Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25
UUI Alm.del Bilag 13
Offentligt
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COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)
REPORT
Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2024-25
UUI Alm.del - Bilag 13
Offentligt
October 2024
Ethiopia
Security situation in Amhara, Oromia
and Tigray regions and return
us.dk
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This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey
of all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other
country of origin information available on the topic.
The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information
does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any
particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be
regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.
© 2024 The Danish Immigration Service
The Danish Immigration Service
Farimagsvej 51A
4700 Næstved
Denmark
Phone: +45 35 36 66 00
us.dk
October 2024
All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service.
The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk
The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source
reference.
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Executive summary
The human rights situation in Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, has been
extensively documented and shows a range of violations and abuses across different regions.
Ethiopian state actors have committed human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, killings,
torture, and sexual violence, particularly in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. The government
extended the State of Emergency (SoE) declared in August 2023 in Amhara and used it
nationwide to suppress dissent, with widespread arbitrary detentions and human rights abuses.
Human rights organisations in Ethiopia face significant threats, including detentions and
harassment of their members, severely impacting their ability to operate and monitor
violations. The government has severely restricted the freedom of expression, with numerous
journalists detained and media platforms controlled or censored.
Men and women are affected differently by the conflicts, with men more often killed, and
women more often subjected to sexual violence. Female combatants face reintegration
challenges; displacement exacerbates vulnerabilities, especially for women.
The Ethiopian government employs multiple surveillance methods, including digital, physical,
and financial monitoring, to gather intelligence on citizens. Surveillance has intensified across
the country after the implementation of the SoE.
Ethiopia is highly vulnerable to climate change, with recurring floods and droughts exacerbating
the already challenging humanitarian situation.
The security situation in Amhara has been volatile since April 2023, marked by armed clashes
between Fano militias and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). The SoE further
intensified the conflict, resulting in arbitrary killings, arrests, and increased displacement.
Since the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 that
ended a two-year conflict in the Tigray region, the security situation in Tigray has improved but
remains unstable. Eritrean and Amhara forces have not fully withdrawn, and sporadic violent
clashes continue.
The conflict in Oromia involves the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and various armed groups
against federal authorities and regional forces. Despite peace talks in 2023, violence has
intensified, with frequent attacks on civilians and kidnappings for ransom. The humanitarian
situation is dire, with limited access to essential services and severe drought exacerbating the
crisis.
Oromia has the highest number of arrests and detentions due to suspicions of affiliations with
armed groups. Authorities often deny fair trials for detainees while holding them in informal
detention centres. The OLA members and their families face maltreatment, imprisonment and
torture. Low levels of evidence are needed for arrests due to the OLA's designation as a
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terrorist organisation. Federal authorities target members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),
despite recognising them as a legal political party. High-ranking officials may face arbitrary
targeting and detention. Both state and non-state actors engage in attacks on civilians
perceived as political opponents, leading to widespread violence and retaliation. Oromos
advocating the Oromo cause in the capital are relatively safer unless involved in mobilising for
unlawful activities. Perceived affiliations with the OLA can still lead to detention.
Since the CoHA, ethnic profiling and arbitrary detentions of Tigrayans by authorities have
significantly decreased. The federal government no longer targets TPLF members, and high-
profile officials can travel freely. However, surveillance persists, especially for those traveling to
and from Tigray. Those working with the federal government face restrictions and threats from
the TPLF, leading to fear and limited movement.
Since the 2018 peace agreement, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) participates in
regional politics, and large-scale prosecution of ONLF affiliates has declined. Although officially
disbanded, former Liyu Police personnel remain active in other regional roles, with some still
occupying government positions. Their exact status and functions remain unclear.
Information on the treatment of failed asylum seekers returning from Europe is scarce, but a
large number of Ethiopian migrants have returned from the Middle East. Bole Airport has stable
infrastructure for data collection on passengers. The monitoring of arrivals by authorities varies,
with those denied asylum abroad not automatically becoming persons of interest. Seeking
asylum at the airport is limited and generally suspended except in emergency contexts.
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Table of contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 1
Map of Ethiopia ................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 7
Abbreviations and terminology ............................................................................................ 9
Access to information ........................................................................................................ 11
1.
General human rights situation since 2022 .................................................................. 14
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
2.
Human rights violations by state actors ...................................................................... 14
Violations of international humanitarian law ............................................................. 15
State of Emergency...................................................................................................... 16
Human rights organisations under pressure ............................................................... 17
Media and the treatment of journalists ...................................................................... 19
Gender issues and human rights violations................................................................. 20
Government surveillance of citizens ............................................................................ 22
2.1.
2.2.
Digital surveillance....................................................................................................... 23
Physical surveillance .................................................................................................... 23
3.
Climate change and the impact on people affected by conflict ..................................... 25
3.1.
3.2.
Impact of drought and flooding .................................................................................. 25
Compounding effects of conflict and climate change ................................................. 25
4.
Security situation - Amhara ......................................................................................... 27
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
Background of the conflict in Amhara ......................................................................... 27
Actors in the conflict.................................................................................................... 28
Conflict dynamics in and types of violence ................................................................. 29
Humanitarian situation................................................................................................ 31
5.
Security situation - Tigray ............................................................................................ 33
5.1.
5.2.
Background of the conflict in Tigray ............................................................................ 33
Actors in the conflict.................................................................................................... 34
Amhara militias .................................................................................................... 34
Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) ............................................................................. 35
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
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5.3.
5.4.
6.
Conflict dynamics and types of violence ..................................................................... 35
Humanitarian situation................................................................................................ 37
Security situation – Oromia ......................................................................................... 39
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
Background of the conflict in Oromia ......................................................................... 39
Actors in the conflict.................................................................................................... 39
Conflict dynamics and types of violence ..................................................................... 40
Humanitarian situation................................................................................................ 41
7.
Treatment of perceived political opponents and ethnic groups in light of the conflicts .. 43
7.1.
Oromia ......................................................................................................................... 43
Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) ............................................................................. 43
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) ............................................................................. 44
Perceived political opponents ............................................................................. 45
7.1.1.
7.1.2.
7.1.3.
7.2.
Tigray ........................................................................................................................... 47
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) members............................................... 47
Pro-government Tigrayans .................................................................................. 48
7.2.1.
7.2.2.
7.3.
Amhara ........................................................................................................................ 49
Fano ..................................................................................................................... 49
Treatment of People with perceived or actual Fano Affiliation .......................... 49
Treatment of Family Members of People Associated with Fano ........................ 50
General Treatment of Ethnic Amharas in Light of the Conflict in Amhara Region
50
7.3.1.
7.3.2.
7.3.3.
7.3.4.
7.4.
Somali Region .............................................................................................................. 51
Treatment of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)..................................... 51
Liyu Police ............................................................................................................ 52
7.4.1.
7.4.2.
8.
Conditions upon return ............................................................................................... 54
8.1.
8.2.
Registration of refugees and of returnees .................................................................. 55
Persons who have committed a crime abroad ............................................................ 55
9.
Migration and asylum in Ethiopia ................................................................................ 56
9.1.
9.2.
Situation of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia ................................................................... 56
Migration out of Ethiopia ............................................................................................ 56
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9.3.
People who return from Middle Eastern countries .................................................... 56
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 58
Annex 1: Meeting Minutes ................................................................................................. 71
An associate professor............................................................................................................. 71
Academic researcher ............................................................................................................... 75
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC).......................................................................... 80
Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC) .............................................................. 86
A research institution .............................................................................................................. 92
International researcher .......................................................................................................... 96
Mehari Taddele Maru, Professor and Academic Coordinator............................................... 100
An international, humanitarian organisation ........................................................................ 104
Martin Plaut ........................................................................................................................... 107
The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) ...................................................................... 110
An international organisation ................................................................................................ 114
Annex 2: Terms of Reference (ToR) ................................................................................... 119
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Map of Ethiopia
Ethiopia is administratively divided into four levels: Regions, zones, woredas (districts) and
kebeles (wards).
1
Below is a map of Ethiopia by regions and zones created by Wikimedia
Commons.
2
1
2
BTI,
Ethiopia Country Report 2024,
2024,
url
Wikimedia Commons,
Map of zones of Ethiopia,
29 November 2023,
url
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Introduction
The report at hand covers the evolving security and humanitarian situation in Tigray, Oromia
and Amhara regions as well as the situation for political opponents of the central government
and political activists in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the report unpacks how the conflicts affect
ordinary citizens as well as how the government employs an extensive surveillance apparatus
to crack down on perceived dissent in light of said conflicts. Finally, the report covers conditions
for returnees in Ethiopia.
The Danish Immigration Service (DIS) developed the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the mission in
consultation with the defined target users of the report, in particular the Secretariat of the
Danish Refugee Appeals Board and the Asylum Division of DIS. The ToR is included in Annex 1 of
this report. In the process of compiling this report, the delegation interviewed 12 sources
comprising non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists, think tanks, human rights
defenders, analysts and researchers. The delegation selected the sources interviewed based on
their expertise, merit and experience relevant to the ToR.
The collection of data is based on multiple sourcing to ensure a high level of validity and
balance of the data. The objective of including a variety of sources is to present a
comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to ToR at the time of publication.
Thus, the present report is based on information from publicly available written sources,
comprised of carefully selected news reports by credible news outlets, books, academic articles
and reports published by other COI units, the United Nations, other international organisations
as well as NGOs and humanitarian organisations.
These sources are complemented with information obtained through 12 interviews conducted
either during a fact-finding mission to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia undertaken by DIS from 11 to 17
May 2024 or remotely before the mission. The minutes of the meetings with the consulted
sources are listed in Annex 2.
Most interlocutors expressed concerns over their access to conflict zones and about their
ability to publish and document human rights violations in light of the political situation in
Ethiopia as of May 2024. The interviews were conducted in English. Prior to the interviews, all
interlocutors were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the mission and the fact that
their statements would be included in a report made publicly available. The interlocutors were
asked how they wished to be introduced and quoted, and all sources are introduced and
quoted according to their own wishes. Six out of 12 sources preferred anonymity. All meeting
minutes were forwarded to the interlocutors for their approval and amendment, allowing them
the opportunity to offer corrections or make comments on their statements. All sources
responded and approved their statements. Care has been taken to present the views of the
interlocutors as accurately and transparently as possible.
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For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the minutes of
the interviews in Annex 2 have been numbered in a consecutive order, used in the report when
referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes. The quotation marks (“) are not
used in the report whenever the text is a copy of the meeting minutes, however, a reference is
made in the footnotes to the paragraphs where the text is cited from. During the interview, the
source may have highlighted issues that are not addressed in the ToR. As these issues could be
relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the meeting minutes in Annex 2,
but not in the report.
The findings are presented in thematic chapters in line with the ToR, beginning with an
overview of the general human rights situation, followed by chapters on the security situation
in Tigray, Oromia and Amhara. These chapters include information about the treatment of
persons with affiliation with opposition groups. A short chapter on the Somali region is
included. Separate sections with information on gender issues and climate change have been
added where it is relevant for an understanding of the situation. Finally, the report concludes
with chapter about migration and conditions for returnees. The report contains information
that addresses the topics specified in the ToR. This means, among other things, that the report
does not cover issues related to the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC).
The report has been externally peer reviewed by CEDOCA, the COI-unit of the Belgian
Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS), in accordance with the EUAA
COI Report Methodology.
3
The research and editing of this report was finalised on 19
September 2024.
3
EUAA,
Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology,
February 2023,
url
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Abbreviations and terminology
ACLED
ARRA
AU
CEDOCA
CGRS
CoHA
COI
DIS
EDF
EHRC
EHRCO
EHRDC
ENDF
EUAA
Fano
ICHREE
IPC
NISS
NGO
OCHA
OHCHR
OLA
OLF
ONLF
PP
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs
African Union
Belgian COI-unit
Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons
(Belgium)
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
Country of Origin Information
Danish Immigration Service
Eritrean Defence Force
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
Ethiopian Human Rights Council
Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center
Ethiopian National Defence Forces
European Union Asylum Agency
Non-state Amhara militia
The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
National Intelligence and Security Service
Non-governmental Organisation
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office the of High Commissioner for Human Rights
Oromo Liberation Army
Oromo Liberation Front
Ogaden National Liberation Front
Prosperity Party
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RRS
SGBV
SoE
TPLF
The Refugee and Returnee Service
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
State of Emergency
Tigray People's Liberation Front
The terminology list is for the purpose of clarifying terms used in this report only. Terminology
used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.
OLA
The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) was formerly the armed wing of the OLF. After the
OLF entered into a peace agreement with the federal government in January 2019,
most of the OLA fighters laid down their weapons. However, some OLA factions are still
engaged in the armed struggle with federal and national security forces in western and
southern parts of Oromia.
4
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is an Oromo nationalist opposition political party.
The organisation is not homogenous and characterised by factionalism. The most
recent split within the OLF came after the peace agreement with the government in
2018. One faction subsequently registered as a political party under the name OLA on
15 November 2019. The Ethiopian government refuses to call the OLA by its chosen
name, instead referring to it as Shene or OLF-Shene.
5
Fano is an Amhara nationalist movement that was active during the 2016-2018
protests. The group emerged as an armed informal militia. However, since 2018,
government security forces - both at the federal and the regional levels - had largely
tolerated violence by Fano.
6
OLF
Fano
4
5
DIS,
Ethiopia Political opposition parties – recent developments,
March 2021,
url,
p. 9
Al Jazeera,
Ethiopia to designate TPLF, OLF-Shene as ‘terror’ groups,
1 May 2021,
url;
DIS, Ethiopia
Political
opposition parties – recent developments,
March 2021,
url,
p. 9
6
HRW,
“We Will Erase You from This Land” Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’s Western
Tigray Zone,
6 April 2022,
url
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Access to information
Gathering information from Ethiopia about the human rights situation is a particular challenge:
government pressure has led to a restricted information landscape over the past few years.
7
The civic space and the freedom of speech in Ethiopia are deteriorating, as the government
controls the environment for reporting on critical issues and the flow of information. The
crackdown on the press undermines credible documentation and verification of human rights
abuses and attacks.
8
Authorities harass and detain journalists and activists into silence or exile
and restrict access to social media and internet.
9
Journalists fear reprisals
10
as many journalists
have been killed or detained, and consequently the number of distinct media voices since 2019
have decreased.
11
An increasingly polarised political climate with disinformation,
misinformation, a proliferation of biased information and access constraints further
complicates the ability to obtain accurate and reliable information on security incidents.
12
Federal and regional authorities have regularly arrested and mistreated journalists and human
rights defenders
13
for not supporting the government narrative,
14
although journalist and long-
time observer of Ethiopia Martin Plaut noted that there is some space for media to publish
critical journalism.
15
In September 2023, the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center
(EHRDC) stated that in the beginning of January 2023, there were 30 incidents of arrests
involving journalists and human rights activists.
16
The EHRDC emphasised that as of May 2024,
five journalists were forced to flee from Ethiopia in 2024 due to threats in comparison to six
journalists in all of 2023.
17
An international researcher stated that Ethiopia has the second
highest number of incarcerated journalists in sub-Saharan Africa, which impedes the flow of
information.
18
The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) opined that over the past 32 years
7
CEDOCA,
Ethiopia: Security situation in Tigray,
16 May 2024,
url,
p. 4; for a discussion of specific problems about
access to information about situation of Amharans in Addis Ababa, see Landinfo,
Etiopia: Forhold for amharer i Addis
Abeba, i lys av konflikten i Amhara-regionen,
27 June 2024,
url,
p. 2
8
Human Rights Watch,
World Report 2024: Events of 2023
-
Ethiopia,
7 February 2024,
url;
Denmark, DIS:
Ethiopia:
An update on the security and human rights situation since February 2022,
23 September 2022,
url,
p. 4; USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url;
A research institution: 10
9
Human Rights Watch,
World Report 2024: Events of 2023
-
Ethiopia,
7 February 2024
url
10
USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url;
Amnesty International,
Ethiopia: “We thought they would fight with those they came to fight with, not with us.” Extrajudicial executions in
Bahir Dar by ENDF soldiers,
26 February 2024,
url
11
EPO ACLED,
EPO January 2023 Monthly: The Information Landscape in Ethiopia,
8 February 2023,
url
12
Denmark, DIS:
Ethiopia: An update on the security and human rights situation since February 2022,
23 September
2022,
url,
p. 4; EPO ACLED,
EPO January 2023 Monthly: The Information Landscape in Ethiopia,
8 February 2023,
url
13
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 55; Martin Plaut: 13
14
USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url
15
Martin Plaut: 13
16
USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url
17
EHRDC: 7
18
International researcher: 3
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
of operation, it is the worst situation ever for operating as a human rights organisation.
19
In
addition, EHRDC noted that the current trend reminds of the situation following the 2005
election, when the former administration targeted journalists and human rights activists.
20
The government controls the state media, including radio, newspaper and television;
21
it
interferes in the national media and actively acts as a producer of content for the various media
accounts.
22
Reportedly, there is a so-called social media army advocating for the government’s
agenda that seeks to debunk the opposition’s narrative.
23
The government tightly controls
foreign correspondents by exclusion or refusal to renew visas.
24
Moreover, the government periodically restricts and disrupts access to internet and blocks
social media sites, especially in conflict areas.
25
The authorities have restricted access to social
media platforms since protests broke out in Oromia in 2023 and disruption of the mobile
internet in Amhara is common,
26
especially under the state of emergency.
27
Some regions have
been described as ‘media deserts’ as there is a lack of accessible public channels to obtain
information from.
28
For instance, the authorities have regularly restricted access for
independent journalists and human rights investigators in Tigray, as well as parts of western
and southern Oromia region and the Amhara region.
29
The lack of journalists, NGOs and
independent monitors in conflict zones makes it difficult to obtain a coherent picture of the
developments of the conflicts.
30
Very little information is available about the conflicts in
Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia, and consequently it is difficult to verify human rights
abuses and war crimes in these areas.
31
However, in the case of Amhara, professor Mehari
Maru noted that, compared to the previous information blockade in Tigray, upholding an
information blockade in Amhara is challenging due to insufficient amount of persons to enforce
it. There will always be loopholes in the information blockade to Amhara.
32
Despite a restricted environment for reporters and monitors, EHRCO highlighted that they have
various methods of information gathering in the regions through human rights investigators at
19
20
EHRCO: 5
EHRDC: 7
21
A research institution: 10
22
Academic researcher 32
23
A research institution: 10
24
Martin Plaut: 14
25
USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url;
EHRCO: 12
26
Human Rights Watch,
World Report 2024: Events of 2023
-
Ethiopia,
7 February 2024,
url;
Amnesty International,
Ethiopia: “We thought they would fight with those they came to fight with, not with us.” Extrajudicial executions in
Bahir Dar by ENDF soldiers,
26 February 2024,
url
27
Amnesty International,
Ethiopia: “We thought they would fight with those they came to fight with, not with us.”
Extrajudicial executions in Bahir Dar by ENDF soldiers,
26 February 2024,
url,
p. 2
28
EPO ACLED,
EPO January 2023 Monthly: The Information Landscape in Ethiopia,
8 February 2023,
url
29
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 41; USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url
30
International researcher: 2
31
Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2024 – Ethiopia,
29 February 2024,
url;
international researcher: 1
32
Mehari Maru: 13
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
the legal branch offices who are capable of receiving reports through various channels,
including phone messages, calls, videos and other digital ways.
33
However, the Human Rights
Council pointed to the politicisation of human rights, stating that in the current situation,
human rights organisations must be careful about whom they receive information from. The
council further stated that human rights organisations must conduct thorough background
checks of victims in order to assess the validity of the information as some claims are
manipulated, which complicates information gathering procedures. The government has a
network of informants that can work against human rights defenders.
34
Moreover, the arbitrary
arrests of reporters and journalists demotivate victims to report about violations as they risk
compromising their personal security, which composes another hindrance in the information
gathering process.
35
33
34
EHRCO: 3
EHRCO: 4, 8
35
EHRCO: 7
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
1. General human rights situation since 2022
Chapters 4-6 in this report describe the security situation in the regions of Tigray, Amhara and
Oromia respectively. This chapter describes the general human rights situation in Ethiopia as
experienced and observed by the interviewed Ethiopian human rights organisations as well as
documented by UN expert groups, researchers and in the media. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs extensively documented the human rights situation from December 2022 to December
2023 in the 2024 report.
36
1.1.
Human rights violations by state actors
The Office the of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Ethiopia has analysed the
human rights situation in Ethiopia as of 2023 and found ‘gross human rights abuses and
violations’.
37
One of the interviewed human rights organisations described the current situation
as the worst in the organisation’s history of 32 years of human rights activism under different
repressive regimes.
38
Taking one step back, UN experts argue that the current instability is due
to a combination of Ethiopia’s history of
’Political
polarization concerning federalism and
centralization and new and long-standing ethnic grievances have continued to destabilize
Ethiopia.’
39
The report to UN’s Human Rights Commission (HRC) documents that there are ‘reasonable
grounds to believe’ that Ethiopian state actors – the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF),
Amhara Special Forces, the Afar Special Forces and the Oromia regional authorities – have
committed serious human rights violations and abuses in Tigray and against Tigrayans
elsewhere as well as in Oromia. Other regional actors, including the Eritrean Defense Forces,
the Fano militias and Tigrayan fighters, have also failed to respect human rights.
40
The violations
committed after the declaration of the SoE on 4 August 2023, stand out as systematic and
widespread and include: ’Arbitrary deprivations of the right to life, physical integrity, arbitrary
arrests and detention, sexual violence, breaches of freedoms of association, expression, of
movement, as well as abductions and enforced disappearances were recorded. The most
common violations included arbitrary arrests and detentions, followed by killings of civilians,
torture, enforced disappearances, and attacks on civilian property…’.
41
Experts from the International Commission of Human Rights have identified ’…grave and
systematic violations of international law and crimes‘, which had been committed in Tigray,
36
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url
37
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 4
38
EHRCO: 2, 5
39
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September
2023,
url,
p. 4
40
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September
2023,
url,
p. 13
41
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 3
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Amhara, Afar and Oromia.
42
During 2023, the expert group has documented 594 incidences of
human rights violations and abuses. Compared to 2022, this represents an increase of 55.9 %;
state actors estimated to be responsible for 70 % of these documented incidences (ENDF,
federal police, regional police and special forces combined).
43
These incidences affected 8 253
individuals and included killings of 1 351 persons; most of the killings occurred in Amhara (740)
followed by Oromia (366).
44
The violations include:
killings (1 351 persons);
injuries (796 persons);
torture and inhuman treatment (346 persons);
sexual violence (82 persons);
arbitrary arrest/detention (5 411 persons);
enforced disappearance/abduction (243 persons);
property/personal items illegally appropriated by the state/non-state armed forces (24
persons).
45
OHCHR states that the human rights situation in Tigray has improved ‘significantly’ and the
level of human rights abuses and violence has been reduced after the signing of the Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 2 November 2022, however, serious challenges remain
because of limited demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.
46
There are reports of
several cases of abductions and enforced disappearances committed by the Eritrean troops in
Central Tigray zone after the CoHA as well as several extrajudicial killings of civilians by Amhara
troops in Western Tigray Zone.
47
The CoHA in Tigray did install hope for a durable peace but the
government then failed to live up to promises of ‘transitional justice and territorial integrity’.
48
In spite of this, in terms of conflicts and violent clashes, the worst affected regions are now
Amhara and Oromia these two regions had the highest number of documented killings in
2023.
49
1.2.
Violations of international humanitarian law
The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and their allied regional forces in Tigray have
violated international humanitarian law since 3 November 2020, as documented by the
International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE). Furthermore, the
42
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
HRC,
Report of the International
Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September 2023,
url,
p. 1
43
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 5
44
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 3
45
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 5
46
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 3, 4;
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January 2024,
url, p. 8
47
CEDOCA,
Ethiopia: Security situation in Tigray,
16 May 2024,
url,
p. 23
48
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September
2023,
url,
p. 2
49
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
pp. 3, 6 figure 1
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’…Tigrayan and allied fighters violated international humanitarian law in Amhara between July
and December 2021 and in Afar between November 2021 and March 2022.’
50
In Amhara
region, Ethiopian forces have unlawfully used hospitals as military bases and in November
2023, ENDF soldiers have interfered with medical treatment of patients at a hospital in North
Gonder Zone in their search for wounded men that they believed to be Fano fighters,
interventions that are against humanitarian law according to Human Rights Watch.
51
The Ethiopian Government did not collaborate in the gathering of the documentation for the
above-mentioned ICHREE report.
52
According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center,
the prime minister actively neglects the dire humanitarian situation and exerts pressure on
international humanitarian organisations to downplay the extent of people in need of
humanitarian assistance.
53
1.3.
State of Emergency
As of 6 June 2024, the SoE, initially declared on 4 August 2023 in the Amhara region, had still
not officially ended
54
in spite of the fact that it was supposed to expire after six months (3 June
2024).
55
The six months SoE had been declared under Emergency Proclamation no 6/2015
issued by the Council of Ministers to protect public peace and stability.
56
The SoE had been
prompted by reports of increasing fighting in Amhara, Ethiopia’s second biggest region,
between Fano militias and the ENDF as well as numerous protests.
57
Fano militias fought along
with the ENDF during the war in Tigray, but their relationship quickly deteriorated.
58
The
Amhara regional administration stated that illegal activities accompanied by weapons had
spread to an extent that required extra measures to maintain law and order and then declared
the SoE.
59
When the SoE expired in February 2024, the parliament decided to renew it for
another four months.
60
Even though the government declared the SoE for the Amhara region,
the Minister of Justice immediately announced that it could also be implemented in other parts
50
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September
2023,
url,
pp. 13-14
51
HRW,
“If the Soldier Dies, It’s on You” Attacks on Medical Care in Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict,
July 2024,
url,
p. 37
52
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
[A/HRC/54/55], 15 September
2023,
url,
pp. 3-4
53
EHRDC: 31
54
Borkena,
Ethiopia’s state of emergency ends, Abiy Ahmed’s gov’t declines to declared it,
6 June 2024,
url
55
OHCHR,
Ethiopia: UN Human Rights Chief calls for sustained efforts to halt violations and abuses,
14 June 2024,
url
56
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 13;
Fana,
State Of Emergency To
Remain In Force For 6 Months: MoJ Minister
,
5 August 2023,
url
57
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 13
58
Reuters,
Ethiopian military clashes with militia in Amhara, injuries reported,
2 August 2023,
url;
Reuters,
Ethiopia
extends state of emergency in Amhara,
2 February 2024,
url;
Guardian,
Ethiopia declares a state of emergency in
Amhara amid increasing violence,
4 August 2023,
url
59
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 13
60
Reuters,
Ethiopia extends state of emergency in Amhara,
2 February 2024,
url;
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic
Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024 to April 2024, 25 May
2024,
url,
p. 2
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of Ethiopia ‘as needed’.
61
The SoE had been applied across the country as a tool that has
enabled the authorities to arrest people who criticise the government.
62
To uphold the SoE the Ethiopian authorities established a General Command Post, which was
headed by the Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). It also
comprises members of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party, the ENDF, Federal Police
and the Government Communication Service. This General Command Post oversees the SoE at
federal level. The government established four other command posts in West Amhara, East
Amhara, Northwest Amhara, and Central Showa.
63
According to one human rights organisation,
several human rights activists have been detained at these command posts for prolonged
periods without fair trials.
64
The SoE criminalised ‘moral support’ to armed groups, suspended judicial review of detentions
and – implicitly – restricted a range of otherwise non-derogable rights. The minimum and
maximum penalties range from three to ten years of prison. According to OHCHR, there are
4 879 documented arrests during 2023 under this SoE. The arrested individuals are held in 16
different detention centres in 12 cities across the country. OHCHR states that many of these
persons had been arbitrarily detained and subjected to prolonged detention before trial. Only 1
132 of these arbitrarily detained persons had been released by December 2023.
65
1.4.
Human rights organisations under pressure
The implementation of the SoE in 2023 has posed a significant threat to people in human rights
organisations including increased risks of detention and abductions, in particularly in the
Amhara region but also in Addis Ababa.
66
The interviewed human rights organisations stated
that the number of human rights violations had increased over the past years; one organisation
emphasised that in the course of 32 years of human rights activism under changing repressive
regimes, the situation had never been worse.
67
Another organisation states that the challenge
of the human rights work in Ethiopia is the combination of the ongoing, armed conflict, the
implementation of the SoE and the shutdown of the internet.
68
The space for national human rights organisations to monitor violations of human rights is
shrinking rapidly: the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO),
69
established in 1991, reports
61
62
Fana,
State Of Emergency To Remain In Force For 6 Months: MoJ Minister
,
5 August 2023,
url
EHRCO: 12, 18
63
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 14
64
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024
to April 2024, 25 May 2024,
url,
p. 4
65
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 13
66
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024
to April 2024, 25 May 2024,
url,
pp. 1-2
67
EHRCO: 2, 5; EHRDC: 6-9; EHRC: 3; EHRDC: 16, 17
68
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024
to April 2024, 25 May 2024,
url,
p. 2
69
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), 2020,
url
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that human rights activists are under attack by the government and that the government has
subjected EHRCO staff and volunteers across Ethiopia to arrest, harassment, intimidation and
extrajudicial killing.
70
In May 2024, EHRCO listed the violent incidents that this organisation has
experienced over the past years:
On 11 February 2023, there was a break-in at EHRCO’s office for Monitoring,
Investigation, Documenting and Reporting Department where a laptop was taken from
a locked drawer in the Department Head’s office. EHRCO reported the incident to the
local police but on 27 March 2023, the police arbitrarily detained three employees
from this office at the Kirkos sub-district police station. The police took them to court
on 28 March 2023, and the court released them on bail.
On 18 March 2023, the Head of Department of the EHRCO was approached at his
home and being threatened.
On 25-27 April 2023, Oromia Police and Justice Bureau officials threatened EHRCO
employees at a workshop in Adama City. The workshop was about the four EHRCO
employees who the police released on bail after detention and the Police officials
threatened to re-arrest them at any time.
On 15 November 2023, three armed men in government security uniforms physically
assaulted an EHRCO employee in the North Ethiopia Region office in Bahir Dar City.
This happened a short time after he had completed an investigation into human rights
violations in the Amhara region. During the attack, the attackers shot at him, and took
his mobile phone and a flash drive with his investigation report as well as his personal
ID cards.
On 6 April 2024, two persons who were identified as government security employees
but dressed as civilians came to the home of one of the leaders of EHRCO, issued
threats, and warned him to stop his human rights activities.
71
Another human rights organisation, Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC),
founded in 2019,
72
has made a call of attention to the whereabouts of a well-known Amhara
human rights activist who the authorities kidnapped and detained based on his anti-war
engagement. When the authorities declared the SoE, they arrested this human rights activist
during a trip to Barta, and he disappeared for several months. Ten months later, his family
received information that the authorities had placed him in what the organisation described as
a concentration camp in the Amhara region with no due process of law.
73
EHRDC described the
current situation, as ‘a complete disregard for the rule of law’, comparing the current situation
in Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi, former president (1991-95) and prime minister (1995-2012),
noting that at least his administration enforced some form of rule of law throughout Ethiopia,
70
EHRCO,
Government’s Escalating Crackdown Against EHRCO Ignites Heightened Alarm!,
25 May 2024, X,
url;
EHRCO: 2
71
EHRCO,
Government’s Escalating Crackdown Against EHRCO Ignites Heightened Alarm!,
25 May 2024, X,
url
72
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024
to April 2024, 25 May 2024,
url,
p. 2; EHRDC, n.d.,
url
73
EHRDC: 16
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notwithstanding the human rights violations against critics, journalists and political opponents.
By contrast – according to EHRDC – currently the Ethiopian air force/ENDF conducted drone
attacks at a school on a Sunday in May 2023.
74
The OHCHR describes the use of drones by ENDF
in 2023 as resulting in a ‘disproportionate levels of civilian casualties’.
75
The Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission (EHRC),
76
which is a federal institution under the
constitution and accountable directly to the Ethiopian parliament,
77
is operational and active,
but the SoE has made the work of the EHRC more challenging in terms of accessing regions and
finding resources to fund the work, especially as the workload is increasing during conflicts.
From July 2023 to March 2024, the EHRC received approximately 1 218 complaints concerning
1 496 individuals of which 70.4 % were processed and 78.7 % were solved by the EHRC. In cases
where the EHRC does not investigate the cases, they are referred to the court or the
Ombudsman. The public knows the EHRC, and they report incidents of torture, forced
disappearance, detention, internal displacement, accessibility for persons with disability, ill
treatment, etc. to the EHRC.
78
1.5.
Media and the treatment of journalists
The authorities restrain the freedom of expression during the SoE as well as before its
declaration. Journalists have been imprisoned in increasing numbers after they have voiced
their political opinions. As of May 2024, one of the interviewed organisations knew of at least
11 journalists in jail.
79
According to OHCHR, the authorities have arrested at least 12 male
journalists since the declaration of the SoE. Some of these journalists are held in detention
centers in Afar, others are held at Kaliti Prison in Addis Ababa.
80
In March 2024, several journalists, including some employed by the Ethiopian Broadcasting
Corporation and Fana Broadcasting Corporate (FBC) had been detained in Addis Ababa after
having participated in the “Adwa barefoot” project – a march to celebrate the Ethiopian fight
against the Italian colonial army.
81
From February to July 2023, the Ethiopian authorities restricted access to social media
platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, and TikTok.
82
According to a research
institution, the Ethiopian government exercises control over the state media, including radio,
74
EHRDC: 16, 17
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 3
76
EHRC, n.d.,
url
77
HRW,
“If the Soldier Dies, It’s on You” Attacks on Medical Care in Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict,
July 2024,
url,
p. 12
78
EHRC: 2
79
An academic researcher: 31
80
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 8
81
Borkena,
Ethiopia : Barefoot Club member Journalists Held Captive in Adwa Celebration Crackdown,
2 March
2024,
url;
EHRDC,
The 1
st
Periodic Assessment of 2024 on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia,
January 2024 to April 2024, 25 May 2024,
url,
p. 6
82
Addis Standard,
News: Internet shutdown costs Ethiopia nearly $2 billion in economic upheaval,
9 January 2024,
url
75
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newspaper and television. Media reports have documented the existence of a social media
‘army’ that advocates for the government’s agenda, and that actively seeks to discredit the
opposition’s narratives; they follow activists’ social media accounts and challenge them
online.
83
1.6.
Gender issues and human rights violations
In spite of a lack of complete gender-disaggregated data, there is ample evidence to suggest
that the armed conflict and violence across Ethiopia affect men and women differently.
84
Out of
the 1 351 killings in 2023, which have been documented by the OHCHR, 1 121 were male,
whereas 96 were female (and 134 of unknown gender); by contrast, all of the documented
victims of sexual violence were female.
85
Sexual violence is generally underreported in
Ethiopia.
86
Both the ENDF and the Ethiopian government’s security forces have been involved in rape and
other forms of conflict related sexual violence in Amhara, Oromia rand Tigray regions against
women and girls. The documented sexual violence have been perpetrated by the ENDF, Amhara
Regional Forces, Oromia Regional Special Forces, Oromia Police, Eritrean Defense Forces and
the Selam Askebari Militia.
87
During the war in Tigray, documentation shows that men and women died from different
causes. Men were more likely to be killed through ‘direct methods such as mass killings’,
whereas women in Tigray were more likely to die due to starvation, rape, looting and
destruction of infrastructure.
88
During the Tigray war, women were massively targeted and
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) was used as a weapon of war.
89
According to one
qualitative study, rape was not regarded as a taboo during that time of war, and the TPLF has
been accused of constant physical and sexual brutality against Amhara women.
90
According to
author and journalist Tom Gardner, it is estimated that 10 000 Tigrayan women – and quite
plausibly ten times more – have been brutally raped in the course of the conflict.
91
The interviewed human rights organisations confirmed the gender differentiated experiences of
violent conflict: men are more likely to be arrested; women are vulnerable to any form of
83
A research institution: 10; Borkena,
Investigative report reveals gov’t “media army” disseminate misleading, false
information,
19 April 2024,
url
84
Tafesework, G.,
The role of women in national and sub-national peace processes in Ethiopia,
Rift Valley Institute,
2024,
url,
p. 2
85
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 5
86
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 10
87
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 3
88
United Nations Human Rights Council,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on
Ethiopia,
15 September 2023,
url,
p. 6
89
EHRDC: 20. For more information about the Tigray was, refer to pp. 15-16 in Denmark, DIS:
Ethiopia: An update
on the security and human rights situation since February 2022,
23 September 2022,
url
90
Desalegn, S., Kasseye, E., Gebeyaw, G., & Meshelemiah, J. C. A.,
The Challenges of Women Housed in Internally
Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps During an Armed Conflict in Ethiopia.
Affilia, 38(1), 2023,
url,
pp. 55-74
91
Gardner, T.,
The Abiy Project: God, Power and War in the New Ethiopia,
Hurst, 2024, p. 283-284
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harassment. Gender-based violence has become a common practice in most parts of the
country, especially in the regions with armed conflict. However, there are incidents of arrests of
female activists during a Fano-related incident in Addis Ababa.
92
There are a number of women
combatants, who might have been forced to fight during the conflicts. Female combatants face
challenges in the process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. For instance, they
may have a difficult time being reintegrated into a society with a patriarchal structure as being
a female combatant is associated with stigmatisation and social exclusion because the women
has transgressed traditional female values in order to engage in fighting.
93
The national peace
process – and more precisely the National Dialogue Commission – has been criticised for only
including women without any attempts of tackling the socio-cultural barriers to women’s
participation and for selecting women based on their political affiliation to the ruling Prosperity
Party.
94
Displacement is another factor, which makes women vulnerable to a myriad of risks and
challenges, as women are more likely than men to suffer from marginalisation as documented
in a qualitative study from two IDP camps in Ethiopia with data collected during the Tigray war.
95
Women who are displaced face challenges that are systemic (gender based violence; family
separation, human trafficking, genocide); psychological (trauma and stress, loss of home and
belongings) and social (lack of social security and stability, reintegration and resettlement
problems and unmet basic needs). Sexual violence is particularly associated with feelings of
shame, astonishment, horror and victimisation, as documented in this 2023 qualitative study.
96
Ethiopia has almost 4.5 million IDPs.
97
92
93
EHRDC: 20
EHRCO: 19
94
Tafesework, G.,
The role of women in national and sub-national peace processes in Ethiopia,
Rift Valley Institute,
2023,
url,
p. 2
95
EHRCO: 16; Desalegn, S., Kasseye, E., Gebeyaw, G., & Meshelemiah, J. C. A.,
The Challenges of Women Housed in
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps During an Armed Conflict in Ethiopia.
Affilia, 38(1), 2023,
url,
pp. 55-74
96
EHRCO: 16; Desalegn, S., Kasseye, E., Gebeyaw, G., & Meshelemiah, J. C. A.,
The Challenges of Women Housed in
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps During an Armed Conflict in Ethiopia.
Affilia, 38(1), 2023,
url,
pp. 55-74
97
OHCHR,
Update on the human rights situation in Ethiopia,
June 2024,
url,
p. 14
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2. Government surveillance of citizens
Surveillance of citizens in Ethiopia takes multiple forms: digitally, via wire-tapping, physically,
via informants
98
and possibly also financially, via the monitoring of financial transactions.
99
The National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) is the organisation assigned to gather
information ‘necessary to protect national security’.
100
One of the interviewed sources described how mass surveillance takes place in different
sectors; on university campuses, members of a study group may be under surveillance. In the
rural areas, agricultural extension workers may conduct surveillance during their outreach
activities where they present farmers with agricultural technologies. In the health sector,
authorities may use outreach agents within WASH services (water, sanitation and hygiene
101
) to
conduct surveillance of the population. According to one source, health professionals, teachers
and people of a legal background are among the most vocal ones when it comes to political
issues and therefore the authorities will most likely follow them.
102
According to the EHRC, it is unclear on which grounds the authorities are likely to initiate
surveillance of citizens.
103
The intensity of mass surveillance had increased since 2018, when
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power,
104
and increasingly so since the declaration of the
SoE in August 2023 in the Amhara region.
105
Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations, has described how previous governments’ surveillance of citizens
historically has been enabled by at least three factors: ’Ethiopia’s history of centralised rule
supported by powerful law enforcement agencies, selective law enforcement and poor
treatment of suspects.’
106
The intensity of the current government’s monitoring of the population remains unclear. One
source opined that the intensity of surveillance seems to increase during public holidays, when
people typically gather in groups for various events.
107
98
99
Freedom House:
Freedom in the World 2024 - Ethiopia,
2024,
url;
Associate professor: 15
EHCR: 43
100
NISS,
NISS,
n.d., url; van Veen, E.,
Perpetuating power: Ethiopia’s political settlement and the organization of
security,
September 2016,
url,
p. 28
101
In Ethiopia
WASH agents visit people in selected
woredas
(districts) across the country where they have direct
access to the families, see UNICEF, 2020
Summary Findings from Sustainability Checks for Rural WASH in Ethiopia –
Technical Paper,
url
102
An academic researcher: 17
103
EHRC: 44
104
An international researcher: 23
105
EHRC: 43
106
van Veen, E.,
Perpetuating power: Ethiopia’s political settlement and the organization of security,
September
2016,
url,
p. 33
107
EHRC: 44
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2.1.
Digital surveillance
The Ethiopian government has purchased a surveillance system in 2021 that allows the
authorities to hack into people’s mobile phones; according to the United States Department of
State, the authorities have made extensive use of these surveillance technologies in order to
spy on citizens, politicians and detainees.
108
In June 2024, the Ethiopian government submitted
a bill to the parliament seeking permission to intercept personal communication without a
court warrant. The government justified the action with reference to the need for further
investigation into possible money laundering and financing of terrorism.
109
The authorities are most likely to surveil prominent members of political parties, but may also
surveil lower-ranked members if they become the object of interest to the authorities.
110
The
interviewed sources confirmed that digital mass-surveillance for any signs of anti-government
activity is a common practice:
111
The authorities tap ordinary phone calls, including encrypted
calls on WhatsApp. The authorities have presented intercepted WhatsApp calls in court as
evidence. Furthermore, the authorities monitor online activity on social media.
112
The federal authorities have a substantial number of agents who are assigned to closely
monitor the online activities of citizens where note is taken of what a surveilled person likes,
comments on or shares, for example on Facebook.
113
For instance, one agent may have 5 or 6
accounts to monitor on social media.
114
When the authorities detain political activists and
journalists, the starting point of their indictment in courts has always been material found on
social media, according to the observations of a research institution.
115
2.2.
Physical surveillance
One source described the widespread use of informants or ordinary citizens that are assigned
to physically follow any person that they suspect of something in order to monitor this person’s
daily activities.
116
The system is called ‘one-to-five’ system. The authorities established this
network of informants in 2011 and based it on a model where the authorities assigned new
party members to monitor five people. Journalist and author, Tom Gardner, has described
Ethiopia as a ‘surveillance state’ where newly elected EPRDF party members had been assigned
persons to monitor within their own networks – e.g. their universities, prisons, businesses,
schools – or households.
117
The Clingendael Institute has analysed the Ethiopian surveillance
108
USDOS,
2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
23 April 2024,
url
BBC Monitoring,
Ethiopian bill seeks power to intercept personal communications,
Wazema Radio, 11 June 2024;
Addis Standard,
News: Parliament considers bill allowing interception of communications without court order in
crime, terrorism cases,
12 June 2024,
url
110
An international researcher: 24
111
An associate professor: 15; a research institution: 10
112
An academic researcher: 15; EHRC: 43, 45
113
A research institution: 10; an international researcher: 24
114
EHCR: 45
115
A research institution: 10
116
An academic researcher: 16
117
Gardner, T.,
The Abiy Project: God, Power and War in the New Ethiopia,
Hurst, 2024, p. 60
109
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system and found it has been a core element of state security and intelligence gathering over
time: ’This term dates back to the military junta’s rule during which it referred to an intrusive
policy of surveillance based on intelligence gathered from informers in one out of every five
households. This generated a legacy of distrust that persists today. More recently, the term
referred to the TPLF/EPRDF’s 2005 post-election aim of having one in every five households
being party-affiliated.’
118
This very close monitoring has been described as consecutive
governments’ efforts to monitor and control citizens very closely: ‘…, other interviewees largely
continued to consider ‘one-in-five’ as an effort to establish ‘deeper control’ over their daily
lives, and to perceive many of the ‘one-in-five’ households as party-affiliated.’
119
According to one source, the authorities reactivated this system soon after the elections in
2022. This system of informers is so efficient that it is difficult to ‘fly under the radar’ for any
citizen who wishes that their political activities remain unknown to the authorities once the
indicated informer has started to follow this person. The informer could be the suspected
person’s own neighbour, and surveillance therefore may begin right at the suspected person’s
doorstep.
120
By contrast, two other interviewed researchers stated that, it is possible for
targeted people to stay under the radar depending on the willingness to take risks and given
that they dispossess themselves of their ID cards, which in turn limits the person’s access to
rights and services as well as job opportunities.
121
118
van Veen, E.,
Perpetuating power: Ethiopia’s political settlement and the organization of security,
September
2016,
url,
p. 32
119
van Veen, E.,
Perpetuating power: Ethiopia’s political settlement and the organization of security,
September
2016,
url,
p. 33
120
An academic researcher: 16
121
Mehari Maru: 14; an international researcher: 26
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3. Climate change and the impact on people affected
by conflict
Ethiopia, as well as other countries in the East African region, is highly vulnerable to climate
change. Recurring floods and droughts in the country have exacerbated Ethiopia’s situation,
which is already a challenging humanitarian situation due to the conflict. These droughts and
floods affect food security and livelihoods, especially among those already displaced by
conflicts.
122
3.1.
Impact of drought and flooding
Ethiopia is experiencing one of its most severe droughts in decades, following four consecutive
failed rainy seasons. This has led to widespread food insecurity and the loss of livelihoods,
particularly in the Somali region, where over 1.4 million heads of livestock have died.
123
Drought forces people to migrate to urban areas in search of work and livelihoods, further
straining urban infrastructure and services.
124
The Somali region's three consecutive below-
average rainy seasons have exacerbated already dire conditions for over 50 % of the
population.
125
Flooding has also become a significant threat. In mid-2021, flooding affected 617 000 people,
causing large-scale losses of livestock and crops.
126
In 2023, unprecedented floods in South-
Eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya displaced millions and destroyed vital
infrastructure.
127
In the Somali region, around 240 000 people were forcibly displaced by floods,
and 1 000 hectares of crops were wiped out.
128
Damaged sanitation infrastructure has
heightened the risk of infectious diseases, such as cholera.
129
3.2.
Compounding effects of conflict and climate change
The intersection of climate change and the ongoing conflicts have worsened the humanitarian
situation in Ethiopia. In Tigray, the conflict has exacerbated food insecurity and reduced the
122
International Rescue Committee,
Crisis in Ethiopia: Climate change meets conflict,
5 January 2022,
url;
NUPI &
SIPRI,
Ethiopia: Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet,
June 2022,
url
123
Humanitarian Practice Network,
Conflict, climate change and displacement in the Somali Region of Ethiopia,
13
March 2024,
url
124
International Rescue Committee,
Crisis in Ethiopia: Climate change meets conflict,
5 January 2022,
url
125
Humanitarian Practice Network,
Conflict, climate change and displacement in the Somali Region of Ethiopia,
13
March 2024,
url
126
International Rescue Committee,
Crisis in Ethiopia: Climate change meets conflict,
5 January 2022,
url
127
UNHCR,
Climate and conflict – aggregating humanitarian crises in Ethiopia,
8 December 2023,
url
128
UNHCR,
Climate and conflict – aggregating humanitarian crises in Ethiopia,
8 December 2023,
url
129
UNHCR,
Climate and conflict – aggregating humanitarian crises in Ethiopia,
8 December 2023,
url
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capacity of both state and community levels to adapt livelihoods to the consequences of
climate change.
130
Displacement caused by conflict is often compounded by climate-related displacement,
creating a cycle of recurrent displacement without durable solutions. For instance, in April
2023, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced due to drought in the Somali region,
only to face further displacement due to floods from May to November the same year.
131
According to Fekadu Adugna Tufa, Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Addis Ababa
University, this recurrent displacement places a significant strain on already limited resources
and hampers the ability of affected populations to recover and rebuild their lives.
132
The conflict and climate change intersection also affects the ability of humanitarian
organisations to provide aid and support. Political instability and ongoing violence create unsafe
conditions for aid workers and disrupt supply chains, making it difficult to deliver essential
services and relief to those in need. For example, damaged infrastructure from floods can block
access to basic health care services, and the presence of armed groups can hinder the
distribution of food and medical supplies.
133
Furthermore, access to land and water has been a critical issue, with insufficient rainfall and
prolonged droughts increasing pasture shortages. This has led to conflicts among pastoralist
and agro-pastoral communities with tensions potentially spilling over into neighbouring
regions, such as South Sudan and Kenya. As resources become scarce, competition for these
resources intensifies, leading to more frequent violent clashes.
134
130
131
NUPI & SIPRI,
Ethiopia: Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet,
June 2022,
url
Humanitarian Practice Network,
Conflict, climate change and displacement in the Somali Region of Ethiopia,
13
March 2024,
url
132
Humanitarian Practice Network,
Conflict, climate change and displacement in the Somali Region of Ethiopia,
13
March 2024,
url
133
UNHCR,
Climate and conflict – aggregating humanitarian crises in Ethiopia,
8 December 2023,
url
134
NUPI & SIPRI,
Ethiopia: Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet,
June 2022,
url
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4. Security situation - Amhara
4.1.
Background of the conflict in Amhara
The Amhara region, Ethiopia's second largest and second most populous, is home to more than
23 million people. Geographically, it shares borders with four Ethiopian regions: Afar,
Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and Tigray and Sudan to the west. The majority of its residents
are ethnic Amhara; however, there is a significant Oromo population, particularly in the Oromo
Special Zone within the Amhara region.
135
Only nine months after the CoHA in November 2022, ending the two-year war in Tigray, armed
conflict broke out in Amhara between the Fano and the ENDF. Tensions rose after the federal
government announced its plans on 6 April 2023 to dismantle regional forces across Ethiopia
and integrate them into security forces.
136
The situation in Amhara has been volatile since April 2023.
137
Towards the end of April 2023, a
series of assassinations of regional and political personnel, who had supported the
demobilisation of special forces, began with the killing of the head of the Amhara faction of the
Prosperity Party.
138
Reportedly, armed attackers targeted 13 political and security officials
across the region, which forced many local and security officials to leave their towns, creating a
security vacuum and a deteriorated security situation in Amhara.
139
The killings of local and
security officials continued, which left the local governments ineffective and non-functional in
many places of Amhara.
140
Fano militias and Amhara nationalists have accused both the federal
and regional governments of being dominated by ethnic Oromos, and hence, they have shown
little trust in the new regional government to resolve the key concerns of the Amhara people.
141
On 4 August 2023, the federal government declared SoE for six months in Amhara following
days of clashes in the Amhara region between the military and local armed fighters
142
and
because of the capturing of major cities in Amhara by Fano.
143
The SoE, though covering the
Amhara region, can be applied across the entire country when deemed necessary by the
135
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
48
136
137
HRW,
“If the Soldier Dies, It’s on You” Attacks on Medical Care in Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict,
July 2024,
url,
p. 9
An international organisation: 12
138
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
pp.
17-18; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 14; ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
139
ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
140
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 14; ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
141
ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
142
Al Jazeera, Ethiopia declares state of emergency following clashes in Amhara, 4 August 2023,
url;
143
Human Rights Watch,
Ethiopia: Military Executes Dozens in Amhara Region,
April 2024,
url
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Ethiopian authorities
144
allowing the authorities to disregard certain elements of the rule of law,
such as banning gatherings and allowing arrest and detention without court order.
145
During the
SoE, government forces had carte blanche to engage in extrajudicial arrest of thousands,
including holding prominent Amhara parliamentarians in detention for months without legal
recourse.
146
On 2 February 2024, the government extended the SoE for another four months.
147
In August 2023, a senior federal official reported that half of Amhara Special Forces members
had joined Fano units rather than demobilise.
148
For more information on the human rights
violations during the SoE, please refer to Chapter 1.1:
General human rights violations since
2022.
4.2.
Actors in the conflict
The conflict in Amhara is marked by the presence of both state and non-state armed actors.
State armed groups active in the region include the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF),
the Federal Police, the Amhara Police, the Amhara local militia, and the Amhara Anti-Riot
Force. Among the non-state armed groups are the Fano, which is a movement of decentralised
groups. It is difficult to distinguish between the state-affiliated ‘Amhara militia’, ‘Amhara
Special Forces’ and ‘Amhara Fano militia’.
149
Moreover, Eritrean forces have trained and
supplied weapons to Fano during the Tigray war. Reportedly, Fano forces are still being trained
in Eritrea.
150
The movement is initially fragmented with a decentralised structure and
membership is informal,
151
although it has become a well-organised military wing over the past
8 months to 1 year.
152
Its use of violence previously made Fano unpopular amongst Amhara
people.
153
The signing of the CoHA and the government’s plan to disband the regional Special
Forces led to rise of Amhara nationalism and hence the popularity of Fano increased.
154
According to Mehari Maru, many Amharas may side with Fano in the conflict as Fano has
proved a resistance to ENDF.
155
Landinfo finds that Amharas are reluctant to join the Ethiopian
144
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
pp. 14-15; Al Jazeera,
What’s behind the crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara region? A simple guide,
10 August,
url;
An international organisation: 12; EHRDC: 13
145
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
pp. 14-15; Al Jazeera,
What’s behind the crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara region? A simple guide,
10 August,
url;
146
Foreign Policy,
Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict Could Spark Civil War,
6 March 2024,
url
147
Reuters, Ethiopia extends state of emergency in Amhara, 2 February 2024,
url
148
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url
149
Rift Valley Institute,
Amhara region,
October 2023,
url,
p. 3; ACLED EPO, Amhara
regional Profile,
8 September
2023,
url
150
EHRDC: 30
151
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 34; International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara,
16 November 2023,
url;
A
research institute:13
152
Mehari Maru: 8
153
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 34; EHRDC: 23
154
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 34; International Crisis Group,
Crisiswatch, Ethiopia,
May 2024,
url;
A research institute: 11;
International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara,
16 November 2023,
url
155
Mehari Maru: 11
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national forces as these forces are primarily composed of soldiers from Oromia and managed
by people from Oromia.
156
Moreover, drone attacks, mass arrest and targeting of civilians by the federal government has
generated increased public support towards Fano. According to the EHRDC, more than 75 % of
youth in Amhara have joined Fano.
157
Since the war in Amhara erupted, the Fano militia aim at
fighting the federal government.
158
The militias have been able to control many rural areas in
the Amhara region,
159
while the militia generally conduct ambush attacks against the ENDF and
political opponents in urban areas
160
and challenge the federal government through its hit-and-
run tactics.
161
Conversely, government forces mostly control towns and main roads.
162
Another actor in the region is the OLA/OLF-Shane, along with Oromo Ethnic militia, which
engage in battles against Amhara militias in the Oromo special zone in Amhara.
163
4.3.
Conflict dynamics in and types of violence
In August 2023, violence escalated in the Amhara region as armed clashes between Fano
militias and the ENDF erupted when the federal army intensified the disarmament of the
Amhara regional Special Forces and Amhara militias.
164
The violence included heavy fighting in
and around cities and towns across the Amhara region resulting in killing of civilians and
damage to property.
165
In August 2023, ACLED recorded 170 violent events and 541 reported
fatalities in Ethiopia, with the majority of political violence cases recorded in Amhara.
166
For the
period of December 2022 to December 2023, the federal army was responsible for most of the
violence against civilians in the Amhara region, followed by Fano militias.
167
Armed clashes also broke out in August 2023 between Fano militias and the Oromo Liberation
Army (OLA) in Dera woreda, which is a disputed territory located on the border between the
Amhara and Oromia regions. Both Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups reside in this area, and
156
157
Landinfo,
Etiopia; Konflikten i Amhara,
20 June 2024,
url,
p. 10
EHRDC: 23
158
ACLED EPO,
The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January 2024,
url
159
ACLED EPO,
The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January 2024,
url;
An International
Organisation: 21
160
ACLED EPO,
The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January 2024,
url
161
International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara,
16 November 2023,
url;
Mehari Maru: 1
162
An International organisation: 21
163
ACLED EPO,
EPO November 2023 Monthly: An Evolving Conflict Environment in Oromia,
14 December 2023,
url
164
ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url;
Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January 2024,
url,
p. 33; An
international organisation: 12
165
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission,
The human rights impact of the armed conflict on civilians in Amhara
Regional State,
14 August 2023,
url
166
ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
167
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 34
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Amhara residents have petitioned for this area to be administered by the Amhara region for the
last two decades.
168
Since August 2023, the level of violence has remained high in Amhara,
169
and throughout 2023,
hostilities between Fano and the federal forces persisted in the region with most clashes
occurring in the rural areas with the use of drone strikes, air strikes and heavy artillery.
170
Reportedly, the authorities established checkpoints across the region to prevent Amharas from
travelling to Addis Ababa, raising concerns of ethnic profiling.
171
In December 2023, ACLED’s Ethiopia Peace Observatory recorded 34 battles between the ENDF
and Fano militias, with the ENDF conducting at least three drone strikes resulting in about 50
reported fatalities in December.
172
In total, ACLED reported 200 fatalities in Amhara in
December 2023.
173
On 29 January 2024, members of the ENDF murdered dozens of civilians in the small town,
Merawi, in Amhara. The killings were reportedly motivated by revenge, although the
government denies to have killed civilians.
174
Reportedly, the episode is one of the most violent
and deadliest since attacks in August 2023.
175
In March 2024, hostilities in Amhara intensified, and fighting between Fano and federal forces
reached major towns for the first time since August 2023, including the capital of the region,
Bahir Dar. Fano confirmed kidnapping 270 youth based on accusations of affiliation with
government forces. In April 2024, the first clashes between security forces and Fano spilled
over to Addis Ababa, killing civilians, based on government accusations of planning ‘a terrorist
attack’. Meanwhile, fights continued in Amhara with the government’s attempt to defeat
Fano.
176
ACLED recorded more political violence in April 2024 compared to previous months,
with Amhara continuing to be the region with the highest number of insurgencies accounting
70 violent events and 314 reported fatalities.
177
168
169
ACLED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url
ACLED EPO,
EPO December 2023 Monthly | The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January
2024,
url
170
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch,
Ethiopia,
November 2023,
url
171
BBC,
Why Ethiopia's Amhara militiamen are battling the army,
16 August,
url;
International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara,
16 November 2023,
url
172
ACLED EPO,
EPO December 2023 Monthly | The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January
2024,
url
173
ACLED EPO,
EPO December 2023 Monthly | The Fano Insurgency: Main Hurdles to Unifying Fano,
19 January
2024,
url
174
Foreign Policy,
Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict Could Spark Civil War,
6 March 2024,
url;
BBC,
Amhara conflict:
Ethiopians massacred in their homes by government troops,
13 February 2024,
url
175
BBC,
Amhara conflict: Ethiopians massacred in their homes by government troops,
13 February 2024,
url;
Human
Rights Watch,
Ethiopia: Military Executes Dozens in Amhara Region,
April 2024,
url;
Foreign Policy,
Ethiopia’s
Amhara Conflict Could Spark Civil War,
6 March 2024,
url
176
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch,
Ethiopia,
November 2023,
url
177
ACLED EPO, EPO Monthly Update | April 2024 Abiy Ahmed’s Sixth Year , 13 May 2024,
url
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The current security situation in Amhara is dire with arbitrary killings, arrests and an increasing
number of IDPs.
178
According to Mehari Maru, the situation in Amhara has transitioned from
sporadic skirmishes to a well-organised and coordinated conflict covering the whole Amhara
region that is marked by intense fighting and instability.
179
The security situation is worst in
Gojjam, Gondor, Wollo and Shewa based on attempts to fight the federal government. The
federal army has taken measures that include killings of civilians.
180
The government
occasionally conducts indiscriminate drone attacks in Amhara.
181
Drone attacks have targeted
Fino Selam, Debre Birhan, Wegel Tena, while there are reports of killings in Bahir Dar, Mota and
Degala.
182
Two human rights organisations noted that they had to scale down their monitoring
activities in Amhara due to the deteriorating security situation.
183
The Foreign Policy describes
the series of violent events in Amhara as a sign of a worrying shift in the conflict's nature. As
the armed confrontation persists, government soldiers begin to perceive broader communities
as complicit in the rebellion, resulting in a greater propensity for collective punishment against
Amhara communities. This escalating cycle intensifies animosity and perpetuates violence.
184
4.4.
Humanitarian situation
Amhara region has high malnutrition rates due to a combination of drought in some areas and
unusual rainfall and severe storms in other areas as well as the ongoing fighting in large parts of
the region.
185
Furthermore, the federal government has exacerbated this situation as the
authorities have denied farmers in Amhara access to critical resources, such as fertilisers and
seedlings. The absence of these critical agricultures resources has created a famine-like
situation and starvation in the Amhara region, according to the academic researcher.
186
In
October 2023, Addis Standard reported at least 18 starvation deaths.
187
According to
projections from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network for the period June–September
2024, parts of Amhara will be in category 3 (crisis) on the Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification (IPC), which classifies the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and acute
malnutrition.
188
The situation is predicted to be most challenging in most of East Gojjam, North
Wollo, South Wollo, and North Shewa. Parts of Central Gondar and South Gondar are classified
178
179
EHRCO: 9
Mehari Maru: 1
180
Mehari Maru: 1
181
A research institute: 17
182
Mehari Maru: 1
183
EHRC: 24: EHRCO: 12
184
Foreign Policy,
Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict Could Spark Civil War,
6 March 2024,
url
185
SIDA,
Humanitarian Crisis Analysis – Ethiopia,
31 March 2024,
url,
pp. 2-4; Academic researcher: 21; Norway,
Landinfo,
Temanotat Etiopia: Konflikten i Amhara,
20 June 2024,
url,
p. 26
186
Academic researcher: 21
187
Addis Standard,
News: At least 18 people die of drought-related hunger in two districts of Waghemra, North
Gonder zones, Amhara region,
2 October 2023,
url
188
IPC,
Understanding the IPC Scales,
2017,
url,
p. 3
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in category 2 (stressed), while the western parts of Amhara (West and Central Gondar, Awi,
Bahir Dar, North, West, and East Gojjam) are categorised at level 1 (minimal).
189
The ongoing conflict in the Amhara region has also led to the region being classified by the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as ’Partially
Accessible’ or ’Hard-to-reach’ for aid workers.
190
The shutdown of telecommunications systems
including internet services in Amhara complicates the coordination of a humanitarian response
even further.
191
The conflict is heavily affecting access to education.
192
In early October 2023, the Amhara
Education Bureau released a report stating that about 3.9 million students, out of six million,
were unable to continue their education. Some schools were able to resume classes in April
2024.
193
On 6 November 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
announced seven deaths because of a bombing of a primary school by a government-operated
drone. The UN agency stated that Fano members had reportedly occupied parts of the school
grounds before the airstrike.
194
According to Project HOPE, the ongoing conflict has brought the health system in Amhara to
the brink of collapse.
195
The Amhara Regional Health Bureau is reporting a wave of
communicable and non-communicable diseases, including outbreaks of measles, malaria, and
cholera.
196
Data from the Health Bureau shows that more than 270 health facilities have been
looted.
197
189
Famine Early Warning Systems Network,
Ethiopia Acute Food Insecurity, July - September 2024 projected
outcomes,
July 2024,
url
190
OCHA,
ETHIOPIA: National Access map,
31 May 2024,
url
191
An international organisation: 13
192
Belgium, CEDOCA,
ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in Amhara,
29 February 2024,
url,
p. 22
193
Addis Standard,
News: Dozens of schools in East Gojjam Zone of Amhara region reopen after six-month delay,
13
April 2024,
url
194
OHCHR, Ethiopia: Violence in Amhara region, 17 November 2023,
url
195
Project HOPE,
Ethiopia: Health System Has Collapsed in Conflict-Affected Areas,
5 May 2024,
url
196
Addis Standard, News:
Unrest fuels health emergency in the Amhara region, spurs a surge in communicable and
non-communicable diseases,
30 December 2023,
url;
Addis Standard,
News: Following cholera outbreak in Bati
district, Amhara health authorities take action to contain the spread of the disease,
27 April 2024
url;
Project HOPE,
Ethiopia: Health System Has Collapsed in Conflict-Affected Areas,
5 May 2024,
url
197
Addis Standard,
News: Unrest fuels health emergency in the Amhara region, spurs a surge in communicable and
non-communicable diseases,
30 December 2023,
url
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5. Security situation - Tigray
This section covers the situation in Tigray since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in
November 2022, including the humanitarian and security situation.
5.1.
Background of the conflict in Tigray
Tigray is Ethiopia’s most northerly region, bordering Eritrea to the north, Sudan to the west,
and Ethiopia’s regional states of Afar and Amhara to the east and south respectively. Prior to
the conflict, Tigray region was home to almost 6 million people, the majority of them Ethnic
Tigrayan, although the region is also home to other ethnic communities, including the Irob and
Kunama who live close to the Eritrean border.
198
On 2 November 2022, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal
authorities signed a ceasefire agreement, officially called Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
(CoHA),
in Pretoria, South Africa, mediated by the African Union (AU).
199
This marked the
official end of a two-year conflict between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal authorities. In the
agreement, the signatories agreed to protect the civilian population and allow humanitarian
access to Tigray. Furthermore, the TPLF consented that the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) would
give up its heavy armaments, disarms and reintegrate into the federal defence structures or
civilian life. On the other hand, the agreement stated that foreign and federal troops should
withdraw from Tigray.
200
It should be noted that the agreement was not signed by the other
stakeholders in the conflict in Tigray, namely the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), as well as
armed groups from Amhara and Afar.
201
DIS has previously reported on the conflict in Tigray and its consequences throughout Ethiopia
in
DIS,
Ethiopia: An update on the security and human rights situation since February 2022, DIS,
Etiopien: Sikkerhedssituationen
and
DIS,
Ethiopia: Political opposition parties – recent
developments
The ceasefire agreement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal authorities has been
upheld by the signatories.
202
However, the Eritrean and Amhara forces have yet to withdraw
their troops from Tigray, and there have been reports of pockets of violent clashes in Tigray
198
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
19
199
African Union,
Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front,
2 November 2023,
url
200
African Union,
Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front,
2 November 2023,
url,
pp. 2-
5
201
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 9
202
Der Spiegel,
Tigray: A Fragile Peace in the Wake of Unspeakable Horrors,
5 April 2023
url;
Refugees International,
Scars of war and Deprivation: An Urgent Call to Reverse Tigray ’s Humanitarian Crisis,
March 2024,
url,
p. 10
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since November 2022.
203
Both Eritrea and Amhara have historically laid claim to parts of Tigray,
and there is evidence of serious security incidents between Amhara and Tigray forces and EDF
and Tigray forces.
204
According to Martin Plaut, journalist and long-time observer of Ethiopia, the CoHA did not
deliver sustainable peace, as it did not resolve the land disputes on Western and Southern
Tigray.
205
EHRCO agreed and elaborated that the peace agreement had failed to deliver on
dialogue and reconciliation processes, leaving the civilian population scarred by the conflict and
wanting revenge.
206
5.2.
Actors in the conflict
5.2.1. Amhara militias
Since November 2022, there have been reports of sporadic fighting between Amhara and
Tigray forces in the Southern, Western and North Western zones of Tigray
207
– two zones that
Amhara claims as their territory.
208
These disputed territories are officially part of Tigray but
have been
de facto
under Amhara control since November 2020. The Federal government has
stated that a referendum should resolve the question of these disputed territories.
209
During the course of the two-year conflict in Tigray, there has been many reports of as many as
1.2 million Tigrayans being expulsed from their homes in Western Tigray, notably by the
Amhara militia, Fano.
210
According to the UN Human Rights Council, the Fano militia continued
to evict and even kill Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray after the signing of the ceasefire
agreement, although to a lesser extent than in previous years.
211
For more on Fano and the
security situation in Amhara, please refer to Chapter 4:
Security situation in Amhara.
203
Addis Standard,
News: Deadly clash in South Tigray Zone as Amhara, Tigray regions accuse each other of
provocation,
28
March, 2024,
url;
RFI,
Éthiopie: six mois après l’accord de paix au Tigré, d'importants défis persistent,
2 May 2023,
url
204
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 26; Sweden, Migrationsverket,
Etiopien: Säkerhet och efterkrigskontext i Tigray (version 1.1),
10 July
2023,
url,
p. 26; ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update | February 2024 Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten
Peace Deal,
19 March 2024,
url
205
Martin Plaut: 1
206
EHRCO: 22-24
207
In Amhara, the disputed territories are refered to as follows: Western Tigray are referred to as Welkait, Tsegede,
and Humera woredas, North-Western Tigray as Tselemt woreda and Southern Tigray as Raya-Azebo and Alamata
woredas, ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update | February 2024 Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace
Deal,
19 March 2024,
url
208
Sweden, Migrationsverket,
Etiopien: Säkerhet och efterkrigskontext i Tigray (version 1.1),
10 July 2023,
url,
p. 26;
ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update | February 2024 Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal,
19
March 2024,
url
209
ACLED EPO, EPO October 2023 Monthly Update: Ethiopia’s International Relations, 22 November 2023,
url
210
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
45
211
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil society Monitoring of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
p. 8; HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p. 45
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5.2.2. Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF)
Months after signing the CoHA in November 2022, EDF troops withdrew from most of Tigray.
However, EDF retained control of parts of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border region. Some of the areas
where Eritrea remained present had already been a source of disagreement between Ethiopia
and Eritrea since the 1998 war.
212
Eritrean forces have committed a series of crimes against civilians in Tigray since the signing of
the CoHA.
213
Documented incidents include the targeted killings of civilians. For instance, on 17
November 2022, Eritrean soldiers reportedly shot and killed four young civilians in Axum,
Central Tigray.
214
Subsequent reports from 19 November 2022 stated that Eritrean forces were
responsible for the deaths of 63 civilians, including 10 children.
215
Furthermore, there have
been different instances of looting and mass detentions by Eritrean forces, particularly noted in
the looting of shops and vehicles towards the end of November 2022.
216
Adding to the violence
are sexual assaults, which have continued unabated despite the peace agreements.
217
Reports
from February 2023 indicate ongoing sexual violence, with survivors having to flee significant
distances to avoid Eritrean roadblocks and seek medical assistance.
218
5.3.
Conflict dynamics and types of violence
As stated above, sexual and gender based violence has remained pervasive in Tigray even after
the signing of the CoHA. The ICHREE documented numerous instances of rape and sexual
violence by both EDF and Amhara forces after November 2022.
219
Amnesty International
highlighted severe cases of sexual violence, including gang rapes and sexual slavery committed
by Eritrean forces. One medical center in Eastern Tigray reported 76 new cases of sexual and
gender based violence within a single week in June 2023.
220
Additionally, the Organization for
Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa found that out of 305 medical records
reviewed, 128 incidents of sexual and gender based violence occurred after November 2022,
212
The Economist,
Ethiopia’s prime minister wants a Red Sea harbour,
2 November 2023,
url;
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil
society Monitoring of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
pp. 13-14; HRC,
Comprehensive
investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
pp.45-46; The Reporter
Ethiopia,
Eritrean forces still occupy several woredas and kebeles in Tigray, officials,
22 April 2023,
url
213
Addis Standard,
News: Tigrayan official accuses Eritrean forces of “summarily executing” civilians, calls on federal
government for protection,
28 November 2022,
url;
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil society Monitoring of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
pp. 8-9; ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update November 2022,
7 December 2022,
url
214
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil society Monitoring of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
p. 8
215
VOA,
Kidnappings, Looting Cited in Ethiopia's Tigray After Truce,
27 November 2022,
url
216
AP,
Kidnappings, looting cited in Ethiopia’s Tigray after truce,
27 November 2022,
url;
ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly
Update November 2022,
7 December 2022,
url
217
BBC,
Ethiopia war in Tigray: Eritrean soldiers accused of rape despite peace deal,
15 February 2023,
url;
The New
Humanitarian,
Ethiopian minorities remain fearful despite peace deal,
16 February 2023,
url
218
The New Humanitarian,
Ethiopian minorities remain fearful despite peace deal,
16 February 2023,
url
219
USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia, 22 April 2024,
url
220
Amnesty International, Ethiopia:
“Today or tomorrow, they should be brought before justice”: Rape, sexual slavery,
extrajudicial executions, and pillage by Eritrean Defence Forces,
4 September 2023,
url
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primarily in areas with EDF presence, indicating that the pattern of sexual violence in Tigray
had not abated.
221
The weaponisation of sexual and gender based violence in Tigray has
previously been described in
DIS, Ethiopia: An update on the security and human rights
situation since February 2022.
222
After the CoHA, forced displacement of Tigrayan civilians by Amhara forces continued. The
authorities detained and expelled more than a thousand Tigrayans from Western Tigray in
November 2022 and January 2023. By March 2024, nearly 60 000 displaced individuals had
sought refuge in IDP shelters near Shire.
223
Similarly, abductions by Eritrean forces have been
frequent post-CoHA. In February 2023, 10 youngsters were abducted from Gure Endagabir
near Axum.
224
By April 2024, there were 93 reported abductions in Gulomkeda and Irob
woredas. These acts have often been coupled with looting, including the theft of livestock.
225
Eritrean forces have committed a series of crimes against civilians in Tigray since the signing of
the CoHA.
226
Documented incidents include the targeted killings of civilians. For instance, on
November 17 2022, Eritrean soldiers reportedly shot and killed four young civilians in Axum,
Central Tigray.
227
Subsequent reports from 19 November 2022 stated that Eritrean forces were
responsible for the deaths of 63 civilians, including 10 children.
228
Furthermore, there have
been different instances of looting and mass detentions by Eritrean forces, particularly noted in
the looting of shops and vehicles towards the end of November 2022.
229
Reports from February
2023 indicate that sexual violence against women have continued since the peace agreements,
while survivors in need of medical assistance have had to flee significant distances to avoid
Eritrean roadblocks.
230
In February 2024, fighting between local forces from Amhara and Tigray erupted in Southern
Tigray. This was the first recorded armed clashes in this part of Tigray since the wider conflict
ended in November 2022. According to ACLED’s Ethiopia Peace Observatory, this indicated that
221
Organization for Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa,
Broken Promises Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence Before and After the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Tigray, Ethiopia,
August 2023,
url,
pp. 1-2
222
DIS,
Ethiopia: An update on the security and human rights situation since February 2022,
September 2022,
url,
pp.
14-15
223
HRW,
Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce,
1 June 2023,
url;
The Reporter,
No way home for
more than 3 million IDPs withering in camps,
30 March 2024,
url
224
Addis Standard,
News: AU monitoring team conducts second visit in predominantly Eritrea-controlled
Gulemekeda district, Zalambessa town,
6 April 2024,
url
225
AP, Eritrean troops are accused of abducting farmers and stealing livestock in Ethiopia’s Tigray, 2 February 2024,
url
226
Addis Standard,
News: Tigrayan official accuses Eritrean forces of “summarily executing” civilians, calls on federal
government for protection,
28 November 2022,
url;
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil society Monitoring of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
pp. 8-9; ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update November 2022,
7 December 2022,
url
227
Ethiopia Watch,
Civil society Monitoring of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,
July 2023,
url,
p. 8
228
VOA,
Kidnappings, Looting Cited in Ethiopia's Tigray After Truce,
27 November 2022,
url
229
AP,
Kidnappings, looting cited in Ethiopia’s Tigray after truce,
27 November 2022,
url;
ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly
Update November 2022,
7 December 2022,
url
230
The New Humanitarian,
Ethiopian minorities remain fearful despite peace deal,
16 February 2023,
url
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the Tigrayan forces had not disarmed as stated in the ceasefire agreement.
231
The fighting in
Southern Tigray between Amhara and Tigray militias continued in March and April 2024 and
tensions over the disputed territories between the Amhara and Tigray regional governments
increased as the ENDF also clashed with Amhara militias.
232
Because of the renewed fighting in
Tigray, protesters in Western and Southern Tigray have demanded that the Ethiopian federal
authorities resolve the territorial disputes.
233
5.4.
Humanitarian situation
According to the UN Human Rights Council, the dire humanitarian situation in Tigray improved
‘significantly’ after the involved parties signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in
November 2022. Following the signing, authorities allowed humanitarian access into some, but
not all, areas of Tigray.
234
Tigray had suffered from acute food shortages during the war, with
famine-like situations in at least 12 districts. After the war, locust infections and ongoing
drought in the Horn of Africa aggravated the food crisis. According to the Interim Regional
Administrator of Tigray, about 2 million persons were at risk of starvation and additional 5.2
needed food aid by the end of 2023.
235
The largest provider of food aid to Ethiopia is USAID but when the agency discovered cases of
theft and resale of food donations, USAID announced that they suspended their food aid to
Tigray by June 2023.
236
Some sources indicated that in reality the suspension of food aid by
USAID occured in the Northern regions of Tigray as early as March 2023.
237
In addition, the
World Food Programme (WFP) discovered that there had been diversions in their food donation
to Tigray and reacted by suspending their donations even though Tigray was in a state of food
shortage.
238
The diversion of food aid has been described as ‘widespread and coordinated’.
239
The distribution of food aid has restarted in Tigray by December 2023.
240
However, the
installment of a new anti-theft system as well as lack of funding means that not everybody at
risk of famine have received food assistance.
241
231
ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update | February 2024 Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal,
19 March 2024,
url
232
ACLED EPO,
EPO Weekly Update (2 April 2024),
3 April 2024,
url
233
ACLED EPO,
EPO Monthly Update | February 2024 Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal,
19 March 2024,
url;
ACLED EPO,
EPO Weekly Update (2 April 2024),
3 April 2024,
url
234
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
60
235
DW, Ethiopia's Tigray region ravaged by deadly famine, 12/12/2023,
url
236
USAID,
Pause of U.S. Food Aid in Tigray, Ethiopia,
Statement by Administrator Samantha Power, 3 May 2023,
url
237
New Humanitarian,
USAID suspends all food aid to Ethiopia over massive diversion scheme: reports,
8 June 2023,
url
238
Martin Plaut: 6
239
New Humanitarian,
Aid glitches and funding shortfalls increase famine fears in Tigray,
13 February 2023,
url
240
TGHAT,
Food aid restarts in Tigray with a reduced target,
30 January 2024,
url
241
New Humanitarian,
Aid glitches and funding shortfalls increase famine fears in Tigray,
13 February 2023,
url;
Martin Plaut: 6
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On the issue of humanitarian aid in Tigray, Martin Plaut opines in May 2024 that there is no
clear evidence of the Ethiopian government being involved, in or responsible for, preventing
humanitarian aid from reaching Tigray.
242
The National Disaster Risk Management Commission,
of the federal government, claims that there are ‘intents of politisation’ of humanitarian aid
defining the situation as ‘a drought rather than a famine’.
243
Despite this, authorities have not
fully restored humanitarian access and humanitarian organisations do not have access to all
areas of Tigray.
244
The war in Tigray has drastically reduced access to medical care. Before the conflict, the region
had over 1 000 health facilities and a large health care workforce.
245
The war resulted in severe
damage and looting of 81 % of health posts, 74 % of health centers, and 86 % of hospitals, and
many facilities only being partially functional due to shortages in supplies and equipment.
246
Medicine shortages, insufficient health professionals, and budget constraints have further
hindered healthcare, forcing hospitals to charge fees that many cannot afford.
247
The disruption
has also increased the risk of disease outbreaks and led to a fivefold rise in maternal
mortality.
248
According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), education in Tigray is hindered
by damaged infrastructure, teacher shortages, lack of materials, financial constraints and
security issues. Despite a reported resumption in May 2023, nearly 400 schools in Western,
Southern, and North Western Tigray remain inaccessible. Education resumed in parts of
Southern Tigray under Amhara control in December 2022.
249
242
243
Martin Plaut: 9
ENA,
Nat’l Disaster Risk Commission Criticizes Elements Trying to Politicize Drought in Ethiopia,
4 February 2024,
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
url
244
42
245
UNICEF, World Food Programme et. Al, Meher
Assessment Report conducted from 18 Nov-8
December, 2023, Tigray Region – Ethiopia,
December 2023,
url,
p. 8
246
Addis Standard, News:
Two-year war leaves 86% of Tigray’s healthcare facilities devastated: new report,
5
October 2023,
url;
UNICEF, World Food Programme et. Al,
Meher Assessment Report conducted from 18 Nov-8
December, 2023, Tigray Region – Ethiopia,
December 2023,
url,
p. 8
247
World Peace Foundation,
Mekelle: A city under a lingering siege (Part 2),
17 August 2023,
url;
EHRC,
Human
Rights Monitoring Report on Tigray,
February 2024,
url,
pp. 18-20
248
CARE,
Fighting for maternal health in Ethiopia with two sticks and fertilizer sacks,
15 April 2024,
url
249
EHRC,
Human Rights Monitoring Report on Tigray,
February 2024,
url,
pp. 21-23
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6. Security situation – Oromia
6.1.
Background of the conflict in Oromia
Oromia is the largest of Ethiopia’s regions, home to an estimated 35 million people, more than
90 % living in rural areas.
250
In July 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed removed Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the
national terrorist list and formally recognised the organisation as a political party in Ethiopia. In
return, the OLF leadership agreed to disarm.
251
However, parts of the OLF did not wish to
disarm and broke out to form the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), who broke ties with the OLF
and launched an insurgency against the federal authorities October 2018.
252
The federal authorities instituted a
de facto
state of emergency, granting themselves extensive
powers, including the imposition of a curfew, a ban on gatherings, and arbitrary detentions.
253
6.2.
Actors in the conflict
The conflict in Western Oromia consists of a myriad of armed groups on both sides of the
conflict. The federal authorities are present through both the ENDF and regional police.
254
Non-
state armed actors in Oromia include the OLA
255
as well as OLA splinter groups, local Oromo
militias, and ethnic militias from the neighbouring regional states of Amhara and Benishangul-
Gumuz, as well as armed civilian groups often consisting of local farmers and youths.
256
The broad fault lines of the conflict lie between the OLA, Amhara militias, and federal
authorities in a struggle for territorial and administrative control over parts of the region, with
different views on the Ethiopian federation.
257
An international researcher stated that it is often
difficult to determine which actors are involved in violent incidents because of the very limited
250
HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations (A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p.
60
251
Salemot, Marew Ababe,
Why did peace talks fail in Ethiopia with the Oromo Liberation Front?,
4 January 2024,
url;
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 11; USDOS,
2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia,
13 March 2019,
url
252
International researcher: 7; Salemot, Marew Ababe,
Why did peace talks fail in Ethiopia with the Oromo
Liberation Front?,
4 January 2024,
url;
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information
Report on Ethiopia,
31 January 2024,
url,
p. 1; HRC,
Comprehensive investigative findings and legal determinations
(A/HRC/54/CRP.3),
13 October 2023,
url,
p. 16; Belgium, CEDOCA,
COI FOCUS, ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in
Oromia,
26 March 2024,
url,
p. 6
253
Belgium, CEDOCA,
COI FOCUS, ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia,
26 March 2024,
url,
p. 6
254
Rift Valley Institute,
CONFLICT TREND ANALYSIS WESTERN OROMIA,
March 2023,
url,
p. 6
255
The federal authorities refers to the OLA as OLF-Shene, Rift Valley Institute,
CONFLICT TREND ANALYSIS WESTERN
OROMIA,
March 2023,
url,
p. 6
256
Rift Valley Institute,
CONFLICT TREND ANALYSIS WESTERN OROMIA,
March 2023,
url,
p. 6; Belgium, CEDOCA,
COI
FOCUS, ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia,
26 March 2024,
url,
p. 10
257
Rift Valley Institute,
CONFLICT TREND ANALYSIS WESTERN OROMIA,
March 2023,
url,
p. 2; Belgium, CEDOCA,
COI
FOCUS, ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia,
26 March 2024,
url,
p. 11
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flow of information from the conflict zones. This leads to conflicting statements about who
committed a given violent incident, leaving it unclear who is responsible.
258
The Ethiopian Peace Observatory (EPO) noted that the actors involved in the conflict have
undergone several changes. Before the peace negotiations in spring of 2023, the Oromia
Special Forces (OSF) were the main force involved in the fight against the OLA. In early April
2023, the Ethiopian federal authorities announced the disbanding of all regional special forces.
A few days later, the ENDF announced that the federal police had taken over security tasks in
Oromia.
259
6.3.
Conflict dynamics and types of violence
The security situation in Oromia varies across the region.
260
Around the turn of the year 2022,
hostilities between the OLA and federal authorities escalated in the four Wollega zones, Guji,
Borana, and parts of West Shewa.
261
At the same time, Fano became increasingly active in the
border area between Amhara and Oromia.
262
All parties involved in the violence have been
targeting civilians throughout the duration of the conflict.
263
In spring of 2023, peace talks took place between the federal authorities and the OLA in
Zanzibar, Tanzania. The negotiators parted ways without results, despite the OLA indicating
holding the talks in a constructive atmosphere. The interviewed international researcher noted
that it is unclear as to whether a deal between the negotiating parties would even put an end
to the conflict because many actors in the conflict have become financially dependent on the
continuation of violence. Furthermore, it is unclear to the researcher whether the negotiating
team from the OLA enjoys any legitimacy amongst the fighters on the ground.
264
After the talks
broke down, the government launched a new offensive in Oromia, after which violence in the
region sharply increased again.
265
Over the course of the conflict, the armed groups have also intensified their attacks against
civilians. In western Oromia, armed groups, mainly the OLA and Fano militias, carry out attacks
on both Oromo and Amhara civilians.
266
Furthermore, Landinfo stated that there has been
increasing tensions between ethnic Oromos and ethnic Amharas in the region in recent
years.
267
Since July 2023, the number of kidnappings for ransom has also increased in
258
259
International researcher: 2, 5, 18
ALCED EPO,
EPO November 2023 Monthly: An Evolving Conflict Environment in Oromia,
14 December 2023,
url
260
International researcher: 4
261
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia,
14 September 2023,
url,
p. 4;
International Crisis Group,
Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Africa: Ethiopia,
April 2024,
url
262
International Crisis Group,
Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Africa: Ethiopia,
April 2024,
url
263
International researcher: 5; International Crisis Group,
Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Africa: Ethiopia,
April 2024,
url
264
International researcher: 7; HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia,
14 September 2023,
url,
p. 4
265
HRC,
Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia,
14 September 2023,
url,
p. 4
266
ALCED EPO,
EPO August 2023 Monthly: Conflict in Amhara Region,
8 September 2023,
url;
EHRCO: 15; EHRC: 38
267
Landinfo,
Temanotat Etiopia: Væpnet konflikt og politisk opposisjon i Oromia,
24. februar 2023,
url,
p. 15
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Oromia.
268
According to the international researcher, the conflict has been going on for so long
that many have become financially dependent on the conflict as a source of income, blurring
the lines in Oromia between politically motivated armed struggle and financially motivated
criminal activity, such as kidnappings for ransom.
269
In November 2023, the OLA and representatives of the Ethiopian government met again in
Tanzania for a second round of peace talks. Violence decreased significantly during the talks.
Again, the talks broke down and violence escalated immediately after the failed negotiations,
resulting in civilian deaths.
270
Meanwhile, tensions between the Oromo and Amhara also lead
to more attacks on civilians.
271
The Oromia insurgency continued with clashes between government forces and the OLA. On 12
January 2024, a drone strike by federal forces in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone killed four people.
Later, on 28 January, the OLA declared a twenty-day ban on transport and businesses. In late
January and February, counterinsurgency operations resulted in the deaths of over 120 OLA
members, including leaders, according to Crisis Group. The authorities briefly detained a French
journalist in February for alleged conspiracy with the OLA. On 4 March 2024, the OLA gained
ground in Gelana district, prompting the government to redeploy troops to the Amhara region.
On 4 April, the OLA reportedly killed twelve Amhara civilians in West Shewa, and government
forces killed twenty civilians in South West Shewa, accusing them of links to the OLA. The
government also attempted to weaken the OLA by calling for fighters to surrender, exploiting
leadership divisions, and training local militias.
272
6.4.
Humanitarian situation
In Oromia, violence and the destruction of existing infrastructure over the past years affect the
local population’s access to essential services such as education, health care, water and
sanitation negatively.
273
Furthermore, ongoing severe drought affect the humanitarian situation
in the southern and western parts of Oromia.
274
Humanitarian organisations face serious
challenges in reaching people in need.
275
According to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), food supply for vulnerable persons and those
268
269
EHRCO: 15; EHRC: 38; international researcher: 5, 7
International researcher: 5, 7.
270
Addis Standard,
News: 45 believers killed in two separate attacks in Arsi and Kellem Wollega zones, Oromia
region,
1 December 2023,
url;
ALCED EPO,
EPO November 2023 Monthly: An Evolving Conflict Environment in
Oromia,
14 December 2023,
url;
271
International Crisis Group,
Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Africa: Ethiopia,
April 2024,
url
272
International Crisis Group,
Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Africa: Ethiopia,
April 2024,
url
273
EHRC: 37; SIDA,
Humanitarian Crisis Analysis – Ethiopia,
31 March 2024,
url,
pp. 2-4; OCHA, Ethiopia: Access
Snapshot, Oromia region (south-west) (As of 31 October 2022), 9 November 2022,
url;
OCHA, ETHIOPIA: Situation
Report - Last updated: 10 June 2024,
url
274
SIDA,
Humanitarian Crisis Analysis – Ethiopia,
31 March 2024,
url,
pp. 2-4; OCHA, ETHIOPIA: Situation Report -
Last updated: 10 June 2024,
url
275
OCHA,
ETHIOPIA: National Access map,
31 May 2024,
url;
EHRC: 37; SIDA,
Humanitarian Crisis Analysis – Ethiopia,
31 March 2024,
url,
pp. 2-4; OCHA, Ethiopia: Access Snapshot, Oromia region (south-west) (As of 31 October 2022),
9 November 2022,
url;
OCHA, ETHIOPIA: Situation Report - Last updated: 10 June 2024,
url
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affected by the ongoing conflict remains inadequate and is hindered by insecurity and logistical
problems against the backdrop of increasing malnutrition rates.
276
Additionally, the EHRC stated
that the presence of armed groups in Oromia prevents farmers from farming the land.
277
CEDOCA cites a report from the European Institute of Peace from 2022, and notes that
government troops had ordered local farmers in Oromia not to sow crops as this could provide
cover for OLA troops.
278
276
277
OCHA,
Ethiopia: Access Snapshot, Oromia region (south-west) (As of 31 October 2022),
9 November 2022,
url;
EHRC: 37
278
Belgium, CEDOCA,
ETHIOPIE: Veiligheidssituatie in Oromia,
26 March 2024,
url,
p. 25
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7. Treatment of perceived political opponents and
ethnic groups in light of the conflicts
7.1.
Oromia
According to the EHRC, one defining trait of the conflict in Oromia is the high degree of armed
groups committing crimes, attacking civilians, officials and civil servants as well as revenge and
retaliation attacks.
279
The EHRC further elaborated that Oromia is the region with the highest
number of arrested and detained people who are suspected by the security forces of
supporting or being affiliated with the armed opposition groups.
280
In most cases, detained people have been denied access to fair trial and justice systems. The
authorities have established informal detention centres as there are too few formal detention
centres compared to the high number of detained persons.
281
According to a human rights organisation, a high number of detentions across Ethiopia occur in
Oromia as the conflict has been going on for the past 4 to 5 years, compared to the more
recently escalating conflict in Amhara.
282
This section describes the extent of the targeting of
perceived political opponents, including the civilian population in Oromia in light of the current
conflict.
7.1.1. Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
The OLA is currently the only group left on the Ethiopian list of terrorist organisations.
283
It is
difficult to assess the scale of the federal authorities’ targeting of persons affiliated with the
OLA due to the limited flow of information from the conflict zones in Oromia. However, it is
clear to one of the interviewed researchers that the authorities imprison many OLA affiliates
and subject many to torture while incarcerated.
284
The researcher further added that the fact
that the authorities officially define OLA as a terrorist organisation in Ethiopia means that the
amount of evidence required to arrest alleged OLA members is very low. Any affiliation with the
OLA at any level places the individual at risk of the federal authorities persecuting them.
285
The
academic researcher interviewed for this report stated that if a person is perceived to be
affiliated with the OLA, e.g. via posts on social media suggesting that the person supports the
resistance, he runs a high risk of being detained. The federal police fired the State Minister of
279
280
EHRC: 38
EHRC: 40
281
EHRC: 41
282
EHRC: 42
283
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 53
284
International researcher: 18
285
International researcher: 19; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information
Report on Ethiopia,
31 January 2024,
url,
p. 53
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Peace, Taye Dendea, on accusations of conspiring with the OLA. He was a member of the
Prosperity Party, but rumours against him led to his arrest.
286
On the other hand, an academic researcher consulted in Addis Ababa for this report opined
that the government treated the OLA members ‘with fear and respect’ because of its military
force. As an example of this, the government invited the OLA leadership to sit at the
negotiations held in Tanzania late 2023.
287
Family members of members of the OLA
The two researchers agreed that family members of actual or alleged OLA members also risk
maltreatment.
288
The international researcher assessed that the higher the position within the
OLA – as well as the alleged position within the OLA – the higher the risk for the family
members. To illustrate this point, the researcher highlighted that the authorities arrested the
family members of a prominent OLF member, Bate Urgessa, a couple of days after his
assassination. The authorities accused Urgessa of being a member of both the OLA and the OLF
as well as being engaged in serious political opposition activities.
289
By contrast, the international researcher assessed that there would be less risk of the federal
forces arresting a low-level OLA fighter’s family.
290
7.1.2. Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
In 2018, the authorities removed the OLF from the national terrorist list and formally integrated
into the legal political architecture of Ethiopia.
291
Although the authorities now formally
recognise OLF as a legal opposition party, all the interlocutors consulted on this topic agreed
that there is a risk that the federal authorities will target OLF members and people affiliated
with the OLF.
292
According to the international researcher, the federal authorities has
de facto
’decapitated‘ OLF,
who cannot in reality function as an actual opposition party. As an example of this, they
highlighted the assassination of prominent OLF member, Bate Urgessa, and the discovery of his
body in the town of Meki on 10 April 2024, only a month after his release from prison.
293
The
researcher stressed that it is unclear who was responsible for the assassination of Urgessa, and
286
Academic researcher: 6; AP,
Ethiopia arrests former peace minister over alleged links to an outlawed rebel group,
13 December 2023,
url
287
Research institution: 8
288
International researcher: 18; Academic researcher: 7
289
Borkena,
Ethiopia : Gov’t arrested family members of Battee Urgessa,
12 April 2024,
url;
International researcher:
20
290
International researcher: 21
291
Salemot, Marew Ababe,
Why did peace talks fail in Ethiopia with the Oromo Liberation Front?,
4 January 2024,
url;
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 11
292
Research institution: 1,2; International researcher: 8-9,11-13: Academic researcher: 1-5; Human Rights Watch,
Ethiopia’s Deepening Crackdown on Dissent,
4 March 2024,
url
293
International researcher: 8; Research institution: 1,2; International researcher: 8-9,11-13; academic researcher:
1-5; Human Rights Watch,
Ethiopia’s Deepening Crackdown on Dissent,
4 March 2024,
url
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the uncertainty about the identity of the perpetrators contributed to a climate of fear within
the political sphere in Ethiopia – even amongst government officials. The researcher described
the targeting of political figures in the country as arbitrary to an extent that no one can predict
who will be under attack next and for what reasons.
294
The academic researcher also pointed
out the authorities placed the long-time chairperson of the OLF, Dawud Ibsa, under house
arrest in 2021, only to release him in March 2022.
295
Despite these high-profile cases of politically motivated targeting of OLF members, two sources
consulted in Addis Ababa for this report agreed that low-ranking members of the OLF are more
likely to be victims of assassinations and kidnapping compared to high-ranking members of the
OLF.
296
It is associated with a higher risk for the perpetrator to target a well-known high-ranking
official whereas low-ranking members are perceived to be without any form of protection and
therefore easier targets.
297
A research institution interviewed for this report highlighted that for
many ethnic Oromos, the OLF has remained a symbol of resistance, but the OLF does not
constitute a cohesive unit. To a greater extent, it is a ‘societal form of resistance,’ so it is difficult
to demarcate its members from members of the community. At the same time, as an
organisation, the OLF is characterised by the presence of various factions and internal disputes.
In various instances, its different sub-groups have operated as on a ‘franchise basis’ rather than
as a centralised organisation.
298
The EHRC stated that Oromia is the region with the highest number of arrests and detentions of
people the authorities perceive to support or affiliate with the armed groups. The prolonged
nature of the conflict compared to the conflict in Amhara explains in part the high number.
299
There are no data to indicate whether politically motived targeting of politicians in Ethiopia,
including the members of the OLF, has increased or decreased in recent years.
300
Family members of OLF
An academic researcher stated that if the family of OLF members talk about the violence that
their spouses, siblings or children experience, or otherwise voice their opinion, the family itself
is at risk.
301
7.1.3. Perceived political opponents
4 sources stated that it is difficult for both state and non-state actors to distinguish between
friend and foe in the conflict.
302
As a result, Oromia has been marked by widespread levels of
294
295
International researcher: 10
Academic researcher: 4; Amnesty International,
Ethiopia: Opposition politician under house arrest: Dawud Ibsa,
15 June 2021,
url;
Africa News,
Ethiopia opposition leader released from house arrest,
18 March 2022,
url
296
International researcher: 13; academic researcher: 4
297
International researcher: 13; academic researcher: 4
298
Research institution: 2
299
EHRC: 40; 42
300
International researcher: 14
301
Academic researcher: 9
302
EHRC: 38, 39; research institution: 2; academic researcher: 8, 11; international researcher: 11
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crimes and attacks against civilians by armed groups and government forces, while armed
groups have attacked officials and civil servants. In this context revenge and retaliation attacks
also occur.
303
A research institution elaborated that civilians are at risk of being perceived as combatants.
According to media reports and credible institutions, such as the EHRC, the federal government
applies ‘a heavy-handed approach’ to anybody who is perceived to be a combatant. A heavy-
handed approach in a warzone means that there are mass arrests, and detention of family
members of persons who the authorities suspect of sympathising with or being members of the
armed resistance. Western and Southern Oromia have higher levels of resistance, and are
particularly hard hit. The more resistance, the more brutal the government’s response has
been.
304
In December 2023, the authorities detained large numbers of young people and
teachers in a house-to-house search in Addis Ababa ahead of a banned anti-war demonstration
in the capital. The authorities accused some of the removal of Ethiopians flags from a school
and of being members of the OLA.
305
The OLA also uses similar tactics of attacking civilians perceived as government-supporters. OLA
forces have killed more than 100 local officials in Oromia.
306
That has caused retaliation in a ‘tit-
for-tat’ action. If the authorities perceive a person in one of the conflict zones in Oromia to be a
supporter of the government, then OLA may target this person and their family as well.
307
Targeting of OLF/OLA in Addis Ababa
According to a research institution, Addis Ababa is not a conflict zone and Oromos who are
vocal about their political opinions would be relatively safe in the capital, especially if they are
not engaged in mobilising their ‘constituencies’ for the so-called unlawful activities. A person’s
safety depends on how prominent this person is and how dangerous the government perceives
the person to be. The authorities perceive some journalists as dangerous. As previously
mentioned, if a person is perceived to be affiliated with the OLA, e.g. via suggestive social
media posts, they will be detained. As an example of this, the research institution also pointed
to the recent event where the State Minister of Peace was fired on accusations of conspiring
with the OLA. He was a member of the Prosperity Party, but rumours against him led to his
arrest.
308
The academic researcher further elaborated that in a mixed neighbourhood in Addis Ababa,
being a vocal supporter of the Oromo cause in itself would not put you at risk vis-à-vis your
303
304
EHRC: 38
Research institution: 6
305
Borkena,
Massive Crackdown in Addis Ababa Ahead of Planned Demonstration,
6 December 2023,
url;
Borkena,
Addis Ababa police say it has arrested 97 students, teachers,
8 December 2023,
url
306
307
Research institution: 7
Research institution: 7; The Guardian, ‘This
is a pandemic’: Ethiopia’s Oromia region gripped by surge in
kidnappings,
23 January 2024,
url;
EHRC: 39
308
Research Institution: 8
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neighbours. However, the authorities would perceive talking openly in favour of the OLA as very
provocative.
309
7.2.
Tigray
Sources stated that the targeting of ethnic Tigrayans and people affiliated with the TPLF by the
authorities has decreased significantly since the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement (CoHA) in Tigray.
310
Based on the complaints received by Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission (EHRC), ethnic profiling and arbitrary detention or arrest of Tigrayans by
authorities have diminished “to a minimum” since the peace agreement. The targeting seems
to have shifted to other ethnic groups, namely the Amhara and Oromo population.
311
The Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center further explained that since the signing of the
CoHA, the authorities have released those Tigrayans previously subjected to mass arrests.
Those released include several human rights defenders, journalists and researchers.
312
Shops,
businesses and hotels owned by Tigrayans, which closed during the conflict, have reopened or
resumed their activities.
313
7.2.1. Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) members
After the signing of the CoHA in November 2022, the Ethiopian parliament voted to remove the
TPLF from the list of terrorist organisations in Ethiopia.
314
However, the National Election Board
of Ethiopia has not yet allowed the TPLF to register as a regional party in Ethiopia.
315
Based on complaints received by the EHRC, there are no indications that the federal
government target TPLF members as of May 2024
.
316
The EHRC further pointed out that the
interim government in Tigray consists of TPLF members who took part in the Tigray conflict,
who attend meetings in Addis Ababa without facing troubles.
317
Since the ceasefire in Tigray in November 2022, the federal government has allowed high
profile TPLF officials to travel freely. However, the EHRDC opined that TPLF affiliates are still
under surveillance. They further described the relationship between the federal authorities and
the TPLF leader as imbued with mistrust; the Tigrayan interim administration has blamed the
federal government for its failure to fulfil humanitarian needs in Tigray, and the federal
309
310
Academic researcher: 5
Sweden, Migrationsverket,
Landinformation: Etiopien. Tigreaner och deras situation utanför Tigray,
31 August
2022,
url,
p. 26, 34; Norway, Landinfo,
Etiopia: Forhold for tigrayer i Addis Abeba,
29 March 2023,
url,
p. 2, 5;
Belgium, CEDOCA,
ETHIOPIE De situatie van Tigreërs in Addis Abeba,
23 June 2023,
url,
p. 9; EHRC: 14; EHDRC: 1
311
EHRC: 14
312
EHDRC: 1
313
EHDRC: 1
314
Belgium, CEDOCA,
ETHIOPIE De situatie van Tigreërs in Addis Abeba,
23 June 2023,
url,
p. 8
315
Addis Standard,
#ASDailyScoop: Court upholds NEBE ruling declining request to establish TPLF as new regional
party,
7 August 2023,
url;
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on
Ethiopia,
31 January 2024,
url,
p. 10
316
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 54; EHRC: 15
317
EHRC: 15
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government has blamed the TPLF for not respecting the peace agreement. Although there is an
ongoing consultation between the two parties, there is still suspicion and tension.
318
The EHRDC pointed out that the authorities keep persons who have travelled to or from Tigray
at airports under intense surveillance. The authorities check their ID cards as well as the
background of travellers, and have access to passenger lists. The authorities may not
necessarily restrict persons from travelling to and from Tigray but will follow the person from a
distance and monitor whom the person meets with as well as the purpose of the travel. The
authorities mainly check high-profile TPLF-members and activists in Bole Airport. The level of
surveillance depends on the political tension.
319
7.2.2. Pro-government Tigrayans
Freedom of movement is restricted for Tigrayans who were working with the federal
government. They are currently still subject to surveillance and targeting by the TPLF. One of
the interviewed organisations shared the case of a regional TV journalist, who had escaped to
Addis Ababa out of fear for the TPLF, this person did not dare to move outside of Addis Ababa
due to fear of being targeted by the TPLF.
320
In September 2023, the local government in Tigray
arrested 15 members of the opposition for organising a demonstration against the TPLF and the
interim government in Tigray.
321
The EHRC did not have information about violations against Tigrayans residing in Addis
Ababa.
322
318
319
EHRDC: 3
EHRDC: 4
320
EHDRC: 1
321
AfricaNews,
Ethiopia: 15 arrests in Tigray before a local opposition demonstration,
6 September 2023,
url
322
EHRC: 16
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7.3.
Amhara
7.3.1. Fano
The conflict in the Amhara region has led to severe maltreatment and human rights abuses
against individuals associated with or perceived to be associated with the Fano movement. The
Ethiopian government’s crackdown on Fano has resulted in widespread violence, arbitrary
detentions, and extrajudicial killings inside and outside the Amhara region.
323
In the Amhara region, the federal government’s indiscriminate labeling of all Amhara people as
'Fanos' has led to widespread targeting and persecution. This broad-brush approach means that
the federal government considers anyone who opposes them a Fano representative. Practically,
Fano has become a name for all Amhara armed resistance movements.
324
The federal
government often detain Individuals suspected of Fano affiliations without due process and
subject them to torture.
325
The EHRCO further stated that attacks, the federal government carry
out arrests and killings in Amhara based on suspicion and accusations of being a Fano member,
support for the group or having family who the authorities perceive as members of Fano.
326
7.3.2. Treatment of People with perceived or actual Fano Affiliation
Outside the Amhara region, particularly in Addis Ababa, the maltreatment of those associated
with Fano continues through extensive surveillance, arbitrary detention, and ethnic profiling.
The government employs various methods to suppress any perceived threats from the Amhara
community.
327
On 12 April 2023, two male members of the Fano militia were shot dead in Addis
Ababa as they tried to escape custody. The police suspected them of planning an attack.
328
The international organisation interviewed for this report stated that Amharas in Addis Ababa
are at risk of arbitrary detention by the security forces; there are reports of security forces
showing up at night at the houses of ethnic Amhara people conducting searches in their
houses. There are reports about ethnic profiling based on information about where people are
from.
329
The EHDRC agreed and further elaborated that the authorities are conducting large-
scale house searches in Addis Ababa. The checks are supposed to find or target people who
support or affiliate with any of the armed groups. Based on reports, the authorities detain
thousands of ethnic Amharas in Amhara and Addis Ababa for shorter or longer periods of time,
suspecting them of supporting the Fano militias, in particular in August 2023 but also
afterwards.
330
Along these lines, the academic researcher stated that the authorities demolish
Amhara houses.
331
There are also evidence of the authorities wrongfully arresting patients in
323
324
EHDRC: 9-10; Academic researcher: 11-13; international organisation: 12-16; EHRCO: 9-12; Mehari Maru: 5-8
Mehari Maru: 7
325
Academic researcher: 32-33; EHRCO: 9, 12, 16;
326
EHCRO: 9
327
International organisation: 23; EHRDC: 10; Mehari Meru: 2
328
Germany, BAMF,
Länderreport 69 Äthiopien - Innenpolitische Lage,
15 May 2024,
url,
p. 9
329
International organisation: 23
330
EHRDC: 10
331
Academic researcher: 24
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medical facilities on the mere suspicion that they were Fano affiliates. In November 2023, in
North Gonder Zone in Amhara, Ethiopian security forces entered and searched hospitals
looking for wounded men that they suspected being Fano fighters or Fano affiliates.
332
7.3.3. Treatment of Family Members of People Associated with Fano
The Ethiopian government's crackdown on Fano extends to the families of those suspected of
being members or supporters. Family members face various forms of persecution, including
surveillance, harassment, and violence.
333
7.3.4. General Treatment of Ethnic Amharas in Light of the Conflict in
Amhara Region
The conflict in the Amhara region has exacerbated the ethnic targeting of Amharas both within
and outside the region, leading to widespread human rights abuses and a deteriorating
humanitarian situation.
334
Furthermore, the academic researcher added that the authorities
explicitly advise business owners in the private sector and managers in the public sector not to
employ people of Amharic origin.
335
Government forces have also attacked churches in the Amhara region: in May 2023, the
national army attacked an orthodox church in Debre Elias District of the East Gojjam Zone in its
search for members of the Fano militias. 95 % of the 600 persons in the church were either
killed, injured or displaced. After that, those who were injured did not dare to seek medical
treatment at the medical facilities where 200 ENDF soldier were receiving medical treatment
after the attack.
336
The government identify Amharas even though the government officially no longer use
ethnicity as a category on ID cards. Any police officer or other official may ask a person where
they are from, where they live or about their place of birth (city). When the police ask about
their name, it will also be an indicator of ethnicity. Furthermore, when a person applies for
renewal of ID card, the local authorities will reveal their ethnicity via their place of birth and
their name. If a person happens to not have an ID card when asked by the police, their name
will reveal their ethnicity.
337
332
HRW,
“If the Soldier Dies, It’s on You” Attacks on Medical Care in Ethiopia’s Amhara Conflict,
July 2024,
url
, pp.
25, 37
333
Academic researcher: 24; EHRDC: 10
334
EHDRC: 9-10; Academic researcher: 11-13; International organisation: 12-16; EHRCO: 9-12; Mehari Maru: 5-8
334
Academic Researcher: 4; International organisation: 12-16; Mehari Maru: 7; EHRCO: 9-10; International
organisation: 12-16
335
Academic researcher: 24
336
USDOS,
2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ethiopia,
30 June 2024,
url
337
Academic researcher: 27, 28; International organisation: 24
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7.4.
Somali Region
7.4.1. Treatment of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
In October 2018, delegates of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Ethiopian
federal authorities signed a declaration of peace in the capital of Eritrea, Asmara, marking an
end to years of armed conflict between the two parties.
338
According to two sources, since the peace agreement and the subsequent absorption of the
ONLF into the regional government, the ONLF now participates in the politics of the region,
especially under the current leadership of the region.
339
Furthermore, the two sources
elaborated that since 2019, the Somali region of Ethiopia has been one of the more stable
regions in the country.
340
The international organisation noted that although Somali State has
remained stable, the overall situation in the region is ‘fragile, but calm’.
341
On the overall treatment of members of supporters of the ONLF, the research institution
opined that there seems to be no large-scale prosecution based on individual membership of or
affiliation with ONLF neither in the Somali Region, nor in Addis Ababa.
342
Similarly, the EHRC
stated that they are not aware to what extent the federal government target or monitor ONLF
supporters or members. The commission has noted incidents of interception and detention
based on statements on social media.
343
The EHRC is not aware to what extent ethnic Somalis
or supporters of the ONLF are targeted by authorities in Addis Ababa. However, the commission
had come across one ethnic Somali person who had to flee to Somalia and who returned with
the support of the EHRC.
344
According to the research institution, the observed sharp decline in targeting of affiliates of the
ONLF can be explained, in part, by the federal authorities’ two-fold approach in the Somali
region. First, the government has been co-opting major opposition groups, which has
contributed to the fragmentation of the regional political landscape, and second, the
government has distributed and redistributed rents and resources among powerful groups in
order to gain stability. Therefore, some of the ONLF leaders are now ‘in businesses’. On the
other hand, there is a genuine feeling of ‘the periphery being centred’ as one researcher
framed it with reference to the fact that some Somalis are now placed in important positions.
An example of such a position held by a Somali is the vice-presidency of the Prosperity Party,
which Adam Farah currently hold. To a large extent, there is a feeling among the Somalis of
being reintegrated into the centre.
345
338
FDRE & ONLF,
Joint Declaration between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF),
21 October 2018,
url
339
International organisation: 26; Research institution: 19
340
International organisation: 26; Research institution: 19
341
International organisation: 27
342
Research institution: 20
343
EHRC: 34
344
EHRC: 34
345
Research institution: 19
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In March 2024, the federal authorities released former president of the Somali region, Abdi
Mohamoud Omar, from prison. Omar previously oversaw command of the Liyu Police and the
federal authorities convicted him of violations of human rights and inciting ethnic and religious
conflict in the Somali region.
346
On 18 September 2024, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) issued a statement
voicing concern over actions taken by Ethiopian authorities in the Somali Region, which the
group claims violate both constitutional rights and the 2018 peace agreement between the
ONLF and the Ethiopian government.
The ONLF alleges that ‘Somali elders, women, and other community members have been
paraded on television, coerced into humiliating themselves by denying their Somali identity.’
347
7.4.2. Liyu Police
As part of the peace agreement of 2018, the Ethiopian federal authorities agreed to disband
the paramilitary police force in the Somali region, known as Liyu Police.
348
However, three
sources consulted in Addis Ababa for this report stated that although the Liyu Police has been
dissolved on paper, the same security personnel remain in place in the region in other
functions.
349
The EHRC explained that they had received information from residents of the region that some
of the persons who held positions during the previous government were still occupying
government positions after the peace agreement and after the dissolution of the police. The
commission opined that the change that happened after the peace agreement is a reform
rather than a revolution. However, the federal government has stated that people should
report if they know of any person who has committed serious human rights violations
occupying official positions.
350
The research institution stated that the circumstances surrounding the state of the Liyu police
remains a puzzle.
351
The international organisation agreed and elaborated that it is uncertain to
which extent the Liyu Police has been replaced by other special forces, fully absorbed into the
regular forces, or if their name has simply been changed. According to this interviewed
organisation, it seems as if the Liyu police has morphed into the existing police force and the
prison guard, etc., and remain active in the fight against the al-Shabaab.
352
346
Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia Releases Ex-Politician Implicated in Heinous Crimes, 15 March 2024,
url
347
Addis Standard,
News: ONLF accuses Ethiopian government of ‘violating constitutional rights’ and
‘breaching peace accord’,
18 September 2024,
url
348
Somali Dispatch,
Ethiopia: Somali Regional Government to Disband Liyu Police,
11 April 2023,
url;
International
organisation: 27
349
EHRC: 35; Research Institution: 21
350
EHRC: 35
351
Research Institution: 21
352
International organisation: 27
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
8. Conditions upon return
Information about the treatment of failed asylum seekers upon their return from Europe was
scarce among the sources consulted in Addis Ababa, as the majority of those Ethiopians who
return from Europe are migrants, not rejected asylum seekers.
353
A large number of Ethiopian
migrants have returned from the Middle East region.
354
Arrival and asylum procedures at Bole International Airport
Bole International Airport is equipped with one of the most stable electricity connections in
Ethiopia as the airport is critical infrastructure to the country. Therefore, Bole Airport has the
capacity, including staff, to maintain and operate an electronic system in place to collect data
about passengers who enter Ethiopia via the airport.
355
The degree to which the Ethiopian federal authorities monitor arrivals to Ethiopia varies.
356
According to one source, a person who has been denied asylum in a foreign country would not
automatically be of interest to the Ethiopian government upon their return. It is a general
perception that seeking the opportunity abroad via migration is beneficial for the migrant, their
family and the sending country.
357
However, one academic researcher opined that there still
might be fear of maltreatment and negative attention among those who return. If the
authorities perceive a person as affiliated with any opposition group, the authorities will not
detain the person on arrival at Bole Airport unless it is a ‘clearly known person’. However, the
authorities will ‘follow-up’ at a later point. The follow-up will include questions about the
person’s identity, place of residence and cohabitants. This follow-up may be undertaken in an
informal way by a uniformed police officer, rather than officially.
358
The EHRC did not have any information on the extent to which Tigrayans returning from abroad
are subject to monitoring or special procedures.
359
Authorities used to have a list of Ethiopians, in particular of Tigrayans abroad who are under
suspicion or government surveillance. However, most of those who fled to neighboring
countries have returned. Previously, the EHRC used to receive complaints about
Ethiopians/Tigrayans who the authorities denied leaving the country.
360
353
354
An international organisation: 1
An associate professor: 1
355
An international humanitarian organisation: 12
356
An international humanitarian organisation: 10
357
An associate professor: 14
358
An associate professor: 14
359
EHRC: 19
360
EHRC: 20
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
8.1.
Registration of refugees and of returnees
From January to end of April 2024, approximately 4 000 Ethiopian refugees had returned, the
majority from Sudan and a small minority from Yemen.
361
The Refugee & Returnee Service (RSS) is the organisation that the Ethiopian government has
legally mandated to register refugees and returnees with technical and financial support from
the UNHCR.
362
The RSS replaces the Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) and is
accountable to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).
363
Since March 2023,
refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to register for and to have digital identification under
the Ethiopia Digital Identification Proclamation No. 1284/2023.
364
In March 2024, the RSS began
testing in Addis Ababa a new digital refugee ID card with a unique number. This system should
prevent double registration but as of May 2024, the RSS has not scaled up the new system.
365
Before that, there had been a long suspension of registration and issuance of documents to
refugees, beginning in November 2021 with the declaration of the State of Emergency.
According to one international organisation, as many as 98 % of refugees did not have access to
registration. Documentation service did only resume in Addis Ababa in 2023. In May 2024, an
important caseload remained.
366
According to the UNHCR, the RSS has only conducted
registration and recognition on
prima facie
basis of refugee status for people arriving from
Laascanood in Somalia and from people from Sudan and non-Sudanese refugees who have left
Sudan.
367
Unregistered refugees are particularly vulnerable to risks of denial of services,
detention, onward movement including smuggling and trafficking.
368
According to one COI
report, many asylum seekers have bought Ethiopian ID cards from corrupt Ethiopian officials in
order to get valid documents.
369
8.2.
Persons who have committed a crime abroad
Information about the treatment of returnees who have committed a crime abroad and served
their sentence abroad, is limited even among sources who follow the situation of migration in
Ethiopia.
370
361
An international organisation; UNHCR,
Regional Bureau for East, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes; Ethiopia
Situation; Population of concern to UNHCR as of 30-Apr-24,
17 May 2024,
url
362
RSS,
History of RSS,
n.d,
url;
An international organisation: 7; an associate professor: 9
363
UNHCR,
Country Summary as at 30 June 2023,
url,
p. 6
364
FDRE,
Ethiopia Digital Identification Proclamation No. 1284/2023,
2023,
url
365
An international organisation, UNHCR
Ethiopia launches inclusive ID system for refugees, boosts access to
national services,
Press Release, 7 March 2024,
url;
FDRE,
Digital Ethiopia 2025,
url,
p. 56
366
An international organisation: 9
367
UNHCR,
Country Summary as at 30 June 2023,
url,
p. 5
368
An international organisation: 10
369
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 69
370
An associate professor: 11
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9. Migration and asylum in Ethiopia
9.1.
Situation of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia
By April 2024, there were 172 645 Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia.
371
The influx of Eritreans who
have crossed the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia have continued during the war despite
the fact that there have been Eritrean soldiers on both sides of the border.
372
Since January
2020, the automatic recognition of Eritreans as refugees has stopped.
373
Around August 2023, Ethiopia had deported approximately 360 unregistered Eritreans and a
few registered refugees by bus to Eritrea. There has been no direct information about their
current situation in Eritrea to relevant organisations.
374
According to one source, Eritrean
refugees in Ethiopia have ‘clear fear’ based on their nationality as the Ethiopian government
sees them as threat.
375
9.2.
Migration out of Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the third-largest refugee-hosting country in Africa.
376
It remains a transit country for
refugees (e.g. coming from Sudan), a destination country for other refugees and a sender
country as well.
377
Lately, fewer refugees, especially Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali refugees,
use the northern route from Ethiopia to Europe than before the conflict in Sudan.
378
After the
ceasefire, observers have noted an influx of migrants with Tigrayan and Amhara ethnicity, both
men and women, along the northern route to Yemen and Djibouti.
379
As of May 2024,
approximately 111 000 persons have left Sudan for Ethiopia, this movement started in April
2023 when the war in Sudan broke out.
380
9.3.
People who return from Middle Eastern countries
The governments of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) signed a bilateral
agreement in 2021 stating that over 100 000 migrants from Ethiopia should be deported from
KSA via Addis Ababa International Airport starting from 30 March 2022.
381
In 2023, Ethiopia has
371
UNHCR,
Regional Bureau for East, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes; Ethiopia Situation; Population of concern to
UNHCR as of 30-Apr-24,
17 May 2024,
url
372
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 71
373
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 70
374
An international organisation: 10
375
An associate professor: 17
376
An international organisation: UNHCR,
Country Summary as at 30 June 2023,
url,
p. 1
377
An international organisation: 4
378
An international organisation: 7; an international humanitarian organisation: 6
379
EHRC: 21
380
Mixed Migration Center,
Routes, protection incidents and future intentions of people displaced by the Sudan war,
May 2024,
url,
p. 1
381
IOM,
Response Capacities Stretched with Hasty Return of 40,000 Ethiopian Migrants,
Press Release, 16 July 2021,
url;
IOM,
Funding Needed to Assist Over 100,000 Ethiopian Migrants Returning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Press Release, 30 March 2022,
url
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
received over 100 000 deportees; in 2024, it is estimated that 1 000 persons will arrive per
day.
382
From 2017 up until 2024, it is estimated that more than 600 000 Ethiopian citizens have
been forcefully deported by the KSA.
383
Between March 2022 and June 2023, the Saudi border
guards have shot and killed ‘several hundreds’ Ethiopian migrants who tried to cross the border
between Yemen and the KSA.
384
Irregular migration towards the KSA continued with about 180
000 Ethiopians who left for the Middle East from January to September 2023.
385
The lists of returnees from the KSA are kept with different organisations like IOM, Peace
Ministry and the RRS. The RSS register the deportees.
386
The challenges related to the high number of deportations are both institutional and
integrational. Institutional, because a new coordination mechanism has had to be created
under the Ministry of Justice
387
and because funding to cover for the needs of humanitarian
assistance is insufficient.
388
In terms of reintegration, people who return from the KSA or other
countries in the Middle East have lived in ‘slavery-like’ situations for years and have passed
through detentions centres where they have been subject to rough treatment. They need to
recover psychologically and socially to become functional economically and to be able to
sustain themselves.
389
The Ethiopian government receives assistance by international
organisations in their efforts to reintegrate the returnees into their local communities through
capacity building, but Ethiopia is a large country with many hard-to-reach rural communities. If
the economic situation of the returnee is not dealt with properly, they are likely to re-migrate
according to one source.
390
382
383
An associate professor: 1, 4
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 73
384
Human Rights Watch, “They
Fired on Us Like Rain” Saudi Arabian Mass Killings of Ethiopian Migrants at the
Yemen-Saudi Border,
21 August 2023,
url
385
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
General Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia,
31 January
2024,
url,
p. 74
386
An associate professor: 9
387
An associate professor: 3
388
IOM,
Funding Needed to Assist Over 100,000 Ethiopian Migrants Returning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Press Release, 30 March 2022,
url
389
An associate professor: 6, 5
390
An international humanitarian organisation: 4
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Annex 1: Meeting Minutes
An associate professor
Addis Ababa, 14 May 2024
Conditions upon return
1.
The majority of those who returned to Ethiopia from abroad are migrants from the
Middle East region. Only very few of the returnees have been to Europe (not including
regular visits from the diaspora). There have been deportations as well as Assisted
Voluntary Returns (AVRs) from the Middle East. Since 2013 until present those who
returned reached approximately 800 000 persons. In 2023, several thousand Ethiopian
migrants were forcibly deported from Saudi Arabia following a bilateral agreement with
the Ethiopian government (Over 100,000).
As a part of the bilateral agreement between the Ethiopian government and Saudi
Arabia, Ethiopia has sent approximately 277 000 migrants recently.
The high volume of deportations has been a new institutional experience for the
Ethiopian government, and a nation task force was set which was then elevated to a
national counsel under which a national partnership coalition is set serving as a
coordination mechanism for efforts by different entities like government sectors, NGOs,
Civil Society and Media. The coalition is hosted at the Ministry of Justice.
As of 2024, about 1 000 Ethiopian migrants are deported every day from Saudi Arabia.
The plan is to return 70 000 over the following months.
The challenges following these mass deportations are the reintegration in society of the
returnees. They need to recover psychologically and socially to become functional
economically and to be able to sustain themselves.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Differentiated expectations to migrants
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6.
People who return from Saudi Arabia or other countries in the Middle East have lived in
slavery-like situations for years and have passed through detentions centres where they
have been subject to rough treatment. The expectations from the community from those
migrants are very limited, and ‘relatively limited support’ can help these migrants. By
contrast, when people return from migration to Europe, people in Ethiopia expect that
those migrants to have lived relatively well. When they return, they are perceived as
failed migrants since they return even though they could have had difficult lives in
Europe. Even being housed in an asylum center in Europe is considered a better condition
than staying in Ethiopia. Returnees from Europe expect more in terms of reception
conditions and post return support in Ethiopia. However, as there are only few people
returning from Europe, the experience is limited. They are given a small lump sum for
their reintegration, which will set them off for fending for themselves. But if they were
brought together and given the support in group it could have enabled them open small
businesses to improve their life.
Returnees from Europe often experience high levels of disappointment and frustration
and may refuse to talk to anybody.
7.
Monitoring of returnees by the authorities
8.
9.
There are list of returnees from Saudi Arabia kept with different organisations like IOM,
the Danish Refugee Council, Peace Ministry and refugee Returnee Service (RRS).
Refugees and Returnees Service (RSS) is in charge of the registration of the deportees,
and IOM is in charge of those who are voluntarily returned. IOM’s assistance includes
psychosocial support, livelihood, and a small amount of money for returnee transport.
Return over land (deportations via bus) is limited, but existing, in particularly from
Djibouti. Most deportations are executed via airplane. Most irregular migration is done
by bus, car, on foot or by boat.
10.
Persons who have convicted a crime abroad
11.
Information about the treatment of returnees who have committed a crime abroad, and
served their sentence abroad, is limited. Interpol is likely to be a part of the process.
Members of the political opposition
12.
The Ethiopian authorities would ‘keep an eye’ on any returnee, who is a member of an
opposition party, or who is suspected of being a member, upon their return. The
authorities would know of any affiliation with the opposition, if the returnee has been
vocal about their support to the opposition on social media. The authorities track social
media accounts and the surveillance of people who participate in demonstrations
abroad is being more ‘tightened’. The government keeps a list and has recently requested
the US government to hand over some Ethiopian citizens who are opposition leaders.
There are several Ethiopian Diaspora in the US who were accused of having committed
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an offence against the Ethiopian state. People may fear to return because of the current
‘ethnic mess’. Related to the ethnic policies mostly people from Tigray, Amhara or
Oromia would be labeled as ‘opposition’ at different regimes and even in a single regime.
13.
Currently, there is ‘a lot’ of ethnic targeting by the state in Addis Ababa, on people from
Amhara ethnic group. They are fearing arbitrary detention based on ethnic origin. Some
people form Oromia can be perceived by the authorities to be aligned with the OLA.
People from Tigray can be perceived to be aligned with the TPLF. When the conflict
among these three regions intensifies, the fear of ethnic profiling increases.
Arrival procedures in Bole airport for persons perceived to be affiliated with an opposition
group
14.
When a person, who is perceived to be affiliated with any opposition groups, arrives in
Bole airport, unless this is a ‘clearly known person’ to the authorities, the person will not
be captured on arrival and detained on the spot. However, the authorities will ‘follow-
up’ at a later point. The follow-up will include questions about who you are, where you
are staying, with whom you are staying. This is most likely done in an informal way, rather
than by a uniformed police officer.
Surveillance is taking place through national institutions via information technologies.
This form of surveillance is complemented by individuals who are assigned to be
informants.
A person who has been denied asylum in a foreign country would not in and by itself be
of interest to the Ethiopian government upon their return. Many people believe that
seeking the opportunity abroad is beneficial for all, the migrant, their family and the
sending country. However, this does not mean that there is no fear of persecution. At
times because if one is labeled as a criminal, and if the government wants him, it induces
fear in the family as a sort of ‘risk by affiliation’.
15.
16.
Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia
17.
Following the coming to power of the Prosperity Party in 2018, it improved the Ethio-
Eritrean relation and the Ethiopian government promised to implement the 12
December 2000 Algiers Agreement with Eritrea. This time some of the Eritrean refugees
in Ethiopia have been told to return to Eritrea thinking that their country is now safe.
Then when the two-year conflict erupted in Tigray in 2020, four refugee camps in Tigray
where Eritrean refugees were hosted were closed. That was, however, only for a so-
called ‘honeymoon period’ in 2019 until the war erupted and the good relations between
Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias Afeworki ended. During the honeymoon period,
many Eritreans came to Ethiopia for family visit and remained in Addis as undocumented
migrants. But they were treated very well in Ethiopia and even some are suspected to
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ETHIOPIA: SECURITY S ITUATION AND RETURN
have served in spying Tigrayans for the Eritrean and Ethiopian government. But when
the Tigray war ended the Pretoria agreement was signed in 2022 which the Eritrean
government perceived as being betrayed as it was part of the war but not part of the
agreement. Consequently, by now, Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia have ‘clear fear’ based
on their nationality as the Ethiopian government saw them as threat. By now the
Ethiopian government is giving tacit recognition for Eritrean opposition groups in
Ethiopia.
18.
During the war, when the four refugee camps were dismantled the Eritrean refugees fled
to neighboring regions and Addis Ababa. They did not have refugee status and when they
left the camps, some went to the Amhara region; others came to Addis Ababa for work,
others to Afar region.
Recently some Eritreans refugees in Ethiopia have been arbitrarily detained as reported
by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.
It has not been possible for the Ethiopian government to return anybody to Eritrea, as
there is no communication.
19.
20.
Field of research
21.
At Addis Ababa University, the majority of students who are interested in migration
studies are focusing on migration patterns and return conditions for people returning
from the Middle East rather than on the situation of returnees from Europe.
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Academic researcher
Addis Ababa, 15 May 2024
Treatment of OLF members since the signing of the peace agreement
1. According to the interlocutor, most of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) members are
being followed by government spies and many are being detained. Currently, OLF
members but also those who are just political vocal, are being oppressed by the
government to be ‘alarming’. The oppression takes several forms, including exclusion from
political participation and being locked into their homes. OLF members are being ‘singled
out’ despite the fact that OLF is an officially legal party because they are actively advancing
a political agenda that is against the government.
2. The speaker of OLF, Bate Urgessa, has been shot dead in Meki in Oromia in April 2024,
which has also led to feelings of frustration and anger among OLF members.
3. As a consequence, OLF members are largely excluded from the political arena. However,
not all OLF members are persecuted but the name of OLF is being used as an instrument of
oppression so that people who have never been OLF members are harassed for voicing
their concerns on social media or just in conversations with friends. If in these
conversations they send the message that they are anti-government, they will be perceived
as OLF members.
4. The interlocutor found that there is a differentiated level of attacks against OLF members
or persons perceived OLF members: the lowest level of OLF members, ordinary citizens,
are likely to be most vulnerable to attacks because they are perceived to be without any
form of protection. If the government is attacking the OLF leader, Dawud Ibsa, who had
been placed in house arrest, or members of the central committee, they know that this will
attract attention from the international community. These attacks lead to self-censorship
and self-exclusion from the political landscape.
5. In a mixed neighbourhood in Addis Ababa, being a vocal supporter of the Oromo cause in
itself would not put you at risk vis-à-vis your neighbours. However, talking in favour of OLA
would be very provocative.
Treatment of OLA members
6. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has been treated by the government ‘with fear and
respect’. Because of its military force, the OLA leadership has been invited by the
government to sit at the negotiations held in Tanzania late 2023. OLA benefits from wide
grass root support because it represents the sheer strength to offer support and protection
to its supporter. Parents and siblings of OLA members have been attacked by the
government.
7. OLA have been responsible for violent actions and these acts have been condemned by the
broader community. OLA members are also attacking family members of the government
in places where OLA is active but not in Addis.
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OLF members detained on grounds of being alleged OLA member
8. It is more dangerous for people to be accused of being an OLF member. OLA members are
feared because they have power and guns.
Treatment of family members of OLF-members
9. If family of OLF members communicates the violence that their spouses, siblings or
children may be subject of to the media, or otherwise voice their opinion, the family itself
is at risk.
OLF infrastructure in Addis
10. There are OLF offices with a physical address and a compound in Addis but because OLF
members are hindered in going there, these offices do not function properly as center of
political activities. Those who go there may be attacked. OLF has not replaced the physical
meeting infrastructure with online activities. Those who are vocal online are more likely to
be affiliated with the army branch, the OLA.
Estimated number of OLF members who are in prison or in informal detention facilities
11. The exact number of people in prison, who are OLF members, is unknown because
everybody is labeled as OLF-members accused of either being official members or of
advancing the party’s agenda. Furthermore, those who have been imprisoned have been
taken by the authorities without them following due procedures of the law, so they are not
correctly registered.
12. In addition to the formal prisons, there are a number of informal detention facilities, the
so-called ‘unknown places’ for the detention of Oromos and for Amhara people. These
places are not proper prisons; it can be schools that are being used to detain people
without informing the public about the existence of such places. According to the
interlocutor, these detention facilities are ‘brutal places’ placed far from Addis Ababa, e.g.
in Afar. The temperature may be 40-41 degrees Celsius and access to food is insufficient.
13. The family of the person in detention is not informed about the disappearance. If the
family requests the local authorities for information about the disappeared family
members, everybody in the office will tell them that they know nothing. If the family
eventually finds the person and go for a visit, they themselves will be labeled as in
opposition to the government. The government places people in these facilities as a way of
installing fear in the population and stopping dissent. According to the interlocutor, this
practice is ‘rampant’.
Gender differences
14. Female political activists are likely to be more vulnerable than male political activists are;
women will particularly be attacked online as well as off-line and it will also affect their
family.
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The surveillance apparatus of the government
15. The state has the technology to conduct digital mass surveillance of its citizens with
technology from China and Turkey. The possibilities include the interception of encrypted
calls on WhatsApp. Ordinary phone calls are being tapped and online activity on social
media is followed. WhatsApp calls have been presented in court as evidence.
16. The state uses citizen informants to physically follow any person that they suspect of
something in order to monitor this person’s daily activities. Furthermore the system of
what is popularly called ‘one-to-five’ of the TPLF government has been reactivated right
after the elections in 2022; it is a system where a person is assigned five people to monitor.
It is difficult to ‘fly under the radar’ for a person who wishes that their political activities
remain unknown to the authorities once the government has started to follow this person.
It starts at your own doorstep with their neighbours.
17. Surveillance takes different forms in different sectors: at the university campus, it may be
through study groups. In the rural areas, it may be through extension workers advancing
agricultural technologies through outreach activities. In the health sector, it may be
through WASH (water, sanitation, health) agents. Health professionals, teachers and
people of a legal background are among the most vocal ones when it comes to political
issues. They are particularly followed.
Geographical extent of armed struggles
18. With the armed struggle in the Amhara region means that being an Amhara person is taken
as a sign of you being supportive of the armed militias. Whether you are in Addis Ababa,
Amhara or Gambela, you may be suspected of being against the government and a traitor.
The Tigrayans cannot operate, work or move around the country. They will be treated as
traitor. These two groups are likely to be criminalised based on their ethnicity and will have
difficulties in accessing basic services.
Situation in the Amhara region
19. Access to internet services has been suspended in the Amhara region.
20. Amhara people are confined and cannot travel to Addis Ababa.
21. The government denies the farmers in Amhara access to critical resources, such as
fertilisers and seedlings. The absence of these critical agricultures resources has created a
famine-like situation and starvation in the Amhara region. The Amhara region is therefore
economically weakened.
22. The Amhara region is attacked with drones every day. Representatives of the federal state
has at several occasions explicitly said that the Amhara people are ‘the burden of the
country’. The purpose of the aggression by the state against Amhara is difficult to explain
and understand.
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Treatment of members of the Fano movement or alleged members of the Fano
23. In the Amhara region, all Amhara people are labeled as ‘Fanos’ by the state, as the state
does not differentiate between ordinary people and members of the armed Fano militias.
24. The Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has recently (May 2024) made a speech in Nekemte (in the
Welega zone in Oromia); the speech contained inflammatory remarks against the Amhara
people, and the Prime Minister accused the Amhara people of planning to attack people in
Oromia. This kind of hate speech is occuring across the country, not just in Amhara but also
in Addis Ababa. Amhara houses are being demolished and business owners in the private
sector and managers in the public sector are explicitly advised by the authorities not to
employ people of Amharic origin.
Level of support to the Fano movement in the population
25. People in Amhara region are massively supporting Fano. The farmers of Amhara have
completely lost hope in the federal government for a number of reasons: the state denies
the farmers critical resources for agriculture, there is a lack of access to basic social
services, such as health services, and the state is using drones to attack villages in Amhara.
26. Members of the Fano militias attack members of the civil society if they suspect someone
of collaboration with the government as an informant. If this suspicion arises, members of
the Fano are likely to come to the person or to their family to warn them, and if the person
then does not stop collaborating or passing on information to the government, the Fano
will attack the family.
Ethnic profiling
27. Even though the government officially no longer use ethnicity as a category on ID cards, a
person may be asked by any police officer or other official where they are from, where
they are based or about their place of birth (city). When they are asked about their name,
this will also be an indicator of ethnicity.
28. When a person applies for renewal of ID-card from the local authorities, their ethnicity will
be revealed via their place of birth and their name. If a person happens to not have an ID-
card when asked by the police, their name will reveal their ethnicity.
Perceptions of the Human Rights Commission’s complaint mechanism
29. According to the interlocutor, people trust the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
(EHRC). Via the EHRC, every citizen has the right to complain if they find that their
fundamental rights have been violated. However, to file a complaint, the person needs
knowledge and skills of how to proceed. The person also needs the confidence and
empowerment that comes with education, and these requirements constitute a barrier for
people without education and resources.
30. The Commission enjoys general respect because the Commission has insisted on
conducting investigations in conflict zones under very difficult circumstances and despite
pressure from the government to stop their investigations.
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Treatment of journalists
31. Journalists are being imprisoned in increasing numbers if they stand out with political
opinions. There is now a least 11 journalists in jail.
32. The government itself is very engaged in public communication on social media; the
government actively acts as a producer of content for its various media accounts. The
government’s various media units have been interfering in the editorial processes of
national media.
33. Currently ‘The Ethiopian Insider’ is the most reliable newspaper. There is an Amharic online
radio called “Wazema” (with summaries in English) based abroad that is also trustworthy.
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Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)
Addis Ababa, 14 May 2024
Introduction
1. EHRC is an independent federal state body with the mandate for promotion and
protection of human rights. As part of their work, EHRC undertakes human rights
investigations upon receipt of complaints.
2. The current state of emergency has made the work of EHRC more challenging in terms
of accessing regions and finding resources to fund the work, especially as the workload
is increasing during conflicts.
3. From July 2023 – Mar 2024, EHRC received approximately 1218 complaints concerning
1496 individuals of which 70.4 % were processed and 78.7% were solved by EHRC. In
cases where the EHRC does not investigate the cases, they are referred to the court or
the Ombudsman. EHRC is known to the public, and incidents of torture, forced
disappearance, detention, internal displacement, accessibility for persons with
disability, ill treatment, etc. are reported to the EHRC.
The Situation in Tigray
Before the 2022 ceasefire
4. From 16 May to 30 August 2021, EHRC and OHCHR conducted a joint investigation into
alleged violations and abuses against international human rights, humanitarian and
refugee laws in Tigray. The report laid the foundation for a transitional justice (TJ)
process in Ethiopia. EHRC also advocated to have TJ included in the peace agreement.
The report includes several findings, such as atrocities, crimes against humanities, and
SGBV used as a weapon of war.
5. When the Tigray conflict spilled over to Amhara and Afar, EHRC conducted similar
investigations following the same methodology in these two regions. The findings of
the reports covering Afar and Amhara were similar to the findings from Tigray.
6. EHRC had access to travel in Tigray during the beginning of the conflict when the
Ethiopian Defence Force (ENDF) was on the ground. When TPLF advanced to Mekelle,
EHRC had to cut down the investigation due to the deteriorating security situation.
EHRC and OHCHR had to cut down on the investigation in Tigray as they had to leave
Tigray due to the escalating conflict, the report received some criticism for not
covering the initial scope the investigation. The UN had established an international
commission of experts, which were only able to come to Ethiopia once to agree on the
investigation scope. However, the commission did not visit Tigray.
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After the ceasefire 2022
7. The ceasefire in November 2022 brought relative peace in Tigray, however, the
reconstruction of infrastructure and social services is taking too long and Tigray suffers
from the extensive devastation. The resumption to a normal life is pending as basic
infrastructure, schools and hospitals are yet to be reconstructed. As indicated in the
investigation reports, basic infrastructure in Tigray, Amhara and Afar were damaged,
and social services were devastated, including health services, schools, and hospitals.
8. Persons with disability are lacking the necessary services. At the same time, new
disabilities have occurred after the conflict, which make the reconstruction of basic
services more critical.
9. Most IDPs returned to their area of origin before the reconstruction commenced. It
was not a hindrance to return as the places of displacement also lacked basic services
and support systems. IDPs from the disputed areas, including western Tigray/Welkayit,
refrained from returning as those areas were still administered by Amhara forces, and
hence, TPLF could not provide protection.
10. In May 2023, WFP and USAID suspended the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
Tigray due to reports of food misappropriation. At that time, EHRC tried to lobby for
the resumption of food assistance. As a result of the suspension, civilians were
penalised for crimes committed by officials. The region had already suffered
extensively from the road blocks during the conflict, and following the suspension of
aid the Tigray population faced additional suffering and exacerbation of vulnerabilities.
When EHRC did the monitoring, they observed how some Tigrayans suffered
tremendously and had to adopt negative coping mechanism, such as prostitution and
school dropouts to survive.
11. Up to May 2024, the situation is problematic in Tigray mainly because the
reconstruction is pending. The Tigray Interim Government is working on a durable
solution plan with aims at mobilising funding from donors for sustainable solutions for
internally displace persons.
12. EHRC could not confirm to what extent Eritrean forces are still present in Tigray, as the
current focus of EHRC in Tigray is to monitor the human rights situation following the
ceasefire.
13. There have always been a number of political parties in Tigray, but previously they
were too small to challenge or oppose the TPLF. Most of the parties were previously
affiliated with TPLF, but currently there is a tendency that the small parties have
become more vocal and oppose TPLF by making open statements of the failed
deliveries of TPLF.
Treatment of Tigrayans
14. Based on the complaints received by EHRC, ethnic profiling and arbitrary detention or
arrest of Tigrayans by authorities have diminished to a minimum since the peace
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15.
16.
17.
18.
agreement. The target seems to have shifted to other ethnic groups, namely the
Amhara and Oromo population.
Based on complaints received by EHRC, TPLF members are currently not targeted by
the federal government. The interim government in Tigray consist of TPLF members
who took part in the Tigray conflict, and currently attend meetings in Addis Ababa
without facing troubles.
The source did not have information about violations against Tigrayans residing in
Addis Ababa. However, there are complaints of alleged violations by members of the
Amhara population.
There is no blockage hindering movement in and out of Tigray, however, it might be
difficult for some to enter and leave the western and southern part, including Welkait,
of Tigray.
According to the source, Tigrayans were a more organized group during the conflict,
compared to Amhara and Afar ethnic groups, in terms of capacity to mobilise support,
advocate and raise international attention.
Return
19. The source was not sure to what extent Tigrayans returning from abroad are subject to
monitoring or special procedures.
20. Authorities used to have a list of Ethiopians/Tigrayans abroad who are under suspicion
or government surveillance. However, most of those who fled to neighboring countries
have returned. Previously, EHRC used to receive complaints about
Ethiopians/Tigrayans who were denied from leaving the country.
Migration
21. EHRC has the mandate of monitoring migration patterns. Along the northern route to
Yemen and Djibouti, EHRC found an influx of migrants with Tigrayan and Amhara
ethnicities, following the ceasefire, as many youths were in a desperate situation and
felt inclined to find new opportunities. EHRC observed that both young men and
women were amongst those migrating. Saudi Arabia and Yemen have made the
borders difficult to cross – some of the migrants were shot in an attempt to cross the
border.
The situation in Afar
22. Afar has suffered extensively from the spillover of the Tigray conflict. Prior to the
conflict, infrastructure were already at a minimum; only one or two hospitals were
functioning for the entire region, which were significantly damaged after the conflict.
23. Most of the IDPs from Afar have returned home, except those from the border of
Tigray due to the fear of attack. Moreover, the conflict affected parts of the region of
Afar experiences suffering from undetonated IEDs and explosives, which particularly
have resulted in causalities of children. There are recent incidents of this.
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The situation in Amhara
24. Another security situation has occurred in Amhara. Although EHRC has an office and
staff in the capital, Bahir Dar, EHRC is unable to conduct investigation, as safety and
security are major concerns.
25. One of the root causes of the conflict is the narrative of the Amharic population that
their issues have not been addressed by the federal government and are asking for the
establishment of a transitional government.
26. The Amhara ethnic group does not seem to be well organized in terms of advocating
for themselves. Compared to the Tigrayans, they do not seem to have attracted
international attention. During the two years of conflict in Tigray, other parts of the
country complained that news only focused on the victimisation of Tigrayans and
neglected the human right violations and humanitarian needs in other parts of the
country.
27. Fano seems to be a fragmented group. According to media news, there are different
Fano groups across the region, who may not necessarily work together, and sometimes
they go against each other. But when it comes to fighting the federal government, the
Fano groups may join forces. In this regard, there are also instances where armed
groups hold people hostage for ransom. Hence, civilians are subject to kidnapping by
armed groups, and consequently armed groups may experience decreased public
support.
28. EHRC could not confirm whether Eritreans forces are training Fano forces and
supplying weapons to the militias besides information circulating on social media.
Moreover, the source could not give an indication of the size of Fano.
Treatment of ethnic Amharic persons
29. The ethnic Amharac population is subject to ethnic profiling and arrests by authorities
as the Tigrayans used to face during the war in Tigray.
30. Amhara persons outside of the Amhara region, such as in Addis Ababa, are also subject
to detention. It is hard to tell what evidence lead to the arrest and detention of
Amhara people, and hence, the targeting differs from situation to situation. There is a
wording in Amharic
weketawi guday
meaning ‘the current situation’, which is used to
describe that the detention is related to the current conflict situation or political crisis.
31. Federal authorities are conducting search in Addis Ababa from time to time. For one
month ago, there was a shooting incidence in Addis Ababa. Prior to that incident,
authorities were conducting house search during nights in some neighborhoods in
Addis Ababa. Certain events may trigger federal authorities to conduct house search,
for instance public holidays, festivals or major public events may lead to search
because authorities believe that some people take the opportunity to create havoc
during gatherings.
32. Persons who are suspected of being affiliated with the Fano are subject to detention
by the federal government. There are formal detention centres, but due to the high
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number of detainees, the federal government make use of informal facilities. In most
cases, the detainees are not brought to court, and if they are, the investigation is not
finalised within a reasonable period of time, and authorities tend to ask for an
adjournment of 14 days. There is no limit to how long a person can expect to be
detained.
33. It is difficult to give an indication of how large a percentage of the Amhara population
supports the federal government versus the Amhara armed groups in the ongoing
insurgency. Generally, the population would not feel comfortable about voicing
publicly who they support.
The situation in Somali state and treatment of ONLF members
34. EHRC is not aware to what extent ONLF supporters or members are being targeted or
monitored by the federal government. However, there are incidents of interception
and detention based on statements on social media. However, the number of incidents
reported is not equivalent to the level of incidents targeting and monitoring of the
Amhara population. EHRC mainly monitors the situation for IDPs and refugees in the
Somali region, as well as the transitional justice process.
35. EHRC received information from residents of the region that some of the persons who
held positions during the previous government are still occupying government
positions after the peace agreement in 2019 and after the dissolution of the police.
The change that happened in 2019 is a reform rather than a revolution. This means
that some officials from the previous regime may still hold positions in the new
administration. However, the current government has stated that people should report
if they know of people who have committed serious human rights violations occupying
official positions.
36. EHRC is not aware to what extent ethnic Somalis or supporters of ONLF are targeted by
authorities in Addis Ababa. However, the source came across one ethnic Somali person
who had to flee to Somalia and who returned with the support of EHRC.
The situation in Oromia
37. Some parts of the Oromia region is precarious and difficult to access because of
ongoing conflict. Some parts of the region is occupied by armed groups. As a
consequence of the occupation by armed groups, farmers are prevented from farming
their land. Nevertheless, EHRC has conducted assessments of the human rights
situation of IDPs, including the humanitarian needs, which have resulted in a published
report.
38. The region is marked by high prevalence of armed groups committing crimes, attacking
civilians, officials and civil servants as well as revenge and retaliation attacks.
39. Officials travelling from one point to another in Oromia are subject to attacks by armed
groups. As a result of this, security and military forces attack people based on suspicion
without making distinction between civilians and armed groups. As the armed groups
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are part of the same ethnic group in Oromia, it is difficult for security forces to identify
who is who and to make a distinction between civilians and armed groups, resulting in
arrest, attacks and causalities of civilians.
40. Oromia is, according to the source, the region with the highest amount of arrested and
detained people as security forces suspect them for supporting or being affiliated with
the armed groups.
41. In most cases, detained people have no access to fair trial and justice systems because
the evidence is limited. As there are too few amount of formal detention centres
compared to the high number of detained persons, informal detention centres are
established.
42. According to the source, a high number of detentions across Ethiopia occur in Oromia
as the conflict has been going on for 4-5 years compared to the newly escalating
conflict in Amhara.
Surveillance
43. Especially since the activation of the state of emergency, the federal authorities have
got a leeway to detain persons whom they suspect or have received information on
without court warrant. The methodologies used include low-tech strategies
(informants) and social media monitoring. If the authorities suspect someone of
supporting Fano financially, authorities may monitor financial transactions conducted.
44. The threshold for monitoring may vary from time to time, and there does not seem to
be any pattern of what type of expression or action can bring Amharic persons into
troubles. For instance, public holidays, where people are brought together, a certain
event or incidences of havoc may lead to intensified surveillance and detention by the
federal government. Small gatherings of people may come to the attention of
authorities. The level of monitoring can change very rapidly.
45. The federal authorities have a substantial number of agents conducting monitoring.
For instance, one agent may have 5 or 6 accounts to monitor social media.
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Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC)
Addis Ababa, 15 May 2024
Tigray, the aftermath of the ceasefire
1. After the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in Tigray, there are some changes
in the scale of targeting of ethnic Tigrayans. During the war there was massive arrests
of Tigrayans and everyone who supported TPLF by the federal authorities. After the
enactment of the CoHA, the government wishes to prove their observance of the CoHA
agreement and that the CoHA was leading to significant change. So, those Tigrayans
who had been subjected to mass arrests were released, including several human rights
defenders, journalists and researchers. Although the number was limited, there were
Tigrayans who allied with the federal government during the war, who were targeted
by the TPLF during the war. There are cases of journalists who escaped from TPLF
because they did not support TPLF or did not take side during the conflict. The tension
has significantly decreased. Currently, there is no targeting or acts against Tigrayans.
The shops, businesses and hotels owned by Tigrayans that were closed during the
conflict have reopened or resumed back to business. However, the freedom of
movement is restricted for those Tigrayans who were working with the federal
government. They are currently still subject to surveillance and targeting by the TPLF.
Recently, a journalist who worked for a regional TV programme, who escaped from
TPLF to Addis Ababa, and he cannot move outside of Addis Ababa due to fear of being
targeted by the TPLF.
2. TPLF has split into two groups; 1) a group of those who support the transitional
regional administration orchestrated by Prime Minister Abiy and 2) a group of those
who are against the transitional regional administration who claim that genocide has
been committed in Tigray and that the federal government should be held
accountable. This group still raises the issue of the ongoing conflicts between the
Tigray and the Amhara regions. The conflict has spilled over to the Tigrayan population
that is also split into two.
3. After the ceasefire in Tigray, the federal government is careful and keep all the doors
open to people from TPLF people. Even high profile TPLF officials can now travel freely.
However, it does not mean that surveillance of TPLF people have stopped. It is not a
well-settled situation yet. There is the fear that a conflict can break out again, because
both sides (TPLF and the federal government) are blaming each other; the Tigrayan
interim administration is blaming the federal government for its failure to fulfil
humanitarian needs in Tigray, and the federal government blames the TPLF for not
respecting the peace agreement. Although there is an ongoing consultation between
the two parties, there is still suspicion and tension. The vocabulary used by the two
parties suggests that it is a pre-war situation, as there were same types of statements
before the war broke out in Tigray.
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4. Especially, in the airport area, there is a serious security surveillance against persons
who have travelled to or from Tigray. For instance, they check the ID cards and the
background of travelers and position. The government authorities have access to a list
of passengers. The authorities may not necessarily restrict persons from travelling to
and from Tigray but the authorities will follow the person from a distance and monitor
who the person meets with as well as the purpose of the travel. The authorities mainly
check high-profile TPLF-members and activists in the Bole airport. The level of
surveillance depends on the political tension.
The treatment of ethnic Amhara, activists and journalists
5. During the war in Tigray, authorities checked everyone with a Tigrayan name against
an extensive list of Tigrayans who was travelling from Bole airport. If the name of a
person was on the list, they would be interrogated by authorities and restricted from
travelling. Now the situation has changed so mainly Amhara people are targeted. The
authorities keep a list with names of journalist, activists and human rights defenders
who are vocal and advocating for the Amharan cause. Authorities (police and security
forces) conduct random searches in Addis Ababa, and they check telephones and social
media accounts during searches. If the authorities detect any videos or posts related to
Fano or OLF, family members will be interrogate and subjected to a background check
as well. If there is any indication that a person is involved with or support any
opposition movement, authorities will interrogate the person. The checks and searches
are conducted randomly almost every evening in Addis Ababa.
6. Some former members of the opposition party, Ezema, have formed a new informal
group and they organised a peace rally in Addis Ababa to call for cessation of
hostilities. Five of the members were detained. One person managed to escape to
Nairobi, and five police officers surrounded his house, while he was in Nairobi,
interrogated his wife and children and asked about his whereabouts, after which they
destroyed everything inside the house.
7. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) documented that 6 journalists had to
flee the country in 2023 due to threats by authorities. In 2024, up to now, 5 journalists
were supported by the EHRDC to leave Ethiopia due to threats. According to the
interlocutor, this has become a new trend that reminds them of the 2005 election,
where the former administration targeted journalists and human rights activists.
8. There is one example of a director of an association for human rights in Ethiopia who
went to the UN in Geneva for a meeting on the torture report. The director and her
family were harassed and interrogated, and consequently, she could not return home
to Addis Ababa.
9. The interlocutor pointed to another example of 12 journalists from one media house
who were detained and taken to Afar because of their Amhara background. This is
similar to the situation in Tigray.
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10. There are conducted massive random searches in Addis Ababa following the conflict in
Amhara in 2024. It is random searches with specific purpose; the checks are supposed
to find or target people who support or are affiliated with any of the armed groups.
Based on reports, thousands of people are being detained for shorter or longer period
of times whose ethnic profile is Amhara and they are suspected of supporting the Fano
militias. The trend is similar to the previous situation during the war in Tigray where
Tigrayans were arrested and detained in Addis Ababa.
11. After the war broke out in Tigray, people were told to share information to the police
regarding people whom they suspected to be Tigrayan or affiliated with the TPLF. The
federal government used this as a tool to drive the public to inform against each other.
The same is now happening against the Amhara people.
12. There are a number of so-called concentration camps, consisting of former school
compounds, factories and warehouses, which are outside the formal prison system.
Overall, there are massive human rights concerns related to the prison conditions in
formal prisons, but the conditions in the concentration camps are horrible. Some of
the camps were established following the declaration of the state of emergency.
Anyone arrested during these searches have been placed in the camps, and it is almost
impossible for someone outside to get insight into the number of detainees and the
conditions. One medical worker secretly filmed the conditions in a camp, which
showed the suffering of the detainees. Those detained in the camps are Amhara
people suspected of supporting the Fano. Thousands of people from Addis Ababa are
concentrated in the camps under very harsh conditions.
13. The state of emergency was declared in order to control the situation in the Amhara
region, but there are vague provisions saying that the government can implement and
enforce the state of emergency wherever the authorities find it necessary.
14. After the adoption of the state of emergency, the Oromo regional government started
targeting Amhara people in the region, and hence, no one knows where they are
detained.
15. In general, many families submit cases of forced disappearances to the EHRC.
16. EHRDC has made a call of attention to the whereabouts of a well-known human rights
activist who was kidnapped and detained based on his anti-war engagement. When
the state of emergency was declared, he was arrested during a trip to Barta, and he
disappeared for some months. Recently, his family received information that he has
been placed in a so-called concentration camp in the Amhara region for the past 10
months with no due process of law. There are risks associated with making calls for
releasing persons who are arrested, but EHRDC is continuing their efforts. There are
still many journalists placed in detention camps in Afar with no access to due process
of law due to the state of emergency.
17. According to the EHRDC, even the Meles Zenawi administration enforced some form of
rule of law throughout the country, notwithstanding the human rights violations
against critics, journalists and political opponents. In May 2023, the EDF conducted
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drone attacks at a school on a Sunday, and to the EHRDC, this signals a complete
disregard for the rule of law.
18. Being young and Amhara is enough to put you at risk of detention during searches. The
government has a list of activists and social media influencers, and the authorities
know where these activists reside, so in case problems occur in Amhara they can
arrests these people. It is a method of dismantling any dissent. People are being
agitated as a result of their engagement in human rights and political activity, but
innocent people with no political or activist background are also arrested. Just by
virtue of being young and Amhara can make someone suspected of being a Fano
member.
19. On Sunday 12 May 2023, while Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a new bridge in
the Amhara region, a drone strike by the federal government targeted two schools
killing a number of teachers and civilians.
Gender disparities
20. Men are more likely to be arrested, but there are female activists and artists who were
arrested following a previous Fano-related incident in Addis Ababa. There are incidents
of torture and sexual abuse of women activists and human rights defenders. They are
more vulnerable to any form of harassment. Gender-based violence has become a
common practice in most parts of the country during the conflict, especially in the
regions with armed conflict, where SGBV is used as a weapon of war in a similar way as
during the war in Tigray where women were massively targeted.
21. EHRC published a report documenting that during the first 6 months after the conflict
erupted in Amhara, more than 200 women were raped by members of the Ethiopian
National Defence Force (ENDF). Many of the women were from IDP camps. Following
the publication of the EHRC report, the government blamed the EHRC for defamation
and made a press statement announcing that the EHRC is infiltrated by foreign
agencies with a political agenda. In addition, some civil society organisations were
condemned by the government for showing solidarity with the EHRC.
Regional differences
22. Mass arrests are most widespread in Addis Ababa as well as in the bigger cities in
Oromia region and Amhara. Following the incidents where Fano targeted and
destroyed a number of prison camps in Amhara for the release of their fellow
members and supporters, most detainees are transported from Amhara to Afar or
somewhere else to ensure better government control. Fano uses prison breaks as a
strategy to gain support from the public; thousands of former prisoners joined Fano
after the prison breaks.
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Fano support and forced recruitment in Oromia and Amhara
23. In the beginning of the conflict, Fano did not enjoy high support in the population. As
Fano was allied with the government during the Tigray war, many Fano member have
been supplied with weapons by the federal government. In the beginning, Fano had a
structure and had a limited number of members, but once the government started
targeted Fano, Fano received increased support. The drone attacks, mass arrests and
targeting of civilians by the federal government in the Amhara and Oromia regions, as
well as the massive internal displacements of Amhara persons, are used in the Fano
campaign to generate increased popular support. According to the interlocutor, the
level of recruitment and support of Fano is out of control. More than 75 % of the
youths in Amhara have joined the Fano. The growing support confirms the government
argument that all Amhara people are suspected for being Fano supporters.
24. Many unemployed young people, who have no hope in Ethiopia and who are suffering,
have joined Fano as a result of their grievance to ‘the whole system’. The same feeling
of grievance is gaining support in Oromia, where young Oromos, who fought and
protested against TPLF, have joined OLA as they are disappointed with the government
and they have no other opportunities.
25. Kidnapping for ransom has become a common tool by Fano members as a criminal
activity to get financial support. They go from door to door and kidnap civilians and
negotiate with relatives for their release, especially those who have business or
wealthy relatives outside the country are targeted.
26. There is a vocal diaspora in the US, the Arab countries and Europe who sponsor the
conflicts.
27. It is well known that the Oromo Liberation Forces have recruited child soldiers. It is
unclear to what extent Fano has recruited children. However, some videos have
circulated showing children aged between 12 and 17 who are Fano members. It is
difficult to determine whether they were forcefully recruited or joined voluntarily. The
circumstances and the brutality of the government forces make young people inclined
to join Fano for their survival. During the war in Tigray, civilians in Tigray who did not
join TPLF were at risk of being killed. This trend is repeated in Oromia and Amhara.
28. Although it is not well documented, it is likely that there are forced recruitment to
Fano. Fano made a call to all Amhara youth across the country and urged them to join
Fano, otherwise they would be considered government supporters.
29. The Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International documented in a report that
families in the Oromia region were killed by federal forces because one of their family
members joined the rebel groups. People are squeezed between two conflicting
parties; they are in risk of being targeted by both federal forces and the armed groups.
30. Eritrea has trained and supplied weapons to Fano militias during the Tigray war.
According to the interlocutor, Fano forces are still being trained in Eritrea.
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Humanitarian needs
31. Prime Minister Abyi is neglecting the high amount of humanitarian needs and putting
pressure on international organisations for them not to disclose the exact number of
people who are in need of humanitarian assistance.
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A research institution
Addis Ababa, 16 May 2024
Treatment of members or alleged members of opposition groups
1. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is one of the oldest opposition movements in
Ethiopia and it has been the leading Oromo resistance movement against successive
regimes. The OLF had a brief stint of becoming part of the governing coalition in the
early 1990s, which was interrupted after the Front’s fallout with the EPRDF.
2. For many ethnic Oromos, it has continued to be a symbol of resistance, but it does not
constitute a cohesive unit. To a greater extent, it is a ‘societal form of resistance,’ so it
is difficult to demarcate its members from members of the community. At the same
time, as an organization, it is characterised by the presence of various factions and
internal disputes. In various instances, its different sub-groups have operated as a
‘franchise’ rather than as a centralized organisation.
3. The OLF has continued its resistance to the current Prosperity-led regional and federal
governments. In the last couple of years, the resistance has increasingly morphed into
an armed confrontation, with the distinction between armed combatants and the
civilian population blurring, which partly explains the persecution in Oromia.
4. Since its establishment, OLF has been through a series of splintering, the latest of
which is the formation of OLA, an armed fraction, around 2019. Likewise, in Amhara,
the Amhara resistance movement now seems to be represented by the Fano. The Fano
seems to enjoy ‘substantive mass sympathy and support’ from Ethnic Amharas. This
‘mass sympathy and support’ is often difficult to distinguish from political activism.
This blurs the distinction from normal political engagement from support to the
ongoing insurgency.
5. Since 2019, OLF has been a legally registered political party, whereas OLA was
designated a terrorist organisation’ by the House of Representatives at the height of
the 2020-2022 War in Tigray. However, individuals voicing the Oromo cause will ‘not
be labelled’, and that in itself is not criminalized. In fact, many in the mainstream
political parties, including the ruling PP, are rallying their constituency around
responding to long-standing Oromo demands. But the government can easily associate
its detractors with the OLA as it sees it fit. The armed struggle remains criminalized,
not least due to its designation as a terrorist group by the Ethiopian parliament.
6. It is also unclear which types of actions would be perceived as anti-government in
Oromia since Oromia is currently regarded as ‘a warzone’ because of the conflict
between government forces and OLA insurgents. The latter explains the dismal state of
the human rights record in the region. Civilians are at risk of being taken for a
combatant. According to media reports and credible institutions, such as the Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission, the central government applies ‘a heavy-handed approach’
to anybody who is perceived to be a combatant. A heavy-handed approach in a
warzone means that there are mass arrests, and detention of family members of
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persons who are suspected of sympathizing with or being members of the armed
resistance. Western and Southern Oromia have higher levels of resistance and are
particularly hard hit. The more resistance, the more brutal has the government’s
response been.
7. Kidnappings for ransom as a tactic to gain access to resources is widespread, and the
number of these kidnappings has increased. The price for the liberation of the victim
rises if it is known that the victim has relatives abroad or in other foreign countries.
Therefore, any travel outside of Addis Ababa has decreased significantly. Ethiopian
Airlines even recently announced that domestic flights have doubled, and many
observers attribute this to the inability to travel by road owing to the insecurity arising
out of the conflict. People who can afford it are avoiding any travel by road out of fear.
8. The OLA also uses similar tactics of attacking civilians perceived as government-
supported. More than 100 local officials have been killed by the resistance movement
by OLA forces in
Oromia.
That has caused retaliation in a ‘tit-for-tat’ action. If a person
in this conflict zone is perceived to be a supporter of the government, then this person
and their family may be targeted by OLA as well.
9. Addis Ababa is not a conflict zone, and Oromos who are vocal about their political
opinions would be somehow safe there, especially if they are not engaged in mobilise
their ‘constituencies’ for the so-called unlawful activities. A person’s safety depends on
how prominent a figure this person is and how dangerous the government perceives
the person to be. Some journalists have been perceived as dangerous. If a person is
perceived to be affiliated with the OLA, e.g. via posts on social media suggesting and if
the person supports the resistance, he/she will be detained. As you can refer from
media sources, the State Minister of Peace was fired on accusations of conspiring with
the OLA. He was a member of the Prosperity Party, but rumors against him were
started and led to his arrest.
Extent of surveillance
10. It is expected that the authorities would scrutinise social media accounts of those
suspected of subversive activities for signs of anti-government activity. Digital
surveillance includes officials taking note of whom the person likes or what they share
or comment on. When political activists and journalists have been detained, the
starting point of their indictment in courts has always been material found on social
media. There is
media report
about the existence of a social media army that
advocates for the government’s agenda, and seek to debunk the opposition’s
narratives; the staff of these units follow activists’ social media accounts and challenge
them online. The government controls the state media, including radio, newspaper and
television.
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The situation in the Amhara region
11. There is a high prevalence of mass detention in the Amhara region. It is illustrative of
the current situation that some opposition members of the national and regional
Parliaments from the Amhara region have been arrested and taken to a place of
detention 216 km away from Addis Ababa with no access for their family members and
under harsh climate conditions.
12. The exact number of detained Fano members or alleged Fano members in detention is
unknown, and there is no way of knowing it as there are no lists available to the public.
Fano is increasingly posturing itself as a movement that ‘embodies’ the Amhara cause
so it is gaining increasingly popular sympathy, including in legal political parties as well
as in religious institutions.
13. In Amhara, civilians are easily recruited into the Fano militia because Amharas harbour
enough legitimate grievances.
14. The Fano was initially an informal militia group, before the war in Tigray, fighting
alongside the regional special forces close to the border of Sudan. It has remained a
loosely organised decentralised structure. The group has never needed to conduct
forced recruitment, as it positions itself as a grievance movement, and most of the
youth who joined the Fano militias, joined Fano by will rather than by forced
recruitment. Many young people speak of stories to have seen their sister or mother
being attacked or heard stories about such incidents and then they go to the bush to
join the militia in their area of origin.
15. As in the case of Oromoia, if a person is perceived to be working with the government
or sympathizing with the government, the person can easily be targeted by the Fano
movement. This double exposure creates a very difficult situation for civilians in the
Amhara region. The civilians are between a rock and a hard place: they will have to
choose which side to join.
16. Many people in Amhara feel betrayed by the central government. The contested land
between the Amhara region and Sudan, the contested areas between Tigray and the
Amhara region, and the attacks on Amhara civilians in other regions combined
constitute fertile ground for further recruitment.
17. The federal government occasionally conducts indiscriminate drone attacks in the
Amhara region, which have killed
civilians
at a student association meeting.
18. Places, where Amharas can ‘fly under the radar’ and avoid persecution, would be
places outside of the war zones, for example, in Addis Ababa or in the Southern
regions. The ordinary/everyday Amharan can easily move to Addis
Somali region
19. Since the peace deal in 2019 and the removal of ONLF from the list of designated
terrorist organisations, the Somali region has been one of the comparably stable
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regions in Ethiopia. The diaspora of the Somali region seems to be fatigued by the
resistance movement and there are some clans that oppose the ONLF. The federal
government has followed two strategies in the Somali region: first, the government has
been co-opting major opposition groups, which has contributed to the fragmentation
of the regional political landscape, and second, the government has distributed and
redistributed rents and resources among powerful groups in order to gain stability.
Therefore, some of the ONLF leaders are now ‘in businesses’. On the other hand, there
is a genuine feeling of ‘the periphery being centred’ as Somalis are assigned to
important positions. The current vice-president of the Prosperity Party (Adam Farah) is
Somali, and to a large extent, there is a feeling of being reintegrated into the centre.
20. There seems to be no large-scale prosecution based on individual membership of or
affiliation with ONLF in the Somali Region or in Addis Ababa.
21. After the official dissolution of the Liyu police, the sort of Liyu police remains a puzzle.
It has been notorious, and now it is much more under the radar. However, the force is
intact, and it is still there and kept in the right place by the local leadership. How it is
deployed is unknown.
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International researcher
Online-meeting, 19 April 2024
Access to information in Oromia
1. The flow of information out of Oromia is very limited. Journalists and independent
monitors are barred from accessing certain areas, and this means that the researcher
sometimes has to rely on unconfirmed reports coming from the actors of the conflict
themselves. Many of the incidents are reported by either the federal authorities or the
Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and UN reports of the number of closed schools etc.
2. A consequence of this lack of journalists, NGOs and general independent monitors in
the conflict zones is that a lot of the information coming out of these areas are stories
from relatives and other anecdotal evidence. For a researcher, this makes it
challenging to piece together a coherent picture of the developments of the conflict.
3. Ethiopia has the second highest number of incarcerated journalists in sub-Saharan
Africa, and this naturally dampens the flow of information in the country in general.
Furthermore, the conflict in Oromia is barely covered by international journalists.
Overview of the conflict in Oromia
4. The security situation in Oromia varies across the region. Some parts are relatively
peaceful and stable such as the eastern parts of Oromia as well as Bale Zone and some
parts of
the Shewa Zones.
The areas affected by the insurgency are the Western parts
of Oromia, including some parts of the Shewa Zones, the Welega Zones (there are
several zones in Welega), Guji zone, as well as Arsi Zone (to a certain degree).
5. The researcher stated that there has been a spike in kidnappings in the conflict areas,
and it is unclear whether these kidnappings are motivated by political ideals or
financial-criminal incentives. According to the researcher, recent events points to the
latter being more true, and he further assessed that the lines between politically
motivated conflict and conflict for financial-criminal incentives has become blurred in
the Oromia conflict (has been true for some years). Political groups has been using
kidnapping as way to earn money and criminal gangs have been drawn into the
political side of the conflict in Oromia. Kidnappings started as a tactic in the Western
parts of the conflict zones but has recently spread to the Eastern parts as well (mainly
related to main roads out of Addis, not in the east in general). In the Eastern parts,
there have been unconfirmed reports that the OLA has been using kidnapping as a
tactic. In this relation, the researcher opined that taxi drivers in Addis Ababa are now
afraid to drive out of the city because kidnapping has been prevalent in the outskirts of
the city. People are especially wary because the conflict is very dynamic and can
fluctuate in scale and intensity very quickly.
6. The researcher has even heard reports that al-Shabaab and even Islamic State are
operating in small cells in Bale and Arsi, but he has not been able to confirm this
himself.
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7. Initially, the current conflict erupted in 2019 when the disarmament agreement
between Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian federal authorities was
signed. Parts of the OLF did not want to lay down their arms and broke out under the
name of OLA who then took up the fighting. Since then, there has been negotiations
between OLA representatives and the federal authorities, but according to the
researcher, it is unclear as to whether a deal between the negotiating parties would
even but an end the conflict because many actors in the conflict has now become
financially dependent on it continuing. Furthermore, it is unclear to the researcher
whether the negotiating team from OLA enjoys any legitimacy amongst the fighters on
the ground (also unclear how coherent OLA is).
Conditions for political oppositions, including OLF
8. OLF remains a legal party in Ethiopia and has – on paper – been part of the legal
opposition since the peace deal with the federal authorities in 2019. However, the OLF
has been de facto decapitated by the federal authorities in Ethiopia, and cannot in
reality function as an actual opposition party. According to the researcher, the legal
opposition in Ethiopia is in practice barred from carrying out their work as they are
silenced by the federal authorities. This is clearly demonstrated by the assassination of
prominent OLF member, Bate Urgessa, whose body was found in the town of Meki on
10 April 2024. Bate had only been released from prison a month earlier.
9. The OLF offices in Addis Ababa remain closed. This because there is no space for the
legal political opposition in Ethiopia. On paper, the OLF is content with the Abiy
government and The Prosperity Party (PP) in general, but this is because OLF fear the
consequences of voicing a difference in opinion vis-à-vis Abiy and the PP. To be clear,
however, the OLF is deeply critical to Abiy/PP.
10. According the researcher, there is a general climate of fear within the political sphere
in Ethiopia – even amongst government officials. This is because the targeting of
political figures in the country feels so arbitrary and no one can predict who will be
targeted next and for what reasons. In the case of the murder of Bate Urgessa, it is
unclear who was responsible and this has made everyone blame each other. What is
very clear, however, is that Bate Urgessa was murdered for political reasons.
11. The researcher further stated that the federal authorities are known to order political
assassinations. However, they are using the tactic of unpredictability and ambiguity
and this makes everyone within the political system nervous. On top of this, the
current economic situation in Ethiopia is so bad that crime has been on the rise. This
further creates ambiguity in terms of the motives behind assassinations and
kidnapping. Wealthy people in general can be kidnapped; OLF leaders can be
assassinated for political reasons. Moreover, the government can kill people suspected
of supporting OLA and those supported of supporting the government can be killed by
OLA.
12. On members of OLF specifically, the researcher stated that these have been targeted
for political reasons by both the federal authorities as well as the OLA.
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13. According to the researcher, low ranking members of OLF are more likely to be
targeted in cases of assassinations and kidnapping compared to high-ranking members
of OLF. The researcher further elaborated that it was surprising that Bate Urgessa was
assassinated, because it generally carries more risk for the perpetrator to target a well-
known high-ranking official. Therefore, low-ranking members of OLF has generally
been the preferred targets. To the researcher, this assassination of Bate Urgessa could
signal that the federal authorities feel emboldened.
14. There are no data on whether the politically motived targeting of politicians in
Ethiopia, including the members of the OLF, has increased or decreased in recent
years. Part of the explanation for this are the blurred lines between politically
motivated crime and financially motivated crime in Ethiopia. However, the researcher
stated that based on conversations with sources within the broader Ethiopian political
landscape, he senses that there might be an increase in politically motived targeting of
politicians in Ethiopia.
15. Many low-ranking OLF officials are in prison due to their political affiliations.
Furthermore, some of the leadership of OLF have also been imprisoned, but they tend
to be released again. The researcher added that when OLF members are arrested and
imprisoned it is because they have been accused by the federal authorities of being
members of OLA as well as being members of OLF.
16. When asked whether persons affiliated with the OLF have been stigmatised or
harassed by members of the local population because of their political affiliation, the
source stated that he had not heard of such cases, but added that he would not rule
this out given the current political climate in the country.
17. Whether or not an OLF affiliate would be approached by the federal authorities if they
returned to Ethiopia depends on their activity on behalf of OLF. If the person in
question was a low-ranking affiliate with little activity for the party, the risk would
generally be lower. However, it is important to stress the unpredictability of the
federal authorities, and therefore persecution against returning low-ranking affiliates
of OLF cannot be ruled out.
Treatment of OLA affiliates
18. The researcher stated that it is difficult to assess the scale of the federal authorities
targeting of persons affiliated with OLA due to the limited flow of information from the
conflict zones in Oromia. However, it is clear that many OLA affiliates have been
imprisoned and many have been subjected to torture while incarcerated.
19. In Ethiopia, the OLA is an illegal (officially defined as a terrorist organisation)
organisation, and this means that the amount of evidence required to arrest alleged
OLA members is very low. This also means that family members of alleged OLA
members also risk persecution. This is true no matter the rank or position of the OLA
member. Any affiliation with the OLA at any level puts the individual at risk of being
persecuted by the federal authorities. It is a common tactic in Ethiopian conflicts to
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hold family members hostage in order to get to the member of the political
organisation the authorities are actually after.
20. The higher the position within the OLA – as well as the alleged position within the OLA
– the higher the risk for the family members. A couple of days after the assassination
of Bate Urgessa, his family members were arrested. He had been accused of being
member of the OLA as well as being member of the OLF and had being engaging in
serious political opposition activities.
21. On the other hand, the researcher assessed that a low-level OLA fighter’s family would
be in less of a risk of being arrested.
22. According to the researcher, the federal authorities have never believed that there is
an actual distinction to be made between OLF and OLA even though OLF as a legal
party in Ethiopia. They have merely viewed OLA as the armed wing of OLF, and as such,
they still believe that the legal political party OLF is conspiring with the illegal armed
group OLA.
Surveillance capacity in Ethiopia
23. In the immediate aftermath of Abiy Ahmed’s election victory in 2018 the federal
authorities relaxed their general surveillance of the population in the political
opposition, but in recent years the surveillance has increased again.
24. Informants embedded in local societies and communities constitute the backbone of
government surveillance. The researcher stated that the authorities have the capacity
to engage in electronic surveillance, but the extent of this is unclear. They are
monitoring certain people’s social media activity. This would generally be more
profiled members of political parties, but could also be a lower-ranking member if they
are suspected of something.
25. When asked whether the federal authorities used social media, including Facebook, to
stoke ethnic tensions in Ethiopia, the researcher stated that the authorities have not
used social media for this purpose. Rather, this outpouring of ethnic discrimination on
Ethiopian social media was very much linked to the conflict in Tigray, and the Ethiopian
diaspora as well as the intensity of that particular conflict played a central role in this.
26. People under surveillance by the federal authorities can take up residence in Addis in
order to fly under the radar. The larger the city, the easier it is to shake the
surveillance. However, in order to do so, the person in question has to get rid of their
id card (kebele) which in turn limits the person’s access to rights and services as well as
many job opportunities.
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Mehari Taddele Maru, Professor and Academic Coordinator
Online meeting, 29 April 2024
The security situation in Amhara
1. The situation in Amhara is characterised by fierce fighting, transitioning from sporadic
skirmishes to a well-organised and coordinated conflict. Notably, there is no large
conventional Fano army present; instead, the conflict is driven by well-coordinated hit-
and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare. The conflict has passed the usual resistance
skirmishes to real engagement; almost the entire Amhara region is now under intense
fighting and instability. The Ethiopian Defence Force (EDF) is facing serious challenges
of transporting armament, personnel and supplies beyond air transportation, as it tend
to be met by hit-and-run attacks. This situation is more prominent in Gojjam, Gondor,
Wollo and Shewa in Amhara where the fight is focused on targeting the federal
government. While the situation cannot be compared to the situation in Tigray, the
(federal) army is taking drastic measures resulting in civilians being killed and places
being bombarded. Killings and attacks have been well reported in Merawi. Other
locations that have been targeted include drone attacks on Finto Selam, Debre Birhan,
Wegel Tena and killings in Bahir Dar, Mota and Dangela where people have been killed.
2. Outside the Amhara region, there are well-documented and recent reports of
permanent attacks, search, arrests and political attacks and forceful conscriptions,
particularly in Oromia and the Addis Ababa surroundings. There are cases in Addis
Ababa and the surroundings where the police search for suspected ethnic Amharans
during night hours with the stated “aim of removing any threat to the Addis Ababa
security” that could be coordinated by Amharans. The search is not merely the result
of intelligence but rather a tendency to look out for any potential conspiratorial
military or political organisation that pose a threat in outside the Amhara region
particularly to the government in Addis Ababa.
3. There are recent reports from Ethio Forum that the Ethiopian National Security
Coordination Council has decided to finalise the military operation by ENDF in Amhara
before the rainy season starts in the end of May or beginning of June. It is the
assumption that ENDF has less capability to maneuver their operation during rainy
season. Large size of army is being transported to Amhara region from various
directions. Contrary to ENDF, Fano is more mobile and not mechanised, and their
operation would not be challenged by the rainy season. This launch of this ‘final
operation’ is expected to lead to intensified fighting and potential killings of civilians in
the Amhara region.
4. In relation to facilitating the return of IDPs to southern Tigray, an agreement between
the federal government and the interim administration of Tigray, there were recent
reports of sporadic violence and assassinations in the towns of Kobo and Alamata
based on resistance to the agreement. However, the fighting was relatively minimal
and seemed to be resolved. In Southern Tigray, there are still sporadic fighting
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between some Amhara forces and TDF, and attacks on officials and civilians including
to Alamata Woreda official who was appointed after annexation of the area by Amhara
forces. Seven civilians including children were also killed by Afar forces in Raya Azebo.
Treatment of ethnic Amharans
5. Compared to the fighting in Tigray that cease in 2022, the treatment of Amharans is
not marked by industrial scale arrests but rather search in Oromia region and across
Addis Ababa in the sense that the police conducts patrolling during the night where
they enter properties, steal valuables and expose the Amharans to extortion. This type
of search is conducted on a regular basis and has also been reported within the past 2-
3 days. Amharans are identified based on their accent. The government has
categorised some parts of Addis Ababa as so-called ‘green zones’ with the aim of
maintaining stability and security and protecting the city from Amharans moving into
Addis Ababa. This initiative has effectively been carried out for the past 3 years. The
police initially look for armament and documents but take the opportunity to use other
tactics against Amharans, such as threatening, harassment, intimidation and damaging
of properties.
6. The search/extortion is most prevalent in the outskirts of Addis Ababa and on the
transportation corridors and main highways. The middle and upper class are not
exposed to the same level of extortion as mostly they avoid land transport but they still
face the extortion when filing in and out of Bole Airport. There were several social
media reports on this. Individuals suspected of being supporting the armed resistance
and protesters are more vulnerable to arrests and extortion.
7. Unlike the Oromos and Tigrayans, the armed resistance is not led by a political party
representing Amharans. However, it is currently the situation that anyone who
opposes the federal government is considered a Fano representative. Practically, Fano
has become name for all Amahara armed resistance movements.
8. Fano has within the past 8 months to 1 year been turned into well-organised, though
divided, military wing from being a small armed units movement. The Amharans are
facing divisions among the different geographically designated Fano brigades. Large
urbanite Amhara elite disassociates themselves from Fano and those residing in
Amahara urban areas may find it challenging to reside while supporting or opposing
Fano due to risk for their livelihood and physical security reasons, and hence they may
want to leave outside the Amhara region and with limited options as neighbouring
Oromia even Addis Ababa could be menacing to them. These Amharans may be are
vulnerable to government suspicion and surveillance.
9. The professor answered that he did not know of cases where Amharans, residing
outside Amhara, face horisontal resentment or discrimination from the general
population due to the conflict between the federal government and Fano. However,
the professor stated that the federal government or the Oromia regional state
discriminate and attack the Amhara population in an organised way though much
harshly as it did with Tigrayans. It is very unlikely that Amharans are targeted to same
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degree as the Tigrayans were targeted during the Tigray war. This is partially attributed
to the fact that the general population in Ethiopia now, unlike in 2021, is fed up with
conflict and want peace at any cost. Oromo people would only attack Amhara civilians
based on the two following scenarios: 1) they are brainwashed by the Oromo elite to
believe that Amhara people pose a threat to them or 2) if their livelihood such access
to land or power is under threat. The Ethiopian government makes a deliberate effort
to equal the Oromo people with the Prosperity Party calling itself ‘an Oromo Ethiopian
government’ or ‘an Oromo Ethiopian leadership’, so an attack, armed resistance or
peaceful opposition to the Ethiopian government would be considered equivalent to
an attack on the Oromo People led Ethiopian government thus against Oromo interest
in resource, power and identity. As a result, there is tension and distrust between
Oromo and Amharan communities. Moreover, the fact that the police and military
forces that are deployed to protect Addis Ababa as in the green zones are
predominantly Oromos and could trigger hate and tension between the two ethnic
groups. Finally, Oromos have attacked Amharans and vice versa in the Oromo zones in
Amhara.
Monitoring and surveillance of Amharans
10. In Amhara, there has been at least 3 attempts of efforts to train a regional Amhara
force under the name Rapid Deployment Forces to fight the Fano militia. The force
included intelligence-gathering officers from the local community who were supposed
to collect intelligence amongst Amharans. However, the effort was not successful due
to overall resistance; many of the members escaped and joined Fano with the weapons
given to them my the military despite being better paid than ENDF personnel. Hence,
the capacity of intelligence gathering of Amharans in Amhara is limited. In Oromia, the
situation may be different due to overlapping identities and loyalties where there is
propaganda campaign and large opportunist Oromo elite that is willing to benefit from
the government approach to equate the government as an Oromo government. Thus,
the Oromo elite is highly divided due to the opportunity presented by the government
if they support its incumbents.
11. According to the professor, it is possible for Amharans to fly under the radar depending
on the willingness to take risk. As the situation intensifies, more Amharans will likely
side with Fano in the conflict, because Fano has proved such a formidably resistance to
the ENDF, and because the conflict has become so ethnicised. Moreover, it is unlikely
for the ENDF to wipe out Fano while Fano may not overwhelm ENDF entirely thus the
chance for the war to continue for foreseeable future save for shocks. The professor is
of the opinion that the damage caused to the coherence between the Amharas and the
federal authorities is irreversible because of the ethnic element and the intensity of the
conflict. It is difficult to assess how protracted this conflict with be.
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Forced Recruitment
12. Forced conscription of youngsters to ENDF training camps is ongoing. In Gojjam
especially, the Fano militia seems to be well-resourced financially and effective in their
outreach effort, which attract many young people to join Fano. There could be
increased recruitment in the bordering areas of Amhara and Tigray as well as western
Tigray, although federal forces are reinforcing in order to oppose the recruitment to
Fano.
Access to information in Amhara
13. It is generally challenging to uphold an information blockade in the Amhara region. For
instance, there was an attempt to impose a blockage in northern Shewa for 2-3
months, which was challenging due insufficient amount of persons to maintain it. In
comparison, in Tigray it was easier to control the flow of information as it was a
coordinated effort by the Eritrean army, Ethiopian army and regional forces. According
to the professor, there will always be loopholes in the information blockade in the
border areas of Amhara. In worst case, information will be channeled through the
border areas to Sudan.
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An international, humanitarian organisation
Addis Ababa, 13 May 2024
Conditions upon Return
1. This organisation works with voluntary returnees. Most cases involve returnees
from the Middle East, neighbouring countries, and Southern Africa. It also deals
with a few cases of returnees from Europe through the Assisted Voluntary Return
(AVR) programme.
2. Ethiopian returnees choose to return for a variety of reasons. Returnees from
Europe often return because they have failed to obtain a residence permit one way
or another. Returnees from Djibouti often return because they encounter
difficulties in migrating further, either due to lack of financial means, health issues,
or because they are being prevented from traveling further.
3. Regardless of the circumstances of their return, it is very common for returnees to
feel as if they have failed in their task – failed themselves but often also their
family or local community who might have invested in the migrant. As such,
returnees are often in debt to their family, who now have an extra mouth to feed.
This means that Ethiopian returnees face challenges on a mental, financial, and
social level upon return to Ethiopia, making the task of reintegrating the returnees
into society challenging. Moreover, many Ethiopians choose to migrate because
they initially find themselves in a difficult economic situation. Returnees often face
even more difficult economic situations upon return.
4. The organisation collaborates with the Ethiopian government in trying to
reintegrate the returnees into their local communities through reintegration
projects which directly benefit the returnees, community based initiatives which
aim to address the drivers of migration and other key priorities identified by
communities and capacity building intervention which aims to improve
government capacity to put in place structure and system which can address
migration challenges, including return and reintegration. Ethiopia is a large
country with many rural communities that are difficult to reach. If the economic
situation of the returnee is not dealt with properly, they are likely to re-migrate.
However, improving the economic situation for the individual often takes time
since people who migrate often lack formal education. Furthermore, it can be
difficult to access the labour market in Ethiopia, especially since the private sector
focuses on personal connections when recruiting. The organisation offers short-
term training to returnees and provides them with in-kind reintegration assistance
(startup capital) and some pocket money to get them going.
5. Because returnees are often in debt to their family or local community, some are
so ashamed and view themselves as failures that they want to settle down
somewhere else in Ethiopia. Furthermore, due to the current conflicts in Amhara,
some parts of Oromia, and impact of the conflict in Tigray, reintegration have
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6.
7.
8.
9.
become significantly more challenging because large parts of these regions are
difficult to access or conductive for sustainable reintegration. In the framework of
its return and reintegration activities, The organisation is currently not returning
anyone to Amhara because of on-going conflict in the region. Since the signing of
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the federal government and Tigray
interim administration, the region is regarded as relatively stable. However, due to
the scale of destruction in Tigray, the organisation still does not return people to
Tigray.
People from Southern Ethiopia tend to migrate south towards South Africa,
whereas people from Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray often choose the Eastern route
through either Djibouti or Somalia towards the Gulf, mainly Saudi Arabia. Few
Ethiopians choose the northern route towards Europe.
In the framework of its return and reintegration support, the organisation assesses
each case individually to determine whether the return is voluntary or not. The
notion of consent is paramount. As such, the organisation only assists the returnee
once they have given consent. Furthermore, the organisation provides counselling
to ensure that the decision is made on an informed basis.
Victims of trafficking (VOT) are handled differently due to the nature of their
vulnerability. In such cases, the organisation collaborates with service providers
who specialise in assisting VOTs. The organisation also helps to build the capacity
of the Ethiopian government to help them provide better services to these victims.
However, it is often difficult to assess whether an individual is a VOT due to the
nature of trafficking in person.
The government does not provide shelter for returning VOTs. These services are
provided by NGOs.
Monitoring Returns
10. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the organisation merely had to inform the
authorities of returns, but during the pandemic, regulations were changed so that
the organisation had to seek approval from the government to return individuals.
This was mainly due to public health concerns but it was later adopted as an
approach applicable to all returns, especially large movements. Since the
pandemic, the organisation now coordinates the issuance of travel documents with
the local Ethiopian embassies and consular departments. The Ethiopian postings
are then informed of the number of returnees, and they relate the numbers and
how many travel documents were issued with the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and then the organisation can return the individuals. This process can be an
issue in countries where the number of returnees is very high, such as Yemen.
11. The land borders between Ethiopia and the neighbouring countries are rather
porous. The land border stretches almost 5 300 kilometres and has 18 official
border-crossings, six of which have an electronic system in place that can register
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entry and exit. However, these systems are fragile since the border-crossings
experience power-outs, but they do register some amount of data. The data
collection for the remaining border-crossings is very analogue since it is basically a
civil servant calling for border-patrol from Addis to receive the number of people
who crossed that particular border-crossing for the day.
12. Bole International Airport has the most stable electricity connection in all of
Ethiopia since the airport is of great economic importance for the government.
This means that the airport has electronic systems in place and that staff of the
airport will have the data of each individual who entered or left Ethiopia, except
when Ethiopians are mass deported from Saudi Arabia and all arrive at Bole at the
same time. In those circumstances, the staff at Bole does not have the capacity to
register the deportees in the electronic databases. The organisation provides
immediate post-return assistance to the deportees from Saudi upon arrival.
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Martin Plaut
Online interview, 3 May 2024
Martin Plaut is a journalist, based in London. He was the Africa Editor of the BBC World Service
News until 2013 and works primarily on southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. He has
published books, articles and comments on Ethiopia and Eritrea over the years.
The security situation in Ethiopia since September 2022
1. The current situation in Ethiopia is characterised by a high level of complexity; the
fluidity and unpredictability of the security situation calls for precautions about any
forecast because things may change from one week to the other. The problems are
manifold: including the fact that the Pretoria Agreement (of 2 November 2022), which
ended the Ethiopia-Tigray war, did not deliver sustainable peace or really resolve
anything, albeit it stopped the most serious fighting, which obviously in itself was a
relief for the affected populations. However, the agreement did not resolve the
question of who owned the places over which the fighting had been about, in
particular Western as well as Southern Tigray. Both are claimed by the Amhara and the
Tigrayans.
2. The current conflictual situation of Ethiopia has a long history with almost ceaseless
clashes between local leaders. Since 1880, the key question of Ethiopia has been how
to find a balance between the center and the periphery. Sometimes the conflicts have
been between the major powers controlling Ethiopia, at other times it has been
between fractions within these powers. Menelik II expanded the territory of the
country in the 19
th
century so that it now includes more than 80 ethnicities. All of these
groups wishing to exercise their given rights, but are denied or restricted in exercising
these rights by the elite in the center, be it the Tigrayans or the Amhara.
3. Over the past weeks (ultimo April 2024) there has been renewed fighting in southern
Tigray as Tigrayans attempt to regain areas they had been pushed out of that they
claim is theirs.
4. There are 3 simultaneous conflicts in Ethiopia, all driven by the periphery striving for a
higher level of autonomy. The most recent of these conflicts, the Tigray war, was in
essence a war between the Tigrayans and the Amhara. The conflict between the
Ethiopian government and the Oromo (one third of the population), is further
complicated by the fact that the Oromo are themselves divided into fractions and
splinter groups.
5. A number of external actors –Eritrea, Somalia and the Arabs –also play a role on the
security situation in Ethiopia. First, Eritrea –once a part of Ethiopia– and its president
Isaias Afwerki strives to gain a central position in the Horn of Africa. He seems to be
determined that as long as he is excluded from such influence, Ethiopia will not be
allowed to gain stability. Currently, he seems to be excluded, or ignored, and his
relations with Prime Minister Abiy appears poor, although that could also change
rapidly. Secondly, Somali troops were brought into Eritrea prior to the most recent
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Tigray war, and there is evidence they fought alongside the Eritreans during the
conflict. The Eritreans and Tigrayans were accused of committing the worst atrocities
against Tigrayans, particularly women.’ There is a lack of discipline among all military
groups, including in the Tigrayan forces, who also committed atrocities, especially
against the Amhara. Thirdly, there are large sums of money that has been introduced
from the Arab world, in particular from the UAE.
The situation in the Tigray region
6. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the USAID recently discovered that there had
been vast diversions of food donated by these two agencies. Some appeared to have
been sold on the international market. Further investigations showed that these
diversions were not only occurring in the Tigray region, but that the Tigray region was
badly affected by this theft. Senior members of the administration and the Tigrayan
military were found to have allowed donor-funded food to be taken from their own
people and sold on the black market. The evidence was so overwhelming that the WFP
and USAID had to suspend all food aid, and introduce a new system of checking the
delivery of aid.
7. This fraud exemplifies the wider economic entanglement, with the Tigrayan elites
having money, interests and investments outside of Tigray. This was developed
through the
Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray
(EFFORT), a mechanism
established during the war against the Derg. Money was taken from aid and from other
sources to build up Tigrayan resources abroad, but came to benefit of these elites.
During the Tigray war, some of the money from foreign investments were channeled
back into Tigray, so that they could, for example, continuing broadcasting even when
they were surrounded, with equipment paid for from abroad.
8. The Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Marxist-Leninist group within it
(MLLT) has had a stranglehold over Tigrayan politics for many years; they actively
excluded smaller political groups from any serious role in decision-making. That has
contributed to much of the anger over the way the war was conducted and the high
loss in human lives. The evidence of diversion of aid only contributes to anger among
those who were not members of the TPLF elite and therefore excluded from the funds.
9. There appears presently to be no clear evidence of the Ethiopian government being
involved, in or responsible for, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Tigray.
10. The worst affected areas in Tigray are the western areas where people were forced out
of their homes by the Amhara, and later by the Fano militias, as well as the southern
areas of Tigray. The north of Tigray continues to be badly affected by the Eritrean
occupation.
11. Another issue, which fuels the conflict, is the lack of a clear demarcation of the border
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in spite of the work of the border commission, which
ruled where the legal border lies. Large communities along the border, especially in
Irob, do not recognise the Boundary Commission’s decisions stipulating that they are a
part of Eritrea. The Boundary Commission’s ruling was a result of the decision by the
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Eritrean and Ethiopian governments of the time to insist that the border be decided
solely on the basis of maps and customary practice, ex aequo et bono. Both nations
can, of course, agree to move the border by agreement at any time.
Fano
12. Bearing in mind that the conflict architecture changes rapidly, the Fano militias now
seem to be independent of the Addis administration and closer to President Isaias. This
gives him the option of using an important actor as a lever against Prime Minister Abiy.
The tactic of undermining his neighbours is one President Isaias has deployed
repeatedly since taking power in 1991. Given the complexity of the conflicts this gives
scope for President Isaias to target ‘anybody who is not on my side.’
The situation for journalists and the media.
13. In Ethiopia, there is some space for the media to publish critical journalism.
Occasionally, ‘the curtain comes down’ and journalists are arrested. It was impossible
for journalists to report from the front line during the Tigray war. Foreign and domestic
journalists were prevented from going to the front and covering the war, despite the
fact that it cost the lives of up to 600 000 civilians. There is not any possibility of
independent reporting from Eritrea, which is at the very bottom of the global rankings
produced by Reports Without Borders.
14. Some of quality newspapers in Ethiopia are Addis Standard and The Reporter. Both are
reliable sources and their staff of journalists manage to give an accurate picture of the
situation in Ethiopia, despite coming under government pressure. The space to report
critical analysis about the political situation, including about the prime minister exists,
even though some of his financial dealings are off limits. The media abstains from
covering questions that are too sensitive. Foreign correspondents are tightly controlled
through the government’s refusal to issue, or renew, visas. Some are excluded,
including the highly respected correspondent of the Economist, Tom Gardner.
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The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)
Addis Ababa, 16 May 2024
Introduction
1. The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), which was established in 1991, is a non-
governmental organisation that envisages a democratic system, including rule of law
and the protection of human rights through monitoring, investigation, documentation
and reporting of human rights violations in Ethiopia. There are 9 branch offices across
Ethiopia with approximately 30 full time employees. In addition, there are hundreds of
numbers of volunteers of members across the country.
2. During the past 32 years of operation, EHRCO staffs and members have been subjected
to arbitrary arrests, harassment, intimidation and extrajudicial killing. The investigation
and reporting department office of EHRCO was broken into in February 2023 by
security forces where the
departments head laptop with important data was taken.
On 5 January 2023, 5 employees were arrested and detained for 8 days as they were
investigating human rights violations in a suburb of Addis Ababa, regarding house
demolition and eviction complaints submitted to EHRCO. Addis Ababa City
Administration sent a warning letter of legal suit to EHRCO accusing the organisation of
publishing false information, inciting violence, which EHRCO has rejected by writing a
response. Given the current challenging political climate, human rights organisations
expect arbitrary arrests, intimidation and harassment from the government. The
human rights situation and the safety of HRDs are highly concerning in Ethiopia, which
is the worst case scenario, as the government is arresting arbitrarily and attacking
journalists, activists, opposition political parties, and HRDs. The pressure and concerns
are ever growing at alarming rate.
The overall human rights situation, surveillance and access to information
3. EHRCO has various systems and methods of information and evidence gathering,
including receiving information via phone messages, phone calls, videos, and other
digital ways of receiving complaints of human rights violations, and then it will deploy
its experts to collect evidences and to corroborate. Moreover, there are human rights
investigators at the 9 branch offices with legal knowledge backgrounds who are capable
of receiving reports through various channels and in many formats .
4. Human rights organisations at the local level are wedged between the political arena
and a political culture that has become ingrained in the society over time. The
politicisation of human rights means that human rights defenders must scrutinise who
the victim is and conduct thorough background checks which is necessary in passing on
information from informants. This risk complicates the information gathering
procedures, and the human rights organisations need to be careful about whom they
receive information from. There is a politicisation of human rights violations.
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5. According to the interlocutor, it is the ‘worst situation ever’ for operating as a human
rights organisation having experienced a long history of conflicts and repressive
regimes for the past 32 years.
6. The increased repression of the civic space and the digital space leads to growing
apathy. One can be silent because of fear, but being apathetic is the most dangerous
thing because ‘you don’t care anymore’.
7. 22 out of 28 complainants received by the EHRCO from the Oromia region were
arrested upon their departure from one of the EHRCO branch offices. The arbitrary
arrest is in itself a human rights violation but these arrests also demotivate all other
victims because it gives the impression that they risk compromising their security and
protection when submitting a complaint. These situations also complicate the
information gathering and access to information and depilate HRDs efforts.
8. The government has increased its technological pressures; its surveillance system may
not be comparable to neighbouring countries. This system gives the government a
network of informants that can work against human rights defenders.
The situation in Amhara region and ethncisation
9. Based on information received from members of the branch office in Amhara, the
situation is really dire in Amhara region with arbitrary killings, arbitrary arrests, and an
increasing number of IDPs. Attacks and killings are based on accusations of being a
Fano member or suspicions of family members being members of Fano, or supporting
of the group which works as an excuse to attack or arrest. It can likely lead to arrest if it
comes to the attention of the government that a friend or brother joined Fano.
Hundreds are arrested because of their Amhara background. The situation of ethnic
profiling during the Tigray war has now been replicated on Amhara against Amhara
people.
10. The number of arrests is worrisome. The state of emergency was declared for the
Amhara region but it is used across the entire country. After the interview, the source
noted that the emergency law has been lifted.
11. Most of those arrested are detained in military camps. The arrests are conducted by
the federal and regional government. Moreover, freedom of movement is restricted; it
is not easily possible to leave the Amhara region for Addis Ababa, as police officers will
stop anyone at the checkpoint. .
12. Due to the deteriorating security situation, EHRCO has reshuffled its branch office from
Gonder to Bahir Dar and scaled down two offices to one office in Amhara, the same has
been done to its other branch offices. The activities of EHRCO have become limited due
to the insecurity and the restricted movement. Moreover, internet connection is
limited in the region, which makes exchange of information challenging.
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The treatment of political opposition members
13. The silencing and discrimination against political opposition members are happening at
many levels. Currently, there are two well-known cases that have given rise to public
attention. The first is the case of Christian Tadele, an Amhara opposition politician of
the National Movement of Amhara (NAMA), who was arrested early in the Amhara
conflict, as he became critical to the government. He was arrested, despite having
immunity as an MP, and he was placed in a military camp, and recently brought before
a court after seven months of detention.
391
The other recent case is the killing of Bate
Urgessa, a former senior official of the OLF, who has been occasionally arrested over
the years.
392
And recently he was killed no one took responsibility. The two cases have
attracted international outcry and attention amongst human rights organisations. The
two cases contribute to a restricted environment for other political parties to operate
in. The government silences everyone who are being vocal for human rights. Lawyers
representing Amhara people get arrested and intimidated.
14. After the declaration of the state of emergency it has become more common to arrest
critics of the government based on the argument that they challenge the peace and
stability of Ethiopia. (The state of emergency is now is lifted)
15. During the reform period of 2018 and 2019, there were some rays of hope as
institutions and a new normative framework were formed and the civic space was
opened. However, over the past years, the government has reversed and worked
against the implementation of laws, repressed democracy and the civic space, and now
we are back to the state of challenging civic space. The government is systematically
attacking the civil space and not abiding by the human rights principles. The human
rights situation is the worst case scenario. ‘Anything can happen to anyone and
anywhere tomorrow or the day after tomorrow’.
Gender disparities
16. EHRCO recently went to Tigray and visited different IDP centres where 50+ IDPs, mainly
women, were interviewed. It became clear that women have suffered tremendously
from the conflict, and that the government has not learned the lesson from Tigray in
regards to the conflict in Amhara. Women in conflict may suffer from the multiplication
of vulnerability, as they might also suffer from the death of beloved ones or death of a
husband, or even disability. Also, displacement is a factor which makes women
vulnerable to myriad of risks and challenges
17. Women are faced with multiple vulnerabilities. In Tigray, women were devastated as
they lived with the active war in their minds. In one of the IDP camps in Tigray that was
recently visited by EHRCO, the women could not contain themselves because they were
391
The Addis Standard,
News: Parliament revokes immunity of Christian Tadele seven months after his arrest,
14
March 2024,
url
392
BBC News,
Bate Urgessa: Ethiopian opposition OLF figure shot dead and dumped by road,
10 April 2024,
url
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still ‘in a war zone in their heads’. Female human rights defenders are also highly
vulnerable to various attacks and victimisation.
18. Conflicts leave a wound in women and children that does not heal when the conflict is
over. For instance, during the conflict in Tigray women were victims of gender-based
violence and sexual assaults, which were rampant during the Tigray war. This was one
of the most horrible aspects of dimensions of that conflict. Even though a peace
agreement has been declared, it still leaves mental scars that do not disappear just
because the guns have fallen silent. Many husbands of women were killed during the
conflict, which has destroyed family structures leaving women more vulnerable. When
men come back to their families, they might suffer from mental health issues that may
likely lead to increases in gender-based violence in communities, which lasts longer
than the conflict itself.
19. There are a number of women combatants, who might have been forced to fight in a
conflict. They face challenges in the process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (DDR). For instance, they may have a difficult time being reintegrated into
a society with a patriarchal structure as being a female combatant is associated with a
lot of stigmatisation, social exclusion because the women had to leave their female role
behind in order to fight. The international community also bears a large part of the
responsibility as the reintegration process is designed mainly for men. For instance,
there is a lack of employment opportunities and psychologists to support women with
their mental health.
20. In the process of the Pretoria peace agreement, no women participated, although
women are the first to go through most of the agony and suffering as they were victims
of SGBV violation. The government is hesitant to approve the National human rights
Action Plan and fails to stop conflics and provide rehabilitation and facilitate the
sustainable relocation of IDPs.
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An international organisation
Addis Ababa, 17 May 2024
Conditions upon return
1. The Ethiopian returnees from Europe are mostly migrants and failed asylum-seekers.
The government Refugees and Returnees Service (RRS), which is a counterpart of
UNHCR on refugee issues as well as on refugee returnees, has a project funded by EU
to provide support to these returnees. Resource are constraint. An EU funded
programme contributes to the reception of migrant returnees and failed asylum
seekers from Europe. However, the program will phase out in 2024.
2. The majority of returnees to Ethiopia (as of May 2024) are from Sudan, because of the
expanding conflict in the country. Another large group of returnees are from Yemen.
With regard to refugees from Sudan, initially the majority were former Ethiopian
refugees who have resided in Khartoum but as the conflict has expanded into the
refugee camps, they have spontaneously returned to their country of origin. More than
10 000 have already been received and approximately 50 000 more are expected soon
to return. The Yemeni caseload includes Oromos, Somalis and to some extent also
people of Amhara origin, as well as others. They have been in Yemen (or other Gulf
countries) for several years as refugees. They are returning as part of IOM’s Voluntary
Humanitarian Program (VHR) program designed for the safe and dignified return of
migrants stranded in Yemen.
Differentiated reception of refugees depending on which country they return from
3. Ethiopia is a transit country for refugees (e.g. coming from Sudan), a destination
country for other refugees and a sender country as well.
4. Returnees are received in the same way regardless of which country they return from.
So-called failed Ethiopian asylum seekers returning to Ethiopia are the primary
responsibility of government.
5. The reception of victims of trafficking relates to the National Partnership Coalition that
coordinates efforts to receive victims. The group is led by the deputy prime minister.
The national partnership coalition has different working groups under it.
6. The northern route from Ethiopia to Europe is not as used any more as prior to the
conflict in Sudan, especially for Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali refugees.
7. The RSS remains the legally mandated office of the Government for refugees including
for registration, documentation, protection and camp management. The capacity of
the RSS varies depending on the specific technical area. Regarding the returnee
programme, the capacity is still low as that has not been as highly prioritised as the
refugee management. Currently, RRS receives support for the registration of refugees
and asylum processing, but the aim is that the RRS will take over the full responsibility
once the required capacity is reached. RRS is applying UNHCR tools for the registration
of asylum seekers and refugees. The handover of responsibility for registration of
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8.
9.
10.
11.
asylum seekers has started in Addis Ababa and in Las Anod but there is still a lot of
capacity development to be carried out for the RRS to be able to fully do the
registration. Data quality and integrity is a particular concern within registration and
asylum processing.
During the war in Tigray, all the refugee camps in Tigray have been either closed or
destroyed. A high number of refugees have been victims of human rights violations,
including kidnapping and gender-based violence. Many of those refugees moved to
Addis Ababa and the rest moved to the Amhara region and the Gondar areas. The
Berhale camp in Afar was also attacked, so those refugees also moved, and camps
were established in Sardo near Semera. After the cessation of hostilities, most of the
refugees in Serdo have returned. An overwhelming number of refugees from camps in
Tigray have come to Addis Ababa. The government has recognised many of the self-
relocated refugees on the ‘out-of-camp policy’ (OCP), so their stay has been legalised
in order for them to not encounter any protection problems. However, these refugees
did not get enough material assistance (compared to when they were inside the
camps), and they could not get access to documentation and economic opportunities.
When a state of emergency was declared in November 2021, a suspension of
registration and issuance of documents for anyone followed. Therefore, as many as 98
% of refugees do not have valid documentation after that. In 2023, documentation
services have resumed in Addis Ababa, and documents are gradually being issued again
but a huge caseload remains. A high number of Eritrean children born in Ethiopia are
very likely to lack civil documentation due to suspension of registration and
documentation services.
The refugees who arrived in Ethiopia after the suspension of registration in 2021, have
limited access to asylum except those coming from conflict emergencies in
neighbouring Sudan and Somalia. There is generally a moratorium on access to asylum
for new arrivals including Eritreans. Unregistered refugees are particularly vulnerable
to risks of denial of services, detention, onward movement including smuggling and
trafficking. Around August 2023, approximately 360 unregistered Eritreans and few
registered refugees have been deported by bus to Eritrea from Ethiopia.
Access to asylum at Bole International Airport is very limited. Only very few are
successful at seeking asylum at the airport. There is a general suspension of access to
asylum with the exception of emergency context (such as Sudan and Somalia).
The situation in Amhara
12. The situation in the Amhara region has been very volatile since April 2023. When the
government decided to disband the regional Special Forces, it led to skirmishes and the
full-blown conflict in the Amhara region between the federal forces and the Fano
militias, followed by the declaration of the State of Emergency in August 2023 (which
was extended after the initial 6 months). Even though the State of Emergency was
proclaimed especially for the Amhara region, it contains a paragraph saying that it may
be applied in other regions as needed.
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13. The security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2023 and the humanitarian
situation has gone worse. Coordinating humanitarian response has been challenging
due to insecurity and logistical issues. Telecommunication services have been shut
down (except for a call service), and there is no internet service in the region.
14. In the Amhara region, there is a general breakdown of the rule of law. The refugees are
concentrated mainly in two areas in Gonder: Alemwach in Debark where Eritrean
refugees who have been displaced from Tigray are hosted and in Metema where
refugees from Sudan are accommodated. There are many checkpoints in these areas.
There are reports of insecurity and attacks against refugees by unidentified groups
including as recent as May 2024.
15. The Amhara region hosts a very significant IDP and refugee population: there is
approximately 29, 300 refugees, and about 66 100 IDPs and 309 900 IDP returnees (as
of May 2024). Most of the IDP locations are in the eastern parts of Amhara, which are
also the hotspots of the conflict. Most of the IDPs are displaced from Oromia.
16. There are reports of detentions of ethnic Amhara persons who are believed to be
associated with the Fano groups in various locations, including in Addis Ababa. The
State of Emergency, initially meant for the Amhara region, is also being applied in
Addis Ababa and elsewhere and ethnic Amhara people are detained on suspicion.
Politicians, human rights activists, journalists and members of the Parliament have
been detained.
17. The most active armed opposition groups in the Amhara region are the Fano militias
and the Kemant Liberation Front in the Gonder area. The government forces and the
regional special forces are also active (these forces have been absorbed into various
regional security structures mainly into riot police and they are fighting together with
the ENDF). So far, there has not been reported cases of direct skirmishes between
Fano forces and other armed opposition groups except for in North Shewa and South
Wollo area where there was a conflict between the Fano and the Oromia special zone
militia operating in that area. The pattern of the conflict is an ambush tactic with
guerrilla-like fighting. Up to now, there has been no publicly known unified structure or
command of all the Fano forces.
18. There has been tensions between Amhara and Tigray in the southern Tigray/Raya
areas as Tigrayan forces have intervened in the disputed areas. As a result, more than
50 000 people have been displaced to the Amhara region. The situation remains
volatile with the government yet to resolve this situation. The concern is that similar
incidents may occur in Western Tigray resulting in displacement of many people.
19. There is a tense situation with regard to the issue of Tigrayan refugees from Sudan who
may be forced to return to Western Tigray due to the expanding conflict in Sudan;
some of these refugees may be perceived to be associated with those who have
perpetrated the Mai Kadra massacres against ethnic Amhara. Therefore, there is a risk
of intercommunal violence if they return. Western Tigray is currently under Amhara
administration and there might follow some changes in the administration of the area.
Recently, the Tigrayan forces have been accused of supporting the RSF which they
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20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
vehemently denied. The Sudan conflict is expanding to the East with a high pace, which
pushes people to displacement and prompt Ethiopian refugees to prematurely return.
There are reports that some Amhara civilians who are perceived to be working with
the government forces, or just supporting the government, may risk being attacked by
Fano forces. It has happened in the past with target assassinations of local officials in
various locations. There are reports of government forces attacking civilians, including
by drone strikes. Civilians report being attacked and harassed by both sides if they are
perceived to be supporting the other. This double threat puts a lot of pressure on the
community because they are requested to support and provide logistical assistance to
both sides. Vigilante justice and possibility for people to be arbitrary accused of
supporting either side of the conflict increases in situations like this when there is a
general break down of rule of law and there is no accountability.
The government forces are mostly limited to towns and main roads while Fano forces
use the rural areas as their ground.
The government has been recently working to return IDPs from Amhara to Oromia.
Some IDPs did return, and other have stayed. In the process of trying to return the
IDPs, there are reports of attempts to put pressure on the IDPs to agree to the return
plan. As a result, there are reports of reduction of access to humanitarian assistance to
the IDPs prompting some of them to move onwards to other places. These negative
factors that hinder delivery of humanitarian assistance are further compounded by the
active conflict and drought happening in some parts of the region.
Even though the situation in the Amhara region is ‘worse’ for Amhara people because
of the active conflict, the situation for ethnic Amhara people outside of Amhara, for
example in Addis Ababa, is also ‘not very positive’. They are at risk of arbitrary
detention by the security forces; there are reports of security forces showing up at
night at the houses of ethnic Amhara people conducting searches in their houses.
There are reports about ethnic profiling based on information about where people are
from. Ethnic Amhara people without valid ID-cards encounter problems in Addis
Ababa. There are reports of people being rounded up and placed in detention facilities.
There are similarities between how the conflict in the Tigray region has evolved and
how the conflict in the Amhara region is evolving with regard to treatment of civilians.
If people, of any origin, are not in possession of a valid ID-card, they may encounter
problems and may be a risk of detention. This has happened to refugees who do not
have ID-cards. Even though the current ID-cards do not have ethnicity as a category,
the cards show place of birth, which indicates ethnicity. People without a proper
residence, e.g., day labourers, are also at risk of being interrogated on the streets. In
addition to their documents, people from Amhara are also easily identifiable on their
language, their accent and their names and some cultural traits.
There is a clear gender dimension of the conflict. Women and children face the worst
effects of the war. They are more vulnerable compared to men, and they are exposed
to rape and to other serious violations of their rights, including gender-based violence.
To what extent gender-based violence has been used systematically as a weapon
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should be determined by the relevant human rights organisations. While men are likely
to be more targeted because of their perceived affiliation with the combatants, but
women may also be subjected to attack and harassment.
The situation in the Somali region
26. Since the peace agreement in 2019 and the absorption of the ONLF into the regional
government, the ONLF now participates in the politics of the region, especially under
the current leadership of the region. However, there are still reports stating that the
situation can be tense. A few security incidents have been reported from some towns
as well as a risk of an interference from neighbouring Somalia. The recent bilateral
agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland has not been well received by Somalia,
which also contributes to the tensions. There are reports of Ethiopians who have been
attacked inside Somalia. Overall, the situation can be described as ‘fragile, but calm’.
27. As a part of the 2019-agreement, the Liyu police should be dissolved but it is uncertain
to which extent the Liyu police has been replaced by other special forces or fully
absorbed into the regular forces, or whether they have simply changed the name. It
seems as if the Liyu police has morphed into the police force and the prison guard, etc.
and are active in the fight against the al-Shabaab in the area.
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference (ToR)
1. Security situation
1.1. Amhara region
1.2. Tigray region
1.3. Oromo region
2.
Treatment of
persons of actual or perceived association with
opposition movements,
including ONLF, OLF/OLA, TPLF and Fano
3. Treatment of people of Oromos, Amharas, Tigrayans, residents of Ogaden and ethnic
Somalis
4. Return
4.1.
Conditions upon return
4.2.
Treatment of
persons of actual or perceived association with association with opposition
movements upon return
119