URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Udenrigsudvalget 2023-24
URU Alm.del Bilag 217
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Section

DENMARK-

SOMALIA

STRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK

2024-2028

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

DJIBOUTI

AWDAL

Bullaxaar Berbera

Baki

Karin

Xiis

Maydh

Boosaaso

(Bender cassim)

Laasqoray

Caluula

Breeda

Bandar Murcaayo

Butyaalo

Qandala

Bargaal

WOQOOYI

GALBEED

Hargeysa

SANAAG

Garadag

Ceerigaabo (Erigavo)

Iskushuban

Qardho

Taxeex

Garoowe

BARI

hurdiyo

Xaafuun

Bandarbeyla

Burco

(Burao)

Oodweyne

Kiridh

Xudun

Dudo

TOGDHEER

SOOL

Buuhoodle Laascaanood

Gori Rit

NUGAAL

Eyl

ETHIOPIA

Mereer-Gur

Xamure

Berdaale

Seemade

Beyra

Gaalkacyo (Galcaio) Garacad

Baxdo

War Galoh

MUDUG

Mirsaale

Hilalaya

Luuq

Xuddur

(oddur)

BAKOOL

Ferfer

Beledweyne

GALGUDUUD

Dhuusamarreeb

(Dusa Marreb)

Ceel Buur

Hobyo

Ceel Huur

Xarardheere

HIRAAN

Tayeeglow

Derri

Buulobarde

Ceeldheere

KENYA

Garbahaarrey

El Beru Hagia

Baardheere

GEDO

Baydhabo

(Baidoa)

Buurhakaba Wanlaweyn

Diinsoor

BAY

Afgooye

Qoryooley

Jawhar (Giohar)

Balcad

Mahadday

DHEXE

Weym Cadale

SHABELLE

somalia

JUBA

DHEXE

Afmadow

Bilis Qooqaani

BANADIR

SHABELLE

Marka (Merca)

Haaway

HOOSE

Bu´aale

Jilib

Jamaame

Kismaayo (Chisimayu)

Baraawe

Muqdisho (Mogadishu)

JUBA

HOOSE

Buur Gaabo

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Contents

List of Abbreviations

Introduction and vision for the partnership

Context, challenges and risks

Danish political priorities and strategic choices

Strategic objectives

Monitoring the strategic framework

Outline of bilateral development programme

Development engagements that would fall under

strategic objective 1

Development engagements that would fall under

strategic objective 2

Development engagements that would fall under

strategic objective 3

Tentative outline of bilateral

programme budget

annex b:

annex c:

Key Data / Figures – Somalia

Results Framework

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Denmark and somalia 2024-2028: List of Abbreviations

List of Abbreviations

APP

ATMIS

CSO

DPPA

FAO

FGM

FGS

FMS

HDP

HIPC

IDP

IFC

IFU

ILO

IMF

IMS

IOM

JSF

MEAL

NCC

NGO

OCHA

OHCHR

SME

SNA

SPA

UIM

UNCDF

UNDP

UNEP

UNFPA

UNHCR

UNICEF

UNMAS

UNOPS

WASH

WFP

WHO

Africa Programme for Peace

Al-Shabaab

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

African Union

Civil Society Organisation

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Female Genital Mutilation

Federal Government of Somalia

Federal Member State

Humanitarian, Development & Peace

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

Internally Displaced Person

International Finance Corporation

Investment Fund for Developing Countries

International Labour Organisation

International Monetary Fund

International Media Support

International Organisation for Migration

Joint Somalia Fund

Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning

National Consultative Council

Non-Governmental Organisation

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Small/Medium Enterprises

Somali National Army

Strategic Objective

Strategic Partner Agreement (Denmark)

Ministry of Immigration and Integration

United Nations

United Nations Capital Development Fund

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Environment Programme

United Nations Population Fund

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

United Nations Mine Action Service

United Nations Office for Project Services

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

World Bank

World Food Programme

World Health Organisation

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Introduction and vision for the partnership

Introduction and vision

for the partnership

Denmark’s ambition is to be a present and relevant partner in the world,

engaging in strategic alliances, and to develop equal partnerships with

countries around the world. That applies particularly in Africa, Europe’s

regional neighbour and an increasingly important continent politically,

economically, and demographically.

Somalia is one of the most fragile and impoverished countries in the world.

Somalia’s instability affects not only the Somali people but also spills over

to the entire Horn of Africa region, and is in turn, impacted by the instability

within the region. The country is affected by poverty, conflict and instability,

violent extremism, political crises and the consequences of climate change

and unsustainable land use. Somalia’s location in the Gulf of Aden, a central

maritime transport corridor, and its proximity to Gulf States means that

Somalia occupies a strategic location in an area of interest for Denmark and

the European Union (EU).

Denmark’s strategic and foreign policy interests in Somalia are focused on

global challenges such as the consequences of recurring climatic shocks,

fighting poverty, increasing the resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable

people, preventing and countering violent extremism, and enhancing maritime

security. At the same time, Denmark is a long-term development partner to

the Horn of Africa region, including to Somalia. Denmark wants to continue

to strengthen our partnership with Somalia in areas of mutual interest both

bilaterally and through the EU, as outlined in the EU-Somalia Joint Operational

Roadmap.

Hence, the long-term vision for Denmark’s partnership with Somalia is to

support a more stable, inclusive, prosperous, and resilient Somalia addressing

root causes of instability, poverty, vulnerability, and inequality in line with

Somalia’s National Development Plan. A more stable and resilient Somalia

would also reduce the number of internally displaced persons, the spread of

violent extremism, the risk of piracy resurgence and contribute to curbing

irregular migration, including towards Europe. Three inter-connected strategic

objectives underpin this vision:

The long-term vision for

Denmark’s partnership

with Somalia is to support

a more stable, inclusive

prosperous, and resilient

Somalia addressing root

causes of instability, poverty,

vulnerability, and inequality in

line with Somalia’s National

Development Plan.

Strategic objective 1:

Ensure adaptation to climate

change through equitable access

to resources and enabling

inclusive and green growth.

Strategic objective 2:

Promote stability and security,

inclusive state building and

protection of human rights.

Strategic objective 3:

Strengthen resilience and

addressing displacement and

migration.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Introduction and vision for the partnership

Each of the three objectives address key challenges facing Somalia, and are

in alignment with Somalia’s national development and stabilisation plans. A

number of Danish engagements will contribute to more than one strategic

objective, reflecting the interconnected nature of the objectives as well

as the fragility factors influencing Somalia. To support this, Denmark will

engage all instruments available including political dialogue, development

cooperation, humanitarian assistance, as well as other foreign policy

instruments – including peace and stabilisation instruments in collaboration

with the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Danish National Police – and

with the private sector, and civil society, including the Somali diaspora in

Denmark. The objectives are founded in the overarching Danish priority of

fighting multi-dimensional poverty based on evidence that poverty reduction

leads to strengthened resilience. Moreover, Denmark’s overall priorities of

strengthening democracy and civic space, promoting and protecting human

rights, and the inclusion of women and youth cuts across all objectives.

Danish past achievements and strengths

Denmark’s partnership with Somalia extends back over four decades. Much

of the early Danish engagement focused on the maritime domain, first on

developing Somalia’s fishery sector, and later on ensuring maritime security

including combatting piracy. Today, Denmark’s partnership with Somalia

includes a broad range of instruments, including political dialogue, diplomacy,

stabilization efforts and humanitarian assistance, as well as one of the largest

Danish bilateral development portfolios globally.

Denmark is recognised in Somalia for a strong commitment to protection

and promotion of human rights and as a facilitator on dialogue dealing with

difficult state-building issues, as well as for our strong role as an advocate

for children and women’s rights. Denmark is also known as a strong enabler

of the private sector. Danish strengths and achievements build on a strong

partnership with Somali counterparts and alignment with key Somali

development priorities.

Denmark has strengthened

democratic governance

by supporting electoral

processes, independent think tanks, and promoting and protecting human

rights. Denmark has supported activities that have strengthened institutions,

including accountability and transparency in public financial management.

Support to improved participation in peacebuilding and capacity development

of local level government has also been part of the Danish engagement.

Danish support has strengthened the social contract in Somaliland between

government and citizens by supporting improved service-provision and the

building of critical infrastructure, such as roads, water supply, and critical

productive sector investments.

Denmark has also facilitated

inclusive economic growth

by strengthening the

enabling environment for private sector growth and supporting public sector

reform. Working with multilateral organizations like the World Bank and IMF to

enable important reforms and build capacity has stimulated the private sector,

and Denmark has supported the provision of loans to small and medium-sized

enterprises in collaboration with other development partners and IFU.

Denmark’s partnership

with Somalia extends

back over

decades.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Introduction and vision for the partnership

Denmark has provided significant

humanitarian assistance and resilience

support

for emergency food distribution, water, shelter, sanitation, and

healthcare during times of crises. This has included the provision of critical

cash transfers through social safety nets programmes targeting the health and

nutrition of pregnant women and girls and their children as well as providing

productive skills training to Somali youth.

Denmark’s bilateral

peace and stabilisation work

is anchored in the Peace

and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa (PSP). Denmark is

recognised as a relevant and flexible actor in the stabilisation space, building

on over a decade of experience and strong alignment with Somali government

priorities. Denmark is a long-term partner in local conflict resolution and

political reconciliation and continues to support enhanced capacities in

maritime security and law enforcement.

Democracy, civic space and human rights

is a core priority for Danish

development cooperation and foreign policy endeavours. In Somalia,

Denmark has led important work on human rights, for example through

co-chairing the “Friends of Children Affected by Armed Conflict” initiative and

has supported multilateral partners in advocating for children and women’s

rights, as well as combatting female genital mutilation and other harmful

social norms. Support for a nascent, but emerging, civil society was piloted

through support to e.g. establishing a civil society coordination forum,

independent think tanks, through our Danish strategic NGO-partners, as well

as by driving a localisation agenda in humanitarian assistance. While Denmark

and Somalia may not see eye-to-eye on all matters, experience shows that it

is possible to maintain critical political dialogue, as seen in recent years, for

example on the election model and policy dialogue regarding the “Sexual

Offenders and Child Rights Bill.”

Democracy, civic space,

and human rights are

core priorities for Danish

development cooperation and

foreign policy endeavours.

Figure 1:

Major Danish Contributions

With Somalia strategically located

along global shipping routes in

the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea,

maritime law enforcement and

international trade

are principal

elements of stability efforts.

Denmark has worked to improve

the capacity to exercise regional

and governmental authority

across land and maritime borders

in order to reduce transnational

organised crime.

With the support of critical

political think tanks, Denmark

has played a role in

preventing

political meltdown in the

run-up to the 2022 elections

and

supported the new government

in restarting crucial accountability

mechanisms such as a National

Consultative Council (NCC).

Denmark is known for its

longstanding presence and

investments in Somaliland.

Through the

Somaliland

Development Fund,

Denmark

has supported 1.4 million citizens

to get access to over 11 million

liters of water per day, built over

150 km of roads, and supported

climate-smart agriculture through

soil/water conservation on over

2,500 hectares of land.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

2. Context, challenges

and risks

Despite pronounced fragility and conflict, Somalia has experienced a certain

degree of stability and nascent political and macroeconomic progress in the

last ten years. The current central government, which came to power in May

2022, has shown willingness to reform, and has ambitions for a more stable

and progressive Somalia. However, with Al-Shabaab (AS) controlling significant

parts of the country and the lack of a functioning state in large parts of

Somalia, the somewhat positive developments are still at risk of unravelling

due to political crises, violent extremism, and a very limited ability to respond

to climatic shocks.

Geopolitics, regional and international partners

There is a broad regional and international interest in Somalia, not least

due to its geostrategic location at the tip of the Horn of Africa and at the

mouth of the Red Sea. Consequently, Somalia has an array of traditional

and non-traditional partners, as well as an active Somali diaspora across the

globe, including in Denmark.

Having lunch in a UNICEF supported XarXar School established near an IDP camp, creating

education opportunities for affected and vulnerable children in Somalia.

UN0773131: ©UNICEF/Zerihun Sewunet

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

Regionally, landlocked Ethiopia is an important player for political, economic,

and security reasons, and has shown interest in acquiring stakes in ports in

Somaliland to secure and enhance trade routes. Relations between Kenya and

Somalia have improved, with enhanced dialogue on regional security, as well

as trade between the two countries. Somalia’s ascension to the East African

Community (EAC) is also subject of dialogue. Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti all

support the joint military offensive against AS to prevent their infiltration into

the wider region. The “Quads” (US, UK, EU and the UN) is an influential group

with regular joint engagements vis-à-vis the Somali government on security,

politics, and humanitarian issues. The US has a strong political and military

presence, and is a key partner in the stabilization and development areas as

well. The African Union (AU) remains a major player in the provision of security,

primarily through the deployment of the African Union Transition Mission

in Somalia (ATMIS – previously AMISOM). Other international actors such as

Turkey, UAE, and Qatar also provide political, financial and security sector

support. Turkey is arguably the most supportive, with visible development

and security support to Somalia. The Gulf States offer consistent and flexible

financial support, and exert influence in Somalia as part of the regional

geopolitical dynamics. China’s role in Somalia has until now largely centred

within the fisheries sector and are supporting the FGS against Somaliland

secession. Russia has also been a partner in the region historically. Most

recently, Russia has taken an interest in re-engaging Somalia in investments

through debt forgiveness and security sector support through the provision of

military equipment.

The EU is a significant actor within political and security affairs, as well as

a large-scale provider of development funds to Somalia. A newly launched

“EU-Somalia Joint Operational Roadmap” (May 2023) is centered on governance

and democratization, security and stabilization and socio-economic growth,

and holds clear links to EU’s “Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Somalia”

(2021-2027). The EU is a key actor for Danish political engagement in Somalia,

and the roadmap provides the umbrella for the EU’s and the EU member

states’ engagement in the country. The Nordic countries and the UK are close

and like-minded partners on a range of issues.

As a result of decades of conflict and subsequently weak Somali government

institutions, funds are largely channeled through multilateral partners. With

approximately $1.9 billion in financing to Somalia, the World Bank is by far

the largest development partner to the Somali government, with a mixture of

IDA grants and budget support. EU is currently the only other development

partner providing budget support to the federal government.

Climate change and natural resource management

Climate change and poor natural resource management serve as a threat

multiplier in Somalia and compound the challenges of political instability,

insecurity, resource scarcity, rapid urbanization, and often result in frequent

humanitarian crises – all of these impacting poverty levels directly, including

multidimensional poverty.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

Somalia is the second most climate vulnerable country in the world. It faces

a number of climate-related risks, including droughts, floods, cyclones, and

climate-related diseases and epidemics. In the last decade, Somalia has

witnessed both multiple exceptionally dry seasons and extended droughts,

interspersed with exceptionally wet seasons and floods. During the fall of

2022, Somalia experienced the worst drought in 40 years. This has resulted

in over 6.5 million Somalis becoming food insecure (out of a total population

of approximately 18 million), 13 million heads of livestock perishing, and

thousands of hectares of crops being lost.

Extreme weather events occur with increasing frequency, leading to abject

poverty and displacement. Without effective adaptation, the effects of climate

change will continue to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and reduce people’s

livelihood options, potentially creating breeding grounds for displacement,

irregular migration, and recruitment to extremist and criminal groups – and

regularly contributes to conflict in Somalia through disrupted livelihoods

dependent on agriculture and pastoralism, as well as increased competition

over dwindling water and grazing areas. This in turn fosters climate-

induced migration leading to inter-communal conflicts and rapidly growing

urbanization.

Livestock and agriculture, two sectors particularly vulnerable to climate

change, constitute up to 70 percent of the country’s GDP. With over 80 percent

of the country comprised of arid and semi-arid lands, even small climate

change effects in these sectors are having dramatic effects on individuals’

livelihoods. As climate change threatens the viability of these two sectors

going forward, urbanisation is rapidly increasing, further straining government

capacities and key life-support systems such as food and water resources,

health, and infrastructure and service delivery.

As a result of widespread poverty and strain on resources, Somalis are turning

to negative coping mechanisms, such as illicit charcoal production and

deforestation, overuse of natural resources, and increasingly risky agricultural

and pastoral practices. Climate change and land degradation affect Somali

women and girls disproportionally, as they typically carry the heaviest

workload, when it comes to fetching water, obtaining energy, and producing

food. Women and girls are underrepresented in decision-making processes

and left out in the planning of climate solutions.

However, there are opportunities for Somalia to make use of its resources

in the longer term. Somalia has mainland Africa’s longest coastline and the

potential to benefit from a “Blue Economy” is large. Moreover, with some of

the most consistent sunshine anywhere in the world (averaging over 3,000

hours a year), as well as the highest resource potential for onshore wind power

in Africa, the potential for a green energy transition based on solar and wind

power is evident.

Somalia is the second most

climate-vulnerable country in

the world.

Climate change and

land degradation affect

Somali women and girls

disproportionally, as they

typically carry the heaviest

workload when it comes to

fetching water, obtaining

energy, and producing food.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

Security, stability and state-building

Somalia is characterized by instability, conflict, and fragility. After 25 years of

a de-facto state-collapse due to a bloody civil war and clan rivalry combined

with various unsuccessful regional and international attempts at intervention,

Somalia managed to adopt a Provisional Constitution in 2012. Since 2012,

Somalia has seen a number of relatively peaceful – albeit very narrow,

unrepresentative and only partially legitimate – election processes, the

latest in 2022. The Provisional Constitution set the foundation for a federal

model, including the establishment of five Federal Member States (FMS),

and Somaliland who continues its claim to independence. To this day main

settlement questions remain, including questions on agreements among

political actors to share power and resources, define borders, constitutional

mandates, as well as on key issues related to security.

The current political system, based on clan affiliation and political elite

bargaining is under pressure as a consequence of a young demographic, high

unemployment rates, climate-related environmental shocks, elite positioning

and demands for more accountable governance. Somalia’s public institutions

mandated to regulate and implement politics, policy, reforms, budgets and

laws remain nascent and amongst the weakest in the world. Somalia ranks as

the most corrupt country globally, according to Transparency International’s

“Corruption Index” in 2022. Since the early 2000s, the Al-Qaeda affiliated terror

organisation AS has been present in Somalia and currently controls large parts

of the country, especially in rural areas in the south and south-central parts of

Somalia. The success of AS is attributed to poor governance and limited ability

of government to deliver basic services, including equitable access to justice.

AS’s ability to fill a governance vacuum has positioned them to extort citizens

and businesses, making Al-Shabaab one of the richest extremist organizations

globally, with the capability to conduct terror attacks in most parts of southern

Somalia, including Mogadishu.

Shortly after the presidential election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May

2022, his government initiated an offensive to combat AS, building upon a

popular uprising against AS in some parts of the country. Stabilizing newly

recovered areas from Al-Shabaab and delivering security, services, access to

resources, and political grievances will determine the long-term success of

these offensives. The use of local clan groups supporting the Somali National

Army has been effective, but efforts to reintegrate these armed factions into

the national security architecture, as well as local reconciliation efforts, may

face challenges at federal member state level.

Stability is also challenged by the extensive clan conflicts that are part of the

history of Somalia. Political appointments are based on clan affiliation and

the delicate balance of bargaining influence is left to the four largest Somali

clans, each gaining an equal share of political power. Full inclusivity of key

stakeholders, such as women, youth and other marginalized groups still

remains a significant challenge, despite some progress. Women lack access

to resources and decision-making power, leaving them more vulnerable to

human rights violations. Early marriage is a major problem in Somalia, with

severe consequences for girls’ health and education. Somalia has the world’s

second highest fertility rate with 6.4 children per woman (2020). Maternal

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

mortality is among the highest in the world, at 1,600 per 100,000 live births,

and despite nascent progress, approximately 98 percent of women in Somalia

undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). Violence, including rape and

domestic violence, is widespread, with no legal accountability system.

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS – previously AMISOM)

has since 2012 been a major security sector actor in Somalia, primarily

acting as security provider to major infrastructure and supporting the Somali

National Army (SNA) and other security sector partners. The mission is

mandated by the United Nations Security Council and delegated to the AU. It

is funded primarily by the EU (approx. 2.5 billion EUR since 2017) and the UK,

and executed by a number of troop contributing countries (TCCs), primarily

Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Burundi. ATMIS is complemented by

bilateral forces from some of the TCCs, while primarily the US, Turkey, Uganda

and Qatar are training significant numbers of forces, including special forces.

An expected draw down of ATMIS forces is set to take place between 2023 and

2024, and remains of critical security concern due to challenges of a smooth

transition of ownership to the government and the lack of a solid threat and

capacity assessment underpinning the transition plan.

Since 2012, there has been progress in terms of building technical, legal

and regulatory systems with support from the international community. The

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief process - initiated in 2020,

has also driven progress on reforms. Through the HIPC process, Somalia

will achieve debt forgiveness and potentially gain access to loans on the

international financial market. HIPC is set to reach completion by the end

of 2023, upon the realisation of an IMF programme, focusing on economic

reforms, including strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation (currently at

around 4 percent of GDP) and strengthening public financial management,

including accountability mechanisms and balancing state budgets.

With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, including a high potential for

maritime oil and gas exploration, Somalia’s potential as a regional economic

player in the maritime and trade industry is significant. However, limited

capacity to police its waters means that Somalia remains vulnerable to illicit

trade and activity. While piracy was a major threat 10 years ago, it has been

effectively addressed through international efforts; but, other transnational

criminal activities are still carried out in the waters off the coast of Somalia.

This includes illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as arms

and human trafficking, which continue to sustain inland conflict and criminal

enterprise. This forms part of a network channelling illicit goods to other parts

of the world, including Europe.

Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has been comparatively

more stable and seen a gradual democratic progression. It has held eight

credible, and largely free and fair, one-person, one-vote elections involving

peaceful transfers of power. Economically, it has attracted large foreign direct

investment projects, including a USD 500 million investment by DP World in

Berbera Port. However, Somaliland’s political settlement is under pressure and

a need to widen the sphere of political participation has emerged. The current

settlement is elitist and exclusive, particularly in regards to women, youth, and

With the longest coastline in

mainland Africa, including a

high potential for maritime oil

and gas exploration, Somalia’s

potential as a regional

economic player in the

maritime and trade industry is

significant.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

other marginalised groups. Governance has never been rules-based – nearly

all elections in Somaliland require significant delays – and men dominate all

three branches of government. Similar patterns exist between government

and the business community where large taxpayers negotiate their taxes and

large contracts have a strong clan balance element. Somaliland has witnessed

a deterioration of political rights, civic space, and not least press freedom in

recent years. Journalists face severe pressure from authorities, with police

cracking down on independent media outlets.

Democracy and civic space, human rights

Civic space in Somalia is dominated by clan affiliation and is severely restricted,

while attempts to constrain civil society are widespread, which in turn leads

to high levels of self-censorship. The legal framework for civil society focuses

more on control of CSOs rather than safeguarding civic space. Activists fighting

for freedom of expression, including journalists, have been regular targets

of arbitrary arrests by security forces without trial and at times prosecuted

using the country’s outdated penal code. Federal and regional military courts

continue to sentence people to death and carry out executions despite serious

due process concerns. Consequently, Somali civil society organisations are

unable or unwilling to effectively hold the government to account, with many

advocates for human rights joining the government side or finding themselves

without the means to make their voices heard.

The justice system remains weak and nascent with regular rights violations

and arbitrary execution of justice, including using the death sentence on

Students wash their hands in their Qansaxleey Primary and Secondary school playground in

Dolow, Somalia, on 5 February 2022.

UN0591232: ©UNICEF/ Ismail Taxta

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

children. Tension and inconsistency between the clan-based traditional

justice system, sharia and formal justice is strong. Key institutional and legal

reforms have to some degree stagnated. The review of the country’s outdated

penal code was put on hold in 2022 and little movement on the passing of

the federal legislation on sexual offenses (Rape and Indecency Bill) or on key

women and child rights bill has been seen. Somalia has not established a

national Human Rights Commission, with the appointment of commissioners

pending since 2018.

Poverty and resilience - economic and social development

Somalia ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2021, the GDP

per capita was 401 USD, with approximately 70 percent of the population

living below the poverty line. GDP growth rates in Somalia are extremely

low. Between 2014 and 2021, real per capita growth rates averaged zero

percent. The lack of an enabling environment for private sector development,

the absence of a regulatory framework, high systemic levels of corruption,

Somalia’s isolation from the international financial system, high public

expenditure relative to revenue collection and Somalia’s reliance on

development assistance and remittances, all hamper higher growth. However,

HIPC debt relief should be a catalyst for promoting investments and better

public services.

The vast majority of Somalis are employed in the informal economy, with

women having particularly low formal sector employment rates. However,

women have limited access to credit and are not proportionally represented

in the political sphere, leaving the concerns of women-led enterprises at the

margins of the political agenda. Livestock production and export represent the

largest foreign exchange earnings for Somalia, accounting for approximately

80 percent of export earnings. Fisheries have enormous potential, but

currently account for a mere 0.2 percent of GDP due to limited investment

and opportunities for processing. Youth unemployment is a growing concern,

with 48 percent of youth either unemployed or engaged in low-productive,

low-paying employment, making them particularly vulnerable to human rights

violations and abuse and at risk of recruitment by armed groups.

Access to finance remains a challenge in Somalia. Traditional Somali banks

have a conservative loan profile, resulting in limited access to finance, particu-

larly for small and medium sized enterprises as well as for women-led enter-

prises. The private sector is also affected by clan affiliation, and Al-Shabaab

generates tax revenues through extortion of private sector actors, resulting in

an unpredictable environment for Somali businesses. Electricity is expensive

and oil-driven, all factors obstructing larger-scale investment and growth.

With poverty widespread in Somalia, the majority of households face many

challenges related to literacy, education, healthcare, housing, personal

security, food security, water and sanitation, and access to jobs and economic

opportunities. Population growth, currently at 3.2 percent, could lead to

an estimated 35 million people in Somalia by 2050 – almost doubling the

current population. This population growth is a serious threat amplifier to

existing drivers of conflict and poses major risks specifically to conflict- and

climate-related migration, rapid urbanization and instability. In May 2023,

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

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Context, challenges and risks

there were 3.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia, or almost

25 percent of the population, mostly located in the south and central parts

of the country, particularly in Mogadishu. Increasingly, climate impacts are

driving displacement – from January to May 2023, 1.1 million more IDPs were

registered by OCHA, of these almost half were displaced because of climatic

factors, drought and flooding.

Service provision is largely in the hands of the private sector, religious actors,

international partners, incl. humanitarian actors, given the very low domestic

resources and revenue generation. Public expenditure in social sectors is

extremely low. The lack of services in most parts of the country, as well as

limited livelihood opportunities, is a significant driver of urbanization. In

addition, instability and conflict drive displacement and continue to affect

access and movement of goods and people. The concentration of provision

of services primarily in urban areas, where international actors have access,

result in IDPs settling in urban areas, often in informal settlements. They live

in temporary, unsanitary conditions often governed by informal settlement

managers, which may facilitate service access but are unable or unwilling to

provide protection.

35 mil

Estimated

Population Growth

2021

2050

17 mil

6.4 mil

5.8 mil

Somalia

Denmark

Population growth, currently

at 3.2 percent, could lead

to an estimated 35 million

people in Somalia by 2050 –

almost doubling the current

population.

Before relocation in Baidoa, Somalia IOM.

©IOM Somalia 2023/Ismail Salad Osman

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Context, challenges and risks

Scenarios

Somalia is at a crossroads. On the one hand, the Somalis are experiencing popular

opposition to Al-Shabaab for the first time. The country is on track to achieving

debt relief based on economic reform and potentially Somalia has major oil and

gas reserves. Somalia is geo-strategically important and has a strong diaspora

that can contribute and influence from outside and are moving back in decent

numbers. However, it is unlikely that the situation will improve significantly in the

short to medium term. Two scenarios are suggested for the medium term:

Figure 2: Scenarios

Scenario 1:

Scenerio 2:

Status quo - fragile progress

In this scenario, Somalia will continue to be chal-

lenged by instability, climatic shocks and high demo-

graphic growth pressures. The drawdown of ATMIS

forces is an additional near-term risk. However,

limited positive development and state-building is

possible and could be promoted by increased inter-

national pressure and support. AS will not disappear,

but will gradually lose support and power while the

central government consolidates its presence in more

and more areas. The political situation will remain

fragile but stable. There will be recurring political

crises and conflicts, but the state will be able to imple-

ment reforms and build its legitimacy. A significant

part of the population will continue to be dependent

on humanitarian aid, but there will be increased

mobilization of resources for long-term investments,

including in climate adaptation.

Marked deterioration - possible collapse

In this scenario, the security situation will gradually

deteriorate because the central government, the

president and the federal member state Presidents

are constantly fighting for power. This increases

discontent among the population and undermines

the fragile legitimacy of the state and the limited

resilience of the people. ATMIS troops will no longer

be there and Somali force generation will have proven

insufficient to replace ATMIS. The security forces frag-

ment along clan loyalties, causing the fight against

AS to fail. Support from the international community

will not be sufficient to reduce poverty and mitigate

the effects of climate change and high demographic

growth, and over time discontent and instability will

grow. In the worst case, the current political agree-

ment will collapse, with a security vacuum after ATMIS

leaves, and AS and local militias will gain increased

power, e.g. with direct control over major cities.

The actual trajectory might end up between these two scenarios and will be

influenced by political stability, climate events, stability of neighbouring states

as well as the state’s ability to manage the needs of the many Somalis living in

abject poverty. Denmark’s strategic framework and the future programming

choices must therefore be flexible enough to adapt also to a markedly

negative development, i.e. responding to a trajectory towards the worst-case

scenario. In that case, a programmatic response could entail among other

geographical retargeting of activities and substitution between instruments

in the portfolio. Focus will be on ensuring diverse partnerships – national,

bilateral and multilateral - and instruments in order to maintain flexibility

towards an ever-changing and volatile context. Continuous risk management

and political dialogue will be key to mitigate the risks.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

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Danish political priorities and strategic choices

3. Danish political priorities

and strategic choices

Danish engagements in Somalia is anchored in Denmark’s 2023 Foreign

and Security Policy Strategy as well as Denmark’s Development Cooperation

Strategy ‘The World We Share’, emphasising a stronger attention to local

demands and shared values, common interests and political priorities leading

the way for an equal partnership. Shared interests between Denmark and

Somalia include a stable Somalia, in a peaceful Horn of Africa, the fight against

violent extremism, maritime security and attention to the multilateral rights-

based world order. The long-term Danish commitment to Somalia provides

a solid platform for a dynamic partnership between Denmark and Somalia

at a time when the climate change agenda and the need for rethinking the

resilience approach in Somalia are prominent.

In this light, key strategic choices for Denmark’s partnership with Somalia

include:

The full use of the Danish Foreign Policy toolbox:

Considering Denmark’s

bilateral engagements with multiple UN partners, EU and the WB, ensuring

coherence between global and in-country engagements based on Danish

policy positions for Somalia will be important. Bilateral engagements include

the bilateral development cooperation programme for Somalia and a large

part of the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa. In

addition, Denmark will continue to work with the entirety of instruments active

in Somalia, including strategic partnerships with Danish NGOs, partnership

with IFU in stimulating economic growth and migration engagements in

partnership with Danish Ministry for Immigration and Integration (UIM),

the Danish Ministry of Defense and Defense Command Denmark and

the Danish National Police. Regional engagements such as the Africa for

Peace Programme will be leveraged to create synergies, as well as regional

cooperation through the African Union (AU).

Denmark bases its partnership on respect for national priorities and

alignment with National Development Plans:

The long-term Danish

commitment provides a solid platform for a dynamic partnership between

Denmark and Somalia, building on a credible and equal dialogue, common

visions for the prosperity of the Somali people as well as strengthened political

and economic relations.

The operationalisation of the vision for Denmark’s partnership with Somalia is

reflected in the three strategic objectives. While building on Denmark’s political

priorities, it is the ambition of this Strategic Framework, and the objectives

underpinning it, to further expand the equal and close partnership with

Somalia based on a solid foundation of shared interests in a stable, inclusive,

prosperous and democratic Somalia. The priorities and objectives have been

consulted with the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as Federal Member

Building on our equitable and

credible dialogue, Denmark

and Somalia partnership is

based on a common vision for

the prosperity of the Somali

people and strengthened

political and economic

relations.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Danish political priorities and strategic choices

States, including Somaliland, and are aligned with priorities outlined in

relevant National Development Plans.

Denmark wants to be a strong green partner for Somalia:

Denmark’s green

profile and expertise can pave the way for beneficial investments in a socially

and economically fair green transition in Somalia. These efforts will build on

Danish expertise – both from Somalia and elsewhere – on engaging in climate

adaptation strategies and leveraging Danish technology, both in adaptation

and mitigation, as well as in natural resource management.

Denmark is a long-term stabilization and peacebuilding partner:

Denmark

has a history of supporting security, stabilization and peacebuilding in

Somalia – including in the fight against piracy mainly through the Peace

and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn of Africa. Denmark has mobilized

significant programmes and resources in the stabilization space and will

use the opportunity to leverage this together with long-term development

investments that can complement early recovery initiatives and reconciliation

activities in newly liberated areas.

Adjusted strategic approach to supporting gender equality, women’s

and girls’ rights:

Danish engagements in Somalia have placed and shall

continue to place emphasis on promoting gender equality, including funding

for initiatives aimed at empowering women and girls, as well as supporting

women’s participation and leadership in governance, private sector, and general

decision-making. It is evident from Denmark’s experience that working with

human rights, social norms and gender equality in the Somali context requires

a consistent, yet pragmatic approach. Denmark will increase support to civil

society in line with Danish priorities including the sexual and reproductive health

and rights of women, girls and marginalised groups, sexual and gender-based

violence, as well as on women’s political and economic participation.

Denmark engages in humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus

models:

The Danish programme portfolio in Somalia encompasses projects

and resources across the HDP nexus. As a significant humanitarian donor,

stabilization partner and development partner, Denmark is well-placed to

ensure strategic cohesion and complementarity between these instruments,

and to do effective model-building for engaging in this nexus. Specifically,

humanitarian instruments can be leveraged together with long-term

development investments in community resilience building and mitigating the

high level of internal displacement.

Strong alliances are key for leveraging Denmark’s interests in Somalia:

Denmark will continue to prioritize partnerships and seek influence first and

foremost through the EU, UN, the World Bank and the AU, as well as through

bilateral alliances, such as with the US, UK and the Nordic+ countries, to ensure

synergies, division of labor and influence. Denmark is committed to reinforce

collaboration with and through the EU, making the EU and EU member states

a preferred political, security and development partner for Somalia. The UK, US

and AU are central partners related to Denmark´s stabilization engagements,

while partnerships with the World Bank, the EU and the Nordic countries

are important on state-building, governance and economic development.

Denmark’s green profile and

expertise can pave the way

for beneficial investments in a

socially and economically fair

green transition in Somalia.

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URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Danish political priorities and strategic choices

Given the risk profile and capacity limitations of Somali institutions, working

through implementing partners in Somalia remains a key modality – and a risk

mitigation strategy - for Danish engagement in Somalia.

Denmark supports a rules-based world order through equal partnerships:

Denmark is running for a seat on the UN Security Council 2025-2026. The

candidature is an extension of Denmark’s longstanding support for the UN

and effective multilateralism, which are also priorities for Somalia. If elected

to the Council, Denmark will work to advance cross-regional partnerships and

a networked multilateralism that enables locally owned solutions to global

challenges. Denmark would inform its work and policy influence in the Council

through on-the-ground experience and in-depth knowledge of challenges faced

by conflict-affected partner countries like Somalia. Denmark will be a strong

voice for the meaningful engagement of non-members and civil society in the

work of the Council, and will focus on critical crosscutting thematic priorities

such as Women, Peace & Security, as well as the interlinkages between climate

change and security, which are highly relevant in the Somali context.

A geographically differentiated and balanced approach is needed:

While

the northern part of Somalia – including Somaliland and Puntland – over

decades has shown to be relatively more stable, the situation in the southern

and central part of Somalia remains volatile and with a stronger Al-Shabaab

presence. These different contexts will be reflected in Denmark´s portfolio,

with the regional PSP program focusing more on the most fragile FMSs,

South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Jubaland, where Denmark

supports early recovery, defection and reintegration, prevention of climate

change related conflicts and various efforts to counter violent extremism and

transnational organised crime. The bilateral program will to an extent focus

more on the more stable Puntland and Somaliland, by addressing national

and state-level settlement and by supporting inclusive governance and

accountability, climate change adaptation as well as inclusive, green economic

growth. Other instruments such as Denmark’s humanitarian assistance, will

operate in areas where needs are the highest.

A strong Danish presence in Somaliland will be maintained:

Denmark will

maintain a strong focus on Somaliland – as has been the case for a number

of years. This decision is shaped by a number of factors including Somalilands

important geographical location, unique operating context and potential

modelling role for development engagements, as well as interests in protecting

progress made against recent democratic backsliding, threats to internal

stability, and growing influence from non-Western actors. Somaliland continues

to receive relatively less interest from development partners in comparison to

the rest of Somalia, leaving Somaliland somewhat at the margins of discussions

on resource- and power sharing. The ambition is to continue the considerable

Danish partnership, benefitting from the relatively stable context. Denmark is,

given its on-the-ground presence in Hargeisa, well placed to play an outsized

role in strengthening donor coordination and partnership with government

institutions. The relatively strong Danish presence in Somaliland is detached

from Somaliland’s ambition to obtain independence. Somaliland’s international

legal status must be clarified through dialogue between the different Somali

parties with support from regional institutions.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

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Danish political priorities and strategic choices

The Somali government wishes to overhaul the current inefficient aid

architecture, and its ambitions for increased direct support through country

systems are high, but the weakness of national institutions and continued

high systemic levels of corruption in the country, imply high risks associated

with on-budget support modalities without significant additional safeguards.

Denmark will therefore continue to push for policy dialogue on key reforms

between development partners and the Somali government.

The strategic objectives also reflect Danish experiences and builds on lessons

learned from previous and current policy dialogue, from development

cooperation, humanitarian assistance, stabilisation and maritime efforts,

migration engagements, as well as investments by IFU and work carried out by

Danish civil society organisations operating in Somalia.

Man holding FAO-distributed agricultural supplies in Jariirey, Bulaburte, Somalia, May 2023.

©FAO/Arete

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Strategic objectives

4. Strategic objectives

4.1.

Strategic objective 1: Ensure adaptation to

climate change through increased and equitable access

to resources and enabling inclusive and green growth

Main UN SDGs contribution: SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 6 (clean water and sani-

tation), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 8 (decent work and economic

growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), SDG 14 (life below water)

Denmark has made addressing climate change a top political priority. As part of

Denmark’s ambitions to be a global green frontrunner, Denmark aims to lead

the way in promoting international climate action, increasing climate-focused

activities in development cooperation, and

establishing green partnerships

with government, civil society, and the private sector.

This also involves

engaging in relevant global fora in order to bring Somalia into the global climate

discussions, including with regards to Somalia’s access to global climate change

finance through global funds, which are not always accommodating fragile

countries like Somalia.

Denmark will ensure continued political dialogue with Somalia around

climate change adaptation

and mainstream efforts to tackle negative impacts

of climate change and promote nature-based solutions across the portfolio.

Specifically, Denmark will work with Somali partners to provide improved access

to water, use of climate-smart agricultural and natural resources management

practices, and facilitate sustainable and inclusive green growth and employ-

ment. These focus areas fall within climate change adaptation, but will simulta-

neously contribute directly to poverty alleviation in Somalia. Specific attention

will be given to gender transformative approaches and human rights across all

engagements.

Denmark will also promote green growth as a catalyst for climate adap-

tation and job creation.

With Africa’s second largest coastline and some of

the most consistent hours of sunshine anywhere in the world, the potential for

solar and wind energy in Somalia is immense. Promoting investments in green

energy will not only help address high-energy costs, one of the top constraints

cited by small and medium businesses in Somalia, but also provide a basis for

skilled jobs and broader private sector investment. Additionally, green invest-

ments in agriculture, one of the top employment sectors in Somalia, can help

rural farmers produce higher value crops, adopt more sustainable livestock

management practices, and strengthen agricultural value chains.

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

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Strategic objectives

4.2.

Strategic objective 2: Promote

peace-building, state-building and human rights

Main UN SDGs contribution: SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 5 (gender equality),

SDG 10 (dreduced inequalities), SDG 16 (peace, justice and string institutions),

SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals)

Given Somalia’s fragility - because of instability and armed conflict, widespread

poverty and severe restrictions on human rights - and building on the nascent

level of political settlement, Denmark will promote inclusive, accountable, and

participatory governance in its partnership with Somalia. This involves work

with a range of key stakeholders, including the Federal Government, Federal

Member States, including self-declared independent Somaliland, civil society

as well as the private sector.

Denmark will continue to focus on

strengthening the development of

legitimate, open and inclusive state institutions.

In collaboration with

partners, Denmark will engage in dialogue and efforts to strengthen the

“social contract” between Somali authorities and the people they serve.

Denmark will

support dialogue and negotiation around core political

settlement issues,

such as control of security forces, resource- and power-

sharing, as well as political representation through support to dialogue

between key political elites and inclusive political processes as well as the

establishment of clear legal frameworks, procedures, and policies that

promote transparency, accountability, and participation. Denmark will support

public sector reform and help build public management systems and capaci-

tate Somalia’s civil service to prioritize and deliver services, both at central and

federal member state level. This will include efforts to expand the tax-base as a

vital element of state-building and enhancing state legitimacy.

Denmark will support the

voice and accountability

of ordinary Somalis

through a nascent independent and rights-based civil society as well as local

level participation in political decision-making processes. Denmark will prior-

itize support towards genuine civic engagement as well as capacity develop-

ment for civil society organizations (CSOs) to enhance their oversight func-

tion and promote the inclusion of marginalized groups in decision-making

processes, including women, youth and minorities. The support to the human

rights agenda will be complemented by encouraging Somali authorities’ role

as duty bearers to better understand and enable a rights-based approach to

tackling the development challenges in Somalia.

Addressing root causes of instability and promoting local solutions to

peace and stability

will be a focus for Denmark’s peace and stabilisation

work primarily through the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Horn

of Africa, which also includes addressing the climate-security nexus through

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Strategic objectives

engagements both at local and national level. Tackling violent extremism to

promote stability will continue to be a strong focus for Denmark’s engage-

ment in Somalia, as will the continued efforts to strengthen maritime secu-

rity. Efforts will be made to couple country-level and global engagements,

including Denmark’s membership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (2023-

24), and potential membership of UN Security Council (2025-2026) which offers

an opportunity to draw attention to solutions to the peacebuilding challenges

affecting Somalia and the region with due attention to local ownership.

4.3.

Strategic objective 3: Strengthen resilience and

addressing displacement and migration

Main UN SDGs contribution: SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger),

SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 10 (dreduced inequalities), SDG 16 (peace, justice

and string institutions), SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals)

In line with Danish development cooperation strategic interests, Denmark will

contribute to enhance resilience for the most vulnerable Somalis. Denmark will

promote an approach to self-reliance focused on livelihoods,

with attention

to individual, household, community and national-level resilience to shocks,

both climatic and security related, including through support to anticipatory

action. Addressing livelihoods and self-reliance is – in itself – a long-term

approach to preventing migration, also outside of Somalia’s borders.

Given the rapid urbanisation in Somalia due to displacement more broadly,

Denmark will under this objective

work both in rural, peri-urban and urban

areas,

taking as point of departure specific vulnerabilities in different geogra-

phies of Somalia. Analysis of the factors of urbanisation should inform human-

itarian, development and stabilization interventions in rural and urban areas.

While Denmark’s substantial humanitarian assistance to Somalia will address

immediate and life-saving needs, including significant use of cash transfers,

the

Danish bilateral engagement will support HDP nexus approaches,

ensuring complementarity between humanitarian assistance and long-term

development efforts. This will be done through engagements (both humani-

tarian, stability and development-focused) working with collective outcomes,

seeking to develop resilience at community level and at a broader systems

level. It will be important to integrate long-term financial and institutional

sustainability into HDP approaches, exploring links to local and national

government systems, albeit weak and under-resourced. Moreover, Denmark

will seek the complementarity in

engaging in peace building and resilience

building at community level

in our stabilisation efforts and development

engagements, applying a community driven development approach with focus

on local decision-making and social dialogue.

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Strategic objectives

In order to ensure sustainability of efforts to enhance resilience for the most

vulnerable parts of the population, Denmark will continue its dialogue with

government and international organisations to

promote the inclusion of

resilience-enhancing efforts into government systems and budgets,

and

advocate for bringing local government into the efforts. While recognising

that it will take Somalia many years to be able to provide basic services to

its citizens, it will be important to promote solutions to meet the needs of

IDPs, informal urban settlers and other vulnerable groups, such as displaced

minority groups, women and youth. Denmark’s long-standing support to

multilateral partners working to provide services such as health and education

will be leveraged to achieve this outcome, for example through our partner-

ship with Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait, as well

as support channelled through civil society organisations.

Denmark will also support the Somali immigration authorities

to strengthen

their human rights based migration management.

This is done to enhance

the authorities’ ability to manage and regulate migration effectively, ensure

border management, provide services to migrants, and address various migra-

tion-related challenges. Safe, orderly and regular migration management will

in turn contribute to broader development outcomes in Somalia.

Family with their harvest of onion, tomatoes, and other products from the kitchen garden in

Qansahley IDP camp, Dolow, Somalia, August 2023.

©FAO/Abdinasir Jama

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Monitoring the strategic framework

5. Monitoring the

strategic framework

The Danish Representation Office in Mogadishu will continuously monitor and

evaluate the progress and results of Denmark’s overall engagement in Somalia

in close cooperation with partners and relevant departments of the Danish

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M&E efforts will be complemented by high-level

bilateral political dialogue with the Federal Government of Somalia, through

the EU and other relevant partners, including relevant Somali line ministries,

civil society and businesses, who have a stake in the implementation of the

Strategic Framework.

Due to the volatile security situation in Somalia, travelling within the country is

constrained. The limited access will be mitigated by engaging and maintaining

a close and constant dialogue with implementing partners on the ground and

their third-party monitoring mechanisms.

The Representation Office will explore the feasibility and options for

establishing and facilitating a Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and

Learning (MEAL) function to provide Denmark with insights into progress

on engagements as well as a risk management system. The possibility of

integrating remote monitoring tools and geo-spatial mapping into this system

will be explored with partners.

The difficult working environment in Somalia and the lack of access means that

continuous risk assessment will be strongly emphasised. The risk assessment

will be anchored at the Representation Office and will be part of a light-touch

review of Denmark’s engagement carried out once a year and adjusted when

needed. This mechanism will assess achievements of planned outcomes and

help make informed decisions – also on adapting engagements to a changing

context. Resources will be allocated for mobilizing short-term Technical

Assistance inputs, as needed, in support of the overall monitoring and learning

function undertaken by the Representation Office. The Representation Office will

engage in regular dialogue with civil society, notably Danish strategic partners

present in Somalia, and with key Somalia think tanks and experts. Annual

meetings between the Representation Office and implementing partners will

provide strategic direction and assess the continued relevance of interventions

and the need for adjustments based on developments in scenarios and risks.

These meetings will be informed by: i) outcomes of the annual political dialogue

between Somalia and Denmark; ii) joint analyses undertaken with like-minded

bilateral and multilateral partners as well as Danish strategic partners present in

Somalia, and iii) evidence based learning from implementing Denmark’s bilateral

as well as multilateral engagement in Somalia.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

6. Outline of bilateral

development programme

OVERALL PRIORITIES, STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES AND

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

The bilateral development programme will be elaborated based on Danish

strategies and priorities as set out in this document, and aligned with the

National Development Plan of Somalia (and where relevant of Somaliland)

as well as based on lessons learned from prior and ongoing engagements.

The programme portfolio will consist of engagements designed to

effectively contribute to the three strategic objectives of the framework. The

bilateral programme should be seen as one important sub-set of several

Danish bilateral and multilateral partnerships, as well as humanitarian

and stabilization instruments brought to bear under this overall strategic

framework.

At the policy level, Denmark will continue efforts to build on political

access and dialogue with key Somali and international stakeholders and

also undertake a “convening role” for knowledge and information sharing

to help improve understanding, coordination and coherence in priority

sectors between political interlocutors, development partners and Somali

stakeholders.

Most engagements in the bilateral programme are expected to be led

by partner organisations, be that multilateral, bilateral or CSO partners,

but Denmark may take the lead in the implementation of a few strategic

engagements, with due consideration of available capacity.

An important focus of the bilateral programme will be on developing and

supporting emerging capacities within the government – e.g. through working

with partners directly engaged with government, such as the World Bank. This

is a medium-to-long-term institutional development strategy, part of state-

building, before direct Danish on-budget support becomes feasible.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

Figure 3: Principles for Engagement

•

Prioritizing coherence and integration, with active

efforts made to ensure synergies across instru-

ments and our programmatic portfolio, as well

as between political dialogue and programmatic

delivery.

Aligning Danish development priorities with

national development plans.

Setting pragmatic objectives that are focused,

realistic in their ambition, aligned to the

resources available, and achievable within the

timeframe and fragile context.

Narrowing our thematic engagements to ensure

a tighter focus, increased synergies across

engagements, and a sequencing of interventions

rather than trying to address too many complex

challenges in parallel.

•

Pursuing a flexible and adaptive approach to

respond to the fluid and dynamic nature of Soma-

lia’s political economy.

Balance national level work with activities at the

FMS and local level, including with civil society

organizations with genuine constituencies, to

increase its chances of success.

Complementing and reinforcing existing endeav-

ours to promote more inclusive local govern-

ance processes for women, youth, and minority

groups to rebalance the political settlements

and encourage elite engagement with the wider

population.

•

The above principles will be applied across the bilateral development

programme: In addition, a number of priorities will cut across all

engagements.

Gender equality

will be pursued applying a gender-

transformative approach where possible in the planning, managing and

monitoring all interventions to ensure equal access and benefits from

engagements while addressing gender-based inequalities.

Engaging youth

dialogue and decision-making is key to fostering a democratic Somalia, given

the young population of Somalia and their lack of voice in the political debate.

Denmark will also follow the

Do No Harm principle,

engaging all stakeholders

to ensure equitable access and distribution of resources, supporting the

participation of local communities in decision-making, and considering the

socio-cultural and historical context of the region. This also involves

conflict-

sensitivity

as an underlying principle for all engagements. Engagements

will be locally driven,

rights-based,

and target those with unequal access to

resources and decision-making power, including women and youth. Finally,

adaptation to negative consequences of

climate change

will be considered in

all engagements, not only included in engagements with a particular focus on

climate change adaptation.

Engaging youth in dialogue

and decision-making is key

to fostering a democratic

Somalia, given the young

population of Somalia and

their lack of voice in the

political debate.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

Development engagements that would fall

under strategic objective 1

1.1 Improved Access to and Management of Water Resources

The 2023 UN Conference on Water, the first held in 50 years, resulted in

a clear “Water Action Agenda” strongly endorsed by Denmark. A bilateral

programme in Somalia presents an opportunity for Denmark to accelerate

the implementation of this agenda, given the critical importance of water

resources in the country and the impending impact of climate change on

water availability. By supporting the development of the water sector in

Somalia, Denmark could improve living conditions and health, promote

food security and productivity, and contribute to sustainable and equitable

water management practices while addressing the climate-security nexus.

In addition, water is a key driver of conflict in Somalia, the conflict further

exacerbated by climate change and demographic growth.

Improved access to water.

Denmark will explore means to support

water infrastructure projects, such as dams, irrigation systems, and water

storage and distribution facilities. This could include the rehabilitation of

non-functional boreholes and the construction of new ones, strategically

placed to provide equal access to water. It could also include the rehabilitation

and construction of surface water harvesting structures such as sand and

sub-surface dams and reservoirs to benefit agro-pastoral and pastoral

communities and contribute to flood prevention and food security. In terms

of targeting of initiatives, this could include meeting the water and sanitation

needs of IDPs and vulnerable populations and strengthening community

resilience in the nexus between humanitarian and development assistance,

thereby also contributing to strategic objective 3 of the framework. This could

include rehabilitating, extending, or building water distribution systems

in urban and peri-urban areas. A WASH approach (or even a One-Health

approach), including hygiene and preventive health measures, could be

relevant not least in IDP settings. Partners could include key multilateral

organisations, but also the multi-partner facility Somaliland Development

Fund, which could be focused more on water and green initiatives. Synergies

with IFU instruments for sustainable infrastructure could be explored.

Improved management of water resources.

Denmark could also consider

supporting the development of water management plans that take into

account the impacts of climate change. This could include activities to map

and monitor water resources in Somalia, including across borders. Denmark’s

expertise in sustainable groundwater management could be utilized to explore

potential collaboration with key organizations working on this in Somalia, such

as FAO, the World Bank and UNICEF.

Lack of water is an important driver of conflict at community level, while poor

water quality is a major driver of diseases. Denmark could explore supporting

local communities in developing strategies for water conservation and efficient

water use, supporting local decision-making and governance, such as local

water user groups, thereby supporting local systems of governance and

increasing equity and inclusiveness. This could also be addressed through

By supporting the

development of the water

sector in Somalia, Denmark

could improve living

conditions and health,

promote food security and

productivity, and contribute

to sustainable and equitable

water management practices

while addressing the climate-

security nexus.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

support to Danish and local NGOs working in this space. Special attention will

be on including women in decision-making processes around water resource

management.

1.2 Natural Resource Management and Nature-based Solutions

Natural Resource Management.

Denmark could consider prioritizing

strategic investments in natural resource management, climate-smart

agriculture and sustainable food systems. Current land and natural resource

management practices are deeply unsustainable, leading to deforestation,

land degradation, and decreased resilience to climate change. Initiatives to

address these challenges could include crop diversification, drought-resistant

crop varieties, and sustainable land management practices. Strategies for

sustainable agricultural practices could also be explored, such as water

conservation, soil management, and information on crop selection.

Promotion and use of Nature-Based Solutions.

Denmark could explore

the promotion of nature-based solutions, such as reforestation, watershed

restoration, and soil conservation. These solutions mitigate environmental

degradation, reduce the risks of drought and floods, and provide important

co-benefits, such as improved biodiversity, increased soil moisture and fertility,

and protection of groundwater resources. This could include a specific focus

on flood prevention. Somalia’s regular flash floods not only threaten lives,

property, and livestock but also wash away critical topsoil which decreases

agricultural productivity in the medium- and long-term. Some successful flood

prevention initiatives have focused on hybrid nature-based solutions like

revegetation and reforestation.

1.3 Green Growth, Business Enabling Environment,

and Market Systems Development

Improving the ways that small and informal economic actors interact with

markets will promote growth and create jobs, thereby reducing poverty.

Marginalised groups—including women and youth – are often excluded

from engaging in markets—either through barriers to loans, monopolies,

fluctuating prices and access issues. Building on existing experience, Denmark

could look to develop a

Market Systems Development approach

to address

these barriers and enable small and medium sized economic actors to access

markets by addressing the underlying factors for the barriers. This could

include supporting the development of regulatory frameworks to include

e.g. women as economic actors, and to support skills-creation, information,

infrastructure and finance.

Supporting inclusive green growth.

Climate adaptation holds significant

potential for creating green jobs in a range of sectors. Denmark could continue

and step up its support to green sector growth and job creation with a focus

on facilitating access to renewable energy, especially decentralized small-scale

solutions, sustainable production and improving environmental protection,

through private sector approaches, including access to finance and technical

assistance that could be targeted in this direction. Another area of interest

would be supporting green jobs that promote the “Blue Economy” and the

Climate adaptation holds

significant potential for

creating green jobs in a range

of sectors.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

sustainable use of ocean resources, not least within Somalia’s fisheries sector.

The existing Somaliland Development Fund could potentially be redesigned to

contribute to the green (and blue) agenda in a targeted way, in collaboration

with bilateral partners in this fund.

Development engagements that would fall under

strategic objective 2

2.1 Political Settlement, Strengthened Institutions and

Public Accountability

Supporting capability, inclusion and accountability at FGS and

sub-national levels.

Denmark will explore ways to support inclusive

democratic processes, further strengthening institutions at federal member

state and local levels. The work may support member states and local

governments around district council formation, planning, revenue collection,

execution and accountability. Where relevant, it may also support national as

well as state-level and local election processes.

Through multilateral partnerships, for example with the World Bank’s

Multi-Partner Fund or relevant projects working to strengthen public

financial management, Denmark would support strengthening of the role,

accountability and legitimacy of the state, strengthening inclusive governance

and financial integrity. This focus could also include work with bilateral joint

programmes to increase the revenue mobilisation, include broadening the tax

base at sub-national level – with a dual objective of increasing fiscal space, and

to develop the state’s role as a duty bearer, thereby strengthening the social

contract, providing services to its citizens.

2.2 Strengthening Civic Space and Improved Participation of Women,

Youth, and Minority Groups in Decision-Making

Denmark could explore scaling up support to a

constructive civil society

engagement

on national and sub-national policy and service delivery

issues. We could also look to support Somali expert policy inputs from think

tanks and other experts in order to support evidence-based policymaking in

Somalia, and to ensure strong policy analysis informing our broader portfolio

implementation. Such an engagement could include taking a lead role in

setting up a civic engagement mechanism. This could build on positive Danish

experiences from other countries and in-country discussions with like-minded

development partners. The mechanism could balance local ownership and

governance with providing funding and capacity-development programs that

would enable civil society organizations to effectively perform their oversight

function and ensure that marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and

minority clans are included in decision-making processes.

Representation of women and youth in political decision-making.

part of a wider civil society engagement, Denmark could initiate and support

reforms to address the barriers that prevent women, youth, and minorities

from participating in the political process. Such efforts could be integrated in

engagements focusing on broadening civic space, institutional strengthening

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Outline of bilateral development programme

and local development engagements based on partnerships with civil society

organizations, political parties, and other stakeholders to facilitate the

participation of women, youth, and minorities in decision-making processes.

This may be informed by ongoing advice from key female decision-makers and

women-led organisations and potentially by a “youth sounding board”.

A woman from the Kabasa IDP camp watered plants at the FAO’s project demonstration

farm in Dolow, Somalia, August 2023.

Advocating for and protecting human rights.

Protecting and promoting

human rights, particularly of women, youth, and minorities, is a central pillar

of all Danish development support. Engagements that promote and protect

human rights – working with both duty bearers and rights holders – will be

considered under this strategic objective. This could be combined with the

continuous advocacy on key human rights issues in our political dialogue with

key government interlocutors.

Development engagements that would fall under

strategic objective 3

In support of the third strategic objective, Denmark will promote resilience,

self-reliance and livelihoods, both at the individual, household, community

and national level. The primary focus of engagements under SO3 will be at the

Denmark will promote

resilience, self-reliance and

livelihoods, across individual,

household, community, and

national levels.

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Outline of bilateral development programme

local and community level, building resilience bottom-up. Under this strategic

objective, engagements under the bilateral programme will complement and

build on experience from the humanitarian assistance Denmark is providing

to Somalia, and engagements would seek to engage across the HDP nexus to

fight poverty and build resilience in a longer-term perspective.

Understanding the multi-faceted nature of poverty and vulnerabilities in

Somalia and contextual differences within Somalia,

building resilience at

individual, household and community level

should address both the lack of

opportunities, and the lack of services, vulnerable Somalis are facing. While

our humanitarian assistance provides support to the provision of services,

the ambition for engagements under the bilateral programme is primarily to

address the lack of opportunities for the most vulnerable Somalis by engaging

in improving livelihoods. It will be necessary to target both rural and urban

settings, taking into consideration the rapid urbanisation in Somalia as well as

the high number of IDPs in towns and cities.

3.1 Enhancing livelihoods and preventing internal displacement

Nearly half of the Somali population are in need of humanitarian assistance.

To reduce humanitarian needs in a longer-term perspective, engagements

will seek to provide opportunities through improving livelihoods. This involves

strengthening the ability of individuals, households, communities and systems

to prepare for, absorb, adapt and recover from shocks from conflict or climate

change and requires addressing the root causes of fragility. Many Somalis, in

the absence of a functioning state, rely on the community and clan to provide

protection and livelihoods, and service provision is often in the hands of either

humanitarian actors, or informal and clan-affiliated networks.

As poverty, instability and conflict in Somalia is often manifested in lack

of food, water and protection, this forces the most vulnerable parts of the

population into displacement in the search of survival, which accelerates

urbanisation and puts strain on already scarce local, and humanitarian,

resources. Water, food and security are, consequently, central to improved

livelihoods, as are small-scale economic opportunities.

Denmark would seek to engage in efforts to

promote community resilience

in places of origin,

knowing that to alleviate displacement pressures, basic

needs must be fulfilled in close proximity to where vulnerable populations are

placed. This could also include climate adaptive services in both urban and

rural areas, for example water, irrigation and climate-smart agriculture.

Building resilience at community level involves adapting and deploying

community level capacities and resources to prepare for and respond to

shocks and mitigate the impacts on community members. A

community

driven development approach

will be considered, including focus on social

dialogue and local decision making in prioritizing needs and activities. This

could contribute to local conflict mediation and resolution, and add to concrete

experience and model building with emphasis on the peacebuilding focus of

the HDP nexus, linking this to the humanitarian financing and development

investments. Contexts and strategies will differ, and a flexible approach

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Outline of bilateral development programme

to strengthen livelihoods will be required, but it could include micro-loans

for productive activities, livestock insurance schemes in rural settings and

climate-smart agriculture interventions. Potential synergy with other Danish

engagements around climate change adaptation will be explored.

Denmark could explore how to engage in efforts to improve livelihoods and

self-reliance through

working with NGOs to model new approaches to

livelihoods and self-reliance,

as well as protection efforts. Social safety nets

in Somalia are often primarily the family, the local community and the clan

affiliation – as long as the community has any resources to share. A targeted

call for proposals from NGOs in this space could be considered, complemented

by support through a multilateral organisation aiming to improve livelihoods

both in rural and urban settings.

In addition, the needs of urban poor, often living alongside IDPs in informal

settlements, could be considered in relation to resilience investments. A

number of partners, both multilaterals and NGOs, are working on urban

resilience, also in secondary cities, as part of a longer term strategy of

improving national resilience and adaptation to changing climate and security

circumstances.

Tentative outline of

bilateral programme budget

DDK

1100

345

200

Overall bilateral

programme

Commitment

2024

Commitment

2025

385

170

Commitment

2026

Commitment

2027

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annex B) key data / Figures - somalia

Annex b) key Data / Figures - Somalia

indicators

Key economic data

Surface area (square km.)

Population

Gross Domestic Product, GDP (current USD, billion)

GDP Growth (annual pct.)

GDP per capita (current USD)

“Ease of doing business”-index (1-100, 1=most business-friendly regulations)

Tax revenue (pct. of GDP)

Net ODA received per capita (current USD)

Net ODA received pct. of GNI

Total debt service (pct. of GNI)

Present value of external debt (pct. of GNI)

Inflation, consumer prices (annual changes in pct.)

Key social data

Population growth (annual pct.)

Life expectancy, total (years)

Total Fertility Rate (number of births per woman)

Population ages 15-64 (pct. of total population)

Urban population (pct. of total population)

Internally displaced population (percentage of total population)

Mortality rate, under-5 (1,000 live births)

Maternal mortality rate, modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births

People at least using basic drinking water (pct. of total population)

Food insecurity (percentage of total population)

Prevalence of HIV, total (pct. of population ages 15-49)

School enrolment primary (pct. gross)

People living below poverty line (pct. of total population)

Female circumcision (aged 15-49, pct.)

Income per capita (current USD)

value

year

source

637,657

17,065,581

7.63

4.0

401

20.0

2.1*

140.4

31.6

0.2

30.4

6.8

2022

2021

2022

2019

2022

2021

2022

UNDP

WB WDI

IMF

WB WDI

IMF

WB WDI

UNDP

3.1

6.9

50.2

46.7

128

692

0.1

9.1

557

2021

2022

2019

2021

2019

2016

2019

2020

2022

2021

2022

2018

WB WDI

UNDP

WB WDI

UNDP

WB WDI

UNDP

WB WDI

UNDP

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annex B) key data / Figures - somalia

indicators

Key environment data

Forest area (pct. of land)

People using at least basic sanitation services (pct. of population)

emission (metric tonnes per capita)

Renewable electricity consumption (pct. of total final energy consumption)

Access to electricity (pct. of population)

Key human rights data

Political rights, 0-40 points

Civil liberties, 0-60 points

Press Freedom Index (1-180)

value

year

source

9.5

0.0

95.03

49.7

2020

2022

2019

2020

UNDP

WB WDI

2023

Freedom House

Reporters Without Borders

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annex C) Results Framework

Annex c)

Results Framework

Impact level

overall vision

Support the development of a stable, inclusive, prosperous and democratic Somalia

Strategic objectives

Ensure adaptation to climate

change

through climate diplomacy,

equitable access to resources and

enabling inclusive and green growth.

Promote stability and security,

inclusive state building and

protection of human rights.

Strengthen resilience and

addressing displacement

and migration.

indicators and means of verification (MoV)

1. Water & sanitation

SDG 6.1.1: Access to drinking water. MoV:

World Bank Databank

2. Water resources

SDG 6.5.1: Integrated water resources mana-

gement MoV: IWRM Data Portal

3. Poverty

SDG 1.2.1: Population living below poverty

line. MoV: World Bank Databank

4. Economic growth

SDG 8.6.1: Proportion of youth not in educa-

tion, employment or training. MoV: World

Bank Databank

1. Stability

SDG 16.3.3: Conflict resolution mechanism.

MoV: World Bank Databank

2. Conflict prevention

SDG 16.1.2: Conflict related deaths. MoV:

ACLED

3. Good governance

SDG 16.6.2: Effective, accountable, and

transparent institutions. MoV: TI’s Corrup-

tion Perceptions Index

4. Human rights

SDG 16.a.1: Independent national human

rights institutions. MoV: GANHRI Status

1. Resilience

SDG 2.1.2: Prevalence of food insecurity.

MoV: World Bank Databank

2. Gender equality and SRHR

SDG 5.3.1: Child marriage rate. MoV:

UNICEF Data

3. Migration

SDG 10.7.3: Safe migration. MoV: IOM

Missing Migrants Project dataset

Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

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Denmark-Somalia – Strategic framework 2024-2028

URU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 217: Orientering om den nye strategiske ramme for Somalia 2024-2028

Denmark-somalia

Strategic framework 2024-2028

November 2023

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Asiatisk Plads 2

1448 Copenhagen K

+45 33 92 00 00

Fax: 32 54 05 33

[email protected]

www.um.dk

Design: Kontrapunkt

The publication can be downloaded via:

www.um.dk

The text can be freely quoted.