UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 105: Orientering om rapport om militærrekruttering af tjetjenere, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2023-24
UUI Alm.del Bilag 105
Offentligt

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)

FFM REPORT

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2023-24

UUI Alm.del - Bilag 105

Offentligt

April 2024

Russia

Recruitment of Chechens to

the war in Ukraine

us.dk – migrationsverket.se

UUI, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 105: Orientering om rapport om militærrekruttering af tjetjenere, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey

of all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other

country of origin information available on the topic.

The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information

does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any

particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be

regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

The Danish Immigration Service

Farimagsvej 51A

4700 Næstved

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

us.dk

April 2024

Agency.

The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk or

migrationsverket.se

The Danish Immigration Service’s and The Swedish Migration Agency’s publications can

be quoted with clear source reference.

The Swedish Migration Agency

Migrationsverket

60170 Norrköping

Sweden

+46 77 123 52 35

migrationsverket.se

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Executive summary

The Information space in Chechnya is tight, and has been further tightening after the invasion

of Ukraine. Therefore, the flow of information out of Chechnya is very limited.

Recruitment in Chechnya to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been different from the rest

of Russia. The Chechen authorities are recruiting in three different ways: patriotic reasons,

financial incentives and by coercive recruitment.

While almost no one has been willing to sign up for patriotic reasons, recruiting Chechens by

offering recruits comparably high salaries has been more successful. Most Chechens posted in

Ukraine have signed contracts for financial reasons.

Coercive recruitment of Chechens has been ongoing since February 2022. Coercive recruitment

in Chechnya peaked around the end of September 2022, when Putin announced a partial

mobilisation. Although it is difficult to assess the scale of coercive recruitment in Chechnya,

most corroborated cases has come from the city of Grozny.

The Chechens most at risk of being coercively recruited are critics of the authorities, family

members of vocal critics, drug and alcohol users as well as members of the LGBT community.

The Chechen authorities have used coercive recruitment to get rid of what they call the

undesirables. In general, any deviation from the norms and rules of Kadyrov’s leadership could

be used to coercively recruit Chechens. In this regard, the Chechen authorities use forced

recruitment as a form of punishment in Chechnya. Although certain groups can be identified as

being more at risk than others, there is also a high degree of unpredictability and arbitrariness

in the actions of Chechen authorities in regards to coercive recruitment.

It is difficult to assess whether there are any actual exemptions for recruitment in Chechnya, as

the Chechen authorities largely ignore the formal exemptions for recruitment to military

service in Russia.

Paying a bribe can exempt a person from recruitment. However, even after a person had paid a

bribe, the Chechen authorities could return for this person after a while in order to recruit him.

It would be very difficult to resist coercive recruitment in Chechnya, as the Chechen authorities

would likely use violence and physical abuse, resort to threats of a prison sentence based on

fabricated criminal charges or would beat the person to death if he refuses to comply.

There has been no recorded cases of coercively recruitment to the war in Ukraine of Chechens

residing in other parts of Russia than Chechnya, except for Chechens living in Dagestan.

Furthermore, the Chechen authorities has not recruited Chechens outside of Russia to the war

in Ukraine.

The Chechen authorities have recruited Chechens serving time in Chechen prisons for the war

effort in Ukraine. They primarily recruited from Chechen prisons in the second or third month

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of the full-scale invasion. However, there were not many prisoners from Chechnya to recruit, as

many Chechen prisoners serve their time in other parts of Russia.

Chechens serving their prison sentence in other parts of Russia has been subject to recruitment

to the war in Ukraine. However, the number of recruited Chechen prisoners is unclear.

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Table of contents

Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 1

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 5

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 7

Access to information ................................................................................................... 8

2. Chechen military recruitment in context ........................................................................... 9

2.1.

2.2.

The full-scale invasion ................................................................................................... 9

The local Chechen leadership ...................................................................................... 11

2.2.1. The relationship between Moscow and Grozny ........................................................ 11

2.2.2. Kadyrov and the “undesirables”

................................................................................ 11

2.2.3. Social life and Adat..................................................................................................... 12

3. Known Chechen armed formations with current or previous presence in Ukraine ............ 14

3.1.

Units under the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation................................. 14

3.1.1. Regular Units of the Ministry of Defence .................................................................. 14

3.1.2. Units formed from Chechen volunteers .................................................................... 15

3.1.3. Units that are formed and trained in Chechnya ........................................................ 15

3.2.

3.3.

Units of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs and Rosgvardia .............................. 15

Aspects of command structures .................................................................................. 16

4. Recruitment of Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine ........................................... 18

4.1.

Overall on Chechen recruitment ................................................................................. 18

4.2. Recruitment dynamics in Chechnya ................................................................................. 19

4.2.1. Recruitment and the relationship between Grozny and Moscow............................. 19

4.2.2. Collective guilt and recruitment ................................................................................ 19

4.3. Types of Recruitment........................................................................................................ 20

4.3.1. True belief .................................................................................................................. 20

4.3.2. Financial incentives .................................................................................................... 20

4.3.3. Coercive recruitment ................................................................................................. 20

4.4. Exemptions from recruitment .......................................................................................... 22

4.5.

Consequences of refusing ........................................................................................... 24

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4.6

Recruitment of Chechens residing outside of Chechnya............................................. 24

Recruitment of Chechens from other parts of the Russian Federation .............. 24

Recruitment of Chechens living outside of the Russian Federation ................... 25

4.6.1.

4.6.2.

4.7.

Recruitment of Chechens in prisons............................................................................ 26

4.7.1. Recruitment from Chechen prisons ........................................................................... 27

4.7.2. Recruitment from prisons outside of Chechnya ........................................................ 27

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 30

Annex 1: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................. 35

Annex 2: Meeting minutes ................................................................................................. 36

Open Caucasus Media ............................................................................................................. 36

Georgian journalist .................................................................................................................. 39

Journalist covering Chechnya .................................................................................................. 41

Alexander Kvakhadze and Gela Khmaladze of the Rondeli Foundation.................................. 44

Mark Galeotti ........................................................................................................................... 47

HRW and NEDC ........................................................................................................................ 51

Russia Analyst .......................................................................................................................... 56

Harold Chambers ..................................................................................................................... 58

Russian journalist ..................................................................................................................... 64

Georgian activist ...................................................................................................................... 68

Prof. Judith Pallot..................................................................................................................... 73

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Introduction

This present report is a product of a joint mission to Tbilisi, Georgia and the United Kingdom

undertaken by Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and the Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) from

17 February to 1 March 2024. The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information

on the recruitment methods of ethnic Chechens to the Russian armed forces during the full-

scale invasion of Ukraine.

The report covers Chechen military recruitment in a wider context of the Russian full-scale

invasion of Ukraine as well as known Chechen armed formations previously or currently

present in Ukraine. Furthermore, the report focuses of the various recruitment methods and

tactics employed by the Chechen authorities, including coercive recruitment. Finally, the report

covers recruitment of Chechens from the Chechen and Russian prison systems.

DIS and SMA drew up the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the mission after consultation with the

defined target users of the report, in particular the Secretariat of the Danish Refugee Appeals

Board and the Asylum Division of DIS as well as a Danish advisory group (Referencegruppen) on

COI. ToR is included in Annex 1 of this report. In the process of compiling this report, the

delegation interviewed 12 sources comprising nongovernmental organisations (NGOs),

journalists, think tanks, human rights defenders, analysts and researchers. The delegation

selected the sources interviewed based on their expertise, merit and experience relevant to the

mission.

Multiple sourcing is implemented to ensure that the collected data is precise and balanced. The

objective is to present a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to ToR at

the time of publication. The minutes of the meetings with the consulted sources are listed in

Annex 2. In addition to the information gathered from the interviews, the report is also based

on available reports as well as articles of relevance for ToR. The interviews were conducted in

either English or in Russian with an interpreter present. Some interviews were conducted

during meetings in Tbilisi and the United Kingdom, while others were conducted via Skype.

Prior to the interviews, all interlocutors were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the

mission and the fact that their statements would be included in a report made publicly

available. The interlocutors were asked how they wished to be introduced and quoted, and all

sources are introduced and quoted according to their own wishes. 6 out of 12 sources

preferred anonymity. All meeting minutes were forwarded to the interlocutors for their

approval and amendment, allowing them the opportunity to offer corrections or make

comments on their statements. All sources responded and approved their statements.

Care has been taken to present the views of the interlocutors as accurately and transparently as

possible. For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the

minutes of the interviews in Annex 2 have been numbered in a consecutive order, used in the

report when referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes. The quotation marks

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(“) are not used in the report whenever the text is a copy of the meeting minutes, however, a

reference is made in the footnotes to the paragraphs where the text is cited from.

During the interview, the source may have highlighted issues that are not addressed in the ToR.

As these issues could be relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the

meeting minutes in Annex 2, but not in the report.

The report has been externally peer reviewed by the Norwegian COI-unit, Landinfo, in

accordance with the EUAA COI Report Methodology.

The research and editing of this report

was finalised on 10 April 2024.

EUAA,

Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology,

February 2023,

url

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Abbreviations

COI

EUAA

DIS

FSB

FSIN

HRW

KIA

MoD

MVD

NEDC

NGO

OMON

PMC

SMA

SOBR

ToR

UFSIN

WIA

Country of Origin Information

European Union Agency for Asylum

Danish Immigration Service

Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)

Federalnaya Sluzhba Ispolneniya Nakazaniy (Federal Penitentiary Service)

Human Rights Watch

Killed In Action

Ministry of Defence

Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs)

Natalia Estemirova Documentation Center

nongovernmental organisations

Otryad Mobilnyy Osobogo Naznacheniya (Special Purposes Mobile Unit)

Private Military Company

Swedish Migration Agency

Spetsialnyy Otryad Bystrogo Reagirovaniya (Special Rapid Response Unit)

Terms of Reference

Upravlenie Federalnoy Sluzhby Ispolneniya Nakazaniy (Office of the Federal

Penitentiary Service)

Wounded In Action

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1. Access to information

The Information space in Chechnya is tight, and the flow of information out of the republic is

very limited.

Under the rule of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen authorities has cracked down on

independent journalists

and ushered public threats against relatives of Chechen activist.

All the oral sources consulted on the topic of access to information in Chechnya for this report

stated that the information space in Chechnya has been gradually shrinking in recent years.

The Georgian activist added that he knows of journalists from Chechnya who has been arrested

due to their work.

As such, many bloggers and journalists has left Chechnya, and are now

covering the area without presence in Chechnya.

Two journalists elaborated that Chechnya is a

much closed society and Chechens are not always willing to talk to people from outside

Chechnya due to fear of repression from local and federal authorities.

On top of this already tightening information space in Chechnya, the Russian full-scale invasion

of Ukraine has brought about a general tightening of the civic space throughout the Russian

Federation, which means that there are now legal implications connected to covering the

invasion of Ukraine.

According to Open Caucasus Media, many journalists and researchers

covering the North Caucasus from abroad has been advised against travelling to the areas since

the launch of the full-scale invasion.

A journalist covering Chechnya further stated that since

the outbreak of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, residents of Chechnya has been afraid even

to give information anonymously, because they fear that they or their relatives would be sent

to the war as a consequence.

Due to these circumstances, the most likely way for this source

and others like him to obtain information from the field in Chechnya in 2024 would be through

family connections.

Open Caucasus Media: 1; Georgian Journalist: 1; Journalist covering Chechnya 1; Georgian activist: 1

Al Jazeera,

Prominent Russian journalist and lawyer attacked in Chechnya,

4 July 2023,

url;

BBC,

Chechnya Milashina attack: Armed thugs beat up Russian journalist and lawyer,

4 July 2023,

url

Amnesty International,

Russia: Politician threatens to decapitate family members of Chechen activist,

February 2022,

url

Open Caucasus Media: 1; Georgian Journalist: 1; Journalist covering Chechnya 1; Georgian activist: 1

Georgian activist: 1

Journalist covering Chechnya: 1,2; Open Caucasus Media: 1; Georgian activist: 1

Georgian journalist: 1; Journalist covering Chechnya: 1

HRW,

Russia: New Restrictions for ‘Foreign Agents’,

1 December 2022,

url;

NPR,

Russian law bans

journalists from calling Ukraine conflict a 'war' or an 'invasion',

5 March 2022,

url;

HRW,

Russia

Criminalizes Independent War Reporting, Anti-War Protests,

7 March 2022,

url

Open Caucasus Media: 1

Journalist covering Chechnya: 2

Georgian Activist: 1

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2. Chechen military recruitment in context

When exploring patterns of military recruitment in Chechnya, the following should be taken

into account; conflict dynamics as well as decisions made, methods used and related

administrative set-up on the federal level in Russia concerning the supply of military personnel.

It is also of importance to consider the relationship between federal and Chechen authorities

and some characteristics of the leadership of Ramzan Kadyrov.

2.1. The full-scale invasion

Military build-up on Crimea and in Belarus and Russian regions bordering Ukraine preceded the

Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although there was ample evidence of

conscripts among Russian troops in Ukraine during the first months

, there was later in 2022

no indications that conscripts were used on any massive scale.

In addition to the Armed

forces, military units of the National Guard and the federal security service FSB, as well as

private military companies (PMCs) and units (now integrated into the Russian armed forces)

from the Ukrainian breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk have been part of the Russian

invasion force.

It is not possible to make any precise estimates of Russian military personnel losses during the

full-scale invasion. It is, however, clear that they have been very high; a declassified U.S.

intelligence report reported in December 2023 that the Russian losses in Ukraine amounted to

315,000 dead and injured troops.

However, numbers vary depending on sources.

Already after the first phase of the invasion, analysts identified a Russian need for

reinforcement and related recruitment of personnel. According to some sources, the issue of

mobilisation was raised and considered by the Russian political leadership already in March

2022, but was opted out in favour of other recruitment campaigns.

These campaigns included

Washington Post,

Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops,

U.S. intelligence warns,

3 December 2021,

url

EUAA,

The Russian Federation - Military service,

15 December 2022,

url,

p. 38; Denmark,

Udlændingestyrelsen,

Rusland - Militærtjeneste,

8 July 2022,

url,

p. 18

Bladel, J. Van,

Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle – Putin’s Camouflaged Referendum?

Egmont

Policy Brief 284, July 2022,

url,

pp. 3-4

EUAA,

The Russian Federation - Military service,

15 December 2022,

url,

p. 37. Galeotti et al,

Militaries,

Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War,

15 November 2022,

url

Reuters, U.S.

intelligence assesses Ukraine war has cost Russia 315,000 casualties,

23 December 2023,

url

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

Time is the Hidden Flank in Assessing Russia’s Mobilisation,

September 2022,

url

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advertised voluntary recruitment campaigns

to the Armed forces of Russia as well

recruitment to and use of PMCs

On 21 September 2022, in what was at the time seen as a response to continued Russian

personnel losses and Ukrainian battlefield advances

, president Putin decreed a partial

mobilisation.

The published decree did not specify any target number, but Minister of

Defence, Sergey Shoigu, stated that 300,000 would be mobilised

(although other sources at

the same time claimed significantly higher numbers

). Following the decision on mobilisation,

there were numerous reports of deviations from both statutory procedures and from what had

been communicated, related to

who

was subject to mobilisation as well as

how

individuals

were called up.

After the mobilisation in the autumn of 2022, the main mode of ensuring the supply of military

personnel has been continued recruitment campaigns. This even though the presidential

decree on partial mobilisation is still in force and various sources have expressed expectations

of another mobilisation wave after Putin has been re-elected as president.

Regions

play a key role in implementing both mobilisation and other forms of recruitment.

With regard to mobilisation, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) gives the regions quotas for how

many people are to be called up.

The highest officials of regions are chairing draft

commissions on regional level, while heads of local administrations chair local commissions,

also called Voenkomat, and the regional level ensures mobilisation and manage the local

Washington Post,

Russian army ramps up recruitment as steep casualties thin the ranks,

16 June 2022,

url

Galeotti et al, Militaries,

Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War,

15 November 2022,

url

Center for Strategic and International Studies,

What Does Russia’s ‘Partial Mobilization’ Mean?,

September 2022,

url;

Foreign Affairs,

What Mobilization Means for Russia - The End of Putin’s Bargain

With the People,

27 September 2022,

url

Russia. Presidential administration,

Указ Президе�½та Российской Федерации от 21.09.2022 № 647

"Об объявле�½ии частич�½ой мобилизации в Российской Федерации",

21 September 2022,

url

Reuters,

Russia calls up 300,000 reservists, says 6,000 soldiers killed in Ukraine,

21 September 2022,

url

Meduza,

Russia to conscript 1.2 million people,

23 September 2022,

url;

Novaja Gazeta Europe,

Источ�½ик: засекрече�½�½ый пу�½кт указа о мобилизации позволяет Ми�½оборо�½ы призвать оди�½

миллио�½ человек,

22 September 2022,

url

Denmark, Udlændingestyrelsen,

Russia - An update on military service since July 2022,

9 December

2022,

url,

pp. 15-16; Norway, Landinfo,

Temanotat Russland: Militærtjeneste og mobilisering,

November 2022,

url,

pp. 23-24; EUAA,

The Russian Federation - Military service,

15 December 2022,

url,

pp. 30-32.

HRW: 20; The New York Times,

Russians Know Putin Will Be Re-Elected, but Many Worry What Comes

Next, 17 March 2024,

url

In a legal Russian context oblast, republics, krai, okrug etc. are referred to as “federal subjects”. In this

report we refer to them as regions.

Chikov, Pavel, 21 September 2022,

url

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level.

Regional leaders have no influence on the size of quotas given to them, but are given a

degree of liberty in how to fulfil them. A similar responsibility is reportedly placed on the

regional level when it comes to voluntary recruitment.

2.2. The local Chechen leadership

2.2.1. The relationship between Moscow and Grozny

The relationship between the Kremlin and the leadership of Kadyrov is often described as being

based on the latter guaranteeing stability in exchange for funding and a high degree of

autonomy from the former.

Therefore, the influence of federal authorities in Chechnya is

limited and the power of Kadyrov to suppress dissent and resistance unchecked.

Security

forces in Chechnya are solely accountable to Kadyrov and, at best, only under limited control by

federal authorities.

Harold Chambers, an analyst focusing on the political and security

dynamics of the North Caucasus, underlines that Kadyrov seeks to have well beyond monopoly

on the use of force in Chechnya and recalls a threat from Kadyrov in 2015 according to which

any federal security official or troops that would come to Chechnya without permission would

be shot.

2.2.2. Kadyrov and the “undesirables”

Chechen authorities are targeting those it perceives as “undesirable”

, using a wide range of

serious human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture,

arbitrary detentions, physical attacks, and prison sentences based on bogus charges.

Groups

exposed include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

Opponents or critics.

Local authorities are silencing those expressing any form of

dissent or opposition to the authorities. Civil society organisations and individual

Russia,

Федераль�½ый зако�½ от 26.02.1997 N 31-ФЗ (ред. от 14.07.2022) "О мобилизацио�½�½ой

подготовке и мобилизации в Российской Федерации",

url,

article 8, 20

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

The New Boyars? How Russia’s Governors Facilitate

Mobilisation,

7 December 2022,

url

Open Caucasus Media: 4; Russia Analyst: 3

Freedom House,

Freedom in the World 2024,

2024,

url

US Department of State,

Russia 2022 Human Rights Report,

20 March 2023,

url,

p. 1

Harold Chambers: 6; The Guardian,

Chechen leader tells soldiers to fire on unapproved Russian troops

in region,

23 April 2015,

url

Human Rights Watch,

Submission by Human Rights Watch on Russia to the Human Rights Committee,

15 February 2022,

url

US Department of State,

Russia 2022 Human Rights Report,

20 March 2023,

url,

pp. 3-15; UN Human

Rights Council,

Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation - Report of the Special Rapporteur on

the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova,

15 September 2023,

url,

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activists involved in human rights work, as well as independent journalists, are targeted

for their work.

LGBT-persons.

Several purges targeting LGBT-persons, the first one in 2017,

orchestrated by local authorities has been widely reported. It should be emphasised

that LGBT-persons are continuously targeted based on their sexual orientation or

gender identity.

Women not conforming

to “traditional values”. The local authorities are not only

tolerating and leaving violent, family-based crimes unpunished, but also playing an

active role.

These and other human rights abuses are committed without any known reactions on the

federal level, and thus with impunity.

2.2.3. Social life and Adat

Family plays a central role in the organisation of social life in Chechnya. In the rural parts of

Chechnya, clan structures are still strong and important, but in the more urbanised areas of

Chechnya, these structures have been less important in recent years. These social structures,

known as

Adat,

is a form of customary rules that defines the fabric for social relationships in

Chechnya. Amongst these customary rules is the notion of collective guilt and collective

punishment within families. This means that if a son or a daughter has committed perceived

wrongdoings, the other family members can be punished for their relatives’ actions. The

punishments would depend on the severity of the wrongdoings of the family member.

Because the notion of guilt and punishment are collective in Chechnya, it is common for

families to engage in vigilantism amongst their own family members as a form of control and to

avoid punishment themselves.

Human Rights Watch,

Submission by Human Rights Watch on Russia to the Human Rights Committee,

15 February 2022,

url

Human Rights Watch,

Submission by Human Rights Watch on Russia to the Human Rights Committee,

15 February 2022,

url;

US Department of State,

Russia 2022 Human Rights Report,

20 March 2023,

url,

pp. 3-4

Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly,

The continuing need to restore human rights and the rule

of law in the North Caucasus region,

23 May 2022,

url,

pp. 1-2, 11-12

UN Human Rights Council,

Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation - Report of the Special

Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova,

September 2023,

url,

p. 17; Human Rights Watch,

Submission by Human Rights Watch on Russia to the

Human Rights Committee,

15 February 2022,

url

Russia Analyst: 1; Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем и

будем пытать» ["They

told the mother: if he doesn't go voluntarily, we will take him and torture him."],

14 February 2024,

url

Russia Analyst: 2; Open Caucasus Media: 11

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Open Caucasus Media highlighted that what on paper could seem like a punishment over

political or religious views could also easily be grounded in a dispute between families and/or

clans. Chechnya is a small society where families and clans are constantly engaged in power

struggles with one another over influence and power within the Chechen society. Whenever a

feud or dispute with another family or clan emerges, it is not uncommon for one part in the

dispute to report the other part to the Chechen authorities over alleged religious and political

offenses.

Open Caucasus Media: 8

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3. Known Chechen armed formations with current or

previous presence in Ukraine

Individual ethnic Chechens could serve in almost any military formation within the armed

forces of the Russian Federation or the security forces of regions. The focus of this report is

however exclusively recruitment to units with a more direct connection to the Chechen

Republic. Within the scope of this report, “Chechen armed formations” are defined as

formations that have participated on the Russian side

in the war in Ukraine. They are either:

▪

garrisoned in Chechnya;

part of the local security apparatus in Chechnya, commonly referred to as “Kadyrovtsy”

or Kadyrovites;

units formed primarily from Chechen volunteers (including coercively recruited

individuals – see

chapter 4);

multi ethnic units that are trained in Chechnya.

3.1. Units under the Ministry of Defence of the Russian

Federation

3.1.1. Regular Units of the Ministry of Defence

The 42

Motorised Rifle Division is a regular Russian army mechanised infantry division

garrisoned in the cities of Khankala, Shali and Borzoy in the Chechen Republic.

This unit is not

comprised exclusively of ethnic Chechens. The 42

Motorised Rifle Division is part of the

Southern Military district and subordinate to the MoD of the Russian Federation. Among the

sub units are 70

, 71

and 291

Motor Rifle Regiments as well as the 50

Self Propelled

Artillery Regiment.

The unit was part of the Southern grouping that pushed into Ukraine from

Crimea and was particularly heavy engaged in countering the Ukrainian counter offensive South

Eastern Ukraine during the summer of 2023.

There are also several formations made up of Chechen volunteers participating on the Ukrainian side in

the conflict.

Chambers, Harold, The Rise of the Russian Spetsnaz University, 30 March 2023,

url

Federation of American Scientists – Intelligenece Resource Program, Directory of RF Defense Related

Agencies and Personnel, 2003,

url;

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, В ЮВО �½а территории

Чеч�½и завершается формирова�½ие 42-й мотострелковой дивизии [In the Southern Military District in

Chechnya, the formation of the 42

motorised rifle division is being completed], 7 December 2016,

url

Federation of American Scientists – Intelligenece Resource Program, Directory of RF Defense Related

Agencies and Personnel, 2003,

url

Ukrainska Pravda, Liberation of Klishchiivka and Andriivka could lead to degradation of Russian ranks –

ISW, 19 September 2023,

url

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3.1.2. Units formed from Chechen volunteers

Akhmat “direction” Units, consisting of at least two battalions, Akhmad Yug (south) and

Akhmad Sever (north)

, not to be confused with previously existing units with the same

denomination, as well as the Akhmat Rossyia and Akhmat Chechnya battalions.

50 51

These units

are formally subordinate to the MoD. Although organisational details are difficult to access, the

battalions seemed to have been organised as a regiment (the 78

Motorised Rifle Regiment

“Akhmad Kadyrov”) of the above-mentioned 42

Motorised Rifle Division.

3.1.3. Units that are formed and trained in Chechnya

Referred to as the Akhamt Group and constituted of Russian citizens with various ethnic

backgrounds. A majority of the soldiers in these units are of other ethnicity than Chechen.

The units are raised and trained by, or have their skills honed by, Chechen commanders at the

Russian Spetsnaz University located in the city of Gudermes in the Chechen republic. Formally

contracted by the MoD, but deployed to Ukraine under Chechen commanders. Since the

dismantling of the Wagner PMC, the Akhmat group has taken over many of the tasks that

previously were allocated to Wagner, especially in the Donbas.

3.2. Units of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs and

Rosgvardia

So called “Kadyrovites” are paramilitary and law enforcement units from the Chechen Ministry

of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Rosgvardia. Chechen Rosgvardia Units were part of the assault on

Kyiv and suffered heavy losses, in particular the 141

Special Motorised Regiment.

The

Rosgvardia units have been less involved over the course of the war, as they are part of Ramzan

Kadyrov’s private security apparatus and not disposable. MVD units have been involved in a

lesser extent and has primarily remained away from the frontlines. Securing rear areas and

serve as block troops.

Harold Chambers: 2

Harold Chambers:

Most Chechen armed formations, regardless of what primary missions they have or within what

structures they are organised carry the name “Akhmat/Akhmad “ as a compliment to other name or

designation.

Harod Chambers: 2; Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

The Chechens: Putin’s Loyal Foot Soldiers,

November 2022,

url

Novaya Gazeta Europe, Akhmat to the rescue: how do Chechen special forces operate?, 28 June 2023,

url;

Rondeli Foundation: 3; Harold Chambers: 4.

Harold Chambers: 4-5

The Times of Israel,

Ukrainian forces destroy convoy of 56 Chechen tanks, kill general near Kyiv –

report,

27 February 2022,

url

Harold Chambers: 2

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At the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine the following Chechen units of the

Rosgvardia were deployed

;

▪

OMON

Akhmat-Grozny

SOBR

Akhmat

249

Separate Special Motorised Battalion

141

Special Motorised Regiment

3.3. Aspects of command structures

On paper, there exist three different chains of command:

1. Units under the MoD are subordinated to military district commands and ultimately to

the Minister of Defence and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the

Russian Federation;

2. Units of the Chechen MVD are organisationally subordinated to the head of MVD of

the Chechen Republic who in turn is subordinate to the head of the Chechen Republic

(in practice not the federal MVD);

3. Rosgvardia is not incorporated under the MoD and has a different mission and

command structure. Rosgvardia reports through the director of the Rosgvardia to the

president of the Russian Federation in his capacity of commander in chief and

chairman of the Russian Security Council.

In theory, the command structure appears straightforward; however, the reality in the case of

Chechen formations is much more complicated.

This can be seen as a central aspect of the

contract between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov, which allows Kadyrov to exercise full

control over Chechnya, including monopoly of force, in exchange for loyalty and keeping any

potential local disturbances under control.

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

The Chechens: Putin’s Loyal Foot Soldiers,

4 November 2022,

url;

Journalist covering Chechnya: 4

Special Purpose Mobile Unit (in Russian: Отряд мобиль�½ый особого �½аз�½аче�½ия)

Special Rapid Response Unit (in Russian: Специаль�½ый отряд быстрого реагирова�½ия)

Russia. Ministry of Defence, Leadership,

url

Chechnya’s boss and Putin’s foot soldier: How Ramzan Kadyrov became such a feared figure in Russia

(theconversation.com)

The Rosgvardia (National Guard of Russia): Russia's Internal Guard (greydynamics.com)

Galeotti et al, Militaries,

Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War,

15 November 2022,

url

Foreign Policy, Why the World Should Be Worried About Chechnya, 19 October 2022,

url;

Harold

Chambers: 6

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The only units of the above-mentioned that are not under full or partial control of Ramzan

Kadyrov are the pre-war regular military units.

In practice, the 42

Motorised Rifle Division.

Units that have been created since the full-scale invasion and formally under the MoD

command structure and thus subordinated higher commands are in practice largely

autonomous and primarily serve the interests and orders of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Regardless of the full ethnic composition of these units, they have Chechen commanders and

strict hierarchies where Chechen soldiers receive preferential treatment and are not being put

at risk to the same extent as other service members.

The Chechen Rosgvardia and the units of the Chechen MVD are an integral part of Ramzan

Kadyrov’s power base. In the case of the Rosgvardia Units, this means that they in practice do

not operate under the formal Rosgvardia chain of command, but take their orders directly from

the Chechen government.

Harold Chambers: 2

Rondelli Foundation: 1

Harold Chambers: 6

Harold Chambers: 4

Galeotti et al, Militaries,

Mercenaries, Militias, Morale, and the Ukraine War,

15 November 2022,

url;

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

The Chechens: Putin’s Loyal Foot Soldiers,

4 November 2022,

url

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4. Recruitment of Chechens to the Russian invasion of

Ukraine

Recruitment in Chechnya to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been different from the rest

of the Russian Federation, both structurally and methodologically.

This chapter unfolds how

the Chechen authorities has recruited ethnic Chechens to the war effort in Ukraine, including

the methods and tactics employed and the scale and patterns over time.

4.1. Overall on Chechen recruitment

The recruitment strategy of the Chechen authorities can be broken down into three different

tactics, which have evolved during the course of the war:

•

True belief

Financial incentives

Coercion

The sources did not agree on the scale of recruitment due to financial incentives and coercive

recruitment respectively. Most Chechens deployed in Ukraine have voluntarily signed contracts

with the Russian MoD.

On the other hand, a journalist covering Chechnya assessed that

around half of the Chechens in Ukraine were there against their will.

According to estimates

from February 2024, around 10-15 Chechens per month were sent to Ukraine by the use of

force.

According to official statistics from the Chechen authorities, 36,000 soldiers from

Chechnya has been sent to Ukraine, of which 16,000 were alleged volunteers.

However, this

number includes volunteers from elsewhere in Russia, who has received military training in

Chechnya.

In the initial phase of the full-scale invasion, Chechnya was the only region in

Russia where volunteers from Russia could sign contracts.

Rondeli Foundation: 1; Harold Chambers: 2, 6

Harold Chambers: 8

Rondeli Foundation: 4

Journalist covering Chechnya: 12

Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем и будем пытать»

["They

told the mother: if he doesn't go voluntarily, we will take him and torture him."],

14 February

2024,

url

Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем и будем пытать»

["They

told the mother: if he doesn't go voluntarily, we will take him and torture him."],

14 February

2024,

url

Important Stories, Чеч�½я собирает людей �½а убой со всей России [Chechnya gathers people for

slaughter from all over Russia], 13 October 2022,

url

Important Stories, Чеч�½я собирает людей �½а убой со всей России [Chechnya gathers people for

slaughter from all over Russia], 13 October 2022,

url

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4.2. Recruitment dynamics in Chechnya

4.2.1. Recruitment and the relationship between Grozny and Moscow

The relationship of interdependency between the Kremlin and the local Chechen leadership

(see

chapter 2)

has created a dynamic in which coercive recruitment of Chechens to the war in

Ukraine has emerged.

Details on the practice of coercive recruitment is unpacked

in chapter

5.3.3.

By delivering men to the war in Ukraine, Kadyrov can show his loyalty to the Kremlin while

simultaneously getting rid of potential obstacles to his government in Chechnya. By delivering

men to the war effort, Kadyrov shows the Kremlin that he is indispensable. At the same time,

Kadyrov has publicly stated that there would be no partial mobilisation in Chechnya as

happened in all other regions of Russia. According to the Russia Analyst, excluding Chechnya

from the partial mobilisation was a way for Kadyrov to tell both the Kremlin and the population

in Chechnya that he is master of his own house.

Harold Chambers elaborated that Kadyrov saw the partial mobilisation as a potential threat to

his authority and legitimacy. Rather than taking part in a public partial mobilisation, Kadyrov

had to deliver the required quota of fighters to Moscow by coercing people to fight in

Ukraine.

Galeotti suspected that the cases of coercive recruitment is happening in part

because the local voenkomat

has failed to meet the quotas from higher up the chain of

command.

4.2.2. Collective guilt and recruitment

In relation to recruitment of young men to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the notion

of collective guilt and punishment as well as taking justice into the hands of the family (see

chapter 2.2.3)

has resulted in families pressuring young males into volunteering, as they fear

harsher punishments from the surrounding society if they do not take action. As such,

pressuring male family members into ‘volunteering’ can be seen as a pre-emptive measure in

order to secure the family as a unit.

Mark Galeotti noted that although the power of the clans (teip) has diminished in Chechnya,

the teip still matters – especially in the rural parts of Chechnya. In these parts of Chechnya, the

need of meeting a certain quota can present itself as an opportunity for the local clan leaders

to get rid of unwanted members of the community by making them sign up to the war in

Russia Analyst: 3

Harold Chambers: 12

Voenkomat: military registration and enlistment office

Mark Galeotti: 3

Russia Analyst: 2; Open Caucasus Media: 11

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Ukraine. In these instances, the Chechen authorities have effectively succeeded in outsourcing

coercive recruitment without ever getting involved.

4.3. Types of Recruitment

Three types of recruitment can be identified, differing in incentives and methods.

In practice,

however, it can be challenging to distinguish between them. This is especially true when it

comes to coercive recruitment.

4.3.1. True belief

In the initial phase of the war, the Chechen authorities tried to recruit Chechens by appealing

to a shared patriotic idea and by putting well-known Chechen commanders in charge of the

recruitment process. According to Chambers, this recruitment tactic failed as almost nobody

wanted to sign up for patriotic reasons.

4.3.2. Financial incentives

Realising that the appeal to this shared patriotic idea yielded very few Chechen recruits, the

Chechen authorities then switched recruitment methods of Chechens by offering recruits

rather well-paid contracts.

Chechnya is a relative poor region in Russia, and the money made

by signing contracts with the Russian MoD are significant compared to standard salaries in

Chechnya.

According to two researchers at the Rondeli Foundation, most Chechens posted in

Ukraine, have signed contracts and are thus deployed for financial reasons. They further

elaborated that Chechen contractors receive monthly salaries of around 3,000 USD along with

other benefits such as free housing and social services. These added benefits only apply to

ethnic Chechens.

Mark Galeotti further elaborated that Chechens who voluntarily sign

contracts are more likely to have influence over the place of deployment and what tasks they

are going to perform..

Voluntary recruitment from Chechnya has been more prevalent in the rural parts of Chechnya,

where the population generally are poorer then in the urban areas.

4.3.3. Coercive recruitment

Coercive recruitment of ethnic Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been ongoing

since February 2022 but it has ebbed and flowed in terms of scale and intensity throughout the

duration of the full-scale invasion. According to Harold Chambers, the extent of coercive

Mark Galeotti: 4

Harold Chambers: 8

Russia Analyst: 6-7

Harold Chambers: 9

Harold Chambers: 10

Russian journalist: 5; Georgian journalist: 5; Harold Chambers: 10

Rondeli Foundation: 4

Mark Galeotti: 7

Mark Galeotti: 3

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recruitment in Chechnya peaked around the time of the announcement of the partial

mobilisation in Russia at the end of September 2022.

There are many unknown variables regarding coercive recruitment in Chechnya, including the

scale.

Chechens who are coercively recruited are forced to sign contracts with the MoD and

according to HRW and Mark Galeotti this means that the paper trail of coercively recruited

Chechens looks as if they volunteered for the Russian war effort.

Galeotti further elaborated

that most of the corroborated cases of coercive recruitment has come from Grozny.

All sources consulted on the topic of coercive recruitment stated that coercive recruitment in

Chechnya has been directed at certain groups of the local population.

Critics of the authorities

are at most risk of being coercively recruited.

Harold Chambers assessed that even being a

member of the ‘wrong’ Telegram-channel could put a person at risk of being recruited, and he

added that the Chechen authorities possess the necessary software to monitor social media

platforms.

HRW stated that activists and members of civil society organisation could risk being

recruited. They further elaborated that cases of recruitment of ad due to their activism is not

limited to Chechnya and Chechens but has also been documented in the rest of Russia.

100

Family members of vocal critics of the Chechen authorities also risk being recruited. The

brother of a well-known Chechen dissident, Khassan Khalitov, had been forcefully sent to the

frontline in Ukraine.

101

Alexander Kvakhadze of the Rondeli Foundation added that he had

heard of other similar cases.

102

In Chechnya, HRW had seen examples of persons being recruited because they were a part of

the LGBT community. These persons were given a choice: either they would to be outed so that

their LGBT identity would be known in the public and by their families – which would entail the

risk of them being killed – or they could sign a contract with the MoD.

103

Users of illegal drugs and alcohol has also been forced to sign contracts with the MoD.

104

Harold

Chambers stated that the authorities used coercive recruitment to get rid of what the Chechen

Harold Chambers: 11

Open Caucasus Media: 2

HRW and NEDC: 19; Mark Galeotti: 3

Mark Galeotti: 3

Harold Chambers: 11-15; Russia Analyst: 8; Mark Galeotti: 5, 6; Rondeli Foundation: 6; HRW and NEDC:

3; Georgian journalist: 6; Russian journalist: 3; Journalist covering Chechnya: 7

Russia Analyst: 8; Mark Galeotti: 5; HRW and NEDC: 3

Harold Chambers: 16

100

HRW and NEDC: 3

101

Rondeli Foundation: 7; Harold Chambers: 16; The Insider,

«Threatening mothers and sisters.» How

Chechen «volunteers» are forcibly sent to fight in Ukraine,

15 June 2022,

url

102

Rondeli Foundation: 7

103

HRW and NEDC: 4

104

Rondeli Foundation: 6; Harold Chambers: 19

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authorities has labelled ‘undesirables’. HRW noted that any deviation from the norms and rules

of Kadyrov could be used to force persons to sign contracts with the MoD or the National

Guard. The Chechen authorities use forced recruitment to Ukraine as a form of punishment in

Chechnya.

105

Although certain groups can be identified as being more at risk than others it should be noted

that there is a high degree of unpredictability and arbitrariness in the actions of Chechen

authorities in regards to coercive recruitment. Sources have indicated that any contact with

Chechen authorities can involve risks from a recruitment perspective.

106

According to

Chambers, this type of seemingly random recruitment seemed to be most prevalent during the

autumn of 2022. At that time, the authorities coercively recruited most Chechen men they

came into contact with without regard for their physical and/or mental condition. Chambers

knows of cases where people involved in car accidents were recruited and sent to Ukraine.

107

Three sources also noted reports of Chechens trying to obtain external passports have been

coercively recruited.

108

Chambers further elaborated that Chechens trying to avoid recruitment

by leaving Russia at the Astrakhan border crossing into Kazakhstan have been recruited at the

border by Chechen authorities.

109

4.4. Exemptions from recruitment

The Russian legislation describes the formal exemptions for recruitment to military service.

110

However, the Chechen authorities largely seem to ignore these exemptions from military

service. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether there are any actual exemptions for

recruitment in Chechnya. As the processes of coercive recruitment is extrajudicial, there are no

identifiable legal exemptions.

111

Sources have mentioned old age and poor health conditions as

factors that could have influence on recruiter’s decisions to target individuals.

112

105

106

HRW and NEDC: 5

Russian Journalist: 8; Georgian Activist: 2; Harold Chambers: 13

107

Harold Chambers: 11, 13. See also

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-chechnya-ukraine-war-recruitment-

kadyrov-shaming/32124093.html

108

Russian Journalist: 8; Georgian Activist: 2; Harold Chambers: 13

109

Harold Chambers: 14

110

Decree nr. 664). Yказ президе�½та российской федерации о

предоставле�½ии отсрочки от призыва �½а вое�½�½ую службу по мобилизации [Decree of the President

of the Russian Federation on rules for exemption from conscription for military service upon

mobilisation], 24 September 2022,

url;

Law on mobilisation. федераль�½ый зако�½ о мобилизацио�½�½ой

подготовке и мобилизации в российской федерации (Federal law nr. 31-FZ ) [The Federal Law on

Preparation for Mobilization and Mobilization in the Russian Federation], 13 February 1997,

url

111

Georgian Journalist: 10

112

Harold Chambers: 23; Journalist covering Chechnya: 9; Russian journalist: 9-10; Open Caucasus Media: 13-14;

Activist: 14

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Furthermore, exemption on health grounds based on different medical conditions is also in

place.

113

Although, there has been numerous cases from across the North Caucasus where the

authorities have ignored medical conditions and even sent people labelled as ‘invalids’/disabled

to Ukraine.

114

One source opined that medical exemption would only be applied in Chechnya if

the person in question is in such a bad health condition that it is physical impossible for him to

fight.

115

If a person is closely connected to Kadyrov and to people in his government – such as law

enforcement officials and other officials – they would be exempted from being forcefully

recruited to Ukraine.

116

On the other hand, if the person is perceived as being in opposition to Kadyrov, the person

could be recruited regardless of his age.

117

In this regard, one should see recruitments as a form

of punitive measure.

118

Therefore, one source opined that medical issues or age limit would not

exempt a person from coercive recruitment.

119

Paying a bribe to the Chechen Recruitment officers can also exempt a person from

recruitment.

120

According to one source, it has become a much-used resort for persons who

wish to avoid recruitment to pay a bribe.

121

The price for exemption by bribe ranges from 300-

500,000 rubles

122

(3,013-5,022 EUR) per person or even up to 5,000,000 rubles (50,565 EUR).

One source pointed out that an ordinary Chechen is unlikely to have 5,000,000 rubles that they

can spend on bribes.

123

However, even after a person had paid a bribe, the Chechen authorities

could return for this person after a while in order to recruit him.

124

If a person was unable to pay the bribe, required to be exempted, then he would be forced to

sign a contract and would be sent to Ukraine. Furthermore, not all persons are presented with

the possibility to try to bribe his way out: If a person has expressed harsh criticism of the

Chechen government, then he could be sent to Ukraine without any possibility for paying a

bribe.

125

113

114

Harold Chambers: 23; Russian journalist: 10; Activist: 14

Harold Chambers: 23

115

Russian journalist: 10

116

Georgian journalist: 11; Activist: 13

117

Activist: 14

118

HRW and NEDC: 15; Rondeli Foundation: 11

119

Rondeli Foundation: 11

120

Journalist covering Chechnya: 9; Activist: 13+17; HRW and NEDC: 18

121

Activist: 13

122

Journalist covering Chechnya: 9;

Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет,

заберем и будем пытать» ["They

told the mother: if he doesn't go voluntarily, we will take him and

torture him."],

14 February 2024,

url

123

124

Activist: 17

Jounralist covering Chechnya: 9

125

HRW and NEDC: 18

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4.5. Consequences of refusing

The interviewed sources assessed that it would be very difficult to resist coercive recruitment in

Chechnya.

126

The Chechen authorities would likely use violence and physical abuse against

people who refuse until they accept recruitment.

127

The person could also face a prison

sentence based on fabricated criminal charges.

128

A third option possible is that the Chechen

authorities would beat the person to death if he refuses to comply.

129

The person who refuses recruitment could try to escape to another Russian region. However, it

would still be possible for the Chechen authorities to find him. The authorities would track the

person via his relatives. The Chechens are known for having a high level of connection to their

relatives. This makes it easier for the authorities to identify the relatives and to subject the

members of the extended family to collective punishment, if the Chechen authorities believe

that a person from a particular family has done something punishable.

130

One source had heard of cases where Chechens had fled abroad in order to avoid recruitment.

However, the Chechen police then took mothers or sisters hostage in Chechnya so that the

person in question would return and sign a recruitment contract with the MoD.

131

4.6

Recruitment of Chechens residing outside of Chechnya

4.6.1. Recruitment of Chechens from other parts of the Russian Federation

The interviewed sources have not heard of any cases of coercively recruitment of Chechens

residing outside of Chechnya in the Russian Federation to the war in Ukraine, except for

Chechens living in Dagestan..

132

Formally, the Chechen authorities can only recruit ethnic Chechens who reside within the

Republic of Chechnya. Recruits from Chechnya would have to register at the Chechen

voenkomat.

133

In this light, it is unclear to what extent Kadyrov is allowed to use force outside

of Chechnya.

134

Recruitment of Chechens by Chechen authorities in other regions of Russia is unlikely to take

place, as it is much easier to recruit Chechens residing in Chechnya. In this regard, it would have

126

Mark Galeotti: 14; Rondeli Foundation: 12; Georgian journalist: 10; Journalist covering Chechnya: 10; Russian

analyst: 10; Activist: 17; HRW and NEDC: 18; Russian journalist: 11

127

Mark Galeotti: 14; Russian analyst: 10; Activist: 17; Rondeli Foundation: 12; HRW and NEDC: 18

128

Georgian journalist: 10; Journalist covering Chechnya: 10; Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если

доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем и будем пытать»,

14 February 2024,

url

129

Russian journalist: 11; Activist: 17

130

Russian journalist: 11-12; Journalist covering Chechnya: 10

131

Journalist covering Chechnya: 11

132

Rondeli Foundation: 5

133

Mark Galeotti: 11

134

Harold Chambers: 24

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to be a very vocal critic of the Kadyrov government for the Chechen authorities to make the

effort of recruiting that particular person.

135

On the other hand, there has been cases where the family have exerted pressure on activists

and critics of Kadyrov residing elsewhere in Russia to stop their activities.

136

In some cases, the

Chechen authorities have worked together with local law enforcement in e.g. Moscow to bring

Chechen critics back to Chechnya.

137

The Chechen authorities could also themselves get a hold

of a particular person, if they wanted.

138

One source mentioned an old case where the Chechen

police had taken and subsequently beaten a couple of Chechens from St. Petersburg back to

Chechnya.

139

The Chechen authorities could also recruit a Chechen if they were visiting relatives in Chechnya.

In such a case, the authorities could coerce the person in question into joining the army.

140

Although, no cases of recruitment other than in Dagestan has been known, this does not mean

that recruitment of Chechens could not occur in other regions of Russia, according to HRW and

NEDC.

141

4.6.2. Recruitment of Chechens living outside of the Russian Federation

The interviewed sources assessed that the Chechen authorities did not recruit Chechens

outside of Russia.

142

The Chechen authorities have not invested much in recruitment outside of

Russia, as it would be much easier for them to recruit the Chechens living in Chechnya

proper.

143

One source knew of cases from Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, where the Chechen authorities had

tried to recruit local Kists to the war in Ukraine. However, these cases were recruitment

attempts to go fight for the Ukrainian side in order to infiltrate the Ukrainian forces.

144

On the other hand, if a Chechen freely travelled to Chechnya, they could be subject to

recruitment.

145

Although, a Chechen family would probably not lure a man to Chechnya for

recruitment to the army.

146

However, there has been different cases of family members luring

Chechens back to Chechnya from Europe. This has happened if the family had wanted to force a

135

136

Mark Galeotti: 12

Mark Galeotti: 13

137

Harold Chambers: 24; Activist: 15

138

Activist: 15

139

Activist: 16

140

Mark Galeotti: 11

141

HRW and NEDC: 10

142

Open Caucasus Media: 15; Activist: 22; Russian journalist: 13

143

Russian journalist: 17

144

Activist: 19

145

Georgian journalist: 9; Russian journalist: 13

146

Russian journalist: 16

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female Chechens family member to return, if for example they found her behaviour to be

against, the local Chechen customs or religious rules.

147

The Chechen authorities have established a network of informants and defenders of Kadyrov

within the Chechen diaspora in Western Europe with the task of persuading Chechens in

Western Europe to actively support Kadyrov and even sometimes to return to Chechnya to

voice their support for Kadyrov.

148

These activists would face no problems upon their return to

Chechnya.

149

Furthermore, there are Chechens who moved to Europe during the first and second Chechen

wars. It happens quite often that these Chechens will return to Chechnya. However, as they left

the country, during these wars, they are not perceived as traitors and therefore not necessarily

in more risk than others. If persons do not criticise the Chechen government, they would

probably not face any problems upon return.

150

4.7. Recruitment of Chechens in prisons

The sources interviewed to this report hold different perspectives on recruitment of Chechens

from prisons in Russia. However, only one source stated that they have not heard of

recruitment of Chechens to the war from prisons anywhere in Russia, including from prisons

inside Chechnya proper.

151

In Chechnya, there are two types of prison systems, between which there is a lot of transfer

and mobility:

152

•

Secret prisons: Regularly physically abuse of prisoners and use of the prison as a way of

forcing people to deliver witness statements, in order to implicate other suspects or to

get confession prior to their transfer to legitimate facilities or court. There are reports

of beating prisoners with truncheons, electric shocks and cases of water boarding.

153

Official prisons: There are very few official penal facilities in Chechnya. This absence is

partly due to concerns from the prison authorities on Islamic radicalisation. Therefore,

the Chechen authorities have continuously tried to move Muslim prisoners deep into

the heart of Russia. According to prof. Pallot, the local Chechen population who are

•

147

148

Russian journalist: 15

Open Caucasus Media: 15; Activist: 20, 22

149

Activist: 20

150

Russian journalist: 14

151

Rondeli Foundation: 13

152

Prof. Judith Pallot: 24

153

Prof. Judith Pallot: 27

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ordinary offenders – common criminals – would serve their time in Chechen

correctional institutions.

154

4.7.1. Recruitment from Chechen prisons

The Chechen authorities have recruited Chechens serving time in Chechen prisons for the war

effort in Ukraine.

155

As it was not possible to recruit from remand prisons when the Wagner

group recruited from prisons,

156

there were not many prisoners from Chechnya to recruit, as

many Chechen prisoners serve their time in the heartlands of Russia.

157

The Chechen authorities primarily recruited from Chechen prisons in the second or third month

of the full-scale invasion. This was because the Chechen units had suffered heavy losses during

the first month and they needed to replace the loss of manpower quickly. It is unclear whether

the Chechen authorities relaxed the practice of recruiting from prisons or whether they ran out

of undesirables to recruit from the prisons.

158

Recruitment of Chechens serving prison time in Chechnya has been another way for the

authorities to get rid of drug and alcohol users, or other categories of people which the

authorities have labelled as ‘undesirables’.

159

Prisoners from Chechen prisons have been

recruited as cannon fodder for offensive initiatives at the front line in the so-called Storm Z or

Storm V units.

160

The recruitment efforts have not necessarily taken place inside the official prisons in Chechnya,

but through the secret prison system in Chechnya. There is a Chechen idiom in Russian

referring to this system as the ‘Kadyrovite Basements’. These basements are not comparable to

the prisons in Russia proper and are completely extrajudicial.

161

However, there have been very

few reports about the phenomenon in general. This has not been a large-scale effort by the

Chechen authorities, but an effort to get rid of these so-called ‘undesirables’.

162

4.7.2. Recruitment from prisons outside of Chechnya

Chechens serving their prison sentence outside of Chechnya has been subject to recruitment to

the war in Ukraine.

163

However, the number of recruited Chechen prisoners is unclear.

164

154

155

Prof. Judith Pallot: 30+34

Mark Galeotti: 15

156

Prof. Judith Pallot: 77

157

Prof. Judith Pallot: 30+77; Mark Galeotti: 15

158

Harold Chambers: 21

159

Harold Chambers: 19

160

Mark Galeotti: 15; Harold Chambers: 19

161

Harold Chambers: 20

162

Harold Chambers: 19

163

Journalist covering Chechnya: 16; Mark Galeotti: 15

164

Mark Galeotti: 15

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Under Russian legislation, a person should be tried either in the place where the crime has

been committed or where the person has permanent residency.

165

In this regard, any Chechen

who has committed a crime or has residence in other regions of Russia and therefore are

serving time in other Russian prisoners outside of Chechnya could be recruited as any other

Russian prisoners could.

166

The Chechens from other Russian prisons would probably be

deployed to regular Russian army units not only the Chechen units.

167

Since June 2022, the private military company (PMC), named the Wagner Group, started to

recruit Russian prisoners, as new soldiers to replace the killed in action (KIA) and wounded in

action (WIA) in Ukraine were needed.

168

The Wagner group focused on recruiting from the big

loyal penal regions, since recruitment required an agreement with the head of the regional

prison authorities called UFSIN.

169

The recruitment was not very popular among the UFSIN officers, because recruitment from

their prison would mean a loss of approximately 200 prisoners, which the prison authorities

needed for their industrial production. Therefore, the chosen for recruitment was mainly the

most loyal colonies.

170

Consequently, PMC Wagner did only recruit prisoners from the correctional colonies in the

Russian heartland.

171

Furthermore, the Russian authorities have continuously tried to move

Muslim prisoners deep into the heart of Russia. This concerns any Muslim that the authorities

would think could be radicalised or is already radicalised or extremist.

172

There have e.g. been

cases of Chechens serving time in Russia proper having links to foreign fighters in Syria.

173

In the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Russian authorities avoided sending prisoners

who were serving time for extremism and terrorism to war, as the authorities considered them

unreliable and disloyal.

174

Therefore, the authorities were afraid of handing over weapons to

persons they perceive as their enemies,

175

fearing that the extremists would turn their weapons

against the Russian soldiers, and not the Ukrainians.

176

However, in recent months, the

authorities have now begun to send perceived religious extremists to the Ukraine as well.

177

165

166

Prof. Judith Pallot: 37

Russian journalist: 23; Prof. Judith Pallot: 78

167

Russian journalist: 23

168

DIS,

Russia: An update on military service since July 2022, December 2022,

url,

p. 21

169

Prof. Judith Pallot: 78

170

Prof. Judith Pallot: 78

171

Prof. Judith Pallot: 81

172

Prof. Judith Pallot: 30

173

Harold Chambers: 22

174

Journalist covering Chechnya: 16; Harold Chambers: 22; Prof. Judith Pallot: 81;

175

Journalist covering Chechnya: 16

176

Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем и будем пытать»,

14 February

2024,

url

177

Journalist covering Chechnya: 16; Important Stories,

«Сказали матери: если доброволь�½о �½е поедет, заберем

и будем пытать»,

14 February 2024,

url

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Recruitment of prisoners is still ongoing and in fact, the MoD has expanded the scope of

recruits, which now includes recruiting from the remand prisons.

178

There are reports of various forms of pressure put on prisoners for them to volunteer and sign

a contract with the MoD. This could be turning of the heating, cutting back on their food

rations, saying no one is going to get parole unless there are some volunteers found etc.

179

According to prof. Pallot, every prisoner is at some risk of being recruited. However, the

likelihood depends on how much a person can resist the pressure they endure. Many of the

prisoners who have a sentence of more than 20 years would be more inclined to accept

recruitment as they are probably going to die in prison, so in that light recruitment may seem

as a better option.

180

178

179

Prof. Judith Pallot: 80

Prof. Judith Pallot: 82

180

Prof. Judith Pallot: 83

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

•

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

Types of recruitment of Chechens

Prevalence of coercive recruitment of Chechens fight in Ukraine? (self recruitment)

Recruitment methods of the Kadyrovites

Prevalence of recruitment from Chechen prisons to the war in Ukraine

Prevalence of recruitment of Chechens serving prison time outside Chechnya to the

war in Ukraine

Recruitment methods in Chechen prisons

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Annex 2: Meeting minutes

Open Caucasus Media

Open Caucasus Media covers the North and South Caucasus, with in-depth analysis of the

issues, movements, conflicts, and people shaping the region.

Tbilisi, 22 February 2024

Access to information

1. The information space in the North Caucasus, including in Chechnya has been shrinking

in recent years. Many journalists and bloggers has left the area and this naturally has

dampened the flow of information. Furthermore, many journalists and researchers

covering the North Caucasus from abroad has been advised against travelling to the

areas since the launch of the full-scale invasion.

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

2. Generally, there are two types of Chechens who are recruited to the war in Ukraine.

There are those, who join the army voluntarily for financial reasons, and there are

those who are coerced and blackmailed into joining the army. According to the source,

there has been many reports of Chechens being coerced into joining war in Ukraine.

The scale of both types of recruitment is unclear to the source, but they have seen

examples of both types.

3. Chechens are primarily recruited to serve in units formed in Chechnya under the

command of the Kadyrovites. In principle, it is the source’s understanding that all

Chechen units, including the Kadyrovites, are under the command of the Russian

Ministry of Defence (MoD). However, the Chechen units, including the Kadyrovites

operate with at large degree of autonomy as compared to the rest of the regular forces

under the Russian MoD.

4. According to the source, the Kadyrovites are a de facto army of Chechnya, and this has

historical explanations. Putin wants stability in Chechnya and as long has Kadyrov can

deliver this, he gets a high degree of autonomy, including on security. However, this

does

not mean that Moscow is without a say in what could be labelled ‘internal

Chechen affairs’. The source stated that FSB has been involved in persecutions of

Chechen human rights activists as well as Chechen LGBT persons, within Chechnya and

beyond human rights activists and LGBT activist in Chechnya.

5. The source assessed that it would be unlikely that ethnic Chechens would be recruited

to serve under ethnic Russian command directly under the MoD. This also includes the

ethnic Chechens who are coercively recruited, because they are coercively recruited by

the Chechen authorities. Generally, Chechens want to be amongst other Chechens.

This is also why Chechens wants to serve prison time amongst other Chechens rather

than amongst ethnic Russians.

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6. The source did not know whether recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine has

been stable throughout the war, but they stated that the visibility of Chechens fighting

in Ukraine has declined compared to the first year of the war. This could be an

indication that there are less Chechens deployed in Ukraine, although, the source did

not know this for a fact.

Coercive recruitment in Chechnya

7. Coercive recruitment in Chechnya serves as a form of punishment. This could be

punishment for following another strand of Islam than the official Chechen strand of

Islam. It could also be for difference even the smallest difference of political opinion.

According to the source, the threshold for when such differences are punished has

been gradually lowered in recent years, meaning

that even the smallest ‘offenses’ can

now be punished.

The source highlighted that what on paper could seem like a punishment over political

or religious views could also easily be grounded in a dispute between families and/or

clans. Chechnya is a small society where families and clans are constantly engaged in

power struggles with one another over influence and power within the Chechen

society. Whenever a feud or dispute with another family or clan emerges, it is not

uncommon for one part in the dispute to report the other part to the Chechen

authorities over alleged religious and political offenses. This was common practice

during the LGBT pogroms in Chechnya in 2017. As such, the source assessed that this

dynamic is currently taking place in relation to coercive recruitment.

9. Common forms of coercion in Chechnya are blackmail against the individual of concern

of the family. Examples of common forms of blackmail in Chechnya are threats of

violence, abduction, trumped up charges based on allegations of drug use as well as

allegations of extremist behaviour.

10. The source explained that extremism is a broad concept in Chechnya and includes both

perceived religious extremism, political extremism and even taking interest in Chechen

culture and history. The person in question is then faced with the false choice of having

the content of the blackmail realised or joining the army.

Chechen customary laws and norms and coercive recruitment

11. If a woman in Chechnya commits any wrongdoing in the eyes of the Chechen

authorities, such as having the wrong religious beliefs, it is likely that her male relatives

would be punished for this. In contemporary Chechnya’s Chechen culture, a woman is

always subject to a male family member who has the responsibility of this woman. If

she is then perceived to have transgressed the norms and values of the Chechen

culture, the male guardian then has to be punished for her perceived wrongdoing. The

source has not seen any such cases where male family members have been coercively

recruited

to the war in Ukraine based on the woman’s actions, but the source assessed

that it could likely be happening.

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12. Generally, the concept of collective punishment is commonplace in Chechen culture.

This means that individual members of a family

–

or even the entire family

–

can

sometimes be punished for one individual’s perceived wrongdoing. One of the

harshest punishments in Chechen culture is for the entire family to be expelled from

the Chechen Republic due to the actions of one individual. Since the war in Ukraine

broke out in 2022, coercive recruitment has been added to the list of collective

punishments.

Exemptions for recruitment

13. The source assessed that elderly people would generally not be coercively recruited to

the war in Ukraine. They further assessed that this would likely be the only form of

exemption since coercive recruitment serves as a punitive measure.

14. The Federal Russian legal system is generally applied arbitrarily and selectively in

Chechnya generally does not apply in Chechnya. Therefore, the exemptions regarding

recruitment to the war in Ukraine listed in the Federal Russian law does not apply in

Chechnya. Rather it is the customary law of Adat, which regulates social norms and

rules in Chechnya, where a small group of elderly men decides in individual cases.

According to the source, the Adat in a Chechen context is perceived as de facto

lawlessness

—

an arbitrary justification serving the interests of the ruling class

—

and

thus many people turn to sharia when seeking justice.

Recruitment of Chechens living outside of Russia

15. The source assessed that it is unlikely that Chechens living in Western Europe would be

subjected to recruitment to the war in Ukraine. However, the source stated that the

Chechen authorities have developed a network of informants and agents within the

Chechen diaspora in Western Europe. These are often tasked with persuading

Chechens in Western Europe to actively support Kadyrov and even sometimes to

return to Chechnya to voice their support for Kadyrov.

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Georgian journalist

Tbilisi, 19 February 2024

Access to information in Chechnya

1. According to the journalist, Chechnya is a very closed society and Chechens are not

always willing to talk to people from outside Chechnya due to fear of repression from

local and federal authorities. As such, reporting on Chechnya can at times be

challenging.

Recruitment in Chechnya

2. Recruitment of ethnic Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine takes place

although it is difficult to assess the scale of this practice. Prior to the full-scale invasion

of Ukraine, it was uncommon for the Russian authorities to recruit Chechens to the

Russian army because Chechens

–

as well as Dagestanis and Ingush people

–

were

perceived as outsiders and not trustworthy.

3. Kadyrovites are also present in Ukraine but they are not taking part in the actual war.

According to sources the journalist interviewed, the Kadyrovites are merely in Ukraine

as a PR operation. Because of this, the they are also referred to as the so-called TikTok

Army.

Types of recruitment

4. The journalist distinguishes between two types of recruitment of ethnic Chechens to

the war in Ukraine: Recruitment for socio-economic reasons and coercive recruitment.

It is very hard to tell how many who have joined the army for financial reasons and

how many who are coerced.

5. Chechnya is a poor region and therefore some choose to join the army as a way of

securing one self and their family. Furthermore, joining the army can be a way of

climbing the social ladder in Chechnya.

Prevalence of coercive recruitment of Chechens to fight in Ukraine

6. Coercive recruitment are usually aimed at social outcasts such as users of drugs and

alcohol but it has also been used towards members of the Chechen LGBT community

as well as critics of the Kadyrov regime. The source has heard of cases where Chechens

has been abducted to basements inside Chechnya where they have been threatened

with long prison sentences unless they signed a contract to join the war in Ukraine.

These prison sentences could be due to anything from drug or alcohol usages to

running a red light. The fact that people are detained in basements rather than regular

prisons cells tells the source that these ways of recruiting Chechens are extrajudicial

without regards to the rule of law in Chechnya. It is also a form of punishment for the

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family members of critics. There are reports of sending the relatives of critics to the

frontlines in Ukraine.

7. The source has also heard that girls and women in Chechnya have been coerced into

making male family members join the army. These females were targeted by the

Chechen authorities because they allegedly done something wrong. The source has

also heard that girls and women in Chechnya have been pressured. For instance, a girl

detained in a different region of Russia was tasked with identifying "three Chechens"

involved in drug use. In another instance, detained girl faced threats that her brothers

would be located and sent to the frontline if she failed to comply with the demands of

the security forces.

To the source’s knowledge, there has not been incidents of ethnic Chechens being

pressured into joining the army in other regions of the Russian Federation. The sources

speculates that considering Kadyrovs authority this could be possible.

9. The source has not heard about forced recruitment abroad to Chechen forces. It would

of course be possible for a person to travel to Russia/Chechnya and voulenteer

Consequences of refusing to be recruited

10. Coercive recruitment is a punitive measure and therefore critics and social deviants can

in theory be forced to sign a contract and sent to the front, even if they are exempted

by law. The whole processes is extrajudicial and no legislation is relevant. As such, the

consequences of refusing this coercive recruitment would most likely be physical abuse

and/or a long prison sentence. In reality, it is not possible to refuse coercive

recruitment. According to the journalist, it is difficult to assess the scale of this coercive

recruitment, because people are afraid that even saying that they were coerced can

have consequences for themselves or their relatives.

Exemptions for recruitment

11. According to the journalist, people who are close to Kadyrov

–

such as law

enforcement and bureaucrats

–

are the only ones who are exempted from being

forcefully recruited to the army.

Military service (conscription)

12. The source is not aware whether regular conscription still takes place in Chechnya.

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Journalist covering Chechnya

Tbilisi, 26 February 2024

Access to information

1. Journalists have always had problems accessing information from Chechnya. Chechens

often do not respond to journalistic inquiries at all, including because the laws of

Russia are interpreted very loosely there. The Journalist has had to use many sources

anonymously in order to ensure their safety.

2. Since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, residents of Chechnya has

been afraid even to give information anonymously, because they fear that they or their

relatives would be sent to the war as a consequence.

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

3. According to the journalist, there are several thousand soldiers from Chechnya

permanently stationed in Ukraine. Sources tell the journalist that, unlike other regions

of Russia, they can return home after a few months if they survive. At the moment,

according to the official version, there are now 7,000 people from Kadyrov's Chechnya

in Ukraine. Recruitment is proceeding systematically through municipal government

structures, district police officers, local security forces and even through imams in

mosques.

4. Ethnic Chechens primarily serve in the Akhmat units, e.g. South-Akhmat, West-Akhmat

and East-Akhmat, which were formed in 2022 in Gudermes. OMON

181

"Akhmat

Fortress" is a mobile special purpose detachment (on transport), a unit within the

Rosgvardiya. OMON "Akhmat-Grozny" is a mobile special purpose detachment, a unit

within the Rosgvardiya.

5. Recruited Chechens tend to obey the Chechen leadership (Kadyrov, Delimkhanov, Apti

Alaudinov, Magomed Daudov) more than the chiefs from the Federal Ministry of

Defence. According to the journalist, Chechens serve on better terms than other

Russians do and their units are better equipped. In addition, Chechen units often come

into conflict with other units of the Ministry of Defence.

6. When asked who would typically be the subject of recruitment in Chechnya, the

journalist stated that first; the authorities would hire those who served in the army, or

the police, or in any paramilitary unit.

7. Relatives of critics of the regime have been subjected to forced recruitment. This

includes relatives of Akhmed Zakayev, the Yangulbayev brothers, and relatives of

181

OMON: Special Purpose Mobile Unit (in Russian: Отряд мобиль�½ый особого �½аз�½аче�½ия)

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Khassan Khalitov etc. As well as those who express dissatisfaction with the authorities

inside the Chechen republic, then forcibly leave for the front.

8. When asked to what extent recruitment of Chechens happened in other Russian

regions than Chechnya, the source stated that recruitment was underway in all

regions, but so far, it has only been in Chechnya that torture and death threats have

been used to get a person to agree to sign a contract and go to war.

Exemptions for recruitment

9. Regarding whether some parts of the Chechen population has been exempted from

recruitment, the journalist assessed that there is an age limit, as pensioners are not

accepted. Furthermore, the security forces temporarily leave alone those who have

bribed the auhtorities not to be recruited. The price ranges from 300-500,000 rubles

(3,013-5.022 EUR) per person. However, even after a bribe, after a while, the Chechen

authorities can return for this person.

Consequences of refusing to be recruited

10. The journalist stated that it is impossible to refuse recruitment. Sometimes it is

possible

to bribe one’s way out of recruitment, but as previously stated, this is no

guarantee. If a person should refuse recruitment, they would likely be met with

physical abuse and/or prison on the basis of fabricated criminal charges. Furthermore,

the relatives could be subjected to various kinds of repression.

11. If a Chechen has fled abroad in order to avoid recruitment his relatives may be

threatened. The source was aware of cases when a mother or a sister was taken

hostage by the Chechen police so that a person would return and go to war.

Prevalence of coercive recruitment of Chechens to fight in Ukraine

12.

According to the journalist’s estimates, about half of all people from Chechnya sent to

Ukraine went there against their wishes. They are typically blackmailed into

recruitment. Examples include blackmail in fake criminal cases, a term in prison,

blackmail that the authorities will publish any information of an intimate nature about

a person. For example, the fact that he is in a relationship with some woman outside of

marriage.

13. The journalist stated that the situation regarding coercive recruitment began to change

a few months after the outbreak of the war, by the summer of 2022, due to the fact

that there were many people killed in the war, wounded, and maimed. Heavy losses

have drastically reduced the number of volunteers.

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14. Fabricated/trumped up charges as a means to coerce Chechens to self-recruit is a

widespread method because it works. The journalist does not have the exact number

of people recruited in this way. However, the source noted that this was common

practice in all districts of Chechnya.

15. Abduction is also used as a method. In this case, kidnapping is an instrument of

pressure on a person to agree to go to war. This also applies to real offenders who

committed a crime and chose to go to war instead of prison. The journalist opined that

this was widely practiced by the Chechen police, but the source could not give an exact

number of abductees for this purpose.

Prevalence of recruitment from Chechen prisons to the war in Ukraine

16. The source did not possess information as to what extent the Chechen authorities

recruit persons to the war in Chechen prisons. Chechens serving their prison sentence

outside of Chechnya has been subjected to recruitment to the same extent as other

prisoners. However, the authorities try not to send those who are serving time for

extremism and terrorism to war, as the Chechen authorities are afraid of handing over

weapons to what they perceive as their enemies. In Chechnya, too, for a long time, the

authorities tried not to recruit those who were accused of extremism, or considered

unreliable by the authorities, not loyal to the regime. Recently however, the

authorities have now begun to send extremists to the war, according to a human rights

activist the journalist spoke to.

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Alexander Kvakhadze and Gela Khmaladze of the Rondeli

Foundation

The Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (Rondeli Foundation) is an

independent, non-profit policy think tank dedicated to helping improve public policy decision-

making in Georgia through research and analysis, training of policymakers and policy analysts,

and public education about the strategic issues, both domestic and international, facing

Georgia and the Caucasus in the 21

century. The activities of the Foundation are aimed at

promoting democracy and enhancing regional cooperation.

Tbilisi, 22 February 2024

Recruitment of ethnic Chechens to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

1. Ethnic Chechens are recruited either through the regular system operated by the

Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) or through Ramzan Kadyrov’s

own system, The

Kadyrovites. Chechens who serve under the Russian MoD are primarily recruited to the

Motorised Rifle Unit. At the launch of the full-scale invasion, these units were

deployed in Belarus and they took part in the initial attacks on Kyiv. Mostly as part of

the 42nd Motorised Rifle Regiment which is stationed in Chechnya peace time. These

troops are not connected to Kadyrov. Both combat and support staff. Suffered heavy

casualties. Chechens who serve under the MoD do not serve under Russian led

command.

2. The Kadyrovites are made up of several different units who perform different tasks.

Some of the units are under the Ministry of Interior and some are under the National

Guard (Rosgvardia) Command. In total, it is estimated that the Kadyrovites consist of

between 12,000 and 14,000 men.

3. According to Khmaladze, the vast majority of Chechens deployed in Ukraine is serving

under the Kadyrovites. There are around 10,000 soldiers deployed in Ukraine in so-

called Chechen units, but only around 20 % of these units comprise ethnic Chechens.

The other 80 % have other ethnicities and come from other regions in the Russian

Federation. Many Russian soldiers prefer serving in these so-called Chechen units,

because they are rarely operating at the front line and usually have better equipment.

Furthermore, Kvakhadze stated that Chechens generally look down on ethnic Russians.

Hence, Chechens are deployed in the Chechen units. The source further added that

MoD units are ethnically mixed and they have never had all-Chechen units. Regarding

Rossgvardia-linked Chechen groups (especially those that had been created before the

war), they are monoethnic and consist of Chechens.

4. Most Chechens serving in Ukraine have signed contracts voluntarily. Chechnya is a

poor region, and Chechen contractors receive a monthly salary of around 3,000 USD as

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well as other benefits such as free housing and social benefits. Furthermore, Chechens

who have served in Ukraine also gain social status. As such, signing a contract with the

MoD and serving in Ukraine is for many Chechens an economic and social opportunity.

These additional benefits of free housing and social services only apply to ethnic

Chechens, according to Khmaladze. Kvakhadze stated that the Chechen contractors are

not likely to be sent to areas of intense fighting such as Avdiivka or Bakhmut.

5. Khmaladze and Kvakhadze stated that every police officer in Chechnya has to serve

three months per year in Ukraine. This is because the lines between police and soldier

is blurred in Chechnya. According to Khmaladze, Chechens residing in other Russian

regions than Chechnya are not recruited except for in Dagestan.

Coercive recruitment

6. Khmaladze stated that there are four types of Chechens who are coercively recruited:

Drug users, alcohol users, islamists and relatives of members of the political opposition

in exile in Europe. They are usually approached by the Chechen police who asks the

person in question to join the army. If they refuse, they are taken into custody where

they are abused into joining the army.

7. The famous Chechen blogger and harsh critic of Ramzan Kaydrov, Khassan Khalitov, has

had his brother recruited and sent to the front lines in Ukraine, because he had been

outspoken against Kadyrov. Kvakhadze has also heard of other such cases, but it is

difficult to assess the scale of this practice. Khmaladze added that sometimes, the

relatives of the political opponents in Chechnya are able to pay bribes to the Chechen

authorities to avoid being coercively recruited.

8. Regarding the coercive recruitment of Islamists, Kvakhadze and Khmaladze stressed

that the radical Islamists who e.g. were convicted of terror, were not sent to Ukraine as

this group were not trusted by the Chechen authorities. However, the authorities in

the North Caucasus, including Chechnya, have a prophylactic list of Islamists, and

people on this list risks being coercively recruited.

9. Kvakhadze stated that most of these coercively recruited Chechens were deployed

during the siege of Mariupol in the spring and summer of 2022, because it was difficult

for them to defect. the source further elaborated that to his knowledge, the practice of

coercively recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine peaked during the siege of

Mariupol. Khmaladze estimated that around 540 ethnic Chechens have been killed

since the start of the full-scale invasion. After the siege of Mariupol, the practice of

coercively recruiting Chechens has declined, in part because many voluntarily sign

contracts. Therefore, there is little need to coercively recruit Chechens.

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10. Both analysts stated that Chechens who are coercively recruited serve under the

Kadyrovite system because this practice is extrajudicial. Since many of them have no

formal military training they primarily work behind the front lines in logistics etc.

Exemptions for recruitment

11. According to Kvakhadze, there are no conditions that would exempt one from being

coercively recruited. The recruitment is meant as a punitive measure and therefore

medical issues or age limit will not exempt one from being coerced into recruitment.

Consequences of refusing to be recruited

12. The analysts had not heard of concrete examples of people refusing to be recruited to

the war in Ukraine. However, Kvakhadze stated that in Chechnya, even the slightest

critique or public disagreement with the Kadyrov government will be punished. As an

example of this lack of toleration of other opinions, the source mentioned that he had

heard of a person who complained about the conditions of the roads near his village in

Chechnya. He was taken into custody by the Chechen police who physically abused him

and made him release a new video in which he now explained that the Chechen roads

were in fact in excellent condition. As such, this example shows Kvakhadze that there is

no room for even the slightest dissent or difference of opinion in Kadyrov’s Chechnya.

Therefore, the source assessed that anybody who would at first refuse to be recruited

would be detained and abused into accepting recruitment.

Recruitment of Chechens from prisons

13. The analysts had not heard of Chechens being recruited to the war from prisons

anywhere in Russia, including Chechen prisons. They had not heard of fabricating

charges in order to coercively recruit Chechens either.

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Mark Galeotti

Kent, 29 February 2024

Kadyrotives and recruitment of regular Chechens to the war in Ukraine

1. During the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Chechens deployed in

Ukraine were primarily the elite and exclusively ethnic Chechen units such as the

Akhmat and the Kadyrovites. These were the so-called TikTok Army as they displayed a

lot of pretence but did very little actual fighting. These units comprise the backbone of

Kadyrov’s security apparatus in Chechnya and Kadyrov is thus dependent on them.

Therefore, as Kadyrov clearly did not want those units in Ukraine. This reluctance to be

deployed in Ukraine led to serious problems with the chain of command, because

orders given to these Chechen units in Ukraine were only obeyed if and when they had

been given the green light by Grozny. This behaviour had made these units unpopular

amongst the rest of the Russian military. As such, the Akhmat and Kadyrovites were in

Mariupol’ during the siege of Azovstal, however, they barely took part in the actual

fighting.

2. Chechens who have been recruited by force are deployed in units without any political

stake. These recruits serve primarily in Chechen units. However, these units can also

contain other ethnic groups. Chechen forced recruits can also be deploy in regular

Russian multi-ethnic units. Kadyrov is only concerned with his elite units. The main

point of engaging

in recruiting Chechens by force is to show Kadyrov’s indispensability

to the Kremlin. On the other hand, excluding Chechnya from the partial mobilisation

that took place across Russia was a way of telling his own population that Kadyrov is

taking care of Chechens and that Moscow is not in control in Chechnya.

Recruitment dynamics in Chechnya

3. There have been cases of both voluntary and coercive recruitment from Chechnya.

Chechnya is a relatively poor region in Russia, and hence many Chechens view

deployment in Ukraine as an opportunity to provide for the family or build a new

house in the village etc. Most of the corroborated cases of coercive recruitment has

come from Grozny, which is the most prosperous region of Chechnya. As such,

Galeotti suspects that these cases of coercive recruitment is happening in part because

the local voenkomat has failed to meet the quotas from higher up the chain of

command. These quotas are based in population size, and as people from the poorer

and rural parts of Chechnya are more willing to sing up, coercive recruitment is likely

more prevalent in the urban areas in order to meet the demands.

4. Although the power of the clans (teip) has diminished in Chechnya, the teip still

matters

–

especially in the rural parts of Chechnya. In these parts of Chechnya, the

need of meeting a certain quota can present itself as an opportunity for the local clan

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leaders to get rid of unwanted members of the community by making them sign up to

the war in Ukraine. In these instances, the Chechen authorities have effectively

succeeded in outsourcing coercive recruitment without ever getting involved.

Kadyrov’s government has always been repressive, and it has always persecuted critics.

In this relation, the full-scale invasion in Ukraine has presented itself as an opportunity

of the Chechen authorities to kill two birds with one stone: By forcefully recruiting

regime critics

–

or people who express different world views

–

the Chechen authorities

can both fulfil the quotas imposed by Moscow and get rid of the person in question. In

the past, they would have had to employ other punitive measures.

Coercive recruitment

6. After the initial phase of full-scale invasion, it became apparent to the Russian MoD

that the need for fighters in Ukraine was greater than initially anticipated. This created

a new dynamic where forced recruitment of ethnic Chechens arose. Forced recruits

from Chechnya has not been recruited to the above listed elite units. This is because

being a part of these elite units is a career path, which has required years of training.

Furthermore, members of the elite units are well paid and enjoy a high degree of social

status in Chechnya.

7. According to Galeotti, coercive recruits are not recruited to perform specific tasks in

Ukraine. Rather, they are deployed in areas in need of manpower and perform tasks

where it is needed. Given the current situation on the battlefield, this means that

coercive recruits are likely to become infantry, because this is needed. On the other

hand, if a Chechen signs up voluntarily, he has likely more influence over where he will

be deployed and what tasks he is going to perform. As an example of this, Galeotti

mentioned a case from March 2023, where a Chechen was arrested for an offense in

Chechnya and was given the choice between four years in prison or deployment in

Ukraine. This man had done military service and was a technical specialist, but because

he had been coercively recruited, he ended up in the infantry.

8. Chechens who are coercively recruited to the war in Ukraine are likely to end up in

multi-ethnic units under ethnic Russian command within the Russian MoD. In the

initial phase of the full-scale invasion, radical Islamists were not recruited, as they were

believed to pose a security threat. However, as the dynamics of the war has shifted

and the need for infantry has emerged, there has been examples of Islamists being

recruited to perform infantry-like tasks at the frontline. The so-called Islamists are

likely to end up in multi-ethnic units under ethnic Russian command within the Russian

MoD

9. Technically speaking, those who are coercively recruited are forced to sign contracts.

This means that on paper, it all looks like a voluntary recruitment. This also means that

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the ones who are coercively recruited are deployed in Ukraine on open-ended

contracts.

10. There has been a tendency from Moscow to recruit people from the Russian periphery,

because it is believed that these are less likely to pose demands and ask questions.

Furthermore, many of the people officially recruited from the Moscow are actually

ethnic minorities from the periphery persuaded to sign up in Moscow because they are

able to pay better than elsewhere in Russia.

Chechen residing outside Chechnya

11. Formally, the Chechen authorities can only recruit ethnic Chechens who reside within

the Republic of Chechnya. Recruits from Chechnya would have to register at the

Chechen voenkomat. However, if a Chechen living elsewhere in the Russian Federation

is caught by the police whilst visiting relatives in Chechnya, they could be coerced into

joining the army.

12. Galeotti has not heard of any cases of ethnic Chechen residing outside of Chechnya in

the Russian Federation being coercively recruited to the war in Ukraine. He further

assessed that this practice is unlikely to take place, as it is much easier to recruit

Chechens residing in Chechnya. As such, it would have to be a very vocal critic of the

Kadyrov government for the Chechen authorities to make the effort of recruiting that

particular person. Galeotti opined that this same dynamic would also be true for

Chechens living outside of Russia for example in the European Union.

13. There has been cases where the family have exerted pressure on activists and critics of

Kadyrov residing elsewhere in Russia to stop their activities.

14. Galeotti assessed that it would be very difficult to resist coercive recruitment in

Chechnya, because the authorities are willing to use violence and physical abuse

towards people who refuse.

Recruitment from Chechen prisons

15. The Chechen authorities have recruited Chechens serving time in Chechen prisons for

the war effort in Ukraine. Some of these recruits have been deployed as the so-called

Storm Z or Storm V units. However, it is unclear how many Chechens prisoners who

has been recruited. Galeotti assessed that Chechen inmates had also been recruited to

other parts of the Russian war in Ukraine. There is a pre-trail detention centre in

Chechnya as well as a high security prison, but there are not many prisoners serving

time in Chechnya.

Military service in Chechnya

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16. Regular military service in Chechnya has been conducted, according to schedule during

the Russian full-scale -invasion of Ukraine. Chechen men who are conscripted to

undertake military service do so in Chechen units serving in Chechnya. As such, the

formal structures of conscription in Chechnya looks like elsewhere in Russia, but in

fact, Kadyrov has more or less full control over the Chechen conscripts.

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HRW and NEDC

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has not been in Chechnya since 2020.

Natalia Estemirova Documentation Center (NEDC) a project under the Norwegian Helsinki

Committee. The centre was founded together with Russian and international human rights

organisations to document violations of human Rights and war crimes committed under the

Chechen wars. In 2015-2016, the centre also conducted FFM in the Donbas to document

violations.

Tbilisi, 20 February 2024

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

1. According to NEDC, there is no official mobilisation taking place in Chechnya, as of

February 2024. However, unofficial recruitment of Chechens in Chechnya occurs. Even

though Chechnya is within the Russian Federation, the Chechen authorities do not abide

by the Russian laws and the source described it as a totalitarian enclave. The Chechen

Republic is therefore under de factor control of one person: The head of the republic,

Mr. Ramzan Kadyrov, and the only real authority above him is the president of Russia.

To NEDC’s knowledge,

there was an ongoing recruitment of Chechen men in Chechnya.

According to this source, there are three levels of recruitment in Chechnya:

Recruitment to the so-called

‘The Kadyrovites’ working under the Ministry of

Interior. They are the foundation

of Kadyrov’s power. Members of The

Kadyrovites’ work within the official structure of the Chechen Ministry of

Interior. These units could be called upon and send to Ukraine, Syria etc. if and

when Kadyrov orders it.

II.

Recruitment of ordinary Chechens, who Kadyrov does not value. These people

are blackmailed or forced to sign contracts. It is not possible for these people not

to sign a contract with the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Once a

person has been ordered to sign, they have to abide. On paper, he would be

signing a contract as a volunteer with the MoD. These persons are being enrolled

into the Russian armed forces.

III.

Chechnya provides certain training centres, so-called institutes for the Spetsnaz

troops within the Republic of Chechnya. Some soldiers from all over Russia come

to these centres to train. Kadyrov’s men –

the Kadyrovites, train them together

with Russian military instructors.

Groups subjected to recruitment in Chechnya

3. According to HRW, political and civic activists from different regions of Russia can be

sent to the Russian army against their will. HRW has seen such examples. However,

these examples were very specific cases of retaliation by the Russian authorities against

people who have engaged in activism or dissenting positions.

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4. In Chechnya, HRW has seen examples of men recruited because they were perceived as

gay. These men were given a choice: either they would to be outed so that their sexual

orientation would be known to the public and their families

–

which would entail the risk

of them being killed or subjected to persecution– or they could sign a contract with the

MoD.

5. Other cases from Chechnya of forced recruitment have been also reported to HRW.

People who are perceived as social deviant from the norms of

Kadyrov’s Chechnya are

likely to be at risk of recruitment. Recruitment could be the punishment for using drugs,

drinking alcohol or of committing petty theft, etc. Recruitment can be also used a tool

against critics of the government. Even more so, if some neighbours have been

quarrelling and one of them feel the need to inform about this to the authorities,

accusing the neighbour of slandering Kadyrov. This could be enough to get the person

recruited for the war in Ukraine. HRW noted that any deviation from the norms and

rules of Kadyrov could be used to force persons to sign contracts with the MoD or the

National Guard.

182

The Chechen authorities are using forced recruitment to Ukraine as a

form of punishment.

6. According to HRW, the Chechen law enforcement and security agencies have also been

kidnapping/detaining local residents, and turning to their families and demanding a

bribe of 10,000 US dollars. However, if the family is not able or willing to raise 10,000 US

dollars, the detained individual is forced to sign a contract. According to the documents,

such contracts would be signed as if the person in question was a volunteer.

7. Ramzan Kadyrov is himself a major general within the National Guard, which is why

many Chechen recruiters from Chechnya are actually winding up serving as part of the

National Guard. The forces of Kadyrov fought in Mariupol. (For more detail, see:

“Russian Chain of Command” chapter in HRW’s recent report ‘“Our

City Was Gone”:

Russia’s Devastation of Mariupol, Ukraine’ (hrw.org).

8. The number of recruitments from Chechnya is very difficult to assess. However, NEDC

got information from Chechen sources of various types that recruitment was ongoing

and widespread. Before the full-scale invasion began, it was possible for Chechens to

move to other parts of Russia, but right now Chechens fleeing Chechnya could be easily

182

The

National Guard of the Russian Federation

Rosgvardiya

(Russian: Росгвардия) is the

internal

military force

Russia,

comprising an independent agency that reports directly to the

President of

Russia Vladimir Putin

under his powers as Commander in Chief of the

Armed Forces of the Russian

Federation

and Chairman of the

Security Council.

The National Guard is separate from the

Russian Armed

Forces.

A law signed by

President of Russia Vladimir Putin

established the federal executive body in 2016.

The National Guard has the stated mission of securing

Russia's borders,

taking charge of

gun control,

combating

terrorism

and

organised crime,

protecting public order and guarding important state facilities

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found by Chechen security

forces, according to this source. Even before Russia’s full-

scale invasion of Ukraine, the situation was difficult for the Chechens. Formally,

Kadyrov’s security forces are part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian

Federation. If they needed to identify someone on Russian territory and get help in

detaining a particular person, then they received it. At the same time, even if they acted

completely illegally, actually kidnapping a person (as, for example, in the case of Zarema

Musaeva in Nizhny Novgorod), the local, regional security forces gave them complete

freedom to do this.

9. However, before the war, people from Chechnya, especially if a person was not very

known to the Chechen authorities, then they had some opportunities to “dissolve” in

another region, especially in other republics of the North Caucasus, or in a large

multinational city. At least for a while. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the nature

of the police in the Russian state has significantly intensified. In cities such as Moscow

and St. Petersburg, a facial recognition system operates effectively. Therefore, a person

wanted by the Chechen authorities will not be safe anywhere in Russia. In small and

medium-sized cities, he will inevitably attract the attention of neighbours as a stranger.

In large cities, he risks finding himself caught by automated identification systems.

However, this does not mean that there were no risks before, but now all Chechens are

at risk. It is more that the risks were quite high before the war and now, by the

estimation of NEDC, they leave practically no reasonable chance for the fugitive. Well,

unless the person is a trained intelligence officer or a conspiracy genius.

10. HRW mentioned cases of young women from Chechnya who fled their abusive families

to other cities in Russia such as Makhachkala, Moscow or St. Petersburg and were

forcibly returned to Chechnya with the assistance of the Russian police. HRW opined

that if this could happen to young women, then it could also be done for men who are

fleeing recruitment.

11. If a person from Chechnya decides to flee the republic, then their family could be

targeted by the Chechen authorities to force the individual to return. Therefore, if the

authorities want to send a man to the frontlines and he flees, this should be sufficient

for them to try to get him back.

12. The two sources had no knowledge of Chechens being recruited by Chechen authorities

in other regions of the Russian Federation besides Chechnya. This does not mean that

recruitment of Chechens would not occur in other regions of Russia. NEDC noted that it

would be rather difficult to research the scope of such a phenomenon in Russia at this

point.

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13.NEDC noted that in Chechnya, torture in detention is widespread and brutal, therefore

there are cases were detainees under torture have given names of people who were

allegedly gay or have spoken up against Kadyrov. These persons did not necessarily have

to be critics or gay, but the mere accusation could be sufficient for the Chechen

authorities to go after these individuals, including with forced recruitment.

14.According to NEDC and HRW, some of the people who are connected to the Chechen

government and have been working within the Chechen security agencies are also sent

to Ukraine. However, they serve at another level than those persons who are perceived

as social deviants who are essentially used as nothing but cannon fodder. Many of the

well-connected serve in the National Guard; some were deployed in the siege of

Mariupol.

15.So-called Kayrovites are well equipped, trained and perceived as an elite. Those serving

in the elite units, such as Akhmat battalion, enjoy a range of privileges and are less likely

to die at the front lines. NEDC opined that the chances of dying while fighting, as a

Kadyrovite is 3-5 times smaller than in other Russian units. Kadyrov protects people from

his personal guard and does not allow his elite units to be used as cannon fodder. By

“personal guard” is meant the armed formations of the Ministry of Internal

Affairs,

which are de facto under the personal effective control of Ramzan Kadyrov. As a rule, he

is not at all concerned about the fate of military personnel and police officers from other

units, even if ethnic Chechens serve there.

Exemptions for recruitment

16.According to both interlocutors, there are no strong exemptions for recruitment in

Chechnya. One should see recruitments such as these as a form of punishment. NEDC

added that such punishments was a clear feature of a totalitarian state.

17.NEDC stated that before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in 2022, a person who

was perceived as Kadyrov’s opponent would be typically disappeared and tortured. Now

these people

–

following on torture

–

could also be sent to Ukraine and serve as cannon

fodder. The war in Ukraine has become a new instrument for Kadyrov to eliminate his

opponents in Chechnya and at the same time show himself useful to president Putin.

18.NEDC advised that Kadyrov appears to have aspirations for a federal level post and the

more useful he can be in the eyes of Putin, the better are his chances of obtaining a post

as minister or something else at this level. This is why Kadyrov is so keen on showing

Putin that Chechens are good soldiers who fight for Russia. Furthermore, Kadyrov is

completely dependent on Putin and the subsidies that the Kremlin are sending to

Chechnya. In this way, Kadyrov also need to show the Kremlin that he is worth all the

money that are allocated to Chechnya from the federal budget.

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Consequences of refusing to be recruited

19.HRW stated that if a person or his family pay a bribe to government officials, he can get

away from being sent to Ukraine. HRW opined that if a person who is not in a position to

pay the bribe still refuses to sign the contract, the authorities would likely threaten to kill

him and retaliate against his family. Hence, in practice there are no way of refusing to

sign a contract if you have no money to buy yourself out. Furthermore, HRW stated that

it is not always possible to pay a bribe. If a person has expressed harsh criticism of the

Chechen government, then he could be sent to Ukraine without the option of paying a

bribe.

Military service

20.

According to the HRW, there are conscription points (‘voenkomaty’)

operating in

Chechnya like anywhere else in Russia. Recruits sign contracts with the MoD, so the

paper trail is flawless. How people are coerced to sign these contracts is another matter.

HRW added that official mobilisation in Chechnya is not happening and did not even

happen during the Russia-wide partial mobilisation in the autumn of 2022 (at the time,

Kadyrov argued that he had supplied many Chechen soldiers prior to the mobilization,

and Chechnya had therefore paid its dues). One may expect another wave of

mobilisation in Russia after the so-called presidential elections in March 2024, which

may also affect Chechnya.

21.NEDC mentioned that officially the mobilisation has never been terminated. The

president never signed a decree to stop the mobilisation. Thus, the Russian authorities

do not need to issue another decree for mobilisation as the mobilisation was never

completed but only suspended. Therefore, the preparation time for a new wave of

mobilisation could be very short compared to the first wave in 2022.

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Russia Analyst

United Kingdom, 29 February 2024

Chechen family structures and

Adat

1. Family plays a central role in the organisation of social life in Chechnya. In the rural

parts of Chechnya, clan structures are still strong and important, but in the more

urbanised areas of Chechnya, these structures have been less important in recent

years. These social structures are known as

Adat,

which is a form of customary rules,

which defines the fabric for social relationships in Chechnya. Amongst these customary

rules is the notion of collective guilt and collective punishment within families. This

means that if a son or a daughter has committed perceived wrongdoings, the other

family members can be punished for their relatives’ actions. The punishments would

depend on the severity of the wrongdoings of the family member.

2. Because the notion of guilt and punishment are collective in Chechnya, it is common

for families to engage in vigilantism amongst their own family members as a form of

control and to avoid punishment themselves. In relation to recruitment of young men

to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this form of taking justice into the hands

of the family has resulted in families pressuring young males into volunteering, as they

fear harsher punishments from the surrounding society if they do not take action. As

such, pressuring male family members into ‘volunteering’ can be seen as a pre-emptive

measure in order to secure the family as a unit.

Recruitment of Chechens and Kadyrov’s relationship with the Kremlin

3. The source stated that Kadyrov and the Kremlin have engaged in a mutually dependant

relationship. Kadyrov depends on the Kremlin for legitimacy and funding and the

Kremlin depends on Kadyrov to uphold stability in Chechnya. Kadyrov can also deliver

some form of legitimacy to the Kremlin in Chechnya. This relationship of dependency

has created a dynamic in which coercive recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

has emerged. By delivering men to the war in Ukraine, Kadyrov can show his loyalty to

the Kremlin while simultaneously getting rid of potential obstacles to his government

in Chechnya. By delivering men to the war effort, Kadyrov shows the Kremlin that he is

indispensable. At the same time, Kadyrov publicly stated that there would be no partial

mobilisation in Chechnya as happened in all other regions of Russia. According to the

Russia Analyst, excluding Chechnya from the partial mobilisation was a way for

Kadyrov to tell both the Kremlin and the population in Chechnya that he is master of

his own house.

Recruitment from the North Caucasus

4. The Russia Analyst stated that the North Caucasus are generally a rather poor region

within the Russian Federation. They did not have any hard data concerning Chechnya

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specifically, but they are aware that in the neighbouring Dagestan there has been quite

of a lot of voluntary signups to the war in Ukraine, because serving in Ukraine is an

opportunity to earn a substantial amount of money. As Dagestan and Chechnya are

comparable both in economic and cultural terms, the source suspected that this

dynamic was also taking place in Chechnya.

5. This means that there are both people who sign up voluntarily and people who are

coerced into signing up. The Russia Analyst suspected that coercive recruitment in

Chechnya could in part be explained by local officials needing to fulfil quotas coming

from above, they turn to coercive recruitment.

6. The source stated that there are different forms of coercion and different degrees of

coercion, and this makes it difficult to draw the line between what is coercion and

what is not coercion. Furthermore, people are often wary of telling relatives that they

have been coercively recruited because they are afraid that this could get the family

into trouble.

7. There are clear examples of coercive recruitment of Chechens. The source mentioned

one example, where a person was threatened that his brother would be tortured if he

did not sign up to the war in Ukraine. Another less obvious example of coercive

recruitment was the case where a young man signed up because the authorities

threatened to show his family pictures of him together with a girl. Then there are

examples of recruitment where it is less clear that actual coercion has taken place. To

illustrate these cases, the analyst mentioned a case of a man signing up for the army,

because he knew that his uncle, who is part of the local law enforcement, would take it

out in the family unless someone from the family “volunteered”. Such cases would

probably not be reported as actual coercion.

8. The source pointed out that vocal critics of the Kadyrov government would likely be

first in line to be coercively recruited.

9. In the initial phase of the full-scale invasion, the Chechen authorities would shy away

from recruiting people who are perceived as radical Islamists as this group of people is

not trusted by the Chechen authorities. Part of Kadyrov’s role in Chechnya is to ensure

that rebellious elements are kept quiet. However, as the demand for more men at the

frontlines has increased, the source

assessed that Kadyrov’s government has hat to cut

corners in order to fulfil the quotas.

10. The Chechen authorities are more authoritarian than elsewhere in Russia. Therefore,

the source assessed that it is unlikely that a Chechen would be able to refuse coercive

recruitment to the war in Ukraine. In general, Chechen authorities are more willing to

engage in violence to get what they want than in other parts of the Russian federation.

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Harold Chambers

Harold Chambers specialises in comparative politics and International Relations, researching

the intersection of power, identity, and violence in Central Eurasia and Southeast Asia.

Chambers has also been working as a freelance analyst, focusing on the political and security

dynamics of the North Caucasus, particularly in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

8 March, online meeting

Access to information in Chechnya

1. Chambers stated that Chechens in Russia generally sticks to themselves and rarely

shares information with non-Chechens. As such, it is generally difficult to get valid

information from Chechnya, but occasionally information still leaks out.

Chechen units observed in Ukraine

2. Chechen-led units in Ukraine are cycling in and out of the battlefield. As such, it is

difficult to assess which units are at any given moment present in Ukraine. However,

there are five different types of Chechen units in Ukraine:

•

First, there are the ‘old’ Ministry of Defence (MoD) units formed prior to the

full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

•

Second, there are the ‘new’ MoD units that have been formed during the

course of the war. Chambers refers to these units as the Akhmat direction

battalions (Akhmat Sever (North), Yug (South), etc). These have been formed in

2022, and in 2024, the Akhmat Rossiya and Akhmat Chechnya regiments were

formed. Chambers stated that it is very difficult to assess the real scale of these

units, as the Chechen authorities manipulate with the official numbers.

Ramzan Kadyrov has more control over these new MoD units compared to the

old MoD units, as the new units are not as integrated into the regular Russian

MoD command structure. As such, these new MoD units resemble the

Kadyrovtsy and the Rosgvardia in their structure and chain of command.

•

Third, there are the Akhmat Group. This started out as a volunteer group and is

now on MoD contracts, which was launched as a part of a prelude to the

mutiny attempt by the Wagner PMC.

•

Rosgvardia units have been heavily involved since the Kyiv assault, but have

been involved to a lesser degree over the course of the war. This is because

they form the core of Kadyrov’s forces in Chechnya

•

MVD units have been involved as well, but to a lesser extent than other types

of units. They have remained away from the frontlines, but were notably used

to “secure” Belgorod Oblast in the wake of Ukraine-supported

raids by GUR-

aligned Russian and Chechen units.

3. Over the course of the war, there has been a notable change in the presence of

Chechen units in Ukraine. In February-March 2022, Chechen so-called elite units took

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part in the assault on Kyiv among other things. This did not go well for these units. In

the April 2022, some Chechen units took part in the siege of Mariupol, but in fewer

numbers than the assault on Kyiv. Since then, the number of Chechen elite units

present in Ukraine as well as their level of eliteness has declined. The big factor in this

development is the aforementioned Akhmat Group.

4. The Akhmat Group is not a majority Chechen group and it has not been so for a long

time—while it is difficult to know the exact timeline of demographic shifts within the

unit, the decrease in the number of Chechens was noticeable after about the first

month of its existence, so around late April 2022. The group has been used as a way to

gather Russians with different ethnic backgrounds from all across Russia, and train

them at the Russian Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya under the command

of ethnic Chechens. This façade of Chechenness has given Kadyrov a way to show Putin

that he is actively contributing to the war without actually putting any of his own men

at risk. Since the dismantlement of the Wagner PMC, the Akhmat Group has largely

taken over the tasks previously performed by Wagner in Ukraine. This has especially

been true in Donbas. Furthermore, Chambers pointed out that there is a rather strict

ethnic hierarchy within the Akhmat Group. This has meant that Chechens in the

Akhmat Group have not been at the frontlines taking part in any actual fighting and

this

–

along with the promise of a decent paycheck

–

has been part of the concerted

recruitment pitch from the Akhmat Group to Chechens, especially Chechens residing in

other regions of Russia than Chechnya.

5. Chambers added that the new MoD Chechen units are made up of ethnic Chechens. It

is only the Akhmat Group, which is not majority ethnic Chechen group.

Kadyrov’s grip on power in Chechnya

6. The distinction Chambers makes between

‘old’ and ‘new’ Chechen MoD units is

important because it helps to explain the overarching trend of Kadyrov’s rule in

Chechnya. According to Chambers, Kadyrov seeks not only to have a monopoly on the

use of force in Chechnya

–

as any given state power seeks to

–

but having well beyond

the monopoly on the use of force. I 2015, Kadyrov stated that if any federal security

official would come to Chechnya without the permission of the Kadyrov regime, they

would be shot. Since then, Chechnya has been fully

under Kadyrov’s control, even

though Chechnya is officially a republic within a federation. The only forces in

Chechnya not directly under the command of Kadyrov is these ‘old’ MoD units.

Kadyrov has even been brought into the Rosgvardia chain of command structure in an

effort to try to contain the potential scandal that the Chechen Rosgvardia units report

to Kadyrov rather than the regular Rosgvardia chain of command. This manoeuvre has

not been possible within the regular MoD units, because it would cause too much

uproar within Russian elite circles and this is why these ‘old’ MoD units have not been

under Kadyrov’s command.

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7. Kadyrov has used the war in Ukraine to have new Chechen MoD units created. These

are not part of the regular MoD structure and are not called

“N Motorised Riffle Unit”,

these are the so-called Akhmat units. This means that the new Chechen MoD units are

only formally under the MoD. Chambers added that these new Chechen MoD units

looks more impressive on paper than in reality, as there is a lot of manipulation with

the official numbers.

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

8. The Chechen recruitment strategy can be broken down into three different tactics,

which have evolved during the course of the war.

a. True belief

b. Financial incentive

c. Coercion

9. True belief: In the initial phase of the war, the Chechen authorities tried to recruit

Chechens by appealing to a shared patriotic idea and by putting well-known Chechen

commanders in charge of the recruitment process. According to Chambers, this

recruitment tactic failed as almost nobody wanted to sign up for patriotic reasons.

Reports of this recruitment tactic in Chechnya had ceased by the end of spring 2022.

10. Financial incentive: Then, the Chechen authorities switched recruiting Chechens by

offering recruits rather well-payed contracts. Chechnya is a relative poor region in

Russia, and the money that can be made by signing contracts with the Russian MoD are

significant compared to standard salaries in Chechnya. This tactic has long been used in

Chechnya to incentivize joining Rosgvardia or MVD units, as well as presumed safety

from such units.

11. Coercion: This recruitment tactic has being ongoing throughout the full-scale invasion,

but it has ebbed and flowed in terms of scale and intensity. The extent of coercive

recruitment in Chechnya peaked around the time when the partial mobilisation in

Russia was announced at the end of September 2022. When the partial mobilisation

was announced, there were protest in Grozny against the mobilisation order, where a

few dozen mothers went out into the main square and begged Kadyrov not to take

their sons to die in Ukraine. The response of the authorities was to detain the

protesters along with their husbands, who were ordered to beat their wives for

protesting. Furthermore, all the sons of the protesters were arrested and deployed to

the battlefield in Ukraine.

12. According to Chambers, this event is very important because this was where the

Chechen authorities realised that they were unable to go about mobilising Chechens in

a public way as it was done in the rest of Russia, as it would bring Kadyrov’s authority

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and legitimacy inside Chechnya in jeopardy. Rather, Kadyrov decided that the

mobilisation in Chechnya had to be done in what Chambers labelled the style of

Kadryov’s regime: In the weeks following the protests in Grozny, Chechen civil society

groups reported the highest number of kidnappings in Chechnya since they began

keeping track of these numbers in April 2020. Over 400 cases was reported, but

according to Chambers, this is an undercount.

13. In the autumn of 2022, the authorities coercively recruited most Chechen men they

came into contact with without regard for their physical and/or mental condition.

Chambers know of cases where people involved in car accidents were recruited and

sent to Ukraine. There were many reports of people who were trying to obtain their

external passports would walk through the front door at the passport office to claim

their passport. Instead, they would be pulled through the back door and shipped off to

Ukraine.

14. The news of this practice quickly spread within the Chechen community, and many

who were only in possession of their internal passports would head for the border with

Kazakhstan in order to try to avoid being recruited.

183

However, the Chechen

authorities set up border patrols as far away as the border crossing with Kazakhstan at

Astrakhan

–

but also at border crossings closer to Chechnya

–

and recruited Chechens

who were trying to get out of Russia. Chambers further assumed that these Chechen

security officials were also posted at the border crossing between Poland and Belarus,

as these has been the main border crossings for Chechen asylum seekers for years.

15. Since the autumn of 2022, coercive recruitment of Chechens has been steadily

ongoing, and any form of contact with the Chechen authorities could put a male

Chechen at risk of being coercively recruited from the autumn of 2022 onwards.

Chechens who commit even the smallest wrongdoings risk being faced with the choice

of being detained and physically abused or being deployed in Ukraine. Chambers

stressed that although this practice is still ongoing, it is not as intensive as in

September 2022.

16. Chambers elaborated that family members to Chechen opposition members in exile

have been coercively recruited. The brother of the famous Chechen blogger Khassan

Khalitov was coercively recruited to Ukraine, but there have also been others similar

cases. Even being a member of the wrong Telegram-channel could mean that you

would be recruited. It was recently discovered that the Chechen authorities have the

software necessary to monitor activities on social media platforms. As soon as the

authorities manage to detain one member of a dissident Telegram-channel, they can

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Russians citizens are able to travel to Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia etc. on their internal passports

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find out who the other members are by physically abusing the detained. This was also

one of the tactics the Chechen authorities used during the LGBT purges in 2017.

17. It is not always clear to what units forced recruits are being deployed because the

Chechen authorities do not want to disclose this information. However, there has been

cases of Chechens falling out with Kadyrov, then disappearing for a couple of months

before resurfacing in videos from the battlefield in Ukraine, succeeded by evidence

that they had been killed at the front. To Chambers, this illustrates that the coercive

recruitment practiced by the Chechen authorities serves as a ‘convenient’ way to

eliminate opposition or even undesirables in a ‘clean way’ while simultaneously

delivering numbers for Moscow.

18. It is not always clear whether the Chechen authorities issue summonses and use the

regular Russian recruitment apparatus when recruiting people. Chambers has observed

irregularities regarding the issuance of summonses throughout the North Caucasus.

However, Chambers noted that the Chechen authorities could easily fabricate a

summons retrospectively, should they need to.

Recruitment from prisons

19. Recruitment of Chechens serving prison time in Chechnya has been another way for

the authorities to get rid of drug and alcohol users, or other categories of people which

the authorities have labelled as ‘undesirables’. These have been recruited primarily as

cannon fodder for offensive initiatives at the front line. However, there have been very

few reports about the phenomenon in general. This has not been a large-scale effort

by the Chechen authorities, but an effort to get rid of these undesirables.

20. The recruitment efforts have not necessarily taken place inside the official prisons in

Chechnya, but through the secret prison system in Chechnya. There is a Chechen idiom

in Russian referring to this system as the ‘Kadyrovite Basements’. These basements are

not comparable to the prisons in Russia proper and are completely extrajudicial.

21. The Chechen authorities primarily recruited from Chechen prisons as early as the

second or third month of the full-scale invasion. This was because the Chechen units

had suffered heavy losses during the first month and they needed to replace the loss of

manpower quickly. It is unclear whether the Chechen authorities relaxed the practice

of recruiting from prisons or whether they ran out of undesirables to recruit from the

prisons.

22. Chechens serving prison time elsewhere in Russia are generally not recruited to the

war in Ukraine. This is because Chechens who are sent to serve time in other parts of

Russia are generally seen as a potential extremist and these are not trusted by the FSB.

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There have been cases of Chechens serving time in Russia proper having links to

foreign fighters in Syria.

Exemptions

23. It is difficult to assess whether there is any actual exemptions for recruitment in

Chechnya. Chambers assessed that age could be a valid exemption, but it is unclear.

Officially, some medical conditions could qualify as an exemption, but Chambers has

seen numerous cases from across the North Caucasus where the authorities have

ignored medical conditions and even send people labelled as ‘invalids’ to Ukraine.

Recruitment of Chechens from other parts of Russia

24. It is unclear to what extent Kadyrov is allowed to use force outside of Chechnya. In

some cases, the Chechen authorities have worked together with local law enforcement

in e.g. Moscow to bring Chechen critics back to Chechnya. However, Chambers has not

seen any such cases related to recruitment to the war in Ukraine.

Military Conscription in Chechnya

25. For roughly a decade, Kadyrov has signed the annual orders for the twice-yearly

conscription, but it was seemingly not followed through on prior to the full-scale

invasion in 2022. The MoD over the years has denied this fact, but Chechen sources

contradict Moscow’s assertion. It is unclear whether these circumstances have

changed over the course of the invasion, as information is generally limited.

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Russian journalist

Tbilisi, 19 February 2024

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

According to this source, the recruitment of Chechens living in Chechnya is widespread,

as there are reports of Chechens who are being killed in Ukraine. Although, the source

did not have specific information on which military unit Chechens would end up in, the

source stated that there are military structures within Chechnya that are somewhat

independent from the regular army of Russia. Sometimes Chechens can be recruited to

the regular Russian army, but there also exists a Chechen battalion under the name of

Shaik Manzur (not to be confused with the Ukrainian battalion of the same name). This

battalion is deployed to the fights in Ukraine.

To the knowledge of this journalist, Chechens are both fighting under Kadyrov (in purely

Chechen units) and in regular Russian military units, which comprise of both Chechens

and soldiers from other Russian regions.

Groups subjected to recruitment in Chechnya

The recruitment would depend on which social group the person in question belongs to.

For example, if a person is working for Kadyrov and his government, he will most likely

join the Kadyrovites in Ukraine in the so-called

‘TikTok army’. These persons would

not

be sent to places in Ukraine, where their lives would be at risk by joining these units.

There could be a considerable number of volunteers from this group, as participating in

war would be perceived as a social lift for this group.

Then there are Chechens who are recruited into the regular Russian army. They are

deployed to fighting under the same conditions as any other Russian soldiers, which

means that their risk of being killed is higher than in the Kadyrovites’ units, especially if

they wind up in the so-called meat grinder waves.

The source opined that many Chechens chose to be recruited voluntary for financial

reasons in order to make a living, because the salary they receive as a soldier was

approximately 10 times higher than a regular salary in Chechnya. However, the source

did not have any particular information to corroborate this information. In contrast to

voluntary recruitment, there are also recruitment by threats: it is common that

recruiters in Chechnya would threaten a person to join the army. Therefore, the Chechen

authorities would probably use a mixture of both threats if a person would be reluctant

to be recruited and promises of a high salary to recruit new soldiers.

The source opined that there are certain groups of men in Chechnya that are more

exposed to being recruited in Chechnya than others. First of all, persons that Kadyrov

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has negative feelings about, for example family members of his rivals or relatives to

persons who criticise the Chechen government, would be more likely to be subjected to

recruitment. In Chechnya, people usually have many relatives, so there could be a

considerable large number of persons who are fitting this description.

There is a training centre for soldiers going to war in Ukraine in the city of Gudermes,

Chechnya. Many recruits from other Russian regions are coming to this centre to receive

training.

If a person is trying to obtain a passport in order to leave Russia and such a person is

registered as living in Chechnya, then the Chechen authorities could attempt to get in

touch with that person in order to recruit him to the war in Ukraine. The source noted

that Kadyrov treats all Chechens as his subjects. This means that Kadyrov finds it to be

his prerogative to treat them as he pleases. This also applies to Chechens living outside

of Russia. If Kadyrov does not like a particular person, he could issue an order and see to

that this person is executed without any trial.

Exemptions for recruitment

The rules, which regulate exemption for recruitment, are found in the Russian

legislation. These exemptions are largely ignored by the Chechen authorities. However,

the source opined that at this point there is no need for recruiting elderly men, which is

why they are not recruited. However, if such a need will arise, elderly Chechens would

also be subjected to recruitment.

10. The medical exemption would only be applied if the person in question is so sick, that it

is physical impossible for him to fight.

Consequences of refusing to be recruited

11. A person in Chechnya cannot refuse if he is recruited by the Chechen authorities, as the

authorities would most likely beat the person to death if he refuses to comply. The

person could try to escape to another Russian region, but it would still be possible for

the Chechen authorities to find him there.

12. Chechens have a high level of connection to their relatives, which makes it easier for the

authorities to identify the relatives and to subject the members of the extended family

to collective punishment, if the Chechen authorities believe that a person from a

particular family has done something punishable. Then family members could be killed,

beaten to death or the authorities may force them to say on tape that they regret doing

whatever the authorities are accusing them or the family member of having done. Once

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the authorities have received the video tape they can kill the person, and no one will

ever find out about it. This practice is widespread, according to the source. However, it

does not mean that ‘everyone’ is killed, but it means that everyone

may live in constant

fear of being killed.

Recruitment of Chechens living outside of Russia

13. The source noted that the Chechen authorities are not able to recruit Chechens living

outside of Russia. However, if they return to Chechnya, they could be recruited.

According to this source, a Chechen can never be safe. A person could also be killed by

the Chechen authorities in Germany or in another country of the EU. This has happened

before.

14. During the first and second Chechen war, many Chechens left Russia and moved to other

places in Europe. Therefore, it happens quite often that these Chechens will return to

Chechnya. This does not put these persons in more risk than others. These persons are

not perceived as traitors only because they left the country during these wars. If persons

do not criticise the Chechen government, they would probably not face any problems

upon return.

15. In a different type of situation, the source explained that there has been examples of

Chechen families who deliberately tried to lure one of their own family members living in

Europe back to Chechnya using different types of false explanations (e.g. by saying that a

family member got sick). This has happened if the family had wanted to force a female

Chechens family member to return, if for example they found her behaviour to be

against, the local Chechen customs or religious rules.

16. The source opined that a Chechen family would probably not lure a man to Chechnya for

recruitment to the army. On the contrary, families would usually try to hide persons

from the authorities.

17. Generally, the Chechen authorities have not invested a lot in recruiting Chechens outside

of Russia, as there are still a lot of people living in Chechnya, who can be recruited and

hence be much easier for the authorities to recruit such persons.

Prevalence of coercive recruitment of Chechens to fight in Ukraine

18. One of the most prevalent coercive methods used by the Chechen authorities is planting

illegal drugs on a person, and afterwards threatening the person with punishment such

as prison, if he would not let himself self-recruit. Consuming drugs is illegal, according to

the law, but it is also perceived as a capital sin within the Chechen religious rules, which

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is why many Chechens would prefer the army than being a disgrace in the eyes of his

family and the wider community.

19. Bribing is a possibility for those Chechens who can afford it when the authorities try to

recruit them. Sometimes the Chechen officials need to recruit someone, and they can

place drugs on a person to coerce him to be recruited. He can then choose to go to jail

on trumped up charges or go to Ukraine. The authorities could also choose just to

threaten a person without planting drugs on the person. This would in many ways be

enough to push the person to let himself self-recruit.

20. Abduction could also be a possibility for recruiting persons to the war in Ukraine.

However, the source had not heard of any documented cases were abductions were

used as a method of recruitment. Nevertheless, as abductions happens fairly often in the

region, the source would not exclude that such methods were used to recruit persons.

21. Common people, who are forced to join the armed forces, would probably be placed in

the regular Russian army ‘to give Kremlin a lot of meat for their grinder’. If you do not

have any connections with Kadyrov this would highly likely be the scenario for a

common Chechen.

Recruitment methods in Chechen prisons

22. The source did not have any particular evidence that could explain whether the Chechen

authorities would be likely to recruit persons from Chechen prisons. However, the

source would not be surprised if such recruitment was a method the Chechen

authorities would use as well.

23. According to this source, there is a real need for more soldiers on the front, so it would

be possible for Chechen prisoners serving in other Russian prisoners outside of Chechnya

to be recruited as any other Russian prisoners would. The Chechens from other Russian

prisons would probably be deployed to regular Russian army units not only the Chechen

units.

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Georgian activist

Tbilisi, 23 February 2024

Access to information in Chechnya

1. The source was in Chechnya last time in 2015. The activist noted that it had become

gradually more difficult to get information out of Chechnya in the last couple of years.

The source knew of journalists working in Chechnya 10 years ago. However, they had

been arrested and thus could not continue their work in Chechnya. The source opined

that the most likely way to obtain information from the field in Chechnya in 2024

would be through family connections and personal relations in general. It is not

possible anymore for journalists to work independently in the field and to get reliable

information from Chechnya through the media.

Recruitment of Chechens to the war in Ukraine

2. According to the source, there are three types of recruitment, of which the Chechen

authorities are using to draft Chechens to the war in Ukraine.

People can be recruited as volunteers. The volunteers are likely to be motivated

by a wish to make money. These persons typically already work closely with

Kadyrov’s

collaborators

and are a part of the so-called Kadyrovites. Furthermore,

the use of volunteers was more widespread in the beginning of the full-scale war,

as many volunteers thought that the war would be finished rather quickly and

hence it was an easy way to earn money and show that one is useful for the

Kremlin. However, this type of recruitment has decreased considerably as the war

has dragged on.

Another of recruitment is forced recruitment, which can occur randomly of any

persons who can be used in the war in Ukraine. These persons could be from

various groups. There are cases of fighting in the streets in Chechnya, which

resulted in that the parties involved were recruited to the MoD. Other cases of

recruitment could be forced recruitment of persons who commit and are arrested

for minor violations of the law, e.g. of speeding in a car. According to this source,

this would be enough for the person in question to be recruited to sign a contract

with the MoD.

Finally, men who try to leave the country may be intercepted and recruited. The

source noted that the Chechen authorities would monitor the Chechens who are

seeking to obtain new passports, as this could indicate that the person is about to

flee Chechnya. Therefore, recruitment officers could wait for the person who had

applied for a new passport, and force him to sign a contract with the MoD. In this

way, it makes it hard for Chechens to flee if they do not already have a valid

passport.

II.

III.

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3. According to this source, most of the recruits from Chechnya are deployed in Chechen

controlled units. However, there are also many Russians within these Chechen

controlled units. As an effect of this, there are several reported cases of fights within

such groups that has resulted in soldiers within the same unit had been killed by each

other.

4. Chechens are mostly sent to units that will support the frontline. Hence, Chechens

would seldom wind up fighting at the actual forefront. These are the more elite units.

There are also Chechens fighting in the so-called

‘meat wave’ attacks; that sends

scores

of poorly trained soldiers to die on the front lines against Ukraine to clear a path for

the Kremlin's more valuable elite units.

5. The source knew of a number of Chechens who had fled to Kazakhstan, as Russian

citizens can easily enter Kazakhstan on their internal passport without being stopped at

the border. However, all of those people that the source knew of had been beaten,

and the following day they were sent back to Chechnya, and afterwards recruited to

Ukraine.

6. According to this activist, the peak of recruitment in Chechnya occurred during the

partial mobilisation in the autumn of 2022. After this mobilisation, the recruitment had

to some extent slowed down. However, the source noted that the recruitment of

Chechens to the war in Ukraine was still ongoing. Kadyrov had to show Putin that he is

a good patriot and therefore, he needed to show that he could find troops for the

Russian army, when Putin needed it. This explained the peak during the mobilisation in

2022.

7. Regarding voluntary recruitment, the Chechen authorities have sought to recruit new

soldiers by promising potential soldiers important amounts of money or they would try

to fix problems the particular person has

–

get a person of interest out of prison

somewhere in Russia in exchange for a signed contract with the MoD. Whether the

recruitment has been forced or voluntarily, every Chechen recruit has to sign a

contract with the MoD. In this way, the paper trail would indicate that the person had

willingly sign the contract even in cases where this was incorrect.

8. According to the source, the Chechen authorities would not resort to fabrication

charges against a person, as threats of beatings or killings, etc. are perceived as

adequate to “persuade” a person to sign a contract with the

MoD.

Groups subjected to recruitment in Chechnya

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9. The source noted that family members of vocal critics of the Kadyrov government are

likely to be recruited to the war. As an example, the source mentioned the case of

Akhmed Sakayev. Sakayev’s brother’s son

was recruited because of his connection to

Sakayev. Furthermore, the source noted that there are reported cases of imams

supporting the Ichekeria movement in Chechnya who have been arrested due to an

informant that had told Kadyrov all about their whereabouts and their affiliation with

the Ichekria movement.

10. According to this source, there are many young people in Chechnya, who supports the

Ichekria movement. However, they do not display their support in the public and they

hide any symbols of Ichkeria

that they might have. It was the source’s opinion that

these Chechens were ready to take on the fight for independence when the time is ripe

11. In the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the source mentioned that there was

ongoing protests in Grozny, where women were protesting against the invasion of

Ukraine. However, Kadyrov send the husbands to the protesting women to Ukraine

stating, that it is the man’s job to keep track of their women, and if the man cannot do

that, then Kadyrov will teach them to do that by sending them to Ukraine.

12. People who show extreme religious opinions and behaviours have already been put in

prison and hence these persons would not be subjected to recruitment to the war in

Ukraine. The religious extremists that are not in prison in Russia would most likely live

outside of Russia

–

mostly in Turkey.

Exemptions for recruitment

13. If a person is rich enough, they can pay the Chechen officials to avoid being recruited.

According to the activist, it has become a much-used resort to pay a bribe not to be

recruited. However, the one percent of the Chechen population that are close to

Kadyrov will not be recruited by the authorities. These persons are exempted from

signing contracts with the MoD.

14. The source stated that there is an age limit for recruitment in Chechnya. The

authorities would not recruit a person that is too old. However, if the person is a

political enemy to Kadyrov, for example a relative to Zakayev, then the person could be

recruited disregard his age. According to the source, medical conditions could also be a

reason for exemption.

Recruitment of Chechens living in other regions of Russia

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15. According to the source, Kadyrov and his close collaborators would be able to bring

back Chechens living in other parts of Russia to Chechnya, if the Chechen authorities

want to get a hold of a particular person, then they would find him.

16. The source mentioned an example from St. Petersburg, where there was a sports

event. During this event, they played the Russian anthem and everybody had to stand

up during the anthem to show their respect. A couple of Chechens were also at the

event. They had lived all their lives in the city. However, they did not stand up during

the anthem and were subsequently taken to Chechnya by the Chechen police and

beaten. Afterwards, they were forced to make a video where they apologised. The

source noted that this was an old story and happened prior to the full-scale invasion.

The source had not heard of specific cases where the Chechen authorities had

recruited Chechens outside of Chechnya.

Consequences of refusing to be recruited

17. The source opined that it was impossible to refuse recruitment in Chechnya, as the

Chechen authorities would beat the person in question if he would not sign a contract

with the MoD when asked to do this. The source explained that a person would be

given two options: you can die or you can go to Ukraine. However, the source also

noted that it was possible to pay a bribe. The amount would be very high, according to

this source, at approximately 5,000,000 rubles (the equivalent to 50,565 euro). The

source stated that ordinary Chechens do not have 5,000,000 rubles that they can

spend on bribes. The only Chechens who have these types of money are Kadyrov’s

men.

Recruitment methods in Chechen prisons

18. According to the source, Kadyrov tries to appear as strong like Prigozhin, and thus

recruits different types of persons from the Russian prisons, for example from

Dagestani prisons. The source knew of Chechens fighting in one of the units under the

Akhmat battalion, where approximately 70 % of the soldiers were non-Chechens. This

could be explained by the recruitment of different prisons around Russia, according to

this source.

Recruitment of Chechens outside of Russia

19. The source stated that the Chechen authorities also tried to recruit Chechens outside

of Russia. The activist had heard of cases from Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, where they

had tried to recruit local Kists to the war in Ukraine. The source emphasised that the

cases he had heard of was recruitment attempts to go fight for the Ukrainian side,

infiltrate them and subsequently kill Akhmed Sakayev who is allegedly fighting in

Ukraine.

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20. The Kadyrovites are spreading information/propaganda in Chechnya about Chechen

activists from Europe

–

from Germany or Sweden

–

these activists have no issues when

they return. The source knew of a case where one woman who had openly talked

about how good Kadyrov is. Such persons are trying to recruit Chechens living in

Europe to come to Chechnya.

21. The source mentioned the case of the MMA fighter Khamzat Chimaev

–

Chechen with

Swedish citizenship

– who is openly Kadyrov’s person. There are also cases from

Germany and Austria where Chechens openly support Kadyrov and his government.

The source opined that they also openly tries to persuade other Chechens to go back

and live in Chechnya.

22. The source noted that the Chechen authorities were not recruiting Chechens living in

Europe to go fight in Ukraine, but more to persuade them to support Kadyrov and/or

come back to Chechnya. This their mission in the European countries.

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Prof. Judith Pallot

28 February 2024, Oxfordshire

Islam in Chechnya

1. Prof. Judith Pallot described that there co-exist two types of Islam in Chechnya: one is

the extremist Wahhabism, which emerged a force among the separatist, in the

1990sand the other is what she referred to as ‘the Kadyrov Islam’. The latter is hard to

define. However, ‘Kadyrov Islam’ is expressed as loyalty to Kadyrov as well as to the

officially-accepted

‘traditional Islam’ (Sufi Islam). Sometimes this form of Islam practice

also draws on element from Salafi traditions. Thus, it is very difficult to grasp.

2. The ethnic Tatars

184

is the largest Muslim population in Russia. The Tatars are generally

perceived by the FSIN

as ‘good Kremlin loyalist’. The Tatars practice one of the four

official state religions which are commonly described as ‘traditional’ (Russian

Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism) Traditional Islam does not challenge the

state, is theologically Russified and some people ever describe it as semi-secular.

185

Kadyrov’s Islam does not fit the definition of ‘traditional Islam as popularly and

officially understood in Russia. The Chechens have long been perceived as the most

dangerous Muslims and potential extremist by the authorities and continue to be so,

even given Kadyrov’s loyalty to the Kremlin. Furthermore, immigrants from primarily

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the 2

most vulnerable group in terms of being

radicalised besides the Chechens, according to Pallot.

3. Pallot explained that the Russian government perceives any Chechen as potentially

vulnerable to being radicalised, and set on the path to extremism and terrorism.

Furthermore, if a Chechen, or another Russian citizen, has chosen to live in a country

outside of Russia then he would be suspected of being unpatriotic, as this would

indicate that the person was anti-Russian.

The Russian prison system - FSIN

4. There is a systemic problem in terms of the way the Russian prison system treats

Muslims. Many Muslim prisoners who practise Islam actively, pray five times a day, eat

only halal food sent in parcels into prison, fast during Ramadan, will be labelled as

radicalised, and, therefore, potentially extremist by the prison authorities. Especially if

184

largest ethnic group in Russia, while Chechens being the 3

largest,

url

185

Laruelle, M., 2021. Russia’s Islam: balancing securitization and integration; Di Puppo, L.,

2019. The paradoxes of a localised Islamic orthodoxy: Rethinking Tatar traditional Islam in

Russia.

Ethnicities, 19(2),

pp.311-334..

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the person happens to be ethnic Chechen as well. The Chechens are at the top of the

danger list as far as the Russian prison Service (FSIN

186

) is concerned.

5. The Russian prison system is highly centralised and managed by the FSIN. FSIN is

organised with a series of regional authorities under the federal administration. These

regional administrations are known as the UFSINs Administrative department of FSIN).

In the region of Kransoyarsk Krai, as well as in other of the larger regions, the regional

administrations are called GUFSIN (Main administrative department of FSIN).

6. The power structure in the Russian prison system is vertical. Therefore, none of the

regional prison authorities or prison facilities are accountable to any local or regional

government structures. In this regard, the UFSIN and GUFSINS receive their orders

from the federal FSIN located in Moscow. For example, if the Sverdlovsk regional

parliament does not accept the GUFSIN’s way of handling the prisons in the region,

there is not much they can do about it other than to complain to the federal FSIN in

Moscow.

7. All the funds allocated to FSIN come from the federal budget and FSIN comprises the

or 5

largest spending department in Russia. FSIN employs more than 225,000

personnel. The FSIN is also a militarised institution in Russia and thus, when Russia

joined the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996, the FSIN had to relocate from the Ministry

of Internal Affairs to be subordinated the Ministry of Justice and it promised to

demilitarise the institution in accordance with the regulation of the CoE.

8. This move of the penitentiary services from Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Justice

happened in most but not all East and central European countries after the fall of the

USSR. However, although the CoE wanted it, Russia did not demilitarise the FSIN. So-

called attested personnel have military ranks “of the internal service” that mirror those

in the armed forces. There are also a minority of civilian employees who work in the

rear offices, or are professionals, such as teachers, and some, but not all, medical

personal.

Remand prisons - SIZOs

9. Russia comprises approximately 210 remand prison and 71 remand blocks in

correctional colonies penal facilities. Remand prisons are mainly located in the

metropolitan and urban centres. Most of these pre-trial detention centres were built in

the 19

century. They have a cellular type of accommodation. In the 1990s, it was not

uncommon to have 40 people in one cell, although they are built to accommodate

approximately 8-12 persons. Overcrowding is still a problem in a large minority of

186

FSIN: The Federal Penitentiary Service (Russian: Федераль�½ая служба испол�½е�½ия �½аказа�½ий

(ФСИН))

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regions. IN 2012 The CoE passed a pilot judgement identifying SDIZOs as constituting a

risk to prisoners’ article 3 rights under the CCHRs. Russia was still under supervision for

the conditions of detention in SIZOs when it was expelled in 2020 for the invasion of

Ukraine. This means that it can be assumed that conditions in SIZOs are inhumane,

unless Russia can prove otherwise for a particular facility.

10. Remand prisons are designed to confine remand prisoners for a short period

–

and a

maximum of 18 months. However, in Russia a remand prisoner can be confined for far

longer if a case is still under investigation or the case has been submitted to the court.

Once this has happened a prisoner can continued to be detained until the case is

completed.

11. Pallot mentioned that there is no probation service in Russia at all. There are plans to

set a probation service before 2030.FSIN has a penal inspectorate that supervises non-

custodial senteces. After release, a person must sign in at the local police station,

sometimes once a week and sometimes once a month.

Correctional colonies - IKs

12. A Russian prisoner serves their sentence in a correctional colony (IK

187

). These were

built during the Soviet era and therefore have a completely different architectural

design and management structure. The Russian government has said several times that

they intend to change this old soviet system. However, it has not happened yet. As in

the Soviet era, IKs have an industrial zone and farms on which prisoners of working

age and who pass fitness test have to work. Labour is compulsory and together with

strict discipline viewed as the main way of rehabilitating offenders.

13. In the Soviet prison system, prisoners were kept in dormitories. This was not only a

place where the prisoners slept. This was meant to be a complete social system, so the

prisoners were meant to identify with one another and participate in socialist

competitions against other dormitories. They were known as detachments called

otryady.The

system was carried over into post-Soviet Russia. The whole vocabulary of

the prison system in the Soviet Union was taken from the military. Dormitories are

criticised both by UNCAT and the CoE because of the prison-on-prisoner violence they

afre associated with. In Russia the dormitories are breeding place of prison sub-culture

- the Thieves-in-Law (Vory-v-Zakone)

14. As of March 2024, 74 people in Russia have had commuted their execution sentences,

as the Russian government has suspended the death penalty in order to become a

member of the CoE. However, since Russia left the CoE after the full-scale invasion of

187

Corrective colony (in Russian: исправитель�½ая коло�½ия/ispravitelnaya koloniya (ИК/IK))

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Ukraine, various Russian politicians have openly discussed the possibility of reinstating

the death penalty in Russia.

Colony settlements

188

- KPs

15. The Russian authorities refer to these settlements as open prisons as we know from

the Western jurisdictions. However, these are not exactly the same as open prisons in

the West. The prisoners are allowed to go and work out of the colonies, however, the

work is decided for them and they are usually escorted to and from work. The

prisoners are not allowed to go into shops on their way back, and they have to come

back to the colony at night.

General regime colonies

16. In the general regime colonies, prisoners are living in dormitories up to 100 adults and

120 juveniles in one a dormitory, but in the past, these numbers were often exceeded.

These colonies are organised as labour camps. Although the Russian prison service

employs a high number of staff, at night when most of the prison personnel leave, the

prisoners are left to discipline themselves. This is why the dormitory system has

become so dominated by the prison sub-culture known as the thieves-in-law or vory-v-

zakone.

189

17.

Not so long ago, the Russian authorities introduced what in law is descrbied as “forced

labour as a alternative to the deprivation of freedom”as a of punishment. According to

the Russian authorities, forced labour is not seen as imprisonment even though the

people sentenced to this punishment or who at the end of a long sentence are

transferred to this punishment have to live in a secure dormitory often located inside

a correctional colony. Through this practice, the Russian government can reduce the

number of prisoners in the statistics, which has been used to appease the CoE in their

rulings that the number of prisoners was disproportionally high in Russia. The number

of prisoners in Russia was at highest - over 1 million -in the late 1990s but has dropped

since to the current 433006 on1

Jan 2023The opportunity for forced labour has

helped get the statistics down, but this is not the sole explanation for the decline in the

number of incarcerated persons in Russia.The new punishment uses in mates of

correctional centres (IKTs) to work on public projects and construction projects;

previously people from Uzbekistan and the Tajikistan had been used to work on those

projects. Forced labour was also presented as a way to replace such migrant workers

by the head of FSIN, Mr. Kalashnikov. However, this scheme does involve incarceration,

as the Russian authorities have transformed the dormitories of the general regime

colonies into labour dormitories for these non-prisoners.

188

189

Colony settlements (in Russian: Коло�½ия-поселе�½ие/ Koloniya-poselenie)

Thieves within the law (in Russian: Воры в Зако�½е/Vory v Zakone)

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18. Pallot opined that it is positive that these non-prisoners are able to leave the

correctional centre to which they are assigned and work. On the other hand, it is a

stretch to call it open prisons when compared to the West, where a person is living at

home at go out and do community labour. The Russian system is not like this.

Strict regime

190

colonies

19.

In ‘strict regime colonies’, every prisoner is living in dormitories. The source mentioned

that political prisoners such as Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin etc. would be

serving in strict regime colonies.

Special regime colonies

20.

‘Special regime colonies’ are built for recidivist, extremists and prisoners perceived as

being very dangerous. In special regime colonies, a prisoner can live in a cell together

with another prisoner, or in a dormitory. This is where the Russian authorities placed

Aleksey Navalny, when he was serving his sentence. Aleksey Navalny started serving

his sentence at a strict regime in the region of Vladimir, but in December 2023, he was

transferred to a special regime colony IK-3 in the Northern region of Yamalo-Nenets

where he died.

21. In special regime colonies, a prisoner could be living in a dormitory, if they serve under

so-called privileged conditions of detention. However, if a person were serving under

strict conditions of detention, they would be living in a cell.

Conditions of detention

22.

Within each of the above mentioned regimes, a prisoner is put so called ‘conditions of

detention’, which determines the person’s level

of privilege. This level determines how

many visits a prisoner may have, how many parcels one can receive parole, which is

called UDO

191

in Russian.

There are three forms of conditions of detention in Russia. Every prisoner enters a

prison on standard conditions. If a prisoner behaves well, then they can be transferred

to privileged conditions. However, if a prisoner behaves badly or the prison officers

find that the prisoner is a bad person, then they can place that person on strict

conditions of detention known as the SUS.

192

The disciplinary cells are planned with a

disposal of space of up to 2m

which is condemned as violating article 3 rights by the

CoE. In theory, prisoners should spend no more than 15 days in a disciplinary cell.

190

191

Strict regime (in Russian: строгий режим/strogiy rezhim)

Parole (in Russian: Услов�½о-досроч�½ое освобожде�½ие от �½аказa�½ия (УДО/UDO)

192

SUS (in Russian: строгие условия содержа�½ия (CУС/SUS)

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23. According to the prison officers, Aleksey Navalny was found to behave badly in prison,

as he allegedly broke the prohibitions within the prison system. There are more than

40 prohibitions in the Russian prison system, which a prisoner has to learn by heart. If a

prisoner violates any of them, they can end up in solitary confinement in a disciplinary

cell also known as the SHIZO

193

or cell-type confinement, known as PKT

194

for up to 15

days. But quite often a prisoner can be released for one day and then, under some

pretext, be returned for another 15 days. This is what happened to Navalny. Parts of

the disciplinary punishment is that the prisoner cannot wear his usual clothes, is given

less food and may be under constant surveillance.

The Chechen prison system

24. In Chechnya, there are two types of prison systems, between which there is a lot of

transfer and mobility.

Secret prisons

25.

The ‘secret prisons’ dates back to two Chechen wars. The secret prions were

established by the military detachments that were fighting as a system to deal with the

prisoners from the other side. In the Second Chechen War, opposition Chechens were

also fighting against Chechens who had thrown in their lot with the Russians.

26. These facilities were created during the two wars. Some of them were located in the

cellars of local public schools or the like. These prisons were operated by the secret

service (FSB) of Chechnya. The cells would be 2*2 metres for a single cell and 10*5

metres for more people in the cell. According to Pallot, Chechens being deported to

Chechnya from the EU would probably be placed in such cells.

27. In the secret prisons, former prisoners and NGO organisations have reported that

prisoners are regularly physically abused and the prisons are used as a way of forcing

people to deliver witness statements, in order to implicate other suspects or to get

confession prior to their transfer to legitimate facilities or court or simply for

retribution for opposing the leadership. There are reports of beating prisoners with

truncheons, electric shocks and cases of water boarding. There are also case of people

simply disappearing

28. These prisons are used as a part of the repression apparatus to keep the Chechen

population under control. The secret prisons are a means of controlling opposition,

non-loyalists or members of the LGBTQi community.

193

194

Solitary cell (in Russian: Штраф�½ой изолятор/Shtrafnoy Izolyator (ШИЗО/SHIZO)

PKT (i Russian: помеще�½ие камер�½ого типа (ПКТ/PKT)

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29. The source mentioned two cases of Chechens, living in Germany, who had been

deported to Russia. Apparently, they were promised by the Russian prosecutor

general’s office that the two persons would not be sent to Chechnya.

However, they

disappeared shortly after their arrival in Moscow.

The official penal facilities in Chechnya

30. There are very few official penal facilities in Chechnya. This absence is partly due to the

Chechen wars, but also because President Putin and FSIN are worried about Islamic

radicalisation. Therefore, the Russian authorities have continuously tried to move

Muslim prisoners deep into the heart of Russia. This concerns any Muslim that the

authorities would think could be radicalised or is already radicalised or extremist.

31. When a potential radicalised person is convicted in Chechnya, the authorities would

move them out of Chechnya into what Prof. Pallot calls ‘the penal heartland of Russia’.

It covers an area formed as an arc starting in Arkhangelsk, passing through Kirov then

Vladimir, the Urals and ending up in southern Siberia. This is also, where the Crimean

Tatars ended up after being arrested and tried in Crimea.

32. In Chechnya, there are two SIZOs (remand prisons). The first, SIZO 1 is located in

Grozny, and the second, SIZO 2, is located north of Grozny. The remand prisoners in

these SIZOs actually have relatively good conditions, which is partly due to the

‘Chechenization’ that has been ongoing since Kadyrov took power after the second

Chechen war. This means that all the civil services including security personnel in

Chechnya are recruited by the Kadyrov government, and not by Moscow.

33. The capacity of SIZO 1, which is the large remand prison in Chechnya, is only for 205

remand prisoners. This is a relatively low capacity compared to other SIZOs elsewhere

in Russia. There are SIZOs in Russia, which can accommodate thousands of remand

prisoners. SIZO 2 has a capacity of 50 places..

34. If a prison facility has personnel, who are from the same clan as the prisoners, they

would be likely to treat those prisoners better than the average and to make the

conditions better for anybody who is locally arrested for an offence such as being a

common thief. According to prof. Pallot, the local Chechen population who are

ordinary offenders

–

common criminals

–

would serve their time in Chechen

correctional institutions.

35. Chechnya has only one correctional colony, the IK-2, which is located in in the city of

Chernokosovo, just north of Grozny in small rural settlement. IK-2 was established in

1956 as a strict regime colony for 1,050 prisoners. However, nowadays it is a general

regime for only 350 prisoners sentence to a general regime. IK-2 has also imbedded

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within it a KP - colony settlement - for 50 people and has a strict regime corpus for 250

persons. Its total capacity is therefore 650.

36. There is another colony settlement in the city of Argun. Furthermore, there is a

correctional centre, which is a place for forced labour

–

an alternative to deprivation

–

correctional centre №1. This centre has a capacity for 200 people.

Determination of place of trial

37. Under Russian legislation, a person should be tried either in the place where the crime

has been committed or where the person has permanent residency, which in Russian is

referred to as PMZh

195

or Propiska

196

. However, there are Chechens who offend

elsewhere in Russia, who are then transferred back to the SIZOs in Chechnya. This is

happening, if the Chechen government has an interest in these particular persons, or if

they are registered as living in Chechnya, then they will subsequently be tried in

Chechnya.

38. Recently, an ethnic Russian citizen burned a Quran in the city of Vladimir. Ramzan

Kadyrov then requested the FSIN for this person to be transfer to a SIZO in Chechnya to

be prosecuted there, although the crime was not committed in Chechnya or the person

in question did not reside in Chechnya. He was nevertheless transferred to be brought

to trial in Chechnya.

39. Furthermore, if a radical Islamist is being transferred for trial in Chechnya from another

Russian region, the person would most likely be sent out of Chechnya again to serve

their sentence.

Transfer of prisoners

40. When prisoners are transferred from SIZO to a colony or between different types of

colonies, they are transferred in so-called Stolypin wagons, which are wagons without

any windows and are towed behind regular passenger trains. The duration of a

prisoner in transport can last for a very long time (sometimes up to two weeks), and

often would relatives not be advised where a prisoner is taken prior to their arrival.

197

The CoE also made a pilot judgement against Russia (Tomov v Russia) concerning the

inhumane conditions amounting to torture in prison transports of all kinds. Russia was

still under supervision when it was expelled from the CoE. Like Anayev on SIZOs, this

195

196

Permanent residency (in Russian: Постоя�½�½ое место жительства (ПМЖ)

Propiska is the old Soviet residence permit system; the word is still used in Russia to describe a

person’s permanent residence. For more information on Propiske please read here: HRW, the residence

permit system (propiska),

url

197

For more information on transportation of prisoners, please see: AI,

Prisoner Transportation

in Russia,

2017,

url

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meant that Russia had not rectified the problems or shown to the CoE that it had a

satisfactory action plan to do so.

Military courts

41. According to the Russian legislation, Chechens who have committed crimes in

accordance with the Russian military laws, should be trialled at a military court. As

Chechnya is a part of the Southern military district, such persons should be trialled at

the military court in the city of Rostov on Don.

Persons at risk of being targeted by the Chechen authorities

42. The source explained that the persons who would be at the highest risk of being

targeted by Kadyrov’s government would be:

•

Opponents of Kadyrov and his government

•

Human rights activists

•

Members of NGOs

•

Members of the LGBTQi community

•

Chechen who has fled abroad

43. Prof. Pallot noted that the question of radicalism is complex, as it is difficult to know

what Kadyrov thinks and hence what the Chechen authorities would perceive as an

extremist Islamist. However, it is rather easier to find out what the Russian prison

service thinks about extremist Islamists.

44. If a Chechen has fled abroad, they would automatically be of interest for the Chechen

authorities. The interest towards Chechens would be much higher than for example

the case of an ordinary Russian who had fled the country.

45. If a member of the Kadyrov clan or the clan that controls the detention facilities in

Chechnya would return to Chechnya from abroad, they would most probably have

fewer problems than others with the Chechen authorities upon return.

46. If a person of interest for the Chechen authorities returns to Chechnya from abroad,

they would likely start of in one of the secret prisons. After the person has made a

confession, they would most likely be transferred into one of the formal remand

prisons under the FSIN.

Monitoring of prisons in Russia

47. In Russia, there is generally no effective and independent monitoring of the Russian

prison facilities. Even more so in Chechnya. There exist public monitoring bodies in

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Russia known as ONK

198

and ombudsman institutions. However, these bodies are

completely integrated into the vertical hierarchy both on the federal level but also in

Chechnya. The most reliable monitoring over the past two decades has been by the

Committee for Prevention of Torttre (CPT) of the Coe that had to make repeated visits

to prisons in the north Caucasus and especially Chechnya. The Russian government

only allowed 4 of 27 of these reports to be published (two shortly after accession to

the CoE in the 1990s, one in 2012 when Putin wasn’t president and one in 2019 that

didn’t concern FSIN faciities.) Since Russia was expelled from the CoE CPT visits have

ceased.

48. Nevertheless, the existing level of public monitoring of the Russian prisons means that

the investigators or the police would prefer to take a person of interest out for

example in the forests beat them up or give the person electric shock treatments

before they are past into the formal system in order to avoid troubles.

General treatment of prisoners

49. There is a lot of violence in the Russian prison system as in the Russian military and in

society as a whole. This violence has been legitimised by President Putin as a way of

solving problems, as a means of repression and to disciplining the population.

Furthermore, there is a history in Russia going back to the violence committed in the

GULAG system and their treatment of prisoners.

50. Prisoners across Russia, including the Chechens, are subjected to humiliating and

demeaning treatment by the prison officers. The prisoners are forced in a ritualistic

way to show that they are inferior subjects. This treatment goes back to the idea of

militarisation of the prison system, as the prison officers, who all go through the

military academy view prisoners as the enemy.

51. According to several interlocutors, with whom prof. Pallot had spoken and interviews

conducted by her research team with 12 Chechen prisoners (by telephone) and former

prisoners, it is only if the prisoners are taught to obey the rules down to the last

button, that they would have understood how to live in society once they have left

prison. The prison officers genuinely believe that strict discipline and forced labour are

the way to re-educate the prisoners. The FSIN still uses the notion of re-education

rather than rehabilitation and return them into society.

52. However, it is important to stress that not all Russian prison officers act like sadists.

The officers have learned to behave in this manner. There are some so-called penal

198

Public monitoring commission ONK (in Russian: Обществе�½�½ая �½аблюдатель�½ая комиссия (ОНК)

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fiefdoms, which are very large prison authorities that would have 12-20 facilities under

them with 40-50,000 prisoners in them. These were setup during the GULAG in the

1930s in northern Russia and in regions as Sverdlovsk, Mordovia, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk

and Kirov etc.

53. The prison officers from these fiefdoms, which are called dynastic families, are the

great grandchildren of the original prison officers in the GULAGs. Therefore, the penal

culture is passed down from one generation of prison officers to the next. However,

that does not mean that just because great granddad shot people in the GULAG, that

their grandchildren would do the same today, but these are hermetically sealed

regions, which are populated by former prison officers, existing prison officers and to

some degree by previous prisoners.

54. The UFSINS and GUFSINS with the worst record of torture within the prison system are

these large fiefdoms, which have been there since the 1930s. Even though the prison

system in Russia is centralised, some of these large prison authorities do not

automatically follow instructions issued from the centre. There have also been

attempts to reform the system. However, such attempts have been resisted by these

large prison authorities.

Treatment of Chechen prisoners

55.

According to 12 interviewed Chechens who has been to prisons in Russia, Chechens are

subject to more scrutiny and surveillance than other inmates. There have been cases of

prison guards who have stamped on the Quran, that break up prayers or schedule

head counts and calisthenics exactly when the sun comes up, and fail to produce

hallal

food in the canteen an d give no alternative to pork on the menu. The authorities build

mosques in any correctional colony with a large number of Muslims. These colony

mosques and prayer rooms a record on cctv the Mulsim prisoners who regularly go to

the mosque which automatically makes them subject of interest and vulnerable to

radicalisation towards terrorism. How Muslims are treated tends to depend upon how

many there are. Prisoner who emerge charismatic leaders are removed to colonies

where they can be isolated from other prisoners.

56. There is a variety of measures in which the prison officers would discriminate against

Muslims. In this regard, it does not even matter whether the Chechen prisoner is

serving time in a Russian correctional colony. If a Chechen identifies with the Muslim

jamaat

in a colony, the person would be under suspicion.

57. There are also some Chechens who are involved with the Vory-v-zakone, which is a

way to align with the criminal gangs to be able to get weapons after they are realised.

Classification of prisons (red, black and green)

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58. The popular classification of Russian prisons goes back to 1990s, the period which is

known as

bespredel

(chaos). In the 1990s, there was a collapse of the penal economy.

Previously, the penal system used to get orders from the state, which it then fulfilled.

However, in the 1990s this system broke down, which meant that many prison officers

were not being paid and so many left their jobs. This led to a hollowing out of penal

power and many prison officers at that time went off into private security companies

or Western firms, as they were allowed to wear firearms. In this new power void, the

Vory-v-zakone

–

the prison gangs

–

in reality took over the running of the prisons in

that time.

59. The Chechen prisoners in the 1990s and early 2000s were treated particularly roughly,

according to prof. Pallot. According to her this ill treatment was explained as a reaction

to the numerous reports from Chechnya at that time of for example beheadings, etc.

Therefore, Chechens in Russian prisons were subject to severe physical abuse by the

Russian prison officers and other prisoners of ethnic Russian decent.

It is important to stress, that the vory were already in control of the

detachments/dormitories prior to the bespredel. However, in the 1990s, the control of

the gangs became quite widespread. The vory decided who would sleep in which bunk,

‘disciplined’ prisoners who did not obey their rules or failed to pay gambling debts,

insulted the gang leaders, and collected tribute

–

the obshak

–

form all prisoners so

they could have a comfortable life in prison. This period was associated with a high

level of violence as other gangs fought for supremacy. There was a high rate of

murdered prisoners.

60. The vory also organised card games at night and they ran the informal market

economy within prisons, in particular the illegal drug market, rose with the influx of

transnational prisoners, cigarettes and mobile phones. The only recourse the

administration had was to lock the prisoners up or put them in isolations cells. They

exercised harsh ‘penal backup’, allowing themselves to use disproportionate and

sexualised physical violence against the prisoners. After 2002 and onwards, the prison

service tried to claw back power from the prison gangs.

61. As a way to regain authority, the prison officers recruited prisoners, known colloquially

as the activists (aktivisti), with promises of early release and possibilities to have more

visits or better food to do the beatings of other prisoners.

62. There are now parallel hierarchies in the prisons, where the old Vory-v-Zakone have

been replaced by new generation gangs of prisoners. These gang leaders are called

avtoritety

199

or authority figures who are at the apex of prison status hierarchy. The

parallel hierarchy is of prisoners appointed by the adminstration as

aktivisti

who hold

199

Authorities, new generation crime bosses.

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various formal positions, such as the “head prefect” of a detachment (the

zavkhoz),

and who chair of prisoner self-organisation committees. The aktivisti do the dirty work

for the prison officers. These are responsible for opening the gates between the

domestic zone and the work zone; for lining up prisoners for the heads count in the

morning, supervising exercise period and so on etc. There are also secret informants

who are recruited by the operational and regime department who report back on

suspect prisoners.

63. In popular culture and among prisoners correctional colonies are divided as follows:

•

The ‘black colonies’, which are controlled by the vory (the gangs).

•

The ‘red colonies’, which are controlled by the official prison officers. These

colonies are called red, as they are named after the NKVD

200

who ran the

GULAGs, as the NKVD officers had red epaulets. In the very red colonies, the

vory are neutralised or now cooperate with the administration.

•

The ‘green colonies’ are colonies with a large proportion of Muslims (according

to our interviews in some up to 30 % of the prisoners in a dormitory or colony).

The green colonies would usually comprise of various Muslims

–

typically a

mixture of prisoners from North Caucasus, Tatars, Bashkirs and immigrants

primarily Uzbeks and Tajiks. The title Green colony is a misnomer, although

often used in Russia, because the Muslim jamaats are not a power hierarchy -

Muslims are not charge it is simply that together they , is a large number of

Muslim prisoners.

64. Prof. Pallot had knowledge of a colony where the leading vory was a Chechen. He had

then negotiated with the prison authorities and had obtained to conditions during

Muslim prayers for the prisoners. However, in return he helped the colony authorities

by identifying the ‘properly radicalised’ Muslims in the

colony. That being said, in

general, the Muslim prisoners prefer not to negotiate with the prison authorities in the

colonies.

65. Among the prison officers, there is a group called the

operativniki

(the operational

officers). These are working as criminal search officers within an internal security

service (ORD) in prisons that can be traced back to the GULAGs. The operativiniki is not

only monitoring prisoners finding out what they are up to, what crimes have the

prisoners committed, will they commit new crimes, etc. but they are also surveilling

the prison officers. Any prison officer who is getting too close to particular prisoners

will then get in trouble with the ORD.

200

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (in Russian: Народ�½ый комиссариат в�½утре�½�½их дел

(НКВД))

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66. The FSB is not legally present in prisons. However, the ORD officers do have a

relationship with the local FSB. The second in command in every colony is an ORD

officer. According to a number of NGOs, this department (ORD) should be abolished

because of the abusive practices of the ORD officers.

67. The prison service is corrupt from top to button. Therefore, the prison officers are part

of this shadow economy/parallel economy in the prisons. This means that the prison

officers are bringing in mobile phones, etc. The corruption goes right to the top. For

example, Aleksandr Reimer who was one of the reforming directors for FSIN was

arrested accused of fraud, as he had allegedly pocketed a large EU grant for buying a

tagging system.

68. According to FSIN, the prison authorities have identified 300 radicalised Islamist

jamaats in the Russian prisons. This has convinced FSIN that prisons actually are a site

of radicalisation. However, these are only going to be extremists if one believes that

there is a linear progression of being born a Muslim and becoming violent and an

Islamist terrorist. According to Prof. Pallot, this is quite a big jump and she was thus

quite doubtful that this theory of radicalisation in prisons would explain why a person

would becoming a terrorist. Radicalisation is more likely in most cases to be associated

with seeking shelter and support while in prison, which is true also of prisoners of

other faiths. The evidence for that does not exist, as this is very difficult to research

and we do not know how many former Muslim prisoners have gone in Russia to

commit terrorist acts.

Determination of place of detention

69. After a person has been tried and found guilty in a crime, the location of where the

person will serve their punishment will depend on the person in question. If it happens

to be a person such as Aleksey Navalny, then the Director of FSIN, Arkady Gostev,

would discuss the location directly with president Putin.

70. According to the penal correctional code, prisoners should be located in the same

region as where the crime has been committed, if possible. If this is not possible, they

should be placed for imprisonment in the neighbouring region, etc. However, the penal

state is still something Russia has inherited from the Soviet Union. This means that the

penal regions in Russia with a very high density of correctional colonies in remote

regions of Russia. This is way beyond what is needed given the number of custodial

sentences handed out by the courts in these regions. The Perm region is not a very

populated region. However, it is the largest penal region in Russia.

71. A prisoner and their relatives have the right to ask to be moved closer to where the

prisoner lives. However, it is not necessarily realised by the FSIN. In the 1990s, there

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were a very high percentage of prisoners being sent to serve their sentence in the

peripheries of Russia. However, now the percentage is smaller and most people

sentenced to general regime colonies will serve their time in the region where there

are from. The exception to this rule are Chechens if sentenced to strict or special

regime colonies who are moved out of the republic.

72. A female prisoner or a prisoner going to a strict or special regime are far more likely to

be sent out of the region to serve, compared to if a prisoner should be serving time in a

general regime colony. Prof. Pallot noted in extradition cases, people has always been

sent off as far away as possible from Moscow or St. Petersburg or anywhere one would

find active NGOs.

73. There are some colonies that has been selected to hold many Muslim prisoners, so

when the authorities in Moscow or other big cities sentence immigrants from

Uzbekistan or Tajikistan to prison, they would end up in this special designated

colonies e.g. in the Siberian region of Kurgan.

74. Now FSIN has started to send recidivists and first-time offenders to different colonies.

They used to be mixed up together at the same colonies.

75. In regards to political activist, they would be sent as far away from Moscow as

possible. The case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a good example on this. He was sent to

the region of Chita. FSIN said at the time that that the chose a colony in Chita, as there

were not any space left in any of the colonies nearby Moscow. Crimean Tatars are

being sent to northern colonies and the same is true of Chechens convicted for

belonging to extremist organisations or under suspicion of holding extremist beliefs.

76. Therefore, unless the Chechen government wishes to hold on to them, the Chechen

prisoners are likely to be sent to the interior of Russia.

Recruitment of prisoners to the war in Ukraine

77. The Chechen forces are made up of loyalist to Kadyrov. Wagner recruited Chechens

from Russian correctional colonies to fight in Ukraine. Prisoners were not recruited

from remand prisons. Therefore, there were not many prisoners from Chechnya to

recruit, according to the Russian legislation.

78. Consequently, Wagner did only recruit prisoners from the correctional colonies in the

Russian heartland. Wagner was mainly recruiting from the big loyal penal regions,

because what the recruitment required was an agreement with the head of the

regional prison authorities UFSIN.

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79. The recruitment was not very popular among the prison administrations as they could

lose around 200 prisoners, which they needed for their industrial production.

Therefore it was mainly the most loyal colonies were chosen.

80. Once the leader of Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, died, the recruitment of prisoners was

taken over by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Prof. Pallot noted that the recruitment of

prisoners was still ongoing

–

in fact, the MoD has expanded the scope of recruits. Now

they are also recruiting from the SIZOs. Today all penal institutions have to keep a

registry of prisoners of the age eligible for mobilization if a general mobilization is

called. Prisoners can currently sing to become contract (professional) soldiers with the

MOFD. They have to serve until the end of the war with Ukraine, they reach retirement

age now 65 or are invalided out At the end of this they are free on licence, not

pardoned as before, and so are liable to return to prisons if they reoffend or break the

terms of the licence.

81. In the beginning of the recruitment of prisoners, the Kremlin did not allow recruitment

of anybody who was responsible of mild and medium crimes; offenders convicted of

serious and very serious crimes could not be recruited (although Wagner ignored this).

Today the only prohibition of recruitment applies only to people convicted of terrorist

and extremist offences and some terrorists or extremists and prisoners convicted of

certain ‘crimes against the body’ such as children.

Coercive recruitment of prisoners

82. There

are reports of various forms of pressure on prisoners for them to ‘volunteer’ and

sign a contract with the MoD. It is things like turning of the heating, cutting back on

their food rations, saying no one is going to get parole unless there are some

volunteers found etc.

83. According to prof. Pallot, everybody is at risk of being recruited. However, it depends

on how much a person can resist the pressure they endure. Many of the prisoners who

have 20+ years sentences would be more inclined to be recruited as they are probably

going to die in prison anyway, so why not die in Ukraine.