
SNA and oversaw the management of detention facilities and prisons, notably in Tell Abyad.
253
IS cells were more active in the southern parts of Raqqa controlled by the former government,
as well as in Deir Ezzour.
254
Despite the decline in IS control since 2017, the group still
maintained a presence in Raqqa’s rural, eastern and southern regions.
255
The IS presence in the
Kurdish controlled areas of Raqqa governorate remained quite robust, albeit less significant
than in Deir Ezzour or southern Hasakah.
256
IS insurgent activity persisted in Raqqa city and in
the area between the city and Tel Samen.
257
5.3.3 Recent security trends
5.3.3.1 ACLED security events in Kurdish controlled areas in Raqqa
The figure below is based on ACLED-data and aims to give an understanding of the level of
violence in the Kurdish controlled areas of Raqqa governorate during the reference period 1
January to 15 November 2024. The types of incidents presented are
explosions/remote
248
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
September 2022,
url,
p. 159; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 112
249
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 113
250
TWI,
Supporting the SDF in Post-Assad Syria,
13 December 2024,
url;
Al Jazeera,
Syria war live tracker: Maps and
charts,
13 December 2024,
url
251
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p.113
252
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p.113
253
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p.113
254
Dino Krause: 15; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 24; Fabrice Balanche: 9; ICG: 23; Sherwan Yousef
(Journalist): 29
255
Hoshang Hasan: 21; An organisation promoting human rights: 20; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 1
256
Gregory Waters: 22; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 24
257
Alexander Mxckeever: 21
37
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violence, battles,
and
violence against civilians.
258
With the larger part of the governorate being
under Kurdish control, only a small area in the south is controlled by the GoS, in addition to the
Operation Peace Spring area in the north which is entirely under the control of Turkish
forces/Turkish-backed groups,
259
these areas are not represented in the figure below.
Figure 2: Security Incidents in areas under Kurdish control in Raqqa Governorate, 1 January – 15
November 2024
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Raqqa (Raqqa city, Karama)
Explosions/remote violence
Source: Data from ACLED compiled by DIS/Lifos
260
al-Tabqah
Battles
Tall Abyad (Ain Issa)
Violence against civilians
In total the Kurdish controlled areas of Raqqa have experienced 430 incidents (out of total 550
incidents for the whole governorate) during the reference period, where most of the incidents
took place in al-Tabqah and Raqqa (341 incidents). There is an extensive variation in the type of
incidents that are dominant in the different Kurdish areas in this governorate. In Raqqa city and
Karama, most of the incidents reported were cases of violence against civilians (96 incidents)
mostly attributed to the SDF or Asayish detaining civilians during raids and at checkpoints. A
considerable amount of the incidents in this area has also been battles (47 incidents), all of
which were armed clashes mostly between SDF and different armed groups (often unidentified
by ACLED), tribal disputes, and IS-activity.
The majority of incidents reported in al-Tabqah were explosions/remote violence (110
incidents), mainly in the form of air/drone strikes conducted by Russian forces targeting IS in
the region. There were 45 incidents of battles reported in al-Tabqah, these were all armed
clashes, most of which were IS attacking SDF or GoS positions. Explosions/remote violence
258
259
ACLED,
Codebook,
2023,
url
United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Arab
Republic:
Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024,
July 2024,
url
260
ACLED, Data Export Tool, January-15 November 2024 (data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
38
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made the majority of the incidents in Tell Abyad (Ayn Issa) (72 incidents), a larger part of which
were shelling/artillery/missile attacks attributed to Turkish forces.
261
5.3.3.2 Security situation in the Kurdish controlled areas of Raqqa and impact on civilians
According to several interviewed sources, the Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa governorate
are relatively stable compared to other regions of North and East Syria, such as Deir Ezzour or
Aleppo.
262
The city of Raqqa, which functions as the administrative capital, remains
comparatively secure due to the strong presence of the SDF and their control over key
infrastructure.
263
Nevertheless, there have been accounts of civilian fatalities and injuries
resulting from instances where SDF patrols resorted to the use lethal force against civilians,
including in Raqqa city.
264
Clashes between SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA
A primary security concern in the areas controlled by the SDF pertains to attacks by Turkish
military forces and SNA groups with ties to Türkiye.
265
The northern rural parts of the
governorate are situated in close proximity to the frontlines between SDF-controlled areas and
the SNA/Türkiye-controlled Operation Peace Spring area.
266
The most intense fighting is taking
place in areas such as Ain Issa, Tell Abyad, and parts of the M4 road.
267
There have been no reports of any notable clashes or bombardments by Turkish forces in
Raqqa city itself in recent years.
268
However, the northern and rural areas of the governorate
continue to experience a higher prevalence of this type of security incident, particularly along
the frontlines with Türkiye and the Turkish-backed SNA forces.
269
261
262
ACLED,
Data Export Tool,
January-15 November 2024 (data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
Fabrice Balanche: 4; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim(journalist): 15; A local NGO worker from North and East Syria: 20;
Heybar Othman: 24; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 19,; Sherwan Yousef: 27; An organisation promoting
human rights: 20
263
Fabrice Balanche: 4,5
264
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 114; SJAC: 1; SNHR,
Man named Abdul Muhsin al-Asman
killed, his brother injured, by SDF gunfire in Raqqa city,
May 27, 2024, 28 May 2024,
url;
SNHR,
68 Civilian Deaths,
Including 13 Children and Three Women as well as Nine Deaths due to Torture, Documented in Syria in April 2024,
1
May 2024,
url,
p. 5
265
SJAC: 2, 16, 31-33; Fabrice Balanche: 8; A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 25; Hoshang Hasan: 20;
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 16, 19-20; Alexander Mckeever: 21, 22; Gregory Waters: 22, 23
266
Heybar Othman (Journalist): 6, 24; Fabrice Balanche: 4,7; Jusoor For Studies: 15, 16; STJ: 18; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist): 17; Alexander Mckeever: 20; Hoshang Hasan: 22
267
Fabrice Balanche: 6-8; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 16, 17; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 28; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist): 2, 16-17; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 21; Alexander Mckeever: 20; A Syrian Arab
Journalist from Enab Baladi: 28; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 22; Heybar Othman (journalist): 6, 24; STJ: 18,20
268
A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 20; Alexander Mckeever: 20; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi:
21;Heybar Othman: 24
269
Jusoor For Studies: 15, 16; RIC: 1; SJAC: 16; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 2, 16-17; A local NGO worker
from Northeast Syria: 21; Alexander Mckeever: 20; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 21; Sherwan Yousef
(journalist): 28; Heybar Othman: 6
39
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Areas such as Ayn Issa, Tell Abyad, and sections of the M4 road remain subject to shelling,
drone strikes, and intermittent clashes between the SDF and SNA.
270
EUAA reported an
escalation in Turkish attacks in mid-January 2024.
271
However, according to ICG, the frequency
of shelling and clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed SNA in northern Raqqa has
decreased since 2020.
272
In a related development, an organisation promoting human rights
has indicated a decline in the number of confrontations between the SDF and SNA in the
vicinity of the frontline city of Ayn Issa, as of October 2024.
273
It has been reported that civilians utilising smuggling routes across frontlines in Syria have been
targeted. The SDF and the SNA have reportedly employed military firepower against civilians
attempting to traverse the border between DAANES-controlled areas and those under the
control of the SNA and Türkiye.
274
Raqqa remained one of the governorates most severely impacted by the presence of
unexploded ordnance.
275
The detonation of landmines resulted in a considerable number of
civilian casualties, including fatalities, in the northern rural areas of Raqqa, as well as in the
eastern parts of the governorate.
276
The impact of these incidents on civilian life and the region's infrastructure is significant and
detrimental, resulting in civilian casualties and displacement.
277
Consequently, while Raqqa city
remains relatively secure, the northern areas are experiencing security concerns, prompting
residents to relocate.
278
Islamic State insurgency
In addition to attacks by Turkish forces and SNA groups supported by Türkiye, the continued
presence of IS sleeper cells in Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa remained a security concern
during the reporting period.
279
Their primary activities involve extortion, targeting SDF
personnel, and occasional attacks on security checkpoints and detention facilities.
280
The
group's tactics include targeted killings, bombings, and prison breaks. Notably, IS has attempted
270
Fabrice Balanche: 6-8; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 16,17; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 28; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist): 2, 16-17;A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 21; Alexander Mckeever: 20; A Syrian Arab
Journalist from Enab Baladi: 28; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 22; Heybar Othman (journalist): 6, 24; STJ: 18, 20; Etana
Syria,
Syria Military Brief: North-East Syria – October
2024, 13 November 2024,
url;
Etana Syria,
Syria Military Brief:
North-East Syria – September 2024,
14 October 2024,
url
271
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 114
272
ICG: 22
273
An organisation promoting human rights: 21
274
Jusoor For Studies: 17
275
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 118
276
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 118
277
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 5, 6; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 22; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 118
278
Fabrice Balanche: 4, 8; A Syrian Arab Journalist From Enab Baladi: 28;
279
SJAC: 2, 16, 31-33; Fabrice Balanche: 8, A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 25; Hoshang Hasan: 20;
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 16, 19-20; Alexander Mckeever: 21, 22; Gregory Waters: 22, 23
280
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 29; An organisation promoting human rights: 20; Alexander Mckeever: 22, 23;
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 20; Heybar Othman (journalist): 26; Dino Krause: 16
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several prison escapes, including major incident in March and September 2024, where IS
members managed to break out of the central prison in Raqqa.
281
IS attacks on SDF forces are predominantly concentrated in the smaller villages and towns
situated to the north and northeast of Raqqa city. These attacks are primarily directed towards
SDF/Asayish checkpoints and vehicles.
282
The SDF forces conducted a series of operations
targeting IS cells within the DAANES-controlled areas of Raqqa. These operations resulted in the
apprehension and neutralisation of multiple IS members.
283
While the primary targets of the IS in Raqqa are the SDF,
284
IS attacks on civilians in Raqqa
mirror patterns observed in Deir Ezzour and Hasakah, targeting small-scale entrepreneurs such
as shopkeepers and farmers in rural regions.
285
However, the frequency of such attacks in the
Raqqa area remains relatively low, and IS extortion in Raqqa city is not as widespread as it once
was.
286
Tension between the SDF and the GoS
There have been no reported confrontations between former Syrian government forces and the
SDF in Raqqa. The interaction between the two in this area was characterised by minimal
collaboration, largely influenced by the Syrian army’s deployment and patrol activities near the
border with Türkiye, along with the Russian military presence in Tell Tamer.
287
However,
according to Sherwan Yousef, small "resistance" groups affiliated with the former Syrian
government, which opposed both the Americans and the SDF, have attempted to destabilise
security in Raqqa by planting booby-trapped bombs in public areas. Despite these activities,
their influence remained minimal prior to the downfall of the former government.
288
5.4 Deir Ezzour governorate
5.4.1 Geography and demography
Situated in the north and eastern areas of Syria the Dier Ezzour governorate borders Iraq to the
East and Hasakah governorate to the north, Raqqa governorate to the west and Homs
281
Heybar Othman (journalist): 26; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 29: Alexander Mckeever: 22; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist): 20; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 114-15; Etana Syria,
Syria Military
Brief: North-East Syria – September 2024,
14 October 2024,
url
282
Dino Krause: 16
283
US government,
Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress April 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024,
1 August 2024,
url,
p. 29;
Rudaw,
SDF kills one in ISIS cell raid in Raqqa,
28 July 2024,
url;
NPA,
SDF announces killing ISIS financier in
Syria’s Raqqa,
24 March 2024,
url;
NPA, SDF, CTG arrest senior ISIS leader in Syria’s Raqqa, 8 September 2023,
url;
Etana Syria,
Syria Military Brief: North-East Syria – October
2024, 13 November 2024,url; Etana Syria,
Syria Military
Brief: North-East Syria – September 2024,
14 October 2024,
url;
NPA, SDF captures 34 ISIS members in two months, 7
September 2024,
url
284
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 20; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 21; Heybar Othman (journalist): 26;
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 114-15
285
Dino Krause: 17; Heybar Othman (journalist): 36
286
Dino Krause: 17; An organisation promoting human rights: 20; Gregory Waters: 22
287
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 18
288
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 26
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governorate to the south.
289
The governorate is subdivided into three administrative districts
Deir Ezzour, Al-Mayadin, and Al Bukamal (Abu Kamal), with Deir Ezzour city designated as its
capital. Most major urban settlements, villages, and towns are located along the Euphrates
River as well as along the Al-Khabour River which runs north to south in the governorate and is
a tributary river to the Euphrates River.
290
As of July 2023, UNOCHA estimated the population of Deir Ezzour governorate at 1,200,181
including 166,041 IDPs.
291
The inhabitants of Deir Ezzour governorate have been described as
‘overwhelmingly’ Sunni Arab and the local society characterized by a large ethnic, religious and
sectarian homogeneity.
292
5.4.2 Actors and territorial control
Prior to the fall of the Assad government in Syria in early December 2024, Deir Ezzour
governorate was almost completely split in half in terms of areas of control. DAANES-
authorities and the SDF controlled the eastern parts of the governorate and the former
government controlled the areas west of the Euphrates River. Until December 2024, the GoS
also controlled a narrow stretch of territory on the eastern bank of Euphrates River, commonly
referred to as the “seven villages”. In early December 2024, this was still a contested area, with
heavy clashes ongoing between pro-government militias and the SDF.
293
Iranian-backed militias
withdrew from the seven villages, Salhiya, Tabia, Hatla, Khesham, Marrat, Mazloum, and
Husseiniya during the same period.
294
In early December, GoS forces and Iranian backed militias withdrew from the cities of Deir
Ezzour and Al Bukamal (Abu Kamal), on the western bank of the Euphrates River allowing the
SDF to gain control of these cities.
295
In early December 2024, the SDF took control of these
cities for a brief period, but subsequently withdrew due to protests from the local Arab
population and armed clashes between the SDF and the HTS-led Military Operations
Department (MOD).
296
Since the HTS-led MOD assumed control of Deir Ezzour city, several
289
United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic:
Syrian Arab
Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024,
September 2024,
url
290
United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic:
Syrian Arab
Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024,
September 2024,
url
291
UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview 2024:
Syrian Arab Republic, 3 March 2024,
url,
p. 9
292
EUAA, Syria: Security Situation, July 2021,
url,
p. 201
293
United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic:
Syrian Arab
Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024,
September 2024,
url;
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
pp. 120-121; Etana Syria,
North-West Offensive Update #3, 3 December 2024,
3 December 2024,
url
294
CEI, Wladimir Wilgenburg,
Eastern Syria After Assad,
10 December 2024,
url
295
Etana Syria,
Syria Update #6: 6 December 2024,
6 December 2024,
url
296
Times of Israel,
Jihadist rebels capture eastern Syria’s Deir Ezzor from US-backed, Kurdish-led force,
11 december
2024,
url;
Syria Direct,
Protests and SDF defections: Discontent simmers in eastern Deir e-Zor,
13 December 2024,
url
42
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members of Arab descent and commanding officers of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzour Military
Council have defected from the SDF.
297
There are several anti-SDF tribal militias operating in the governorate, including the Aghedat
Lions Battalion and the recently established Arab Tribal and Clan Forces (ATCF). Both of these
have had an active presence in the parts of Deir Ezzour governorate controlled by DAANES.
These groups have entrenched themselves as a bona fide resistance movement to the SDF, and
until the fall of the Assad government, they were supported and supplied by the GoS and Iran.
These aforementioned groups launched continued attacks against SDF and villages in DAANES-
controlled areas on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.
298
The Islamic state has a significant presence across Deir Ezzour governorate but holds no true
territorial control over territory in DAAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour governorate and is
essentially composed of sleeper cells with an active presence in the areas.
299
5.4.3 Recent security trends
5.4.3.1 ACLED security events in Kurdish controlled areas in Deir Ezzour governorate
The figure below is based on ACLED-data and aims to give an understanding of the level of
violence in the Kurdish controlled areas of Deir Ezzour governorate during the reference period
1 January to 15 November 2024. The types of incidents presented are
explosions/remote
violence, battles,
and
violence against civilians.
300
Deir Ezzour governorate was divided along
the Euphrates River, with the SDF controlling areas east of the river and the GoS and its allies
holding territories to the west.
301
However, it remains difficult to distinguish exactly what
areas/villages belong to what sphere along the contact line, therefore the areas in the figure
below are just a rough estimation of the areas under Kurdish control in the governorate.
297
Syria Direct,
Protests and SDF defections: Discontent simmers in eastern Deir e-Zor,
13 December 2024,
url;
Institute for the Study of war, Iran Update, December 16 2024, 16 December 2024,
url
298
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
pp. 120-121
299
Gregory Waters: 1, 3
300
ACLED, Codebook, 2023,
url
301
United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic:
Syrian Arab
Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of June 2024,
September 2024,
url
43
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Figure 5: Security Incidents in areas under Kurdish control in Deir Ezzour Governorate, 1
January – 15 November 2024
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Abu Kamal (As Susah, Hajin)
al-Mayadin (Diban)
Battles
Deir Ezzour (al-Busayrah, al-
Kasrah, al-Suwar)
Violence against civilians
Explosions/remote violence
Source: Data from ACLED compiled by DIS/Lifos
302
During the reference period the Kurdish areas in Deir Ezzour were subjected to 837 incidents
(out of total 1 733 incidents in the entire governorate), according to ACLED’s data. The most
dominant type of incident in Deir Ezzour during the reporting period were battles. A substantial
part of these battles were categorized as armed clashes between different tribal militias and
the SDF, but there were also clashes reported between GoS-forces and the SDF, and armed
clashes between IS and the SDF. The data also showed cases of inter-tribal clashes in the area.
The area where the majority of the incidents took place is the Deir Ezzour district, mainly the
sub-districts of al-Busayrah, al-Kasrah, and al-Suwar (452 incidents). In these areas 282 battles
took place during the reporting period, and a significant number of incidents of violence against
civilians (118 incidents). The larger part of these incidents were attributed to the SDF detaining
civilians, and IS-attacks on civilians. Regarding incidents of explosions/remote violence in the
Kurdish areas of Deir Ezzour there were a variety of incidents (air/drone attacks, IED, shelling,
etc.) in this category and mostly involving GoS forces and pro-government militias and IS.
303
5.4.3.2 Security situation in the Kurdish controlled areas of Deir Ezzour Governorate and impact
on civilians
Clashes between SDF and Arab-tribes
The Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour Governorate have witnessed frequent and ongoing-
armed clashes and attacks throughout 2024 between Arab tribal militias the SDF under
DAANES-control, which has contributed to fragile and fragmented security situation in the area.
302
303
ACLED,
Data Export Tool, January-15 November 2024,
(data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
ACLED,
Data Export Tool, January-15 November 2024,
(data extracted 2024-11-16),
url
44
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The frequent and ongoing clashes between Arab tribal groups and SDF have resulted in civilian
casualties and displacement of civilians particularly in towns and villages along the Euphrates
River.
304
The ongoing conflict in Deir Ezzour was sustained by a multitude of factors e.g. the
control of oil fields in DAANES-administered areas, the positioning of Iranian militias in
territories held by the former government on the western bank of the Euphrates River directly
opposite SDF-controlled areas on the eastern bank and the presence of the International
Coalition forces against the IS presence in the area.
305
Armed attacks by Arab tribal militias typically consist of smaller units, between 30-40
individuals, conducting cross-river raids and small-scale attacks using light weapons from areas
on the western bank of the Euphrates areas controlled by the former government into SDF-
controlled areas on the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
306
Arab tribal militias primarily conduct guerrilla-style attacks against SDF assets, including
vehicles, patrols, and checkpoints. Occasionally, they target civilians suspected of informing for
the SDF. While there have been instances of these militias attacking civilians associated with
the DAANES, analyst Alexander McKeever noted that, as of October 2024, no such incidents
had been reported.
307
Fabrice Balanche stated that most clashes between the SDF and Arab
Tribal militias occur at night, where the SDF also withdraw to their barracks, leave their
checkpoints and stop conducting patrols.
308
Sources interviewed for this report had various estimations of the number of casualties from
the continued fighting between the SDF and Arab tribal militias between January and October
2024, with some sources estimating 100 casualties, while others estimated 64 casualties
including 27 civilians as a result of the fighting.
309
The journalist Sherwan Yousef stated that
there had been a total of 70 clashes between Arab tribal militias and the SDF in Deir Ezzour
between January and October of 2024 resulting in approximately 37 civilian casualties and
most prevalent in the areas surrounding Al-Sohail, Busayra, and Ghranij.
310
The frequent clashes which have been ongoing between the SDF and Arab tribal militias
throughout 2024, experienced a particular uptick in clashes in August 2024, when Arab tribal
forces launched a major armed attack on SDF positions in the towns of Dhiban, Abu Hamam,
Al-Khushkieh, Shuaitat, Al-Latwa and Granij and further down river towards the villages of
Baghouz, which in turn forced the SDF to temporarily withdraw from the areas before regaining
control of the affected areas. The clashes persisted for about three weeks in August of 2024
304
SNHR: 1, 9, 12-13; SJAC: 9-12, 25, 28-29; RIC: 4; Fabriche Balanche: 31; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 12-
14: A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 13; An organization promoting human rights: 23; A Syrian-Arab
journalist from Enab Baladi: 16, 18; Sherwan Yousef (Journalist): 4, 21; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 5, 7-8; An Ngo
operating in North and East Syria: 31-32, Haybar Othman (journalist): 21, 23; Jusoor For Studies: 3, 19; STJ: 22
305
An oganisation promoting Human rights: 22
306
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 8
307
Alexander Mckeever: 11
308
Fabrice Blanche: 36
309
Hoshang Hasan(Journalist): 8; ICG: 16
310
Sherwan Yousef (journalist):
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and were concluded with an agreement which included the cessation of SDF sieges and GoS-
Controlled security squares in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli in return for an immediate
cessation of hostilities in Deir Ezzour. The clashes resulted in casualties and fatalities on both
sides. Artillery fire between SDF, Arab tribal militias and GoS-units from both sides of the
Euphrates River resulted in displacement of civilians from villages in both SDF-controlled areas
and in GoS-controlled areas west of the Euphrates River.
311
Civilians were displaced from the
villages of Diban, Abu Hammam, Al-Kishkiyah, Al-Dahlah, and a number of other villages in the
area.
312
In late September 2024, a renewed insurgency and incursion into DAANES-controlled areas by
Arab tribal militias took place, which targeted SDF positions. With the help of US-led coalition
support, the SDF was able to manage and contain the cross-river infiltration. The targets of such
smaller cross-river incursions by Arab tribal militias are typically SDF-military units, personnel
and checkpoints.
313
The continued violent attacks and shelling and the sporadic uptick in violent clashes throughout
2024 between the SDF and Arab tribal militias is a continuation of hostilities between the SDF
and Arab tribal militias which broke out in August 2023. Those clashes broke out when SDF
arrested Ahmed Al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), the leader of the Deir Ezzour Military Council, which
chiefly consisted of local Arab tribal members, on fears that he would switch his allegiances to
side with the GoS and Iran and drive SDF out of areas controlled by the Deir Ezzour Military
Council on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River.
314
Reports of SDF’s indiscriminate response and further civilian casualties as a result of the
uprisings lead to a large increase in the amount of Arab tribal forces joining the rebellion
against the SDF in 2023. Particular when Aghedat tribal leader Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Hefel and his
men of the Aghedat tribe, joined the uprising against the SDF particularly in the towns of
Dhiban, Al-Shuhail, Al-Busayrah.
315
The former government and Iran have been instigating Arab tribes against the SDF for a number
of years in an attempt to undermine the SDF, in part by providing substantial weaponry and
equipment. Coupled with support from GoS and Iranian-backed forces, from government-
controlled areas of Deir Ezzour Governorate, this has increased the tribes’ capabilities to an
311
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 124; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 12; A local NGO
worker from Northeast Syria: 15; STJ: 24; SNHR: 12; SJAC: 26; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 14; Alexander
McKeever: 10, 12; ICG: 15; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 16; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 5, 7; Heybar
Othman (Journalist): 23; STJ: 24; RIC: 2-5; Jusoor For Studies: 19; IGC 8
312
SJAC: 28
313
Alexander McKeever: 10-12; SJAC: 29
314
STJ:22; EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 123; Heybar Othman (Journalist): 15-16; A Syrian
Human rights organization: 1-2: ICG: 12; Alexander McKeever: 9
315
EUAA,
Syria – Security Situation,
October 2024,
url,
p. 123; Heybar Othman(Journalist): 15-16; ICG: 12
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extent and led to the increase in clashes between Arab tribal forces and the SDF since August
2023.
316
Longstanding grievances between the Arab tribes and DAANES-administration have persisted
for years and stem in part from an unequal allocation of economic resources, particularly
oilrevenues from refineries in the areas to the local Arab majority population and a lack of
political representation in DAANES-controlled areas in the eyes of these population groups.
317
Most tribes in the Deir Ezzour area have aligned themselves with Abu Khawla in opposition to
SDF and DAANES authorities, while other tribal leaders in the area have expressed solidarity
with the SDF and participated in the fight against Abu Khawla's affiliated tribal militias and
Iranian militias, Hizbollah and GoS. Notably, the majority of SDF casualties have been
individuals of Arab descent. The clashes cannot exclusively be seen as an Arab uprising against
the Kurds, rather the confrontations can be seen as clashes between the SDF and specific Arab
groups and tribal militias in Deir Ezour. It is worth noticing that not all members of the Aghedat
tribe are engaged in conflict with the SDF. Ibrahim Al-Hefels cousin, Sheikh Hefel Al-Hefel has a
positive relationship with the SDF. Similarly tribes in the western part of the governorate, as
well as tribes from Afar, Baghouz and Susa in the eastern part of the governorate or in the
following towns of Markada, Al-Sour, Hajin, Al-Sousah, Al-Sha'fah, Al-Baghouz and several
adjoining villages have not rebelled against the SDF.
318
According to ICG, the dynamics in the Deir Ezzour governorate created an environment for
external actors to intervene and create tension and instability. The primary aim of this tribal
insurgency, including the former government’s and Iran’s main intention, was prior to the
downfall of the Assad government, essentially to regain control over the resources in the
region.
319
IS insurgency
On a general level and across DAANES-controlled areas in north and east Syria, IS activity
across the governorates and cities in the northeast encompassed all three aspects of its
operations: violent attacks, financial activities, and human smuggling. IS attacks occurred
multiple times a week, while in comparison; SDF counter-IS operations were conducted
multiple times a month. The first half of 2024 was particularly violent, with twice as many
attacks during this period as in all of 2023. While the level of violence has since decreased, it
remains elevated. In the spring of 2024, the SDF conducted several counter-IS operations,
resulting in the capture of low- and mid-level IS command officials. IS has been able to
maintain a high level of violence despite the number of counter-operations conducted by the
SDF.
320
316
317
ICG: 11, 15
ICG: 10
318
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 3-5; Heybar Othman (journalist): 18-20;
319
ICG: 11, 14
320
Gregory Waters: 4
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In 2024 increased IS activity and attacks have taken place in Deir Ezzour, where sleeper cells
have carried out frequent attacks on SDF positions, oil infrastructure civilian officials of the
DAANES-administration and civilians.
321
These incidents often involve extortion under the guise
of religious tax collection, and have increased significantly from 2023.
322
Deir Ezzour has been the region most profoundly impacted by IS violence. A substantial
escalation in attacks in this area has been observed, with IS attacks against the SDF in Deir
Ezzour having increased considerably in 2024 compared to 2023. The number of attacks against
the SDF in 2024 was 168, while the number of IS-initiated attacks against the SDF in 2023 was
64. These attacks were predominantly characterised by so-called hit-and-run tactics employing
light weaponry, in addition to a limited number of attacks utilising rocket-propelled grenades
against SDF checkpoints, and a few cases of rocket attacks on houses belonging to members of
the SDF. While the primary targets of IS attacks in Deir Ezzour province are the SDF, according to
the Syrian Human Rights Organisation, IS activities rarely led to civilian casualties in Deir
Ezzour's DAANES-controlled regions in the first 10 months of 2024.
323
Contrary to other sources, an NGO operating in North and East Syria stated that IS attacks have
decreased in Deir Ezzour compared to previous years, with IS shifting its focus to extortion
under the guise of religious (zakat) tax collection.
324
Dino Krause assessed that IS attacks in Syria tend to be underreported,
325
and according to
Jusoor for Studies, it is specifically the number of IS attacks in DAANES-controlled areas in Deir
Ezzour that are underreported, and the total number of attacks is unknown. This is because IS
does not claim all their attacks against the SDF in DAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour
Governorate.
326
In the five towns of Shuhayl, Busayra, Diban, Zire and Wajes in the areas of DAANES control in
central Deir Ezzour governorate, there is a significant presence of IS, which is reported to
exercise authority as a shadow government. IS takes control of the villages during the night,
despite the absence of an official administrative structure. The IS presence in these towns
consists of nighttime patrols, extortion, intimidation of the civilian population, and greater
freedom of movement for IS. DAANES security forces do not enter these towns at night to
conduct counter-IS operations.
327
321
Dino Krause: 18-19; Alexander Mckeever: 8; A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 7; Gregory Waters: 4, 14, 27, 31;
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 14-15; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 23; RIC 6; SNHR: 4, 10; SJAC 30, 34;
Fabrice Balanche: 3; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 5; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 4, 16, 18; An
organization promoting human rights: 1, 25-27: Heybar Othman (journalist): 10, 13; Jusoor For Studies: 21-25
322
ICG: 18; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 14; Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 20; Hoshang Hasan: 9; An
NGO operating in North and East Syria: 34; Fabrice Balanche: 37-38; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim(journalist): 5; A local
NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 18; Heybar Othman (journalist): 10
323
Dino Krause: 18-19; Fabrice Balanche: 37; A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 8: ICG: 17; Hoshang Hasan: 10
324
An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 34
325
Dino Krause: 1
326
Jusoor For Studies: 25
327
Gregory Waters: 11; Heybar Othman:11; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 4
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Three of the abovementioned towns have had a significant IS presence since 2021, which has
now expanded to two more towns since 2022. IS does not have territorial control or
permanent checkpoints in Deir Ezzour, but it is very dangerous to travel in the area at night,
according to Gregory waters.
328
The strength of IS, combined with the SDF's lack of capacity in
this area, means that IS has nearly free rein to do as they please with the population—whether
that involves extortion, recruitment, or simply existing alongside a population that is too
intimidated to cooperate with authorities in relation to countering IS.
329
Deir Ezzour is the area with the highest level of all three of the most prevalent aspects of IS
activity i.e. violent attacks, financial activities, and human smuggling. There was regular
smuggling across the Euphrates River to areas controlled by the former Syrian government,
linking IS activities in the northeast with central Syria. Recruitment for IS occurs in Deir Ezzour,
as does outreach to former IS fighters in the region. However, it remains unclear how
successful IS has been in recruiting new adult members with no previous affiliation to the
group.
330
There are recent reports of IS 'safe houses' in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour,
which the group used for political and religious indoctrination before sending individuals to
military training camps. This represents a new development in the Deir Ezzour area and is a
trend that, until recently, only occurred in parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian
government.
331
There are regular attacks against Kurdish security forces and threats of violence toward the
local population. Targeted assassinations still occur, but not as frequently as in the past. This
fragile security situation makes it difficult for NGOs to operate in the area and for services to
be provided to local populations in the affected area.
332
There is an essential lack of SDF presence in the DAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour. There
are towns in Deir Ezzour where an SDF security presence exists at the perimeter, monitoring
entry and exit, but there is a lack of a permanent interior security presence. This situation has
allowed IS cells to persist and grow, and sometimes intermingle and reorganize themselves
together with the remainder of local tribal insurgency.
333
Local sources describe the situation as one of reduced SDF security presence and fewer
security operations conducted against IS by the SDF, alongside a simultaneous increase in IS
attacks on SDF security forces. SDF counter-IS operations are as of the fall of 2024 not
increasing at the same rate as operations conducted by IS. This is due to The SDF’s withdrawal
328
329
Gregory Waters: 12
Gregory Waters: 13
330
Gregory Waters: 14
331
Gregory Waters: 15
332
Gregory Waters: 16
333
Gregory Waters: 17
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from several towns in the Deir Ezzour Governorate in connection with the 'tribal insurgency' in
the autumn of 2023 and reestablished itself with a slightly reduced footprint in the area.
334
IS has been able to increase its presence and the number of its attacks in Deir Ezzour for a
number of reasons. IS has been able to take advantage of Turkish attacks in other areas of
DAANES-controlled northeastern Syria closer to the Turkish border, which has forced the SDF
to divert manpower and resources from Deir Ezzour to counter this development. The former
Syrian government and Iran have supported the tribal insurgency in Deir Ezzour, which has
further forced the SDF to divert resources. This has enabled IS to expand its presence and
increase the frequency of its attacks in the area.
335
According to Dino Krause’s assessment this
could indicate that the SDF is struggling to maintain the pace of counter-IS operations in Deir
Ezzour.
336
334
335
Gregory Waters: 18
Heybar Othman (journalist): 13; Dino Krause 20
336
Dino Krause 20
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6. Freedom of movement
The movement of individuals within DAANES-controlled areas of Syria was influenced by a
number of factors, including administrative requirements, social norms and security incidents
during the reporting period. While the ability for residents to travel and relocate in the areas
controlled by DAANES was not entirely impeded, a number of factors did exist which presented
difficulties for individuals intending to travel or relocate.
337
These include military conscription, the prevalence of checkpoints, the lack of adequate
infrastructure and security incidents, which affect not only civilians in general but also specific
groups such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), males of conscription age and those travelling
to and from insecure areas such as Deir Ezzour.
338
However, the short- and long-term implications
of the recent transition of power in Syria, with regard to civilians' ability to move between the
various areas currently controlled by DAANES, remain uncertain.
6.1 General freedom of movement
The residents of DAANES-controlled areas have generally been able to travel between the areas
of Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ezzour.
339
Public transportation in the form of minibuses was
available. However, private cars were often preferred, as public transportation options are
irregular and of poor quality.
340
Furthermore, fuel shortages are a general constraint on
movement in the DAANES-controlled areas of Syria.
341
Checkpoints, which are predominantly managed by the SDF, are widely distributed and situated
at city entrances and major intersections, as well as along the routes connecting Amuda,
Qamishli, Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ezzour.
342
While individuals passing through checkpoints in
areas controlled by the DAANES are typically not subjected to inspections during the daytime,
they may be subjected to such procedures at night.
343
The SDF conducts comprehensive checks at its checkpoints on people entering the DAANES-
controlled areas from areas of Syria controlled by the former government.
344
All individuals are
337
338
RIC: 13; SNHR 15; SJAC 36
RIC: 13; SNHR: 15; SJAC: 36; Fabrice Balanche: 42, 43; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 34; A Local NGO
worker from Northeast Syria: 29, 32; A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 9; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 24, 25; An
NGO operating in North and East Syria: 36; Jusoor For Studies: 30; STJ: 30; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi;
24, 25; An organization promoting human rights: 28-30; An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 35; A Syrian
Human Rights Organisation: 9
339
Fabrice Balanche: 42,43; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 34, 37; Hoshang Hasan: 24
340
SJAC: 41; An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 36; Jusoor For Studies: 30; STJ: 34; A local NGO worker from
Northeast Syria: 31
341
Fabrice Balanche: 49
342
SJAC: 37; STJ: 35; Sherwan Yousef (Journalist): 32, 33; A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 13; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim: 36, 38; Fabrice Balanche: 46; SJAC: 37; An organisation promoting human rights: 31
343
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 12
344
SNHR: 15
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required to present a valid form of identification and proof of residency in the area. Men in the
conscription age must also present their military booklet.
345
6.1.1 Regional variations and specific challenges
6.1.1.1 Deir Ezzour
Deir Ezzour is the most precarious area in NES, with significant threats, deriving from increased
IS activity, tribal conflicts, and an unstable security situation, especially after dark when the SDF
exercises less effective military control over this area.
346
STJ has indicated that there are typically
more restrictions in place regarding travel from the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour to the
other areas in north and east Syria under DAANES control.
347
Additionally, there are a greater number of checkpoints situated between the Kurdish-controlled
areas of Deir Ezzour and the other DAANES-controlled regions of north and east Syria. This is
largely attributable to the prevailing security situation in Deir Ezzour, which is less stable than in
other DAANES-controlled areas such as Raqqa.
348
There have been reports of frequent harassment, bribery and extortion of civilians at checkpoints
in Deir Ezzour.
349
However, it is often unclear who is responsible for these incidents.
350
The SJAC
has documented a number of cases in which the SDF opened fire on civilians who refused to
comply with inspection procedures.
351
The security situation in Deir Ezzour makes it dangerous
for DAANES employees to travel on roads in the area. They are considered agents for the PKK by
IS, which targets them. Additionally, Arab militias backed by the former Syrian government in the
region may also attack DAANES employees.
352
Poor infrastructure in Deir Ezzour further complicates movement in this area, prolonging travel
times and increasing exposure to security incidents that occur on the roads such as killings,
kidnappings, robberies and IEDs.
353
Furthermore, reports indicate that oil trucks have been
subject to frequent attacks in Deir Ezzour,
354
and the southern route between Hasakah and Deir
Ezzour is considered particularly exposed.
355
345
346
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 9
RIC: 13; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 29; SJAC; 37; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 38
347
STJ: 37
348
STJ: 37
349
SJAC: 37; Fabrice Balanche: 46
350
Fabrice Balanche: 46
351
SJAC: 37-40
352
Sherwan Yousef (journalist): 35
353
An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 35,37; SJAC; 41
354
NPA,
ISIS militants attack oil tankers in Deir Ezzour,
28 August 2024,
url;
SOHR,
New attack ISIS members attack oil
truck and threat drivers to kill them in northern Deir Ezzor countryside,
7 November 2024,
url;
NPA,
Gunmen attack
oil tankers in Deir ez-Zor,
26 November 2024,
url;
Enab Baladi,
For Security Reasons, drivers abandon oil
transportation in Deir Ezzor,
27 August 2024,
url;
A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 24
355
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 36; Sherwan Youssef (journalist): 31; A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab
Baladi: 24
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6.1.1.2 Hasakah and Raqqa
The M4 road between Hasakah and Raqqa, situated along the frontlines of Operation Peace
Spring, is subject to frequent shelling and security incidents.
356
However, the situation on the
route between Hasakah and Raqqa is comparatively stable in comparison to the route between
Hasakah and Deir Ezzour, situated to the south, as there are less security incidents on this
route.
357
Similarly, the occurrence of corruption or extortion at SDF checkpoints in Hasakah and
Raqqa is infrequent in comparison with Deir Ezzour.
358
However, instances of extortion and
bribery are pervasive along the routes traversing DAANES-controlled areas between cities.
359
Although there have been some improvements to the infrastructure in the area,
360
it remains
the case that there are a number of security issues related to movement when travelling in
these areas, including the possibility of IS attacks, shelling and Turkish drone strikes on these
roads, as well as instances of kidnapping, extortion and bribery.
361
6.1.1.3 Aleppo
Following recent developments related to the major HTS offensive that took control of Aleppo
and the recent transition of power, it is unclear whether it is currently possible for civilians to
travel between these areas in Aleppo and the areas of northern and eastern Syria currently
controlled by DAANES. Until recently, while certain restrictions were in place, individuals were
able to travel to and from the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo, such as Ashrafiyeh, Sheikh
Maqsoud, as well as the Tal Rifaat enclave, to the remaining DAANES-controlled areas.
362
However, this has been a complex process due to the necessity of crossing territory that was
controlled by the former government, and may have included the payment of bribes.
363
It was
only possible for individuals to travel to and from these areas when there were no ongoing
security operations.
364
6.1.2 Specific groups and restrictions
6.1.2.1 Men of conscription Age
Men of the conscription age range typically encounter greater challenges when attempting to
move between the various areas under Kurdish control in north and east Syria. This is largely
attributed to the heightened risk of conscription to the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty by the
356
357
Jusoor For Studies: 30; STJ: 33
An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 36; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 36
358
Fabrice Balanche: 46
359
ICG: 33
360
Fabrice Balanche: 48; STJ: 33
361
A Syrian Arab journalist from Enab Baladi: 24; Sherwan Yousef: 30; An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 36;
Jusoor For Studies: 30; ICG: 33; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 36; NPA,
Unidentified gunmen attack 5 oil tankers in
Raqqa,
3 November 2024,
url;
SOHR,
Military escalation Turkish forces and their proxies fire artillery shells on
positions in Al-Raqqah countryside,
25 October 2024,
url
362
Jusoor For Studies: 28; STJ: 30; Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 24; A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 9; An
organisation promoting human rights: 28; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 35; Fabrice Balanche: 40
363
Fabrice Balanche: 40; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim: 35;
364
Jusoor For Studies: 28
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Kurdish authorities,
365
as well as the risk of being targeted by IS.
366
Men in this age bracket are
required to present their military booklet at checkpoints operated by the Kurdish authorities, and
individuals who have failed to report for duty are detained for the purpose of conscription.
367
Men of the conscription age range from the areas under Kurdish control in Aleppo, face
significant challenges when attempting to travel to the other areas under Kurdish control in NES.
This is due to the necessity of traversing territory under the control of the Syrian government,
which may result in arbitrary detention or conscription into the Syrian Arab Army.
368
The same
applies to individuals who have been mobilised as reservists, individuals associated with the
YPG/PYD, as well as individuals with outstanding security issues with the GoS.
369
Students from North and East Syria attending university in areas of Syria under the former
government's control are an exception to the general circumstances. They are able to travel
between the areas of Syria under Kurdish control and the areas controlled by the former
government, as they are exempt from performing military service.
370
6.1.2.1 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
A Syrian human rights organisation has indicated that travel between the different areas
controlled by the DAANES does not require prior permission.
371
However, IDPs and people from
areas outside the control of the DAANES require sponsors and the necessary documentation to
settle and travel between the various areas under DAANES' control.
372
Some sources indicated
that this was also the case for people originating from Arab majority areas controlled by the
DAANES, such as Deir Ezzour and Raqqa, as well as the areas of Aleppo formerly under Kurdish
control.
373
Those lacking the requisite documentation often encounter difficulties at checkpoints, which
restricts their ability to travel between the different areas in NES.
374
Individuals displaced to SDF
controlled areas require a local sponsor in order to obtain the displaced ID card issued by the
DAANES. This is particularly the case for ethnic Arabs from the areas of Deir Ezzour controlled by
the former Syrian government and Iranian-backed militias prior to the transition of power in
365
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 25, 26; An organisation promoting human rights: 30; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist): 39; DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 22
366
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 25
367
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi: 25; An organisation promoting human rights: 30; Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim (journalist):39; Fabrice Balanche: 42; DIS,
Syria – Military recruitment in North and East Syria,
June 2024,
url,
p. 22
368
Fabrice Balanche: 41, 44; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 34, 35; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi:
25; SNHR: 15
369
Fabrice Balanche: 41; A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 28
370
Fabrice Balanche: 45
371
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 10
372
An organization promoting human rights: 29; Jusoor For Studies: 32; A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi:
23; Hoshang Hasan: 27; An NGO operating in North and East Syria: 38
373
Jusoor For Studies: 28; STJ: 31, 32
374
Fabrice Balanche: 44, 47
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Syria. The majority of these people are able to find a sponsor relatively easily, as many have
relatives who can sponsor them or are from the same tribe or clan.
375
The DAANES has stated that the reason for this procedure is twofold: firstly, to address security
concerns, and secondly, to facilitate the vetting and tracking of newcomers who wish to take up
residence in SDF-held areas.
376
6.1.2.2 Women and Children
While there are no formal restrictions on women’s movement in the areas controlled by DAANES,
social and cultural norms often necessitate male accompaniment, particularly in conservative
areas such as Deir Ezzour.
377
Women traveling in niqabs are subject to inspections to prevent men
from evading detection.
378
It is possible for women and children to travel between the Kurdish-controlled areas of North
and East Syria and other areas of Syria formerly under the control of the Syrian government.
379
However, the Tell Rifaat enclave represented a distinct case, and while it was possible for women
and children to travel out of this area while it was under Kurdish control, they would be required
to pay bribes to do so.
380
6.1.2.3 Ethnic groups
It has been reported that individuals from Arab majority areas, such as Raqqa or Deir Ezzour,
are required to obtain a permit from the DAANES authorities, as well as a sponsor, before they
can settle in Kurdish majority areas, such as Hasakah.
381
In contrast, Kurds attempting to travel
to areas of Deir Ezzour under the control of militias with ties to the former Syrian government
and Iran may encounter difficulties at checkpoints.
382
Meanwhile, a Syrian Human Rights Organisation has indicated that discrimination against
ethnic Arabs at checkpoints controlled by the DAANES is uncommon. This is due to the SDF
exercising caution to ensure that ethnic Arabs are treated on equal terms, in an effort to avoid
inciting unrest against the DAANES. However, at checkpoints in Deir Ezzour, SDF members
affiliated with specific Arab clans may mistreat individuals from rival clans.
383
375
376
A Local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 33
A Local NGO worker from Northeast Syria: 33
377
STJ: 36
378
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 12
379
Fabrice Balanche: 44; Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim (journalist): 35; Jusoor For Studies: 28
380
Fabrice Balanche: 40
381
Jusoor For Studies: 29;STJ: 31
382
Hoshang Hasan (journalist): 26
383
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation: 11
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“As If an Earthquake Had Struck”: Turkish Airstrikes Are
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68 Civilian Deaths, Including 13 Children and Three
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Man named Abdul Muhsin al-Asman killed, his
brother injured,
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Amid unknown fate of the commander of “NDF” |
Regime forces take control of security zone in Al-Hasakah city,
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Amid high alert | Internal Security Forces
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Turkish military escalation in 24 hours | 27
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24 October 2024,
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In different areas stretching for 500 kilometres
along border strip | Turkish aircraft attacks 25 vital institutions, destroying many of them,
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New Attack ISIS members attack oil truck and
threat drivers to kill them in northern Deir Ezzor countryside,
7 November 2024,
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accessed 28 November 2024
Syrian Observer (The),
To Hinder Damascus-Ankara Rapprochement: SDF Ignites Turkish
Occupation Fronts North of Aleppo,
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SDF Attack on National Army Threatens to Ignite Fronts,
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Jihadist rebels capture eastern Syria’s Deir Ezzor from US-backed, Kurdish-led
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Iran is Attempting to Push the United
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DOD Announces 2,000 Troops in Syria, Department
Prepared for Government Shutdown,
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Annex 1: Rojava Information Center (RIC) Query
Response
RIC, Security situation in North and East Syria written response, 12
October 2024
Have there been any recent clashes between the SDF and the Syrian
National Army/Türkiye?
1. The direct clashes between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army
factions are currently confined to the north and west of Manbij, in addition to the Tel
Tamir frontlines. In Tel Tamir and Ain Issa, the Turkish army continues artillery and
missile shelling operations.
Clashes in Deir Ezzour
2. On August 6th 2024, militias linked to the Government of Syria (GoS) and Iran-backed
militias operating in GoS territory commenced with an offensive operation against the
DAANES-governed side of Deir ez-Zor.
3. The conflict persisted for approximately three weeks. Initial reports indicated that the
militias had gained control of several villages, but these attempts were quickly
countered by the SDF.
4. On August 9th the GoS and Iran-backed militias shelled al-Dahla and Jadeed Bakara
resulting in the death of 11 civilians, including 5 children. Consequently, a considerable
number of residents left their homes. During the fighting, a number of meetings were
held between representatives of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the government
of Syria (GoS), and the Russian Federation.
5. On August 13th, an agreement regarding Deir ez-Zor was reached. The agreement
included a cessation of the SDF’s siege on GoS-controlled areas in Heseke and
Qamishlo, the release of prisoners on both sides, and an immediate cessation of
hostilities in Deir ez-Zor. However, the following day saw Iran-backed militias conduct
artillery bombardment on a US military base situated in al-Ozba, in close proximity to
the Conoco oil field.
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6. The security situation in Deir ez-Zor is tense, with the majority of ISIS sleeper cell
attacks occurring there and regular fighting across the Euphrates river, which divides
DAANES-governed territory from that of the GoS.
7. Iran-backed militias have a great deal of political and military control on the GoS side of
the river, in and around the city of Deir ez-Zor. During the fighting, long-term instability
in Deir ez-Zor risks a sleeper cell activity spike: as
noted
by CJTF-OIR, ISIS has previously
attempted to exploit clashes in Deir ez-Zor to conduct covert sleeper cell attacks.
Have there been any recent clashes between IS and the SDF in the DAANES-
controlled parts of Syria?
8. Between January and September 2024, the RIC recorded 194 ISIS sleeper cell attacks in
the DAANES-controlled parts of NES. Our monthly sleeper cell reports document the
locations, numbers and types of attack. The September report documents 23 IS sleeper
cell attacks across NES.
384
9. Sleeper cell activity in Deir ez-Zor targets oil investors and tankers, extorts money from
local residents by demanding payment of taxes (‘zakat’) under the threat of harm and
targets SDF military positions and vehicles.
10. These attacks reflect the persistent efforts of ISIS to reassert influence over the region’s
oil industry—a critical resource for financing their operations. Despite the group’s
weakened presence, they continue to launch violent assaults to extract money and
maintain control over economic lifelines. ISIS also continues its campaign of
384
Rojava Information Center,
January Sleeper Cell report – Third Phase of Hol Camp Operation Begins,
5 March
2024,
url
; Rojava Information Center,
February Sleeper Cell Report - ISIS attacks up, Turkiye targets YPG/YPJ veterans,
6 March 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center,
March Sleeper Cell Report – Moscow attack puts international
spotlight on ISIS’ enduring threat,
4 April 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center,
April Sleeper Cell report – SDF
Commander in Chief Criticizes Coalitions “Diminished Focus”,
10 May 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center,
May
Sleeper Cell report – ISIS Ramps up Attacks on Oil Targets,
9 June 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center, June Sleeper
Cell Report – Successful raids and ongoing attacks in Deir ez-Zor, 8 July 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center,
July
Sleeper Cell Report – Increased ISIS Attacks Amid DAANES’ Efforts to Stabilize Security Tensions in the Region and
Reconciliation Forum for Releasing Prisoners,
8 August 2024,
url;
Rojava Information Center,
August Sleeper Cell
Report – Attack in Germany brings international attention to ISIS’ activity,
9 September 2024,
url;
Rojava Information
Center, September Sleeper Cell Report – SDF Raid Campaigns in Raqqa amid ongoing ISIS activity, 14 October 2024,
url
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intimidation against the local population, in particular those who work closely with the
DAANES.
Are there civilian casualties, and if so to what extent?
11. According to RIC sleeper cell data, between January and September 2024, ISIS attacks
resulted in 25 civilian casualties and 16 civilians injured.
12. According to RIC sleeper cell data, between January and September 2024, ISIS attacks
resulted in 25 civilian casualties and 16 civilians injured.
Is it possible to travel freely between the different regions under DAANES-
control?
13. It is possible to travel during the day, but caution is needed when traveling at night in
the eastern and northern countryside of Deir Ezzor due to ISIS sleeper cell activity.
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Annex 2: Query Response Syrian Network for Human
Rights (SNHR)
SNHR, written response, 21 October 2024
General security situation in in the DAANES-controlled parts of Syria since
January 2024
1. Since the start of 2024, there have been reports of recurring clashes between SDF and
Arab tribal forces in Deir Ez-Zour Governorate, with the most recent clashes taking place in
August 2024. These clashes have resulted in civilian casualties, as well as material damage
caused by the indiscriminate bombing.
2. Meanwhile, there have been reciprocal bombings by the SNA and the SDF from time to
time. These skirmishes have been concentrated on the dividing lines separating these two
groups’ territories in eastern and northern rural Aleppo Governorate.
3. Additionally, SNHR has recorded continued clashes between US-led International Coalition
forces and Iranian militias throughout 2024. These clashes have been concentrated in Deir
Ez-Zour Governorate near the oil fields and Coalition bases to the east of the Euphrates
Shield.
4. Moreover, residents of the region, especially in Deir Ez-Zour Governorate, have noticed a
significant increase in the spread of IS cells in the area in 2024. These cells have been
carrying out killings and assassinations regularly.
5. There has also been a noticeable rise in revenge acts among local tribes, as arms have been
widely available to civilians. These phenomena are particularly prevalent in the areas
separating the GoS forces and the SDF along the Euphrates River in rural Deir Ez-Zour.
Clashes between the SDF and the Syrian National Army/Türkiye
6. There have been no major rounds of clashes between the SDF and the Syrian National
Army/Türkiye recently. Rather, there have been some occasional light gunfire. Most
recently, the SDF fired a shell at al-Mahsanli village in the rural areas of Jarablos city in
eastern rural Aleppo Governorate on October 16, 2024, following by light gunfire between
the two sides.
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7. SDF-SNA clashes are taking place on the dividing lines in the villages that are
administratively a part of Afrin City in northern rural Aleppo Governorate and Jarablous city
in eastern rural Aleppo Governorate.
Clashes between the SDF and the Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour
8. SNHR has been recording intermittent reciprocal gunfire. The most recent clash that
devolved into full combat was in August 2024.
9. SDF-Arab tribes clashes are taking place in the villages along the Euphrates River in
northern and eastern rural Deir Ez-Zour Governorate.
Clashes between IS and the SDF in the DAANES-controlled parts of Syria?
10. The most recent operation by ISIS cells took place on October 15, 2024, when they targeted
oil tankers, which resulted in the killing of an SDF fighter.
11. SDF-IS clashes are concentrated in the badiya ‘desert’ region of Deir Ez-Zour and some
villages in the governorate where IS cells can be found.
Civilian casualties
12. From August 6 to August 13, 2024, the villages and towns along both banks of the
Euphrates River in eastern rural Deir Ez-Zour saw some military escalation and continuous
reciprocal attacks between the tribal forces, supported by GoS forces and Iranian militias on
one side, and the SDF on the other. This occurred after the tribal forces launched a large-
scale attack on SDF military headquarters in these areas, which originated from a GoS-held
area. Thereafter, the two sides carried out reciprocal bombings using heavy weaponry
(artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy machine guns). SNHR documented the killing of at
least 17 civilians in this incident, including eight children and six women, and at least 34
others were injured, as a result of the indiscriminate attacks that involved the use of heavy
weapons and the crossfire in the area. More particularly, ground GoS attacks resulted in
killing of 11 civilians, including six children and four women. This happened when the GoS
forces bombed al-Dahla town. Additionally, a woman was killed in a regime attack on Abu
Hamam town (both al-Dahla and Abu Hamam are under the control of the SDF).
13. On the other hand, similar attacks by the SDF on the GoS-held al-Boulayl town killed two
civilians, a woman and a girl. Three more civilians, including one child, were killed in the
crossfire and shelling between the two sides. as SNHR was unable to accurately assign
responsibility for these killings.
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14. On Wednesday, October 16, 2024, an SDF rocket launcher fired multiple rockets at the al-
Mahsanli village in the rural areas of Jarablos City in eastern rural Aleppo Governorate. One
of the rockets struck al-Mahsanli School during school hours, injuring six civilians – four
children and two women. The attack also partially destroyed the school’s outer fence and
moderately damaged the school itself. The area targeted is under the control of the SNA.
Freedom of movement
15. It is possible to travel freely between the different regions under DAANES-control. However,
a challenging factor in this regard is the strict checks conducted by the SDF at their
checkpoints on people coming from GoS-held areas, particularly young men who are
usually taken for conscription in training camps.
Human Rights Violations
16. Syrian Democratic Forces/Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
(SDF/DAANES) continued conducting arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, and
carrying out campaigns of mass raids and detentions, targeting civilians under the pretext
of fighting ISIS, with some of these arrest campaigns backed by US-led Coalition
helicopters.
17. SNHR has also documented arrests/detentions of civilians over accusations of working with
the Syrian National Army (SNA).
18. SNHR has additionally documented arrests/detention of civilians for conscription (i.e.
Obligatory Self-Defence Duty), with these detainees taken to SDF military training and
recruitment camps, which are concentrated in SDF-controlled areas of Aleppo Governorate.
19. Moreover, SNHR has documented arrests/detentions of individuals over accusations of
working with the Arab tribal forces, which involved in some cases the destroying or burning
down of the detainees’ houses. These arrests were concentrated in Deir Ez-Zour
Governorate. Other arrests involved members of Kurdish parties over voicing criticism of
the living situation and corruption in SDF-held areas.
20. Furthermore, a number of civilians were arrested/detained for participation in the anti-SDF
popular protests that objected to the school curriculums imposed by the SDF in its
territories. These arrests were concentrated in Manbij city in rural Aleppo governorate.
21. Meanwhile, the SDF also continued abducting children with the objective of recruiting
them for military training, with these children being sent to military training camps. The
parents and families of these conscripted children are not allowed to contact them, with
the SDF also refusing to disclose their fate.
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22. Since the start of October 2024, SNHR has recorded anti-SDF popular protests in Manbij
city in rural Aleppo Governorate, accompanied with a general strike across Manbij city and
its rural areas. This was in objection to the ‘Education Authority’ of the SDF’s Autonomous
Administration enforcing the mandatory implementation of its own school curriculum in
the city’s schools.
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Annex 3: Syria Justice and Accountability Centre
(SJAC) Query response
SJAC, online meeting, 2 October 2024 and written contribution, 30
October 2024
Developments to the general security situation and violence against civilians
Aleppo
1.
Throughout 2024, civilians in Aleppo experienced consistent indiscriminate
violence, which originated from areas jointly controlled by the SDF and Syrian
government forces, resulting in numerous civilian fatalities and injuries.
2. Civilian casualties
were also documented in February, when a motorcycle explosion
injured three civilians, among them children.
385
3.
In April, one civilian was killed and another injured when a guided missile fired
from areas jointly controlled by Syrian government forces and the SDF.
386
4.
In May, another civilian was killed and a child injured as a result of artillery shelling
originating from jointly controlled areas.
387
Following this, it was reported that a man
and child were
moderately injured as a result of mortar and rocket shelling
originating from jointly controlled areas that targeted the village of Sheikh
Nasser.
388
5.
In September 2024, four children were injured in Jarablus after pro-government
forces and SDF fired heavy artillery.
389
The same month, a general strike also took
place in Manbij in protest of SDF policies, which included ongoing rights violations
and arbitrary arrests.
390
6.
There have not been any recent clashes between the Syrian government and the
SDF in the Aleppo area.
385
Baladi
386
News,
Aleppo: The National Army Arrests a Cell within the SDF,
29 October 2024,
url
The Syria Civil Defense Telegram,
Civilian Death and Other Injuries,
28 April 2024,
url
387
The Syria Civil Defense Telegram,
Civilian Death and Child Injured,
4 May 2024,
url
388
The Syria Civil Defense Telegram,
Man and Child Moderately Injured,
9 May 2024,
url
389
Jarablus Press,
Four Children Injured,
7 september 2024,
url
390
Syria TV,
General Strike in Manbij to Protest Against SDF Policy In City Administration,
18 September 2024,
url
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Raqqa
7.
In July 2024, a young man was reportedly killed in the countryside of Raqqa by two
men, who were part of the SDF, after fighting between two tribes broke out. After
the young man’s death, security forces affiliated with the SDF withdrew from the
village and two houses were burned.
391
Towards the end of July, the SDF carried out
raids allegedly supported by the US-led International Coalition that resulted in the
deaths of two individuals and the arrest of another in the rural areas of Raqqa.
392
8.
In August, members of the SDF violently assaulted staff at the National Hospital and
damaged equipment following the death of one of their members during surgery,
393
demonstrating how the SDF sometimes engages in retributive acts against the
civilian population, according to the SJAC’s assessment. One month later, SDF
arrested young individuals in Raqqa who were attempting to cross into areas
controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA) north of Raqqa. The arrests were
made during a raid in the Hweijeh Al-Sawafi camp in the Raqqa countryside, where
two young men were detained on charges of belonging to ISIS.
394
In the same
month, an elderly woman from Tal Abyad was killed by an SDF sniper while crossing
from areas controlled by the SNA for medical treatment.
395
Seven people were also
reportedly arrested by the SDF after a dispute broke out with SDF members, and
the individuals were taken to an unknown location.
396
Deir Ezzour
9.
In Deir Ezzour, tensions between the SDF and civilians resulted in civilian casualties
in May. For example, when SDF members fired at a vehicle that refused to stop at a
checkpoint in Darnaj, two children were killed.
10.
Civilian casualties continued into June 2024 as well. For example, a young man was
killed in late June by the SDF during a raid and arrest operation in the countryside
of Deir Ezzour. Local news reported that a man from the town of Darnaj was killed
by SDF personnel in Al-Jaradi, with two different reasons surrounding his death. The
first was that he died under torture, while the second stated that the young man
391
392
Syria TV,
Following a Tribal Dispute, A Young Man was Killed by Two Members of the SDF in Raqqa
7 July 2024,
url
Syria TV, Two Killed and One Arrested in a Raid by SDF in Rural Raqqa 28 July 2024,
url
393
Syria TV,
SDF Assault Raqqa National Hospital Staff,
4 August 2024,
url
394
Syria TV, Targeting Young Men, SDF Launches Arrest Campaign in Raqqa, 16 September 2024,
url
395
Syria TV,
Elderly Woman Killed by SDF Bullets North of Raqqa,
18 september 2024,
url
396
Syria TV,
Security Campaign in the Countryside of Hasakah Ignites Protests,
25 September 2024,
url
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was shot directly by SDF forces during the raid.
397
Near the banks of the Euphrates
river towards the end of July, which serves as the dividing line between the Syrian
government forces and the SDF, a seven-year-old girl was also killed by gunfire from
the SDF and her parents injured.
398
SJAC documenters interviewed a family member
of the young girl and were informed that a sniper bullet pierced her head from
behind as she and her family members attempted to escape gunfire.
11.
In July, dozens of residents in Deir Ezzour staged protests, calling for the release of
detainees held by the SDF. The SDF responded with a raid campaign, targeting
demonstrators through one of its patrols.
399
Raids continued to the end of July,
when a vehicle driven by a military leader of the SDF was attacked.
400
Then, in
August 2024 multiple individuals were injured while one man was killed when the
SDF attempted an arrest in western Deir Ezzour. The SDF was attempting to arrest
the individuals on charges of involvement in smuggling, and tensions rose following
the incident, with fears of potential clashes between the SDF and residents.
401
The
SDF also raided a house in the city of Al-Busayrah, resulting in the death of a
nurse.
402
12.
In September, a young man was crossing the Euphrates River when he was killed by
a sniper from the SDF. It is reported that the man was coming from the town of Al-
Duwair, under government control, towards the town of Granij under the control of
the SDF.
403
Hasakah
13.
In July, members and the head of the Kurdish National Council were arrested in
Qamishli, and the SDF used violence to forcibly disperse a demonstration that was
organized in response. Arrest campaigns were also carried out that targeted
activists, journalists, and minors.
404
In Amuda, SDF also fired gunshots to end a
demonstration in which residents were protesting the ongoing military trench
digging. Local news sources note that criticism of the SDF has been growing due to
397
398
Syria TV,
A Young Man Killed in Deir Ezzour During an SDF Raid,
9 June 2024,
url
Syria TV,
A Child Killed and Her Parents Injured,
30 June 2024,
url
399
Syria TV,
Demonstration in Deir Ezzour Demanding Release of Detainees, and the SDF Responds with Raids,
2 July
2024,
url
400
Syria TV,
SDF Surrounds a Town in Deir Ezzour and Launches a Campaign of Raids and Arrests,
31 July 2024,
url
401
Syria TV,
One Person Killed and Two Others Wounded by SDF Bullets in Deir Ezzour,
6 August 2024,
url
402
Syria TV,
Nurse Killed in SDF and International Coalition Raid,
23 August 2024,
url
403
Syria TV,
Young Man Killed by Sniper from SDF While Swimming in Euphrates River,
21 September 2024,
url
404
Syria TV,
SDF Arrests Head and Members of Kurdish National Council,
1 July 2024,
url
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excessive spending on trench digging as opposed to essential services, in addition
to the violations against activists and journalists under SDF control.
405
14.
Towards the end of September, SDF launched a security campaign in Al-Hasakeh’s
countryside, searching 17 villages for weapons but confiscating only hunting guns.
Residents accused SDF of stealing gold jewelry and money, which led to protests
that SDF responded to with live ammunition.
406
15. Earlier this year there was fighting between different groups affiliated with the Syrian
government, which took place in the security square in Al-Hasakeh.
Recent clashes between the SDF and the Syrian National Army/Türkiye
16.
Another threat to civilians in AANES-controlled areas, especially the northern areas
of Aleppo, Al-Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh governorates, are Turkish attacks, which have
been ongoing since Türkiye's incursion into northeast Syria in 2019 as tensions
between the SDF and Türkiye still exist, especially in the border areas. Turkish
shelling and drone attacks in northeast Syria have targeted members of the SDF and
affiliated security forces, but also resulted in civilian casualties. These attacks also
often targeted vital civilian infrastructure as well, including water treatment
facilities, causing further damage for the local civilian population.
17. There has been an increase in Turkish drone attacks and airstrikes in 2024, which target
critical infrastructure, as well as SDF personnel.
Aleppo
18.
Clashes between the SDF and Türkiye were common in 2024, with reports of
consistent exchanges of fire and acts of indiscriminate violence. On January 5th, for
example, Turkish artillery targeted SDF positions in the villages of Deir Jamal,
Maraanaz, Kafr Naya, and Biloniyah in the northern Aleppo countryside.
407
Ten days
later, the SDF and the SNA exchanged fire on the fronts of Manbij,
408
while intense
Turkish artillery shelling targeted SDF positions south of Azaz.
409
On January 20th,
rocket fire from the SDF targeted the vicinity of the town of Dabiq in northern
405
406
Syria TV,
Tension Between People of Al-Hasakeh and the SDF Due to Military Trenches,
10 July,
url
Syria TV,
Security Campaign in Rural Al-Hasakeh Ignites Protests,
25 September 2024,
url
407
NABD,
Turkish Artillery Shelling Targeted SDF Positions,
6 January 2024,
url
408
Manbij News,
Violent Bombardment Between SDF and Turkish Army,
15 January 2024,
url
409
Azaz Network News,
Heavy Turkish Artillery Shelling,
17 January 2024,
url
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Aleppo countryside,
410
and intense artillery and rocket fire occurred the next day
between the SDF and Turkish bases on the Karabajli-Dandania.
411
Mutual shelling
continued on January 30th between the SDF and Turkish forces, with the SDF
targeting the vicinity of the National Hospital and the village of Sejraz west of Azaz,
as well as the Kuwait al-Rahma camp in Afrin. In response, Turkish forces shelled
the surroundings of Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo countryside, including Maranaz,
al-Malikiyah, and Shwargha in the Shirn district of Afrin.
412
19.
In March, a woman was killed and three children injured due to shelling by the SDF
on the village of Tal Mald.
413
In Al-Samouqa village, located near SDF-controlled Al-
Shahba (Aleppo governorate), Turkish shelling in May seriously injured two
children, one of whom later died from his injuries.
414
Shelling continued in May,
when artillery fire from the SDF targeted the city of Azaz in northern Aleppo.
415
Turkish forces continued shelling positions of the Manbij Military Council, affiliated
with the SDF, in the rural areas of Manbij.
416
Meanwhile, in June another civilian
was killed, and several others were injured due to a rocket attack by the SDF
targeting the Kuwait Al-Rahma camp.
417
20.
In August, the SNA continued to shell positions of the SDF in the Tal Rifaat area.
418
On August 9th specifically, a child was killed and others were injured due to the
shelling by the SDF on the village of Al-Halwanji in the countryside of Jarablus.
419
In
September, a civilian woman was injured as a result of artillery shelling by SDF on
the village of Abla in the Al-Bab area,
420
and clashes again erupted in October 2024
between the SNA and the SDF in the Kafr Khashir area in northern Aleppo,
coinciding with Turkish artillery shelling targeting militia positions in the region.
421
Hasakah
410
Alternative Atarib Media Center,
Missile Attack from SDF Targets Northern Aleppo Countryside,
20 January 2024,
url
411
412
Facebook,
Intense Artillery and Missile Shelling Between SDF and Turkish Bases,
21 January 2024,
url
Al Marsad Media Network,
Missile Attack Targets Azaz Countryside,
30 January 2024,
url
413
The Syria Civil Defense Facebook, Missile Bombardment Originating From the Joint Control Areas, 30 January
2024,
url
414
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre,
Human Rights Violations in Syria - May 2024,
20 June 2024,
url
415
Media Office in Binnish,
Artillery Shelling by SDF Forces Target Azaz,
19 May 2024,
url
416
Awwsat,
Türkiye Re-Escalates Against SDF in Northwestern Syria,
24 May 2024,
url
417
Facebook,
A Martyr and Several Injuries Due to SDF Bombing Targeting Kuwait Al-Rahma Camp,
16 June 2024,
url
418
Independent Sham Media Center,
The National Army Forces Continue to Shell SDF in Tal Rifaat,
7 August 2024,
url
419
Editor’s News Network,
A Child Killed and Others Injured,
9 August 2024,
url
420
DCRN,
Civilian Woman Wounded as a Result of SDF Artillery,
10 September 2024,
url
421
Syrian News Agency, Urgent: Clashes Between the National Army and SDF (Oct. 5, 2024),
url
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21. Clashes between the SDF and Turkish forces have also resulted in civilian casualties and
greatly disrupted city infrastructure. Specifically, residents of Al-Hasakeh have no
access to running water or consistent electricity due to Turkish actions. Residents in Al-
Hasakeh reported that Turkish shelling of electrical plants/towers in December 2023
caused extensive power outages for Al-Hasakeh city and the surrounding areas which
have persisted throughout April. Al-Hasakeh city residents also had no access to
running water in April, as Türkiye and Turkish-backed factions control the flow of water
to Al-Hasakeh city, and this current cutoff began in 2023. The lack of water and
electricity forces residents to pay large amounts of money each month to meet their
basic needs through alternative and expensive means, such as generators and drinking
water purchased from water tanker trucks. In April, Turkish-supported factions also
attacked the Al-Saida fuel station in Al-Qahtaniyah, one of the largest fuel stations in
the northeast, causing a large shortage of fuel and driving up transportation costs for
civilians.
422
22.
In terms of clashes, Turkish artillery, rockets, and aerial strikes targeted SDF
positions in northeastern Syria in January 2024. Drone attacks hit a power station in
Derbasiyeh in the Al-Hasakeh countryside, resulting in injuries to a worker. The
strikes also hit a site known as a "wedding hall" in Derbasiyeh, the power station in
Qamishli, six sites in the Rmeilan field and Tal Adas field, the industrial area, the
Court of Justice area in Qamishli, a police station for land transport, and a site
adjacent to the Qamishli municipality. Sources noted that some of the sites hit in
Qamishli are under overlapping control between the SDF and the Syrian
government.
423
23.
In late May and early June, SJAC documenters noted some increase in the level of
Turkish military activity, with a series of drone attacks that killed civilians and SDF-
affiliated military personnel in Al-Qamishli and Amuda. Turkey likely ordered these
attacks in response to the AANES’ plans to proceed with municipal elections in
summer 2024, which were later cancelled.
424
In May, Turkish drones targeted SDF
positions at least eight times, intensifying military operations against SDF
installations in the region.
425
Turkish forces also shelled a military point in the
countryside of Al-Hasakeh, escalating tensions in the area.
426
422
423
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre,
Human Rights Violations in Syria - April 2024.
20 May 2024,
url
The New Arab,
Turkish Army Continues its Bombing of SDF Areas in Northern Syria for the Third Day,
15 January
2024,
url
424
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre,
Human Rights Violations in Syria - June 2024,
July 2024,
url
425
Nudem, New Turkish Bombing Targets North and East Syria, 31 May 2024,
url
426
Syria News,
Two SDF Members Killed in a Turkish Bombing Targeting Military Point
,1 June 2024,
url
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24.
In August, documenters noted more Turkish attacks than usual. A Turkish drone
reportedly killed a civilian woman and her son near Al-Qamishli’s Heart and Eye
Hospital in late August.
427
Recent clashes between the SDF and the Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour
25.
Violent clashes occurred between SDF forces and Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour
throughout 2024, resulting in many casualties. In February 2024, local news
reported that the SDF shelled the city of Al-Mayadeen. The SDF brought in military
reinforcements to areas of contact with the National Defense and Iranian militias in
Al-Mayadeen and shelled government positions several times.
26.
Violent clashes increased in August and September 2024, resulting in many civilian
casualties. In August, the most significant violations in Deir Ezzour governorate
were a series of armed clashes between the SDF and fighters from prominent Arab
tribes in the area, who were supported by the Syrian government forces and groups
loyal to it. These events represent the largest clashes between the SDF and pro-
government tribal fighters since August 2023. Reportedly at the urging of Ibrahim
Al-Hefel, the pro-government leader of the prominent Akedat tribe, tribal fighters
targeted SDF-controlled villages of Abu Hammam, Diban, and Al-Latwa beginning
on August 6th. In response to the attacks by pro-government tribal fighters in Deir
Ezzour, the SDF imposed a blockade on areas controlled by the government in Al-
Hasakeh and Qamishli cities to prevent the entry and exit of cars and people from
the area, in addition to implementing a curfew.
428
To conceal the blockade, the SDF
attacked journalists to prevent them from reporting on the situation.
429
27.
By mid-August, local media reported that at least 18 civilians had been killed in the
fighting in Deir Ezzour, many from shelling by heavy weapons. In one incident, the
pro-government tribal fighters’ shelling of civilian homes in Al-Dahlah and Jadeed
Bakkarah villages on August 9th killed 12 people, including multiple women and
children. Though the deadliest fighting ended in mid-August, SJAC notes that
tension and small clashes between the SDF and the government-backed fighters
continued throughout August.
28.
Along with the high number of civilian casualties, the fighting caused profound
consequences for civilians in Deir Ezzour governorate, according to SJAC. The
427
428
North Press Agency,
Turkish Raid Targets a Woman and Her Son,
28 August 2024,
url
Syria TV, SDF Imposes Blockade on Syrian Forces in Al-Hasakeh, 7 August 2024,
url
429
Syria TV,
SDF Attacks Journalists to Hide its Siege of Civilians in Al-Hasakeh,
16 August 2024,
url
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ongoing clashes caused damage to homes and displaced civilians from Diban, Abu
Hammam, Al-Kishkiyah, Al-Dahlah, and several other villages. Water stations in Abu
Hammam and Al-Sahba were rendered out of service due to the shelling as well.
Retaliatory military action from the SDF also impacted civilians in government-
controlled areas of Deir Ezzour governorate (on the western side of the Euphrates),
with three children reportedly injured in Boqrus from SDF shelling.
29.
In September, clashes continued between SDF forces and the Tribal Forces in
several areas.
430
A vehicle of the SDF opened fire on a young man from the town of
Diban, resulting in his immediate death. The young man, Khalil Al-Aboud Al-
Mohammad Al-Mezar, was 33 years old and a civilian that had no recorded
affiliation to any armed group.
Recent clashes between IS and the SDF in the DAANES-controlled parts of
Syria
30.
One of the SDF’s primary objectives in the areas it controls is combating ISIS, which
continued to demonstrate its presence via multiple attacks in June. ISIS activity
continues to pose a major threat to civilians in both SDF-controlled and
government-controlled territory, according to SJAC Several attacks in SDF-controlled
areas of Deir Ezzour governorate this month killed SDF members, employees of
local AANES institutions, and civilians. Attacks occur regularly in SDF-controlled
parts of Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates as well.
431
These attacks are usually
carried out by unknown gunmen on motorcycles, and they typically target patrols
or military points but have not yet reached the level of large-scale clashes. The U.S.-
led Coalition, which partners with the SDF in operations to defeat ISIS, announced
that ISIS has carried out 153 attacks in the first half of 2024 in Syria and Iraq. In
Syria, the U.S.-led coalition, in cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces and
other partners, carried out 59 operations resulted in the killing of 14 ISIS elements
and the arrest of 92 others.
432
Raqqa
31.
In response to these ongoing attacks, SDF regularly launch security operations in its
territory, one of which it conducted near Al-Karama agricultural area in Al-Raqqa in
430
Shaam Network, Renewed Clashes and Mutual Shelling Deepens Suffering of Civilians in Deir Ezzour, 7 September
2024,
url
431
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre,
Human Rights Violations in Syria - June 2024,
24 July 2024,
url
432
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, Human Rights Violations in Syria -July 2024, 3 September 2024,
url
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August. The SDF reportedly raided homes and arrested 15 alleged ISIS-affiliated
individuals in Al-Hasakeh city in October 2024 as well.
32.
In September, ISIS released a claim on its official media platforms, stating that it
executed two people in Al-Raqqa governorate, claiming that these individuals were
“spies” for the SDF. According to local media reports, ISIS posted videos depicting
the executions and the bodies, along with the written claim about the attack.
433
33. IS has left a number of unexploded incendiary devices and mines in homes and graves
in the area around Raqqa, which have resulted in civilian casualties.
Deir Ezzour
34. In July 2024, several ISIS attacks in SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour governorate
targeted SDF members, civilians, and oil tanker trucks belonging to the Autonomous
Administration. Subsequently in August 2024, ISIS attacks in SDF-controlled areas of
Deir Ezzour governorate this month primarily targeted SDF members, such as one IED
attack that injured two SDF members in Al-Jarthi.
Al-Hasakeh
35.
On April 20
th
, 2024, the SDF announced a “special and large-scale operation in the
outskirts of Al-Hasakeh city,” which resulted in the arrest of approximately 38
individuals accused of belonging to ISIS. The media center of the SDF announced
that the individuals arrested were planning “various terrorist operations against the
city’s residents.” Activists reported that raids were carried out and that there were
arbitrary arrests.
434
Freedom of movement between the different regions under DAANES-control
36.
Generally, the ability to travel freely between different areas under DAANES control
is limited and varies between cities and from time to time, depending on security
concerns and the ongoing above-mentioned conflict-related violence. This is
particularly true in Deir Ezzour Governorate, where checkpoints and military
433
Syria TV,
ISIS Announces the Killing of Eight Members of Regime Support Militias in in Homs Desert,
8 September
2024,
url
434
Shaam Network, Widespread Raids and Arrests,
SDF Announces Implementation of Security Operation in Al-
Hasakeh,
20 April 2024,
url
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operations often hinder freedom of movement and impact the daily lives of
residents. It is important to note that when travel is restricted and roads are closed,
civilians are more susceptible to violence and security threats in SJACs assessment.
37. According to SJAC documenters on the ground, SDF checkpoints are widespread in
the area, and members present at the checkpoints frequently harass civilians that
pass through them. If civilians respond to this treatment, verbal and physical
clashes can ensue, and it is not uncommon for civilians (including children) to be
killed in this violence in SJAC’s assesment.
435
SJAC tracked at least four cases in April
and May of 2024 alone, of which, SDF forces opinion fire on civilians passing
checkpoints when they refused to cooperate with the checkpoints members.
38. On April 3
rd
, 2024, SDF armed men open fired on three civilians at an SDF
checkpoint in the town of Al-Jarthi, east of Deir Ezzour. The three men moved to
hospital later.
436
39. On 8
th
of April 2024, and SDF checkpoint killed a civilian on Abu Hamam checkpoint
in Deir Ezzour.
437
On April 18
th
, one man killed and a second injured when SDF
soldiers opened fire on them as they refused to stop at the checkpoint.
438
40. May 23
rd
, 2024, SDF checkpoint opened fire on a man who refused to stop at a
checkpoint, resulted in killing two children and injuring number of civilians near a
checkpoint in town of Daranj, in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzour.
439
41. There is a risk of IEDs on the roads between Hasakah and Deir Ezzour. There is public
transportation between Raqqa, Hasakah and Tabqa, but the condition of the roads are
very bad. It is also necessary to travel on the roads by day rather than night to avoid
attacks.
Human rights violations
42.
Despite ongoing political and military support from the United States and other
western allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other affiliated
435
436
The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre,
Human Rights Violations in Syria - May 2024,
20 June 2024,
url
Open source informaiton availabnle
here.
437
The
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: A young man was killed and another wanted by the SDF was injured by
gunfire at a military checkpoint in the northern countryside of Deir Ezzor.
url
438
The
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: A young man was killed and another wanted by the SDF was injured by
gunfire at a military checkpoint in the northern countryside of Deir Ezzor.
url
439
Syria TV: kills two children and injures others at "Daranj checkpoint" east of Deir Ezzor.
url
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military/security entities in the territory controlled by the Autonomous
Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) continue to engage in or cause acts of
indiscriminate violence that result in rights violations against the population,
creating an unstable security situation in the region and making the area unsafe.
In terms of general developments, the SDF continues to crush civilian political
dissent with violence in various cities, regularly dispersing protests with the use of
gunfire. The SDF also continues to arbitrarily arrest civilians across its territory,
conducting raids and arresting individuals on various charges, including opposition
to the SDF. Individuals are also arrested due to alleged ISIS affiliation, and SJAC’s
assessment is that these charges are a pretext used to silence any critics who
oppose arbitrary arrests or excessive use of violence during raids. After arrest, SJAC
has documented that individuals in detention are subject to routine rights
violations, including torture. Civilian deaths caused by the SDF were recorded by
local media throughout the reporting period for various reasons, including killing
individuals crossing from Syrian government-controlled areas, during attempted
arrests, and in the course of raids.
Disclaimer:
The information listed in this report is not the extent of human rights violations in the DAANES
controlled territory but only some of the rights violations related to the scope of the report.
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Annex 4: Meeting minutes
Fabrice Balanche, associate professor and research director at the
University of Lyon, Skype meeting, 25 September 2024
Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2. He
has conducted field studies, research and written books and articles about Syria, including the
Kurdish areas of Syria.
General security situation in NES
1. There have been no major changes to the security situation in the areas of Syria controlled by
DAANES since January 2024. However, at the local level, there is significant insecurity, and the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are facing difficulties in maintaining control, particularly in Deir
Ezzour.
2. The last major battle between the SDF and Arab tribal militias in Deir Ezzour took place in
September 2023. The source assessed that this is not due to the SDF becoming stronger
relative to the tribal militias. Rather, it is because the SDF has allowed Arab tribes to manage
specific areas of Deir Ezzour with high concentrations of tribal populations, tacitly accepting oil
theft and smuggling conducted by Arab tribes in collaboration with the GoS to government-
controlled areas in order to maintain social peace in these majority Arab tribal regions of Deir
Ezzour Governorate.
3. Turkish drone and air strikes are a big security issued for the whole area under control. In
addition to regular clashes on the frontlines where SNA and SDF areas of influence meet.
Raqqa
4. According to NGOs, the situation in Raqqa is quite stable. Raqqa is the official capital of North
and East Syria, and the security situation in this area remains relatively stable due to the strong
presence of the SDF. In 2022, it was possible to move around the streets of Raqqa at night.
Areas outside Raqqa city, such as Tishreen and Masouriyah, are also fairly secure.
5. Since January 2024, there have been no reports of clashes in the Kurdish-controlled areas of
Raqqa Governorate.
6. In the north, the village of Ayn Issa is threatened by pro-Turkish forces. There are snipers and
strikes in areas along the front lines between Tell Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn, also known as the
Operation Peace Spring area, which is controlled by the SNA and Türkiye, so security in these
areas is limited.
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7. There are limited clashes between the SDF and pro-Turkish forces in the Kurdish-controlled
areas around Tell Abyad. Clashes are also occurring northwest of Tell Tamer and northeast of
Ayn Issa, both located on the front line between the Operation Peace Spring area, controlled
by the SNA and Türkiye, and the Kurdish-controlled areas. However, the rest of the region is
largely uninhabited, with no villages, large cities, or population. Türkiye has also changed its
strategy, now relying more on drone strikes targeting infrastructure, such as power plants and
water stations, rather than depending on its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxy forces to
conduct major attacks in the area.
8. Clashes in these areas mainly result in combatant casualties. Civilians try to avoid these zones,
but traveling through them, particularly on the road between Kobane and Ayn Issa, can lead to
civilian casualties. However, civilians generally avoid this area whenever possible.
9. The Islamic State (IS) is active in government-controlled areas in southern Raqqa Governorate,
but not in the Kurdish-controlled areas of the governorate.
Hasakah
10. Nearly 400,000 people live in Hasakah city, including a large number of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) from other parts of North and East Syria, such as Kobane and Qamishli. The IDPs
from these regions prefer to stay in Hasakah city due to fear of Turkish airstrikes.
11. NGOs are located in Hasakah and Raqqa. They were previously based in Amuda as well but
relocated to Hasakah city due to threats of Turkish strikes.
12. Hasakah city is relatively secure, with no significant security incidents reported recently.
However, the security situation remains fragile. The city is divided into two areas: Kurds in the
north and Arabs in the south. Generally, it is better to live in the northern part of the city than
in the southern Arab suburbs, where jihadist infiltration is possible.
13. The main socioeconomic issue in Hasakah city is the lack of water, primarily because Türkiye
controls the water treatment stations. People with money and NGOs pay for water treatment.
Although there are wells in the city, the water is salty and should not be consumed due to the
risk of disease. However, residents, being poor, cannot afford clean water.
14. Hasakah city is relatively safe because it is far from the Turkish border, but IS has a presence
throughout the city. The economic situation in the city has slightly improved due to the
presence of NGOs. In the areas From Qamishli to Amuda, the population is predominantly
Kurdish, and there is local-level security. However, this area is subjected to Turkish airstrikes on
a regular and continued basis.
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15. Ordinary citizens do not face security-related issues in the Hasakah district of Hasakah
governorate. Arab Sunnis do not face security-related issues in the Shaddady area, while Kurds
generally avoid this area. The main security concern is the American military base near
Shaddady, which has been attacked with rockets fired by IS or pro-Iranian militias. These
attacks generally do not result in civilian casualties unless individuals are in the wrong place at
the wrong time.
16. There have been Turkish drone strikes in the areas around Qamishli and Al Malikiyah. The
strikes mainly target cars driven by YPG or PKK members but have also resulted in civilian
casualties. Whether these strikes were intentional or accidental is unknown. Last year, there
were three strikes in Qamishli that resulted in civilian casualties involving individuals who were
clearly not affiliated with the YPG.
17. There are limited clashes between the SDF and pro-Turkish militias in the Kurdish-controlled
areas surrounding Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn (the Operation Peace Spring area). These frontline
clashes are characterized by exchanges of small arms fire and strikes, which generally do not
involve civilian casualties but can affect farmers whose land is closer to the frontline. If civilians
stay away from the front lines, they generally do not face any security-related issues.
18. Hasakah governorate is generally quiet regarding IS activity. Last year, there were a couple of
incidents involving IS in the vicinity of Al-Hol and southeast of Shaddady and Sirwar. IS is
primarily active in Deir Ezzour.
19. IS maintains control over the population inside the Al-Hol camp, and people who do not follow
IS rules may be killed at night. Camp residents who are in deradicalization programs are
generally moved to other camps. Al-Hol is located in a remote area, so there are not many
people outside the camp, making the surrounding area relatively easy to control.
Aleppo
20. There are frequent and ongoing clashes between pro-Turkish forces and the SDF in the Tall
Rifaat enclave to the north of Aleppo. This area is very insecure, but it is unlikely that Turkey
and the pro-Turkish forces will invade Shahba. This is because it is important for Russia, Iran,
and the Syrian government to maintain this buffer zone between the pro-Turkish forces and
Aleppo. Pro-Turkish forces will be closer to Aleppo if they manage to expel the SDF from the
Tall Rifaat enclave, which would pose a threat to the security situation in Aleppo city.
21. The Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo province are very small, consisting of only a few
hundred square kilometers. There is permanent insecurity on the frontlines and in the Tall
Rifaat enclave between pro-Turkish forces and the SDF. People want to leave the enclave for
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Aleppo city, but are prevented from doing so by the Syrian government unless they can pay
bribes that would allow them to enter government-controlled areas from the Tall Rifaat
enclave.
22. It is difficult to obtain information about these areas, and there is no information regarding
clashes between the YPG/SDF and the Syrian government in Aleppo governorate. There is also
no information about increased patrolling or the buildup of troops in Kurdish-controlled areas
of Aleppo governorate.
23. There have been no recent clashes between the SDF and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The most
recent clash involving HTS occurred a year ago during the HTS incursion into Afrin and Azaz,
where it was against the pro-Turkish militias in the area and took place outside the Kurdish-
controlled areas of Aleppo governorate.
24. There has been a major development in the Manbij area, which is jointly controlled by the SDF
and GoS forces due to pressure from pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (SNA) groups and
Turkey, who have launched strikes in the region. According to Fabrice Balanche, Türkiye
intends to take Manbij and Kobane to build a security belt. In response, Russia has attempted
to broker a rapprochement between Turkey and the Syrian government. However, the Syrian
government has shown little interest in these negotiations, according to Fabrice Balanche.
25. When SNA groups tried to invade Manbij around six months ago, in March 2024, Russia
responded with an airstrike.
26. The clashes between the SDF and pro-Turkish SNA groups involve rockets and mortars that
affect people in the immediate vicinity, but there is not much information regarding civilian
casualties. On the frontlines in Manbij and Kobane, the clashes between the SDF and pro-
Turkish SNA groups result in casualties among fighters. These casualties are confined to the
areas around the frontlines, where there are not many civilians, and it is primarily combatants
who are affected by the clashes.
27. The city of Kobane and the surrounding villages are relatively secure, as this area is a
stronghold of the PYD. However, the area is constantly under threat from Turkey. Many people
have left Kobane due to fears of a Turkish incursion, as was the case in Tell Abyad, where the
population had to flee and lost everything. There is also a lack of investment and confidence in
the future in this area.
28. A few months ago, there was a car bomb in Manbij, but the number of casualties was unknown
to the source at the time of the interview. The frontlines between Kobane and Jarablus (the
Euphrates Shield area, which is controlled by pro-Turkish SNA groups and Türkiye) are more
secure because the Euphrates River is somewhat of a no-man's land. However, Turkish
airstrikes on Kobane in 2022 resulted in civilian casualties, including children.
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29. To the east of Kobane, on the road connecting Kobane and Ayn Issa along the frontline
between the Kurdish-controlled SDF areas and Tell Abyad, the road is quite dangerous because
snipers target drivers using it. People generally use an alternate, newer route through Raqqa,
Tabqa, Sarin, and Kobane to avoid the road that connects Kobane and Ayn Issa, which lies on
the frontline between the Kurdish-controlled areas and the SNA and Turkish-controlled
Operation Peace Spring area.
30. There is no IS activity in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo province. IS is active in the
Badhia desert in the Hama and Homs governorates, as well as in government-controlled areas
of Raqqa and Deir Ezzour governorates.
Deir Ezzour
31. The security situation in the Kurdish-controlled regions of Deir Ezzour is very fragmented and
unstable. There are frequent clashes between Arab tribes and the SDF, as well as intra-tribal
fighting among different Arab tribes and clans. There is no central authority because the SDF is
unable to fully control the area. Each tribe or clan attempts to control the areas surrounding
their villages, which results in clashes over resources such as water and access to
infrastructure.
32. The area from Deir Ezzour city to the Al Bukamal crossing on the Iraqi border is a grey zone and
is very dangerous. The SDF are present, but stay in their barracks most of the time. On the
ground you do not know who is in charge of security. Armed people in civilian clothes are
checking cars on the road. IS is stille present and there are numerous clashes at night. The
unstable security situation in these areas has resulted in a significant portion of the civilian
population relocating to other regions.
33. There are no NGOs in the Kurdish-controlled areas between Deir Ezzour city and the Al
Bukamal crossing, and access to medical assistance is very limited. Tribal members who remain
in the villages controlled by their tribe are protected by it. However, these individuals may face
issues if they attempt to leave their village and pass through checkpoints controlled by another
tribe or militia. This poses a problem for people in need of medical assistance, such as pregnant
women. There are hospitals in Al-Suwar and Shaddady, but accessing them is quite
complicated due to the insecure roads.
34. In the Khabur Valley, between southern Hasakah and Deir Ezzour, and in the areas around
Shaddady and Siwar, the situation is very bad due to a lack of water, which negatively affects
agriculture. The resident population is predominantly poor Sunni Muslim Arabs. Only a few
NGOs operate in the area due to the security situation, and the local population is generally
opposed to the Kurds. This is also the area where people are most at risk from the Islamic
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State. Isolated cars are attacked on the road, and it is better to travel in a convoy and during
the day. Two Christian priests were killed on this road (Marqadeh), and SDF cars are often
targeted. In 2022 two SDF conscripts who have been killed.
35. Most of the clashes between the SDF and the Arab tribes occur during the night. During the
day, the SDF controls a number of checkpoints and conducts patrols, but after dark, they
withdraw to the barracks and patrol outside their bases. At night, the security situation is
fragile and unpredictable due to the lack of SDF patrols and security presence. In general,
civilians tend to avoid going outside at night because of the precarious security situation.
36. There are checkpoints located at the entrance of each village, as well as at crossroads and
bridges. On the main road, the checkpoint is controlled by the SDF, while other checkpoints are
managed by individuals who do not wear uniforms and are thus unknown. They could be part
of a local militia or a group affiliated with the SDF but not officially recognized by it.
Checkpoints are a resource that these groups use to extort money and goods from civilians
passing through.
37. The primary targets of IS attacks in Deir Ezzour province are the SDF. People with new cars are
assumed to belong to the SDF and thus become primary targets for IS. IS is attempting to expel
the Kurds and the SDF to retake control of the area. They have been unsuccessful so far but are
reorganizing themselves to do so. IS threatens NGO workers and individuals suspected of
collaborating with the SDF, extorting them for money. People who do not comply with this are
targeted by IS. This type of extortion is primarily carried out by IS, as it is a major source of
income for the group.
38. Civilians are also subjected to extortion by IS, and those who do not pay are targeted by the
group. Women who refuse to wear a hijab and follow IS rules are afraid to be targeted, but
Fabrice Balanche is unaware of specific examples of people being killed or injured. The area is
very conservative, so women who refuse to wear a hijab are also targeted by their own
families. The patriarchal power is ruling the area and maintain the social conservatism by force
if needed.
39. The Euphrates River forms the border between the SDF and the Syrian government. However,
there is a small area in the north of Deir Ezzour city where the northern bank is controlled by
the Syrian government. This year, the number of clashes in this area has decreased. Such
clashes are limited to the front lines.
Freedom of movement
40. The Tall Rifaat enclave is a special case because you have to travel through government-
controlled areas to reach the Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa or Kobane, making travel
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difficult. While it is possible for women and children to travel out of this area, they would have
to pay bribes.
41. For men, it is much more difficult to travel out of the Tall Rifaat enclave, primarily because of
the mandatory military service to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). If a man has not performed
military service, he will be caught by the government if he attempts to travel through areas
controlled by the Syrian government. The same applies to reservists who have been called up,
people affiliated with the YPG/YPD, or individuals with outstanding security issues with the
Government of Syria. Some of these individuals can cross into different areas of the Tall Rifaat
enclave if they travel with the special convoys operated by the YPG/SDF. There is an agreement
between the SDF and the Syrian government that allows these official convoys to travel
unhindered into Manbij from the Tall Rifaat enclave.
42. There are generally no issues traveling from Kobane to Raqqa or other parts of the Kurdish-
controlled areas of North and East Syria. There is a high level of freedom of movement in these
areas unless the individual has been called up for the mandatory Self-Defense Duty by the
Kurdish authorities and is attempting to avoid it. In such cases, the individual will be caught at
the checkpoints and sent to perform the Self-Defense Duty.
43. It is possible to travel between the Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir
Ezzour, and there are public and private transportation options available. The road between
Hasakah and Raqqa is secure, and it is safe to travel on this road at night. The main issue on
this road is car accidents rather than security incidents.
44. Women and children can travel between the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria
and other areas of Syria under the control of the Syrian government. There are buses from
Raqqa and Qamishli to Damascus, and it is also possible to fly between Qamishli and
Damascus. This is not the case for men wanted for military service in the Syrian Arab Army or
reserve duty, as they will be arrested if they cross into areas controlled by the Syrian
government.
45. Students from the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria who are studying for the
Syrian government high school diploma or completing their secondary education travel to
Aleppo and Deir Ezzour for this purpose. Upon completing their exams, they can attend
university in Homs, Damascus, or Latakia. While at university, they can travel between Latakia
and Qamishli for vacation without any problems because, as students, they are not obliged to
perform military service.
46. There are SDF checkpoints located at crossroads and entrances to cities, but inside the cities,
there are generally no checkpoints. Typically, there is no corruption or extortion at the SDF
checkpoints in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa and Hasakah. In Deir Ezzour, people have
to pay money at the checkpoints, but it is often unclear whether the groups at these
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checkpoints officially belong to the SDF. They are often not wearing uniforms, and it is
therefore hard to identify which group they belong to.
47. Men wanted for mandatory Self-Defense Duty will be detained at checkpoints. IDPs face
challenges at checkpoints due to a lack of documentation, which restricts their ability to move
around. They need a sponsor to vouch for their identity at these checkpoints. Documents are
required to travel between the various areas of the Kurdish-controlled parts of North and East
Syria. This is why the Kurdish authorities want to issue IDs to IDPs.
48. the road network in the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria is quite good, with a
new bridge connecting Raqqa to the south bank of the Euphrates. Additionally, the road
between Hasakah and Raqqa has been widened, making travel easier. .
49. The M4 between Tell Tamer and Manbij is on the frontline between the SDF and pro-Turkish
SNA group forces, and it cannot be used. Previously, it was possible to travel from Qamishli to
Kobane in four hours; now, it is necessary to travel through Hasakah, Raqqa, Tabqa, and
Kobane, which takes a day. Transportation is a challenge as it is irregular, and taking a taxi from
Qamishli to Raqqa is quite expensive due to the lack of fuel. This fuel shortage generally
restricts movement in the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria.
Dino Krause, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Skype
meeting, 26 September 2024
Dino Krause is a postdoc researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS),
where his research focuses on the dynamics of armed conflicts with jihadist non-state actors. In
particular, he is interested in the role played by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda as the two
leading transnational jihadist networks.
In his Postdoc project, Dino Krause investigates dynamics related to the de-escalation of armed
conflicts with transnational jihadist actors. He specifically focuses on negotiations leading to
ceasefires, humanitarian access in war-affected areas, prisoner releases, as well as how civil
resistance campaigns can affect ongoing jihadist conflicts.
IS capacity and activity in Kurdish controlled areas of North and East Syria
1. IS initiated attacks in Syria generally tend to be underreported. However, there has
been an increase in IS attacks across Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria in
2024. According to US Central Command, this is the first year since 2019 where there
has been an increase in IS attacks compared to the previous year. Data from the ACLED
database indicates a rise in armed clashes in the first nine and a half months of 2024
compared to the same period in 2023.
2. According to data from ACLED, there were 195 armed clashes involving IS in the first
nine and half months of 2023, increasing to 387 in the first nine and half months 2024.
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Artillery and missile attacks by IS rose from 6 to 13 from 2023 to 2024 in the same
reporting period. According to these metrics, IS attacks in these areas have increased,
with only one dimension decreasing significantly: the use of remote explosives. These
dropped from 65 to 55, which in Dino Krause’s assessment could indicate a change in
strategy or mode of operations, as IS may be focusing on attacking these areas more
directly rather than carrying out attacks from a safe distance. This does not suggest that
IS is getting weaker but that they are adapting their tactics.
3. The quarterly report published by US Central Command for Operation Inherent Resolve
significantly increased its estimate of the number of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria from
1,255 in January 2024 to 2,500 in April 2024. This increase was not explained further,
and it is unclear whether the initial estimate was too low or if IS has been able to
increase its number of fighters through recruitment in the reported period.
4. The same report stated that IS had established training centers in the central Badia
region. Although IS has not held any territorial control in Syria since 2019, it has been
able to relocate fighters to remote areas outside the reach of its enemies, such as the
Syrian government, except for drone strikes. This also allows IS to gather larger
numbers of fighters and grow in strength.
5. IS attacks in the Kurdish-controlled areas of north and east Syria are generally carried
out by small groups of fighters typically belonging to cells of 4 to 8 members, which for
instance attack a checkpoint and then retreat. According to Dino Krause, IS is aware
that if they attempt to operate more openly and with larger numbers of fighters,
reinforcements of Kurdish forces would attack them.
6. IS does not have an open presence in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria, and many
of it’s targeted assassinations take place at night
7. The most recent UN estimate from January 2024 regarding the number of IS fighters is
higher and suggests that IS consists of around 3,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria.
8. It is difficult to say much about the current leadership of IS, as several IS leaders have
been killed since 2019, including the organization’s supreme leader Al-Baghdadi. Very
little is known about the new leader of IS, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who was
announced in the fall of 2023. However, there are no photos or biographical
information on al-Qurashi. Some jihadism researchers assess that the actual new caliph
of IS could be the leader of IS in Somalia. Most jihadism researchers, however, would
disagree with this, as according to IS itself; its leader must be a descendant of the
Quraysh tribe. It is more likely that the leader of IS is still in Syria.
9. IS’s organizational structure in Syria has changed since 2019. During the caliphate era,
IS in Iraq and Syria was responsible for directing the other provinces in a hierarchical
manner. In 2018–2019, there was an internal reorganization that established regional
offices responsible for the various IS provinces around the world, resulting in a flatter
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organizational structure than before. The caliph and the highest decision-making body
are still located in Syria, but the provinces of Syria and Iraq are now essentially on par
with other IS provinces worldwide.
10. Previously, the Syrian and Iraqi branches of IS would send oil and tax money to IS
groups in Africa and other parts of the world. Now, financing networks in central and
eastern Africa are generating their own financial surplus and are sending money to
Lebanon and Turkey, part of which is then funneled into Syria.
11. IS has sleeper cells throughout Syria, especially in the southern part of the country.
However, the exact extent is difficult to gauge based on database research. In areas
where IS is weak, its focus is on gathering weapons and money, as well as recruiting
followers before conducting attacks openly. This was also their modus operandi prior to
the establishment of the caliphate.
12. Two or three years ago, most IS sleeper cells in Syria were quite small, and the
individual fighters had no contact with IS fighters in other provinces. For example, IS
fighters in Raqqa would likely have no contact with IS fighters in Deir Ezzour or
Hasakah. This was a risk diversification strategy. Further up the command chain, IS
leaders had contact with other IS leaders in different parts of the organization, perhaps
in the same region. The higher the leader's rank, the greater the contact with other
leaders across Syria. This strategy was implemented toward the end of the caliphate to
minimize damage to other cells when one cell was captured due to a lack of
communication data between cells. Similarly, captured fighters are unable to disclose
information about other cells.
Aleppo
13. The Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo province are the Kurdish controlled regions of
Syria with the lowest level of IS activity, according to ACLED data. Essentially, the
situation in this area has not changed much between 2023 and 2024, and there have
been six registered attacks by IS in the Kurdish-controlled parts of Aleppo in the first
nine and half months of 2024.
14. These attacks have been small-scale shootings targeting vehicles and checkpoints
belonging to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). There was also a case involving a
judge who was shot but not killed by an IS member in Manbij. Overall, this area is not a
focal point for IS operations in Syria, but it is possible—and likely—that there are
sleeper cells that are not claiming further attacks, according to the Dino Krause’s
assessment.
Raqqa
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15. Compared to the situation in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo, the situation in
Raqqa is somewhat different. At the provincial level, the number of IS attacks doubled
from 2023 to 2024, but these attacks are primarily taking place in the Badia region
outside the areas of Kurdish control in Raqqa governorates,.
16. The number of IS attacks on SDF forces decreased from 18 in in the first nine and half
months of 2023 to 9 in the same period of 2024. These attacks primarily occur in small
villages and towns to the north and northeast of Raqqa city, targeting SDF/Asayish
checkpoints and vehicles.
17. IS attacks on civilians in Raqqa follow a similar trend to those in Deir Ezzour and
Hasakah. Essentially, the civilians targeted by IS are small businessmen, such as
shopkeepers and farmers in rural areas. In the Raqqa area, the number of these attacks
is quite small. There are also several cases of IS attacks on civilians in areas controlled
by the Syrian government on the west side of the Euphrates River, which borders the
Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa.
Deir Ezzour
18. Deir Ezzour is the area in northeast Syria that is by far the most affected by IS violence.
There has been a large increase in attacks in this area initiated by the Islamic State.
There were 174 IS-initiated attacks in the first nine and half months of 2023 in all areas
of Deir Ezzour governorate, including in both Kurdish controlled and government of
Syria controlled areas of Deir Ezzour. The number of IS-initiated attacks in both GOS and
Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour has increased to 338 in during the same period
in 2024. This increase spans all types of armed attacks, including shootings, clashes,
attacks against civilians, as well as remote explosives, IEDs, looting, and property
damage. These attacks are occurring in both the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour
and the Badia region west of the Euphrates River.
19. IS attacks against the SDF in Deir Ezzour have increased significantly in 2024 compared
to 2023. There were 168 attacks against the SDF in 2024, while there were 64 IS-
initiated attacks against the SDF in 2023. These attacks were mostly carried out using
light weaponry, along with a few attacks using rocket-propelled grenades at SDF
checkpoints. There have even been a few cases of rocket attacks on houses belonging
to members of the SDF.
20. The number of SDF counterinsurgency operations against IS actually decreased at the
same time as the increase in IS-initiated attacks on SDF forces in Deir Ezzour. According
to Dino Krause’s assessment this could indicate that the SDF is struggling to maintain
the pace of counter-IS operations in Deir Ezzour. Turkish airstrikes and attacks from pro-
Iranian militias, combined with decreased support from the United States, have forced
the SDF to conserve resources and manpower for counter-IS operations.
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Hasakah
21. IS activity in Hasakah was fairly low compared to 2023. The number of IS-initiated
attacks decreased in the first nine and half months from 39 in 2023 to 25 in the first
nine and half months of 2024. Most IS-initiated attacks in Hasakah were shootings
directed at SDF vehicles or checkpoints, and there were few attacks against civilians in
this area. A diesel tanker was attacked by gunfire, and an alleged PKK member was
assaulted in Hasakah city. The Syrian Democratic Council office in Qamishli has also
been attacked by IS, but there were no fatalities.
22. Hasakah is relatively calm, but this does not mean that IS is absent from the area. There
have been quite a few arrests of IS cells in Hasakah in 2024. In addition, the Kurdish
authorities announced that they arrested 40 individuals linked to financing IS in May
2024, which indicates that the level of IS activity should not be measured solely by the
number of attacks, according to the assessment of Dino Krause.
Impact on Civilians
23. IS targets farmers and shopkeepers in the Kurdish-controlled areas of northeast Syria to
extort them for financial gain. IS disguises this extortion as collecting zakat (religious
tax), a practice that also occurred during the caliphate, but it is essentially a form of
organized crime. People who do not pay may be killed, and the same applies to those
driving oil or diesel trucks in rural areas, who are sometimes stopped by IS for the
purpose of extortion. This is a recurring pattern across different parts of the Kurdish-
controlled areas of north and east Syria.
24. The other civilians targeted by IS in these areas are those accused of collaborating with
the Kurdish authorities or former Kurdish fighters. Politically active locals engaged in
civil councils who may have spoken out against IS are also targeted. There have also
been one or two cases where IS has targeted demobilized IS fighters because they are
seen as traitors.
SDF capacity to counter IS
25. It is unclear whether IS' capacity has significantly increased or whether the increase in
IS operations is linked to a weakening of the SDF. The estimations regarding
recruitment by the UN and US Centcom are rough estimates that differ by thousands.
Too little is known about the location of IS cells in Syria, the kind of weaponry they have
access to, and their strategic rationale for underreporting attacks.
26. The SDF has a capable military force, intelligence service, and police force, making it an
effective actor for conducting counter-terrorism operations. They also receive support
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from the US. The problem is that they are fighting on multiple fronts. They must guard
prisons containing tens of thousands of people, which is a drain on resources.
Additionally, there is the continued bombardment by Türkiye and conflicts with tribal
and Iranian militias in Deir Ezzour.
Al Hol camp
27. The security situation in the Al Hol camp is very unstable, and the circulation of
weapons within the camp is well known and documented. When the Kurdish
authorities present the weapons seized in connection with raids, the amounts are
generally quite large.
28. There are parts of the camp that are essentially no-go areas for the guards themselves,
specifically the foreign sections used to house non-Syrians and Iraqis, which the
authorities only enter in large groups. There are examples of Yazidi women being freed
10 years after capture, demonstrating how inaccessible parts of the camp are.
29. Petty crime is omnipresent, and IS ideology is still very prevalent in the camps. Al Hol
has roughly 90% women and children, yet a considerable number of women in the
camp still adhere to IS ideology. They have access to weapons and funding from
abroad, which are used to exercise power within the camp. People who diverge from
that ideology—such as women who do not veil themselves, listen to music, or openly
speak out against the Islamic State—may be killed or severely injured.
30. The recently published report by Amnesty International has accused the Kurdish
authorities of human rights violations in the camps, including enforced disappearances,
gender-based violence, torture, and murder. These violations were also mentioned in
the OIR Centcom report from 2024.
31. From a security perspective for the areas surrounding the Al-Hol camp smuggling
operations are taking place in the heart of the Al Hol camp, which include the
smuggling of weapons and money. There are also reports of Islamic State affiliates
being smuggled out of the camps for bribes. Additionally, there are reports that the
Kurdish guards do not conduct appropriate patrols in the camp because they are
underpaid and lack discipline.
32. The number of attacks against the Kurdish guards in the camp has decreased
significantly since 2022. However, this could be due to a reduced presence rather than
indicative of an actual improvement, according to the assessment of Dino Krause.
Prison escapes, such as the one in Hasakah in 2022, still occur. There was a large prison
breakout in Ayn Issa in 2019 and another breakout in Aleppo in 2024, where twelve IS-
affiliated individuals escaped from a detention facility.
33. The liberation of IS affiliates and members from Al Hol and other facilities remains a
major short- and mid-term priority for IS, according to the assessment of Dino Krause.
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The population of the camp has decreased from an estimated 50,000 to an estimated
41,000 people. Repatriation from the camp is taking place, primarily to Syria and Iraq.
34. Reintegration programs in Syria are quite basic. Often, a tribal leader will vouch for a
person and their family before they are returned to the community, but that is
essentially the extent of the program. Neighbors then live door-to-door with people
suspected of IS affiliation. Consequently, the released families face a high degree of
marginalization in their return communities.
35. The unhindered smuggling in and out of the camp, combined with the presence of IS
ideology among the inhabitants of the camp, means that it is highly likely there is a
form of spillover. However, the general data regarding incidents involving Hasakah is
quite low, despite the fact that Al Hol is located in Hasakah. This may be due to
underreporting according to the sources’ assessments.
Mahmoud Sheikh Ibrahim, a Syrian-Kurdish Journalist based in
Erbil, meeting in Erbil, 8 October 2024
General security situation in DAANES-controlled North and East Syria
1. The security situation in parts of northern and eastern Syria under Kurdish control is
unstable due to several threats, the northern frontlines face regular bombardment
from the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Türkiye, while the southern areas controlled
by DAANES, such as southern Raqqa and Kurdish-controlled areas in Deir Ezzour are
increasingly threatened by IS presence.
2. Turkish air and drone strikes generally target three main areas in Aleppo, Raqqa, and
Hasakah: Manbij and its surrounding area, Ayn Issa and its surrounding area, and Tell
Tamer. These areas are regularly attacked by Turkish forces, which also strike other
locations from time to time.
3. IS activity is primarily concentrated along the banks of the Euphrates River. The western
bank is controlled by the Syrian government, except for some areas near Raqqa, while
the eastern bank is under the control of the SDF. Regular IS attacks occur in the eastern
part of Deir Ezzour, as well as in the areas around Manbij, Raqqa, and Tabqa.
Islamic State
4. IS has a significant presence within the communities of Shadaddy and the Deir Ezzour
governorate, driven by ideological, religious, ethnic, and financial factors, which IS uses
to mobilize the population in these areas. As a result, two administrations exist in the
eastern part of the Deir Ezzour governorate: one is the autonomous administration,
and the other is IS shadow governance structures, which is particularly strong in the
villages of Busayra, Diban, and Soheil.
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5. IS primarily targets oil trucks transporting crude oil from areas controlled by the
autonomous administration to those controlled by the Syrian government and the SNA.
IS also targets civilian oil investors who refuse to pay zakat tax to IS, as well as members
of the SDF and civilian officials of the autonomous administration. IS frequently accuses
civilian employees of the autonomous administration of being SDF spies or
collaborators. In August 2024, IS members attacked a businessman working with oil
investments with grenades in the town of Busayra.
6. Transportation on the roads from Hasakah to Raqqa and Kobane decreases significantly
after dark, indicating the impact of the threats mentioned above on the civilian
population. While moving short distances between villages in Kurdish areas is relatively
safe, traveling to the ethnically mixed populated areas in the southern part of the
Kurdish-controlled regions is dangerous, especially at night.
Deir Ezzour
7. The security situation in Deir Ezzour has a greater impact on the civilian population
compared to other areas in northern and eastern Syria under Kurdish control. This is
due to threats from IS and attacks by Arab tribes backed by Iranian militias and military
personnel.
8. The Iran-backed Arab tribal groups typically consist of thirty to forty fighters armed
with light weapons, such as AK-47s and grenades, and carry out uncoordinated attacks
against the SDF from the western bank of the Euphrates River, which is controlled by
the Syrian government.
9. The security situation in Deir Ezzour is complex and characterized by the presence of
many different actors and groups, whose affiliations are not always clear. Some attacks
are initiated by IS, while others are carried out by groups backed by Türkiye, Iran, or the
Syrian government. According to Mahmoud Sheikh’s opinion the main aim of these
actors is to destabilize the region and force an American withdrawal for North and east
Syria.
10. It is not always clear which group has initiated a specific attack, but Mahmoud Sheikh
Ibrahim assessed that IS is responsible for more attacks than other groups, based on
their activity on social media, where they claim responsibility for certain incidents.
11. These armed groups mine the roads and carry out attacks using motorcycles with a
driver and a shooter. Initially, these attacks primarily targeted one or two SDF soldiers
on their way to work. However, in late September and early October 2024, the attacks
have escalated, and as of October 2024 SDF convoys consisting of three or four vehicles
are also being targeted.
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12. There are regular clashes between the Arab tribes and the SDF in Deir Ezzour. A major
clash occurred in August 2024 around the village of Diban, during which the Arab tribes
nearly reached the coalition base near the Al Omar oil field and Green Village. The
Americans intervened, and the SDF sent reinforcements from Hasakah to push the Arab
tribes back to the western bank of the Euphrates River in GoS-controlled areas.
13. Shelling, heavy machine gun fire, and mortar attacks have occurred across the
Euphrates River between Syrian government forces and the SDF in 2024. The SDF also
conducted an operation across the river in early September 2024, during which they
kidnapped some members of the government forces.
14. The fighting in Deir Ezzour results in regular casualties among civilians. In August 2024,
11 civilians were killed in a mortar attack by Syrian government forces on the village of
Al Dahalah. The mortar attacks are generally indiscriminate and often lead to civilian
casualties.
Raqqa
15. The security situation in Raqqa is more stable compared to Deir Ezzour. The situation in
Raqqa has improved since it was liberated from the Islamic state in 2017, and the
population has increased as people from other parts of Syria have relocated there. This
population increase has also led to a rise in the number of IS affiliates in the area.
16. The main security threats in Raqqa come from IS and cells backed by the Syrian
government or Türkiye, which plant bombs in the area. Clashes occur between the SDF
and the SNA north of Raqqa in the areas surrounding Ayn al-Issa and along the M4
road. There are also clashes between the SDF and the SNA in the vicinity of Tell Abyad,
which happen more frequently than those on the frontlines in Hasakah.
17. Ayn al-Issa and the Tell Abyad area (Operation Peace Spring Area) are the most affected
regions in northern Raqqa due to clashes between the SDF and the SNA. Civilians in the
Ayn al-Issa area are occasionally impacted by shelling from both the SDF and Türkiye
across the border. Civilian casualties in this area are generally considered collateral
damage from the fighting between the armed actors in the areas.
18. There have been clashes between the Syrian government forces and the SDF. The
relationship between the Syrian government and the SDF in Raqqa is characterized by
limited cooperation, primarily due to the Syrian army’s presence and patrols along the
border with Türkiye, as well as the Russian presence in Tell Tamer.
19. The coalition conducted two operations against IS in Raqqa last month, during which
two IS leaders from Deir Ezzour were apprehended. IS is attempting to recruit young
people between the ages of 16 and 18 in the Raqqa area. There have been reports in
October 2024 regarding the abduction of 20 boys by IS, who were taken to the Bahdia
desert for training.
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20. IS targets prisons in Raqqa to liberate its members. Recently, in august 2024 several
foreign fighters escaped from a prison in Raqqa.
Aleppo
21. The Syrian government occasionally imposes blockades on the Kurdish neighborhoods
of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo. In response, the SDF imposes reciprocal
tit-for-tat blockades on the Syrian government’s security squares in Hasakah and
Qamishli. These blockades have previously led to armed clashes between the SDF and
Syrian government forces, but this has not been the case in 2024.
22. The main offensive activity from Türkiye in the Aleppo governorate occurs in the area
surrounding Manbij and the Tell Rifaat enclave. Manbij is under SDF control but is
geopolitically important due to its location along the M4 road. Acording to Mahmoud
Sheikh assesment Türkiye, the Syrian government, and Russia strategic objective is for
the SDF to withdraw from Manbij, but so far, the SDF has not done so.
23. There are regular clashes between the SDF (Manbij Military Council) and the SNA north
of Manbij in the Sarjul Valley. There are also regular clashes and shelling between the
SNA and the SDF in the Tell Rifaat enclave. There have been instances of an increased
concentration of SNA fighters near the Tell Rifaat enclave, who appeared to be
preparing for a large-scale attack in this area. However, this has not materialized. This
occurred most recently in September 2024. The clashes in Manbij and the Tell Rifaat
enclave occasionally result in civilian casualties, and the civilian population has adapted
to the ongoing conflict.
24. Manbij city is an Arab-majority town where IS occasionally conducts attacks in the form
of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The most recent IS attack on
Manbij occurred between February and April 2024. IS is currently also active in the
north of Manbij.
Hasakah
25. The security situation in Hasakah varies depending on whether you are in the southern
parts of the governorate or the northeastern region around Qamishli and Derik, which
is primarily affected by Turkish strikes from across the border. Otherwise, the security
situation in the northeastern areas is generally calm, and IS does not have a significant
presence there.
26. There are generally no security incidents on the road north of Hasakah city. IS has a
greater presence in the southern part of Hasakah, where it operates out of certain
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neighborhoods. The SDF recently arrested three members of IS from this area who
were filming Hasakah prison. The coalition base in Shaddady is regularly attacked by IS.
27. Qamishli and the main surrounding roads are regularly affected by Turkish drone and
artillery strikes, which result in civilian casualties. In the first week of October 2024,
two Turkish drone strikes hit a civilian car between the border to Iraq and Qamishli,
resulting in several civilian casualties.
28. Clashes between the SDF and the SNA occasionally occur in the Hasakah governorate.
Last month, the SDF conducted an attack against SNA forces, resulting in heavy
casualties. However, Turkish artillery strikes from across the border are more prevalent
than clashes between the SNA and the SDF.
29. The artillery and mortar strikes occasionally inflict civilian casualties in areas close to
the frontlines of the areas controlled by Turkish-backed groups and Türkiye. As a
consequence much of the civilian population has fled these areas. The trenches
adjacent to the frontlines are mined, which sometimes results in casualties among
shepherds during harvest season in the area.
30. There is sometimes tension surrounding the security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli.
Recently, the SDF imposed a blockade preventing food, water, and fuel from entering
these areas. The blockade was lifted after seven hours. These kinds of blockades occur
from time to time in Hasakah and Qamishli, and they sometimes lead to clashes
between the SDF and Syrian government forces, which can result in civilian casualties.
Al Hol camp
31. The prices for smuggling people out of Al Hol have increased dramatically. It costs
around $20,000 to smuggle a woman out of the camp and between $5,000 and
$10,000 to smuggle a child out. People are smuggled out of the camp by drivers of the
water trucks that enter and exit Al Hol camp. Recently in 2024, two women were
smuggled out of the camp with their children and sent to Türkiye.
32. Mahmoud Sheikh is unaware of any examples where smuggling operations in and
around the Al Hol camp have resulted in civilian casualties, but IS sometimes targets
smugglers who defraud the women they smuggle out of the camp by taking their
money and then do not or cannot smuggle them out of the camp.
33. The area outside the Al Hol camp is a sparsely populated desert close to the Iraqi
border, and the violence inside the camp generally does not spill over into the
surrounding inhabited areas. Some members of the surrounding population are also
involved in the smuggling operations in and out of the camp.
Freedom of movement
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34. Civilians can generally travel between different areas under Kurdish control. However,
traveling from the Kurdish-controlled parts of Aleppo to other areas under Kurdish
control can be complicated. This is because some of the Kurdish-controlled areas of
Aleppo are enclaves, such as Tall Rifaat, the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and
Ashrafieh and people traveling from these areas to Hasakah, Qamishli, or Raqqa must
cross territory controlled by Syrian government forces.
35. Crossing government-controlled territory, in order to pass from Kurdish controlled
enclaves in Aleppo to other Kurdish controlled areas in the northeast is generally not a
problem for people who are not wanted by the Syrian government, such as women,
children, and men above the age of conscription. However, men within the conscription
age range cannot travel through these areas unless they pay a smuggler to facilitate
their transport from the Kurdish-controlled parts of Aleppo to other areas under
Kurdish control in North and East Syria. There are 19 Syrian government checkpoints
between the Kurdish enclaves and the Kurdish controlled areas of North and East Syria.
36. The road between Manbij and Hasakah is open, as are the roads between Hasakah,
Raqqa, and Qamishli. However, traveling along these roads at night can be dangerous.
The road between Hasakah and Raqqa is mostly desert, and the autonomous
administration has placed checkpoints every ten kilometers along this route. However,
IS and criminal groups target oil trucks on this road. The southern road to Deir Ezzour is
the most insecure.
37. Civilians can travel by bus between Raqqa, Tabqa, Hasakah, and Qamishli. There are
also buses that run between Kobane and the Iraqi border every other day. The buses
are cheap, and as there are many passengers onboard, these busses travel at night.
38. SDF checkpoints are prevalent in all areas controlled by the autonomous
administration, but sometimes the SDF withdraws from checkpoints at night in Deir
Ezzour to avoid being targeted by IS. This also occurs on the Khurafe road between
Hasakah and Deir Ezzour, where IS occasionally attacks SDF convoys in the southern
part of this road
39. Wanted individuals and men within the conscription age range cannot move
necessarily freely in the areas of North and East Syria under Kurdish control. If a person
avoiding mandatory Self-Defense Duty is apprehended at a checkpoint, he will be
detained and sent to perform military service.
A local NGO worker from Northeast Syria, online meeting, 9
October 2024
General security situation in North and East Syria (NES)
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1. The Kurdish controlled areas in NES remain strictly under SDF control. The main
security issue in the region is the Turkish drone attacks which have expanded beyond
the 30 kilometers safe-zone established by Türkiye, to include areas at least 70
kilometers away from the Syrian-Turkish border, as far as al-Hol and Abd al-Aziz
Mountain. Additionally the targets of these attacks have increasingly come to include
SDF, Asayish (Internal Security Forces), government and administrative figures, not only
PKK affiliated targets, such as PKK-linked elements who work alongside the SDF
according to Turkish reports, as they used to focus on previously.
2. The Turkish attacks on the region has also included attacks on key infrastructure
facilities such as power and water stations, most of which are located in Hasakah
governorate.
3. Another important element related the general security situation in this region is the
fighting between Iranian backed forces affiliated with the Syrian government and SDF
forces in Deir Ezzour.
4. Increased IS activity, especially in Deir Ezzour is the third major security trend in the
DAANES-region. Last month alone, in September 2024, IS conducted 22 attacks against
the SDF, the Asayish (Internal security forces ISF) and people perceived to be working
with the Self-administration governance institutions like local councils, communes and
municipalities.
Hasakah
5. In the northern parts of the governorate along the M4 highway, Turkish strikes remain
the major security concern. According to the source’s assessment this will go on until
Türkiye reaches its objectives in the area or the US manages a de-escalation and a
compromise between both sides, which is unlikely in the short to medium term despite
some increasing talks about it by US officials. The US on the other hand have become
an increasingly unreliable partner for self-administration due their unclear intentions in
the region, which is pushing the Kurds to seek alternatives with the Russians and the
regime. The alternative plan also is not making progress despite ongoing talks between
Damascus and the Self-Administration due to the intransigence position of Damascus of
granting any decentralized rights to the self-administration or allowing it to maintain its
military and security forces.
6. In January 2024 Türkiye conducted a series of attacks on multiple locations and targets
in the Hasakah province, many of which were vital infrastructure facilities. Among the
targets was al-Suwaydiya power generation station which is the main power station
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that provides power to the entire Hasakah region, and until this day the power has not
yet been restored in some of the affected areas.
7. In the same series of attacks a water station was targeted, in addition projects that are
funded and restored by international actors such as USAID. A power station in Darbasia
was also targeted. This particular power station provides power to the Alouk water
station which is the sole water source in Hasakah. Alouk is currently under the control
of Turkish backed opposition groups.
8. Turkish targeting has also come to include oil stations. The self-administration relies
heavily on oil revenues. Because of the Turkish attacks between 40-60% of the
revenues have gone down.
9. During the year there has been some talks between Türkiye and the US, in which the
US tried to persuade Türkiye to reduce its attacks on the region, especially those
targeting governance efforts. There was some reduction in the amount of attacks, but it
did not last for long and in May and June airstrikes were resumed to previous levels. In
the beginning of October 2-3 attacks took place on the road between Hasakah and
Qamishli where a senior YPJ commander was killed. In the same period ISF
commanders were also targeted by Turkish strikes.
10. Tension that occurs in other areas between the SDF and the regime forces and its
proxies, like for instance in Aleppo or Deir Ezzour, this tension is reflected in Hasakah
city and Qamishli. This usually results in the SDF imposing blockades on the security
squares in these two cities. Meaning blocking all kind of supplies that are intended to
go to the government institutions inside the squares.
11. There is no major IS presence in the area, but there are sleeper cells that are able to
move around, mainly near Qamishli but also in the south parts of the governorate near
Tal Hamees and Shaddady.
12. The main focus of IS activity in Hasakah is focused on the camps and the prisons where
IS members and prisoners are held. The majority of these camps and prisons are
located in Hasakah. Some of these camps are seen by IS as safe zones for them, such as
the al-Hol camp, where there have been cases of reversed smuggling meaning that
people have been smuggled in to the camp.
Deir Ezzour
13. The situation in Deir Ezzour is fragile, especially eastern rural parts of the governorate
from Busayra to Baghouz where many the tribes are located, in addition to most of the
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oil fields and oil facilities, which in turn has become a ground for dispute among tribes
but also external actors like Iran and Damascus.
14. The dominance of Kurds in the self-administration has also created local grievances and
tension between tribes and the SDF in the area, which in September last year resulted
in major clashes between SDF and local tribes. Therefore Iran and the Syrian
government have given support to some of the tribes, primarily the al-Hifal tribal family
and its leader Ibrahim al-Hifal, in order to ignite the conflict between the tribes and
SDF. The Syrian government and Iran are trying to push more tribes into joining the
fight against SDF, but most tribes in the area are reluctant to do so, and still prefer the
SDF to the Syrian government and Iran.
15. Clashes happened again in August 2024 between SDF and tribesmen backed by the
Syrian government who came from the government controlled side of the Euphrates
river in deir Ezzor governorate. The SDF was able to push them back and take control of
the whole area but the fighting, which lasted for 24 hours resulted in 15 civilian
casualties. During this attack, the SDF, with support of American airstrikes, for the first
time conducted a counterattack on the government-controlled side of the Euphrates
river. The SDF has now imposed strict security measures such as more check-points
along the river and observation towers on the riverbank as a consequence of the
attack. The situation remains unstable since the area is very hard to monitor and
control, especially movement across the riverbank from government-controlled areas.
16. Due to the ongoing Turkish military drone and airstrikes in the northern parts of the
DAANES areas, the SDF is focusing most of its military capabilities on those areas to the
north. This impacts the SDF’s fighting capability against IS, especially in Deir Ezzour. This
means that IS is more capable of operating in Deir Ezzour, being able to move sleeper
cells from the government controlled areas of the Badia desert to Deir Ezzour and also
across the Iraqi border.
17. Additionally, the tension between tribes and the SDF and the deteriorating economic
situation is creating a profitable environment for IS to recruit people and take
advantage of people’s vulnerabilities. IS uses the state of instability, bad economy and
lack of employment opportunities against the self-administration by blaming them for
the dire condition in the communities and thereby recruit more unemployed youth,
who they pay between 50 – 100 USD to conduct an IED attack or an assassination.
18. IS is still able to collect taxes from people in Deir Ezzour, especially from those who
have businesses. IS also targets, not only military and security branches but now also
the self-administration government structures, such as local councils on a community
level.
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19. IS conducted 22 attack in NES in September and at least 70% of these attacks were in
Deir Ezzour.
Raqqa
20. Security wise Raqqa is the most stable area in NES. Being far away from the Turkish
border the number of attacks on Raqqa city have decreased significantly.
21. The northern parts of the governorate are located on the frontlines between Kurdish
controlled areas and areas controlled by Türkiye and SNA-groups. The Ayn Issa area
along the M4, is considered a war zone and a high-security zone, with daily clashes and
shelling between the SDF and SNA take place. There is also a presence of the Syrian
army and Russian forces in that area, but no US presence.
22. These areas on the frontline are mostly desert areas, but there are some smaller and
scattered villages and communities. These villages are at times hit by shelling, which
can result in civilian casualties.
23. The main issue currently affecting Raqqa is the issue of drugs, both consumption and
smuggling. Drugs are being smuggled from the government controlled areas other side
of the Euphrates river, and as a result drug related crimes are increasing.
24. IS presence in the area is limited due to the increased security measure taken by the
SDF. IS has also shifted their interest to other areas such as Deir Ezzour.
Aleppo
25. The Tel Rifaat area is outside of the so called “US zone”. There is a strong presence of
Iranian backed groups and the SDF only operates in the eastern part of the area. The
area is not officially under SDF control. In this area YPG and YPG linked groups are
operating in that area and they engage in regular fighting with the SNA on the
frontlines. These attacks are causing fatalities because both sides are conducting
incursions across the frontline and there are tens of deaths on both sides. From time to
time there are also civilian casualties due to the shelling.
26. If IS is present in this area they usually operate under a different name like for instance
Hizb al-Tahrir and Huras al-Din in Idlib or other Islamist armed groups.
27. There has not been reports of clashes between HTS and SDF since they do not share
frontlines.
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Freedom of movement
28. When it comes to entering Kurdish-controlled areas from Syrian government-controlled
areas it can be difficult because people (not originally from SDF held areas) need to pay
bribes to cross from one area of control to another. It is very common that people
travel from NES to GoS areas if they do not fear security concerns with Damascus (for
example youth at military conscription age)
29. Travelling through SDF-held areas is possible and quite easy. The area of concern would
be the eastern rural Deir Ezzour, due to the security situation there, especially after
dark, when SDF exercise less actual military control of the area.
30. There is a new road connecting Hasakah and Raqqa, which is called the New M4. One
can reach Raqqa in 2,5 hours from Hasakah city and from there go to Tabqa and then all
the way to Manbij and Kobane.
31. There are bus stations in the big cities in the region with mini-buses that travel back
and forth to different areas (for example between Raqqa and Deir Ezzour).
32. People who could face problems at check-points are mainly young men who are
wanted to perform the self-defense duty for the Kurdish Self Defense Forces. Ethnic
Arabs from parts of Deir Ezzour controlled by the Syrian government are required to be
issued with a so-called displaced ID card by the self-administration in order to live in
SDF-held areas and move around in the areas held by SDF
33. Those individuals displaced to SDF areas need a local sponsor to obtain the displaced ID
card by the Self-Administration, especially those in Deir Ezzour regions held by
the regime and Iranian-militias. Most people don’t have issues finding a sponsor
because many have relatives in these areas who can sponsor them or are from
the same tribe or clan. The Self-Administration says this procedure is due to security
concerns and the need to vet and track newcomers who want to reside in SDF-held
areas
Alexander McKeever, This Week in Northern Syria, WhatsApp
meeting, 11 October 2024
Alexander McKeever is a researcher/journalist based in New York. He writes the weekly
newsletter, This Week in Northern Syria, covering recent events and dynamics in the regions of
Syria controlled by the DAANES and the affiliated SDF, and by the Syrian Interim Government
and the SNA under the auspices of Türkiye.
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Aleppo
1. The security situation in Aleppo is mainly dominated by the frontline activity between
SDF and SDF aligned forces, and the SNA and Türkiye-backed forces. There are regular
exchanges of attacks between these groups, in addition to raids carried out by HRE
(Afrin Liberation Forces), who is a front group for the SDF operating in these areas.
2. According to Alexander’s recent observations, there has been one particular SNA group
called al-Quwa al-Moushtaraka (Joint Force), affiliated with al-Hamza brigade, carrying
out more offensive attacks on SDF/HRE. This group employs a brigade that seems to
have partial Central Asian members (Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kyrgys). This brigade appears to
have been active on the frontlines in Afrin against the SDF/HRE for some time, which
was confirmed in October 2024. Individuals involved with the brigade had been in Idlib
prior to Afrin.
3. Other key security developments in areas under Kurdish control in Aleppo are the
Turkish drone strikes, which are a mix of military usage of loitering munitions and
smaller drones, mostly focused on the frontlines. Targeted assassinations of key SDF
figures are also taking place, which are carried out by Türkiye further away from the
frontlines.
4. The events impacting the security situation in Kobani consists almost entirely of Turkish
drone attacks and where. In Kobani there have been the highest profile attacks of
civilian political targets.
5. In the Tel Rifaat enclave and Manbij there is a presence of regime forces and Iranian
backed groups, but it is very hard to determine the extent of their presence in these
areas. Occasionally, GoS forces would blockade check-points between these areas,
nominally under SDF control, and this is mostly related to various political and military
tensions between the Syrian government and SDF.
6. In Manbij there have been some occasional attacks claimed by IS. However, there is no
IS-activity in the Tel Rifaat-region.
7. Civilian casualties happen occasionally but are relatively low compared to the amount
of activities and incidents in these areas, and most oftenly civilians are not intentionally
targeted in these areas.
Deir Ezzour
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8. IS insurgency has been a major security issue in Deir Ezzour, particularly affecting the
central part of the government around the city of Busayrah.
9. The tribal alliances in the eastern parts of Deir Ezzour are also a great source of tension
and instability. According to the source, the tribal uprising in 2023, characterized the
security situation in Deir Ezzour. The unrest at the time was limited to branches of the
Aqidat tribe, mainly al-Bakir and al-Hafel. Although the SDF regained control over the
areas where the tribal insurrection took place, mostly around Diban to Hajin, scattered
attacks continued and many of these militants moved across the Euphrates river to
areas controlled by GoS. Alexander McKeever stresses the importance of differentiating
between the tribal militias that the GoS created when they reentered the area in 2017,
and tribal forces, such as Ibrahim al-Hafel’s tribesmen who recently came to the area.
The Syrian Government supported these tribal forces, and more so as October 2024
then during the flare-up in 2023.
10. In late September 2024 there was a renewed major tribal insurgency from across the
river on SDF positions but the SDF together with the coalition’s support managed to
contain the infiltration.
11. The main targets of these insurgency attacks are almost entirely SDF targets; SDF
vehicles, SDF patrols, SDF check-points. Occasionally insurgency attacks target civilians
that they deem to be informers for the SDF. It also happens that Insurgents target
civilians working for the DAANES-administration, however, there is no reports on such
attacks happening recently, as of October 2024.
12. The smaller scale insurgent attacks that are attributed to tribal actors are typically just
focused on security personnel. However, more large scale fighting across the river
between the GoS forces and SDF have lead to civilian casualties, usually by mortars or
rockets that are fired across the river. For instance, there was this incident in August
during the most recent major flare-up, a civilian family was killed by artillery fire by
GoS-forces, on the SDF-controlled side of the river. SDF responded by carrying out
some limited cross-river raids into government- controlled areas – a type response that
has typically been a rare occurrence, according to the source.
13. Another issue is the rocket and drone attacks on US military sites and bases in the
region. Those are clearly from Iranian linked actors in Iraq or in Syria, and when the US
responds to those, they will mainly target sites in Deir Ezzour.
Hasakah
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14. The situation in Hasakah varies in different parts of the governorate. There is southern
Hasakah where the situation blends into the one in Deir Ezzour in terms of IS activity.
This is largely on the road that runs north-south from Shadaddy to Deir Ezzour. There is
less frequent activity compared to Deir Ezzour, but still several IS-claimed attacks per
month in this part of Hasakah. The road to al-Hol also sees some IS insurgent activities.
15. The Tel Tamar and Ras al-Ayn frontlines in north-western Hasakah (the eastern part of
the SNA- and Türkiye-controlled Operation Peace Spring area) have similar dynamics to
the frontlines in northern Aleppo, but could be considered less active. On these
frontlines there are sporadic SDF-claimed raids and clashes in addition to Turkish
shelling. Overall there is a lower population density in these areas and therefore we
rarely see civilian casualties.
16. The GoS presence in Hasakah governorate includes the security squares in Hasakah and
Qamishli, a military base in the northeast of Hasakah city, a pocket including Qamishli
airport and several dozen villages south and east of Qamishli. That occasionally leads to
tension.
17. From time to time, in the southern neighborhoods of the city such as Geweran, the SDF
carry out security campaigns often related to IS.
18. The area stretching from Hasakah city to Qamishli up to Derek is a hotspot for Turkish
drone attacks, especially around Qamishli and sometimes in Amuda. These attacks
mainly target SDF but occasionally civilian members of the DAANES-administration are
being targeted as well. At times civilian activists in PYD related groups such as the
women’s organization and other political activists are also targeted by Turkish attacks.
Nevertheless, the attacks are often carried out on open highways and therefore civilian
casualties are relatively limited.
19. The effects of the Turkish attacks on the infrastructure that occurred in late 2023 and in
January of 2024, are still palpable and frequently ongoing. The attacks targeted
electrical grid, oil fields and the power plant in Swuydiya. Due to this, there have been
some protests in Hasakah city because the DAANES-administration reduced the fuel
allocation to bus and taxi drivers. Water supply has also been a major issue as a direct
effect of these attacks on vital infrastructure.
Raqqa
20. The security situation at the Ayn Issa frontline (bordering the western area of the
Operation Peace Spring area) is very different from the one in Raqqa city. This part of
the frontline is more active than the Tel Tamar frontline (located next to the eastern
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part of the Operation Peace Spring area) in Hasakah governorate in terms of the
fighting between SDF and Türkiye/SNA. The area is largely considered a military zone.
Türkiye has about 50 military installations throughout the Operation Peace Spring area,
some of which are larger bases and some are frontline positions with Turkish army
commando units. The situation on this frontline consists of reciprocal shelling and
artillery, and some SDF raids. There haven’t been many drone attacks in this area.
21. There has been some IS insurgent activity in the areas around Raqqa city up to Tel
Samen, however, it has been less intense than Deir Ezzour and southern Hasakah.
According to the source, there is a notion of less IS-insurgency and rather more SDF-
counterinsurgency raids, this year compared to last year. However, it is unclear whether
this has to do with IS-attacks going unreported and the fact that local media tend to
report more on SDF-raids. SDF-raids occur mostly in Raqqa city and around the
Karamah area closer to the Deir Ezzour-border.
22. In September 2024 there was an IS-prison escape during a prison transfer from the
Central prison to the Silo prison and several IS-prisoners escaped, allegedly by bribing
security officials.
23. The attacks that have been claimed by IS have almost entirely been focused on SDF-
targets.
An organization promoting human rights, online meeting, 9
October 2024
General security situation in DAANES/SDF controlled areas of NES
1. The overall security situation in the Kurdish controlled areas of North and East
Syria has worsened. This is due to Turkish air and drone strikes as well as an
increase in IS operations and presence, especially in Kurdish controlled areas
of Deir Ezzour combined with increasing attacks by Arab tribal militias, who
are supported logistically by the GoS and Iran. Although there have been less
Turkish air and drone strikes in 2024 compared to 2023 the drone strikes are
still occurring on a frequent basis.
2. The decreasing security situation has led to more to civilians leaving Kurdish-
controlled areas in north and east Syria.
3. The decreasing security situation has led to an increase in the amount of
minors joining the SDF due to the relatively high wages that the organisation
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pays in salary. Young people over 18 will tend to join the Asaiysh also for
economic reasons. Both the SDF and Asayish pay wages that are relatively
higher to what other employers in the region pay, which is a clear economic
incentive to join these forces. The relatively high salary paid by the SDF and
Asayish even incentivizes families to encourage their minor children to join the
SDF and for young people over 18 to join the Asayish. Young people without
family support networks, jobs or job prospects, or school dropouts around the
age 15-16, are the ones that are most likely to join the SDF and the Asayish, if
they are above 18. According to the source the PKK-affiliated Revolutionary
Youth Movement, operating in Kurdish-controlled areas, are also recruiting
among minors.
4. The Turkish air and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure has had a major
impact on the populations living in Kurdish controlled areas in North and East
Syria. The drone and airstrikes on power plants in the Kurdish-controlled areas
has led to frequent power cuts, which has led to the local population building
solar panels to generate power. Turkish air and drone strikes have also been
destroying water wells, which has led to water shortages in certain areas and
has prevented farmers from growing crops in certain areas.
Aleppo
5. There is continuous and regular fighting, in the form of shelling and artillery
fire between the SDF and SNA-groups across the frontlines separating the
Kurdish-controlled area of Manbij, Tal Rifaat and Kobane with areas controlled
by SNA-groups and Türkiye, particularly in the Tall Rifaat enclave. Over time
the fighting on the frontlines increase and decrease in intensity, but it remains
ongoing.
6. Manbij is the most affected areas in terms of clashes across the frontlines
between SDF and SNA-groups. According to the assessment of the source, this
is due to the Turkish strategy of overtaking the area and thus being able to
connect the two Türkiye and SNA-controlled areas of the Euphrates Shield
area with the Operation Peace Spring area, which the Manbij area sits right.
7. There are frequent Turkish drone attacks in the Kobane area under DAANES
control.
8. The Syrian government has at times imposed a food embargo, in both late
2023 and early 2024, on the Kurdish-controlled Tall Rifaat enclave, preventing
food supplies from entering the area.
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9. There is limited ability for civilians to cultivate their lands due to the fighting
along the frontlines. Fires in agricultural fields also contributed the loss of the
early wheat harvest in the summer of 2024.
10. Civilians living in areas close to the frontlines are impacted by continuous
Turkish drones strikes in the area.
11. There is less presence of the Islamic State in Kurdish-controlled parts of
Aleppo compared to other DAANES-controlled areas in north and east Syria.
The source assessed that their might be active IS sleeper cells in Kurdish-
controlled areas of Aleppo governorate, but the source was not aware of any
active IS operations in the areas.
Hasakah
12. The Syrian Democratic Forces is in greater military control of Hasakah
governorate compared to other DAANES-controlled areas in north and east
Syria.
13. The SDF conducts frequent raids against Islamic State cells in neighborhoods in
both Qamishli and Hasakah city.
14. According to the source, Türkiye has informants operating in the Kurdish-
controlled areas of Hasakah, including in Hasakah city itself. Informants have
provided info on SDF whereabouts in the region. To counter this the SDF has
carried out arrest operations of informants mainly in 2022.
15. Turkish drone and airstrikes take place in a 35-kilometer zone stretching from
the Turkish border into DAANES-controlled areas. Most of the Turkish drone
and airstrikes happen around Qamishli and Hasakah city, as well as the areas
around Amuda and Al Malikiyeh.
16. There is collateral damage from Turkish drone and airstrikes. For instance,
targeted drone strikes have also happened in markets in DAANES-controlled
area for instance in august 2024.
17. In the Kurdish-controlled areas of Hasakah governorate, there are exchanges
of small arms fire and artillery on the frontlines to the Operation Peace Spring
area, which is controlled by Türkiye and SNA groups.
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18. IS has a network of supporters in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, but does
not have an active presence in these cities.
19. According to the source’s assessment, the Islamic State has two operational
goals. One is collect information on the prisons in DAANES-controlled areas to
free their members from the prisons and the Al-Hol camp. The source also
assessed that IS cells are preparing for strategic attacks to free their members
from DAANES-controlled prisons in the Kurdish-controlled areas.
Raqqa
20. In the Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa governorate, there are no Turkish or
GoS attacks. The area is more secure than other areas under Kurdish control,
with the exception of the presence Islamic State cells. IS attacks are
concentrated against security forces, prisons and checkpoints. IS is not
targeting civilians in Raqqa. Al-Karamah in eastern Raqqa governorate has the
largest presence of IS cells.
21. Recently, as of October 2024, there have been less clashes between the SDF
and SNA in areas close to the frontline city of Ain Issa, which borders the
Türkiye and SNA-controlled Operation Peace Spring area.
Deir Ezzour
22. The ongoing conflict in Deir Ezzour is sustained by multiple factors: the
presence of the International Coalition forces against the Islamic State, control
of oil fields in Kurdish-administered areas, and the positioning of Iranian
militias in government-held territories on the western bank of the Euphrates
River, opposite Kurdish-controlled areas on the eastern bank.
23. There are frequent clashes and confrontation between the Arab tribes and the
SDF in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour. Arab tribes in the Kurdish
controlled areas of Deir Ezzour have allied themselves with Syrian
government.
24. Iran has supported Arab militias, which have tried to capture territory from
SDF by conducting cross-river attacks and by shelling SDF-controlled areas.
25. The Islamic state is conducting daily attacks against the SDF and Asayish in Deir
Ezzour governorate. The SDF is the main target of IS attacks in the area. The IS
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is taking advantage of the fighting between Arab militias and the SDF to launch
its operations against the SDF.
26. Civilian casualties occur as collateral damage as a result of the fighting
between the Arab tribes and the SDF as well as from Islamic State attacks,
even if civilians aren’t the direct target of these attacks. The clashes and
attacks in the area has also led to forced displacement of civilians.
27. IS is resurging in Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour governorate due to
the deteriorating economic situation. As a consequence of this the SDF is
conducting more counterinsurgency operations against IS.
Freedom of movement
28. It is possible to travel between the DAANES-controlled parts of Hasakah, Deir
Ezzour, Raqqa and Aleppo for residents in these areas. Local residents in the
Kurdish controlled areas travel to Hasakah and Qamishli for hospital
treatment.
29. IDPs face more difficulty in traveling between various parts of DAANES-
controlled areas. It is required for IDPs to have a sponsor in order to travel
from one part of the Kurdish controlled areas to another.
30. Men of military age face restrictions to their movements if they have not
completed mandatory self-defense duty for Kurdish self-administration. If they
are detained by SDF they will be sent to do the mandatory self-defense duty.
31. The source was aware of anecdotal information pertaining to practice of
paying bribes in order to pass through checkpoints from GoS-controlled areas
into areas controlled by DAANES in north and east Syria. On the road from
Amuda to Qamishli there are two checkpoints. Between Hasakah and Qamishli
there are a minimum of three checkpoints and between Hasakah to Raqqa
there are a minimum of five checkpoints.
A Syrian Human Rights Organisation, Skype meeting, 28 October
2024
The source has been monitoring and documenting violations (e.g. killings, abductions, torture
etc.) against civilians conducted by different parties of the Syrian conflict since 2011. It has a
well-established network of sources throughout Syria.
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Security Situation in DAANES/SDF-Controlled Areas of Deir Ezzour Province
1. The situation in Deir Ezzour, particularly in its eastern countryside, has significantly
deteriorated following the arrest of Abu Khawla, a former chairman of the Deir Ezzour
Military Council, an Arab component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Abu
Khawla faces accusations of conspiring to orchestrate a coup against the SDF and the
American presence in the province in collaboration with Iranian elements.
2. His arrest sparked armed confrontations between the SDF and fighters loyal to Abu
Khawla.
3. The hostilities in Deir Ezzour do not represent a conflict between the SDF and the Arab
tribes in the province, nor can they be characterized as a Kurdish-Arab conflict, as some
analysts have suggested. It is not an Arab uprising against the Kurds, as others have
portrayed. Rather, these confrontations are a clash between the SDF and groups
affiliated with Iranian militias and Hezbollah, with some involvement from the Syrian
government (GoS).
4. Regarding the stance of the tribes, there have been conflicting positions among the
Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour. While the majority have aligned with Abu Khawla in
opposition to SDF control, some tribal leaders have expressed solidarity with the SDF
and participated in the fight against Abu Khawla's affiliated groups and Iranian militias.
Notably, the majority of SDF casualties have been Arab.
5. There have been no clashes or other forms of fighting between the SDF and the Syrian
government (GoS) in the parts of Deir Ezzour province under DAANES control. Limited
skirmishes have occurred between the GoS and SDF in the security square in Hasakah
and near the airport.
6. Clashes have occurred between US forces and Iranian or Russian fighters in the eastern
part of the Deir Ezzour countryside, specifically in seven villages located along the
eastern banks of the Euphrates River near the Conoco base.
7. The Islamic State (IS) remains active in Deir Ezzour province, having conducted 225
attacks from the beginning of 2024 until the end of October 2024. IS has primarily
targeted high-profile Arabs who cooperated with the SDF, attacked oil storage facilities,
and utilized its small cells in DAANES to launch attacks in areas where Sharia law is not
enforced (as defined by IS).
8. IS activities in 2024 rarely led to civilian casualties in DAANES-controlled regions of Deir
Ezzour.
Freedom of Movement in Kurdish-Controlled Regions of North and East Syria
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9. Residents of DAANES/SDF-controlled areas are permitted to travel between the
DAANES/SDF-controlled sections of Aleppo and other regions in North and East Syria,
including parts of Hasakah, Deir Ezzour, and Raqqa. All individuals must present an
identification document and proof of residency in the area. Men of military service age
are also required to present their military book.
10. There is no necessity to apply for permission to move between provinces under
DAANES control for residents of the area.
11. At checkpoints within DAANES territory, discrimination against Arabs is uncommon. The
SDF exercises caution to ensure that Arabs are treated equitably alongside Kurds to
avoid inciting unrest against DAANES. However, at checkpoints in Deir Ezzour, SDF
members affiliated with specific Arab clans may mistreat individuals from rival clans.
12. Generally, individuals passing through checkpoints are not subjected to inspections
during the day but may be checked at night. Women, particularly those wearing a
niqab, are inspected by the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) to ensure that men are not
concealing themselves behind the niqab.
13. From Qamishli to Raqqa, there are approximately 15 checkpoints at the entrances to
cities and along the roads. Between West Deir Ezzour (Maamel area) and East Deir
Ezzour (Al-Baghous), there are three to four checkpoints, and eight checkpoints exist
from East Deir Ezzour to Raqqa.
General security situation in DAANES in 2024
14. The SDF comprises both Arabs and Kurds, making it misleading to characterize arrests
of Arabs by the SDF as indicative of a conflict between these groups. Some
organisations are deliberately attempting to frame the security incidents in the area as
part of a broader Arab-Kurdish conflict.
15. Ordinary citizens and activists who criticize DAANES are generally not arrested. Those
who are detained typically include individuals engaging with external parties, such as
Turkish or Iraqi authorities (particularly those affiliated with Barzani in the Kurdistan
region of Iraq).
16. In 2024, there has been a decrease in civilian casualties and arrests within DAANES
compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the occurrence of clashes between the
SDF and the Turkish army along the borders has decreased in 2024 compared to 2023.
Gregory Waters, online meeting, 26 September 2024
Gregory Waters is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute, a consultant for the
International Crisis Group, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project. His
research focuses on the Syrian regime's security forces, primarily utilizing open source research
to assess the capabilities and structure of the Syrian Arab Army and allied militias. He has also
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written about and tracks the developments of the Islamic State in central Syria. Gregory also
works as a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project, where he writes reports
primarily on Syrian and Iraqi extremist groups. He has previously been published by the Atlantic
Council, Bellingcat, and open Democracy, and currently writes about Syria for the International
Review.
Islamic State (IS) capacity in parts of North and East Syria under Kurdish
control
1. IS has a presence across every governorate in the Kurdish-controlled parts of North
and East Syria, and in every major urban area, both Arab and Kurdish. IS also has the
ability to establish a presence in most rural areas. While IS attacks are primarily
concentrated in areas of Deir Ezzour governorate under Kurdish control, there have
been regular attacks on and discovery and dismantling of IS cells in Manbij, the cities
of Hasakah and Qamishli, the Shaddady countryside, and in Raqqa city by Kurdish
forces and its surrounding areas over the last two years, particularly in the past year.
2. IS presence in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli has been growing over the last two
years, especially in Qamishli city, where their presence has become increasingly
significant. In early September or August 2024, a five-man IS cell was captured in
Qamishli city as they were attempting to build a car bomb.
3. IS has no true territorial control in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria and is
essentially composed of sleeper cells made up of individuals who also have day jobs.
An attempted IED attack for Newroz last year was planned by a local person working
for an NGO.
4. IS activity across the governorates and cities in the northeast encompasses all three
aspects of its operations: violent attacks, financial activities, and human smuggling. IS
attacks occur multiple times a week, while Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) counter-IS
operations are conducted multiple times a month. The first half of 2024 was
particularly violent, with twice as many attacks during this period as in all of 2023.
While the level of violence has since decreased, it remains elevated. In the spring of
2024, the SDF conducted several counter-IS operations, resulting in the capture of low-
and mid-level IS command officials. IS has been able to maintain a high level of
violence despite the number of counter-operations conducted by the SDF.
5. The level of violence does not fully reflect IS's capacity. At some point, the levels will
naturally decrease, but this does not mean that IS has been pushed back. While IS
attacks have increased across all areas of the northeast, most occur in Deir Ezzour.
6. Circumstantial evidence suggests that IS has been able to rebuild its manpower over
the last two to three years, which has, in turn, increased its capability to conduct
attacks. There is also the question of whether IS has been downplaying its activity in
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the northeast to encourage a U.S. withdrawal from the area. The realization that a U.S.
withdrawal is not imminent could explain the recent escalation in IS activity in the
northeast, according to the assessment of Gregory Waters.
7. IS sleeper cells in North and East Syria generally consisted of four to five men around
two years ago, and these cells were highly compartmentalized, as were their chains of
command, to protect them from exposure and capture. Whether this remains the case
is still unclear.
8. The announcement of IS leadership captures and killings over the last two and a half
years indicates that IS leaders are now more localized, which differs from the previous
dynamic where leadership was based in the northwest and directed fighters in the
northeastern parts of Syria.
9. There have been instances where the claimed emir of Raqqa and the claimed emir of
North and East Syria, as well as local financiers, have been captured. IS is increasingly
relying on face-to-face interactions to exchange information, which forces its
command chain to be based locally. However, some IS leaders remain based in Aleppo,
focusing on activities outside Syria and requiring access to Turkey for smuggling or
communication with external contacts.
10. There have been a substantial number of leadership kills and captures, but the IS
command chain in the northeast appears resilient, as evidenced by the increased IS
activity in the first half of 2024. The age and demographics of the captured IS leaders
this year, mostly in their early to mid-twenties, indicate a generational shift in the IS
command structure, with the current commanders being post-insurgency promotions.
This may affect IS's capacity, though the impact is unclear at the moment.
Deir Ezzour
11. There are five towns in Deir Ezzour (Shuhayl, Busayra, Diban, Zire, and Wajes) where
the common narrative is that there is an IS shadow government, and that IS takes
control during the night, although they do not have an administrative structure. The IS
presence in these towns consists of nighttime patrols, extortion, intimidation of the
civilian population, and greater freedom of movement for IS. Kurdish security forces
do not enter these towns at night to conduct counter-IS operations.
12. Three of these towns have had a significant IS presence since 2021, which has now
expanded to two more towns over the last two years. IS does not have territorial
control or permanent checkpoints in Deir Ezzour, but it is very dangerous to travel at
night. In mid-September 2024, there was an IS attack in Wajes, Deir Ezzour.
13. The strength of IS, combined with the SDF's lack of capacity in this area, means that IS
has nearly free rein to do as they please with the population—whether that involves
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extortion, recruitment, or simply existing alongside a population that is too
intimidated to cooperate with authorities in relation to countering IS.
14. Deir Ezzour is the area with the highest level of all three aspects of IS activity. There is
regular smuggling across the Euphrates River to areas controlled by the Syrian
government, linking IS activities in the northeast with central Syria. Recruitment for IS
occurs in Deir Ezzour, as does outreach to former IS fighters in the region. However, it
is unclear how successful IS has been in recruiting new adult members with no
previous affiliation to the group. It is also uncertain whether recruitment for IS takes
place outside of Deir Ezzour.
15. There are recent reports of IS 'safe houses' in Kurdish-controlled Deir Ezzour, which the
group uses for political and religious indoctrination before sending individuals to
military training camps. This represents a new development in the Deir Ezzour area
and is a trend that, until recently, only occurred in parts of Syria controlled by the
Syrian government. This indicates the level of safety and security that IS has achieved
in Deir Ezzour. Although there have been Kurdish battalions in IS in the past, there are
currently no reports of IS outreach to Kurds. IS also exploits the ethnic tensions
between Arabs and Kurds in its recruitment propaganda.
16. There are regular attacks against Kurdish security forces and threats of violence toward
the local population. Targeted assassinations still occur, but not as frequently as in the
past. However, it is unclear whether this is because IS cannot carry them out or
because fewer people are willing to cooperate with the security forces. This situation
makes it difficult for NGOs to operate in the area and for services to be provided to
local populations in the affected area.
17. Essentially, there is a lack of SDF presence in the Deir Ezzour area. There are towns in
Deir Ezzour where an SDF security presence exists at the perimeter, monitoring entry
and exit, but there is a lack of a permanent interior security presence. This situation
has allowed IS cells to persist and grow, and sometimes intermingle and reorganize
themselves together with the remainder of local tribal insurgency.
18. The SDF withdrew from several towns in the Deir Ezzour province in connection with
the 'tribal insurgency' in the autumn of 2023 and reestablished itself with a slightly
different footprint in the area than in the past. Generally, the SDF will withdraw its
physical presence from checkpoints in the area if they are under severe threat and are
incapable of defending them properly. The SDF relies more on patrols than on a
permanent physical presence. Local sources describe the situation as one of reduced
SDF security presence and fewer security operations conducted against IS by the SDF,
alongside a simultaneous increase in IS attacks on SDF security forces. SDF counter-IS
operations are currently not increasing at the same rate as operations conducted by IS.
Aleppo
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19. The IS presence in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Aleppo province is primarily
centered around Manbij. IS claims attacks in this area occur steadily, but at the same
time, this is also the area where IS attacks are least frequent. There is a steady
presence of IS in the region, but they are not always engaged in violent activity. This is
one of the key aspects of IS's presence in North and East Syria. In Deir Ezzour, there is a
lot of violence, which is not the case in other areas, such as Raqqa or Manbij, which
have a similar dynamic.
20. IS has had a long-term presence in Manbij, and because this area is such an important
crossing point, connecting the northeast with the northwest, one would expect IS to
have established an infrastructure that enables it to use pre-existing smuggling routes
or create its own for moving goods and people.
21. There have been no reports of IS activities in the area around Kobane. The issues
facing Kobane are generally more related to PKK activity impacting the local
population. The PKK’s overt presence in the area, along with the deteriorating
socioeconomic situation, has led to a significant population flight from the town,
which is not attributable to IS.
Raqqa
22. The IS presence in Kurdish controlled areas of Raqqa governorate is quite robust. The
coalition and SDF conducted a raid in the Raqqa area in early September 2024, during
which they captured an IS leadership figure. IS still conducts extortion in Raqqa city,
although this is not as widespread as it once was. The Kurdish security forces are
fearful of the IDP community from the informal camps in the countryside, as well as
those in Mansour and the Tabqa area. The threat may be overstated, but it does
present a security and administrative problem for the authorities.
23. There have been IS attacks on the road to Ayn Issa and in the city area. There were two
attacks on the Asayish headquarters this year, as well as one in the Mansour
countryside. A large population has recently returned to Raqqa, Mansour, and Tabqa
from Al Hol, and the integration of these families will carry an increased risk of some
of them rejoining IS and supporting IS activity in the area.
Hasakah
24. The level of IS activity in Hasakah is a close third to that in Raqqa, but it certainly
seems to be increasing recently, as of September 2024. In the months preceding the
Sina’a prison attack in 2022, there was an increased level of overt IS activity in
Hasakah. Before and since then, there have been multiple car bomb operations, both
successful and unsuccessful.
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25. IS has had a presence in Hasakah for a long time and has maintained networks across
Hasakah province for years, primarily due to the presence of the Al Hol camp. This
network enables IS to smuggle women out of the camp, and there has been an
increase in violent attacks in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli. According to security
officials, IS uses the Shadaddy countryside as a key transit route.
26. The main change regarding IS activity in the area is its ability to conduct violent
incursions into the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, rather than just smuggling
operations. According to Gregory waters, there is no clear reversal of this trend.
Impact on civilian population
27. IS assassinates aid workers and individuals connected to local non-military authorities.
There are also regular claims that the SDF is killing and wounding civilians as collateral
damage during its raids against IS, as well as mistakes made in connection with these
operations, for instance in wrongfully targeting the individuals with no IS affiliation.
Additionally, there are many reports of civilian casualties related to the SDF’s response
to the tribal insurgency in autumn 2023, including women and children killed during
the SDF’s besiegement of certain towns in Deir Ezzour. However, there have been no
reports of civilian casualties inflicted by the SDF outside the Deir Ezzour area of
operations.
28. According to Gregory Waters it is safe to assume that there have been civilian
casualties in the fighting between IS and the SDF, but the extent of these casualties is
difficult to pin down in actual quantifiable numbers. The most common targets of IS
attacks are SDF security forces, particularly at checkpoints or during SDF-patrols. IS is
also attempting to facilitate further prison breaks. Additionally, IS consistently engages
with the civilian population, with extortion and intimidation being the most common
forms of interaction. In recent years, more violence has been directed toward the
civilian population; however, IS has now established a baseline level of intimidation,
which means it does not have to kill local sheikhs, businessmen, and aid workers as
frequently. However, such killings still occur. The attack in Hasakah last Kurdish New
Year (Newroz in march 2024), was directed toward civilians, indicating that IS will still
attempt mass casualty attacks when the opportunity arises according to Gregory
waters assessment.
29. Outside of Deir Ezzour, it is relatively safe to travel from Raqqa to Hasakah, but there
are still checkpoints. The real hindrance to civilian freedom of movement due to
security issues is in Deir Ezzour, where there is a substantial amount of arrests and
subsequent detention of local Arabs at checkpoints. There is no system with in the
SDF-forces for processing detention cases, and individuals detained at checkpoints
may remain in jail for a long time. This also occurs to a lesser extent in the Raqqa area.
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30. The IS insurgency certainly influences the behavior of women in areas where IS has a
significant presence. IS affects the way women dress, as well as their ability to attend
school and work for NGOs in five towns in Deir Ezzour governorate (Shuhayl, Busayra,
Diban, Zire, and Wajes slocated south east of Deir Ezzour city on eastern bank of the
Euphrates river) where IS has a significant presence. This influence can also be
observed on an individual level in other parts of the northeast, especially in cases
involving women from Al Hol who are found by IS and have been known to be
intimidated by IS. One example involves a woman who was previously married to an IS
fighter believed to be dead. The woman remarried, but her former husband was not
dead and was able to enlist a local IS-cell to kill her. Women continue to play a
significant role in IS, both as supporters within IS and as victims. This situation applies
to both those inside and outside of Al Hol.
31. IS targets oil trucks traveling between SDF-held areas and government-controlled
areas. As of now, this occurs roughly once a month in 2024. This does not significantly
affect general access to oil, as there are hundreds of trucks transiting these areas every
day.
Al Hol Camp and the impact of the IS insurgency and the level of conflict of
in Northeast Syria
32. The level of violence in Al Hol Camp has drastically improved following a three-part
security operation conducted by the SDF over the last two years. There have been no
documented or confirmed IS-linked murders in Al Hol Camp in 2024. However, it is
unclear whether this improvement is solely due to improved security condition in the
camp or because the
Hizba
has consolidated its control over the population, making
the use of violence unnecessary for intimidating or influencing behavior.
33. Gregory Waters estimates IS attacks in areas surrounding the camp seem to be linked
to attempts to spark riots and breakouts from the camp. There have been attacks on
checkpoints in the area, including car bombs. IEDs and mines have been laid out on
roads in the area, targeting indiscriminately. Additionally, there is activity related to
the smuggling of weapons and people in the areas surrounding the camp. General
crime and rampant smuggling of goods and people are pervasive in the area. NGOs
and Kurdish security services are involved in addressing this issue.
34. Despite absence of murders in the camp this year, the
Hizba
is quite strong in the
foreign annex. A reorganization of the camp has led to issues related to the provision
of services in this part of the camp. The most extreme group of foreigners is, as of
September 2024, located between the service center and the rest of the foreigners. As
a result, women are unable to access services because they cannot travel through
Camp 3. NGO workers are also attacked or subjected to stoning by IS affiliated
detainees when they attempt to pass through this area, making the delivery of service
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provisions very difficult. Medical assistance for women in the camp is very limited, as
Hasakah hospital has ended its system of referrals for medical issues for individuals
from the Al Hol camp.
35. Individuals who escape from Al Hol are housed in local communities, either
permanently or while on their way to other parts of Syria, Türkiye, or Iraq. Attacks on
the SDF outside of the camp are coming from cells that operate in Hasakah city or
Shadaddy. Gregory waters assessed that these attacks seem to be linked to regional
propaganda campaigns regarding the release of 'sisters' from the camp or are timed
with operations in the camp.
36. There are documented cases of physical violence against women and children, as well
as instances of child abduction. In the foreign annex, any male child over the age of 14
is placed in a detention facility by Kurdish security forces. There have been no reports
of attacks on security forces inside the camp this year. This is primarily linked to the
inability or unwillingness of the SDF to conduct raids in the camp.
37. The impact of the Al Hol camp on the security situation in the area is best described as
a drain on resources. The security resources used to prevent several thousand
probably devout IS members from revolting or breaking out of the Al-Hol camp limit
the SDF’s ability to monitor other areas. International NGO resources are also
primarily focused on Al Hol, far more than in other areas of the northeast, resulting in
a yearly degradation of every facet of life in the area. All areas of the northeast are
economically destitute at the moment, which Gregory Waters assessment enhances
the ability of actors in the region to conduct armed engagements and attacks across
the region.
38. Issues related to drug crime are rampant and are increasingly worsening across all
areas of the northeast. This has been linked to a general rise in criminality, which in
turn has a negative impact on the security situation in the northeast and has resulted
in thefts, robberies, and murders related to drug crime. The IS security issue in the
Kurdish-controlled areas of the northeast is now compounded by drugs and
criminality, as well as the resources that go into preventing women from breaking out
of Al Hol and joining IS.
39. A form of methamphetamine is the most common drug in Raqqa, previously smuggled
in by Iranian factions from Iran. Hashish and Captagon are also available, along with a
range of other drugs in Hasakah. According to locals in Raqqa, the increase in drug-
related crime has had a negative impact on the security situation. These issues are
familiar in low-income neighborhoods in North America and Europe, but in northeast
Syria, they are compounded by the presence of IS.
40. IS has also engaged with the drug trade as intermediaries and producers to finance its
operations. Raqqa is the mostly affected city in the Kurdish controlled areas in the
north east, as it is the largest population center in the area; however, the negative
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impact of drug-related crime is prevalent as far north as Hasakah, Qamishli, and
Amuda.
SDF capacity to counter IS
41. SDF is still conducting counter-IS operations, but their ability to do so always comes
back to intelligence gathering. In Deir Ezzour, the SDF’s capacity for intelligence
gathering has decreased, as their intelligence networks have weakened since the Arab
tribal uprising in autumn 2023. The security forces still have the ability to conduct
raids, which they do quite frequently. There has been a notable uptick in the number
of captured versus killed IS leaders during SDF raids. However, it is unclear whether
they are able to uncover IS networks.
42. Turkish bombing raids lead to a short pause in SDF activity and operations but do not
have a long-term substantial impact on the SDF’s capacity to conduct counter-IS
operations. Contrary to the common narrative proposed by other regional analysts,
that Turkish operations and drone strikes against the SDF inhibit their capacity to
conduct counter-IS operations, but the rate at which the SDF conducts IS operations is
also contingent upon political calculations on their part, according to Gregory Waters.
Nanar Hawach, senior analyst, International Crisis Group (ICG),
Skype meeting, 17 October 2024
As Senior Analyst for Syria, Nanar Hawach researches conflict dynamics, politics, governance
and non-state actors in the country.
Aleppo
1. In Aleppo, clashes between the SDF and various Turkish backed groups (such as Sultan
Murad division, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Faylaq al-Sham, al-Jabha al-Shamiya, 50th division, the
Levant Front, Liwaa al-Shamal, al-Shamat and al-Hamza division take place on a regular
basis and are more prevalent in Aleppo compared to other governorates.
2. The SDF controls a small territory in northern Aleppo, where they fight alongside Afrin
Liberation Forces (HRE) in an effort to regain control of their former stronghold Afrin.
3. The fighting at the frontlines in northern Aleppo, has been going on for years, but intensified
in July this year, as did the Turkish shelling of the areas controlled by SDF.
4. Clashes and shelling between SDF and Turkish backed groups, and Turkey, in northern Aleppo
have killed over 120 people on both sides only this year, this includes civilians.
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5. IS retains a presence in Aleppo although small.
6. In addition to that, there are internal dynamics that affect the general security situation in
Aleppo. A good example of that is the protests in Manbij recently, where people protested
the new educational curriculum that the DAANES self-administration presented. This
illustrates a polarization in this society, with a segment of the population rejecting the
autonomous administration’s governance. Furthermore, Nanar Hawach assessed that it
could be seen as two conflicting ideologies that exist: there is the more secular left-wing,
and on the other hand there is the more conservative. Moreover, this also highlights the
limitations in the autonomous administration’s governance capabilities in terms of its
responsiveness to these internal dynamics and its ability to reform, especially considering it
is an non-regcognized non-state actor and its only pillar of safety is the US.
7. According to Nanar Hawach, the self-administration’s way of dealing with this kind of unrest
and protests in the areas under its control is through a security-based approach, meaning it
tends to crack down on protests and increase its security presence, rather than being more
agile.
8. Tension and some skirmishes between GoS forces and the SDF, occur from time to time in
Aleppo, but they are very localized and often based on individual disputes. Sometimes the
GoS imposes embargos on the Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo, which recently happened
in August 2024.
9. Aleppo is an important economic hub in terms of trade, and every actor operating in this
region benefits in one way or another from trading opportunities presented here. This in
turn means that there is limited cooperation between actors, for instance there are
unofficial crossings between SDF and GoS for this purpose, and neither part wants to ruin
this. However, what we see sometimes is that different actors try to push boundaries in
order to gain trade leverage.
Deir Ezzour
10. The Arab tribes in northeast Syria, especially the ones in Deir Ezzour, have longstanding
grievances with the Kurdish ruling. Despite being the majority population and the fact that
they living in oil-rich areas, the tribes have less political representation. Arab dominated
areas often suffer from unfair allocation of economic resources, for instance Deir Ezzour
produces 50% of the AANES income, but only 16% of the budget is allocated to the region.
Most of oil is sold to Kurdish areas of Hasakah, and outside the region, to Damascus, and
KRI.
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11. The dynamics in the Deir Ezzour governorate creates an environment for external actors to
intervene and create more tension and instability. For example, the GoS and Iran have for
years been instigating Arab tribes against the SDF in order to undermine the SDF. The GoS
has, with very persuasive methods, been able to penetrate Arab tribes, and together with
Iran they have provided them substantial weapons an equipment, that have lifted the tribes’
capabilities to some extent. In addition to that, the support they receive from the GoS forces
and Iranian backed forces add to their capabilities. Due to this, there has been an increase
of clashes between Arab tribes and the SDF, since the uprising in August 2023.
12. There are two main tribal leaders, Nawaf al-Bashir from the Bakara tribe, and Ibrahim al-
Hafal from Aqidat tribe, who are important in this context. First there is Nawaf al-Bashir,
leading the Bakir brigade, with a clearer link to Iran, and his militia is considered more as a
pro-government militia. Then there is Ibrahim al-Hafal who leads Quwat Mouqatilin al-
Aashayir. In al-Hafal’s case, the SDF sort of lost his support after the uprising in August 2023,
while Nawaf al-Bashir was always leaning more towards supporting the GoS and Iran This
uprising took place after the SDF arrested the head of SDF’s local subgroup “Deir Ezzour
Military Council”, Ahmed al-Khbeil “Abu Khawla”. According to Nanar Hawach, this has to do
with what was mentioned earlier, the SDF’s way of dealing with these issues using forceful
security measures.
13. Depending on the situation, the SDF responds to threats in its areas of control, often by
using security measures such as political prosecution, arbitrary arrests, forced conscription,
and military crackdowns.
14. The primary aim of this tribal fighting, not to mention the GoS and Iran’s main intention, is
essentially to regain control over the resources in the region, and the conflict will most likely
go on, at least as long as the external actors are fueling it, according to the assessment of
Nanar Hawach.
15. The tribal militias try to push across the banks of the Euphrates river into SDF areas, which
they managed to do a few months ago but were pushed back by the SDF with support of the
US. This illustrates the tribes’ capabilities very well as this would not have been possible just
a year ago. It is important to note that in this particular conflict, the tribal militias consisting
of tribesmen from the area, are leading the fighting against SDF, according to Nanar
Hawach. The Iranian militias and the Iranian backed militias are also present in the areas
west of the river, but the roles are differentiated between them and the tribal militias. For
instance, the tribal militias do not attack US bases.
16. So far this year, clashes between tribal forces supported by the Syrian government and Iran,
and the SDF have resulted in 64 casualties, including 27 civilians.
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17. IS continues to pose a major threat in terms of insurgency. IS-attacks are mostly so called
“hit-and-runs” with the aim to destabilize and intimidate. It mostly attacks members and
commanders of the SDF. IS activity is very different from the tribal militias, because the
latter is based on genuine grievances and marginalization, however both contribute to
undermining and delegitimizing SDF’s dominance.
18. Civilians are systematically targeted by IS for recruitment and extortion. When civilians are
being targeted by IS they are often suspected as SDF-informants. At least 60 member of SDF
have been killed by IS this year.
19. The deteriorating economic situation in the region, specifically since 2020, has contributed
to IS resurgence. Ultimately, IS benefits from the destabilization of the SDF. Arabs and IDPs
tend to join IS, not for the ideology this time around, but rather as a source of income. This
means that IS has a stable access to recruits. According to Nanar Hawach, in a poor and
underdeveloped region such as Deir Ezzour, joining a militia or an extremist organization
such as IS, is one of very few ways of making a living, and most importantly it provides
access to profitable illicit businesses like smuggling.
20. There has also been an increase of internal clashes between tribes in Deir Ezzour, which
cause a relatively high number of deaths each year. These clashes are based on family or
clan disputes often rooted in rivalries. The SDF refrains from intervening as it doesn’t want
to be seen as taking any tribe’s side. It is also customary to let the tribes settle their own
feuds. The GoS on the other hand, takes advantage of these tensions between tribes to fuel
rifts in order to destabilize and undermine the SDF.
21. In 2024, 81 people have been killed and 245 injured in northeast Syria in this type of
violence. Most clashes between tribes occur in Deir Ezzour, then Raqqa, followed by
Hasakah and then a small portion in Aleppo.
Raqqa
22. Shelling and clashes between SDF and Turkish backed factions in northern Raqqa have
decreased since 2020, most likely due to a shift of priorities. These areas are sparsely
populated with no significant resources.
23. In Raqqa and Hasakah, there have been less IS-attacks, as these areas serve as an economic
lifeline for the group. This means that the access to areas controlled by Turkish backed
groups facilitates smuggling and money transports from abroad. IS is able to purchase
weapons and other supplies through these smuggling routes. IDPs in Raqqa tent to join IS
for a source of income.
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24. IS also extorts money from businesses, essentially oil investors, who are feeling forced to
pay bribes to the group in order to avoid reprisals on their businesses. According to Nanar
Hawach, there are fewer IS attacks in Raqqa because the region is economically beneficial to
the group. This keeps the US's attention away from the area.
Hasakah
25. The northern border between Hasakah and Türkiye continues to be subjected to Turkish
shelling campaigns. Türkiye launched three waves of intense campaigns during October and
December of 2023 and in January 2024, targeting critical infrastructure in cities near the
border, including Qamishli. These attacks destroyed water and electricity stations, hospitals,
and oil and gas facilities. Only in October 2023, the estimated revenue losses due to these
attacks were up to 1 billion dollars. For a non-state actor like SDF in a poor country like Syria,
this has a great impact on the autonomous administration’s capabilities, its ability to govern,
and its legitimacy according to the assessment of Nanar Hawach.
26. Another wave of attacks took place 23-27 October 2024, Turkey targeted infrastructure and
military positions of the SDF, killing 17 civilians and injuring nearly 70. These strikes follow
PKK’s deadly attack in Ankara 23 October.
27. Following the Turkish attacks on vital infrastructure in late 2023 and early 2024, the
autonomous administration was forced to import oil, and at the same time export gas and
raising the local prices for gas and in general increasing charges for their services. This had a
heavy impact on the population that suffers from lack of basic services.
28. The Turkish attacks are highly linked to the developments in northern Iraq where Türkiye is
fighting the PKK. Each wave of attacks on northeast Syria is usually linked to something
happening in Iraq since Türkiye sees the SDF and the PKK as equivalents. Apart from that,
there is the direct and explicit Turkish threat of a military incursion in northeast Syria, which
in a way threatens the autonomous administration’s existence according to the assessment
of Nanar Hawach.
29. Hasakah represents the most stable governorate under SDF-control in terms of governance,
but there are still some internal issues and it DAANES-authorities tend to deal with them by
repressive methods, very similar to the ones the Syrian government uses. According to
Nanar Hawach’s assesment, the more pressured the SDF becomes due to all the threats
surrounding it (Türkiye, IS, tribes, economy, etc.) the more repressive it becomes towards
the population.
30. For instance, after the Syrian government, the SDF was the actor who conducted the most
arbitrary arrests in Syria in 2023. Over 600 people were reported arrested arbitrarily by the
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SDF, many of which were under the pretext of fighting IS, tribal uprising, but also criticizing
the living conditions. Forced recruitment is also very common and often justified under the
pretext of fighting IS.
31. Casualties caused by the fighting between SDF and Turkish backed forces, and Turkish
shelling in northern Hasakah were 42 fatalities, including 11 civilians and three unknown in
the first 10 months of 2024. There have been 100 fatalities caused by the fighting between
the SDF and Turkish backed forces, and Turkish shelling since October 2023.
32. Al-Hol is another major issue in the governorate and it poses a big threat. The camp is
basically an Islamic “wilaya”. Islamic laws are being implemented and children as young as
five are being trained as part of the “Cubs of the Caliphate”. IS seems to have the capacity to
organize large scale attacks from al-Hol such as the escape attempt from al-Sinaa prison. At
the same time the local authorities lack the manpower, resources, and knowledge to
enforce security. Any escalation to the general security situation will risk the situation in al-
Hol getting out of hand, as IS seems to take advantage of the instabilities in the region.
Freedom of movement
33. Travelling at night is avoided due to the prevalence of kidnappings. Extortion and bribery is
very common when travelling on the roads between cities in DAANES-controlled areas. It
could be very hard for a person who are not familiar with the dynamics of this region to
navigate in these areas when travelling because it can be very unsafe for someone who are
not used to it.
A Syrian Arab Journalist from Enab Baladi, online meeting, 14
October 2024
Aleppo
1. The Kurdish controlled parts of the Aleppo province have experienced a decrease in the
amount of IS attacks in 2024. This is mainly due to limited IS activity in the area. There
has on the other hand, been an escalation in relation to clashes, drone strikes and
bombardments from Türkiye in the area, which result in casualties among civilians and
combatants. There was an alleged Turkish attack in the first week of October 2024.
However, it has not been confirmed whether Türkiye was responsible.
2. There are repeated clashes between the Syrian National Army (SNA) and SDF in the
Aleppo governorate, but these clashes have not had an impact on the territorial
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control. The clashes generally take place in the area surrounding the Tell Rifaat enclave,
and in the Afrin countryside. These areas are where the largest clashes take place, but
there are also limited small-scale clashes between the SDF and the SNA in other areas
of Aleppo.
3. Although the autonomous administration often issues statements about shooting down
Turkish drones, the amount of drone strikes in the Kobane area was higher in 2023 than
in 2024, according to the journalist.
4. The armed clashes between the SNA and the SDF rarely result in civilian casualties, as
they take place in areas close to the frontline, where the presence of a civilian
population is limited. However, the attacks by Turkish drones and the bombardments
do occasionally result in civilian casualties. An official source from the autonomous
administration made a statement regarding an attack that occurred around 10-11
th
of
October 2024, and which resulted in civilian casualties.
5. There is currently a strike in Manbij because the local population is unhappy with the
curriculum being imposed on the schools in the area, and the autonomous
administration has sent SDF and Asayish reinforcements to the area to prevent this
from escalating further. The situation is similar in Kobane.
6. There have been no recent clashes between the Syrian government and the SDF in the
Aleppo area. The relationship between the Syrian government forces and the SDF in
this area is characterised by limited cooperation. The Syrian government regularly
closes roads leading the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo (Sheikh Maqsoud and
Ashrafieh). These sieges are often linked to sieges imposed by the SDF on the security
squares in Hasakah and Qamishli. The source is unaware of similar sieges imposed in
the areas of the Aleppo countryside, where the Syrian Government and the SDF share
control, such as Tall Rifaat, Ain al-Arab and Manbij.
Hasakah
7. The current security situation in Hasakah is similar to the security situation in the
Kurdish controlled parts of Aleppo. However, occasionally IS conducts operations in
Hasakah city and Qamishli, such as IED attacks or attacks with silenced weapons
targeting the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) and camp protection personnel. This is
the first time that this has occurred since the attack on the prison in 2022, and IS
activities in these cities increased from January to June, but has since then decreased.
8. IS generally targets civilian officials affiliated with the autonomous administration. IS
has also targeted personnel from the Syrian Arab Army in the security squares of
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Hasakah and Qamishli. IS also targets civilians in Deir Ezzour, but this is not the case in
Hasakah.
9.
Most IS operations in Hasakah take place in the area surrounding the Al Hol camp, as
well as remote rural areas. The main objective of the operations taking place around Al
Hol is the liberation of IS-affiliated women from the camp.
10. There have been no clashes between the SDF and the Syrian government forces around
the security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli. However, in august 2024, the SDF
recently imposed an embargo on them by closing the roads, which prevents food and
fuel from entering the security squares. None of the journalist’s correspondents were
able to confirm whether or not the SDF imposed a similar embargo in the beginning of
October 2024.
11. There are clashes between the SNA and the SDF on the frontlines in the rural parts of
north and northwestern Hasakah. Hasakah city, Amuda and Qamishli are occasionally
affected by Turkish air- or drone strikes. The airport in Qamishli was hit by a missile
attack in the second week of October 2024, but it is unclear who was responsible for
the attack.
12. According to the autonomous administration, the airstrikes often target civilians, but
often times it is later apparent that the casualties in question were among the SDF or
the YPG, and not civilians. Türkiye has also regularly targeted critical infrastructure,
such as power and water stations in the beginning of 2024, which has cut off water and
power to the area, and has led to civilian casualties. For example, the Turkish strikes
have led to power outages in water wells located in Qamishli, which has led to the
city’s water supply being cut of. .
13. The area around Derik/Al Malikiyeh is perhaps the area, which has been affected most
by bombardment from Türkiye. These attacks primarily target the main roads between
the different cities, and there is also limited IS activity in the rural parts of eastern
Hasakah.
Deir Ezzour
14. The amount of IS operations in Deir Ezzour is significantly higher than the other parts
of Syria under Kurdish control. IS has a very free reign in the eastern rural areas of Deir
Ezzour, where it primarily targets oil refineries and persons affiliated with the oil
industry, who IS think should pay zakat-tax. IS also targets people, who they consider to
be SDF-collaborators. If people from the oil industry refuse to pay the zakat-tax, IS will
target their business by attacking their offices or trucks, but the journalist is unaware of
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if people have been killed by IS for not paying zakat-tax. There was a recent case, in
which a person in the oil industry was ordered to pay zakat to IS, but did not take it
seriously. Ten days later unidentified individuals attacked his oil field with Molotov
cocktails, as well as one of his cars. There was also an attack on the Sijan oil field in
August 2024.
15. IS also regularly targets oil trucks in the Deir Ezzour area. According to the official IS
newspaper Al-Naba, 51 trucks have been destroyed and 15 trucks have been emptied
between 1 August 2023 and 15 August 2024. . On 13
th
October an oil truck was
hijacked, and the driver was injured.
16. There are also Arab tribes who oppose the autonomous administration in the area,
which has led to attacks on the SDF by Arab militias, some of who receive financial
support from the Syrian government. These militias conduct attacks on the SDF from
the western bank of the Euphrates River, which is controlled by the Syrian government.
These attacks culminated on 7 August 2024.
17. The SDF responded to the attacks from Arab militias by imposing embargos on the
government-controlled security enclaves in Hasakah and Qamishli, which led to a
decrease in attacks on the SDF by Syrian government, supported Arab militias. The SDF
is still being attacked, but due to the amount of actors in Deir Ezzour, it is often unclear
whether it is IS or the Arab militias, who are responsible for the individual attacks.
18. The clashes between the different actors in Deir Ezzour often result in civilian
casualties, but it is difficult to ascertain whether this is collateral damage or a targeted
attack.
Raqqa
19. The security situation in Raqqa is similar to the security situation in Hasakah. There are
no Turkish bombardments in Raqqa, but the amount of armed clashes is higher than in
Hasakah, but less than in Deir Ezzour. These armed clashes are primarily between IS
and the SDF, and take place in remote rural areas of Raqqa.
20. IS primarily targets people affiliated with the SDF. The journalist was unaware of
civilians being targeted by IS in Raqqa.
21. There are regular armed clashes and bombardments on the frontlines in the northern
part of Raqqa. Artillery strikes and shelling cause civilian casualties in villages located in
the vicinity of the frontlines. Raqqa city is not affected by these bombardments, and IS
attacks in Raqqa city are very rare.
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22. There has been an influx of narcotics into Raqqa, which has led to an increase in crimes
related to narcotics, such as killings and robbery. This has a negative effect on the
security situation in Raqqa city.
Freedom of movement
23. People from the areas under Kurdish control in Deir Ezzour and areas outside the
control of the autonomous administration are unable to relocate permanently to
Hasakah or other areas controlled by the autonomous administration unless they get a
security permit issued by the Asayish internal security forces. To obtain this permit it is
necessary for the person in question to have guarantor that is from the area.
24.
It is possible to travel between Raqqa and Hasakah by car, but IS attacks do occur on
the road. The roads between Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ezzour are generally dangerous,
because they are remote, which enables IS to conduct hijackings on them. The road to
Deir Ezzour is more dangerous than the road from Hasakah to Raqqa. Although the
source has not observed random attacks on civilian villages and cities, three separate IS
attacks on oil tankers were documented in October 2024.
25.
Men in the military age generally have greater difficulty moving between the different
areas under Kurdish control in north and east Syria, which is due to the risk of
conscription by the Kurdish authorities, as well as the possibility of being targeted by IS.
Security barriers and checkpoints are usually spread between villages and cities,
making movement difficult for those who fail to report for service, as stopping them at
a barrier will lead to their conscription for compulsory military service.
26. Travelling from Sheikh Maqsoud, Ashrafieh and the Tal Rifaat enclave to the other areas
under Kurdish control is difficult for men in the conscription age range, as they have to
cross territory controlled by the Syrian government, and may be detained arbitrarily or
for military service in the Syrian Arab Army. They may also face conscription by the
Kurdish authorities.
27. The amount of SDF checkpoints has increased in Deir Ezzour following the dissolution
of the Deir Ezzour Military Council. There has been no increase or decrease in the
amount of SDF checkpoints in Raqqa, but the amount of the checkpoints on the roads
between the cities and towns in Hasakah has increased.
28. Civilians can travel between Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ezzour using minibuses.
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Sherwan Yousef, A Syrian-Kurdish journalist in North and East Syria
and CEO of Defacto Magazine, WhatsApp, 8 October 2024 meeting
Developments security situation since January 2024
1. Since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, around
10,000 refugees have fled to North and East Syria from Lebanon, and the Democratic
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) is providing them with
assistance.
2. There are still IS sleeper cells in Raqqa and Deir Ezzour. Recently, the SDF apprehended
two IS sleeper cells. In addition to the fight against IS, Kurdish controlled areas
experience regular shelling by Türkiye, as well as Arab tribes backed by Iran in Deir
Ezzour. The U.S. is also sending a significant amount of weapons into Deir Ezzour.
3. Since 2019, Türkiye and Russia have had an agreement regarding joint patrols in
Kobane. These joint patrols between Turkish and Russian forces in Kobane and Al-
Darbasiyah have recently resumed. On the political side, the local administration was
planning to hold municipal elections for local councils. However, these elections have
been suspended twice and are now seem indefinitely postponed due to international
pressure from the U.S., Turkey, and Europe, according to Sherwans Yousefff’s
assessment.
4. Iran has attempted to create instability in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour,
by backing Arab tribes in opposition to the SDF, who conduct regular shelling and
drone attacks from the government controlled areas of the governorate on the
Western Bank of the Euphrates river. The SDF, in cooperation with the U.S., is still
fighting IS sleeper cells in Deir Ezzour. The US also supports the SDF in conflicts with
militias backed by Iran in Deir Ezzour.
5. The attacks by Türkiye, Iranian backed militias and IS affect civilians and result in
civilian casualties. In 2024, there have been 111 IS-initiated attacks across most parts
of North and East Syria, including Hasakah and Raqqa, which have resulted in 55
civilian casualties. There have also been 29 artillery attacks initiated by Iranian-backed
militias in Syrian government controlled areas of Deir Ezzour.
6. 503 locations across North and East Syria have been attacked by the Turkish army and
the SNA in 2024, of which only 48 were SDF controlled positions. 79 civilians have been
killed of which 14 were women 23 were children. These attacks include indiscriminate
shelling with artillery, drone strikes and armed clashes between the SDF and the SNA.
Aleppo
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7. According to Sherwan Youssef, the SDF is not officially present in Manbij. This is due to
an agreement between Russia and the U.S that lead to the SDF leaving the Manbij
area. However, according to Türkiye, Manbij is controlled by the YPG, but officially
Manbij area is controlled by the Manbij Military Council (MMC), which is affiliated with
the SDF, and operates under their umbrella. Following a request from the Turkish
government, an agreement has been reached with the international coalition to
withdraw all elements and leaders of the from the area. The agreement also stipulates
that only the elements of the MMC, which consists of the local population, should
remain.
8. Manbij is located close to the frontlines between the SDF and the SNA. There is regular
shelling in this area and the surrounding villages. There is also a consistent presence of
Turkish drones in the region. The frontline area between Manbij and the Jarabulus
district controlled by SNA and Türkiye is a contested area where clashes between the
SDF and SNA are frequent.
9. There is also fighting between the YPG and the Afrin Resistance Group (HPE) one the
one side against the SNA on the other side in the Tell Rifaat enclave in the northern
part of the Aleppo governorate. The fighting in this area between Kurdish-backed
groups and Turkish-backed groups is ongoing. The conflict consists of clashes between
smaller units from the SDF and the SNA around the borders of the areas they control.
Additionally, there is a regular presence of Turkish drones, as well as rocket and
artillery attacks from both sides.
10. According to an agreement from 2019, the SDF was supposed to leave Kobane
following the Turkish attacks. However, the SDF remains in Kobane and protects the
area adjacent to the Turkish border to a certain extent. Officially, the Russians and the
Syrian government control Kobane and the border with Türkiye. In addition to the joint
patrols between Turkish and Russian forces, the area around Kobane is affected by
regular Turkish drone strikes.
11. The civilians in Manbij, Kobane, and Jazire are dissatisfied with the American
withdrawal from the area, which has resulted in the presence of Syrian government
forces in Kobane and Manbij. There are few employment opportunities in Kobane,
which in effect is a military zone. The situation in Manbij is different, as there is still
trade with the government-controlled areas of Aleppo, as well as with Turkish-backed
groups. However, the economic situation in Manbij is still not good.
12. Generally there are not many direct armed clashes between the Syrian government
forces and the Kurdish-led groups in the Aleppo governorate. In general, HTS is not
operating close to the Kurdish controlled areas.
13. The SDF and U.S. coalition forces sometimes conduct counter-IS operations in Aleppo,
but IS generally does not have a significant presence in this area. Most IS activities
occur in Deir Ezzour and Raqqa, and occasionally in Manbij. While there are individuals
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in Manbij with connections to IS, the group does not maintain a clear or active
presence there. There are IS cells in Manbij. On occasion, bombings are carried out by
SNA under the guise of IS to avoid accountability.
Hasakah
14. The Syrian government has a limited presence in the security square in Hasakah city,
and sometimes the SDF and the Asayish impose a blockade on the security square,
which inhibits the Syrians government’s movement as well as the movement of
supplies in and out of the security squares. The most recent example of this occurred
on October 6
th
and 7
th
2024, when the SDF imposed a blockade on the area to prevent
disturbances related to the anniversary of the October 7
th
2023 attack by Hamas, as
well as due to the fighting in Deir Ezzour between Arab tribes supported by the Syrian
government and the SDF in August 2024. These blockades generally do not result in
active fighting.
15. Although the security situation in Hasakah city is relatively safe, the conditions for
civilians in the city are very poor. The main reason for this is that the Allouk water
station in Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn) has been targeted by Türkiye, which has led to a
shortage of water and causing many civilians to leave Hasakah City.
16. The security situation between Qamishli and Derik is relatively safe, but there are
occasional Turkish bombardments and drone strikes. For instance, there was a drone
attack in the second week of October on individual cars in both Amuda and Qamishli.
The situation in Amuda, Derik, and Qamishli is generally better than in other areas of
northeast Syria. There is no active fighting in this area, but Turkish drone attacks do
occur from time to time. Türkiye claims to be targeting the PKK, but these attacks
result in civilian casualties. Recently, a women and her child were killed in this type of
attack in Hileileia, Qamishli.
17. IS is not very active in Hasakah, but there are IS cells in Tel Hamis, Tal Kocer, and Arab
towns and villages in the Hasakah governorate. The Asayish sometimes arrest
individuals in these regions. However, there are IS members in the prisons in Rumaylan
and Derik. There is some IS activity in the area between Hasakah and Shaddady, but
not much. On the other hand, IS is active between Shaddady and Deir Ezzour.
Additionally, there is IS activity around Raqqa and Karama. IS targets SDF and Asayish
checkpoints, as well as small business owners and oil trucks.
18. The presence of the Al-Hol camp generally has no effect on the area surrounding Al
Hol, which is controlled by the Asayish and security forces. However, there are security
related issues within the camp itself. IS-affiliated women provide IS and Sharia
education to other women and children in the camp. The most recent operations by
the coalition and SDF have uncovered weapons in the camp, but this generally does
not affect the surrounding area.
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19. Although some NGO employees and members of the security forces have been
involved in smuggling activities in and out of the camp, this does not have a significant
effect on the security situation in the surrounding area. Smuggling was previously a
major issue in the area but is now under control, according to the assessment of
Sherwan Youseff.
Deir Ezzour
20. There is a great deal of insecurity in Deir Ezzour due to the presence of many different
groups in the area, including IS, Arab tribes backed by Iran and the Syrian government,
and the SDF. There is also a high incidence of violent crime, robbery, and extortion,
making it difficult for people from outside Deir Ezzour to travel there.
21. There has been a significant amount of fighting between Arab tribes supported by Iran,
the Syrian government and the SDF in 2024, with nearly 70 clashes occurring between
them. These clashes have resulted in civilian casualties, including seven men, 11
women and children. In total, around 37 civilians have been killed. This type of fighting
is especially prevalent in the areas surrounding Soheil, Busayra, and Ghranij.
22. There are no direct clashes in Deir Ezzour between Iran, the Syrian government and the
SDF. According to Sherwan Youssef, Iran, Türkiye, and the Syrian government want to
extend their influence in North and East Syria, so they create proxies within the Arab
tribes, who attack the SDF in their place. There was fighting between groups backed by
the Syrian government and SDF in august 2024, as well as October and November
2023. There are also examples of Arab tribes being backed by Türkiye, and these
groups recently attacked Manbij. Groups have been established under the names of
the tribes of Deir Ezzuor, Manbij and the Arab regions in the areas of Turkish control in
northern Syria. These groups have conducted numerous attacks on the contact lines in
Manbij, particularly during the heightened tensions in Deir Ezzour in 2023 and 2024.
23. IS attacks SDF and Asayish checkpoints in Deir Ezzour, as well as oil trucks, NGO
workers, and civilians. The SDF and the coalition conducted 28 joint operations against
IS in Deir Ezzour and Raqqa. Additionally, the SDF conducted 12 independent
operations against IS, during which 11 civilians were killed in Deir Ezzour. IS uses the
civilian population in these areas as human shields when the SDF conducts operations
against them.
24. There are NGO offices operating in Qasera, and there is limited NGO activity in Deir
Ezzour. This is because NGO-offices can be targeted by IS and other groups. On 18
September 2024, vehicles and members of the international ITF organisation, which
specialises in mine clearance, were subjected to robbery and theft by an armed group
in the countryside of the town of al-Shaddadi, situated to the south of Hasakah.
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Raqqa
25. The security situation in Raqqa is better than in Deir Ezzour. There are still some IS
sleeper cells in Qarama and Raqqa, but these groups are quite small, as the SDF, the
Asayish, and the coalition have a strong security strong in the area. However, there
have been instances of IS emirs hiding in Qarama, which is a relatively large city in rural
Raqqa.
26. Small “resistance” groups affiliated with the Syrian government, which oppose the
Americans and the SDF, also try to destabilize the security situation in Raqqa by placing
booby-trapped bombs in public areas, but they do not have much influence.
27. The situation for civilians in Raqqa is generally good. It is comparable to the situation
for civilians in the Jazire area of the Hasakah governorate and better than in most
areas of northeast Syria.
28. The situation in the northern part of the Raqqa governorate is different due to the
threat from Türkiye, especially in the villages close to the M4 and Ayn al-Issa. This town
used to be the capital of the autonomous administration but is now almost completely
empty of civilians. The villages near the M4, such as Tell Abyad, are affected by regular
shelling from artillery and rockets; because of this, there is little or no civilian presence
in this area.
29. There is a small amount of IS activity in Raqqa, but they do not pose a significant
security threat. IS has been responsible for two or three bombings in Raqqa, as well as
an attempted prison break in the central prison in Raqqa that took place in March 2024
using a tunnel from a rented house.
Freedom of movement
30. Türkiye took control of an area stretching from Serekaniye/Ras al-Ayn to Tell Abyad in
during the 2019 military campaign Operation Peace Spring. Prior to the Turkish military
intervention, the M4 road between Hasakah and Qamishli was in very good condition.
It took two or three hours to drive to Kobane from these areas. Because of this, it is no
longer possible to pass through Ayn al Issa when traveling from Hasakah or Qamishli to
Kobane. Now, since the M4 is generally closed, it is necessary to travel from Hasakah to
Raqqa and then from Raqqa to Kobane, which takes between seven and eight hours.
There is sometimes IS activity on this route, and they attempt to attack oil trucks.
31. The road between Hasakah, Shaddady and Deir Ezzour is very dangerous, especially for
people not from Deir Ezzour, while the security situation on the road from Hasakah to
Raqqa is better. On 14 June, Alan Omar, 37, a resident of the Tal al-Hajar
neighbourhood in the city of Hasakah, was the victim of a robbery while returning from
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the southern Hasakah Dam Lake to his city via the "Petroleum Road", which is
completely devoid of "Asayish" checkpoints.However, there is sometimes IS activity on
these roads, resulting in the hijacking of oil trucks and the extortion of civilians for
money. The road from Hasakah to Deir Ezzour is dangerous for civilians and NGO
workers. These roads are long and remotely located, making it difficult for the Asayish
to control them.
32. There are many Asayish and SDF checkpoints between Hasakah and Deir Ezzour. IS
targets checkpoints in these areas during the night.
33. Groups affiliated with the Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour sometimes set up makeshift
checkpoints along the roads between Shadaddy and Deir Ezzour. These are generally
temporary, as the SDF cracks down on them. The checkpoints established by these
groups frequently extort Arab NGO workers.
34. SDF checkpoints in Deir Ezzour check the identity of individuals traveling through them,
as well as their potential links to IS, the Syrian government or Iran. Generally, civilians
can pass through the SDF checkpoints unhindered.
35. Travelling on roads in Deir Ezzour can be difficult for employees of the autonomous
administration, as they are targets for IS, who consider them agents for the PKK. The
Arab militias backed by the Syrian government in the area can also target employees of
the autonomous administration.
36. People typically travel using their own cars or minibuses. However, officials from the
autonomous administration generally prefer using their own cars rather than public
minibuses, which also contain other passengers.
Hoshang Hasan, a Syrian-Kurdish journalist with North Press
Agency, WhatsApp meeting, 12 October 2024
Aleppo
1. Manbij and Kobane are areas that have been under the Russian sphere of influence in
northeast Syria since 2019, since the SDF, Russia and the Syrian government entered
into a security agreement that allowed Russian and GoS presence in these areas. Joint
patrols between Russian forces and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) groups
in these areas resumed in September 2024 after they have been stopped after a last
wave of Turkish escalation earlier in 2024.
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2. Two main factors affect the security situation in Kurdish-controlled parts of the Aleppo
governorate. The first is Turkish drone attacks in the Kobane area, and the second is
clashes between SNA groups and the SDF in the rural areas surrounding Manbij. A
village in this area was the target of an artillery attack in the second week of October,
resulting in two civilian casualties.
3. The fighting between the SDF and the SNA is primarily concentrated on the frontlines
and consists mainly of shelling and limited incursions by both sides, resulting in
exchanges of small-arms fire. Shelling and artillery strikes occur regularly on the
frontlines, periodically resulting in civilian casualties among inhabitants of nearby
villages.
4. Syrian government forces have maintained a presence in North and East Syria since
2019 and are currently positioned on the border with Türkiye, as well as in Kobane,
Amuda, Derik/Al Malikiyeh, and the security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli. The
relationship between Syrian government forces and the SDF in the Aleppo governorate
is characterized by limited security cooperation regarding the border, and there are
currently no clashes between the SDF and the Syrian Arab Army in this area.
Deir Ezzour
5. Tribal militias backed by Syrian government forces and Iranian-backed militias regularly
attack the SDF and international coalition bases on the eastern side of the Euphrates
River in the Deir Ezzour governorate. The most recent large-scale attack occurred in
august 2024, near the villages of Baghouz and Diban.
6. One of the major factions conducting these types of attacks on the SDF is the “Lions of
Aghedat,” commanded by Daham al-Sultan. This faction is connected to Ibrahim al-
Hefel and the Aghedat tribe, both of which have ties to the Syrian government and
Iran. Iranian militia targets coalition bases epically after October 7th in Gaza. On 12
th
October US-CENTCOM announced the target of Iranian militia headquarters in Deir
Ezour after they attacked US-Coalition forces.
7. There is also regular shelling on the frontlines along the Euphrates river between forces
affiliated with the Syrian government and the SDF, which also results in civilian
casualties. In August 2024, the villages of Al-Dahla and Jadeed Bakkarah were shelled
by the Syrian government’s 4
th
Division, resulting in 11 civilian casualties.
8. Clashes between tribal militias backed by the Syrian government and Iran and the SDF
have resulted in approximately 100 civilian casualties in 2024.
9. IS has sleeper cells throughout North and East Syria, and maintains a significant
presence in Deir Ezzour, where it imposes zakat tax on the civilian population. IS may
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target individuals who refuse to pay zakat. The method usually followed is that they
send a threat via WhatsApp, and if the person does not respond, they may send him a
written threat to his home or workplace, and if he does not pay them, his car or home
will be targeted.
10. IS's primary target in the Deir Ezzour governorate is the SDF, as well as individuals
working for the Autonomous Administration.
Hasakah
11. The security situation in Tell Tamer is similar to that in Manbij and consists of regular
shelling and limited incursions, which lead to exchanges of small-arms fire.
12. There are no clashes in the areas surrounding Qamishli, Derik/Al Malikiyeh, Amuda,
and Darbasiyah, but Turkish drones are active in these areas. Qamishli was attacked by
Turkish drones three or four times in September 2024, and Amuda was also recently
attacked once or twice. Last time Amouda was targeted on 26 October 2024.
13. The primary targets of the Turkish drone strikes are military personnel with the SDF,
YPG, or PKK, as well as civilians working for the Autonomous Administration and many
civilian who may be close to the target location killed. However, these strikes also result
in casualties among civilians with no affiliation to the Autonomous Administration or
the SDF. Recently, a 20-year-old civilian man was killed in this type of attack.
14. The water supply from the Allouk water station has been cut, resulting in a
considerable shortage of water in the Hasakah area over the last five years. Türkiye has
used the cutting off of water supplies as a kind of another war.
15. IS primarily targets the SDF in Hasakah, but civilians who oppose IS ideology may also
be targeted. Merchants may also be targeted for extortion.
16. IS conducted a large-scale attack on the Al Sina’a prison in 2022 and maintains a covert
presence in the central part of Hasakah city in majority Arab neighborhoods.
Al Hol
17. The security situation inside the Al Hol camp has improved slightly over the last two
years, as the number of killings has decreased. There are around 42,000 people in the
camp in total, including the foreign annex, as well as Syrian and Iraqi citizens. A number
of Iraqi citizens have been repatriated to Iraq in 2024; however, a significant number of
Iraqi citizens remain in the camp.
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18. Women affiliated with IS frequently attempt to escape the camp, and the number of
successful escape attempts have recently increased. Smuggling networks facilitate the
escapes of IS women and children by hiding them in water trucks and taking them to
Hasakah city. From Hasakah city, the escapees are then taken to Tell Abyad and
Serikaniyeh (The operation peace Spring area) before crossing into Türkiye, Idlib, or
Jarablus (The Euphrates Shield area controlled by SNA-groups and Türkiye.
19. These activities generally do not impact the security situation in Hasakah, as the
individuals escaping usually only transit through Hasakah before traveling on to their
final destination.
Raqqa
20. Raqqa city was previously an IS stronghold, and IS remains the main security concern in
the area. An IS sleeper cell attacked an Asayish police station in the center of the city in
the summer of 2023.
21. IS targets SDF military personnel and civilians working for the Autonomous
Administration in Raqqa, as well as individuals who do not conform to IS ideology. In
the eastern part of rural Raqqa, the situation is similar to that in Deir Ezzour. IS has a
significant presence in this area and has imposed a zakat tax on the resident civilian
population.
22. The frontline at Ayn Issa (bordering the western part of the Operation Peace Spring
area) has been the most active frontline between the SDF and the SNA. The situation in
this area is characterized by regular shelling and drone activity, as well as clashes on the
ground, although these occur less frequently. There have been no reports of civilian
casualties in this area lately, but in general, the shelling and clashes have resulted in a
significant number of civilian casualties.
23. There have been no recent clashes between the Syrian government and the SDF in
Raqqa.
Freedom of movement
24. People are able to travel from Hasakah to Raqqa and to Aleppo. It is also possible to
travel between Derik/Al Malikiyeh, Amuda, and Kobane. There are two roads to
Kobane, but since one of these roads passes through Ayn Issa, it is necessary to take
the longer route due to the security situation in the area.
25. Travelling to Deir Ezzour can be difficult due to IS sleeper cell activity on the roads.
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26. Additionally, Kurds traveling to areas of Deir Ezzour controlled by militias supported by
the Syrian government and Iran may be stopped at checkpoints. It is impossible for
Kurds to travel to areas controlled by the SNA, such as Serekaniyeh, as they will be
accused of being agents for the PKK or the SDF.
27. People from the areas of Deir Ezzour under government control who want to travel to
the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria are required to have a
sponsor/guarantor and obtain a residence permit. Without this document, it is not
legally possible for this group to enter the areas under Kurdish administration.
An NGO operating in North and East Syria, meeting in Erbil, 10
October 2024
General security situation in North and East Syria (NES)
23. The current security situation in the NE is the result of years of instability in this region. The
predominant security issues in NES under Kurdish control are mainly the Turkish drone
attacks, the tribal tensions in Deir Ezzour, including internal tribal tensions as well as
disputes between tribes and the self-administration, and the instability that IS creates in al-
Hol camp in Hasakah.
24. Drug smuggling is also increasingly becoming a great issue in this region.
Hasakah
25. There is a significant number of incidents occurring regularly in Hasakah that are attributed
to unknown actors. These incidents vary from bombings and explosions, kidnappings, to
robberies and killings etc.
26. IS is very active in al-Hol camp and their ideology is very present in the camp.
27. The security situation in Al-Hol camp and its surroundings is extremely unstable. The SDF is
regularly conducting so-called “cleansing campaigns” in al-Hol camp and the surroundings
in order to clear the area from weapons. These campaigns could last for weeks and recur
whenever the SDF has information on renewed IS activities in the camp or in the area.
28. Robberies occur on the road to al-Hol camp. Even NGO’s working in the camp get
occasionally robbed.
29. There are around 9-14 SDF checkpoints from Hasakah city to al-Hol camp. IS presence and
activities in the camp is the cause of this constant high security alert among the SDF, which
creates general tension in the entire area. The SDF’s capabilities in terms of fighting the IS-
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ideology are limited and therefore the SDF focus more on the security aspects, i.e.
increased security measures (checkpoints, “cleansing campaigns”, etc.) in the area.
30. There are reports of IS attacks targeting civilians in Hasakah. According to the sources, IS
does not distinguish between SDF and civilians, because they view everyone who is against
it as “infidels” (“kafer”).
Deir Ezzour
31. The situation in Deir Ezzour is still highly affected by the tribal-SDF dispute that happened
last year. In the beginning of 2024, the SDF were pushing to consolidate control over the
areas along the Euphrates River, which forced the tribe leader Ibrahim al-Hafel and his clan
to move to areas in Deir Ezzour controlled by the GoS. Since then there have been regular
insurgencies by small groups of tribesmen who cross the river from GoS controlled areas to
SDF areas. They clash with the SDF and then return. According to the NGO operating in
North and east Syria, this is a way for Ibrahim al-Hafel to demonstrate that he is still present
and capable.
32. Additionally, there are daily attacks inside SDF-controlled areas conducted by tribes
affiliated with al-Hafel targeting the SDF.
33. The control of and access to these areas in Deir Ezzour is very much linked to its geography
– its proximity to the Iraqi border. There is a significant presence of Iranian backed militias
in areas in Deir Ezzour not controlled by the SDF. The al-Hafel clan receives support from
the Iranians in terms of access to these areas in order to operate there, according to the
NGO working in North and East Syria.
34. IS attacks have decreased in Deir Ezzour compared to previous years. Nowadays they focus
mostly on extorting money from people, the so called “zakat” (Islamic obligatory charity).
When it comes to people who fail to pay, IS will turn to the Islamic rule of law to determine
the punishment depending on the situation and the person in question.
Freedom of movement
35. Travelling in Deir Ezzour is very dangerous and there are many incidents occurring on the
roads such as killings, kidnappings and robberies. In addition to that, the roads in Deir
Ezzour are in very bad condition.
36. Many people travel between Hasakah and Raqqa using public transportation. The roads are
more controlled and therefore there are less incidents happening compared to Deir Ezzour,
but there is always the risk of Turkish drone attacks. Moving around in Hasakah
Governorate, for instance between Hasakah city and Qamishli, is easy, i.e. kidnappings and
robberies occur but not as often as in Deir Ezzour.
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37. In general, the roads in the areas controlled by DAANES are in very bad condition and the
self-administration does not have enough resources to repair them. Consequently, the time
it takes to travel in-between these areas is prolonged due to the bad roads, which in turn
means a greater risk for those travelling.
38. The DAANES administration has recently opened several documentation centers where
people can get ID-documents in order to be able to move around, especially for those who
returned to the DAANES-areas and those who do not have any documents. A person from
outside the Kurdish-controlled areas also need a sponsor to be able to enter these areas.
Heybar Othman, Syrian-Kurdish journalist in North and East Syria,
WhatsApp meeting, 10 October 2024
General security situation
1. The general security situation in North and East Syria (NES) varies from area to area.
Many cities have remained relatively stable since the beginning of the Syrian crisis,
including Derik, Ruymalan, Darbasiyah, Qamishli, and Amuda. These areas generally
have not witnessed major military operations and were not exposed to significant
destruction during the Syrian conflict. However, Turkish drone strikes occasionally
target SDF leaders and Asayish (Internal Security Forces) Checkpoints in these regions.
Turkish drones also target basic infrastructure in North and East Syria, such as oil
stations, bakeries, water stations, power stations, and grain silos.
2. Türkiye began targeting critical infrastructure in 2023 and has continued to do so in
2024, focusing on waterworks, power stations, particularly in Kurdish-controlled areas
of Hasakah governorate and gas and oil fields in northeast Syria. Power stations in the
towns of Amuda, Qamishli and Al-Qahtaniyah (Tirbespiye) were targeted in the most
recent attack on 23-26 October 2024. A bakery was targeted in the city of Amuda, the
main bakery in Kobani and grain silos in the city of Qamishli. The Awda and Saida oil
stations and the Al-Suwaydiyah factory were also targeted. According to DAANES
statistics, around 30 vital sites, including basic infrastructure, have been subjected to
Turkish bombing. In the latest attack, 15 civilians were killed and about 51 wounded.
Seven of them were workers at the Suwaydiyah petrol station. Two members of the
internal security forces and nine members of the Syrian Democratic Forces were also
killed. Türkiye has conducted hundreds of attacks on gas and oil fields. A hospital and
several grain silos in Kobane were hit by shelling from the Turkish side of the border.
Schools and hospitals have also been struck in connection with drone, rocket and
mortar attacks from the Turkish side.
3. In 2023, the Turkish forces initiated a series of sporadic bombing operations targeting
border areas between Syria and Turkey. These attacks have been occurring
approximately every six months. The majority of the attacks are conducted via drones,
with some instances involving Turkish warplanes. This was evidenced by the bombing
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of Turkish jets at the station in the village of Taqel Baqal, situated near the city of
Malikiyah (Derik). During this incident, Issam Abdullah, a journalist with the Hawar
Media Agency, was killed while filming the initial bombing of the station. However, the
plane proceeded to bomb the power station once more.
4. The locations that are subject to bombardment are as follows: Malikiya (Derik),
Ramilan, Al-Qahtaniya (Trabsbieh), Al-Qamishli, Amuda, Darbasiya, Kobani and Manbij.
5. Furthermore, there is ongoing heavy weaponry shelling along the frontlines between
the Syrian Democratic Forces and the SNA. This is occurring in the areas of Abou Rasien
(Zirgan) town, Tal Tamr, Ain Issa, the northern Manbij countryside, the Al-Shahba area
around Aleppo, and in the vicinity of Afrin, including several villages and towns.
6. The most critical front lines between the SDF and the SNA are: the area around Abou
Rasien (Zirgan), the northern part of Tal Tamr town, the northern part of Ain Issa, the
M4 road between Tal Tamr and Ain Issa (approximately 120 km), the northern part of
Manbij, The Tal Rifaat enclave, and southern Afrin. The aforementioned regions are
subject to attacks by Turkish drones, and there is a regular exchange of heavy weapons
and mortar shells between the SDF and SNA factions. The frontline between Zirgan and
Tell Tamer spans about 800 kilometers, stretching from Ayn al Issa in the west to Tell
Tamer in the east, bordering the Operation Peace Spring area.
7. The areas around Tell Tamer and Zirgan are heavily affected by regular shelling, rocket
attacks, and small arms exchanges between the SDF and the SNA. Many civilians have
left the area because, although these areas are controlled by the SDF, they are regularly
attacked by the SNA and Türkiye, making it impossible for civilians to send their
children to school. Schools in these areas, as well as in Hasakah, have been converted
into IDP accommodations.
8. Another frontline in the Manbij area is about 30 kilometers long and is located
between the Euphrates in the east and Areema village in the west. This area is also
affected by regular shelling, rocket attacks, and mortar fire from both sides i.e. the SDF
on one side and the SNA and Türkiye on the other side.
9. IS S has been increasing its presence in Deir Ezzour governorate, and the number of IS
attacks in this area has risen compared to 2023. Both the U.S.-led coalition and the SDF
have issued statements indicating that the number of IS attacks in 2024 has doubled
compared to 2023.
Deir Ezzour
10. IS cells frequently conduct attacks in the eastern countryside of the Deir Ezzour
governorate in areas controlled by the SDF. IS has been linked to a number of
operations, including the planting of explosive devices on main roads, assassinations of
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SDF fighters and employees of DAANES institutions, and the targeting of local residents.
They have also been responsible for attacks on small groups at SDF points and civil and
service institutions affiliated with the Deir Ezzour Civil Council, utilising a hit-and-run
tactic. In addition, demands have been made for money from workers in civil society
organisations, oil well investors, and businessmen in the region. Zakat has also been
demanded from farmers after the main crops have been collected.
11. The Islamic State is still active in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzour, in areas under
the control of the SDF. This is especially the case in the towns of Al-Busayrah, Al-
Shuhail, Dhiban and their affiliated villages. In addition, there are reports of activity
along the Syrian-Iraqi border. IS is less active in the towns of Markada, Al-Sour, Al-
Gharanij, Hajin, Al-Sousah, Al-Shafah, Al-Sousah and Al-Baghouz.
12. It is also observed that the number of IS operations is less prevalent in the western
countryside of Deir Ezzour in comparison to the more active hot spots in the eastern
countryside. In summary, the majority of the operations conducted by the Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant are concentrated in the towns of Al-Shuhail, Dhiban and Al-
Busayrah, in addition to the Deir Ezzour desert on the Syrian-Iraqi border
13. IS has been able to increase its presence and the number of its attacks in Deir Ezzour
for several reasons. Firstly, IS is taking advantage of Turkish attacks in other areas of
Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria closer to the Turkish border, which forced the
SDF to divert manpower and resources from Deir Ezzour to counter the attacks coming
from the border areas. Secondly, the Syrian government and the Iranians are
supporting some Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour, who have launched numerous attacks on
the SDF, further forcing the SDF to divert resources. This enables IS to expand its
presence and increase the frequency of its attacks in the area.
14. North and East Syria is an ethnically diverse region, with many areas, such as Tabqa and
Raqqa, inhabited exclusively by ethnic Arabs. This is also the case in Deir Ezzour. Some
cities have a Kurdish majority, but the entire region is home to a variety of ethnic and
religious groups, including Christians, Arabs, and Yazidis.
15. Ahmed Abu Hawler, the former head of the SDF-controlled Deir Ezzour Military Council,
was arrested by the SDF in August 2023 at the American military base in Hasakah. This
arrest prompted many uprisings across various cities and towns in Deir Ezzour, led by
the members of the Aghedat tribe, which temporarily took control of three cities and
seven to ten villages in the eastern part of Deir Ezzour governorate.
16. The majority of the uprisings occurred in areas where the Sons of the Aghedat tribe,
led by Ibrahim Al-Hefel, are present, specifically in Dhiban, Al-Shuhail, Al-Busayrah, and
approximately five villages on the eastern banks of the Euphrates River. The SDF did not
respond to these actions, and this has become a regular occurrence, happening
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approximately once a month this year, resulting in clashes between Arab tribes and the
SDF.
17. The SDF did not respond to these actions, and this has become a regular occurrence,
happening approximately once a month this year, resulting in clashes between Arab
tribes and the SDF.
18. It should also be noted that not all members of the Aghedat tribe are engaged in
conflict with the SDF. For example Sheikh Hefel Al Hefel, cousin of Ibrahim Al Hefel who
is leading the armed opposition against the SDF, has a positive relationship with the
SDF.
19. Not all the Arab tribes in Deir Ezzour participated in these clashes against the SDF. This
includes the tribes in the western part of the governorate, as well as tribes from Afar,
Baghouz, and Susa in the eastern part. The majority of the SDF members are Arab, but
the leadership is predominantly Kurdish. There were no rebellions against the SDF in
the following towns: Markada, Al-Sour, Hajin, Al-Sousah, Al-Sha'fah, Al-Baghouz and
several villages affiliated with them.
20. Similarly, there were no noteworthy rebellions against the Syrian Democratic Forces in
the western countryside of the city of Deir Ezzour.
21. The Deir Ezzour Military Council operates more independently from the SDF than
military Councils in Manbijj and Raqqa. Arab tribal fighters in civilian clothes, backed by
the Syrian government, conduct regular incursions against the SDF by crossing the
Euphrates River from the government-controlled side. They also target critical
infrastructure in the area. These incursions occurred more frequently in September
2024, but their frequency has decreased in October 2024.
22. The underlying reason for the decrease in this type of incursions is the blockade
imposed by the SDF and the Asayish on the government-controlled security squares in
Hasakah and Qamishli. The SDF enforces these blockades when Arab tribes backed by
Iran and the Syrian government conduct incursions across the Euphrates River. When
these blockades are in place, it is impossible for civilians and goods to enter the
security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli. The latest blockade was imposed by the SDF
three days ago, coinciding with the anniversary of the Hamas attacks.
23. The clashes between the SDF and Arab tribes backed by Iran and the Syrian
government result in civilian casualties among the IDP population in the Deir Ezzour
area. At least 20 civilians were killed in the latest attack of this kind. There is also
regular shelling from the government-controlled side of the river, which results in
civilian casualties in the surrounding villages. On August 8, 2024, regime forces and pro-
Iranian militias shelled the town of Dhiban and the Al-Latwa neighborhood, killing 2
civilians and wounding 5 others. On 9 August 2024, Syrian regime forces and pro-
Iranian militias launched an artillery and mortar attack on the villages of Al-Dahla and
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Jadid Bakara, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals and injuries to 5 others, according
to an official statement from the SDF.
Raqqa
24. Raqqa governorate is more stable than Deir Ezzour. The city of Raqqa is located more
than 60 kilometers from the frontline in Ayn al Issa and the M4 road (the Operation
Peace Spring area), and there are no clashes between the SDF and the SNA around
Raqqa city itself. Clashes in Raqqa governorate generally occur on the frontlines around
Ayn al Issa, but this frontline is calmer than those around Zirgan, Tell Tamer, and the
areas around Manbij and Jarablus.
25. Heybar Othman is unaware of whether the clashes in Ayn al Issa have resulted in
civilian casualties in 2024. Previously, these clashes resulted in multiple civilian
casualties, including women and children.
26. IS has changed its tactics and conducts limited attacks in Raqqa using small arms
weapons, focusing on the liberation of IS-affiliated women and fighters from prisons
and camps, as well as primarily targeting the SDF and the Asayish. Five IS fighters
recently escaped from a prison in Raqqa. IS generally does not attack civilians in Raqqa.
In 2022, IS conducted a comprehensive attack on the prison in Hasakah to liberate
more than 5,000 IS-affiliated prisoners. IS carries out regular attacks on prisons in
Hasakah, as well as on bases belonging to the SDF and the Asayish in the western part
of Raqqa.
27. The SDF prevented journalists from traveling to Deir Ezzour to make a documentary
about the U.S. base in the Conoco oilfield. This was due to the unstable security
situation in the Deir Ezzour governorate, which is affected by attacks from IS, as well as
from Arab tribes backed by Iran and the Syrian government.
28. Traveling to Deir Ezzour is also dangerous for people who are not from the area,
including foreigners and NGO workers. However, local Arabs are able to travel around
Deir Ezzour. Christians and Kurds may face lethal risks if they attempt to travel in Deir
Ezzour from attacks conducted by IS and Arab tribal militias. Nonetheless, people from
Deir Ezzour can generally travel to Raqqa, Hasakah, and Qamishli, but they will be
subject to security checks by the Asayish or the SDF to ensure that they are civilians.
People from Deir Ezzour can travel to Hasakah only if they have a sponsor in Hasakah.
29. Traveling to Raqqa from Qamishli is generally safe, especially in comparison to traveling
to Deir Ezzour. There are buses traveling between Qamishli, Hasakah, and Raqqa that
civilians can use to travel between these cities. Traveling between Hasakah and Raqqa
is also generally safe.
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30. SDF checkpoints are more prevalent in Deir Ezzour and along the road between
Hasakah and Raqqa. There are over 25 SDF checkpoints on this road, established to
counter attacks from criminal groups and IS. There are fewer SDF checkpoints around
Derik, Ruymalan, Darbasiyah, Qamishli, and Amuda. These areas are close to the
Turkish border, and Turkish drones and artillery have previously targeted SDF
checkpoints in this region. There are also fewer SDF fighters in these areas, and SDF
fighters generally position themselves further away from the checkpoints due to the
threat from Turkish drones.
31. The situation regarding SDF checkpoints in Raqqa and Deir Ezzour is different. SDF
fighters generally withdraw into the buildings of checkpoints during the night in Deir
Ezzour due to the threat from IS. The number of checkpoints between Raqqa and
Hasakah has not changed since 2022, and security along this road has increased due to
the presence of these checkpoints.
32. Women and children can travel freely between Hasakah and Raqqa. The situation for
women in Deir Ezzour is different due to cultural factors in terms of women only being
able to travel with a male guardian. Most attacks by IS or Turkish drones target soldiers,
while criminal groups rob men and women indiscriminately. This usually occurs
between Hasakah and the Al Hol camp, and the number of armed robberies in this area
has increased during 2024. The SDF has conducted operations against criminal gangs in
the villages around Al Hol to prevent this type of crime.
33. IS has also imposed zakat tax on drivers of oil tankers and farmers in Deir Ezzour. The
tax is usually between 200 and 300 USD, and people who do not pay the zakat may be
killed, although this is not always the case. On 5 May 2024, an individual sustained
injuries when ISIS elements threw a hand grenade at their residence in the town of Al-
Hawaij in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzour.
34. In the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzour Governorate, as well as in Shadaddy City and
Raqqa City, IS is demanding zakat from hundreds of farmers following the harvest
season of major crops such as wheat and barley. Additionally, they are targeting well
investors, oil tanker drivers, businessmen, and money transfer office owners.
35. Some residents of Deir Ezzour have been known to pay zakat and refrain from reporting
IS members, citing concerns about potential retaliation and even fatal consequences.
Some residents choose not to pay zakat. Those who do not pay zakat are subjected to
assassinations or kidnappings, and cases of their homes being targeted with hand
grenades or RPG shells by IS have been documented.
36. Similar cases also occur in Raqqa, where small business owners are targeted for
extortion. However, it is not always clear whether IS or criminals are responsible for the
extortion. In general, criminal groups engage in looting and robbery across all of
northeast Syria, especially along the road between Hasakah and Al Hol, as well as in
Deir Ezzour. Sometimes they target NGOs; for example in august 2024, an unknown
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group blocked the road between Hasakah and Al Hol and robbed NGO workers from
Save the Children. This also happened to the NGO MSF and an organization working in
demining.
Jusoor For Studies, online meeting, 27 September 2024
Jusoor for studies is an independent research institution focusing on the political, economic,
and social dynamics affecting Syria and its neighbourhood.
General security situation in DAANES/SDF controlled areas of NES
1. Generally speaking the security situation in North and East Syria is
characterized by active fighting between various military forces associated
with a number of security incidents and persecution of civilians in the areas.
2. There are currently ongoing clashes between SNA and SDF across the Kurdish-
controlled areas of North and East Syria.
3. The armed clashes between Arab tribes and SDF in Deir Ezzour governorate,
which began in September 2023 are still ongoing.
4. Turkish forces continue to employ drones to target SDF-forces and high profile
officials working for DAANES-administration in the Kurdish-controlled areas of
north and east Syria.
Security situation and movement in DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of
Aleppo-province
5. Areas controlled by SDF in Aleppo governorate are divided into two types of
areas. Firstly, Manbij city and the rural areas surrounding it with full SDF
presence and then the the rural northern parts of Aleppo governorates also
under the control of SDF-forces. Secondly, there is the Tall Rifaat enclave,
which almost completely controlled by the Afrin liberation Forces (HRE), which
has an affiliation to the PKK and is allied with the SDF. HRE has a limited
security cooperation with the GoS and Russia as well as Iranian militia that all
have a presence in the Tall Rifaat enclave. The actors mentioned above have a
joint operations room where military matters are coordinated.
6. There are ongoing clashes between the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the
SDF and Afrin Liberation Forces with artillery being fired back and forth by
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both sides. Military incursions by troops from both sides into each other’s
territory also happen frequently. The artillery shelling and incursions mostly
happens on the northern frontline of the Tall Rifaat enclave, which borders
SNA and Turkish-controlled areas.
7. Due to the nature of the fighting between SDF and SNA-groups and Türkiye
the civilians face hard living conditions in the area due to the fighting and
many civilians from the area has been displaced from the fighting.
8. In northern Aleppo and its surroundings and on the northern Tall Rifaat
frontline most of the civilians living in these areas have been displaced due to
the fighting. The area is best be described as a military zone. Frontline zones in
DAANES-areas in north and east Syria are areas that extend 10-12 km beyond
the frontlines. Civilians living in those areas are at risk of being targeted as a
result of the fighting between the SDF and the SNA/Türkiey. Humanitarian
organizations have acknowledged these zones in the DAANES-areas as
humanitarian zones due to the areas proximity to the frontlines relative to
other areas in North and East Syria under DAANES-control.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled parts of Hasakah-province
9. There are clashes between the SDF and SNA-groups on the frontlines between
the Operation Peace Spring area and the DAANES- controlled areas in the
northwestern part of Hasakah Governorate.
10. There are three main security issues affecting the cities of Al-Hasakah and
Qamishli. First, security incidents related to detention facilities and camps
housing ISIS members and their families, the most prominent of which was the
ISIS attack on the Al-Sinna prison in January 2022, and which lead to a large-
scale prison break and allowing many ISIS members to successfully escape.
The detention facilities and camps housing ISIS members or their families have
been subjected to various attacks and security incidents for several years.
These incidents range from attempts by ISIS members to break out or attack
these facilities to their escape and flight to nearby civilian areas. The Al-Sinna
prison has not been subjected to further attacks since the January 2022, but
the instances of resistance and escapes by ISIS members have continued in
various areas under SDF control. The most recent of these incidents involved
the escape of ISIS prisoners in Raqqa on 29
th
august 2024.
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11. The second threat pertains to the potential for clashes between Syrian
government forces and the SDF in what are referred to as the "security
squares" in Al-Hasakah and Qamishli. According to the Jusoor Center for
Studies, the last time actual clashes occurred between the SDF and
government forces in and around the security squares was in August 2024.
12. The Security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli at times experience being
closed of by the SDF for days, while the SDF have been conduct raids and lay
siege to the security squares and preventing foodstuffs and supplies from
entering the security squares. There are several reasons for these closures,
often linked to strained relations with the Syrian government or attempts to
pressure it during negotiations. These actions may include theSyrians
government’s Fourth Division besieging areas under the Autonomous
Administration in the Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods in
Aleppo. In other cases, the siege by the SDF is due to clashes or mutual
kidnappings with pro-government militias within the security squares in the
cities of Al-Hasakah and Qamishli.
13. The third security threat is the targeted drone- and airstrikes from the Turkish
air force against the SDF and members of the Self-administration, which has
an affiliation to the PKK. These targeted air- and drone strikes typically happen
against vehicles belonging to the SDF or employees working for the Self-
administration and the areas in and around Qamishli and Hasakah cities.
14. Jusoor for Studies has not confirmed civilian casualties from Turkish airstrikes
through its monitoring but does not rule them out. It has documented
casualties among DAANES employees since Turkey's aerial escalation in Syria
began on 24 October 2024. One attack specifically resulted in the deaths of 5–
6 workers and guards at an oil station linked to the SDF-led DAANES
administration.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of Raqqa-province
15. Clashes between the SDF-force and the SNA only occur in the northern part of
rural Raqqa governorate on the frontlines between the SNA and Türkiye-
controlled Operation Peace Spring area. In the rest of Raqqa governorate
under DAANES-control, there are no clashes between the SDF and SNA.
16. Shelling and rocket fire has resulted in civilian casualties for civilians living
close to the Operation Peace Spring frontline. This is partially the case in areas
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bordering the western part of the Operation peace spring Area close to Tall
Abyad, where civilian villages have been shelled indiscriminately with mortar
fire. A functioning school with attending students called the Al-Thawra
Preparatory School in the Al-Thawra (formerly Al-Jalbah) village has also been
targeted frequently by shelling. The village is located 12 km from Ain Al-Arous
on the road to Ain Al-Arab. It is the closest village to the dividing line between
the Peace Spring area and the eastern countryside of Ain Al-Arab. The village
and its school are frequently subjected to shelling, with the most recent attack
occurring in early November 2024.
17. Civilians have also been known to be targeted, when they have been using
smuggling between areas across the frontlines within Syria. There have been
examples of civilians being fired upon by both sides when they have used
smuggling routes that have crossed the frontline between DAANES-controlled
areas and areas controlled by the SNA and Türkiye.
18. There have also been cases in which agricultural farmland has been set on fire
in DAANES-controlled areas close to the frontlines.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour-province
19. There are ongoing clashes between Arab tribes and the SDF in DAANES-
controlled parts of Deir Ezzour Governorate. In august 2024, tribal militias
attacked the SDF in a raid across the Euphrates river, which caused civilian
fatalities on both side of the river in both DAANES-controlled areas and in
government controlled areas.
20. The SDF have been known to conduct arrest campaigns among the local Arab
majority population in Deir Ezzour. Coupled with the marginalization by the
DAANES-authorities of the local Arab population and the corruption by the
authorities this has all contributed to a deterioration of the security situation
in the area.
21. In North East Syria in areas under DAANES-control IS has frequently target the
SDF and GoS forces on both sides of the Euphrates river in Deir Ezzour
Governorate.
22. Many attacks and incidents perpetrated against civilians are icommitted by IS,
even if the attacks are reported as being perpetrated by anonymous attacker.
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23. IS has been focusing its attacks on SDF positions in DAANES-controlled areas.
The most amount of IS attacks against both the SDF and civilians happen in
DAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour, then followed by the eastern Raqqa
country side in Raqqa governorate and lastly in the southern part Hasakah-
countryside.
24. IS typically conduct‘s insurgency attack against SDF positions and checkpoints
in the abovementioned areas, but they do not engage in regular armed
clashes with the SDF instead IS operate through insurgency style-attacks in the
DAANES areas.
25. The number of IS attacks in DAANES-controlled areas in Deir Ezzour are
underreported, and the total number of attacks is unknown. This is because IS
do not claim all their attacks against the SDF in DAANES-controlled areas of
Deir Ezzour Governorate. One cannot estimate the proper strength of the IS in
the area, since IS attacks are underreported and not claimed by the IS.
26. According to the assessment of Jusoor for Studies, IS is conducting insurgency
operations in the areas across north and east Syria. One of IS’ main objectives
in in the DAANES-controlled areas of Raqqa and Hasakah is the liberation of
imprisoned relatives and fighters currently held in prisons in these areas.
27. The above mentioned strategy provides an idea of the Islamic State’s
intentions and movement in DAANES-controlled areas in Raqqa, Hasakah and
Deir Ezzor Governorates according to the assessment of Jusoor For Studies.
Freedom of movement
28. Travelling to and from the Kurdish-controlled areas in Aleppo is very restricted.
Only the elderly and minors can travel freely between these areas, provided
they are not on the wanted lists of the regime forces or SDF, as it is necessary
to transit territory controlled by the Syrian government to reach the remaining
areas in the north and eat Syria controlled by DAANES. . Individuals can only
travel when there are no ongoing security operations in these areas.
29. People with ID-documents proving that they are living or originate from Deir
Ezzour can only travel to Hasakah city, if they have a sponsor from Hasakah
that will vouch for or provide a guarantee for them. Without a sponsor, it is
not possible from Arabs from Deir Ezzour to travel from Deir Ezzour to
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Hasakah or to other majority Kurdish areas such as Derik/Al-Malikiyah or
Amuda for Dier Ezzor residents in DAANES-controlled areas.
30. It possible to travel on the road between Hasakah and Raqqa, but security
incidents frequently occur on the roads between Hasakah and Raqqa, as well
as the roads between Hasakah and Deir Ezzour. Most people transport
themselves using private transportation and a smaller number of people use
public transportation in the form of mini-busses.
Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), online meeting, 23 September
2024
STJ is an organisation documenting human rights violations committed in Syria.
General security situation in DAANES/SDF controlled areas of NES
1. The most recent significant security developments in the Kurdish-controlled
areas of North and East Syria have been three waves of Turkish air- and drone
strikes in September and October 2023 and in January 2024.
2. There have also been armed attacks on SDF-forces conducted by pro-
government Arab tribal militias in in the Kurdish-controlled parts of Deir
Ezzour Governorate in September 2024.
Security situation DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of Aleppo governorate
3. The main security development in the Kurdish controlled areas of Aleppo have
been the occasional blockades imposed by the Syrian government on the two
SDF-controlled Kurdish neighborhoods Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in
Aleppo city and the Tall Rifaat enclave. These blockades have been conducted
simultaneously to the attacks on SDF-forces in Deir Ezzour by pro-government
militias. The blockades of supplies by the GoS often happen when there is
tension between the SDF and the GoS in the security squares in Hasakah and
Qamishli as part of a tit-for-tat strategy between the SDF and GoS.
4. Regular clashes occur on a weekly basis between the SDF and SNA-groups on
the frontline between the DAANES-controlled area of Manbij and SNA-
controlled areas. There are also weekly clashes between the SDF and SNA
groups on the frontlines between the Operation Peace Spring Area, and areas
controlled by the SDF. This is also the case for the border regions of the Tall
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Rifaat enclave. Civilian casualties in connection with clashes on the frontlines
are not frequent, and it is mainly fighters that are killed in these clashes. This
is because; the amount of civilians present in the areas surrounding the
frontlines is limited. However, there has been displacement of civilians when
SNA-groups attacked the Manbij area in coordination with Arab tribes and SNA
factions in September 2023. the past.
5. Civilian casualties in the Kurdish controlled areas of Aleppo mostly occur in
connection with Turkish drone strikes in the area, which result in significant
damage.
6. There are no clashes between the SDF and IS in DAANES-controlled areas of
Aleppo. There have also been no clashes between the SDF and the HTS in
2024, as there is no real frontline between the two parties. There were clashes
between the SDF and HTS in September 2023 in Manbij, but not in the first
nine months of 2024.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled parts of Hasakah governorate
7. An unidentified amount of IS members tried to escape the Al Sina’a prison in
Hasakah city in September 2024. IS militants previously attacked the prison in
January 2022, and resulted in the escape of an unidentified number of IS
inmates. At that time the prison contained approximately 1000 inmates,
including IS commanders.
8. The road between Qamishli, Hasakah city and Raqqa is regularly attacked by
Turkish drones, as is the countryside surrounding Hasakah city.
9. There have been attacks on oil facilities and Asayish police stations in the areas
around Derik/Al Malikiyeh and Amuda during the last wave of Turkish air and
drone strikes in January 2024. In total 64 locations were targeted by Turkish
planes and drones. The attacks resulted in six civilian casualties, including two
children.
10. There are regular clashes between the SDF and SNA-groups on the frontline of
the SNA-controlled area of Operation Peace Spring and the SDF-controlled
areas in Hasakah governorate. However, the clashes between the SDF and
SNA-groups in the eastern part of the operation peace spring area are less
frequent than clashes in the western part of Operation Peace Spring on the
frontline to the Kurdish-controlled areas in Raqqa governorate.
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11. The intensity and frequency of the clashes between the SDF and SNA Turkish
backed groups fluctuates depending on the political situation, according to the
assessment of the Syrian for Truth and Justice (STJ).
12. The amount of clashes between the SDF and the SNA have generally
decreased since the Turkish air and drone attacks in January 2024.
13. There are generally less civilian casualties in connection to the fighting on the
frontlines between SDF and SNA-groups. Civilian casualties typically only occur
when people are trying smuggle themselves across the frontline from Kurdish-
controlled areas and into SNA-controlled areas on their way to Türkiye.
14. Civilians outside the frontline areas in Hasakah governorate are not affected
directly by the clashes on the frontlines between SDF and SNA-groups.
However, there have been civilian casualties because of the Turkish air and
drone strikes in Hasakah governorate.
15. There have been a couple of cases where IS has assassinated SDF-personnel or
civilians employed by the DAANES administration. However, IS is generally not
very active in Hasakah governorate due to the presence of SDF-forces and the
U.S. military in the area. STJ is not aware of recent cases where civilians have
been targeted by IS in Hasakah governorate.
16. Although security incidents occur regularly within the Al Hol camp, the
presence of the camp itself does not have a significant impact on the security
situation in the surrounding area of the Hasakah governorate. This is because
the camp is remotely located far from the cities in the governorate.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of Raqqa governorate
17. There have been at least two attacks on Asayish detention stations in the
Kurdish-controlled areas of Raqqa in 2024, which were committed by the IS.
One of the attacks resulted in two civilian fatalities and a number of injuries to
civilians that were in the area during the attack. The STJ is not aware of
reports, where IS specifically targeting civilians in the DAANES-controlled parts
of Raqqa Governorate during the first nine months of 2024.
18. Armed clashes between SNA groups and the SDF occur regularly on the
frontlines between the western part of the SNA-controlled Operation Peace
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Spring area around the Tall Abyad area. These clashes generally do not result
in civilian casualties.
19. There have been no reports about clashes between the Syrian government
forces and the SDF in Raqqa governorate in the first nine months of 2024.
20. There is frequent shelling, artillery and armed attacks by SNA-groups or
Türkiye on the M4 main road connecting Hasakah city and Raqqa city, which is
located in the immediate vicinity of frontlines of the Operation Peace Spring
Area. This road is important for the transportation of goods, and these attacks
inhibit the ability of civilians to travel using this road. According to the source’s
assessment, the attacks along the M4 road are ordered by Türkiye and
executed by SNA-groups. STJ assessed that the objective of the Turkish/SNA
attacks on this road is to prevent the movement of goods and people between
the different areas under Kurdish control.
21. Russian military forces have occasionally escorted convoys of civilian vehicles
on the M4 road, thus preventing them from attacks by SNA groups.
Security situation in DAANES/SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour
governorate
22. There are regular clashes between the SDF and the Arab tribes in the areas of
Deir Ezzour under DAANES-control. These clashes are a continuation of the
major clashes that broke out between the tribe led by Ibrahim Al Hefel, other
triba lgroups and the SDF in 2023. Groups allied to Ibrahim Al Hefel and
backed by Iran and the GoS conduct regular attacks against the SDF by crossing
the Euphrates river, which divides the areas of Deir Ezzour controlled by the
DAANES and the GoS.
23. The Al Hefel tribe attacks on the SDF in Deir Ezzour were framed as an Arab
rebellion against the Kurdish authorities in 2024. However, according to the
sources assessment, it is clear that the clashes and attacks on the SDF by the
Arab tribes in 2024 have been backed by Iranian-backed militias and the GoS
to create further instability in the areas of Deir Ezzour controlled by the
DAANES.
24. Arab tribes have conducted incursions from into SDF territory from the areas
of Deir Ezzour under the control of the GoS, and have attempted to capture
SDF territory in August 2024. However, these attacks have been unsuccessful.
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25. There has been less local public support for the tribal attacks against SDF in
2024 among the Arab population in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Deir
Ezzour compared to 2023.
26. The Arab tribes are divided in relation to support of the SDF. Some Arab tribes
support the SDF, as they are not aligned with the Al Hefel tribe.
27. Civilians have been injured and killed by shelling from the GoS and tribal
militias. by shelling conducted by the GoS and Arab tribal militias. Nine people
have been killed or injured by artillery shelling in the DAANES-controlled areas
of Deir Ezzour in August 2024.
28. IS has maintained a covert presence in the DAANES-controlled parts of Deir
Ezzour governorate since it lost its remaining territorial control in 2019, and
continues to conduct an insurgency against the SDF and the DAANES-
authorities.
29. IS has attacked SDF and Asayish checkpoints in Kurdish controlled areas of Deir
Ezzour. This has resulted in collateral casualties among civilians that happened
to be in the areas, when the attacks occur.
Freedom of movement
30. Civilians can generally move freely between the different areas under
DAANES-control. For residents of these areas it is possible to travel and move
between the various parts DAANES-controlled areas in Aleppo, Hasakah,
Raqqa and Deir Ezzour governorates.
31. A person from Deir Ezzour would need permission from the DAANES-
authorities to settle in Qamishli. A person from the Kurdish controlled areas of
Raqqa would also require permission from the DAANES-authorities to settle in
Qamishli.
32. People travelling from the DAANES-controlled Tall Rifaat enclave or the
neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh to the Kurdish controlled
areas of Raqqa, Deir Ezzour and Hasakah need a permit to enter the areas
under Kurdish control, as they travel through areas controlled by the GoS.
33. The condition of the roads is not good, and the road between Hasakah and
Raqqa along the frontlines to the Operation Peace Spring Area is especially
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bad due to regular shelling by SNA groups targeting civilians on this road. The
roads in Deir Ezzour are also generally of poor quality, as the DAANES-
authorities lack the means to improve the infrastructure in areas under their
control. However, at the same time, a major bridge is currently being
reconstructed in Raqqa.
34. Public transportation is available in Hasakah governorate, but mostly people
travel by private cars, as it is of poor quality. There are a small number of
companies offering public transportation between the different areas of
Kurdish control in the form of small minibuses.on busses small minibuses. The
amount of companies offering public transportation has decreased in recent
years.
35. There are SDF checkpoints in Hasakah governorate. The majority are located in
the southern part of the governorate towards Deir Ezzour, which is partly due
to the presence of alleged IS fighters in the area. There are more checkpoints
between Hasakah city and Deir Ezzour than there are between Hasakah city
and Qamishli. There are usually checkpoints at the entry points of most cities
in the DAANES/SDF-controlled parts of north and east Syria.
36. There are no military or administrative restrictions on the freedom of
movement of women in the areas under DAANES-control. However, some
women may face social restrictions enforces by their families and local
communities in relation to travelling freely. Women from the more socially
conservative communities, such as in Deir Ezzour, are required to have a male
chaperone to travel, and women from this area generally face greater
difficulties when travelling due to social restrictions and the amount of
checkpoints.
37. There are generally more restrictions in terms travelling from the Kurdish
controlled areas of Deir Ezzour to the other areas in north and east Syria
controlled by DAANES, and there are more checkpoints located betwee the
Kurdish controlled areas of Deir Ezzour and the other DAANES-controlled areas
of north and east Syria. This is primarily due to the instability of the security
situation in Deir Ezzour compared to other DAANES-controlled areas, such a
Raqqa.
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Annex 5: Terms of reference
Background
1.1 Historical overview
1.2 Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES)
1.4 Conflict background and international involvement
Actors
2.1 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
2.2 The Syrian National Army (SNA)
2.3 Islamic State (IS)
2.4 Government of Syria (GoS)
Security situation in DAANES-controlled areas at the provincial level
3.1 Security situation in DAANES-controlled areas of Aleppo-province
3.1.1 Geography and demography
3.1.2 Territorial control
3.1.3 Armed groups currently operating in Aleppo-province
3.1.4 Clashes between Kurdish-led groups and Turkish-backed armed groups
3.1.5 Islamic State insurgency
3.1.6 Airstrikes
3.1.7 Impact on civilian population
3.1.8 Explosive hazards
3.2 Security situation in DAANES-controlled areas of Hasakah-province
3.2.1 Geography and demography
3.2.2 Territorial control
3.2.3 Armed groups currently operating in Hasakah-province
3.2.4 Clashes between Kurdish-led groups and Turkish-backed armed groups
3.2.5 Islamic State insurgency
3.2.5.1 Al Hol camp
3.2.6 Airstrikes
3.2.7 Impact on civilian population
3.2.8 Explosive hazards
3.3 Security Situation in DAANES-controlled areas of Raqqa-province
3.3.1 Geography and demography
3.3.2 Territorial control
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3.3.3 Armed groups currently operating in Raqqa-province
3.3.4 Clashes between Kurdish-led groups and Turkish-backed armed groups
3.3.5 Islamic State insurgency
3.3.6 Airstrikes
3.3.7 Impact on civilian population
3.3.8 Explosive hazards
3.4 Security Situation in DAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour-province
3.4.1 Geography and demography
3.4.2 Territorial control
3.4.3 Armed groups currently operating in Deir Ezzour-province
3.4.4 Clashes between Kurdish-led groups and Arab-tribes
3.4.5 Clashes between Kurdish-led groups and GoS-forces
3.4.6 Airstrikes
3.4.7 Impact on civilian population
3.4.8 Explosive hazards
Freedom of movement in DAANES-controlled areas at the provincial level
4.1 Freedom of movement in DAANES-controlled areas of Aleppo
4.2 Freedom of movement in DAANES-controlled areas of Hasakah
4.3 Freedom of movement in DAANES-controlled areas of Raqqa
4.4 Freedom of movement in DAANES-controlled areas of Deir Ezzour
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