NPA, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 3: NATO PA Policy recommendations 2024

NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2024-25
NPA Alm.del Bilag 3
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POLICY

RECOMMENDATIONS

ADOPTED IN 2024

199 SESA 24 E | 25 November 2024

NPA, Alm.del - 2024-25 - Bilag 3: NATO PA Policy recommendations 2024

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

STANDING WITH UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY

DECLARATION 489

SHAPING NATO FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

DECLARATION 490

BREAKING THE SILENCE AND FIGHTING FOR DIGNITY:

COMBATTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

RESOLUTION 491

STRENGHTENING NATO’S INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENCE

RESOLUTION 492

GALVANISING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE TO SUPPORT ALLIED PROSPERITY AND

SECURITY

RESOLUTION 493

NATO AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: FUTURE-PROOFING THE ALLIANCE AND

SUPPORTING UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY

RESOLUTION 494

HARNESSING OPPORTUNITIES OF THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN

RESOLUTION 495

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STANDING WITH UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY

DECLARATION 489

The Assembly,

Reiterating

its unequivocal condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s

ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine as well as its missile and drone attacks against urban

centres and critical infrastructure, aimed at terrorising the Ukrainian people;

United

and determined to support Ukraine, its democracy, independence, sovereignty and

territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders, as well as its right to self-defence

and self-determination for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win;

Stressing

that Russia bears sole responsibility for triggering the most serious security crisis

on the European continent since the Second World War, threatening the very foundations of the

rules-based international order;

Highlighting

that Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a critical test of the collective resilience

of democracies against the tyranny and brutality of authoritarianism and that by supporting Ukraine,

Allies also protect their own security and shared democratic values;

Convinced

that Russia’s threat to Allies and to global security will remain for the long term

and that Allies must ensure that Ukraine wins,

recognising

that Russia’s aggression would not stop

at Ukraine;

Stressing

that the way democracies step up to respond to Russia’s aggression and long-term

threat will shape the future European and international order for the next generations;

Stressing

that the current efforts in military assistance are not sufficient for Ukraine to win

against Russian aggression and

recognising

that the amount, type and timeliness of military

assistance that is provided to Ukraine has significant battlefield consequences;

Recognising

that Russia can and must suffer strategic defeat in Ukraine;

Commending

the initiatives taken by Allied countries to address the most urgent shortages

experienced by Ukraine;

10.

Determined

that Allies must move beyond incremental,

ad hoc

steps in their support to

Ukraine towards a clearly stated strategy premised on the goal that Ukraine must be provided with

all that it needs, as quickly as possible and for as long as it takes for it to win;

11.

Welcoming

the European Union’s agreement to use the extraordinary revenues stemming

from around 200 billion euros in immobilised Russian assets to directly finances recovery and military

aid to Ukraine;

12.

Highlighting

that NATO Allies account for 99% of all military aid to Ukraine and that since the

start of Russia’s war, the United States has provided Ukraine with over 80 billion dollars in military,

financial and humanitarian aid, while other NATO Allies and partners have provided over 100 billion

dollars;

Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Sofia (Bulgaria) on Monday 27 May 2024.

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13.

Welcoming

the clearly demonstrated solidarity of the EU member states with Ukraine, with

the establishment of a 50 billion euro financial mechanism for Ukraine for a period of 2024-2027;

14.

Applauding

the substantial assistance for Ukraine in the amount of 60.8 billion dollars recently

approved by the United States that demonstrates the powerful U.S. commitment to Ukraine;

15.

Recognising

that nine countries have completed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine;

16.

Stressing

that Allies together represent roughly 50% of the world's total economic and military

might, that aid to Ukraine only represents a tiny fraction of their GDPs and that it is therefore a small

investment compared to the strategic benefits related to Ukraine’s victory;

17.

Expressing

profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery, resilience and

resolve of the people, the democratic institutions and the armed and security forces of Ukraine;

18.

Reaffirming

that it will never recognise any of Russia’s illegal and forcible attempted

annexations of Ukrainian territory;

19.

Convinced

that there can be no lasting peace in Europe without Ukraine as an integral part of

the European and Euro-Atlantic families;

20.

Stressing

that Allies must also continue to step up their support to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and other vulnerable partners, working in close synergy with the

European Union;

21.

Stressing

that Allies need to actively engage third countries to convince them to condemn

Russia and to limit their commercial engagements with Russia,

recognising

that Russia is

conducting imperial and revanchist policies in violation of international law, including the United

Nations (UN) Charter, as highlighted in UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions

ES-11/1 and

ES-11/4, and

underlining

Russia’s role and intent to destroy the international rules-based order;

22.

Denouncing

the military assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian and North Korean

regimes to Russia’s war and those who provide material or other kinds of assistance to Russia;

23.

Saluting

the significant strengthening of NATO’s political and practical support for Ukraine,

particularly through establishing the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) and through the further

development of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) into a multiyear assistance

programme for Ukraine;

24.

Welcoming

the planned establishment of the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre

in Bydgoszcz, Poland, allowing Ukraine to share its lessons from Russia’s war and to learn and train

alongside Allied armed forces;

25.

Stressing

that NATO’s Washington Summit must send a clear signal that Allies will stand with

Ukraine until victory and must take a concrete step forward towards Ukraine’s NATO membership;

26.

Reaffirming

its readiness and determination to support Ukraine’s further democratic

consolidation and reform agenda on the now irreversible path to NATO membership, including

through the special fund to support Ukraine’s democracy;

27.

Recalling

Declarations 474

and

482

and other Assembly Resolutions in support of Ukraine;

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28.

URGES

the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to clearly affirm that their strategic goal is Ukraine’s victory and to urgently step up and

speed up the delivery of the military assistance which Ukraine needs to win;

to set assistance to Ukraine on a sustainable footing and to agree that all Allies must

dedicate the necessary resources for the long term;

to use all available opportunities to provide Ukraine with the required number of air

defence systems, primarily Patriot, to protect civilian objects;

to support Ukraine in its international right to defend itself by lifting some restrictions on

the use of weapons provided by NATO Allies to strike legitimate targets in Russia;

to continue to ensure the fair sharing of the burden among all Allies across all types of

assistance to Ukraine - military, humanitarian, financial and material;

to continue to use the NUC format, to the fullest extent, as a regular platform of

consultation for discussing issues of common security and to continue to expand the

format;

to establish a NATO mission for Ukraine in order to enhance NATO’s role in coordinating

Allied efforts in support of Ukraine, particularly in the Ukraine Defence Contact Group

(the Ramstein process), the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) and the

International Donor Coordination Centre in Wiesbaden;

to agree on an interoperability roadmap to guide Ukraine’s transition to full

interoperability with NATO;

to ramp up Allied defence production for the Alliance’s needs as well as to support

Ukraine, to work with Allied defence industries and with like-minded partners to prioritise

aid to Ukraine over orders from other third countries and to support the urgent

development of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity through direct investments into

Ukraine’s military production;

to support the prompt establishment of the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre

in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and encourage Allies to take a decision on the structure and

funding at the Washington Summit in July;

to recognise that Ukraine has made significant progress towards an invitation to join

NATO;

to redouble efforts to help Ukraine achieve full membership as soon as possible by

accelerating its integration into NATO and make significant and tangible progress on it

at NATO’s Washington Summit;

to fully support Ukraine’s path of democratic reform, including by establishing a Centre

for Democratic Resilience at NATO’s Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing

resources and exchanging best practices;

to encourage more Allies to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine;

to provide ambitious, sustainable, equitable and predictable funding for the multi-year

CAP assistance programme;

to support the ongoing strengthening of the NATO Representation to Ukraine;

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to recognise the Assembly’s essential complementary role in supporting Ukraine’s

democratic institutions and reform process on its path towards membership;

to allow for engagements between the NUC and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on

the parliamentary dimension of the NATO-Ukraine relationship;

to designate a liaison officer in the expanded NATO Representation to Ukraine to work

with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to support capacity-building efforts for the

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

to continue to support the establishment of a special tribunal for prosecuting Russia’s

crime of aggression and all efforts to ensure accountability for all of Russia’s crimes;

to back the ramping up and effective enforcement of sanctions against Russia and its

accomplices;

to prepare a long-term strategy and proactive measures of modern containment of

Russia in order to counter the Russian threat in all its dimensions, actively defend

democracy and the rules-based international order, and boost Allied and Alliance

resilience to and contest Russia’s aggressive political, military and hybrid destabilising

activities, affecting the Alliance and Allies’ security;

to support Ukraine’s efforts to promote President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula for a

comprehensive, just and sustainable peace;

to step up support for Ukraine’s reconstruction and urgently develop legal frameworks to

allow for the use of frozen Russian assets;

to advocate among partner and affiliated countries, as well as, more broadly, among

countries of the “Global South” the need to support Ukraine, and to condemn Russia, in

line with relevant resolutions of the UNGA.

_______________

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SHAPING NATO FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS AT THE WASHINGTON

SUMMIT

DECLARATION 490

The Assembly,

Convinced

that NATO is and remains the cornerstone and indispensable guarantor of Europe

and North America’s security;

Underlining

that NATO has succeeded throughout all shifts in the security environment

because it is defined not by what it stands against but by what it stands for – the defence of

democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;

Stressing

that, for 75 years, the unique commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article

5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has prevented an armed attack from any state actors against the

Alliance;

Recalling

that Allies only invoked Article 5 once, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist

attacks against the United States;

Certain

that Allies today face a new era of strategic competition and their greatest test for

collective security and defence in a generation;

Stressing

therefore the need to contain Russia across all domains;

Underscoring

that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to Allied

security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; terrorism in all its forms and

manifestations remains the most direct asymmetric threat to the Alliance and is increasingly

supported by the Russian and Iranian regimes; and the stated ambitions and coercive policies of the

People’s Republic of China pose multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests, security

and values;

Saluting

the profound transformation at 360 degrees of the NATO Alliance initiated at the

Madrid Summit and accelerated at the Vilnius Summit;

Expressing

deep concern about ongoing Russian hybrid activities on Allied territory, including

sabotage, acts of violence, cyber and electronic interference, disinformation campaigns and other

hybrid operations;

10.

Stressing

that the Washington Summit must shape NATO for the next generations and

demonstrate continued rock-solid unity and determination as well as a clear commitment by all Allies

to take on a fair share of the responsibility for Allied security;

11.

Welcoming

Sweden’s accession; reaffirming its full support for Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia

and Herzegovina’s aspiration to join NATO; underlining its consistent support to NATO’s Open Door

Policy; and fully convinced of the value NATO’s partnerships add to Allied security;

12.

Firmly committed

to supporting Georgia’s democracy, independence, sovereignty and

territorial integrity, and European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but

deeply concerned

about the

law on the so-called “transparency of foreign influence”, which is a step backwards for the country’s

Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Sofia (Bulgaria) on Monday 27 May 2024.

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democratic consolidation and runs counter to its NATO as well as EU aspirations, and

urging

the

Georgian authorities to withdrawn the law before it further damages Georgian democracy;

13.

Recalling

the 30

anniversary of the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the

anniversary of the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative;

14.

Determined

to continue to play its part to strengthen NATO and the unique transatlantic bond;

15.

URGES

the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit

meeting in Washington:

to make clear that NATO is prepared and will defend every inch of Allied territory at all

times under Article 5;

to take further measures to implement the renewed Defence Investment Pledge agreed

at the Vilnius Summit with all its elements, including:

Deliver without delay on the enduring commitment and concrete plans to reach at

least 2% of GDP annually on defence spending, invest at least 20% of defence

budgets on major equipment and recognise that, in certain cases, substantially

higher spending will be necessary to satisfy Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;

Ensure investment in R&D is appropriately funded.

ii.

to take concrete steps to reduce and eliminate obstacles to defence trade and investment

among Allies;

to reaffirm the commitment to collective defence at 360 degrees against threats from all

directions; to NATO’s three core tasks – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and

management as well as cooperative security; and to increasing national and collective

resilience;

to fully recognise the threat that autocracies pose to democracies, as laid out in NATO’s

2022 Strategic Concept, and operationalise NATO’s commitment to defending shared

democratic values by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO

Headquarters;

to urgently step up and speed up the delivery of the military assistance which Ukraine

needs to win and to ensure Russia’s defeat in Ukraine;

to develop a strategy regarding NATO support for Ukraine against aggression by the

Russian Federation at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and to help hasten

Ukraine’s victory against Russia’s invasion forces;

to send a clear signal that Allies will stand with Ukraine until victory and take concrete

steps forward on its now irreversible path to NATO membership, in line with the

Assembly’s recommendations in Declaration 033 SC 24 E rev.2;

to reaffirm the fact that NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three

core tasks of the Alliance and is integral to the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to

deterrence and defence, and by taking into account the Vilnius Summit decisions, to

agree on additional taskings in this regard;

to make concrete, long-term commitments for military assistance to Ukraine until it

reaches victory and beyond;

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to prepare a long-term strategy and proactive measures of modern containment of

Russia in order to counter the Russian threat in all its dimensions, actively defend

democracy and the rules-based international order, and boost Allied and Alliance

resilience to and contest Russia’s aggressive political, military and hybrid destabilising

activities, affecting the Alliance and Allies’ security;

to promptly complete the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO’s enhanced

deterrence and defence posture, including by resourcing NATO’s new defence plans and

making these plans fully executable by all criteria;

to ensure sustainable implementation of the rotational air defence model on the Eastern

Flank;

to make full use of the Defence Production Action Plan and other NATO instruments,

including for joint procurement, to urgently strengthen Allied defence industries;

to agree on a pledge that all Allies must fairly share the burden and responsibility for the

Alliance’s shared security;

to take the unique and essential partnership with the European Union to the next level

with a view to reinforcing its complementarity with NATO;

to strengthen relations with strategic partners in NATO’s southern neighbourhood,

beginning with those belonging to the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul

Cooperation Initiative, building on the report by the Secretary General’s independent

Group of Experts, and to step up cooperation with partners at risk and like-minded

partners across the globe, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as agree on a

relevant roadmap;

to recognise, in the Summit communiqué, the Assembly’s indispensable role and

contribution as a link between the parliaments and people of the Alliance and NATO.

_______________

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BREAKING THE SILENCE AND FIGHTING FOR DIGNITY:

COMBATTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

RESOLUTION 491*

The Assembly,

Deploring

the persistence of widespread and systematic sexual violence in armed conflicts

around the world and the impunity from which most perpetrators continue to benefit;

Strongly condemning

the deliberate use of sexual violence in armed conflict, by some state

and non-state actors, as a tactic and a weapon of war against civilian populations and military

personnel;

Recalling

that women and girls are disproportionately targeted by conflict-related sexual

violence, while

acknowledging

that men and boys are also affected by such violence;

Underscoring

that sexual violence in the context of conflict is prohibited under international

law and that it can, under certain conditions, amount to a crime against humanity, a war crime, and

a constituent act of genocide; and

considering

that conflict-related sexual violence in all its forms

is a blatant violation of the principles upon which NATO and Allied societies are founded;

Emphasising

that conflict-related sexual violence is deeply rooted in harmful gender norms

and structural inequalities between men and women and, therefore,

highlighting

the necessity of

progressing towards gender equality;

Stressing

the importance of prioritising the needs of victims and survivors, who often endure

profound physical and psychological scars, as well as societal stigmatisation and ostracism;

Reiterating

that all parties involved in armed conflicts must cease and prevent all forms of

sexual violence and take specific measures to protect against such violence;

Emphasising

that conflict-related sexual violence, by undermining social stability, fuelling

hostilities, and hampering post-war recovery and peacebuilding efforts, undermines Allied and

international security;

Reaffirming

the importance of fully implementing UNSC resolution 1325 on Women, Peace

and Security (WPS), as well as the nine subsequent UNSC resolutions on WPS, particularly 1820

and 1888, which all recognise the need to combat conflict-related sexual violence;

10.

Recognising

that the empowerment of women and girls is a core principle of the WPS agenda

and a key component in the realisation of durable peace and security;

11.

Saluting

the adoption in recent years by NATO and the Allies of policies and measures to

combat conflict-related sexual violence and to advance gender equality more broadly, including the

WPS Policy approved at the Washington Summit;

12.

Recognising

the urgent need for concerted efforts in bilateral and multilateral formats,

including in NATO, to combat conflict-related sexual violence;

Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on

Monday 25 November 2024

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13.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and, where

appropriate, NATO bodies:

to implement in an integrated and systemic manner national and collective policies

addressing conflict-related sexual violence;

to provide appropriate and long-term financial support for these efforts;

to intensify their efforts to combat structural gender inequalities that contribute to

conflict-related sexual violence;

to ensure that national armed forces are adequately equipped and trained to recognise

and prevent conflict-related sexual violence, protect civilians from such violence and

assist victims and survivors;

to continue raising awareness and denouncing the use of sexual violence as a weapon

of war and a driver of conflict, particularly in key multilateral fora;

to use their diplomatic influence to impress upon armed actors their moral and legal

obligations to refrain from committing sexual violence and protect civilians from such

violence;

to ensure justice and uphold accountability by providing national and international judicial

institutions with sufficient political, financial and technical means to investigate and

prosecute conflict-related sexual violence cases, and to advocate for compensation to

victims and survivors for the harm suffered;

to adopt targeted sanctions against those found responsible for carrying out, ordering or

enabling conflict-related sexual violence;

to invest in the collection of accurate, reliable and disaggregated data on conflict-related

sexual violence, as well as in broader research efforts, and develop specific monitoring

and evaluation mechanisms of Allied efforts to counter conflict-related sexual violence in

order to maximise their impact, accountability and transparency;

to contribute to the prevention of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings by

designing and implementing community education and awareness campaigns and early

warning and intervention systems, as well as addressing systemic inequalities;

to increase the representation of women as well as victims and survivors in security,

peacekeeping, law enforcement, and military roles to foster trust in institutions, empower

survivors and victims as agents of change, and contribute to durable peace;

to provide rapid, effective and comprehensive responses that meet the needs of victims

and survivors, ensuring access to protection, justice as well as support services and

reintegration programmes, and to systematically include victims and survivors in the

design and implementation of such efforts;

to increase financial, technical and political support for international and civil society

organisations combatting conflict-related sexual violence and helping victims and

survivors;

to maintain and deepen support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s use of sexual

violence in its war of aggression against Ukraine and to assist victims and survivors and

Ukrainian courts in seeking redress for these atrocities;

to cooperate more closely, in accordance with relevant NATO policies and procedures,

with partner countries, relevant international institutions and civil society organisations

active in the fight against conflict-related sexual violence and the implementation of the

WPS Agenda;

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p. to establish a Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO to serve as a platform for

sharing resources and exchanging best practices among Allies and their partners in

defending democracy and the rules-based international order, including the prohibition of

conflict-related sexual violence.

_______________

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STRENGHTENING NATO’S INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENCE

RESOLUTION 492*

The Assembly,

Recognising

that Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against

Ukraine, which constituted the expansion of Russia’s armed aggression that has been ongoing since

February of 2014, has fundamentally changed Euro-Atlantic security and forced NATO Allies to

adjust to a more dangerous security environment and acquire the capabilities necessary to defend

their populations and territory;

Alarmed

by Russia’s rapid missile arsenal modernisation and expansion, including new

dual-capable ballistic, cruise and aeroballistic missiles designed specifically to hold NATO

populations and territories at risk, and the growth of its production capacity to sustain its reckless,

brutal and illegal air campaigns against Ukrainian cities, civilian populations, and armed forces;

Very concerned

about significant advancements and investments by Russia, China, and

North Korea in their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, including a Russian nuclear weapon in

development designed to target space infrastructure, which, coupled with its reckless nuclear

rhetoric and announced nuclear missile deployments to its ally, Belarus, represents a clear effort to

shift the global balance of strategic power;

Recognising

that Russia’s use of nuclear rhetoric and manipulation through threats and

escalation tactics aims to destabilise Allied unity, and

reaffirming

that such actions must not deter

the Alliance from providing sustained and robust support to Ukraine;

Clear-eyed

about the growing forms of opportunistic military cooperation among autocratic

regimes in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang, which are particularly focused on the

exchange of missile and drone capabilities and know-how, and

alarmed

these forms of cooperation

are extending to non-state actors, further escalating existing conflicts and conventional and nuclear

risks across the globe;

Alert

to the central role advanced missiles and drones already play in a growing number of

conflicts in the Alliance’s near neighbourhood, particularly in Russia’s massive and cruel war of

aggression against Ukraine, involving weapons from Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea and North Korean troops, and now using a strategic ballistic missile that could be a carrier of

weapons of mass destruction;

Vigilant

to the reality this growing complexity of air threats presents a clear and pressing

challenge to NATO Allies’ existing air and missile defence systems and forces partners to use their

air defence forces to shoot down Russian military targets over their territory;

Troubled

by Russia’s repeated violation of arms control frameworks and counter-proliferation

initiatives, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the New Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (New START), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and

understanding

that the continued erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation

frameworks and norms undermines strategic stability;

Commending

Ukraine for its heroic territorial defence against Russia’s air campaign despite

its significant disadvantages in troops and materiel;

Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on

Monday 25 November 2024

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10.

Urging

Allies to learn from Ukraine’s capable defence against Russia’s complex air war,

especially the dispersal and manoeuvrability of its air defences and innovative use of unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and as direct-attack

munitions;

11.

Recalling

that Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is fundamental to the Alliance’s core

task of deterrence and defence and, therefore, vital to collective defence, in order to avoid losing

NATO’s competitive edge to actors who seek to create international instability and challenge the

rules-based international order;

12.

Noting

that underinvestment in Allied air and missile defence capabilities after the end of the

Cold War has undermined Allied security in the current, unstable and unpredictable security

environment;

13.

Acknowledging

that Allies must now make significant investments in NATO IAMD in order to

meet the new baseline for defence and deterrence agreed upon at the Madrid and Vilnius Summits;

14.

Welcoming

the operationalisation of the missile defence base in Redzikowo, Poland, as a

significant milestone in strengthening NATO’s IAMD capabilities and enhancing the Alliance’s

deterrence and defence posture on its eastern flank;

15.

Welcoming

multilateral initiatives to strengthen and modernise Allied IAMD, notably the

European Sky Shield Initiative, as well as the development and acquisitions of air and missile

defence systems by individual Allies;

16.

Also welcoming

Allies’ stated intention at the Washington Summit to update NATO’s IAMD

policy, based on a 360-degree approach to increase readiness, responsiveness, and integration

through new initiatives, such as the IAMD Rotational Model across the Euro-Atlantic area with an

initial focus on the eastern flank;

17.

Stressing

that all air and missile defence initiatives should meet capability targets specified

by the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and that new assets should be interoperable with

other NATO systems;

18.

Encouraging

Allies to invest in and become early adopters of advanced missile defence

technologies, including directed energy weapons, space-based sensors, and more effective

interceptors;

19.

Emphasising

that a stronger and more capable NATO IAMD architecture means not only

more launchers, interceptors, radars and sensors, but also a more integrated NATO command and

control (C2) network to link national assets into a coherent Alliance-wide system;

20.

Affirming

that a modernised, 360-degree NATO IAMD is a strategic imperative given the

deterioration of the Alliance’s security environment;

21.

Understanding

fully that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in

deterrence; it cannot substitute them;

22.

Underscoring

that NATO must remain united in its response to Russia’s aggression and

continue to support Ukraine while demonstrating that manipulation, threats, and coercion will not

deter the Alliance from upholding international law and defending democratic values;

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23.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single

points of failure across the Alliance’s eastern flank, where many layers of air defences

are either ageing, incompatible, legacy Soviet equipment, or non-existent;

to upgrade their air defences to NATO standards and ensure they are interoperable and

integrated within a wider IAMD architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile

threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;

to build on the commitments made in Madrid to implement NATO’s air and missile

defence as a crucial prerequisite to meeting the standards of performance outlined at

the Vilnius Summit, and to maintain the balance of defensive and offensive systems that

underpin NATO’s deterrence and defence posture;

to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP as a baseline, with at least 20% allocated

to investments and new equipment purchases, to increase Allies’ capabilities and meet

the deterrence and defence standards to which they have pledged, and to recognise

that, in certain cases, substantially higher spending will be necessary to satisfy Article 3

of the Washington Treaty;

to stimulate production across Allies’ industrial bases by sending consistent demand

signals, making necessary investments, and lowering barriers to defence cooperation

between Allies;

to adapt the Alliance’s air and missile defence architecture to the state and non-state

threats it faces, particularly to the clear and present challenge of Russia;

to consider whether the Alliance’s ballistic missile mission should be adapted to handle

the realities of the current security environment;

to ensure that Allies have lower-tier capabilities to address a range of non-strategic air

and missile threats;

to learn from Ukraine’s heroic self-defence, particularly the critical role of dispersed and

mobile air defence systems, and incorporate these lessons into Allied missile defence

practice;

to advance innovation in UAVs as both battlefield managers, direct attack munitions, and

in offensive and defensive roles;

to hone their ability to exercise IAMD missions, increase their participation in relevant

NATO IAMD entities, including the NATO IAMD Centre of Excellence in Crete, and

ensure these missions’ seamless integration into the Alliance’s broader deterrence and

defence posture.

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GALVANISING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE TO SUPPORT ALLIED

PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

RESOLUTION 493*

The Assembly,

Stressing

that maintaining NATO and Allied technological superiority is paramount in a

security environment characterised by renewed strategic competition between democratic Allies

and autocratic powers;

Recognising

that both Allied and competitor country military systems increasingly rely on

commercially developed technologies;

Determined

to step up support for technological innovation and adoption across the Alliance,

while redoubling efforts to secure supply chains and limit competitor countries’ access to the most

militarily sensitive technologies without resorting to blanket protectionism;

Concerned

that China’s growing economic and technological capabilities coupled with its

capacity to acquire sensitive Western technologies with military applications through legal and

illegal means pose a serious strategic challenge to Allies and partners;

Noting

China’s stated ambition to achieve a dominant position in key technology markets,

many of which have military applications, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI),

aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced

rail, electric vehicles, and other electrical equipment;

Understanding

that AI is a force multiplier that will strongly condition future markets and

battlefields, and that it too has become a source of mounting trade and geostrategic tension;

Welcoming

the determination of Allied countries and partners to fully leverage the positive

potential of AI while developing regulations and standards to address the potential dangers posed

by AI and to thwart those intent on deploying AI as a weapon against the democratic world;

Supporting

the establishment of tough and comprehensive sanctions regimes, including

technology access restrictions, aiming to undermine Russia’s capacity to sustain its war of

aggression against Ukraine;

Applauding

the significant investments that North America, Europe, and partner countries

like Japan and the Republic of Korea have made in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure that

critical commercial and defence industries will have assured access to these essential industrial

components into the future;

10.

Recognising

that at least 92% of the world’s most advanced (below ten nanometers)

semiconductor manufacturing capacity is currently located in Taiwan;

11.

Endorsing

western commercial and government efforts to strengthen defences against

intellectual property theft;

12.

Recognising

that the evolving nature of military equipment development demands new,

technically and politically challenging export control strategies;

Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on

Monday 25 November 2024

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13.

Condemning

Russia’s evasion of export controls and sanctions to acquire restricted western

technologies that it incorporates into weapons systems used in its illegal and unjustified war in

Ukraine and similar efforts carried out by Iran and North Korea;

14.

Acknowledging

that the resale of restricted technologies to countries where technology

restrictions do not apply or are not rigorously enforced facilitates the diversion of these technologies

to strategic competitors;

15.

Concerned,

moreover, that western governments have under-resourced export controls and

sanction enforcement efforts, which effectively lowers the risks and costs to those engaged in

circumventing those restrictions;

16.

Cognisant

that effective technology export control regimes require coalitions among Allies

and partners collectively working to ensure comprehensive restrictions that restrict rivals’ access to

militarily sensitive technologies;

17.

Welcoming

the AUKUS partnership engaging Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United

States, which represents an important advance in technology sharing and defence industrial

cooperation among two key NATO Allies and an Indo-Pacific partner, and which could become a

model for expanded technological collaboration among democracies in the future, as well as the

Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom, which

similarly engages two NATO members and an Indo-Pacific partner and is open for other countries

to join;

18.

Observing

that NATO Allies must maintain well-funded innovation programmes in

partnership with the private sector and universities to better exploit the commercial and strategic

advantages of technology;

19.

Encouraged

that NATO recognises shared technology development as a critical force

multiplier which enhances interoperability and efficiency while fostering critical defence industrial

links among Allies;

20.

Endorsing

NATO’s recognition of the challenge that strategic competitors pose in this domain

and particularly their shared efforts to thwart Allied technology export restrictions;

21.

Supporting

efforts like the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap, which defines

shared objectives to guide NATO’s technology cooperation with that important partner and outlines

key workstreams under four delivery areas: innovation policy enablers, innovation ecosystem

engagement, pilot activities and lessons learned;

22.

Recognising

that a continuous dialogue between national defence ministries, agencies and

scientific and defence industrial communities can facilitate efforts to integrate emerging

technologies into national force structures;

23.

Applauding

the launch and ongoing build-up of NATO’s DIANA programme which

underscores the Alliance’s commitment to technology innovation;

24.

Convinced

that NATO Allies require a comprehensive framework for securing supply chains

and regulating trade in sensitive technologies with competitor nations and should coordinate their

approaches in this domain;

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25.

URGES

the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to dedicate more political attention and resources to counter the risks of technology

leakages through trade, targeted investments in western firms undertaken by strategic

competitors, smuggling, and espionage;

to recognise the full scope of China’s technological and strategic ambitions and its

tendency to engage in technology theft to achieve these and to invest substantial

resources towards these ends in collaborating with other strategic competitors;

to collaborate more closely with partners in the Indo-Pacific in research and

development, academic exchanges, and efforts to secure supply chains for the critical

inputs needed to expand production of key technologies;

to enforce existing and secondary sanctions and export restrictions relating to military

technology and increase cooperation relating to the development of appropriate

measures to increase the economic resiliency of the Alliance in the face of strategic

competition from such countries as Russia and China;

to coordinate export controls on emerging dual-use technologies and strategic

intellectual property, including through relevant international forums, so that strategic

competitors are prevented from accessing critical technology that could be used to

threaten the security of Allies and partners;

to strike workable balances between security considerations and open trading principles,

particularly among like-minded states, that avoid overly stringent controls and outright

protectionism that would hinder innovation, undermine competitiveness, and unduly

raise prices;

to bolster transparency about the nature of technology-driven security threats so that

companies are better placed to factor in national security considerations when making

trade and investment decisions;

to ensure that proper rules and enforcement measures are in place so that inward and

outward investments are not leading to the proliferation of sensitive technologies;

to strengthen public-private-university partnerships to drive technology development;

to support Ukrainian efforts to develop and access key technologies it can use to defend

its sovereignty and protect its people;

to support NATO efforts to work with public and private sector partners, academic and

civil society, in accordance with relevant NATO policies and procedures, to develop and

adopt new technologies, establish international principles of responsible use, and

maintain NATO’s technological edge through innovation;

to allocate public funding needed to underwrite technological advances with military

applications, in line with the renewed commitment to defence and investment spending

adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit and reiterated at the 2024 Washington Summit.

_______________

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NATO AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: FUTURE-PROOFING THE

ALLIANCE AND SUPPORTING UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY

RESOLUTION 494*

The Assembly,

Recognising

NATO’s unparalleled role over the past 75 years as the guarantor of Europe and

North America’s security and the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, its

ability to evolve and adapt in response to changing security challenges, and

reaffirming

its

unwavering commitment to shared democratic values, including individual liberty, human rights, and

the rule of law, which form the foundation of the Alliance’s mission, while

acknowledging

that the

defence of these values is integral to NATO’s role in safeguarding security and stability in the

Euro-Atlantic area;

Applauding

the unity, resolve, and ironclad commitment to uphold the unique transatlantic

bond and the ironclad commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article 5 demonstrated by Allies

at the 2024 Washington Summit in addressing the most significant security challenges since the

Cold War;

Welcoming

the transformative decisions taken at the recent Summits to radically enhance

NATO’s defence and deterrence posture, including bolstering forward defences, adopting new

defence plans, reinvigorating the defence industry and streamlining NATO’s command and control

arrangements;

Acknowledging

the increased defence spending by Allies, with 23 nations meeting or

exceeding the 2% of GDP target by 2024, while

stressing

that the security environment requires all

Allies to step up for the long term;

Condemning

in the strongest terms Russia’s ongoing illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war

of aggression against Ukraine, continued illegal temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory, its war

crimes, and its reckless nuclear sabre-rattling, which pose a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic stability;

Reaffirming

unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity within

internationally recognised borders, and its irreversible path toward full NATO membership, and

saluting

the Washington Summit decisions to make the support of Ukraine more predictable,

coherent and institutionalised, including by establishing the NATO Security Assistance and Training

for Ukraine (NSATU), taking forward the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis,

Training, and Education Centre (JATEC), and announcing a Pledge of Long-Term Security

Assistance for Ukraine with the intention of a minimum baseline funding of EUR 40 billion within the

next year;

Strongly condemning

the abuse by the Russian Federation of its membership in international

organisations, in particular Interpol, to persecute political opponents as well as Ukrainian military

personnel, politicians and public figures;

Stressing

that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, that this

threat will persist into the long term, and

welcoming

the Allies’ decision at the Washington Summit

to develop recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia;

Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70

Annual

Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November

2024

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Reiterating

that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, remains the most direct

asymmetric threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;

10.

Clear-eyed

about the multiple and systemic challenges the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

poses to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values as well as to the rules-based international order;

and

deploring

the PRC’s role as decisive enabler of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as

well as the growing collusion between autocratic regimes in Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and

Belarus;

11.

Condemning

in the strongest possible terms the increasing military support to Russia by North

Korea, whose deployment of troops against Ukraine and supply of missiles and munitions pose a

serious threat to the peace of Europe and the Indo-Pacific area, and constitute a further violation of

international law;

12.

Reaffirming

the importance of NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, which addresses

challenges from all directions, including the southern flank, where instability, trafficking, terrorism

and militant groups continue to pose threats to Allied interests; and

welcoming

the adoption, at the

Washington Summit, of an action plan for NATO’s stronger, more strategic and result-oriented

approach toward the southern neighbourhood;

13.

Highlighting

the value of NATO’s partnerships, including growing cooperation with

like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold the rules-based international order;

14.

Underlining

its consistent support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and for the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia

and Bosnia and Herzegovina;

15.

Recognising

the importance of NATO’s strategic partnership with the European Union,

welcoming

for the first time the nomination of a Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space,

and

calling

for reinforced collaboration, particularly in areas such as military mobility, resilience, and

countering hybrid threats, while ensuring full involvement of non-EU Allies in EU defence initiatives;

16.

Recognising

that emerging threats and challenges, including disinformation, cyberattacks,

disruptive technologies and the militarisation of space, require NATO to adapt its strategic

capabilities and maintain its technological edge;

17.

Acknowledging

the security implications of climate change and the importance of ensuring

NATO remains committed to becoming the leading international organisation for understanding and

adapting to the impacts of climate change and extreme weather on security, while also

welcoming

the recent establishment of the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, which

seeks to foster civilian and military cooperation on these issues;

18.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to demonstrate their ironclad commitment to NATO’s collective defence by ensuring the

full implementation of decisions taken at the Washington Summit and previous Summits

to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence posture and enhance readiness, including the

ability to deter by denial through further strengthening our forward defences and

investing in a robust, layered air defence shield across the Alliance’s eastern flank;

to develop, by the next Summit in the Netherlands, a common strategic approach to

Russia, focusing on fully preparing the Alliance to contain and counter Russia’s hostile

actions across the board, whether conventional, hybrid or nuclear, while supporting

efforts to degrade Moscow’s ability to conduct aggressive wars, including by ensuring

the full implementation of sanctions by all Allies as well as by recognising Ukraine’s right

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to strike legitimate military objects on the territory of the aggressor, in line with the self-

defence principle of Article 51 of the UN Charter;

to ensure that all Allies meet at least the 2% GDP defence spending target without delay

and to consider further raising the target in order to ensure full implementation of NATO’s

new defence plans, while delivering on the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge

and encouraging joint procurement initiatives;

to sustain and increase military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine,

ensuring the timely delivery of munitions and advanced weapon systems, including air

defence systems, long-range precision weapons, and multi-role fighter aircraft, while

delivering on the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine and exploiting

the full potential of NSATU, the NATO-Ukraine Council, the Comprehensive Assistance

Package (CAP), the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, the

NATO Representation in Ukraine, and other instruments of support, and to maintain this

support to Ukraine for as long as it faces the Russian aggression or the threat thereof in

the future;

to support Ukraine’s efforts, as expressed in Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan,

to achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and to remain faithful to the principle of

“nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine”;

to step up political and practical efforts to help Ukraine receive an invitation and become

the 33

member of NATO as soon as possible;

to strengthen the sanctions framework against the Russian Federation and the DPRK in

order to increase the price for their cooperation in the aggression against Ukraine, and

provide Ukraine with all the means, including medium-range missiles, to defend itself

and deter further aggression;

to continue supporting national and international initiatives to hold Russian forces and

officials accountable for violations of human rights, war crimes, the crime of aggression

and other breaches of international law;

to operationalise Allies’ commitment to democracy, freedom, and the rule of law,

including by establishing without delay a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO

Headquarters;

to continue efforts to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist

groups, including by fully implementing the Action Plan on Enhancing NATO’s Role in

the International Community’s Fight Against Terrorism, updated at the Washington

Summit, and supporting the work of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Coordinator

for Counter-Terrorism;

to use political and economic leverages to deter China from supporting Russia’s war

effort and to continue boosting Allied resilience to China’s systemic challenge to Euro-

Atlantic security, including by reducing strategic dependencies, investing in cyber

defences and working with partners of the Alliance, particularly the EU and like-minded

Indo-Pacific partners, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue

with Beijing;

to expand NATO’s engagement with southern partners, building on the action plan

adopted at the Washington Summit, including shoring up Allied security on southern

borders while seeking mutually beneficial cooperation and exploring synergies with

southern neighbours and other relevant actors, including the European Union, as well as

enhancing the role of the recently appointed NATO Secretary General’s Special

Representative for the southern neighbourhood to make NATO’s contribution to regional

stability more effective and making better use of the Strategic Direction-South HUB in

Naples;

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to remain committed to security and stability in the Western Balkans, to support reforms

and reconciliation across the region, and to enhance assistance to regional partners in

countering malign influences of authoritarian countries;

to continue reassuring Allies and partners in the Black Sea region by strengthening

relevant multi-national battlegroups, preserving freedom of navigation, and supporting

Georgia’s and the Republic of Moldova’s efforts to push back against Russian malign

activities;

to advance NATO’s technological edge and deliver on NATO’s recent defence innovation

initiatives, capitalising on the strengths of free societies in advancing innovation, while

ensuring integration of innovative technologies across NATO’s defence architecture;

to ensure that NATO addresses climate-related risks as a core element of its defence

planning, including by stimulating innovation to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and

critical raw materials and enhance our autonomy in this regard, while enhancing Allies’

resilience to climate-related disasters and supporting global efforts to mitigate climate

instability;

to continue integrating NATO’s Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Human Security

agendas across all core tasks, including by delivering on the updated WPS Policy.

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HARNESSING OPPORTUNITIES OF THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN

RESOLUTION 495*

The Assembly,

Recognising

that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will transform the ways wars are fought and that

leadership in AI is crucial for maintaining NATO’s technological edge and ensuring the responsible

use of AI in the military domain;

Acknowledging

that the integration of AI into military systems will revolutionise warfare

through, for example, advancements in decision-making support, the deployment of autonomous

systems and the augmentation and adaptation of soldiers’ roles;

Reaffirming

the need to adopt an international convention governing the use of AI in lethal

autonomous weapons systems;

Recognising

the plethora of technical, operational, legal and ethical challenges that the

implementation of AI may bring to future armed conflicts and the potential for AI in warfare to create

concerns and mistrust among the wider public;

Observing

that the pace of innovation and demand for rapid adaptation of AI by armed forces

pose challenges for civilian oversight and regulatory processes, and that most international

regulatory and government efforts do not apply to national defence and the military domain;

Welcoming

the Alliance’s revised AI Strategy and

reaffirming

the Principles of Responsible

Use of Artificial Intelligence in Defence;

Applauding

NATO's efforts to foster an innovative AI ecosystem through the NATO Innovation

Fund, its investments in promising start-ups, and the DIANA accelerator program, which emphasises

AI as a cross-cutting enabling technology;

Strongly supporting

the efforts and work of other NATO bodies, such as the NATO Data and

AI Review Board, the NATO Science and Technology Organization, and the NATO Communications

and Information Agency, in ensuring that the Alliance can reap the rewards whilst avoiding the pitfalls

associated with AI;

Welcoming

key efforts by national governments and international organisations to regulate

and govern the development and use of AI, all aimed at creating frameworks for the ethical and

democratic use of AI;

10.

Cautioning

that external actors, such as the People’s Republic of China and the Russian

Federation, are ramping up efforts in this technological area to strengthen their armed forces with

fewer democratic and ethical constraints than Allies;

Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the

Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on

Monday 25 November 2024

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11.

Observing

that the People’s Republic of China and Russia may not abide by internationally

launched initiatives towards the ethical and responsible use of AI in the military domain, reflected in

the fact that the People’s Republic of China has not endorsed the Responsible AI in the Military

Domain (REAIM) Blueprint for Action despite attending the Summit in Seoul, Republic of South

Korea;

12.

Affirming

the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, a

core component of NATO’s deterrence and defence capabilities;

13.

URGES

member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to advance joint efforts on AI in the civilian and military domains to ensure that NATO

maintains its technological edge and its armed forces can leverage the technology’s

benefits whilst being cognisant of the operational, ethical, and legal challenges

associated with the adoption of AI;

to continue developing and enforcing joint operational and tactical standards to

strengthen collective defence and address future interoperability challenges, including

misaligned data, data sovereignty issues, and system integration gaps;

to invest in fostering an innovative AI ecosystem that enables NATO to leverage

commercial advancements for Allied forces and implement cross-functional risk

assessments to apply civilian dual-use solutions in the military;

to actively raise public awareness of AI’s role in the armed forces to build trust and

legitimacy, and prevent mistrust and negative impacts on democracy and human rights

by ensuring ethical use that upholds NATO’s democratic values;

to work towards a proactive and coherent strategic framework and activities across

NATO bodies and member countries, enabling governance to keep pace with technical

developments and innovation and ensuring that ethical and legal guidelines are

effectively implemented on the ground;

to ensure that all Allies build a minimum level of AI adaptation for future conflicts and

consider how smaller Allies could contribute to standardisation and integration;

to build on existing approaches to regulate AI in the military domain and strive for a

balance between military considerations and political priorities in the incorporation of AI

in the armed forces enabling NATO to enhance its operational effectiveness while

upholding democratic principles;

to foster ethical oversight by involving military, civilian, and regulatory representatives

in integrating dual-use solutions, leveraging private sector expertise to minimise biases,

promote workforce diversity, and prioritise funding for start-ups that align with NATO’s

ethical and legal principles;

to ensure that cooperation with the EU and other partners in this field includes a

structured dialogue, so that the key AI documents of both institutions remain aligned,

particularly regarding ethical standards;

to continue to strongly support the development of inclusive and universal norms and

standards for the ethical, legal, and responsible use of AI in the military domain.

_______________