REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

Retsudvalget 2024-25
REU Alm.del Bilag 167
Offentligt

Adoption: 1 December 2023

Confidential

GrecoRC5(2023)10

Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in

central governments (top executive functions) and

law enforcement agencies

FIFTH EVALUATION ROUND

SECOND COMPLIANCE REPORT

DENMARK

Adopted by GRECO

at its 95

Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 27 November-1 December 2023)

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

INTRODUCTION

GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round deals with "Preventing corruption and promoting

integrity in central governments (persons entrusted with top executive functions, PTEF)

and law enforcement agencies (LEA)".

This Second Compliance Report assesses the measures taken by the authorities of

Denmark to implement the recommendations issued in the

Fifth Round Evaluation

Report

on Denmark which was adopted at GRECO's 83

Plenary Meeting (17-21 June

2019) and made public on 4 September 2019, following authorisation by Denmark. The

Fifth Round Compliance Report on Denmark was adopted by GRECO at its 88

Plenary

Meeting (22 September 2021) and made public on 17 December 2021, following

authorisation by Denmark. GRECO noted that further progress was necessary to

demonstrate an acceptable level of compliance with the recommendations and asked

the Head of Delegation of Denmark to provide a report on the progress in implementing

the recommendations.

As required by GRECO's Rules of Procedure

, the authorities of Denmark submitted a

Situation Report on measures taken to implement the recommendations. This report

was received on 20 April 2023 and served as a basis for this Second Compliance Report.

GRECO selected the Slovak Republic (with respect to top executive functions in central

governments) and Iceland (with respect to law enforcement agencies) to appoint

Rapporteurs for the compliance procedure. The Rapporteurs appointed were Ms Radka

MONCO�½OVÁ, on behalf of the Slovak Republic, and Ms Ásthildur VALTÝSDÓTTIR, on

behalf of Iceland. They were assisted by GRECO’s Secretariat in drawing up the Second

Compliance Report.

ANALYSIS

GRECO addressed 14 recommendations to Denmark in its Evaluation Report. In the

Compliance Report, GRECO concluded that recommendations ix and x had been dealt

with in a satisfactory manner, recommendation iii had been partly implemented and

recommendations i, ii, iv, v, vi, vii, viii, xi, xii, xiii and xiv had not been implemented.

Compliance with the 12 outstanding recommendations is dealt with below.

II.

Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive

functions)

Recommendation i

GRECO recommended that an analysis of integrity-related risks involving members of the

government and special advisers be carried out and that on this basis a strategy for the

integrity of persons with top executive functions be developed and implemented.

The Compliance procedure of GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round is governed by its Rules of Procedure, as

amended: Rule 31 revised bis and Rule 32 revised.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

GRECO recalls that recommendation i had not been implemented in the Compliance

Report, as no analysis of integrity-related risks involving members of the government

had been carried out as a basis of a future strategy on these matters. The authorities

had referred to the existence of rules and guidelines on integrity-related matters

applying to ministers and special advisers. However, these measures had already been

assessed in the Evaluation Report and did not correspond to the expectations of a more

holistic approach underlying the recommendation.

The Danish authorities report that there are still no immediate plans to develop and

implement a strategy for the integrity of members of the government. It makes

reference to the information already submitted in the Compliance Report regarding

measures taken to implement the outstanding recommendations. When it comes to

special advisers, the Danish authorities reiterate that several inquiries have already been

carried out, and that lack of compliance with the rules on conflicts of interest,

confidentiality or gifts by ministers and advisers can entail a violation of the Criminal

Code and can therefore lead to sanctions.

GRECO notes that the information provided does not highlight any new measure having

been taken to implement the recommendation. The authorities reiterate that rules and

guidelines exist, the violation of which can lead to sanctions. Several inquiries were

carried out in respect of advisers which led to further awareness activities. Against this

background, the authorities have no plans to carry out an analysis of integrity-related

risks for persons with top executive functions (hereafter: PTEFs). GRECO stresses again

that the Evaluation Report highlighted the need for a greater sensitivity to certain

integrity risks and for more importance to be attached to promoting integrity among

PTEFs.

GRECO concludes that recommendation i remains not implemented.

Recommendation ii

10.

11.

GRECO recommended (i) that a code of conduct for persons with top executive functions

be adopted, complemented with appropriate guidance regarding conflicts of interest

and other integrity-related matters (e.g. gifts, outside activities, third party contacts,

handling of confidential information etc.) and (ii) that such a code be coupled with a

mechanism of supervision and enforcement.

GRECO recalls that recommendation ii had not been implemented in the Compliance

Report. As regards the first part of the recommendation, the authorities had made

reference to a ministerial handbook received by all new ministers, which is updated

regularly and contains relevant regulations regarding governmental work, including all

applicable rules and guidelines on integrity-related matters. A memorandum on

conflicts of interest had been added following the June 2019 general election. The

authorities acknowledged that the handbook does not contain any rules on lobbyists or

employment following termination of their ministerial position, as Denmark does not

have such rules. Ministerial advisers were reported to be fully covered by the Code of

12.

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Conduct for the Public Sector. GRECO had pointed out that these instruments had

already been assessed in the Evaluation Report, except the new memorandum on

conflicts of interest. It had highlighted in that report the benefit of establishing a code

of conduct for members of the government consolidating the rules on integrity and

providing additional guidance, as a complement to the handbook. The additional

memorandum for the most part reiterates existing provisions of the Public

Administration Act, without providing much further guidance, as advocated for in the

Evaluation Report.

13.

Regarding the second part of the recommendation, the authorities had pointed out that

lack of compliance with the rules on conflicts of interest, confidentiality and gifts could

entail a violation of the Criminal Code. For special advisers, the Code of Conduct for the

Public Sector outlines that sanctions in the form of a warning, a reprimand or dismissal

can be imposed for violations of its provisions. In turn, for ministers, a violation of the

rules can in some cases be sanctioned in accordance with section 5 of the Ministerial

Accountability Act. GRECO had stressed the added value of a non-criminal enforcement

mechanism to be foreseen in a code of conduct for PTEFs, which could cover all integrity-

related misconduct that did not rise to the level of a crime, providing for additional

proportionality to the accountability of ministers who have little or none for official

misconduct other than political oversight. Finally, as regards special advisers, while in

the Evaluation Report GRECO considered the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector a

comprehensive document which provided clear guidance, it also concluded that it would

not in all situations be pertinent for special advisers (inter

alia

given the political

neutrality expected of civil servants and the differences in status and recruitment

between civil servants and special advisers). It was therefore considered more

appropriate to have special advisers covered by a special code of conduct for PTEFs.

The Danish authorities reiterate the information already provided in the Compliance

Report as regards both parts of the recommendation. While they acknowledge that the

ministerial handbook does not provide any guidance regarding contacts with lobbyists

or employment following termination, they are of the view that it does provide

adequate guidance on confidentiality, conflicts of interest, bribery and the acceptance

of gifts. In case of violation by ministers of integrity rules, they may be dismissed by the

Prime Minister or subject to a vote of no-confidence by Parliament. Therefore, Denmark

has no current plans to take further measures to implement the recommendation as

regards ministers. As regards special advisers, the authorities reiterate their position

that a code of conduct complemented with appropriate guidance and coupled with a

mechanism of supervision and sanctions already exists.

GRECO takes note of the information provided, which does not bring any new elements

or tangible measures to implement either part of the recommendation. GRECO cannot

but conclude that both parts of the recommendation remain unimplemented.

GRECO concludes that recommendation ii remains not implemented.

14.

15.

16.

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Recommendation iii

17.

GRECO recommended that i) systematic briefing on integrity issues be imparted to

members of the government upon taking up their positions and at certain intervals

thereafter and ii) confidential counselling on integrity issues be established for them.

It is recalled that this recommendation had been partly implemented. GRECO had noted,

as regards the first part, that briefings on integrity issues had been imparted to members

of the government upon taking up their position in recent governments. This was

highlighted as a good practice. However, for this part of the recommendation to be fully

implemented these briefings would need to be repeated at certain intervals thereafter

(notwithstanding the fact that ministers can always contact the Prime-Minister’s Office

at their own initiative). This part of the recommendation was therefore partly

implemented. As regards the second part of the recommendation, GRECO had noted

that ministers are reportedly counselled on a daily basis by their permanent secretary,

their secretariat and Law Divisions. However, in the Evaluation Report, it had found that

these channels to communicate on possible ethical dilemmas should be “more clearly

defined, harmonising practices and consolidating institutional memory”. As this had not

been done, it had assessed this part of the recommendation as not implemented.

The Danish authorities again report no new information. In Denmark’s experience, all

integrity-related rules and guidelines are in general adhered to and that the existing

channels for advice and briefings are sufficient to ensure compliance. Denmark has thus

no current plans to take further steps to implement the recommendation.

GRECO takes note of the absence of new measures taken to give effect to this

recommendation.

GRECO concludes that recommendation iii remains partly implemented.

Recommendation iv

22.

GRECO recommended that, in order to improve public access to information under the

Access to Public Administration Files Act, the scope of the exceptions under the Act be

restricted or further measures be taken to ensure that the exceptions under the act are

applied less frequently in practice.

GRECO recalls that this recommendation had not been implemented. The Danish

authorities had stated in April 2021 an intention to revise the Access to Public

Administration Files Act. Negotiations were on-going to see if a political agreement

could be reached on restricting the use of certain exceptions under the act. GRECO

welcomed this stated intention, but the process was at too early a stage to warrant even

a partial implementation of the recommendation.

The Danish authorities now indicate that in December 2022, the government announced

that it wishes to establish an expert committee to prepare proposals for a new Access

to Public Administration Files Act in order to give the public better opportunities for

18.

19.

20.

21.

23.

24.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

insight into political decision-making processes. Political negotiations on the

establishment of the committee are ongoing.

25.

GRECO welcomes the announced establishment of an expert committee to prepare

proposals for a new Access to Public Administration Files Act. However, again this

process is still at a very early stage. In the absence of other measures reported to ensure

that the exceptions under the current act are applied less frequently in practice, GRECO

can only conclude that the recommendation remains not implemented.

GRECO concludes that recommendation iv remains not implemented.

Recommendation v

27.

GRECO recommended i) introducing rules and guidance on how persons entrusted with

top executive functions engage in contacts with lobbyists and other third parties seeking

to influence governmental processes and decisions; and (ii) increasing the transparency

of contacts and subject matters concerning lobbying of persons entrusted with top

executive functions.

It is recalled that this recommendation had been assessed as not implemented in the

Compliance Report. The Danish authorities had acknowledged that there were no rules

or guidance in place regarding contacts with lobbyists and other third parties seeking to

influence governmental processes and decisions. However, the general rules on

confidentiality, conflicts of interest, bribery and rules regarding acceptance of gifts

apply, including, for special advisers, the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector. GRECO

recalled that it had found in the Evaluation Report that these general rules did not

provide sufficient transparency in respect of the impact of lobbyists and other third

parties (including special interest groups) on government policies and considered it

crucially important to address this issue to uphold public trust in democratic decision-

making processes.

The Danish authorities explain that according to a political agreement on a transparency

scheme for ministers’ expenses and activities, ministers’ participation in official

representative events, representative expense and gifts received must be declared

monthly, as foreseen in chapter 13 of the ministerial handbook. They also point out that

as part of the legislative process, the comments submitted by interest groups on draft

legislation are usually published by the Parliament. The authorities refer again to the

rules on conflicts of interest contained in the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector and

the Public Administration Act. In cases where these provisions do not apply, they are

supplemented by the general fundamental legal principle of impartiality. There are no

current plans to introduce any more specific rules regarding contacts with lobbyists.

GRECO notes that the rules referred to by the authorities on the monthly report of

official events attended by ministers, as well as their representative expenses and gifts

received are of little use in shedding more transparency on meetings of PTEFs with

lobbyists and on subject matters discussed in such meetings. The same can be said of

the publication of comments submitted by third parties on draft legislation. Moreover,

such publication occurs at the stage draft laws are considered by Parliament, later than

26.

28.

29.

30.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

any discussions that may occur at the pre-parliamentary stage of preparations of the

draft laws. As regards the reference to the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector, the

Public Administration Act and the legal principle of impartiality, GRECO has already

stated in the previous reports that these were too general to offer proper guidance to

PTEFs on their contacts with lobbyists and other third parties. It cannot but regret that

the authorities have no plans to remedy this gap.

31.

GRECO concludes that recommendation v remains not implemented.

Recommendation vi

32.

GRECO recommended introducing rules to deal with the employment of persons

entrusted with top executive functions following the termination of their service in the

public sector.

GRECO recalls that this recommendation was not implemented in the previous report.

Reference had been made to 2016 discussions in Parliament to prepare models for rules

regarding revolving doors, but these had not come to fruition and there were no plans

at the time of that report to introduce any rules in this area.

The authorities report that there are still no plans to introduce specific rules regarding

revolving doors. Violation of the duty of confidentiality and bribery are sanctioned under

the Criminal Code, which ensures the safeguarding of confidential information when

moving from the public to the private sector.

GRECO takes note of the absence of new information or measures to give effect to this

recommendation. It already stressed in the Compliance Report that it would be rare for

moves from the public to the private sector to rise to the level of crime.

GRECO concludes that recommendation vi remains not implemented.

Recommendation vii

37.

GRECO recommended (i) enshrining in regulation or legislation an obligation for

members of the government to publicly declare their assets, income and financial

interests; (ii) that quantitative data on income as well as data on assets and significant

liabilities is included in the financial declarations; and (iii) that it be considered to oblige

special advisers to declare their financial interests publicly on a regular basis as well.

It is recalled that this recommendation was assessed as not implemented, in the absence

of any measure taken to give effect to it.

The Danish authorities refer, as they did in the Evaluation Report and the Compliance

Report, to a system in place since 2005, by which all ministers have been required to file

their financial interests on the basis of a standard, which is published. Even if the scheme

is not based on legislation, successive governments have complied with this regime as a

mandatory measure. Thus, Denmark does not find it necessary to take further measures

33.

34.

35.

36.

38.

39.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

to implement these two parts of the recommendation as regards members of the

government.

40.

As regards the third part of the recommendation, the authorities emphasise that special

advisers have a duty to report potential conflicts of interest to the permanent secretary

of their ministry or their manager. Therefore, it is not considered necessary to introduce

new rules regarding special advisers’ financial interests.

GRECO takes note of the information provided, which merely reiterates that already

submitted in the previous reports. It is clear that no measures have been taken to

implement this recommendation, not even to give due consideration to obliging special

advisers to declare their financial interests on a regular basis.

GRECO concludes that recommendation vii remains not implemented.

Recommendation viii

43.

44.

GRECO recommended that declarations submitted by persons entrusted with top

executive functions be subject to substantive control.

GRECO recalls that this recommendation was not implemented in the Compliance

Report. The authorities had stated that even though there is no formal review

mechanism regarding the accuracy of information provided by ministers, the

declarations are published on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office. Consequently,

this information (and any inaccuracies therein) will be subject to scrutiny by Parliament,

the press and the public at large, and ministers bear political responsibility for this

information. They could be dismissed by the Prime Minister or subject to a vote of no-

confidence by Parliament. In view of the fact that in Denmark’s experience, the rules are

in general adhered to, the authorities did not find it necessary to take further measures

to implement the recommendation as regards ministers.

The Danish authorities provide no new information as regards this recommendation and

reiterate that, as the rules regarding declarations by ministers are generally adhered to,

Denmark does not find it necessary to introduce specific review mechanisms regarding

financial declarations.

GRECO can only regret that the Danish authorities have not found it necessary to ensure

that financial declarations by ministers are subject to substantive control.

GRECO concludes that recommendation viii remains not implemented.

41.

42.

45.

46.

47.

GRECO recalls that Bureau 75 established four criteria to be fulfilled to conclude that a “consider-

recommendation” has been implemented, namely 1) pertinence (Has the reflection process carried out in the

country concerned really taken into account GRECO’s underlying concerns?); 2) extent (Were these concerns

examined/discussed in depth, possibly with the involvement of appropriate (expert) institutions/individuals?);

3) legitimacy (Has the decision to act/not to act been taken by an appropriate authority, ideally at political level?);

4) documentation (Has the reflection process and/or its results been properly documented?).

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

Regarding law enforcement agencies

Recommendation xi

48.

49.

GRECO recommended developing a streamlined system for authorisation of secondary

activities within the police, which is coupled with effective follow-up.

GRECO recalls that this recommendation was not implemented in the Compliance

Report. The authorities had explained that a generalised system of reporting secondary

activities would be incompatible with the Civil Servants Act, which does not provide for

a system for employees to report their secondary activities. Employees are already

nevertheless already obligated to provide information to their managers on their

secondary activities, if so requested, and, if in doubt whether the secondary

employment is compatible with employment within the police, must report their

secondary employment. Employees with the security level “secret” or “top secret” are

always required to report their intention to take up secondary activities. The authorities

stressed that it is the experience of the Danish National Police that secondary activities

in the vast majority of cases are unproblematic and that staff members of the police

have a great understanding of when a secondary activity is incompatible with their

profession. If in doubt, employees ask their managers for advice.

The Danish authorities report again that it is the opinion of the National Police that

employment in the police is characterised by a need to report secondary employment

only with a view to a concrete assessment of any potential conflicts of interest. A

reporting duty applies to employees with the security level “secret” or “top secret”.

Other employees must report secondary employment if in doubt about its compatibility

with their police duties. The National Police finds the current reporting system suitable

to filter those secondary activities that adversely impact the exercise of the staff

member’s functions or could entail a real, potential or perceived conflict of interest.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It is apparent that still no measures have

been taken to implement the recommendation. As pointed out in the previous report,

GRECO is not convinced that sufficient information is available to allow for the drawing

of conclusions on the potential for problems or the understanding of the incompatibility

of secondary activities on the part of police staff.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xi remains not implemented.

Recommendation xii

53.

GRECO recommended that a study be conducted concerning employment of staff of the

police after they leave the police and that, in the light of the findings, a policy be adopted

to minimise the risk of possible conflicts of interest in this respect.

GRECO recalls that this recommendation was not implemented. The authorities had

stated that the fact that former staff of the police are hired elsewhere was not

considered an issue. Staff members were said to be well acquainted with the rules on

50.

51.

52.

54.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

confidentiality of the Criminal Code, which continue to apply after leaving the police. A

new survey, as suggested by GRECO, was found not to serve any purpose in the Danish

context, as it would depend on the willingness of former employees to participate. In

view of these elements, the Danish authorities took the view that the initiatives already

in place, such as the implementation of the whistleblower regulations, were more suited

to deal with cases where there are doubts about the impartiality of staff. GRECO

regretted that the matter was dismissed outright, without this being supported by

available data, and was again framed with reference to the Criminal Code,

demonstrating a lack of sensitivity to integrity-related risks which do not rise to the level

of crime.

55.

56.

The Danish authorities do not report any new information in respect of the

recommendation.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xii remains not implemented.

Recommendation xiii

57.

GRECO recommended that the authorities analyse the need for introducing a

requirement for certain officials within the police to declare financial interests on a

regular basis.

It is recalled that this recommendation was not implemented in the Compliance Report.

The authorities had referred to several initiatives to enhance the management of risks

associated with procurement, including the obligation upon procurement officers to

supply goods or services to the Danish police, as well as to register their directorships,

ownerships, joint ownerships (etc.) of companies that could be potential suppliers to

the police. Denmark did not believe that there was a need to analyse whether a further

requirement to declare financial interests would be necessary. GRECO pointed out that

these registration requirements were introduced in response to a scandal involving the

procurement of IT equipment in the police, following an internal police report. However,

a thorough reflection on the benefits of a requirement for certain officials in top

management or particularly vulnerable positions in the police to declare their financial

interests on a regular basis had not taken place.

The Danish authorities refer again to the above-mentioned registration requirements

for procurement officers. They also note that employment in the Danish Police requires

obtaining a security clearance by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (DSIS). DSIS

conducts a security investigation of the applicant. This security examination contains

among other things the applicant’s financial circumstances. Employees in the Danish

Police are required to report significant changes in their financial circumstances. This

process is not set in place specifically as a measure against corruption, but helps to

inform DSIS’ overall assessment of the applicant’s character and financial vulnerability.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. While it assessed positively in the

Evaluation Report the standard vetting of all police officers upon recruitment to the level

58.

59.

60.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

of “confidential”, it had noted that in practice, ten years may elapse before they would

need to be re-vetted at the same security level or to a higher level when moving to a

new position. Moreover, the level of “confidential” does not include a wider check of

the economic situation of the officer in question. GRECO is of the view, therefore, that

the vetting system does not sufficiently capture possible integrity risks linked to the

financial situation of certain police officers. The need for introducing a requirement for

certain police officers to declare their financial interests on a regular basis has still not

been properly analysed.

61.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xiii remains not implemented.

Recommendation xiv

62.

63.

64.

GRECO recommended that measures be taken to raise awareness of staff of the police

of their duty to report corruption-related misconduct within the police service.

GRECO recalls that, in the absence of any measures taken to give effect to the

recommendation, it had considered it not implemented in the Compliance Report.

The Danish authorities report that all employees in the police must comply with Section

10 of the Staff Regulations, which states that the official must conscientiously “comply

with the rules governing his position both in and out of service, worthy of the respect

and trust, as the position requires.” Employees are aware of the process in relation to

turning to their union representative, their immediate manager, the human resources

department or the Independent Police Complaints Authority if they observe corruption-

related misconduct. Students attending the Police Basic Education are introduced to

their obligation to comply with the law in the primary parts of the education. This

includes, among other things, a lesson in which the students discuss and reflect on the

inherent dilemmas of when and how to speak up against a colleague who crosses the

line. The students are also taught how to handle gifts and corruption. The students,

among other things, work with group assignments in which one of the assignments deals

with the receipt of gifts. The assignments are then reviewed in the class where the

students discuss the matter. It is the opinion of the Police College that all police officers

after completing their education have a good understanding of their obligation to

comply with the law and to take action against illegal behaviour in the police.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. The attention given to the duty to report

misconduct during the Police Basic Education is welcome. However, it is important to

keep raising awareness of staff on this issue throughout their career. This sends the

message that misconduct within the police force is taken seriously by police

management and relevant structures at that it will not be tolerated. Such continued

attention is helpful in countering any possible “code of silence” that may develop among

colleagues serving side by side. This would be all the more useful that the above-

mentioned Section 10 of the Staff Regulation does not specifically mention the duty to

report misconduct. As such, it does not appear that any measures have been taken to

implement this recommendation.

65.

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66.

III.

67.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xiv remains not implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the foregoing, GRECO concludes that Denmark has still dealt with in a

satisfactory manner only two of the fourteen recommendations contained in the Fifth

Round Evaluation Report.

Of the remaining recommendations, one remains been partly

implemented and eleven remain not implemented.

More specifically, recommendations ix and x have been dealt with in a satisfactory

manner, recommendation iii has been partly implemented and recommendations i, ii,

iv, v, vi, vii, viii, xi, xii, xiii and xiv have not been implemented.

With respect to top executive functions, no progress has been made on any of the

recommendations. The only positive step is the announced establishment of an expert

committee to prepare proposals for a new Access to Public Administration Files Act.

However, this process is still at a very early stage. The authorities essentially repeat the

information and arguments already assessed by GRECO in the Evaluation and

Compliance Reports. As already highlighted in previous reports, the frequent references

to the provisions of the Criminal Code (e.g. on bribery and confidentiality) confirm a lack

of sensitivity to integrity issues which do not rise to the level of crime. There is sadly no

indication that the gaps in existing rules and policies highlighted in the previous reports

are being addressed. An analysis of integrity-related risks involving members of the

government and special advisers as a basis for a future integrity strategy is still lacking.

There is still no code of conduct for persons with top executive functions (PTEFs). The

transparency of lobbying needs to be increased and rules introduced on how to deal

with the employment of PTEFs following the termination of their public service. More

data must be included in the financial declarations of ministers and these declarations

must be subject to substantive control. In light of the above, GRECO deeply regrets

Denmark’s plainly expressed refusal to implement several recommendations. It can only

urge the Danish authorities to revisit this position and address the concerns underlying

the abovementioned recommendations.

As far as law enforcement agencies (police) is concerned, the situation is the same as in

the previous report. No new measures or information are reported in respect of

improving the system of authorising secondary activities, conducting a study on the

employment of staff once they leave the police, analysing the need for introducing a

requirement for certain officials to declare financial interests and raising the awareness

of staff on their duty to report corruption-related misconduct. GRECO again stresses the

need for the authorities to take determined action in this regard.

In view of the above, GRECO concludes that Denmark is not in sufficient compliance with

the recommendations contained in the Fifth Round Evaluation Report within the

meaning of Rule 31 revised bis, paragraph 10 of the Rules of Procedure. GRECO

therefore decides to apply Rule 32 revised, paragraph 2 (i) and asks the Head of

68.

69.

70.

71.

REU, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 167: Orientering om GRECO (Group of States Agains Corruption), fra justitsministeren

delegation of Denmark to provide a report on the progress in implementing the

outstanding recommendations (i-viii and xi-xiv) by 31 December 2024.

72.

In addition, in accordance with Rule 32 revised, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (ii.b),

GRECO invites the President of the Statutory Committee to send a letter – with a copy

to the Head of delegation of Denmark – to the Permanent Representative of Denmark

to the Council of Europe, drawing attention to the non-compliance with the relevant

recommendations and the need to take determined action with a view to achieving

tangible progress as soon as possible.

Further, in accordance with Rule 32 revised, paragraph 2, subparagraph (iii), GRECO

requests the authorities of Denmark to receive a high-level mission with a view to

reinforcing the importance of complying with the relevant recommendations.

GRECO invites the authorities of Denmark to authorise as soon as possible the

publication of this report, to translate it into the national language and to make the

translation public.

73.

74.