Retsudvalget 2023-24
REU Alm.del Bilag 32
Offentligt
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Commissioner Johansson
Ministry of Justice
Date:
13 October 2023
Dear Commissioner Johansson,
1.
Please be informed that the Danish Government, in accordance with the
provisions in Article 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March
2016 (Schengen Borders Code), has decided to temporarily reintroduce
border controls at the internal borders for six months as from 12 November
2023. The border controls may extend to all internal borders, including land,
sea and air borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing
points are determined by the Danish National Police. The border controls
will focus on the Danish-German land border and the Danish ports with
ferry connection to Germany. Such border control will thus not be carried
out at the Danish-Swedish border crossings.
This decision has been reached in order to be able to effectively counter the
significant threat to our public policy and internal security caused by
terrorists and organized criminals who are able to exploit the free mobility
within the Schengen area and the threat from espionage from foreign state
intelligence. This notification provides factual information and elaborates
on the circumstances and events which give rise to a new serious threat to
our public policy and internal security, while taking into account the free
movement of persons in the practical execution of the border controls.
2.
First of all, the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA), under the Danish
Security and Intelligence Service, assess that the terrorist threat to Denmark
remains at the level of significant (level 4 of 5). Due to recent international
attention to events in Denmark and Sweden involving defamations of the
Quran the terror threat has been assessed to be heightened within the current
threat level.
Slotsholmsgade 10
DK - 1216 København K.
Phone +45 7226 8400
www.justitsministeriet.dk
[email protected]
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The events have attracted substantial negative attention from various actors,
including militant Islamists groups, communities and individuals in foreign
countries. Due to the speed and unpredictability in which the defamations
of the Quran are shared via international media, social media and militant
Islamic propaganda, the threat picture is assessed to be volatile. The Danish
Security and Intelligence Service has concrete indications of a number of
threats targeted against both Denmark and Danish interests abroad
following the defamations of the Quran.
Furthermore, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) assesses that
Islamic State (ISIS) and Al Qaida (AQ) wish to revenge the defamation of
the Quran in Sweden and Denmark.
Currently, the primary potential terrorist threat emerges from sympathizers
inspired by propaganda from the mentioned groups. Both groups have
encouraged sympathizers to seek revenge against Denmark and Sweden for
defamations of the Quran. AQ and ISIS state in propaganda videos that it is
an Islamic duty to revenge the defamations.
AQ’s top management issued a declaration on 13 August 2023 which likens
Denmark and Sweden. In the declaration, AQ encourages attacks against
Danish and Swedish embassies and diplomats. Furthermore, the declaration
encourages Muslims to form attack cells.
In general, militant Islamism is estimated to be the primary terrorist threat
to Denmark. In this regard, it is further noted that CTA assess that since the
summer of 2012 a large number of individuals have travelled from Denmark
to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq. Approximately one third of these
individuals are presumed to have died in the conflict zone, and
approximately half of them have either returned to Denmark or taken up
residence in other countries outside of the conflict zone. According to
information available, approximately one fifth of these individuals from
Denmark, including their children, currently reside in the conflict zone or in
neighboring countries. Some of the individuals who have travelled from
Denmark to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat towards
Denmark or Danish interests abroad. Likewise, it is possible that individuals
having departed other countries than Denmark including other European
countries will pose a threat towards Denmark and Danish interests abroad.
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Exploitation of refugee and migrant routes has previously been included as
a central element in the planning of attacks by ISIS against targets in Europe,
and it is possible that militant Islamist groups still intend to exploit these
routes.
Secondly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine still constitutes an extraordinary
and uncertain situation in Europe.
DDIS states that Denmark and the West continue to be faced with the
prospect of a long-term conflict with Russia that will use an array of
different means to create fear and uncertainty. The increased tension
between Russia and the West means that there is a high and persistent threat
of espionage from Russia.
In April 2022, Denmark expelled 15 Russian intelligence officers. However,
the Russian need for gathering information in Denmark has increased. It is
thus expected by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service that Russia
will look for new ways to receive information e.g. through the use of visiting
intelligence officers.
3.
Against this backdrop and after careful consideration, the Danish
Government considers temporary reintroduction of internal border controls
as a necessary and effective measure to address these real and current threats
to public policy and internal security.
This is also supported by the following facts:
- From 11 February 2023 until 18 August 2023 a total of 168 weapons
have been confiscated in relation to the border controls against
Germany.
- From 11 February 2023 until 18 August 2023 the police have refused
entry to 801 persons on the Danish-German border.
Finally, the recent migration developments within the Schengen area
remains to be of great concern to Denmark. In 2022 approximately 330.000
incidents of irregular entries were recorded which in comparison to 2021 is
an increase of 64 percent. In the first 38 weeks of 2023 the number of
registered irregular entries is 22 percent higher than within the same period
in 2022. The number of filed applications for asylum in EU+ (EU, Norway
and Switzerland) in 2022 were one and a half times as many as in 2021 with
a total of 991.000. In 2023 as of 24 September 2023 774.000 applications of
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asylum in EU+ have been filed which is 28 percent more than within the
same period of 2022.
4.
The Danish Government remains committed to the principle of free
movement of persons. Please rest assured that the scope of the internal
border checks will continue to be limited to what is deemed strictly
necessary to respond to the threat to our public policy and internal security.
It thus remains a matter of priority for the Danish Government that the
practical execution of the temporary border controls is carried out in a
manner with the least negative impact on persons crossing the border for
legitimate reasons and with careful considerations taken to the free
movement of persons within the EU.
The Danish police conduct the border controls in cooperation with German
law enforcement authorities where cooperation is also established regarding
exchange of information.
The border controls are carried out as spot-checks which in terms of
quantity, location and intensity are adapted to the expected number of
travelers as well as the current intelligence picture, the local conditions and
the traffic patterns at the individual border crossing points. The internal
border controls are thus substantially different from the systematic control
of Denmark’s external borders. The Danish National Police have found that
the previous border controls have not had a distinctive negative impact on
the free movement of persons across the internal borders. This will continue
to be a priority for the Danish authorities in close cooperation with the
German authorities.
In continuation of letter of 14 April 2023 Denmark has decided to strengthen
the use of alternative measures in the border regions by increasing the use
of intelligent monitoring of the border areas as well as increasing the number
of police patrols and the crime-fighting efforts in the border area while at
the same time deescalating the intensity of the border control. This
restructuring of the police efforts in the border areas is still being
implemented. However, it is the assessment of the Danish Government that
alternative measures at this point cannot fully remedy the need for
reintroduction of internal border controls. The reintroduction of internal
border controls thus remains a measure of last resort.
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The Danish Government will notify the other Member States about this
decision.
Yours sincerely,
Peter Hummelgaard
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