UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2023-24
UUI Alm.del Bilag 118
Offentligt

COUNTRY OF ORIGION INFORMATION (COI)

FFM REPORT

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2023-24

UUI Alm.del - Bilag 118

Offentligt

JUNE 2024

Iranian Kurds

in the

Kurdistan

Region of Iraq

us.dk

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey

of all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other

country of origin informa on available on the topic.

The report at hand does not include any policy recommenda ons. The informa on

does not necessarily reﬂect the opinion of the Danish Immigra on Service.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determina on or merit of any

par cular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be

regarded as indica ve of a par cular legal posi on.

The Danish Immigration Service

Farimagsvej 51A

4700 Næstved

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

us.dk

June 2024

The publica on can be downloaded for free at us.dk

The Danish Immigra on Service’s publica ons can be quoted with clear source

reference.

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Executive summary

Iranian Kurds have long had a presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); they have arrived

con nuously in small numbers since the 1980’s. As of March 2024, they number around 8,500

registered individuals. Many Iranian Kurds are members of the Iranian Kurdish opposi on

par es, either because they share the same ideology or by pursuit of safety. Their op ons for

residency depend on whether they are aﬃliated with a party and their mode of entry.

Iranian Kurds, who have entered the KRI legally, can acquire the Iqama residence permit by

presen ng a passport, paying a fee of approximately 800 USD, and ﬁnding a sponsor, an Iraqi

ci zen who can support the Iranian Kurd during his stay in the KRI. Iranian Kurds, who have

entered the KRI illegally without passports, can apply for a humanitarian or poli cal residence

permit, but are required to register as asylum-seekers with the UNHCR and receive a UNHCR

cer ﬁcate prior to submi ng the applica on to local authori es. The residence permits are

valid up to 12 months. Permanent residence permits do not exist in the KRI.

In most cases, Iranian Kurds receive a poli cal residence permit, as many are members or

supporters of Iranian Kurdish poli cal par es. The relevant poli cal party is required to issue a

sponsor le er for the applica on process, and the applicant must achieve a security clearance

through the KRG security service, Asayish. Residency procedures vary between Erbil and Dohuk,

where the Kurdistan Kurdish Democra c Party (KDP) is in control, and Sulaimania, where

Patrio c Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is in control. In general, the Kurdistan Regional Government

(KRG) lives up to the principle of non-refoulement.

The residence permit grants access to employment in the private sector, rental housing,

healthcare, and educa onal possibili es including high school. For housing, a further security

clearance is required along with a sponsor le er from the speciﬁc neighbourhood’s Mukhtar.

Iranian Kurds do not receive the right to vote and run for oﬃce, and in prac ce it almost

impossible for Iranian Kurds to acquire Iraqi ci zenship. Both the employment possibili es and

housing op ons are in general aﬀected by the economic crisis in the region following

longstanding poli cal conﬂicts between the KRI and federal government of Iraq.

The Iranian Kurdish opposi on par es PDKI, Komala, and PAK are residing in KRI, while the

sources diﬀered to what extent these par es have been disarmed. Another Iranian Kurdish

opposi on party, PJAK, is placed in the border area between KRI and Iran.

PDKI and Komala have been evacuated from the border areas, and possibly disarmed, following

a security agreement between Iraq and Iran. Iran conducts covert ac vi es and persecutes

Iranian Kurds in the KRI through assassina ons, abduc on a empts and both physical and

digital harassment. Assassina ons have been conducted through shoo ngs, missile strikes,

drone a acks and improvised explosive devices. Target proﬁles have included vocal members of

Iranian Kurdish par es, peshmergas, ac vists and journalists, who comment on Iranian internal

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

aﬀairs and foreign ac vi es. There is also an ongoing military conﬂict between Türkiye’s armed

forces and the PKK in mountainous areas of Duhok and Erbil governorates.

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Table of contents

Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 1

Introduction and methodology ............................................................................................. 5

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 7

Map of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) ................................................................................... 8

Background.......................................................................................................................... 9

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq ................................................................................................. 9

Iranian Kurdish parties in KRI ............................................................................................... 10

1. Entry, residency and citizenship ...................................................................................... 12

1.1. Requirements for entry at airport and land border points .............................................. 12

1.1.1.

1.2.

30 day visa ........................................................................................................... 12

Residence permits ....................................................................................................... 12

1.2.1. Residence permit – legal entry (Iqama) ..................................................................... 13

1.2.2. Refugee status – illegal entry ..................................................................................... 13

1.3.

1.4.

1.5.

Registration of Iranian Kurds by local authorities ....................................................... 16

Access to citizenship in practice .................................................................................. 16

Prevalence of deportation to Iran ............................................................................... 17

2. Socio-economic and political rights connected to residence permit in KRI ........................ 19

2.1. Housing ............................................................................................................................. 19

2.1.1. Housing for individuals with a residence permit ....................................................... 19

2.1.2. Housing for individuals without a residence permit.................................................. 20

2.1.3. Al-Tash ....................................................................................................................... 20

2.2. Education .......................................................................................................................... 21

2.3. Employment...................................................................................................................... 21

2.4. Healthcare services ........................................................................................................... 22

2.5. Food, water and electricity ............................................................................................... 24

2.6. Right to vote and run for office ........................................................................................ 24

3. Security in KRI ................................................................................................................ 25

3.1. Development of the general security situation in KRI since 2022 .................................... 25

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

3.1.1 Iran-Iraq Border Security Agreement ......................................................................... 25

3.1.2. Evacuation and Relocation of Iranian Kurdish armed parties ................................... 25

3.2. Foreign Armed Actors ....................................................................................................... 27

3.2.1. Iranian persecution of Iranian Kurds within KRI ........................................................ 27

3.2.2 Türkiye’s military campaign against PKK .................................................................... 29

3.3 Non-State Armed Actors (PKK and ISIS)............................................................................. 30

3.4 Security incidents and the extent and type of casualties .................................................. 30

3.5 Freedom of Movement within KRI .................................................................................... 31

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 33

Annex 1: Interviewed sources............................................................................................. 39

Wladimir van Wilgenburg ........................................................................................................ 39

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar....................................................................................................... 43

An International Organisation in Iraq ...................................................................................... 47

A local Human Rights Organisation ......................................................................................... 49

A local Human Rights NGO ...................................................................................................... 55

An International Humanitarian Organisation .......................................................................... 59

A local NGO providing legal assistance .................................................................................... 63

Directorate of Residence ......................................................................................................... 67

An International Organisation ................................................................................................. 71

Department of Foreign Relations (DFR), Didar Farhad Head of legal office in DFR, Hardi Head

of authentication office in DFR ................................................................................................ 76

Directorate of Passport............................................................................................................ 77

Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................. 79

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Introduction and methodology

The report focuses on Iranian Kurds in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), speciﬁcally access to

KRI, residence permit, ci zenship, socio-economic and poli cal rights connected to a residence

permit as well as the security situa on in the region.

The report is the product of a mission to Erbil on 2 to 7 March 2024, conducted by the Country

of Origin Informa on Division from the Danish Immigra on Service (DIS), the Danish Na onal

ID Centre (NIDC) and Norwegian Landinfo.

The purpose of the report is to provide updated background informa on for the processing of

asylum cases in Denmark.

The mission’s terms of reference (ToR) was formulated in coopera on with the NIDC and the

Danish Return Agency (DRA). In this process, the Centre for Asylum, DIS, and the Danish

Refugee Appeals Board have been involved in order to acquire their contribu ons to the ToR.

The sources had none or very li le informa on on some issues in the ToR: Access for Iranian

Kurds arriving to KRI from abroad; foreigners’ access to Iraqi ID card and to ci zenship in Iraq.

The ToR is included in

Annex 2.

The EUAA COI Report Methodology has been applied in the wri ng process.

The report is

based on a synthesis of informa on obtained from oral sources complemented by wri en

sources.

In the process of compiling this report, the delega on orally interviewed 11 sources in total.

These sources comprised of local KRG authori es (Directorate of Residence, Directorate of

Passport, Department of Foreign Aﬀairs), NGOs, interna onal organisa ons as well as an expert

and a scholar. These sources were selected based on their exper se, ﬁeld of work, merit,

experience or, in the case of local authori es, their area of responsibility.

All sources were granted the possibility of being quoted anonymously as not to jeopardise their

work condi ons and personal security in the KRI. All but the local authori es and one expert

source chose to be quoted anonymously.

The delega on requested a mee ng with the Directorate of Na onality and Civil Status as well

as with the airport authori es; however, the requests were not met. Due to security concerns

the delega on did not travel from Erbil to Sulaimania to meet with sources there.

The sources consulted were informed about the purpose of the mission and that the

informa on they provided would be included in a public report.

The minutes from the mee ngs were forwarded to all sources but the Directorate of Residence

and the Department of Foreign Aﬀairs who at the mee ng accepted the use of the informa on

EUAA,

EUAA Country of Origin Informa on (COI) Report Methodology,

February 2023,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

given in a public report. All other sources except the Directorate of Passport gave their approval

and comments to the dra ed minutes. The Directorate of Passport was given numerous

reminders and were informed that the minutes would be used in the report.

The approved interview notes can be found under

Annex 1: Interviewed sources.

Some mee ngs with the sources were conducted in English without the use of an interpreter,

however, the mee ngs with two local NGOs, an Iranian Kurdish scholar, and the KRG authori es

were partly conducted in Kurdish language with the use of a Kurdish interpreter.

For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the mee ng

minutes in Annex 1 have been given consecu ve numbers, which are used in the report when

referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes. The inten on hereby is to make it

easier to ﬁnd the exact place of a statement in the mee ng minutes.

This report was peer-reviewed by the Norwegian Landinfo, as they visited the KRI as part of the

mission’s delega on.

The research and edi ng of the report were ﬁnalised on 1 May 2024. The report is available on

the websites of DIS (us.dk) and NIDC (nidc.dk), thus available to all stakeholders in the refugee

status determina on process as well as to the public.

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Abbreviations

HRP

IDP

IQD

IRGC

ISIS

KDP

KRG

KRI

MEK

NGO

PAK

PDKI

PJAK

PKK

PRP

PUK

UNHCR

USD

Humanitarian Residence Permit

Internally displaced person

Iraqi Dinars

Iranian Revolu onary Guards Corps

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Kurdistan Democra c Party

Kurdistan Regional Government

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Peoples Mujahedin Organisa on of Iran

Non-Governmental Organisa on

Kurdistan Freedom Party

Democra c Party of Iranian Kurdistan

Kurdistan Free Life Party

Kurdistan Workers Party

Poli cal Residence Permit

Patrio c Union of Kurdistan

United Na ons High Commissioner for Refugees

Unites States Dollars

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Map of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Source: UNHCR Iraq,

Opera onal Context - KRI Situa on - UNHCR and People of Concern

Presence May 2024,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Background

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq

In 1992, the KRI was established following the Gulf war.

The region has been ruled by two Iraqi

Kurdish par es; the Kurdistan Democra c Party (KDP), which is led by the Barzani family, and

the Patrio c Union of Kurdistan (PUK),

which splintered from the KDP in the 1970s,

led by the

Talabani family.

From 1994, the two Iraqi Kurdish fac ons engaged in civil war un l the United

States brokered a peace agreement in 1998.

This led to a power-sharing agreement between

the two par es.

From then on, KDP controlled Erbil and Duhok Governorates, while PUK

controlled Sulaimania, a geographical division which s ll exists today. In each governorate the

controlling party oﬃcials are responsible for se ng policy. The ministries and administra ve

ins tu ons run by these par es cons tute the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

The KRG and KRI were oﬃcially recognised by the post-Saddam Iraqi cons tu on of 2005.

As a

part of the American-driven recons tu on of Iraq, the KRG relinquished their demands for

independence in return for special rights provided by the 2005 cons tu on. Amongst these

special rights, the federal Iraqi government would send the KRG’s share of the Iraqi na onal

budget to the region’s na onal bank, from where local authori es would distribute salaries to

public employees.

Circumstances changed following ISIS’s military campaign in 2014, where their forces reached

Samara and Baquba ci es approximately 50 km north of Baghdad.

Kurdish president Barzani

declared his inten on to hold a referendum on KRI independence due to Iraq being “eﬀec vely

par oned”. Kurdish forces took control of oilﬁelds in Kirkuk, and began independently

expor ng oil.

Baghdad responded to these developments by reducing salary payment to KRI,

The Kurdish Project,

Kurdish History,

n.d.

url

London School of Economics Middle East Centre (LSEMEC), ‘The

Iraqi Kurds’ Destruc ve Inﬁgh ng:

Causes and Consequences’

by Bekir Aydogan, 15 April 2020,

url;

Washington Ins tute,

The Rise and Fall

of Kurdish Power in Iraq,

spring 2023,

url

Foreign Policy,

Iraqi Kurdistan’s House of Cards Is Collapsing,

22 March 2023,

url

London School of Economics Middle East Centre (LSEMEC),

‘The Iraqi Kurds’ Destruc ve Inﬁgh ng:

Causes and Consequences’

by Bekir Aydogan, 15 April 2020,

url;

Washington Ins tute,

The Rise and Fall

of Kurdish Power in Iraq,

spring 2023,

url

Council on Foreign Rela ons,

1920 – 2022 The Kurds’ Long Struggle with Statelessness,

n.d.,,

url

Federa on of American Scien st,

Transcript: Albright, Talabani, Barzani Remarks, 9/27/98,

September 1998,

url

Foreign Policy,

Iraqi Kurdistan’s House of Cards Is Collapsing,

22 March 2023,

url

BBC,

Iraqi Kurdistan Proﬁle, 25 April 2018,

url

Wilson Center,

Baghdad’s Centraliza on Push: Two Court Rulings Undercut Kurdish Autonomy and

Washington’s Role in Iraq,

25 March 2024,

url

The Guardian,

Iraq Crisis: US considers air assault on Isis as ﬁreﬁghts reach Samara,

13 June 2014,

url

BBC,

Iraqi Kurdistan Proﬁle, 25 April 2018,

url

Wilson Center,

Baghdad’s Centraliza on Push: Two Court Rulings Undercut Kurdish Autonomy and

Washington’s Role in Iraq,

25 March 2024,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

and from 2014 onwards only paid a small share of the total amounts, leading to economic crisis

in the KRI.

In 2017, Iraqi federal forces recaptured the oilﬁelds,

and in 2023 managed to

cease KRG oil exports. Baghdad’s pursuit of poli cal re-centralisa on con nued following the

Kurdish vote for independence at the referendum in 2017, and in February 2024, the Iraqi

Supreme Court revoked the KRG’s authority to distribute salaries, nullifying Kurdistan’s

economic autonomy.

Iranian Kurdish parties in KRI

Following the Iranian revolu on in 1979, the Kurdish Iranian par es Democra c Party of Iranian

Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala waged an armed struggle against the Iranian government for

control of the Kurdish areas in north-west Iran. They retreated to northern Iraq during the early

1980s due to military pressure from Iranian forces. They have maintained their bases in Iraq

since, and the par es con nued their clandes ne ac vi es within Iran from their bases in exile

in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. However, the par es ceased their military ac vi es in the

mid-1990s.

In 2015, PDKI and KDP-I re-established their bases in the border areas,

and in 2016 declared

their resolve to resume the armed struggle. This led to armed clashes between Iranian security

forces and PDKI, KDP-I, PAK and PJAK.

KDP-I split from PDKI in 2006 to create their own party

but reuniﬁed with PDKI in 2022.

From 2016 to 2018, ﬁgh ng intensiﬁed, and in 2018 the

Iranian Revolu onary Guards Corps (IRGC) struck PDKI bases in KRI with missiles. Following

these developments, the scale of the ﬁgh ng diminished.

Iranian pressure and a acks on Iranian Kurdish par es intensiﬁed once more following the

mass-protests that erupted in Iran following the death of a young Kurdish woman, Mahsa (Jina)

Amini, during custody of Iran’s morality police in 2022.

Following her death, the Iranian

Kurdish par es called for a general strike, leading the Iranian authori es to accuse them of

inci ng unrest in Kurdistan. Even though the protests following Mahsa (Jina) Amini’s death

London School of Economics,

The Collateral Damage of the KRI’s Economic Policy,

17 April 2018,

url

BBC,

Iraqi Kurdistan Proﬁle, 25 April 2018,

url

Wilson Center,

Baghdad’s Centraliza on Push: Two Court Rulings Undercut Kurdish Autonomy and

Washington’s Role in Iraq,

25 March 2024,

url

Landinfo,

Iran: Iransk-kurdiske par er med baser I Nord-Irak – Endret situasjon høsten 2023,

December 2023,

url,

p. 1

Landinfo,

Respons Iran: Økt kurdist militærak vitet i Iran, 13 February 2017,

url,

p. 11

Comba ng Terrorism Center,

Iranian Kurdish Mili as: Terrorist-Insurgents, Ethno Freedom Fighters, or

Knights on the Regional Chessboard?, May 2017, Vol. 10. Issue 5,

url;

Landinfo,

Respons Iran: Økt kurdist

militærak vitet i Iran, 13

February 2017,

url,

p. 3, 7-8

Kurdistan24,

Iranian Kurdish par es unite a er 16 years split,

22 August 2022,

h ps://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/29285-Iranian-Kurdish-par es-unite-a er-16-years-split

[insert

link in browser]

Landinfo,

Iran: Iransk-kurdiske par er med baser I Nord-Irak – Endret situasjon høsten 2023,

December 2023,

url, p. 1

Washington Ins tute,

Iran’s Pressure Campaign on Iranian Kurds Con nues,

13 September 2023,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

were characterised as mul -ethnic

, the Iranian government framed the protests as rooted in

Kurdish separa sm.

This narra ve led to Iranian a acks targe ng Iranian Kurdish par es

based in the KRI.

Following the protests in Iran, the KRI based Iranian Kurdish par es PDKI,

Komala and PAK were a acked by Iran in 2022 and 2023.

Landinfo,

Iran: Iransk-kurdiske par er med baser I Nord-Irak – Endret situasjon høsten 2023,

December 2023,

url

Washington Ins tute,

Iranian Protests and A acks on KRI: An a empt to Deﬂect from Domes c

Turmoil,

21 November 2022,

url

Washington Ins tute,

Iranian Protests and A acks on KRI: An a empt to Deﬂect from Domes c

Turmoil,

21 November 2022,

url;

Badawi, Tamer, Carnegie Endowment for Interna onal Peace,

Iran’s

Security Anxiety in Iraqi Kurdistan,

8 November 2022,

url

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 4

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

1. Entry, residency and citizenship

1.1. Requirements for entry at airport and land border points

According to the KRG E-visa portal, foreigners can enter the territory of the Kurdistan Region of

Iraq (KRI) through border-control points holding a valid passport, entry visa or residence

permit. In case a foreigner arrives in KRI without a valid iden ty document or visa, or if they are

refused a visa, they cannot enter the KRI and must return to their country of origin or the

country from which they arrived, unless the aim is to seek asylum.

(See sec on

Refugee status

– illegal entry)

1.1.1. 30 day visa

At any border-control point to the KRI, ci zens from 53 countries, including Iranian ci zens,

have recently been granted the ability to enter the Kurdistan Region without a pre-arranged

visa by presen ng a passport of at least 6 months validity.

The applica on for a 30 day visa

can be submi ed online as well as at the border entry point, including the airport.

The fee for

a 30 day visa is 72.26 USD.

The Directorate of Residence manages extensions of visas. A visa can be extended for 30 days,

three mes. As such, a person entering KRI can stay legally for four months in total without

leaving the country, if they extend their visa. In this case the person gets a stamp in the

passport and not a residence permit. It is not a requirement to leave the country between the

extensions of visa. The fee for extending the visa is 40 USD.

1.2. Residence permits

There are two types of residence permits for foreign na onals in KRI: residence based on legal

entry and residence based on illegal entry. Both types of residence permits can be renewed.

The KRG authority responsible for issuing residence permits is the Directorate of Residence,

under the KRG Ministry of Interior.

In KRI, there are Iranian Kurds living without being registered. However, the sources did not

know the numbers.

KRG E-visa Portal, Travel to Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 2024,

url

GOV KRG, Kurdistan Region of Iraq,

Visa-Free Entry to Kurdistan Region for Ci zens of 53 Na ons,

February 2024,

url;

Rudaw,

KRG provides visa on arrival for ci zens of 53 countries,

20 February 2024,

url;

E-Visa Portal, KRG,

Passport Expira on,

url

Directorate of Residence: 22

KRG,

Representa on in the US, 2023,

url

Directorate of Residence: 3

Directorate of Residence: 6

Directorate of Residence: 1-5

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 3; A local Human Rights NGO: 23; An Interna onal Organisa on: 32

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

1.2.1. Residence permit – legal entry (Iqama

)

Upon legal entry to KRI, an applicant presen ng a passport can apply for a residence permit.

Other documents than a passport are not needed to prove iden ty.

The residence permit

gives the right to stay as well as to work in the private sector.

The legal entry residence permit

costs 780-800 USD (1,175,000 IQD) for ﬁrst me issuance.

For this type of residence permit, the applicant is required to have a sponsor. The sponsor must

be an Iraqi ci zen, who is willing to support the applicant while staying in the KRI. O en the

sponsor is the employer of the applicant.

There is no requirement for the type of job

undertaken by the applicant; however, the employer must have a registered business and must

obtain a security clearance.

It is a requirement to pass a blood test to start the case handling process. The blood sample will

be tested for HIV and diﬀerent types of Hepa s. If the blood test is not passed, a residence

permit will in most cases not be issued. If the blood test is Hepa s posi ve, depending on the

type of Hepa s, a residence permit can in some cases s ll be issued.

The applica on for the residence permit can be submi ed online, but due to the blood test

requirement, it is not possible to have a residence permit issued from abroad.

The residence permit is valid for 6 or 12 months. The only excep on is a residence permit

obtained by marriage to an Iraqi ci zen. This type of residence permit can be valid for a

maximum of three years. There is no permanent residence permit.

1.2.2. Refugee status – illegal entry

Asylum seekers and refugees, who entered KRI illegally i.e. without a valid passport, can apply

for legal stay at the Directorate of Residence.

These individuals can be issued a humanitarian

(HRP) or a poli cal residence permit (PRP).

A requirement for this is a UNHCR cer ﬁcate, as

the UNHCR is responsible for the registra on of the asylum seekers.

Iqama: the legal residence and working permit (Directorate of Residence: 1)

Directorate of Residence: 10; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 21

Directorate of Residence: 1, 11, 15, 17, 18; A local Human Rights Organisa on: 23

Directorate of Residence: 25

Directorate of Residence: 11, 15; A local Human Rights Organisa on: 23

Directorate of Residence: 18

Directorate of Residence: 13-14

Directorate of Residence: 12, 15

Directorate of Residence: 21

An Interna onal Organisa on: 4, 16; UNHCR,

Residency and Freedom of Movement,

n.d.,

url

An Interna onal Organisa on: 3

UNHCR, Registra on with UNHCR, n.d.,

url;

Directorate of Residence: 30-31; An Interna onal

Organisa on: 8

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Both PRP and HRP require renewal

a er one year.

The PRP is mostly issued to Iranian

refugees, while the HRP is issued to Syrian refugees.

Since the report at hand is focusing on

Iranian Kurds, only the process of issuing PRP is addressed. For informa on on HRP, please refer

Annex 1.

Having rela ves in KRI is not a requirement for obtaining PRP and HRP.

Previous stay in the KRI is not an obstacle for obtaining a residence permit as such; however, if

an applicant has previously overstayed and then le KRI without obtaining an exit permit, it

might present a challenge for the security clearance.

The process of issuance is diﬀerent in the three governorates of the KRI: Erbil, Dohuk and

Sulaimania.

For Dohuk Governorate, informa on on refugee status for Iranian Kurds could not

be found within the deadline of the report.

1.2.2.1. The process of PRP in Erbil Governorate

The majority of the Iranian Kurds who enter KRI without a passport are poli cally ac ve

members or supporters of poli cal par es. In order for them to be granted a PRP, they need to

present a support le er from the Iranian Kurdish opposi on party with which they are aﬃliated

(KDPI, Komala etc.). The next step is the blood test and then the security clearance. The

security clearance must be issued by the General Asayish (main headquarters of Asayish in

Erbil).

An Iranian Kurd will not pass the security clearance, if they have preciously engaged in

illegal ac vi es such as terrorism, drugs or have pending court cases.

The Directorate of

Residence stated in 2019 that members of the armed forces of the Iranian Kurdish par es are

not given residence permits.

More recent informa on could not be found. Some mes the

applicant is not informed of the reason why they have not passed the security clearance.

An interna onal humanitarian organisa on stated that Iranian Kurds who entered KRI illegally

and who are not members of any of the Iranian Kurdish opposi on par es cannot obtain a

poli cal residence permit, nor can they apply for an iqama residence permit. What they can do

is apply for a UNHCR cer ﬁcate, which might help them with housing and at security checks

Directorate of Residence: 38

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 15

Directorate of Residence: 37

Directorate of Residence: 39

An Interna onal Organisa on: 17

An Interna onal Organisa on: 6; UNHCR, Residency and Freedom of Movement, n.d.,

url

Directorate of Residence: 35; UNHCR,

Residency and Freedom of Movement,

n.d.,

url,

An Interna onal

Humanitarian Organisa on: 13, An Interna onal Organisa on: 9-13

Directorate of Residence: 35

DIS,

Iranian Kurds Consequences of poli cal ac vi es in Iran and KRI, February 2020,

KRG, Ministry of

Immigra on and Displacement, Directorate of Residency, Erbil Province Mee ng with Brigadier General

Yadgar A. Faraj Erbil, 27 October 2019: 150,

url

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 17

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

while crossing checkpoints.

However, this informa on could not be corroborated by other

sources. For more elaborate informa on on freedom of movement,

see sec on 3.6.

Having obtained the UNHCR cer ﬁcate, an applicant is also requested to present the following

documents to the KRG authori es: ID document or passport (in absence of documenta on, the

applica on can s ll be processed), proof of residence issued by the local mukthar (government

appointed community leader) and as already men oned, the applicant must also pass a blood

test, receive a security and clearance and a party ID.

The process can take one month, if the

requirements are fulﬁlled.

Currently, registration by UNHCR is a required step to obtain legal residence document issued

by the government.

An international humanitarian NGO noted that the above mentioned

procedure is applicable whether or not the person is registered with UNHCR.

For Erbil

Governorate, UNHCR’s website does not mention registration with UNHCR as a requirement

for being issued a PRP. However, in Sulaimania, Governorate registration with UNHCR is a

requirement.

Children below the age of 18 will not be issued a separate residence permit. The name of the

child will be listed in the mother’s residence permit. The child’s birth cer ﬁcate from either Iran

or Iraq is required as documenta on.

1.2.2.2. The process of PRP in Sulaimania Governorate

According to UNHCR, foreigners holding a valid UNHCR cer ﬁcate, any iden ty document

(Na onality ID, Civil ID), and a sponsorship, can obtain residence permits by applying at the

Sulaimania Residency Department’s Refugee Unit with those documents. Furthermore, a blood

test is required as well as a clearance by the local Asayish, who will request a valid address from

the applicant, and the local Mukhtar must conﬁrm the applicant’s address through a le er. The

Residency Department issues a one-year renewable residence permit a er obtaining both the

results of the blood test and the security clearance by Asayish. In addi on, UNHCR states that

Iranian Kurdish asylum-seekers are required to bring a sponsorship le er from a Kurdish

poli cal party. The issued residence permit will be valid for 6 months.

However, an NGO providing legal assistance to Iranian Kurdish refugees in Sulaimania

commented that in prac ce during the last ﬁve years it has become increasingly diﬃcult to

obtain PRP in Sulaimania. The source assessed that 80 percent of Iranian Kurds are facing

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 18

An Interna onal Organisa on: 9-11, 13; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 13

An Interna onal Organisa on: 13

An Interna onal Organisa on: 8

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 13

UNHCR,

Residency and Freedom of Movement,

n.d.,

url

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 16

UNHCR,

Residency and Freedom of Movement,

n.d.,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

obstacles in obtaining PRP. Iranian Kurds with poli cal background are no longer asked by the

KRG authori es in Sulaimania to provide a support le er that conﬁrms their support or

membership of one of the Iranian Kurdish poli cal par es. This used to be one of the

condi ons to start the process to acquire the refugee permit, once the Asayish approved

them.

Due to the pressure by the Iranian government on the KRG, the Iranian Kurdish poli cal

par es no longer have the inﬂuence they used to have on ma ers related to their members.

The NGO had observed that in some cases applicants were told by the authori es in Sulaimania

that they could not issue a permit to them and instead the applicants travelled to Erbil to

submit an applica on. However, the applicants were not necessarily issued a permit in Erbil.

Furthermore, the NGO stated that there is no possibility for appeal if an applica on for

PRP/HRP is rejected,.

1.3. Registration of Iranian Kurds by local authorities

The Directorate of Residence maintains both a digital and a physical database which stores

applica ons for residence in KRI.

The database contains informa on on the applicants’ origin

and prior stays in KRI, etc. It is part of the Directorate of Residence’s procedure to check the

databases for informa on, when a person applies for residence and when a residence permit is

issued.

The online database was established in 2020, whereas the paper database dates back to

2003/2005. The paper database is in the process of being digitalised.

Since the delega on did not get to meet with the Directorate of Na onality and Civil Status, no

further informa on can be provided on this subject.

1.4. Access to citizenship in practice

Iraqi na onality law no. six of 2006 outlines how foreigners can obtain Iraqi ci zenship.

It is

limited to certain categories and for all of them legal entry to the country is a prerequisite.

is the sole discre on of the Federal Iraqi Government to issue ci zenship. The KRG authori es

do not have the authority to issue ci zenship.

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 19-20

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 26

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 25

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 24

Directorate of Residence: 23

Directorate of Residence: 23-24

Directorate of Residence: 23-34

An Interna onal Organisa on: 46; Iraqi Na onality Law, Law 26 of 2006, 7 March 2006,

url

An Interna onal Organisa on: 46; Na onality Law, Law 26 of 2006, 7 March 2006, Ar cle 6b,

url

An Interna onal Organisa on: 48; Directorate of Residence: 41; A local NGO providing legal assistance:

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

According to the nationality law, ten years consecutive legal stay is a requirement to obtain

citizenship in Iraq. If a non-Iraqi citizen marries an Iraqi citizen, this requirement is reduced to

five consecutive years.

In practice, an NGO observed that sometimes, when an Iranian

Kurdish individual, who is married to an Iraqi citizen, applies for Iraqi citizenship, the Iraqi

authorities send the applicant back to Iran to interrupt the consecutive stay, which provides

the authorities with a reason for not granting citizenship.

There are other requirements, and even if an Iranian refugee fulﬁls them all, an applica on for

ci zenship can be rejected.

According to an Iranian Kurdish scholar it is not possible for

Iranian Kurds in KRI to obtain Iraqi ci zenship.

The sources pointed to the reason being that

there are poli cal concerns regarding demographic change as stated in the cons tu on.

In limited cases, some Iranian Kurds managed to obtain Iraqi ci zenship via marriage to an Iraqi

ci zen. However, this is not a systema c or open legal channel for all Iranian Kurds.

1.5. Prevalence of deportation to Iran

An Interna onal Organisa on noted that the KRI authori es live up to principles of non-

refoulement in general, although, it can depend on a person’s case and proﬁle. There are some

individuals that the KRI authori es may be more prone to deport.

The source did not

elaborate on who this might be.

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on noted that they did not see examples of

deporta on to Iran, but they did see deporta ons to Syria. The source, however, pointed out

that there are many Iranian Kurds living in KRI who are not registered as refugees, and for this

reason they are unaware of what happens to individuals from this group.

The same source

elaborated that there are two types of deporta ons:



Firstly, there are informal deportations, performed by the local security authorities or

the residence office writing a letter expressing the need for deporting a certain

person.

Secondly, in criminal cases, the court can decide to deport a defendant and in these

cases the decision is final.



An Interna onal Organisa on: 46; A local NGO providing legal assistance: 29

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 29

An Interna onal Organisa on: 47

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 24

An Interna onal Organisa on: 47; A local NGO providing legal assistance: 31

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 30

An Interna onal Organisa on: 57

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 23-24

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 25

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

On the subject of the blood test as a requirement for residence permit, an Interna onal

humanitarian organisa on stated that they have not seen examples of deporta on on grounds

of not passing the blood test.

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 14

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

2. Socio-economic and political rights connected to

residence permit in KRI

If a refugee has a legal residence permit (HRP/PRP), they will automatically get access to

housing (renting), health services, employment (private sector) and education.

2.1. Housing

Regarding the Iranian Kurds’ access to housing in the KRI, sources tend to diﬀeren ate between

two categories of Iranian Kurds: Those with residence permits and those without. If an

individual is in possession of a valid residence permit, the sources informed that the residence

permit unlocks the possibility of acquiring rental housing.

2.1.1. Housing for individuals with a residence permit

While a residence permit grants access to rental housing in general, taking residence in a

speciﬁc neighbourhood might entail further requirements. To rent a house or apartment in a

speciﬁc neighbourhood, a security clearance is required from the local Asayish oﬃce,

together with a support le er from the local district chie ain (Mukhtar).

Both an Interna onal

Organisa on and an Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on stated that a sponsor le er is not

required to take residence in a speciﬁc neighbourhood.

According to a local NGO providing legal assistance, in Sulaimania it is the case that an Iranian

Kurdish refugee with a residence permit cannot freely choose in which neighbourhood to live,

but is directed to a residence by the local Asayish.

According to an Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on, housing is diﬃcult to obtain in

general because of the poor economic situa on in KRI,

and o en two to three families reside

together. From 2004 to 2014, the KRI witnessed an economic upturn, which led to a

“construc on frenzy”. In this period, Erbil more than doubled in size. But when oil prices

dropped from 115 USD a barrel in 2014 to 35 USD in 2016

, the KRI came close to bankruptcy.

The economic uncertain es have con nued since.

An Interna onal Organisa on: 34

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 4; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 1; An Interna onal

Organisa on: 34

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 6; An Interna onal Organisa on: 35

An International Humanitarian Organisation: 13; A local Human Rights Organisation: 6

An Interna onal Organisa on: 35; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 3

A Local NGO providing legal assistance: 21

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 4

Washington Ins tute,

The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq,

Spring 2023,

url

Reuters,

Economic ‘tsunami’ undermines war against Islamic State in Iraq – Kurdish deputy PM,

January 2016,

h ps://www.reuters.com/ar cle/uk-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-interview/economic-

tsunami-undermines-war-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-kurdish-deputy-pm-idUKKCN0UU0GQ/

[insert link

in browser]; Bertelsmann S ung,

BTI 2024 Country Report: Iraq,

19 March 2024,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

2.1.2. Housing for individuals without a residence permit

According to a local NGO, the Iranian Kurds who are not in possession of a residence permit do

not have access to rental housing. This group is searching for other op ons such as se lements

and camps with their friends and families or in diﬀerent urban areas of the KRI.

When consul ng the sources, there appeared to be diﬀerent deﬁni ons of “se lements” and

“camps”. An Iranian Kurdish scholar stated that both of these terms are used by NGOs, while

locally they are all referred to as “camps”.

On the other hand, the Interna onal Organisa on

stated that there are no refugee camps for Iranian refugees, and that most Iranian Kurds live in

urban se ngs and in se lements.

The local Human Rights Organisa on uses the words

synonymously.

Sources men oned that se lements can be aﬃliated with or supervised by the Iranian Kurdish

par es

100

, such as the Jezhnikan se lement, which is aﬃliated with the KDPI.

101

Usually these

informal se lements are old abandoned military bases and buildings.

102

A local Human Rights

NGO explained though that following the Iranian bombing of an Iranian Kurdish se lement in

Koye in 2022,

many Iranian Kurds le the se lements.

103

2.1.3. Al-Tash

When asked speciﬁcally about the status of the remaining popula on of Iranian Kurdish

refugees who se led in the al-Tash camp near Ramadi during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s, an

Iranian Kurdish Scholar noted that this popula on came to live in

Barika Camp in Sulaimania,

Sherewen in Kalar District and Kawa Camp in Erbil.

104

The same source further stated that some

of these refugees, mainly elderly people, went back to Iran. However, those who had a chance

to travel to a third country did so.

105

Those who stayed in the se lements in KRI s ll do not

have Iraqi documents.

106

For further reading on ID documents for refugees from the al-Tash

camp, see report by Landinfo.

107

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 4; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 1

A local Human Rights NGO: 1

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 1

An Interna onal Organisa on: 35

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 4, 7, 8, 9

100

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 4; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 1, 6

101

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 6

102

A local Human Rights NGO: 1

103

A local Human Rights NGO: 6

104

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 1

105

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 5

106

A Local NGO providing legal assistance: 36; A local Human Rights Organisa on: 16

107

Landinfo,

Temanotat Iran Stadfestelse og dokumentasjon av statsborgerskap – spesielt for al-Tash

ﬂyktninger,

8. februar 2024,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

2.2. Education

Educa on at elementary, secondary and high school level is generally available to Iranian

Kurdish refugees in the KRI, if they can prove their iden ty as refugees or are holders of a

residence permit.

108

Public schools are free of charge.

109

However, an Iranian Kurd needs to

provide documenta on for the educa onal level that they have already achieved. This can

prove diﬃcult, as an Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on informed the delega on that the

individual cannot ask their previous place of educa on in Iran for the necessary, relevant

documents.

110

A security clearance from Asayish may also be required.

111

When it comes to higher levels of educa on such as access to university studies access for

Iranian Kurdish refugees’ is rather limited. The requirements for university enrolment include a

residence permit, relevant documenta on and a sponsorship provided by an individual who has

lived in the KRI for a long me.

112

Further informa on on this could not be found within the

deadline.

The procedures for enrolling in educa on, regardless of level, can vary. Allegedly, an Iranian

Kurdish child was recently rejected admi ance to elementary school despite the child’s father

being in possession of a residence permit. In another account, being the holder of a UNHCR

cer ﬁcate may prove to be suﬃcient documenta on for enrolment in university.

113

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar stated that Iranian Kurds used to have be er possibili es when it

came to studying at university or ge ng a teaching job in the KRI. However, non-Iraqi ci zens

face more challenges in rela on to higher educa on, as Federal Iraq is pressuring the KRI on its

autonomy.

114

2.3. Employment

As is the case with housing, a residence permit is necessary for Iranian Kurds seeking

employment.

115

Iranian Kurds, who do not possess a residence permit, tend to ﬁnd

employment in the irregular sector.

116

Iranian Kurds are generally inhibited from the public job

market, as non-Iraqi ci zens are barred from public employment. However, Iranian Kurds with a

residence permit do have access to the private sector

117

, where they have equal access and

108

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 18; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 31; An

Interna onal Organisa on: 40

109

An Interna onal Organisa on: 40

110

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 30

111

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 8

112

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 19

113

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 18, 19

114

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 9-10

115

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 27; An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 16; a local Human Rights

NGO: 20

116

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 25

117

An Interna onal Organisa on: 30

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

opportuni es as the locals.

118

The sectors that most o en employ Iranian refugees are

restaurants

119

, supermarkets and construc on services.

120

Occasionally, it has been possible for

Iranian Kurds or other non-Iraqi ci zens to be hired in the public sector through contract

employments, which are deﬁned as temporary employments. However, since the Iraqi central

government cut the KRI’s budget in 2014, the public sector has, in general, stopped hiring.

121

Finding a job in the private sector is diﬃcult due to the declining economy of the KRI.

Furthermore, Iranian Kurds seeking employment in the private sector compete with internally

displaced persons (IDPs), local Kurds and Syrian Kurds. Work condi ons are o en tough, as daily

working hours can stretch to ten or twelve hours with no over- me pay, and in some places

working weekends is required. This is partly due to the Labour Law not being applied at all by

companies.

122

When it comes to geographic varia ons in employment, most Iranian Kurds ﬁnd work in the

ci es of Erbil and Sulaimania rather than in Dohuk.

123

Poten ally it is easier to ﬁnd employment

in Erbil, but it is s ll diﬃcult.

124

Some Iranian Kurds and Iranians do not apply for residence permits but work on a one-month

basis. These individuals cannot aﬀord the residence permit fees, and instead travel to the KRI

from Iran on 30-day visas, work as casual labourers for 25 days, then travel back.

125

However,

the Directorate of Residence stated that a visa can be extended for 30 days, three mes

without the applicant needing to leave the country.

126

For informa on on 30-day visa, please

refer to

sec on 1.1.1.

2.4. Healthcare services

Iranian Kurds in KRI have the same access as the local Iraqi Kurds to public and private health

facilities. Public healthcare facilities charge every patient a small fee (approximately 50 cents

127

or 500 IQD

128

) for health services.

129

In addition to this, emergency services are free of charge;

and basic treatment for most diagnosis is available.

130

118

119

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 12

An Interna onal Organisa on: 39

120

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 28

121

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 15; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 28

122

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 28-29

123

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 26

124

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 28

125

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 21-22

126

Directorate of Residency: 3

127

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 32

128

An Interna onal Organisa on: 36

129

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 17; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 32; An Interna onal

Organisa on: 34, 44

130

An Interna onal Organisa on: 36

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According to informa on on accessibility of medical treatment in KRI from EUAA MedCOI

database, various specialist treatments in KRI are available in private and/or public health

facili es. Most recent reports from KRI s pulate that specialist treatment by a pulmonologist

(lungs), internist, gastroenterologist (diges ve tract)

131

, and otorhinolaryngology (ear, nose and

throat) is available.

132

The list is not exhaus ve. A source interviewed by the delega on noted

that some more complicated treatments are not available in the KRI, and the pa ent will need

to travel abroad to access this treatment.

133

The services provided by public healthcare facili es are perceived to be poor in quality and

there are long ques for treatments.

134

Wai ng mes for surgery can reach a year.

135

Hospitals are low on medicines, and according to an Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on, a

doctor at a public hospital is usually required to assess 20 pa ents an hour. These factors lead

to general distrust in public hospitals and drive many to seek treatment in the private

healthcare sector.

136

This percep on was corroborated by an academic study in Erbil, sta ng

that most pa ents prefer private clinics or hospitals since those facili es are perceived by the

pa ents to have be er access to specialists (in par cular for chronic diseases such as

hypertension), be er quality and quan ty of medicines, and laboratory tes ng.

137

Private

healthcare services are, however, expensive.

138

Private healthcare, or government subsidised semi-private healthcare

139

, might be the only way

that individuals suﬀering from emergency condi ons can receive treatment, but it is o en too

expensive for refugees and most Iranian Kurds.

140

An NGO providing legal assistance informed the delega on that it has documented 180

instances of Iranian Kurds dealing with health diﬃcul es, of which ten to twelve, usually with

breast cancer or eye-sight condi ons, can only ﬁnd medical treatment abroad. As the KRI does

not issue travel documents to Iranian Kurds, these individuals cannot access the treatments

they require.

141

131

EUAA MedCOI database, Medical Country of Origin Informa on ACC 7883,

url

[accessible for

authori es in EUAA member states]

132

EUAA MedCOI database, Medical Country of Origin Informa on ACC 7887,

url

[accessible for

authori es in EUAA member states]

133

An Interna onal Organisa on: 37

134

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 17

135

A local Human Rights NGO: 32

136

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 32, 33

137

Annals of Medicine & Surgery, Ann Med Surg (Lond). 2023 Jul; 85(7): 3409–3417, Kochr Ali Mahmood,

MS and Abubakir Majeed Saleh,

Barriers and facilitators inﬂuencing access to and u liza on of primary

healthcare services in Kurdistan-region, Iraq: a cross-sec onal study,

url

138

An Interna onal Organisa on: 32

139

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 18

140

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 17, 18, 19

141

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 10

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

2.5. Food, water and electricity

Access to food, water and electricity is in general the same for everyone, Iraqi and Iranian Kurds

alike. It depends on ﬁnancial capabili es, networks and geographical area of residence.

142

Electricity and water is provided by government services, and is, according to one source, not

expensive. For addi onal electricity, generators can be purchased as well.

143

The Interna onal Organisa on informed the delega on that they provide targeted assistance

and protec on services, such as a one-year cash support programme, which is available to

those who are eligible. However, it is not a sustainable solu on to rely on such services. The

Interna onal Organisa on seeks to enhance self-reliance among refugees.

144

Further

informa on on access to food, water and electricity could not be found within the deadline.

2.6. Right to vote and run for office

Poli cal rights are granted through ci zenship, meaning Iranian Kurds do not have the right to

vote, run for oﬃce

145

or to receive a passport.

146

Even if an Iranian Kurd marries an Iraqi ci zen,

they would not receive Iraqi documents, nor would their children receive Iraqi ci zenship.

147

For further informa on on the access to ci zenship in prac ce for Iranian Kurds, see

sec on

1.4.

142

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 20; An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 34; a local Human Rights

Organisa on: 29, An Interna onal Organisa on: 41

143

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 34

144

An Interna onal Organisa on: 42

145

A Local Human Rights Organisa on: 30; An Interna onal Organisa on: 37

146

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 23

147

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 24

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

3. Security in KRI

3.1. Development of the general security situation in KRI since 2022

3.1.1 Iran-Iraq Border Security Agreement

On 19 March 2023, Iran and Iraq signed a border security agreement aimed at disarming the

Iranian Kurdish armed par es opera ng in KRI, and closing their military bases in the KRI-Iran

border areas,

148

to prevent them from inﬁltra ng into Iran.

149

A deadline was set for September

2023.

150

The implementa on of the agreement was s ll being discussed by the governments of

Iran and Iraq in November 2023.

151

According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, KRI authori es were

not part of the agreement, although, they respect it, and have provided assistance in its

implementa on. The KRG, however, has not been willing to forcibly remove the Iranian Kurdish

par es, because they consist of a mixture of refugees, ﬁghters and their families. According to

the same source, the president of KRI has stated that the Iranian Kurds were not crea ng

problems for the KRI authori es.

152

3.1.2. Evacuation and Relocation of Iranian Kurdish armed parties

According to mul ple sources, the reloca on of Iranian Kurdish armed par es from their camps

and bases in the border areas has been completed, and their inhabitants have been relocated

deeper into KRI.

153

The bases at the border were evacuated and in some cases destroyed.

154

PDKI had a camp in Keelashin, and shared two with Komala in Seedakan and Halgurd.

155

The

Iranian Kurdish scholar referred to footage released by the Iranian government that showcased

that the Iranian Kurdish party camps were empty

156

, and that their inhabitants now live in

camps and se lements.

157

Following these developments, the Iran-KRI border has been

manned by federal Iraqi border guards.

158

148

Reuters,

Iraq and Iran sign deal to ghten border security,

19 March 2023,

h ps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-iran-sign-deal- ghten-border-security-2023-03-19/

[insert link in browser]; An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 1-4

149

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 2

150

French Research Center on Iraq,

Iran’s goals and strategy for expelling Kurdish opposi on groups in

the Kurdistan region of Iraq, 13 September 2023,

url

151

United Na ons S/2024/96, Security Council Distr.: General, 25 January 2024, Implementa on of

resolu on 2682 (2023), Report of the Secretary-General,

url,

sec on 40, 49

152

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 4-5

153

A local human rights NGO: 6, 9; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 2; An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 28; An

Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 3

154

A local human rights NGO: 6; A local Human Rights Organisa on; 9; Mehr News Agency,

An -Iran

armed adversary groups leave shared borders,

19 September 2023,

url

155

A local Human Rights organisa on 9

156

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 31, 32

157

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 28

158

A local human rights NGO: 9

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Regarding the current presence of PDKI and Komala, sources agreed that PDKI is located in Erbil

Governorate, but their exact loca on is disputed. A local Human Rights Organisa on claimed

PDKI is now based outside Erbil

159

, while Wladimir van Wilgenburg stated that PDKI was near

Koye and near Baharka in Erbil Governorate.

160

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq informed

the delega on that PDKI was relocated to two camps in unspeciﬁed loca ons in Erbil

Governorate.

161

Regarding Komala, Wladimir van Wilgenburg stated that the party was now based in

Sulaimania,

162

while an Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq stated that Komala relocated to Erbil

Governorate. The same source did not rule out that they could have a presence in

Sulaimania.

163

3.1.2.1. Disarmament of Iranian Kurdish armed par es

Sources diﬀered on whether the Iranian Kurdish par es have been disarmed. The Iranian

Kurdish scholar did not have actual knowledge on whether the par es have been disarmed, but

stated that oﬃcial statements from Iran, Iraq and KRG prevail. Iran has thanked both Baghdad

and the KRG for their assistance in making the Iranian Kurdish par es disarm, implying that

both reloca on and disarmament have taken place in accordance with the oﬃcial

announcements.

164

A local human rights NGO also stated that disarmament has taken place,

but the source was unaware of the fate of the weapons.

165

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq

also stated that the Iranian Kurdish par es made the decision to disarm, have conﬁrmed that

they have disarmed, and that there is no evidence that contradicts this.

166

The Iranian Kurdish

par es, however, want to keep small arms for personal protec on.

167

In contrast to the above, according to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, most of the Iranian Kurdish

par es have not been disarmed.

168

He further speciﬁed that PDKI and PAK have retained their

weapons.

169

Komala has allegedly been disarmed, however, not as a result of the Iran-Iraq

security agreement, but due to Kurdish pressure to end their inﬁgh ng.

170

An Interna onal

Organisa on in Iraq added that there is an ongoing power-struggle within Komala, and that

they are divided amongst themselves.

171

159

160

A local human rights NGO: 6

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 7

161

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 8

162

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 7

163

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 8

164

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 30

165

A local human rights NGO: 10

166

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 4

167

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 16

168

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 1

169

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 7, 12

170

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 9

171

An Interna onal Organisa on in Iraq: 9

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

3.2. Foreign Armed Actors

Regarding the presence of foreign armed actors opera ng within KRI, this sec on primarily

focuses on the Iranian presence, but Tÿrkiye is also men oned in

sec on 3.2.2.

While Iran does not have any military bases within the KRI

172

, sources stated that Iran has a

covert presence

173

, through which the Iranian government pressures

174

, harasses

175

or targets

Iranian Kurds.

176

A local Human Rights NGO further elaborated that Iranian agents enter the KRI

in disguise, or open front companies and businesses.

177

3.2.1. Iranian persecution of Iranian Kurds within KRI

According to mul ple sources, Iranian Kurds in KRI have experienced assassina ons

178

threats

179

and abduc on a empts perpetrated by Iran.

180

3.2.1.1. Assassina ons

A local NGO providing legal assistance to Iranian Kurds stated that since 1980, there have been

400 documented cases of poli cally mo vated assassina ons of Iranian Kurds in the KRI by the

Iranian government.

181

Wladimir van Wilgenburg added that the Iranian intelligence service

o en carries out a acks and assassina on on Iranians living in KRI, regardless of the Iran-Iraq

security agreement.

182

A local Human rights NGO stated that nine Iranian Kurdish refugees, who were either members

of a Kurdish party, independent ac vists or human rights workers have been assassinated in KRI

since 2021. Three of these assassina ons, as well as a failed assassina on a empt on an Iranian

Kurdish lawyer in Erbil, Sohrab Rama

183

, have taken place since January 2023.

184

Sources provided several examples of assassina ons of Iranian Kurds in the KRI. In the following

cases, Iran has been accused of being the perpetrator:

172

173

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 17

A local Human Rights NGO: 23-24; An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 27

174

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 31

175

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 26

176

A local Human Rights NGO: 10

177

A local Human Rights NGO: 24

178

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16, local Human Rights Organisa on: 10; a local Human Rights NGO: 25;

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url

179

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 26, 27; a local Human Rights NGO: 4; local Human Rights Organisa on: 10,

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url

180

A local Human Rights NGO: 4; USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April

2024,

url

181

A local NGO providing legal assistance: 12

182

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

183

Kurdistan24,

Kurdish lawyer faces assassina on a empt in Erbil,

17 November 2023,

h ps://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/33175-Kurdish-lawyer-faces-assassina on-a empt-in-Erbil

[insert

link in browser]

184

A local Human Rights NGO: 3; A local NGO providing legal assistance: 14

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ



Behrouz (Rebin) Rahimi, an Iranian Kurdish political activist, who was registered with

the UNHCR in Erbil, was killed in Sulaimania in 2021. His wife blamed Iran, and the

Kurdistan Human Rights Network states that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

(IRGC) was behind several killings of Kurdish political activists in Iraqi Kurdistan.

185

Siyamand Shaboui, a member of PDKI, was reportedly assassinated in Barhacat on 11

July in 2023.

186

Shaboui was reportedly the third member of PDKI to be assassinated by

Iran on 7 July 2023. The two others were named Lokman Aji and Adel Mahajer in

Qaladze district.

187

. On the same day another political activist, Saadi Moradpour,

formerly affiliated with the Democratic Party, was wounded in Sulaymaniya.

188

Shoaib Zarei, a cadre in Komala, was assassinated in March 2024 near Sulaimania city.

Komala blamed Iran.

189

It was pointed out by sources that the IRGC commits assassina ons, and then returns to Iran.

190

3.2.1.2 Harassment

An Iranian Kurdish scholar explained that Iran harasses Iranian Kurds in the KRI with threats,

which aﬀects the whole community. The source presented two examples;



First, Iran uses online channels, such as a Telegram channel called “Diarunadiar” to

spread threats among Iranian Kurds, and telling them that “there is no future for you

in KRI”.

191

Secondly, sometimes Iranian agents publish pictures of Iranian Kurds’ private

residences, and send the inhabitants messages saying “we are very close to you”, in

order to show the Iranian Kurds that they are close by.

192



A local Human Rights NGO added that Iran creates an atmosphere of lack of safety amongst

Iranian Kurdish refugees, by conduc ng threatening phone calls, abduc on a empts or by

185

Kurdistan Human Rights Network,

Unknown oﬀenders kill Iranian Kurdish Ac vist in Iraqi Kurdistan,

July 2021,

url

186

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 11

187

Kurdpa,

Assassina on of Siyamand Shaboui, the third member of the Democra c Party of Iranian

Kurdistan within six days in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 13 July 2023,

url;

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports

on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url;

Hengaw,

Hengaw’s Inves ga on into the

Assassina on of Two Members of the KDPI in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,

7 July 2023,

url

188

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url;

Hengaw,

Hengaw’s

Inves ga on into the Assassina on of Two Members of the KDPI in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,

7 July

2023,

url

189

Rudaw,

Komalab blames Iran in killing of member in Sulaimani,

url

190

A local Human Rights NGO: 25; Federal Oﬃce for Migra on and Refugees,

Brieﬁng Notes Summary,

December 2023,

url;

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

191

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 26-27

192

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 26-27

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

shoo ng at Iranian Kurdish residences. The source noted that this compels many Iranian Kurds

to join poli cal par es to get safety.

193

3.2.1.3 Target proﬁles of Iranian Persecu on

Mul ple sources men oned that members of Iranian Kurdish par es have been targeted by

Iranian threats or assassina ons. Some of these have been peshmergas or low-level party

members.

194

However, not just members of Iranian Kurdish par es are targeted by Iran, as

Iranian Kurds who are poli cally ac ve in the media or comment on poli cs in Iran, can be

targeted by Iranian pressure too. Especially vulnerable are those individuals who have families

in Iran. Occasionally, Iranian Kurdish journalists, working for media in KRI, receive threats

involving their family members in Iran.

195

Two local NGOs pointed to the following proﬁles as being targeted by the Iranian government:

Iranian Kurds, who have le Iran and con nue their work from exile, i.e. ac vists, including

party members, supporters as well as non-party-aﬃliated ac vists, journalists and human rights

defenders.

196

For instance, in August 2023, a journalist from Halabja reported receiving death

threats from individuals he believed to be from Iranian intelligence due to his reporting on the

country’s interference in the region’s politics.

197

Iranian Kurdish refugees, who ﬂed Iran in the wake of the 2022-protests, included individuals,

who were not members of Iranian Kurdish poli cal par es. However, they were s ll exposed to

threats and warnings from Iran.

198

According to an Iranian Kurdish Scholar, Iran does not send threatening texts to every Iranian

Kurd in KRI, but targets the ac ve ones, which is enough to aﬀect the whole community.

199

3.2.2 Türkiye’s military campaign against PKK

As a part of Türkiye’s military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkish

armed forces have constructed military bases in Duhok Governorate, and in Bashiqa in Ninewa

Governorate.

200

Apart from their opera ons against PKK, Turkish forces occasionally strike

PJAK.

201

In March 2024, Türkiye and Iraq entered an agreement, leading to Iraq designa ng the

PKK as a banned organisa on in Iraq.

202

Also in March 2024, Türkiye announced that a

193

194

A local Human Rights NGO: 4

A local Human Rights NGO: 3; A local Human Rights Organisa on: 11, 12; Wladimir van Wilgenburg:

25, 27

195

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 25

196

A local Human Rights NGO: 4; A local NGO providing legal assistance: 14, 15; USDOS,

2023 Country

Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url;

197

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url;

198

A local Human Rights Organisa on: 13

199

An Iranian Kurdish scholar: 27

200

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 19

201

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 11

202

Al-Monitor,

Iraq bans PKK as security es Turkey gain momentum,

14 March 2024,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

comprehensive military opera on will be launched in the summer of 2024 against the PKK in

Iraq and Syria.

203

3.3 Non-State Armed Actors (PKK and ISIS)

There is some ISIS presence in the disputed areas of Iraq, for instance in Makhmur and Diyala,

where they occasionally conduct a acks on Iraqi security forces and extort farmers for money.

Recently, however, they have not had the capability to carry out large a acks in Iraq. ISIS

sleeper cells do exit, and in February 2024 the authori es in Sulaimania arrested a number of

ISIS supporters.

204

The ISIS suspects were arrested by Asayish for “spreading the extremist ideas

of ISIS” on social media pla orms.

205

In another incident in November 2023, the Sulamania-

based Asayish arrested 55 ISIS suspects in Sulaimania, Halabja and Kirkuk a er conduc ng

“tens of raids”.

206

The PKK maintains a presence in the Qandil Mountains, as well as in Duhok

207

, from where it

conducts an insurgency campaign against the Turkish security forces present in the KRI. Figh ng

has also taken place between the PKK and the KRI’s security forces, and the PKK has targeted oil

pipelines within its areas of opera ons.

208

Both Wladimir van Wilgenburg and an Iranian Kurdish scholar regard the Kurdistan Free Life

Party (PJAK) as a branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The sources stated that PJAK is

outside of KRG’s inﬂuence, and as a result has not been disarmed or evacuated from its bases

near Qandil.

209

3.4 Security incidents and the extent and type of casualties

In 2021, missiles struck various places in and around Erbil, injuring a refugee and an IDP. The

Shia mili a Saraya Awlia al-Dam claimed responsibility for the a ack and stated that their

target was the U.S. base in al-Harir.

210

Following the protests in Iran in 2022-2023, Iran accused the Iranian Kurdish par es of inci ng

unrest in Iran. The IRGC conducted mul ple missile and drone strikes against Iranian Kurdish

par es in Erbil and Sulaimania. On 14 November 2022, two were killed and ten injured.

211

another set of strikes that took place on 28 September 2022, 13-18 individuals were killed and

203

Washington Ins tute,

Turkey’s An -PKK Opera on and “Development Road” in Iraq Are Two Sides of

the Same Coin,

8 april 2024,

url

204

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 22; Rudaw,

Sulaimani security forces arrest 30 ISIS suspects,

23 February

2024,

url

205

Rudaw,

Sulaimani security forces arrest 30 ISIS suspects,

23 February 2024,

url

206

Rudaw,

Sulaimani security forces arrest 55 ISIS suspects,

18 November 2023,

url

207

Shafaq,

Duhok governor expects end to Turkey-PKK conﬂict soon,

10 March 2024,

url

208

CSIS,

Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),

13 July 2023,

url

209

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar: 34, Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 11

210

Rudaw,

Refugee, IDP injured in Erbil rocket a ack,

17 February 2021,

url

211

USDOS,

2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

20 March 2023,

url;

Reuters,

Iran

strikes dissidents in Iraqi Kurdistan, two dead – oﬃcials,

November 2022,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

58-60 wounded, as the IRGC struck Iranian Kurdish par es in the same governorates.

212

UNHCR

condemned the a ack in which Iranian refugees were killed.

213

In the same a ack, U.S. forces

downed an Iranian drone en route to Erbil, ci ng the drone posed a threat to U.S. personnel.

214

In 2022, the U.S. military base in Erbil was targeted in an Iranian missile strike. The missiles

came down close to the U.S. base, but no casual es were reported on the American side. One

local civilian was reportedly injured.

215

In January 2024, three Iranian drones were shot down by missile defence systems, as they

targeted the area of Erbil Interna onal Airport, where the U.S. base and consulate are

located.

216

In the same a ack, a ballis c missile struck the home of a local businessman, killing

four and wounding six. The IRGC claimed that the house was a “Mossad espionage centre”,

which was denied by KRG authori es.

217

3.5 Freedom of Movement within KRI

Iranian Kurds can only travel within the Kurdistan region, but local poli cal dynamics can also

inhibit travel within the KRI. An Iranian Kurd with a residence permit from KDP controlled-Erbil,

who travels to PUK-controlled Sulaimania, will be stopped, delayed and ques oned at the many

checkpoints on the routes.

218

Mul ple sources including the Directorate of Residence informed

the delega on that to pass through a checkpoint, an Iranian Kurd requires a valid residence

permit

219

or work-visa issued by the KRG.

220

Iranian Kurds holding a UNHCR cer ﬁcate but no residence permit cannot travel from one city

to another.

221

A source noted that it might be possible to use a UNHCR cer ﬁcate to cross a

checkpoint.

222

Checkpoints are not run by regular police units, but by either KDP or PUK-aﬃliated security

forces, who each man their own checkpoints.

223

212

USDOS,

2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

20 March 2023,

url;

Reuters,

Thirteen

reported killed as Iran Revolu onary Guards target dissident sites in Iraq,

September 2022,

url;

DW,

Iran launches fresh strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan,

28 September 2022,

url

213

UNHCR,

UNHCR statement, 28 September 2022, Erbil, Iraq,

28 September 2022,

url

214

Reuters,

Thirteen reported killed as Iran Revolu onary Guards target dissident sites in Iraq,

September 2022,

url;

USDOS,

2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

20 March 2023,

url;

215

Reuters,

Iran a acks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,

13 March 2022,

url

216

Poli co,

Iran claims responsibility for blasts near US consulate in Iraq,

16 January, 2024,

url,

ABC News,

Explosions reported near US Consulate in Iraq; Iran claims responsibility,

16 January 2024,

url

217

HRW,

Iraq: Iranian A ack Kills Civilians in Erbil,

22 January 2024,

url,

An Interna onal Organisa on in

Iraq: 13, Poli co,

Iran claims responsibility for blasts near US consulate in Iraq,

16 January 2024,

url

218

A local Human Rights NGO: 12; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 24

219

Directorate of Residence: 32

220

A local Human Rights NGO: 18, 19, 20; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 31

221

An Interna onal Organisa on: 53; A local Human Rights NGO: 14

222

An Interna onal Humanitarian Organisa on: 18

223

A local Human Rights NGO: 21

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 118: Rapport om iranske kurdere i kurdistanregionen i Irak, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Iranian Kurds living in KRI do not suﬀer ill treatment by

the KRG’s armed forces.

224

However, in one case, Nazila Maroufian, an Iranian Kurdish journalist,

claimed she was tortured for 13 days in January 2023 in Sulaymaniyah prison.

225

Further

information on the subject could not be found within the deadline.

224

225

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 25

USDOS,

2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Prac ces: Iraq,

22 April 2024,

url;

IranWire, Iranian

Journalist Marooﬁan Flees Persecu on to France, 11 October 2023,

url

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

Annex 1: Interviewed sources

Wladimir van Wilgenburg

March 2023

Background

Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a freelance journalist, poli cal analyst and author of several books

on Kurds. He has worked on the topic since 2005 and has been based in Erbil since 2014.

3. Security situa on in the KRI

Development of general security situa on in KRI – the Iran-Iraq agreement

1. Since the war in Gaza started, there have been more attacks by Iranian proxies on the

US base in Erbil which was not directly related to the Iranian Kurds, while other attacks

have been related to the Iranian Kurdish. For instance, the PDKI camp in Koye was

targeted in September 2018 by a missile attack. But there have been no direct attacks

on Iranian Kurdish parties since the security agreement between Iran and Iraq. Since

this agreement has not been made public, what is known about it, is only what have

been cited in the media. The Iran-Iraq security agreement seeks to remove and disarm

the Iranian Kurdish parties and their fighters from the Iran-KRI border areas, which has

taken place, and there is still pressure on the Iranian Kurdish parties. On the issue of

disarmament, most of the Iranian Kurdish parties have not been disarmed.

2. The parties still have arms, as the agreement primarily seeks to remove them from the

border areas, so they cannot infiltrate into Iran. Their bases at the border have been

evacuated, and more Iraqi border police have been sent to the border. There is also

talk of an iron-fencing of the border between Halabja and Iran, primarily to stop the

Kurdish smugglers (Kolbars) from crossing the border.

3. Overall the security situation in KRI has been quiet because of the agreement, but

there has been more pressure on the Iranian Kurds groups since the government in

Baghdad became more pro-Iran than the previous government. Nevertheless, there

have been lot of attacks on US bases in the KRI since the war in Gaza and one

businessman was killed. But since February this has stopped.

4. The KRG authorities were not part of the Iran-Iraq agreement, but they respect it and

have helped to implement it, though the Kurdish authorities are not willing to forcibly

remove the Iranian Kurdish groups, because they are refugees and consist of a mixture

of fighter a nd their families. The position of the Iranian government is to remove the

Iranian Kurdish parties to another country as it was done with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq

(MEK) members who were moved to Albania. During the nationwide protests in Iran in

2022 and 2023 there was a number of attacks by the Iranian government on the

Iranian Kurdish oppositions groups in KRI, i.e. PDKI, Komala and PAK. The parties were,

however, not directly part of the protests that were more locally organized.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

5. The president of the KRI said, that the Iranian Kurds are not creating problems for the

KRI-authorities, and there is mutual respect.

6. Seen from the side of the Iranian government, the agreement between Iran and Iraq

has not been fully implemented. However, the agreement should be seen as a

response to the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 that have largely been oppressed and

for the moment Iran seems to be satisfied.

Status of the evacua on and disarmament of the Iranian Kurdish par es

7. Practically PDKI is still armed and are not disarming. They do not though, conduct

attacks across the border into Iran. The PDKI still have a presence in the camps in Koye

and

near

Baharka. These camps most likely did not fall under the Iran-Iraq agreement;

however, the precise content of the agreement is not completely clear. PDKI also used

to consist of two different groups, but they have merged.

8. There has also been talks about the Iranian government wanting to build a wall around

the PDKI camp in Koya, however, it has not taken place.

9. Recently, the information came out that the Iraqi authorities had revoked the passport

of the PDKI leader. With regards to Komala, the source stated that it has been a while

since he visited the Komala camps in Sulaimania Governorate and he was not

informed about the latest status of the parties. However, to the knowledge of the

source, Komala has been disarmed, but not as a part of the security agreement, but

due to Kurdish pressure to end their infighting. Komala is more present in the

Sulaimania area, and have camps outside the city. But the term “Komala” can be

misleading as there are maybe 3 different Komalas, one is Kurdish while one is Iranian-

Kurdish, and there is also a splinter group from the Kurdish Komala.

10. Having been evacuated from the border area, PDKI and Komala still have their political

offices. They are not very active in Iran, but they still have their supporters in Iranian

Kurdistan.

A lot of Iranian Kurds

would like to leave KRI, because they are not given

Iraqi citizenship

and have difficulties due to their legal status.

Most of the top leaders

of the Iranian Kurdish parties have foreign passports.

11. PJAK is basically a branch of the PKK, and the KRI-authorities cannot exercise their

influence to the same degree on PJAK since they are located outside of KRI control

near

Qandil. The Turkish armed forces sometimes strike PJAK as well as the PKK. PJAK

follows the same internal rules as the PKK, so marrying is prohibited for fighters, and

they

do not have their own

families like the other Kurdish groups. PJAK has several

other names, among others it is also known as KODAR.

12. PAK did not have bases in the border area with Iran. PAK played a big role in the fight

against ISIS, including when ISIS tried to attack Erbil and for this reason the party has a

close relationship with KDP. Recently, an Iranian government media falsely announced

that the leader of PAK was killed. The source did not believe that PAK has been

disarmed either.

13. The KDP and the PUK are treating the Iranian Kurds differently depending on their

alliance with Iran. PUK still operates in the border areas closer to Iran, they feel more

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

pressured by Iran and is more willing to give concession to Iran than KDP. In January

2024, the Iranian government launched ballistic missiles against an Iraqi Kurdish

businessperson and his child in Erbil, they both were killed.

14. There was a rumour on PUK being pressured to give one of the Komala camps to the

Hashd al-shabi, however, this was not confirmed.

MEK

15.

Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) was moved to Albania a long time ago and no longer has a

presence in KRI. However, a small party named Khabat have said that they are close to

MEK. MEK is present in France and in the US. The source did not have further

information on MEK.

Foreign armed state actors:

16. When asked if Iranian intelligence presence has increased, the source did not know.

The Iranian intelligence service often carry out attacks and assassinations on Iranians in

KRI, regardless of the Iran-Iraq agreement.

17. Iran does not have military bases in the KRI.

18. The Hasd al-Shaabi/PMF is not present within the KRI, but are located outside the

borders of KRI. They operate in the disputed areas between KRI and federal Iraq, in

Kirkuk and Mosul.

19. The Turkish army have several bases in

Duhok

and in Bashiqa in Ninewa Governorate.

Non-state actors

20. Syrian Kurds have their parties in KRI, in Erbil and Sulaimania.

21. Regarding non-state military actors, there are 3,000 Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga in the

KRI, but they are a part of the official Peshmerga army.

22. ISIS does not have a presence within the KRI and seen from an overall perspective they

are dormant. However, sometimes they have sleeper cells. For instance, in February

2024, the authorities in Sulaimania arrested some ISIS supporters. ISIS mostly operate

in the disputed areas in Iraq, for instance in Makhmur and Diyala, where they

occasionally conduct attacks on Iraqi security forces and extort farmers for money.

Recently, ISIS have not been able to carry out big attacks in Iraq. If the federal

government in Baghdad agrees with the US that the US Army should leave Iraq, ISIS

could get more active.

23. In January 2024, in Iran, ISIS carried out a big attack.

But this comes from ISIS in

Afghanistan.

Freedom of movement

24. At the border between Erbil and Suleymaniyah

(Slemani)

there are many checkpoints

as well as there are checkpoints in the cities. The source did not have information to

share on the freedom of movement related to Iranian Kurds.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

KRG forces

25. When asked if Iranian Kurds suffer ill treatment by the KRG armed forces, the source

replied that this was not the case.

Proﬁles targeted by Iran:

26. Iranian Kurds who are politically active, active in the media or comment on politics in

Iran can be targeted by Iranian pressure, not just members of Iranian-Kurdish political

parties. Especially those with family in Iran are at risk, as Iran can put pressure on their

families. Sometimes Iranian Kurdish journalists who are working for media in KRI

receive threats when they write critical articles about the situation in Iran. The threats

could involve their family members in Iran.

27. Social media are banned inside Iran, and Iranians living abroad using social media are

most likely monitored.

28. When asked if low level party members are targeted by the Iranian government in KRI,

the source replied that some low level party members were killed.

29. Iranian Kurds involved in opposition parties cannot go back to Iran, due to the risk of

being arrested. Iranian Kurds who are not involved in the political opposition parties

will not face problems when they go back.

30. On access to information on the situation in Iran, the source noted that all the media in

Iran are state controlled which makes it difficult to find valid information. Besides,

talking to sources inside Iran online would put them at risk.

Party documents

31. When asked if party members can use the party ID or support letter to pass through

checkpoints, the source replied that they need a residence permit to pass through

checkpoints.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

An Iranian Kurdish Scholar

March 2024

Socio-economic and poli cal rights connected to residence permit in KRI

Housing

1. The Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI live either in camps supervised by the UNHCR, in

informal settlements supervised by Iranian Kurdish parties or living in the cities. The

source said that “Camps” and “Settlements” are NGO terms, locally they are all called

camps.

Barika Camp in Sulaimania, Sherewen in Kalar District and Kawa Camp in Erbil were

established to host the Iranian Kurdish refugees, who needed resettlement after the

closure of al-Tash camp in Ramadi. These specific Iranian Kurdish refugees came during

the Iran-Iraq war, and the source does not know how many live in these camps today.

They are supervised by the UNHCR.

Other camps than those managed by UNHCR are managed by one of the Iranian

Kurdish political parties, who according to the source are now civilian and unarmed.

2. There are different, local, procedures for gaining residence in these camps. For Barika,

Sherewen and Kawa a UNHCR certificate is required, a residence permit from the KRG

authorities. If they wish to take up employment, an approval from the local chieftain

(mukhtar) and a security clearance from Asayish is required too.

3. The source did not know how many live in these camps.

4. For those Iranian Kurds that came from Iran directly, the source has not heard that

there are any UNHCR supervised camps for them to take residence in.

5. The source has heard that some of the Iranian Kurds that came to Iraq during the Iran-

Iraq war went back to Iran, but not in large number; most of those who returned were

elderly, but he does not know how many or what happened to them. In fact, most of

the refugees from al-Tash who had the chance to go to a third country did so. Of those

who stayed in KRI, they were disgruntled that the UNdid not support their

resettlement to a third country. Those who went back to Iran probably face a life of

government pressure and surveillance.

6. Any person from Iranian Kurdistan who comes to the KRI, because they are targeted by

the Iranian government, remain under surveillance by the Iranian intelligence service.

They often meet obstacles in finding good working opportunities in KRI.

7. There might be people in Barika, Sherewan and Kawa who sympathize with the Iranian

Kurdish political parties; however, the source could not confirm the existence of

organized political activity in these camps.

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Educa on

8. It is possible for Iranian Kurds to access public education. The requirements are a

residence permit, sometimes a UNHCR certificate, and security clearance from Asayish.

If these requirements are fulfilled s/he and his/her children can go to public school.

9. When it comes to higher education, it is getting more difficult even if one has a

residence permit. Earlier it was easier for an Iranian Kurd to start studying at university,

or get a teaching job in the KRI.

10. But because of pressure from Federal Iraq, it is more difficult now. Baghdad is

pressuring the KRI on autonomy, and if the KRI falls more under federal control, then

non-Iraqi citizens will face more challenges regarding getting higher education. Federal

Iraq only wants Iraqis to work in public sector, so if Baghdad gets more control for KRI,

they will start asking questions to why an Iranian Kurdish refugee is on the payroll.

Employment

11. The job opportunities are even with the locals. There are limited job opportunities for

everyone.

12. Iranian Kurds work in the private sector, where they have the same conditions as the

local Kurds.

13. Iranian Kurds cannot work in the public sector, as they are not Iraqi citizens, but can

sometimes be contract employed. A contract employment is a temporary employment.

14. The source says that it is sometimes possible to find non-locals working in the public

sector on a contract-employment.

15. Local Kurds can also work on contractual terms in the public sector, but the public

sector stopped hiring people after the Kurdistan budget was cut by the Iraqi Central

Government in 2014.

16. A residence permit is needed to get a job, and it functions as a work permit.

Healthcare

17. When it comes to healthcare, Iranian Kurds have the same access to public healthcare

as the locals. It costs the same for both Iranian Kurds and locals. The price is low, and is

considered a symbolic fee. There are long ques and wait times for treatment in the

public sector. If an individual is in a condition of emergency, private hospitals might be

the only way to get help. But these are too expensive for refugees.

18. There are also private hospitals and semi-private hospital, but these are too expensive

for most Iranian Kurds.

19. Semi-private falls under the public sector, and is more expensive than regular public

healthcare but less expensive than private healthcare.

Food, Water, Electricity

20. Regarding access to food, water and electricity is the same for everyone in KRI. It

depends on where you live and how financially able you are.

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21. In Iraq there is subsidized food commodities for local Iraqis, but generally not for non-

Iraqis. Sometimes NGOs and humanitarian organization distribute food and help the

most vulnerable.

22. There is some assistance in the camps supervised by the UNHCR, but nothing that

makes life comfortable.

Poli cal rights

23. The sources says; no, Iranian Kurds do not have political right, cannot vote and cannot

run for office, or get Iraqi documents

24.

After years in the KRI, the source had not received a passport or official documents,

and he had not heard of anyone who has. He and other Iranian Kurds are a lost

generation who cannot get Iraqi citizenship. Even if they marry an Iraqi citizen, they do

not get official documents, and their children are not citizens of Iraq either.

Security

25. Iranian Kurds living in KRI close to Iran, have to be careful when travelling around KRI,

even if KRI authorities protect Iranian Kurds.

26. The source also states that Iran conducts online harassment of Iranian Kurds and sends

threatening texts. For example there is a Telegram channel called “diarunadiar” that is

spreading threats among Iranian Kurds in KRI and telling them that “there is no future

for you in KRI”. Sometimes Iranian agents publish pictures from someone’s private

house within Erbil or other cities to show the Iranian Kurds that they are close by and

send the people living there a message saying (“we are very close to you”).

27. All profiles of Iranian Kurds have been targeted by Iranian covert activities. Sometimes

the victims have been members of the Iranian Kurdish parties, and sometimes the

victims were not party members. Party members are more vulnerable than other

Iranian Kurds.

When asked if an Iranian Kurd, who is not politically active or an activist, can

experience persecution by Iran, the source replied that Iran cannot send threatening

texts to every Iranian Kurd in KRI, but the idea is to target the active ones, which is

enough to effect the whole community. But Iran considers all refugees from Iran

dissidents and a threat.

28. The security agreement between Iran and Baghdad has separate phases. The Iranian

Kurdish parties have been evacuated from the border areas with Iran and deeper into

KRI territory, where they live in camps and settlements now.

29. The source has heard that Iran has pressured Iraq to take the official Iraqi documents

away from an Iranian Kurdish political leader in Iraq. So Iran can pressure Iraq to follow

Iran’s interests.

30. Regarding the status of disarmament, the source did not have the actual knowledge

about the disarmament. The official statements from the Iranian, the Iraqi federal as

well as the KRG governments prevail. Iran has thanked Baghdad and the KRG for their

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31.

32.

33.

34.

assistance in getting the Iranian Kurdish parties to disarm. This implies that the

evacuation and the are disarmed haven taken place according to the official

announcements.

There where two KDPI camps in Koya, one of them was a headquarter, which has been

evacuated. According to the KDPI, those who are evacuated are new lifing in a civil

situation. In the other camp civilians are living and they are still there.

Concerning the situation in the Komala camps in Sulaimania governorate, the source

did not have specific knowledge. It was the perception of the source that the Komala

camps have been emptied. The source refereed to footage released by the Iranian

government that showcased that the KDPI camps as well as the Komala camps were

empty.

Regarding PAK, the source did not have information.

PJAK are still in the mountains and not disarmed. They are considered part of PKK, and

the KRI cannot influence them in the same way as the other groups. This is because

they are in areas of KRI, where the Kurdistan Regional Government cannot exercise

control.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

An International Organisation in Iraq

Erbil, 6

March 2024

Security situa on in KRI

1. Iran and Iraq have entered into a security agreement, which affects the KRI.

2. Iraq and Iran agreed that Iranian Kurdish opposition parties must halt all military

activity against Iran, relocate away from the KRI/Iran-border and disarm themselves.

3. The bases along the border have been evacuated and are empty.

4. The Iranian Kurdish political parties have made the decision to disarm, they have

confirmed that they disarmed and there is no evidence that contradicts this.

5. The Iranian Kurdish political parties are now looking for solutions to their future.

6. The source says that the Iranian Kurdish political parties have relocated from the

border, and the ex-fighters now live in container camps, while their family members do

not. The issue now is to find out what happens to them whether they will integrate

into the local communities or go back to Iran, if they can do so safely (most would not

want to take the risk). They are aware that resettlement to a third country is not a

likely option.

7. The camps are physically run by the KRG authorities and their peshmergas.

8. KDPI and Komala live in separate camps. KDPI former peshmergas are placed in one

camp, and Komala former peshmergas are in two camps, all three located in the Erbil

governorate. There are other camps in the Sulaimaniyah governorates but they go back

to the 1990s and include families. . Other families live in settlements, which means

they live in villages or towns mixed with the local population.

9. Regarding Komala, the source stated that they are divided amongst themselves, as

there is an ongoing power-struggle.

10. Regarding PJAK, the source does not know what their status is, or how they have been

affected by the security agreement. PJAK does not seem to be a source of contention

with Iran.

11. Iran is suspicious of the Iranian Kurdish political parties and they do not want

oppositional political activity. Iran has some long standing requests for extradition of

some members of the Iranian Kurdish opposition political parties, but there have been

no cases of extradition to Iran from the KRI.

12. Several Komala members were executed last month by Iran.

13. The strike that Iran carried out against the home of a businessman in Erbil, caused a

strong reaction from the KR and Baghdad. The Iranian government said that it was a

Mossad affiliated place, but both KR and Baghdad authorities said that this was the

family home of a businessman.

14. There are also divisions within KRI. PUK is closer to Iran and KDP is closer to Turkey and

less sympathetic to Iran, but they try to have a balanced position. Elections for the

Kurdistan Region Parliament are due to take place on 10 June 2024 after several

postponements because of the disagreements between the two main parties

15. The disagreement between PUK and KDP amongst other subjects concerns the

treatment of PKK, which is a Turkish Kurdish opposition group. KDP is more on the

Turkish line and want PKK out of Iraq.

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16. It has been reported that the Iranian political parties have not carried out military

operation for several years. They say they wish to hold on to their personal weapons

for their own protection, not for use in military operations.

Rights, residence permit and ci zenship

17. Some party members may have been given a new Iraqi passport as a travel document,

but that does not mean that they are or given citizenship. They are not Iraqis.

18. The Iranian Kurds do not have voting rights in KRI.

Perspec ve

19. The development in the relationship between Iran, Iraq and the Iranian political parties

seem to be inching towards consolidating. However, there is still a lot of distrust

between the Iranian Kurdish political parties and Iran, and between the KRG and Iran.

The immediate risk of military confrontation has been averted.

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A local Human Rights Organisation

Erbil, 4

March 2024

Background

1. This local Human Rights organisation follows the human rights situation in Iranian

Kurdistan. It was founded in December 2019, and it was registered by the UN as a

human rights organization following the situation for the Iranian Kurds in March 2022.

2. The organization has offices in the KRI, Switzerland and Canada. Since the

establishment of the organization, it has been documenting and reporting on human

rights violations against Iranian Kurds inside and outside of Iran.

Housing for Iranian Kurdish refugees

3. The source did not know the exact numbers of Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI. A

number of refugees are registered by the UNHCR, while other Iranian Kurdish refugees

are not registered with the UNHCR.

4. There are two categories of Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI. One category is close to

the Iranian Kurdish parties; they are staying in the camps/settlements that are

supervised by one of the political parties. The other category of Iranian Kurds living in

KRI are those who are scattered in both urban and rural areas by renting places for

those who can afford it, while other stay in affordable hotels or motels.

5. A refugee coming to KRI will need a residence permit. Refugees who are affiliated with

one of the political parties, can find assistance from their party. Other Iranian Kurds

who are not affiliated with one of the parties, can go to one of the UNHCR offices to

apply for asylum with the hope of being granted a UNHCR certificate that might

eventually will lead them to gain a KRI residence permit which is a requirement for

housing and for working in KRI.

6. With regards to the requirement to register to live in a specific neighbourhood to rent

a house/an apartment in the KRI, an Iranian Kurd will need a residence permit for the

KRI and a security clearance from the security office (asayish). Furthermore, s/he will

need a support letter from the local district chieftain (mukhtar).

Status of the evacua on of the Iranian Kurdish par es exiled in KRI

7. The members of the political parties live mostly in camps in Sulaymaniya province.

There are two camps in Erbil province. They are mainly in Koya and Sulaymaniya. The

camps run by political parties are: Amirya (KDPI), Azadi (KDPI), Zergwiz (Komala CPI),

Zergwiz Elah (Komala Party), Jezhnikan (KDPI), Zewiaspi (KDPI), Banehgewreh (Komala

Party), Topzawa (Khabat), Pak Shar (PAK)

8. Koye is a town between Erbil and Sulaymaniya. There is a citadel-like KDPI

headquarters for KDPI fractions that were later reunited. (Zergwiz Elah) is the

headquarters for (Komala Party). These two camps were targeted by Iran multiple

times. After the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and after the Iranian pressure on the

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Iraqi federal government and the KRG there was a security agreement signed between

Iran and Baghdad that included closure of the party camps. Being subjected to attacks

and pressure, the citadel-like camp supervised by the KDPI was fully closed and the

people had to find new shelter, either in the urban area in Koye town or to move

elsewhere to find new housing. In the mean time the (Zergwiz Elah) camp was

disarmed and only the families and civile organizations sheltered there.

9. The Iranian government requested that party settlements near the Iranian border were

evacuated. There was no large settlement of the parties next to the Iranian border,

however, smaller settlements for armed members of these parties that were

evacuated. All these smaller settlements were evacuated because of Iranian pressure

and KRG pushing them. The names of the settlements were: Cheelashin/ Keelashin

(KDPI), Seedakan (Komala and KDPI), Halgurd (Komala and KDPI), Saqqar (Komala and

KDPI).

Four of these important smaller settlements of Komala and KDPI were evacuated; the

settlements were located close to the Iranian border in the Choman district of Erbil

Governorate.

The Iranian government targe ng Iranian Kurds

10. Threats or targeting by the Iranian government against Iranian refugees and specifically

towards the political parties, range from restriction in their access to documents,

physical threats, and assassinations. The source added that threats and targeting by

the Iranian government towards Iranian Kurds in the KRI was included in the

agreement between Baghdad and Teheran.

11. As an example of assassination by the Iranian government, taking place in KRI against a

member of the Iranian Kurdish political parties, the source pointed to the KDPI

member named Siyamand Shaboui, who was formerly staying at the camp in Koye and

was relocated to the camp in Barhacat. He was minding his own business and was not

a threat to anyone; he was assassinated by the Iranian government in 2023. The source

does not know the exact date. Also, in resent month a member of Komala named

Shoaib Zarei 34 years old, was assassinated by an Iranian agent on March 16, 2024, in

(Zargwiz Elah) camp near Sulaymaniya.

12. Siyamand Shaboui was a low-profile member of KDPI, and yet he was killed. The source

believes that Iran within the agreement with Baghdad has included a list that includes

names of high-profile members of political parties and Iran continues to pursue

deportation of those members both from Baghdad and KRI. Neither Baghdad, nor the

KRG has any intention to deport these people. The source has not seen the list, but it is

a threat that is constantly present among Iranian Kurds in KRI, especially for those who

are affiliated with the parties.

13. With regards to other profiles of Iranian Kurds than the party affiliated people being

targeted by the Iranian government in the KRI, the source pointed to the new wave of

Iranian Kurdish refugees who entered the KRI, especially after the Woman, Life,

Freedom movement. This wave included many people who were not necessarily

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member of a party, but who were protesters and targeted inside Iran, then they fled

the country and came to the KRI looking for shelter. The source had heard and seen

people who are not members of the parties but who are still being exposed to threats

and warnings. These people are constantly taking precautions and keeping a low

profile to be protected. The source did not know of names of such people living in KRI

being threatened by the Iranian government.

14. Post September 2022 protests, the source pointed to two different categories of

refugees coming to the KRI. Almost all of them irregularly. This group includes the ones

who were arrested, detained, and released on bail and managed to leave the country.

The other group of people who came to the KRI were the ones who were injured

mostly by rubber bullets in their eyes and were seeking treatment and protection.

Names of the injured Ali Misri, Hero Qadimi, Sora Qadimi and others. The number of

people coming in this was above fifty people. They went mostly to Sulaimania.

15. When asked if the source knew of family members of members of parties who were

targeted by the Iranian government, the source pointed to an example that took place

about three or four years ago: a car owned member of the KPDI was targeted by an IED

that was attached to his car allegedly by the Iranian government. The incident led to

the injury of the KDPI member and the death of his son who was not a member.

Al Tash camp refugees

16. There is still a camp in Ramadi Governorate that is accommodating more than a

thousand Iranian Kurdish refugees, who came to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, who are

not affiliated with any parties. In Sulaimania, Barika camp, and in Erbil, Qushtepa, there

are Iranian refugees who fled war more than thirty years ago and they do not have any

naturalization process and no Iraqi documents. In both camps they have UNHCR

refugee certificates. Some of them managed to get residence permit. Each camp is run

by their own council.

17. Baharka, a district and small town outside Erbil, outside the town there are two camps

called Jeshnika and Grdechal. But these are party affiliated people; they are not among

the group of refugees fleeing the Iran-Iraq war.

Educa on

18. Education at the elementary and secondary level and high school appear to be

available to Iranian Kurdish refugees living in the KRI, if they can prove their identity as

a refugee or if they are holders of a residence permit. The source gave an example that

happened two or three days ago in which an Iranian Kurd without residence permit

tried to have his child admitted at a school in KRI but he did not succeed.

19. With regards to access to university for Iranian Kurdish refugees it seems to be limited;

the requirements for enrolling in university in the KRI seems to be a residence permit

as well as a sponsorship by someone who stayed in KRI for a longer period and who has

the required documentation. Iranian ID documents will not guaranty being enrolled in

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university in the KRI. Being a holder of a UNHCR certificate may sometimes work as

sufficient documentation for enrolling in university, depending on how the person is

manoeuvring.

Employment and residence permit

20. Iranians and Iranian Kurds coming to the KRI as none refugees can apply for a

residence and work permit that is issued for one year. As soon as they are granted a

residence permit, they can apply for jobs in the private sector in KRI, but not in the

public sector.

21. Some Iranian and Iranian Kurds do not apply for a residence permit; rather they work

on a one-month basis. They work for instance for 25 days in KRI and then they cross

the border back to Iran, and then they return to the KRI to work for another month.

The reason why they do not apply for a residence permit is that they can’t afford the

fee they need to pay for a residence permit in the KRI. There are many labourers from

Iran coming to work in the KRI.

22. The classic situation is that the labourers working for a month, they can only take

employment as casual labourers on a daily basis for a month or less. In this situation

they cannot legally rent housing. On a thirty-day visa one cannot be hired into a private

company which requires a residence permit.

23. In terms of requirements for the regular residence permit for people entering the KRI

legally, the applicant needs to present a passport and to pay a fee of some hundred

USD for it and a sponsor which could either be a lawyer or an employer. In case, the

applicant has a job offer, the employer can act as a sponsor for the applicant; in case

not, the lawyer can act as the sponsor. This residence permit gives the right to stay and

the right to be employed at the private sector in the KRI; the residence and work

permit is one and the same document. This permit is issued for a year and it is

renewable.

Legal stay in KRI for refugees

24. For Iranian Kurds who entered the KRI for fear of being targeted or if they are affiliated

by the Iranian Kurdish parties and who cannot return to Iran, they are issued political

residence permits. The political status is mentioned in their ID, but the refugee does

not need to pay a large sum of money for the permit. They only pay smaller fees at the

Residence Office. For an Iranian Kurd to be granted the political status, they need the

UNHCR certificate and a support letter by of the Iranian Kurdish political parties and

then apply at the Residence Office.

25. In terms of employment for refugees who do not have a residence permit, they need

to improvise in the sense that they work as casual labour in the irregular sector. The

KRG security authorities check the documents of employees at the private sector. If

someone does not have residency it is difficult to have employment at a private sector

entity.

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Geographical varia ons in the access to employment

26. For Iranian Kurds who are employed in KRI, mostly work in Erbil and Sulaimania cities,

and less in Dohuk.

Healthcare

27. Previously, Iraqi Kurdish peshmergas as well as Iranian Kurdish pershmergas had access

to free healthcare in the Shorish Hospital in Sulaimania along with Peshmerga Hospital

in Erbil. The last update of the status of these two hospitals is unknown to the source.

In this respect, the source pointed out that the recent agreement between Iran and

Iraq regarding Iranian Kurdis refugees in KRI has affected a number of elements. For

instance in Sulaimania Governorate, it appears that a refugee no longer need a support

letter from one of the political parties to obtain refugee status; only a UNHCR

certificate is needed. The source mentions this because in the recent package

agreement between Iran and Iraq, potentially, the free healthcare for peshmergas

could also be affected by the agreement.

28. Access to healthcare for refugees depends on their financial power. Iranian Kurds have

the same access to healthcare as the local residence. If they can afford a private

hospital, it is more expensive than the public hospitals. The public hospitals that are

subsidised only charge symbolic fees. The fees are lower than in private hospitals.

Food, water, electricity

29. Access to food, water and electricity depends on where the person is located. In KRI,

there is not a centre that will provide these services for Iranian Kurds coming without

any network. Previously, KDPI and Komala had hostels for people needing these

services, however, these hostels no longer exist. For the sake of documentation, a

refugee should immediately go to one of the UNHCR offices in Erbil and Sulaimana to

be registered. In terms of accommodation, they can only stay in one of the party

camps if they are affiliated with one of these. In case they are not affiliated with one of

the parties, they need to find a place to rent by themselves.

Poli cal rights

30. Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI do not have the right to vote in KRI, nor do they have

the right to run for office.

The general situa on for Iranian Kurds in the KRI

31. The general situation for Iranian Kurds in KRI has been worsening due to the pressure

of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

32. KRI is a part of Iraq, not an independent state and it is a neighbour of Iran, due to this

KRG does not have the tools to resist the pressures coming as a result of the

agreement. Baghdad and Teheran have made this agreement with multiple terms to

limit Iranian Kurdish refugees and political parties. Baghdad is using pressure against

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the KRG to implement this agreement, even at points of suspending salaries for some

public servants until KRG submits to implement some of the articles of the agreement.

KRG sees itself in a position in which they must meet the agreement at some point.

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A local Human Rights NGO

Erbil, 4

March 2024

Introduc on

1. The source’s main focus is to document and report on human rights violation in Iranian

Kurdistan, but also non-Kurdish areas of Iran.

Security in KRI

The General security situa on

2. The security situation for Iranian Kurds in KRI has always been tense and with a lot of

pressure security wise. At least nine Iranian Kurdish refugees, either affiliated to

parties or independent activists, human rights workers have been assassinated in KRI

from 2021 until today. The source has noticed traces of Iranian involvement in these

politically motivated assassinations. Unfortunately, due to the political relations

between KRG and Iran there has not been any follow up of these cases.

3. After the protest and uprising in Iran in September 2022, a number of new refugees

are coming to KRI. These are individuals either at risk of execution by the Iranian

government or they were imprisoned and released on bail; or they were injured, so

they fled Iran to Kurdistan region. These people were involved in a historical protest.

This has pushed the Iranian government to continue persecution of these individuals,

even outside the country and in KRI. There has been retribution attacks against these

new refugees. From January 2023 until today, the source had recorded three

assassinations and one unsuccessful attempt of assassination. The three individuals

were peshmergas, member of Iranian Kurdish political parties. The last person was an

Iranian Kurdish lawyer. It was an unsuccessful attempt of assassination against his life.

This lawyer himself was working on the cases of Iranian executions in KRI.

4. Threats against Iranian Kurdish refugees are particularly important for those who

continue their activities even in exile: activists, journalists, human rights defenders that

left Iran and want to continue their work. These individuals become targets from

Iranian government threats. These threats are mainly categorised, and the number one

is threatening phone calls, followed by abducting attempts, shooting at the residences

or where they stay, creating an atmosphere of lack of safety for refugees that continue

their activities. The source knows that several cases for individuals under threats have

been compelled or forced to join one of the political parties to get safety. Those who

do not join the political parties, continue to live in hiding and have to avoid the public.

Disarmament process

5. The disarmament process comes as an element of a bigger context. The source took

into consideration that refugee settlements have been targeted physically multiple

times by the Iranian security forces. Including missiles and drone attacks. The source

had seen multiple attacks since 2018, and specifically in 2022 in Sulaimaniya and Koye.

Thousands of people had to leave the camp in Koye because it was constantly

bombarded. These people had to move to the urban areas and find shelter there. This

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created a sort of chaos because these people are not accustomed to live in urban

areas, and the responsibility for this people were handed over to the urban areas.

Within that context, the Iranian government has been pushing Bagdad to implement

some agreements concerning the Iranian refugees. As KRG is not a state, they could

not run the process. So that agreement between Iran and Baghdad is still in place.

Status evacua on

6. The Iranian Kurdish political parties and their bases along the border have been closed

according to this agreement. The bases were evacuated, shutdown and some of them

were destroyed. That is mostly the case for KDPI and Komala, mainly in Suleimania.

Members of KDPI and Komala based on the border, they were all relocated to outside

Erbil. These settlements are hosting members of these parties who do not have arms.

7. In the new settlements, they are not armed. The classic camps had women and

children. In the new settlements by those evacuated from the border, are mainly single

members of these parties, men and women, but not children. That is the latest status.

8. Previously members of these parties could easily travel and had access to cities. This

has been restricted. Even wearing Kurdish uniforms have been limited and they cannot

carry guns. KRG is monitoring the situation. These measures have been introduced in

order to protect their own safety.

9. As far as the source knows, they have not noticed any base or settlements close to the

Iranian border. It seems that these locations have been fully evacuated. Another

development that relates to the topic is that previously KRG’s security forces were

responsible for the security along the border. But now it is the Iraqi border guards that

have been deployed. Iran has more influence on the Bagdad security bodies.

Loca ons of the weapons a er the disarmament process

10. The source has tried to understand what happened to the weapons after the

disarmament process. The source confirmed that there has been disarmament, but

because of confidentiality and security issues of these parties, the Iranian political

parties never came back to us on this issue of what happened to the weapons.

Iranian kurds and KDPI / Komala

11. The Iranian parties have tried to respect the sovereignty of Iraq and not to cause

problems for the Iraqi Kurdistan They have not initiated any attacks against Iran. This

has been an historical understanding. One has not seen a military operation started

from here against Iran. The parties of Iranian Kurds have members and sympathisers,

and the local parties here realised that. The relations seem to be at a good level.

Komala and KDPI have offices in Erbil and Suleimania.

Freedom of movements for Iranian refugees, rela on between UNHCR and KRG

12. For Iranian Kurds, refugees and non-refugees, they can only travel within Kurdistan

region. When it comes to internal freedom of movement; if a person has a residence

permit for Erbil and wants to go to Suleimania, it is most likely that he or she will be

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13.

14.

15.

16.



stopped at a checkpoint. They will be delayed and questioned. This has to do with the

dynamics between the local parties and these kind of sensibilities.

If someone has been granted residency in Erbil, but has a job in another governorate,

they have to get another permit - the whole process again. This is mainly relevant

when it comes to refugee residency permit. If it is a regular permit, it is not that

restricted.

Some Iranian Kurds are refugees, but they have not managed to get the residence

permit. The only document they have is UNHCR asylum seeker certificate. In that case,

it is almost impossible to travel from one city to another. The reason is the local

authorities in KRG must recognise the document issued by UNHCR. They cannot use

the UNHCR document to pass checkpoints. The same about access to housing. If s/he

only has the UNHCR document, it is almost impossible to rent a place. Over the past

few years, as an Iranian Kurd s/he must be member of a political party on paper to get

residence permit. That is the condition set by the residency office.

The KRG-issued document for refugees must be renewed every year.

The source did not know how many Iranian Kurds only holding a UNHCR document.

However, they assessed that there are many cases. Multiple factors lead to this:

Kurds persecuted within Iran, they do not necessarily agree with the ideology of the

parties so they do not want to be members. Former members of the parties left the

party for whatever reason, and are not members anymore.

The services and support provided by UNHCR has very much been imbalanced with the

situation of Syrian refugees in KRI. It seems like Syrian Kurds have been involved in

processes of resettlement in third countries. That is almost a non-existent status for

Iranians.

The support for Iranian Kurds from UNHCR has been very limited and not clear. The

source pointed to an example that took place in 2021 an Iranian refugee without a job

and no hope for resettlement, went to UNHCR for support. As a mean of protest, the

refugee set himself to fire and he ended up in hospital.

Situa on for Iranian Kurd returning from Europe to KRI

17. The source has not seen cases of Iranian Kurds returning from Europe to KRI.

Documents and checkpoints

18. Regular entries with passport if the visa is still valid and they can use their work permit.

19. When it comes to refugees, they need a valid document issued by KRG, political or

refugee residency permit for six months or one year. Previously, members of political

parties could use their own IDs, but that is no longer the situation. Komala or KDPI

members cannot show their own ID, it has to be a valid residence permit. But there

might be coordination if it is about a high level individual.

Travel between diﬀerent parts of KRI and who manages the checkpoints?

20. There are checkpoints between cities and the requirements are always the same. A

foreigner needs to present a valid ID card that could be regular residency or political

residency.

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21. Checkpoints are not run by the regular police, but by security forces, and there are

differences between the areas controlled by KDP and PUK. In PUK-controlled areas,

PUKs own security forces manage the checkpoints, and in KDP-controlled areas the

forces are from KDP.

22.

The source said that it had not heard of Turkish Checkpoints in the areas that they

operate, but maybe there are Turkish checkpoints in remote districts in the mountains.

Iranian intelligence services in KRI

23. The source has noticed pattern in that IRGC or other security forces such as Ministry of

Information do not have open presence.

24. The source stated that the Iranian presence is not open. Iranian agents enter the KRI in

disguise, or open front companies and businesses

25. The true intention behind this is about intelligence gathering for the benefit of Iran.

The source had seen a number of assassinations. The last one was a member of KDPI,

he was approached by someone that wanted to do business. IRGC commit

assassinations and go back to Iran. However, things have slightly changed. There is a

growing sentiment against Iran. Now local Kurds have more sympathy for Iranian Kurds

due to Iran's attack on Iraqi Kurdistan.

Cross through checkpoints with documents from the par es like Komala and KDPI.

26. Previously members of Iranian Kurdish political parties could use their own party IDs,

but that is no longer the case.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

An International Humanitarian Organisation

Erbil, 3

March 2024

Background

The organiza on works with IDPs and refugees in many countries, including Iraq in the

following sectors in the sectors of protec on monitoring, legal assistance, educa on and health

service.

Socio-economic and poli cal rights connected to residence permit in KRI

Housing

1. Iranian Kurds staying legally in the KRI with a residence permit have the possibility to

rent housing. The Iranian Kurds, who are without a residence permit, live in

settlements with friends and families or in different urban areas in KRI. These informal

settlements are usually old abandoned military bases and buildings. One of these

settlements was bombed by Iran over a year ago. The bombing took place in

September 2022, in which the bases of Iranian Kurdish armed forces were bombed in

several locations in Erbil, and a few civilian Iranian Kurds were killed.

2. When asked if these Iranian Kurds living in the informal settlements have legal stay,

the source responded that it is not easy to obtain a residence permit in KRI; however,

the KRI is seemingly lenient with Kurdish refugees in that they are not deporting them

or detaining them.

3. Iranian Kurds who legally reside in the KRI with a residence permit can move freely

around, and can reside in any city or place in the KRI. Though they cannot travel to

federal Iraq. In order to take residence in a certain neighbourhood, a security clearance

is required by the KRI security agency “Asayish”. This clearance is not difficult to get,

and a sponsor letter is not required for this process. However, in order to obtain a

residence permit a sponsor of a political party is required.

4. But housing is still difficult to get, because of the general housing situation. There are

few available houses because of the poor economic and employment situation in KRI.

So often 2-3 families will reside together. Informal settlements are an option for

Iranian Kurds, and there are 4 in Erbil.

5. Iranian refugees do not live in any formal camps run by the UN or the KRI government,

but are scattered across towns and settlements. Many left the settlements in 2022

after Iran conducted a bombing strike by the Iranian government in one of the

settlements in Koya town. The source has since this bombing stopped entering the

settlements and has stopped the services. The only way to communicate with them is

online.

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IRANIAN KURDS IN THE KURDISTA N REGION OF IRAQ

6. The source did not have detailed information on Kawa and Jazhnikan settlements.

Kawa camp is a settlement of Iranian refugees situated in Erbil Governorate. Jezhnikan

is a settlement of Iranian refugee settlement affiliated with KDPI.

Entry/exit

7. Most Iranian Kurds who are here are at risk, but the risk differs whether an Iranian

Kurd has entered legally or illegally. If you enter legally, then you are fine. Like any

other person, an Iranian Kurd entering legally, will be granted a 30-day visa. If an

Iranian Kurds is granted his 30-day visa and then a residence permit, the Iranian Kurds

will not face any legal problems and will not need to be afraid of deportation or the

security forces or the government.

8. But a residence permit issued for the first time, costs at least 500 USD a year or above,

which is costly for most Iranian Kurds.

9. There are fines for overstaying a visa at approximately 15 USD a day, some enter KRI

legally but exit illegally to avoid paying the fines at the border.

10. In case an Iranian Kurd with illegal stay in KRI left for Europe and then decides to return

voluntarily to KRI, s/he can return via the airport legally.

Residence permits

11. Iranian Kurds who have entered illegally have nothing recorded to their names, and

can only access the political residence permit and not the humanitarian residence

permit, which requires legal entry. The document for political residence permit is only

issued for KRI.

12. To apply for a residence permit, the applicant needs to be present in the KRI.

13. To get a political residence permit in the KRI, some requirements must be met. You

need to be a recognised member of an Iranian Kurdish opposition party in Erbil or

Soleymania/KDPI or Kumala, present a party ID card and along with an Iranian ID to

prove the names and date of birth etc., either original or a copy and finally, as a prove

of residential living area in KRI, a housing supporting letter from a governmental focal

point, i.e. the local mukhtar in KRI is needed. This procedure is applicable whether or

not the person is registered with the UNHCR or not.

14. The process starts at the Directorate of Residence who refers to Asayish for the

security check. Biometrics are collected from the applicant as well, including a blood

test that is tested for HIV and Hepatitis. In the experience of the source, they did not

see anyone with these diseases being deported.

15. The political residence permit is valid for one year, before it needs renewal.

16. For children under 18 years are not going to have a separate residence permit. The

name of his child will be listed in his mother’s residence permit. The child’s birth

certificate is required as documentation. A birth certificate either from Iran or Iraq will

be accepted.

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17. Sometimes Asayish rejects applicants, and the source does not know why. This

rejection implies that the applicant will not be able to obtain a residence permit at all.

18. Iranian Kurds who entered KRI illegally and who are not members of any of the Iranian

Kurdish opposition parties cannot obtain a political residence permit, nor can they

apply for a regular residence permit. What they can do is to apply for a UNHCR

certificate, which might help them with housing and at security checks while crossing

checkpoints.

19. If family members of an Iranian Kurd are party members, then other members of the

family can join the party.

20. The source did not know about members of armed groups and their access to

residence permits.

21. In order to obtain a regular residence and work permit, only people who enters

regularly with a stamp in the passport can access this.

22. In order to work in the KRI, one needs a sponsorship from the private company and

that sponsorship is usually done by lawyers. Some lawyers’ main case load is to make

fake working contract for people applying for residence and work permit.

Deporta on

23. The source had not heard of any cases of deportation to Iran, nor had they heard of

deportations of Iranian Kurds. In this respect, the source pointed to the fact that

source only provide services for Iranian refugees and asylum seekers who are

registered as such; however, there are many Iranian Kurds who are not registered with

the UNHCR and the source does not provide service to these persons and do not have

knowledge about them.

24. The source had, however, heard of cases of deportation of Syrian refugees.

25. There are two types of deportations. There are informal deportations, performed by

the local security or the residence office writing a letter expressing the need for

deporting this person. If this letter is sent by Assayish, it can be directed to the

Department of Residency. In these cases, the source can in some cases advocate for

the person in order to stop the deportation. In criminal cases, the court can decide to

deport a defendant and in these cases the decision is final.

26. If Iranian agents kidnapped an Iranian Kurd from the KRI to bring them back to Iran,

these are cases that the source is not aware of. This might happen.

Employment

27. Kurds must get visa for entry, and then apply for obtaining work residence permits.

28. A political residence permit grants access to the job market, but not in the public

sector. Only Iraqi citizens can work in the public sector; however, since 2014, KRG

stopped hiring workers. So Iranian Kurds work in the private sector, which is small and

there is a lack of opportunities due to the declining economy of KRI. There are IDPs and

Syrian Kurds, who also seek employment in this sector. So finding a job in general is

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difficult, but it is easier in Erbil than in Sulaimania and Dohuk, but still difficult. The

sectors who most often employ Iranian refugees are restaurants, super markets and

construction.

29. The working conditions are often hard in that working hours are often 10-12 hours per

day without extra pay and in some places weekends are work days too. The source

knew of an example in which an Iranian Kurd worked for a full month for 200 USD.

Labour law is not being applied at all by the companies working in the private sector.

Educa on

30. All refugees have access to education, but they still face challenges. An Iranian Kurd

needs to provide documentation for the education that he already has achieved, which

might not be easy, as they cannot ask their school or university in Iran for documents.

But if they can provide these documents, they can enrol in education.

31. Iranian Kurds have access to schools without a residence permit, but for university

enrolment, a residence permit is required.

Health services

32. Iranian Kurds have the same access to health service as the host community. Publicly

provided healthcare is almost free, there is a symbolic price around 50 cents. But the

services are of poor quality in general, and not all treatments are available. Many go to

private healthcare for special treatments, but this costs money. If someone needs

surgery in a public hospital, s/he will be put on waiting list for a year, less or more. For

instance, treatment for diabetes, heart failures and cancer is available for those who

can pay the price. For diabetes, the refugees have access to free treatment at the Layla

Qasim Hospital in Erbil.

33. In the government healthcare system, they usually only have a few types of medicines

and often they do not have the needed medicines. In terms of logistics and quality, the

healthcare system in KRI is very poor. The source exemplified this in that a doctor at a

public hospital may look at 20 patients during one hour. This is why many people do

not trust the public hospitals and prefer to go to the private sector instead even

though it is more costly.

Food, water, electricity

34. Electricity and water is not very expensive. It is provided by government services, and

generators can be bought as well. The electricity supply is the same everywhere, but in

some places there is privately supplied electricity, which can be expensive.

35. Electricity is provided to houses only. One cannot put up a tent a plug into the

electricity system.

36. There is no free food or NGO assistance to get food. Maybe the World Food Program

can assist but the source is not aware.

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A local NGO providing legal assistance

Erbil, 6

March 2024

Background

1. The purpose of the NGO is to advocate for the rights of the Iranian Kurdish refugees in

Iraqi Kurdistan. The NGO provides legal assistance in terms of documents, food and

healthcare and legal assistance and advocacy in cooperation with international NGOs

on resettlements to third countries. s

Overview of the situa on for Iranian Kurds in KRI

2. There are 12,000 Iranian Kurdish refugees who have been granted a UNHCR asylum

certificate. Out of these, the NGO has had interaction with 4,500.

3. The Syrian refugees in KRI have been categorised as refugees who escaped war, while

the majority of the Iranian Kurdish refugees have a political background, thus escaping

persecution by the Iranian government due to their political activities.

4. The majority of Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI do not carry passports and the refugees

who are in KRI essentially can be divided into two groups: Those who are forced to stay

here being granted UN documents or local residence permits and they have not been

able to be granted other documents due to legal matters. Those who, due to the lack

of legal documents, resorted to leaving KRI through irregular means to a third country.

5. Those who did not find shelter in a third country and are still staying in KRI, their rights

to legal documents have always been challenged. This community find themselves in

the margins. Due to the complicated nature of the relationship between Iran and Iraq,

between Iraq and KRG and due to the policies and practices of the UN, the Iranian

Kurds staying in KRI are not given the rights that they are entitled to.

6. Iraqi law does not give rights to Iranian Kurdish refugees. The sole interaction by the

UNHCR with Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI is to register them as asylum seekers and

to renew their asylum seeker certificate.

7. When an Iranian Kurd has been registered by the UNHCR, the KRG provides a proof of

identity that is a document only recognised by the KRG. The proof of identity does not

give the right to buy a SIM-card, to own property, to get a drivers licence for

professional purposes, to work in the public sector or to travel outside of KRI. Nor does

it give the right to register a business under their own name.

8. The KRG authorities have told the lawyer working for the NGO, that they can only

protect Iranian Kurdish refugees to some extent and that it is up to the refugees to

protect themselves.

9. The source added that Iranian Kurdish refugees who are disabled or have diseases

cannot travel abroad to seek treatment, because they do not have an internationally

recognised travel document.

10. The NGO has documented at least 180 cases of refugees dealing with health conditions

among which 10-12 cases according to medical doctors can only find treatment

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abroad. The main part of these cases are children with rare diseases, breast cancer and

eye sight problems. With the lack of travel document from KRG and Iraq, it is not

possible for the people concerned to get treatment. The NGO was familiar with cases

in which the patients died due to the lack of treatment.

11. Resettlement options for Iranian Kurds in KRI are very limited.

Assassina ons of Iranian Kurds in KRI commi ed by the Iranian government

12. With regards to threats by the Iranian government against the Iranian Kurds in KRI,

since 1980 until today there were 400 documented cases of politically motivated

assassinations. The assassinations increased significantly in 1992. In most of these

cases, no lawsuit was filed at the local court. Only recently, some lawsuits have been

filed.

13. The lawyer representing the NGO represented the victim’s family in a lawsuit. The

victim who was an Iranian Kurdish activist, Behrouz Rahimi, was assassinated on 14 July

2021. Four persons acting on behalf of the Iranian government intelligence authority

monitored the victim during six months and killed in Sulaimania. Out of these four, two

of them were arrested and detained by the court in Sulaimania. One of them was

acquitted and the other one received a life sentence. All four of the accused were Iraqi

citizens hired by the Iranian intelligence service.

14. In the past two to three years, the NGO has registered five cases of assassination

carried out by the Iranian security agencies against the Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI;

threats in different forms and manners against the Iranian Kurdish communities in KRI.

15. The profile of the assassinated, include members of the political parties, supporters of

the political parties and activists who are not affiliated with any of the political parties.

If the Iranian government becomes aware that the activists in KRI are continuing their

activities in exposing the government, it does not matter to the government if the

activist is a party member or not and if they are armed or unarmed, it will still target

the activist.

Residence permit

16. It is important to note that the document issued to Iranian Kurdish refugees by the

KRG is in legal terms not a residence permit. Technically, it is a document that proves

the identity of the holder.

17. The Iraqi law for residence permit is called ‘The Law of Residence for Foreigners’ that

covers foreigner entering the country legally. In the law there is no mentioning of

refugees, i.e. those who enter the country without a passport.

Residence permit in the governorate of Sulaimania

18. The reason for the difference in practice in granting permits based on political

affiliation between the governorates in KRI is mainly due to political pressure by the

Iranian government on different political actors in KRI.

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19. Five years ago in the governorate of Sulaimania, it was easier to be granted a permit

based on political asylum for Iranian Kurdish refugees in KRI, however, since then it has

become increasingly difficult to obtain this type of permit. Almost 80 percent of Iranian

Kurdish refugees are facing obstacles in accessing this document through the filters of

the local security offices due to the change of political dynamics etc.

20. Previously, the practice was that any Iranian Kurd with a political background,

independent or party affiliated, who came to the KRI, the local authorities would with

no exception ask them to provide a support letter that confirms either their support og

membership of one of the Iranian Kurdish political parties. This was one of the

conditions to start the process to acquire the refugee permit, once the Asayish

approves him/her. However, the recent situation and the change in the political

relations between the countries have implied that the support letter from one of the

political parties is no longer a condition in the governorate of Sulaimania. The reason

for this is Iran’s political influence and pressure exercised over the Iraqi state.

21. Recent practices by the local authorities and the clearance of the security authorities is

that even if the person is granted a permit based on political affiliation, the refugees

cannot choose freely in which neighbourhood that they want to live. Recently, the

security offices tell these permit holders where they can settle.

22. The process of being issued a permit as a political refugee is delayed.

23. Travelling from Sulaimania to Erbil governorate, the source was stopped at the

checkpoint for thirty minutes and questioned. This is related to the dynamics of the

political situation between the two governorates.

24. The NGO’s lawyer noted that there is no space for a lawyer or the refugee himself

could appeal a decision on residence permit to the court. Essentially, if a permit is not

granted there is no avenue for appeal.

25. The NGO has observed in multiple cases that Iranian Kurds not being able to be

granted a permit as a political refugee in Sulaimania. The applicant were in some cases

told by the authorities in Sulaimania that they could not issue a permit to him/her and

instead they went to Erbil to submit an application. However, the applicants were not

necessarily issued a permit in Erbil. The system is unconventional.

26. Because of the pressure by Iran on the KRG, the Iranian political parties no longer have

the influence they used to have on matters as for instance the access to residence

permit for their members in KRI.

27. The influence of Iran on KRI was exemplified in their attempt on influencing the KRG to

build walls around the compounds of the Iranian Kurdish political parties.

Ci zenship

28. The sole authority of issuing Iraqi citizenship is the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, Office of

Nationality and ID, Baghdad. The KRG does not have the authority to issue citizenship.

29. According to Iraqi law, if an Iranian Kurd marries an Iraqi citizen, they should be

entitled to acquire Iraqi citizenship after five consecutive years, or ten years in case

two Iranian Kurds are married. However, what the source sees in practice when these

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individuals apply for Iraqi citizenship, is that the Iraqi authorities send the Iranian

Kurdish individual back to Iran to interrupt the circle of time in order to find an excuse

for not granting them citizenship.

30. In terms of being granted citizenship via marriage to an Iraqi citizen, it does not make

any difference if the Iranian Kurd is a man or a woman. In limited cases, some Iranian

Kurds managed to obtain Iraqi citizenship via marriage to an Iraqi citizen, however, this

is not a systematic or open legal channel for everyone.

31. The source stated that there are two reasons why the Iraqi government does not issue

citizenships to Iranian Kurds. Firstly, the Iranian government is pressuring the Iraqi

government, and secondly the Iraqi government fears that if citizenship is given to

Iranian Kurds the percentage of votes in elections given to Kurdish parties in Iraq will

rise as will the percentage of votes to parties in Baghdad will fall.

Dis nc on between Syrian and Iranian Kurdish refugees by the KRG authori es

32. Syrian refugees have been offered a higher level of services in the KRI in terms of

housing, media avocation and cash assistance than the Iranian Kurdish refugees. The

source was not sure if it was the KRG authorities or the UN who were behind the

differentiated treatment.

33. As opposed to an Iranian Kurdish refuge, a Syrian refugee can buy a SIM card and have

it legally registered based on his/her UNHCR certificate.

34. An Iranian Kurdish refugee can access a SIM card if an Iraqi citizen is willing to purchase

it under his or her own name for the Iranian Kurd, or buy a SIM card without proper

legal registration.

35. Most Syrian refugees have their Syrian passport, which means that if they want to

travel abroad, this is possible for them.

Al Tash

36. Around the year 1980 during the Iran-Iraq war, 5,000 Iranian Kurdish refugees were

accommodated in the Al Tash camp near Ramadi. The remaining of the refugee

population now live in Barika in Sulaimania and Kawa outside Erbil. Forty-four years

later, none of these Iranian Kurdish refugees have been able to acquire any Iraqi

identity document or passport. The children and grandchildren of these refugees are

still living on refugee permits issued for one year at a time.

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Directorate of Residence

Erbil, 6

March 2024

Responsibili es

1. The Directorate manages issuance and renewal of Iqama (the legal residence and

working permit).

2. They are also responsible for issuance of residence permits to persons without a legal

stay/legal entry in KRI, e.g. Syrians.

3. The Directorate also manages extensions of visas. A visa can be extended for 30 days,

three times. As such, a person entering KRI can stay legally for four months in total

without leaving the country, if he/she extends their visa. In this case the person gets a

stamp in the passport and not a residence permit. It is not a requirement to leave the

country between the extension of visa. The fee for extending the visa is 40 USD.

4. Lastly, the Directorate manages exit visas. If a person overstays, they will be required

to pay a fee.

5. The Directorate of Residence falls under the KRG Ministry of Interior and under Iraqi

law.

Types of residence permits:



There are 3 types of residence application at the Directorate of Residence

1: First time application (with proof of legal entry in KRI)

2: Renewal of residence permit

3: Foreigners without a prove of legal entry (with illegal entry in KRI)

There are two types of physical documents: A brown card proving legal entry and

blue/purple card proving illegal entry [corresponding refugee status]. The documents

contains some UV print and have no tactile elements. The document contain

information about the holder (Name, surname, DOB, Issue date, expire date, children,

passport number, residence type, Sponsor).

8. On the back of the card there is contact information of the sponsor. The document also

contains a barcode which is a reference to the Directorate of Residence. It is not

possible to have the brown card issued if the persons have not entered KRI legally.

9. The documents are personalised locally, including at the office of the Directorate of

Residence in Erbil.

Residence permit with legal entry (Iqama)

10. Foreigners who enter KRI with a passport can apply for a residence permit issued on a

brown ID card. Other document than the passport to prove identity is not needed.

11. It is required to have a sponsor when applying for residence. This is often a company if

the persons comes to work. However, the sponsor could be any Iraqi citizen that is

willing to support the person while staying in KRI. This goes for both first time issuance

and renewal.

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12. An Iqama can be applied for through an online system. Documents can be uploaded via

this system, and the applicant can review the process online. The system was

implanted after COVID.

13. A blood test is required to be submitted the application. If the blood test is passed, the

process of residence is started. The test is for HIV and different types of hepatitis. If the

blood test is passed, the process can start. If not, the application will not be granted a

residence permit and will be send back.

14. However, if the blood test is tested positive for hepatitis the person can in some cases

still be issued a residence permit, depending on the type of hepatitis. In these cases

the person is referred to the Ministry of Health. When the blood test is passed, the

applicant appears for information capture, pay the fee, and their residence card is

printed.

15. Because of the result of a blood test is required, and proof of legal entry in KRI, it is not

possible to submit the application from abroad. If a person already has a job, their

lawyer or a company representative can be the sponsor. If not, a private person can be

the sponsor. This person must be an Iraqi citizen. This person and the applicant must

also have a contract which states that the sponsor will take care of the applicant.

16. If an applicant has a private sponsor, who is not familiar with the online system, the

application can be made offline.

17. If an applicant has a private sponsor and not a job, they can travel to KRI and if they

continue to extend their visa, they have four months to acquire a job, and then, they

can apply for the residence permit, and if they do not acquire a job, they can obtain a

permit with a sponsor.

18. There is no requirement for the type of job. The employer must be a registered

business, and must obtain a security clearance.

19. For diplomats, the process goes through the Department of Foreign relations.

20. The residence permit is valid for six months or one year. There exists no permanent

residence permit.

21. The maximum is three years and this is only available for persons married to an Iraqi

citizen. The fee and process for this residence permit it different.

22. Visa: there is a website where you can apply online before arrival. Some are exempted

from visa. If you don’t have the visa from online you have to apply at the airport.

23. The Directorates database is renewed every month. It contains information about

which country an applicant is from, how many stays they have had in KRI, etc. The

Directorate has a paper database and an online database. The paper database dates

back to 2003/2005, and the online started in 2020. The physical version is in process of

being digitalised in the digital archive. There has been a digitalization process since

2020 (COVID), and the intent is to eventually rely solely on the digital database.

24. Is it part of the procedure to check archives when a residence permit is issued.

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Fees

25. The legal residence permit costs 780-800 USD (1,175,000 IQD) for first time issuance.

Renewal costs 100 USD, if the applicant has an insurance (the insurance is bought

when the application for residence is submitted). A person can choose to pay for an

insurance. The price is 50,000 IQD per month. It is optional, but the Directorate

recommends it. If accidents happens, they are covered.

26. Without the insurance the renewal costs 500,000 IQD. For citizens that do not require

a visa (e.g. Europeans), the fee is less (200 USD).

27. Extension of visas costs 100,000 IQD/70 USD per extension.

28. When a person overstay his/her visa/residence permit the person is fines every day of

overstay. The overstay is fines with 20 USD per day. The person is also required to pay

for an Exit Visa that cost 40 USD. The same applies if a person have previously had

residence permit. If a residence permit has expired while the person is not in KRI, there

is no fee, but the person must obtain a residence permit anew.

Previous stay

29. If a person has previously stayed in the KRI and perhaps overstayed, they can follow

the exit visa process, and their present stay will be legal.

Residence Permit for persons who have entered KRI illegally

30. Syrian refugees without a passport or with illegal entry are stationed in camps,

supervised by UNHCR.

31. After getting the UNHCR document, a person will have a blood test and apply for the

security clearance. Then they can get the blue/purple residence card.

32. With this card, a person can travel, work and be part of society. However, this permit

does not grant travel outside KRI, meaning that the person cannot leave KRI. It is as

such a proof of identity, with which a person can work, pass checkpoints etc. inside

KRI.

33. In case a person holding a blue/purple card wants to settle in another governorate in

KRI than the issuing governorate, then the person needs to transfer their files to this

governorate to be issued a new card stating the governorate of domicile.

34. For this type of residence permit, there is a differentiation of nationality. Syrians are a

large group. Because of the large numbers of Syrian refugees coming to KRI the

Directorate of Residence have set up an office near a camp in Barhaka, which is a town

20 minutes outside Erbil town. At this office UNHCR is present and issue UNHCR

documents, the persons applies for the residence permit and gets the security

clearance. The residence card is also issued there. In addition, the Asayish (KRI

intelligence service) also has an office to perform security checks of the refugees.

35. The majority of the Iranian Kurds with illegal entry and without a passport are in KRI

because they are politically active (members or supporters of political parties). In order

for them to have a political residence permit, they need to show a support letter from

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36.

37.

38.

39.

the political party with which they are affiliated (KDPI, Komala etc.). When it is

presented, the blood test is made. The security clearance has to be issued by the

General Asayish (main headquarters of Asayish in Erbil). The Asayish gives final

clearance to the Directorate of Residence to issue the blue/purple card to this group.

An Iranian Kurd will not get a security clearance if they have background activities with

e.g. terrorism, drugs or having a pending court cases.

When asked if the armed members of the Iranian political parties will be granted a

blue/purple residence permit as a political refugee, the source replied that the she did

not have the exact answer. For the case processing of application for political asylum,

the Directorate of Residence, the applicant need to bring the security clearance from

Asayish.

In the majority of cases on Iranian Kurds, they have been affiliated with one of the

Iranian Kurdish parties. However, if an Iranian Kurd claims that s/he has no affiliation

with one of these parties, presenting a document that shows affiliation with one of

parties is still a requirement for submitting an application, before they can be sent to

the blood test, after which the Directorate of Residence finally refer the person the

final decision be the General Asayish office. The permit given to Syrians, and the

permit given to Iranians are the same. However, the reason is different. On the back of

the card, it will say whether the permit is given for

political

humanitarian

reasons.

The Syrian cases are considered refugees fleeing war for which reason they are

considered humanitarian cases. In the exceptional cases in which an Iranian Kurd states

that s/he is not affiliated with any party, it is still the discretion of the general Asayish

to decide whether or not a permit can be granted based on the security check.

The blue/purple card has no fee, but needs to be renewed.

When asked if residence permit for persons who have entered KRI illegally was

required to have relatives in KRI, the source replied that this was not the case.

Iraqi ID card

40. The Iraqi ID card is only issued to Iraqi nationals and as such it proves Iraqi nationality.

Iraqi ci zenship

41. With regard to the possibility to apply for citizenship, according to Iraqi law, granting

citizenship is solely the discretion of the federal Iraqi authorities; the KRG authorities

do not have the discretion to grant any foreigner citizenship.

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An International Organisation

Erbil, 5

March 2024

Background

There are more than 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Iraq out of which the vast majority

are Syrians. By end of January 2024 there are approx. 8,500 Iranians in KRI out of which the vast

majority of are ethnic Kurds.

Legal residence permit

1. Concerning the registration role of the international organisation vis-à-vis the KRG and

Federal Iraqi authorities, the handling of legal residence is in the hands of the

government.

2. International organisation undertakes registration of refugees and asylum seekers, but

only residence documents from the government entail legal residence in Iraq.

3. In federal Iraq, the entity called PC-MoI (Permanent Committee of Ministry of Interior)

issue the PC-MoI card which is the legal residence document issued for refugees and

asylum seekers. While in the KRI, there are two types of humanitarian residence

permits: political residence permit (PRP) and humanitarian residence permit (HRP) as

the basis for protection of refugees and asylum seekers in Iraq. In Erbil most Iranians

receive the PRP, but that is not the case in Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk.

4. The type of humanitarian residence card is written on the back of the card. The HRP

card and the PRP card is issued by the Directorate of Residence in either Dohuk, Erbil

or Sulaymaniyah.

5. The card does not say residence permit, it says: Personal Identification.

6. The process for issuing HRP and PRP is slightly different depending on which of the

three Kurdish governorates the application is submitted to: Sulaymaniyah, Erbil or

Dohuk.

7. The important point is that that refugees and asylum seekers either have a HRP. PRP or

PC-MoI card which provide them protection for them to safely stay in Iraq.

8. Registration by the international organisation is at this moment required step to obtain

legal residence document issued by the government.

9. Other documentation needed for applying for residence permit with KRI authorities:

10. Id document: Passport or ID card (in absence of this, the application can still be

processed)

11. Security clearance by Asayish (KRI intelligence service)

12. Blood test

13. Proof of residence issued by Mukthar (government appointed community leader) The

process can take one month, if the requirements are fulfilled.

14. There is a restriction to who can obtain HRP and PRP issued by the KRI authorities:

15. HRP is currently not issued by KRG if the person have entered KRI legally with certain

exceptions.

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16. An asylum seeker can apply for HRP or PRP if s/he entered illegally, but an application

can be rejected.

17. Previous stay as refugee in KRI is not a complication for obtaining a normal residence

permit. What matters is how they enter, and with which documents, the relevant time

around. If an individual was previously a resident of KRI and left without due process (an

exit permit) with the authorities, it might present a challenge to obtain security

clearance again. A previous residence permit or application for such will be registered

with the authorities.

18. Reasons for the KRG authorities to reject an HRP/PRP to a refugee could be if the person

entered legally, even though the international organisation has registered the applicant

with few exceptions related to family unification and vulnerable/humanitarian cases.

Registration by the international organisation

19. When registering with the international organisation, the applicant is invited to

present any available documents, including identity documents. However, if identity

documents are not available, people are registered anyways based on the international

organisation’s assessment of their identity. This assessment is made at an interview.

20. Physical presence is mandatory for registration with the international organisation.

21. General basic biodata is collected, along with biometric data.

22. There is no data sharing agreement with Iraq authorities, so the international

organisation’s database is not available to them.

23. Documents submitted are kept in both physical and digital form in the international

organisation’s archive.

24. The international organisation’s registrations are verified every one or two years. If a

person fails to present themselves physically for renewal, their registration will

become inactive.

25. Resettlement automatically inactivates a registration.

26. By request of the registered person, a registration can also be inactivated.

27. A person or a legal representative can, if requested, and based on legal authorization

and consent by the respective applicant can gain access to a person’s file

28. If a foreigner has entered legally and therefore cannot obtain HRP, s/he can still

Sulaymaniyah they can receive the international organisation’s documentation where

in Erbil documents cannot be issued without the security clearance. In Dohuk,

applicants cannot access registration in absence of security clearance.

29. If a person has only the international organisation’s registration, and not the legal

residence permit, they are not protected in the same manner with regard to access to

public services and freedom of movement, but the international organisation will

intervene if there is a threat of for example refoulement. The international

organisation does currently not have data concerning how many refugees and asylum

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30.

31.

32.

33.

seekers in KRI who has only the international organisation’s registration, and not the

legal residence permit.

The document provided by the international organisation was previously issued to

individuals and families. Lately (since one month) the individual certificate is only

issued if needed but not as a general practise anymore.

Due to the inherently peaceful, humanitarian and non-political nature of asylum and

international protection, active combatants are not admissible to the international

organisation’s registration procedures. The Civilian Character of Asylum (CCA) is

maintained through screening. Where a former member of an armed group

approaches for registration and has disarmed, and it has been verified by the

international organisation that s/he is a civilian who has genuinely and permanently

renounced armed activities, the international organisation will register the person.

If a person does not see added value by obtaining the international organisation’s

registration, they can choose to remain unregistered. Some may not register due to

lack of information. The source did not have information on unregistered refugees in

KRI.

The international organisation’s registration is conducted as per global standards.

Standard database and system used.

Conditions for Iranian Kurds in KRI

34. If a refugee has a legal residence permit (HRP/PRP), one can access housing (renting),

health services, employment (private sector) and education.

35. In order to rent a house, it is a requirement to register with the local Asayish and to pay

the rent. A sponsor is not needed to access housing. There are no camps for Iranian

refugees. Most of them are living in urban settings or in settlements.

36. Health services require a nominal fee (500 IQD), except emergency service, which is free.

Basic treatment is available, also for most diagnosis. However, treatment for some

diseases will only be available in private clinics where it is expensive.

37. Some more complicated treatments are not available in the KRI, and the patient will

need to travel abroad to access this treatment.

38. HRP/PRP gives generic right to work in the private sector not to the public sector.

However, employment rate in KRI are low.

39. Most refugees work as daily labour in the informal sector, for instance in restaurants.

40. Holders of HRP and PRP have access to public (free) and private schools (tuition fee

payed by their families).

41. Refugees living in urban setting have access to food, water and electricity insofar as

s/he pays for them.

42. The international organisation provides a targeted assistance and protection services,

but relying on this is not a sustainable solution. For example, the multiple purpose cash

support is available for a year only for those who are eligible. The international

organisation tries to enhance self-reliance of refugees.

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43. In terms of access to electricity, for the host community there is not only the city

power, there are also private generators where one must pay on a monthly basis based

on the amount of amperes used.

44. Holding the HRP or PRP card is the key to stay in KRI with safety and dignity.

45. Refugees cannot participate in elections, general nor parliamentary. It is only for Iraqi

citizens.

Citizenship

46. Iraqi nationality law no. six of 2006 outline how foreigners can obtain Iraqi citizenship.

It is limited to certain categories and for all of them legal entry to the country is a

prerequisite. Another is ten years consecutive legal stay. If a non-iraqi marries an Iraqi

citizen, it’s five consecutive years.

47. There are other requirements, and even if an Iranian refugee fulfil them all, an

application for citizenship can be rejected. There are for example political concerns

regarding demographic change as stated in the constitution. The international

organisation is aware of cases where persons have been there for more than 40 years,

without gaining citizenship.

48. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior is the sole authority for citizenship. In cases where an

applicant fulfil all criteria, the minister still have the discretion to reject an application.

49. There is an Iranian consulate in Erbil.

50. After 2005, there was a group of Iranian Kurds who obtained citizenship issued by the

KRG authorities as well as a drivers licence. Most of these passports were later on

revoked by the federal government of Iraq, because these cases where not perceived

as Iraqi citizens.

Freedom of movement

51. Is dependent on the type of residence. If a foreigner has legal residence issued by KRI

authorities, s/he are free to move around in the KRI.

52. A person registered with legal residence in Erbil can travel to Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah

governorates, but if they want to live there, they need to transfer there. In this case, a

process is required including obtaining approval from current governorate of residence

and security clearance and approvals from security apparatus and residency of the new

governorate.

53. A certificate provided by the international organisation is not valid for access through a

check point. Neither is a membership card from a party. It also depends on the specific

situation, security situation and the person in charge at the specific check point.

54. To ensure free movement, a refugee must have the legal residence permit.

55. KRI check points are manned with KRI personnel.

56. A KRG issued Visa or Residence permit only grants access and freedom of movement in

KRI not in federal Iraq.

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Non-refoulement

57. The KRI authorities live up to principles of non-refoulement in general but it can depend

on a person’s case and profile. There are some individuals that the KRI authorities may

be more prone to deport. The international organisation tries to intervene for refugees

at risk of refoulment, and are mostly successful.

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Department of Foreign Relations (DFR), Didar Farhad Head of legal

office in DFR, Hardi Head of authentication office in DFR

Erbil, 4

March 2024

1. It is not possible for DFR to verify documents (authentication mail) if they only have

know the document number, or have an anonymised copy of the document. In order

for the DFR to verify documents they require to see the front and the back of the

document.

2. Since January 2023: 50.400 documents have been legalised by the DFR: including

documents from KRI, central Iraq and documents from abroad.

3. DFR is in close contact with KRG representative offices abroad.

4. Residence permits falls the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior.

5. There has been no change in DFR stamps since NIDC’s visit in September 2022.

However, there has been a change in signatures. 3 persons are permitted to sign

documents. Specimen signatures are shared with KRG representative offices abroad,

and from there sent to foreign countries. Specimens of the new signatures (the 3

signing officers) will be distributed within the next week.

6. They do verification of e.g. university degrees, civil documents, driving licenses.

7. There are 3 steps when verifying documents:



1: When an application is submitted, the documents are checked. The stamps

and signatures from the responsible ministry are verified (e.g. Ministry of

Justice if the document is a marriage certificate). If everything is ok, the

document is stamped and signed by one of the three responsible officers at

the DFR.



2: The documents are then registered digitally in the DFRs digital system. A file

number is generated. The file-number from the system is written into the

stamp from step 1.



3: The document is stamped with the round red stamp.

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Directorate of Passport

Erbil, 4

March 2024

Background

The mee ng took place with Colonel Abdu Salam: Head of Directorate of Passport in Erbil

Governorate.

Issuance of passports

1. The DoP informs that the process of passport issuance starts by applying for an

appointment online.

2. On the day of the appointment, the applicant is required to bring an Iraqi ID-card and

an information card, and pay a fee. The fee is paid with credit card and cash are not

accepted, which is a new procedure. However, if an applicant does not have a credit

card, the directorate will be helpful.

3. The information card is issued to the head of the family, most often the father, and

contains information on the holder, spouse and children. The card is not digitalized.

4. The required ID-card needs to be the newest version of the card. But if a person does

not have the new version, they can still have a passport issued.

5. Passports cannot be issued by proxy, as the issuance process requires the collection of

the applicants fingerprints, facial picture and iris scan, and the passport must be

collected by the holder him/herself.

6. If an applicant cannot physically come to the issuance place, the Directorate of

Passport have the possibility to come to the applicant. Previously with the old

passports, a notary would write a note, and bring it to the issuance place on behalf of

the citizen applying for the passport.

7. Since an Iraqi passport and national ID-cards fall under the jurisdiction of the federal

government in Baghdad, final approval needs to come from Baghdad, but this usually

happens within 1 hour of the request being sent to the Nationality Operation Room in

Baghdad.

8. If everything in the application is approved, the passport can be issued within an hour.

The passport is then personalised at the DoP office, where the application was

submitted. 9. If the passport is issued from Erbil, it will list “Erbil” as issuance

authority.

9. The Directorate of passport is currently issuing two different versions of passports. The

new version have been issued for a year in federal Iraq, and in Erbil since July 2023.

They will stop issuing the old version within a year. The old passport remain valid until

their expiration dates.

10. Iraqi citizens can apply for a passport abroad by visiting Iraqi embassies. The

requirements are the same.

11. The Iraqi passport cannot be issued to foreigners, including Iranian Kurds, as they do

not hold Iraqi citizenship.

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12. For applicants above 18 years, the validity of a passport is eight years. If the applicant

is below 18 years, the validity if four years.

13. The passport can be issued from the moment an individual is born. The same rule

applies for the issuance of ID-cards according to Iraqi law.

Renewal of passports

14. The DoP states that for a passport to be renewed, the applicant must present his/her

previous passport.

15. An application for passport renewal can be submitted, when the passport has less than

one year of validity left. If the passport has more than one year of validity left until its

expiration, an application for renewal can still be submitted, but for an extra fee.

16. It is not a requirement to have the passport renewed before it expires.

ID-cards

17. The new ID-card is a digital card, and carries all information about the holder including

fingerprints.

18. It is not issued by the DoP, but by the General Directorate of Citizenship.

19. The DoP has access to the digital ID-card database, and can verify an ID- card by

checking in the digital system.

20. The DoP states that the new ID-card and its digital database, fraud with ID-cards has

become almost impossible.

21. With the old Iraqi ID-card, the process of verification was more difficult.

22. With this new digitalised system, the DoP informs that eventually, the new ID-card will

be a requirement for passport application, with the only exception being for elderly

citizens or individuals with disabilities.

23. The fee for renewal of a passport is 200.000 IQD. The fee for a new passport is 91.000

IQD.

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

Access, residence permit, access to public services and security in

the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for Iranian Kurds

1. ACCE SS TO KRI

a. Requirements for entry at airport and land border points

b. Types of residence permits available, incl. requirements

a. The issuance of ID cards to foreigners

c. Registration of Iranian Kurds by local authorities

d. Access to citizenship in practice

a. The issuance of documents related to citizenship (nationality certificates and

passports)

e. Freedom of movement within KRI

Prevalence of deportation to Iran

2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC A ND POLITICAL RIGHT S CONNE CTED TO RESIDENCE

PERMIT IN KRI

g. Housing

h. Education

Employment

Healthcare

Political rights (hold public office, participate in elections)

k. Food, Water and Electricity

3. SECURITY IN KRI

m. Development of the general security situation in KRI since January 2023

n. Foreign armed actors

o. Non-state armed actors

p. Prevalence of security incidents and the extent and type of casualties

q. Kurdish armed forces and law enforcements