Retsudvalget 2022-23 (2. samling)
REU Alm.del
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EU JUSTICE
SCOREBOARD
Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions
COM(2022) 234
THE 2022
Justice
and Consumers
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
© European Union, 2022
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Print
PDF
ISBN 978-92-76-51556-2
ISBN 978-92-76-51630-9
ISSN 2467-2246
ISSN 2467-2254
doi:10.2838/52765
doi:10.2838/819957
DS-AG-22-001-EN-C
DS-AG-22-001-EN-N
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THE 2022
EU JUSTICE
SCOREBOARD
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
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Country codes
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
HR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czechia
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Croatia
Italy
Cyprus
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
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Foreword
This edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard marks its 10
th
anniversary.
Over these ten editions, we have developed the Scoreboard from an overview of es-
sential indicators from outside sources into a rich collection of high-quality data, often
specifically gathered for this purpose by the Commission in collaboration with judicial
networks and other sources. Specifically in recent years, the EU Justice Scoreboard and
its information on judicial independence played an increasingly important role with
the attention focussing on the rule of law across the European Union. The vital role of
the Scoreboard was clear during the global health crisis, which further highlighted the
importance of digitalisation of justice as one means to keep courts open and providing
access to justice. The detailed indicators on digitalisation, now presented for the second
time, are an essential monitoring tool showing Members States where there is room
for improvement. The evolution of the Justice Scoreboard over these last ten years is
remarkable.
Together with the annual Rule of Law Report, the EU Justice Scoreboard traces develop-
ments in the rule of law in EU Members States. Both initiatives are essential elements
in the EU’s rule of law toolbox, offering different perspectives on these issues. The EU
Justice Scoreboard provides a quantitative and visual analysis of national justice sys-
tems and informs the Rule of Law Report, which includes a country-specific qualitative
analysis of the major developments in Member States.
The 2022 Scoreboard maintains previous editions’ general structure by analysing data
on independence, quality and efficiency of national justice systems. At the same time,
it is an evolving tool. This 10th edition responds to the current need for more compara-
tive information for the annual Rule of Law Report, and for the monitoring of the Na-
tional Recovery and Resilience Plans, and deepens the analysis in relevant sub-areas.
For efficiency, monitoring is extended to cover length of proceedings of administrative
authorities in specific areas of EU law. For quality, new figures are available on specific
arrangements for access to justice (in particular for persons with disabilities and for
child-friendly proceedings), and on legal safeguards regarding decisions or inaction of
administrative authorities. For independence, readers can find new charts on companies’
perceptions of the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and the courts.
Innovations in structural independence indicators include information on authorities
involved in security checks on judges and safeguards relating to the temporary em-
ployment of judges or prosecutors in political posts – both sensitive issues that require
appropriate safeguards for independence and impartiality.
As in previous years, the Scoreboard is the result of extensive and long-term collabora-
tion between many different institutions and people. I want to pay tribute here to the
excellent cooperation between the European Commission and the group of contact per-
sons for national justice systems, judges and prosecutors in Member States, the Expert
Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF), the Council of Europe’s
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), the European Network of
Councils of the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of Presidents of the Supreme Judicial
Courts of the EU (NPSJC) and the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme
Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-Europe).
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
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The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard has clearly shown that the effectiveness of EU justice
systems continues to improve in a large majority of Member States, even when faced
with the difficult circumstances experienced over the last years. At the same time, chal-
lenges remain in some Member States, that still have much to do to ensure the full trust
of citizens in their national legal systems, especially where the status, position, and
ultimately the independence of judges is at risk. The data presented in the Scoreboard
enriches our understanding of the shortcomings and challenges at the national level,
but equally so, it informs us of where there are positive trends and good practices that
others can follow.
The 10-year anniversary of the Scoreboard shows us that the EU and its Member States
remain committed to improving their justice systems and upholding the rule of law even
during times of hardship. This should be a strong encouragement to continue to nourish
the dialogue between Member States, support them in learning from and assisting each
another, and ultimately improving the rule of law in the European Union.
Didier Reynders
European Commissioner for Justice
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Contents
Foreword
1. Introduction
2. Context: Developments in justice reforms in 2021
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.1. Developments in caseload
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
3.2.2. Resources
3.2.3. Assessment tools
3.2.4. Digitalisation
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems
3.3. Independence
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection
3.3.2. Structural independence
3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence
4. CONCLUSIONS
iii
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9
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22
22
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1. Introduction
Effective justice systems are essential for the application and enforcement of EU law and upholding the rule of law and other
values the EU is founded on and which are common to the Member States. National courts act as EU courts when applying EU
law. It is national courts in the first place that ensure that the rights and obligations set in EU law are enforced effectively (Article
19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)).
In addition, effective justice systems are also essential for mutual trust and for improving the investment climate and the sustain-
ability of long-term growth. This is why improving the efficiency, quality and independence of national justice systems continues to
feature among the priorities of the European Semester – the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The 2022 annual
sustainable growth survey (
1
), which sets out the economic and employment policy priorities for the EU, confirms the link between
effective justice systems and Member States’ business environment. Well-functioning and fully independent justice systems can
have a positive impact on investment and are key for investment protection, and therefore contribute to productivity and com-
petitiveness. They are also important for ensuring the effective cross-border enforcement of contracts, administrative decisions
and dispute resolution, essential for the functioning of the single market (
2
).
In this context, the EU Justice Scoreboard gives an annual overview of indicators focusing on the essential parameters of effec-
tive justice systems:
efficiency;
quality;
independence.
The 2022 Scoreboard further develops the indicators for all three aspects, including on accessibility to justice for persons with
disabilities, and again on the digitalisation of justice, which has played a major role in keeping the courts functioning during the
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as more generally, to promote efficient and accessible justice systems (
3
). This edition strengthens
the business dimension on all three aspects by including new data on administrative efficiency, legal safeguards in relation to
administrative decisions and confidence in investment protection. Finally, for the first time the 2022 Scoreboard presents the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the efficiency of justice systems.
- The European Rule of Law Mechanism –
As announced in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines, the Commission has established a comprehensive European Rule
of Law Mechanism to deepen its monitoring of the situation in Member States. The Rule of Law Mechanism acts as a preventive
tool, deepening dialogue and joint awareness of rule of law issues. At the centre of the new Mechanism is the annual Rule of
Law Report, which provides a synthesis of significant developments – both positive and negative – in all Member States and the
Union as a whole. The 2021 Rule of Law Report, published on 20 July 2021, drew on a variety of sources, including the EU Justice
Scoreboard (
4
). Moreover, as announced by President von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the Union Speech, the 2022 Rule of Law
Report will include recommendations to Member States. The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard has also been further developed to
reflect the need for additional comparative information identified during the preparation of the 2021 Rule of Law Report, so as
to support forthcoming Rule of Law reports.
1
2
3
4
COM(2021) 740 final.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Identifying
and addressing barriers to the Single Market, COM(2020)93, and accompanying SWD(2020)54.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox of opportunities,
COM(2020)710, and accompanying SWD(2020)540.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism/2021-rule-law-report/2021-rule-law-report-communication-
and-country-chapters_en
1. Introduction
1
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What is the EU Justice Scoreboard?
The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist the EU and Member States
improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems by providing objective, reliable and comparable data on
a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the (i) efficiency, (ii) quality and (iii) independence of justice systems
in all Member States. It does not present an overall single ranking. Rather, it gives an overview of how all Member States’
justice systems function, based on indicators that are of common interest and relevance for all Member States.
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an equal footing.
Efficiency, quality and independence are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever the model of
the national justice system or the legal tradition on which it is based. Figures for these three parameters should be read
together, as all three are often interlinked (initiatives aimed at improving one may affect another).
The Scoreboard mainly presents indicators concerning civil, commercial and administrative cases, as well as, subject to
availability of data, certain criminal cases (i.e. cases concerning money laundering at first instance courts), in order to assist
Member States in their efforts to create a more efficient investment-, business- and citizen-friendly environment. The
Scoreboard is a comparative tool which evolves in the course of dialogue with Member States and the European Parliament
(
5
). Its objective is to identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system and to provide relevant annual data.
What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard?
The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of
Justice (CEPEJ), with which the Commission has concluded a contract to carry out a specific annual study, provides much
of the quantitative data. The data cover 2012-2020, and have been provided by Member States in accordance with the
CEPEJ’s methodology. The study also provides detailed comments and country-specific factsheets that give more context.
They should be read together with the figures (
6
).
Data on the length of proceedings collected by the CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ – a calculated length of court
proceedings (based on a ratio between pending and resolved cases). Data on courts’ and administrative authorities’
efficiency in applying EU law in specific areas show the average length of proceedings derived from the actual length
of court cases. Note that the length of court proceedings may vary substantially between areas in a Member State,
particularly in urban centres where commercial activities may lead to a higher caseload.
Other data sources, covering the period from 2012 to 2021, are: the group of contact persons on national justice systems
(
7
), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (
8
), the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial
Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (
9
), the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU
(ACA-Europe) (
10
), the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (
11
), the European Competition Network (ECN)
(
12
), the Communications Committee (COCOM)(
13
), the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property
rights(
14
), the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) (
15
), the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (EGMLTF) (
16
), Eurostat (
17
), and the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) (
18
).
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
E.g. European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (P8_TA(2018)0216).
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en
To help prepare the EU Justice Scoreboard and promote the exchange of best practice on the effectiveness of justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to
designate two contact persons, one from the judiciary and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly.
The ENCJ brings together Member States’ national institutions that are independent of the executive and legislature, and are responsible for supporting the judiciary in the
independent delivery of justice:
https://www.encj.eu/
The NPSJC provides a forum that gives European institutions the opportunity to request the opinions of supreme courts, and brings them closer by encouraging discussion
and the exchange of ideas:
http://network-presidents.eu/
ACA-Europe is composed of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Councils of State or the Supreme administrative jurisdictions of each EU Member State:
https://www.aca-europe.eu/
CCBE represents European bars and law societies in their common interests before European and other international institutions. It regularly acts as a liaison between its
members and the European institutions, international organisations, and other legal organisations around the world:
https://www.ccbe.eu/
The ECN has been established as a forum for discussion and cooperation between European competition authorities in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU (TFEU) are applied. The ECN is the framework for the close cooperation mechanisms of Council Regulation 1/2003. Through the ECN, the Commission
and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States cooperate with each other:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html
The COCOM is composed of EU Member State representatives. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the draft measures that the Commission intends to adopt on digital
market issues:
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/communications-committee
The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network of experts and specialist stakeholders. It is composed of public and private sector
representatives, who collaborate in active working groups:
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home
The CPC is a network of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and EEA countries:
https://single-market-scoreboard.ec.europa.eu/
governance-tools/consumer-protection-cooperation-network-cpc
The EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing legislation:
http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/financial-crime/index_en.htm
Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about/who-we-are
The EJTN is the principal platform and promoter for the training and exchange of knowledge of the European judiciary:
https://www.ejtn.eu/en/
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
13
14
15
16
17
18
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Over the years, the Scoreboard methodology has been further developed and refined in close cooperation with the group
of Member States’ contact persons on national justice systems, particularly through a questionnaire (updated annually)
and by collecting data on certain aspects of the functioning of justice systems.
The availability of data, in particular for indicators on the efficiency of justice systems, continues to improve. This is because
many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial statistics. Where difficulties in gathering or
providing data persist, this is either due to insufficient statistical capacity, or because the national categories for which data are
collected do not correspond exactly to the ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases is the data gap due to a lack of
contributions from national authorities. The Commission continues to encourage Member States to further reduce this data gap.
How does the EU Justice Scoreboard feed into the European Semester
and how is it related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)?
The Scoreboard provides elements for assessing the efficiency, quality and independence of national justice systems. In
doing so, it aims to help Member States make their national justice systems more effective. By comparing information on
Member States’ justice systems, the Scoreboard makes it easier to identify best practice and shortcomings and to keep
track of challenges and progress made. In the context of the European Semester, country-specific assessments are carried
out through a bilateral dialogue with the national authorities and the stakeholders concerned. Where the shortcomings
identified have macroeconomic significance, the European Semester analysis may lead to the Commission’s proposing
to the Council to adopt country-specific recommendations to improve the national justice systems in individual Member
States (
19
). The RRF will make available more than EUR 670 billion in loans and non-repayable financial support, of which
each Member State would need to allocate a minimum of 20% to the digital transition. The RRF offers an opportunity
to address country-specific recommendations related to national justice systems and to accelerate national efforts to
complete the digital transformation of justice systems. Payments to Member States under the performance-based RRF are
contingent on the fulfilment of milestones and targets. In this context, the Commission therefore has to continuously assess
whether the Member States’ recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) are implemented satisfactorily in order to contribute to
effectively addressing all or a significant number of challenges identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations
or challenges identified in other relevant Commission documents adopted in the context of the European Semester (
20
).
Why are effective justice systems important for an investment-
friendly business environment?
Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have a positive economic impact, which is particularly relevant in the
context of the European Semester and the RRF. Where and when judicial systems guarantee the enforcement of rights,
creditors are more likely to lend, businesses have higher confidence and are dissuaded from opportunistic behaviour,
transaction costs are reduced and innovative businesses are more likely to invest. In fact, an effective justice system is vital
for sustained economic growth. It can improve the business climate, foster innovation, attract foreign direct investment,
secure tax revenues and support economic growth. The benefits of well-functioning national justice systems for the
economy are confirmed by a wide range of studies and academic literature, including from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) (
21
), the European Central Bank (ECB) (
22
), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (
23
), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (
24
), the World Economic Forum (
25
), and the World Bank (
26
).
19
In the context of the European Semester, the Council, on the basis of the Commission’s proposal, addressed country-specific recommendations on their justice systems to
seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK). The Commission also monitors judicial
reforms in BG and RO under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. There were no country-specific recommendations in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF processes.
Article 19(3)(b) and Article 24(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and
Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, November 2017,
Europe: Europe Hitting its Stride,
p. xviii, pp. 40, 70:
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/
eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en
ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d15997
99aa0e475e5624651
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and the Montaigne Centre for the Rule of Law and Administration of Justice of Utrecht University, ‘Economic value of the
judiciary – A pilot study for five countries on volume, value and duration of large commercial cases’, June 2021:
https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/
production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/Reports/Economic%20value%20of%20te%20judiciary%20-%20pilot%20study.pdf
See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’ OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18, June 2013 and ‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and
Empirics’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1060.
World Economic Forum, ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2019’, October 2019:
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019
World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp. 83, 140:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017
1. Introduction
3
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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A study has found that reducing the length of court proceedings by 1% (measured in disposition time (
27
)) may increase
the growth rate of the number of companies (
28
), and that a higher percentage – by 1% – of companies perceiving the
justice system as independent tends to be associated with higher firms’ turnover and greater productivity growth (
29
).
Another study has indicated there is a positive correlation between perceived judicial independence and foreign direct
investment flows (
30
).
Several surveys have also highlighted the importance of the effectiveness of national justice systems for companies.
For example, in one survey, 93% of large companies replied that they systematically and continuously review the rule
of law conditions (including court independence) in the countries they invest in (
31
). In another survey, over half of small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) replied that the cost and excessive length of judicial proceedings, respectively,
were the main reasons for not starting court proceedings over the infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) (
32
).
The Commission’s Communications on
Identifying and addressing barriers to the single market
(
33
) and the
Single market
enforcement action plan
(
34
) also provide insights into the importance of effective justice systems for the functioning of
the single market, in particular for businesses.
How does the Commission support the implementation of good
justice reforms through technical support?
Member States can draw on the Commission’s technical support available through the Directorate-General for Structural
Reform Support (DG REFORM) under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) (
35
), with a total budget of EUR 864.4 million
for 2021 to 2027. Since 2021, the TSI has been supporting projects directly linked to the effectiveness of justice, such as
the digitalisation of justice, reforms of judicial maps or better access to justice. The TSI also complements the measures
proposed by the Commission to address the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely the RRF, since it
can support Member States in the preparation and implementation of their recovery and resilience plans. The RRPs include
actions, among others, related to making justice more effective: digitalising justice, reducing backlogs, and improving the
management of courts and cases.
How does the Justice programme support the effectiveness of
justice systems?
With a total budget of EUR 305 million for the period 2021-2027, the Justice programme supports the further development
of the European area of Justice based on the rule of law including the independence, quality and efficiency of the justice
system, based on mutual recognition and mutual trust, and on judicial cooperation. In 2021, around EUR 45.3 million were
provided to fund projects and other activities under the three specific objectives of the programme:
EUR 12.2 million were provided to promote judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and to contribute to the
effective and coherent application and enforcement of EU instruments as well as to support to Member States for their
connection to the ECRIS-TCN system,
27
28
The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of a year multiplied by 365 (days). It is a standard
indicator developed by the Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ):
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp
Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, ‘The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States’, JRC Technical Report, EUR 28440 EN, Publications Office of the
EU, Luxembourg, 2017:
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_and_economic_development_across_eu_
member_states.pdf
Idem.
‘Effect of judicial independence on foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe and South Asia’, Bülent Dogru, 2012, MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive:
https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/40471/1/MPRA_paper_40322.pdf.
EU Member States included in the study were: BG, HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, RO, SK and SI.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Risk and Return – Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of Law’, 2015
http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf,
p. 22.
EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Intellectual Property (IP) SME Scoreboard 2016:
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/
documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-summary_en.pdf
COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Long term
action plan for better implementation and enforcement of single market rules,
COM(2020)94, in particular actions 4, 6 and 18.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en
The TSI regulation was adopted in March 2021. According to article 5 its aim is to support:
“….institutional reform and efficient and service-oriented functioning of public
administration and e-government, simplification of rules and procedures, auditing, enhancing capacity to absorb Union funds, promotion of administrative cooperation,
effective
rule of law, reform of the justice systems,
capacity building of competition and antitrust authorities, strengthening of financial supervision and reinforcement of the fight
against fraud, corruption and money laundering”
(emphasis added).
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
4
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0013.png
- The European Rule of Law Mechanism –
EUR 17.7 million were provided in support to training of justice professionals on EU civil, criminal and fundamental rights
law, legal systems of the Member States and the rule of law,
EUR 15.4 million were provided to support the development and use of digital tools in complementarity with the Digital
Europe Programme as well as the maintenance and extension of the e-Justice portal.
Why does the Commission monitor the digitalisation of national
justice systems?
Digitalisation of justice is the key to increasing the effectiveness of justice systems and a highly efficient tool for enhancing
and facilitating access to justice. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the forefront the need for Member States to
accelerate modernisation reforms in this area.
Since 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included certain comparative information on the digitalisation of justice across
the Member States, for example in the areas of online access to judgments or online claim submission and follow-up.
The Commission’s Communication on
Digitalisation of justice in the European Union – A toolbox of opportunities
(
36
),
adopted in December 2020, presents a strategy aimed at improving access to justice and the effectiveness of justice
systems using technology. As outlined in the Communication, a number of additional indicators were included in the EU
Justice Scoreboard as of 2021. The purpose is to ensure comprehensive and timely in-depth monitoring of progress areas
and challenges encountered by Member States in their efforts towards the digitalisation of their justice systems.
36
COM(2020) 710 final.
1. Introduction
5
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0015.png
2. Context:
Developments in justice reforms in 2021
In 2021, a large number of Member States continued their efforts to further improve the effectiveness of their justice systems.
Figure 1 presents an updated overview of adopted and planned measures across several areas of justice systems in Member
States engaged in reforming their justice systems.
Figure 1
Legislative and regulatory activity concerning justice systems in 2021
(adopted measures/initiatives under
negotiation in each Member State) (source: European Commission (
37
))
Adopted
25
Under negotiation
20
BE BG CZ Dk EL FR HR LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK SE
15
BG CZ IE ES HR IT CY LV LT LU NL PL PT RO SK FI SE
BE CZ EE EL ES FR LV LT HU MT PT RO SI SK
BE BG ES IT CY LV LT LU NL AT PL SK FI
BE CZ DK IE EL ES LV HU PT RO SK
BE EE IE FR HU NL AT PT RO SK
IE ES FR HR IT CY LU PL SI SK
EL FR LV LT MT NL PT RO SK
BG IE CY LT LU HU NL PL PT RO SI
10
BE BG LV HU MT AT PT RO SK
BG CZ IE FR HR IT LU HU NL PL RO SK
BG EL ES FR HR LV LT PL SK FI
BE BG FR NL AT PL PT RO
IE IT LV LT LU HU NL AT SK FI
DK FR NL PT RO SK
BG EE IE AT PL SI
BG HR LU HU RO
LV LU PT RO
FR HU MT RO
ES LT HU SI
FR LT PT
FR MT PT
0
Procedural
law
ADR
methods
Adminis-
tration
of courts
Council
for the
Judiciary
Re-
Court
Public
ICT in the
designing specialisa- prosecution
justice
of the
tion
service
system
judicial map
Use of AI
in the
justice
system
IE ES MT
Legal aid
Court fees
Judges
Prosecutors
Legal
professionals
Other
In 2021, procedural law continued to be an area of particular focus in many Member States, with a significant amount of ongoing
or planned legislative activity. Reforms concerning the status of judges and the rules for legal professionals also saw significant
activity. A number of Member States were in the process of introducing legislation for the use of information and communication
technologies (ICT) in their justice systems. The momentum from preceding years for measures concerning the administration of
courts continued in 2021. Some Member States are already actively using or planning to use artificial intelligence in their justice
systems. The overview confirms the observation that justice reforms require time – sometimes several years – from their an-
nouncement, until the adoption of the legislative and regulatory measures and their implementation on the ground.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also created new challenges that highlighted the importance of accelerating reforms to digitalise
the justice system. In this context, several Member States adopted new measures to ensure the regular functioning of courts,
while guaranteeing the continued and easy access to justice for all, in particular through the adaptation of procedural rules. The
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-Europe) developed a questionnaire
examining the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the professional activity of the supreme courts. Respondents included the
Supreme Administrative Courts and the Supreme Courts (members of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial
Courts of the EU (NPSJC)). Without examining the substantive measures taken to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, Figure 2
presents an updated overview of the changes to procedural law adopted by the Member States to facilitate judicial functions of
the courts, either through new legislation, Supreme Court rulings, court regulations or practices.
37
This information has been collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems for 26 Member States. DE explained that a number of judicial
reforms were under way, but that the scope and scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 federal states.
2. Context: Developments in justice reforms in 2021
7
LT PL RO SK FI
5
CZ ES FR MT NL PL PT RO
CZ EL FR LV HU PT RO SK
IE ES HR CY PL PT RO SK
ES HR LT MT PL SI SK
BE ES HR IT NL PT RO SK
ES FR HR IT CY LU NL
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0016.png
Figure 2
Changes in procedural rules in Supreme Courts due to COVID-19 pandemic
(source: ACA-Europe and NPSJC (
38
))
Form of judgments (e.g. short judgment, oral judgment)
Time limits for execution of court decisions
Special parts of the procedure (e.g. urgent measures)
Procedural deadlines
Other
Mandatory timeframes for deciding cases
Special matters (e.g. public procurement, welfare, regional
or municipal ordinance, safety, health)
Number of judges for deciding cases
Deadline for appeal
A
A
A
A
EXISTING PROCEDURAL LAWS MAINTAINED
EXISTING PROCEDURAL LAWS
MAINTAINED
DK
EE
IE
ES
HR
LV
LT
HU
MT
RO
SI
FI
SE
BE
A
A
A
A
A
NO
DATA
BG
CZ
DE
EL
FR
IT
CY
LU
NL
AT
PL
PT
SK
(*) The data covers the period between December 2020 and December 2021. For each Member State, the left column presents the practices in Supreme Courts, and the right column
presents the practices in Supreme Administrative Courts (column marked with letter ‘A’). The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the
original language.
BE:
Raad van State/Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) and Hof van Cassatie /Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court).
BG:
Върхове�½ адми�½истративе�½ съд (Supreme
Administrative Court).
CZ:
Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) and Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court).
DE:
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court).
EE:
Riikohus (Supreme Court).
IE:
Chúirt Uachtarach (Supreme Court).
EL:
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας (Council of State).
ES:
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court).
FR:
Conseil d’Etat
(Council of State), Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court).
HR:
Visoki upravni (Supreme Administrative Court).
IT:
Consiglio de Stato (Council of State).
CY:
Supreme Court.
LV:
Augstākā
tiesa (Supreme Court).
LT:
Vyriausiasis Administracinis Teismas (Supreme Administrative Court).
LU:
Cour administrative (Administrative Court) Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court).
HU:
Kúria (Supreme Court).
MT:
Court of Appeal.
NL:
Hoge Raad (Supreme Court), Centrale Raad van Beroep (highest administrative court in social cases), Raad van State (Council of
State).
AT:
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court), Personalsenat (special evaluation panel) of the superior court, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court).
PL:
Naczelny
Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court).
PT:
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Supreme Administrative Court.
RO:
Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Supreme Court).
SI:
Vrhovno sodišče (Supreme Court).
SK:
Najvyšší súd (Supreme Court).
FI:
Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Supreme Administrative Courtt).
SE:
Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme
Administrative Court). No data from:
BG:
Върхове�½ касацио�½е�½ съд (Supreme Court);
HR:
Vrhovni sud (Supreme Court);
IT:
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court);
SE:
Högsta domstolen (Supreme Court).
38
Two questionnaires have informed this chart, one from the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-Europe) and one
from the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC). For some Member States, there is only one column present in the chart. In these cases,
there is no Supreme Administrative Court, or no answers were provided to the survey sent to the NPSJC.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
8
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0017.png
3. Key findings
of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, for all three of which the Scoreboard
presents indicators.
3.1.
Efficiency of justice systems
The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, commercial and administrative
cases and in specific areas where administrative authorities and courts apply EU law (
39
).
The efficiency related indicators in 2020, in particular the number of incoming cases, clearance rate and disposition time, were
impacted by the specific circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic across the EU, which affected Member States in dif-
ferent ways (e.g. in terms of timing or severity) (
40
).
3.1.1. Developments in caseload
The caseload of national justice systems decreased in several Member States, compared to the previous year, while increasing or
remaining stable in others. Overall it continues to vary considerably between Member States (Figure 3). This is testament to how
important it is to remain attentive to caseload developments to ensure the effectiveness of justice systems.
Figure 3
Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (
41
))
2012
2018
2019
2020
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
N
O
D
A
T
A
DK AT PL
SI
EE HR LV SK CZ
FI
BE LT PT RO NL EL HU ES BG
IT
IE
SE CY MT LU FR DE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases,
other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases.
39
40
The enforcement of court decisions is also important for the efficiency of a justice system. However, comparable data are not available in most Member States.
In IT, the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. More details on the
individual Member States’ situation are presented in 2020 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States – country profiles, carried out by the CEPEJ
Secretariat for the Commission:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en.
2020 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat for the Commission:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
9
41
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0018.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Estimated length of proceedings –
Figure 4
Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/per 100
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
RO BE LT
IE
CZ HR ES PL PT SK EL
IT
FR LV
SI
DE MT EE HU LU AT NL DK SE
FI
NO
DATA
BG CY
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern
uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK.
Data for
NL
include non-litigious cases.
Figure 5
Number of incoming administrative cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source:
CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
SE DE NL LT AT
FI BG EL RO ES CY FR HR HU EE PT PL LU BE
SI CZ SK LV
NO
DATA
IT MT DK
IE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities.
DK
and
IE
do not record administrative
cases separately. Removal from judicial procedure of some administrative procedures occurred in
RO
in 2018. Methodology changes in
EL, SK and SE.
In
SE,
migration cases have
been included under administrative cases (retroactively applied for 2017).
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
The indicators on the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, commercial and administrative cases are: (i) estimated
length of proceedings (disposition time), (ii) clearance rate, and (iii) number of pending cases.
- Estimated length of proceedings –
The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, meaning the time taken by
the court to reach a decision at first instance. The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the
number of resolved cases at the end of a year multiplied by 365 (days) (
42
). It is a calculated quantity that indicates the estimated
minimum time that a court would need to resolve a case while maintaining the current working conditions. The higher the value,
the higher is the probability that it takes the court longer to reach a decision. Figures mostly concern proceedings at first instance
courts and compare, where available, data for 2012, 2018, 2019 and 2020 (
43
). Figures 8 and 10 show the disposition time in
42
43
Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_
en.asp
The years were chosen to keep the eight-year perspective with 2012 as a baseline, while at the same time not overcrowding the figures. Data for 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015,
2016 and 2017 are available in the CEPEJ report.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
10
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0019.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Estimated length of proceedings –
2020 in civil and commercial litigious cases, and administrative cases at all court instances, while Figure 24 shows the average
length of proceedings in money laundering cases at first instance courts.
Figure 6
Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2018 –
2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
NO DATA
0
DK EE LV AT LT
SI HU SK NL
FI BG PL HR SE LU CZ RO ES MT
IT
FR EL PT CY BE DE
IE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases,
other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in
SK.
Pending cases include all instances in
CZ
and, until 2016, in
SK. LV:
the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information system.
Figure 7
Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at first instance in 2012, 2018 –
2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
LT NL EE AT
SE LU CZ HU RO DK SK DE LV PT
FI
PL
SI
ES MT EL FR HR
IT
NO DATA
BE BG CY
IE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern
uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders. Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK.
Pending cases include all instances in
CZ
and, up to 2016, in
SK. IT:
the temporary
slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. Data for
NL
include non-litigious cases.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
11
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0020.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Estimated length of proceedings –
Figure 8
Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court instances in 2020 (*)
(1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)
First instance courts (2020)
Second instance courts (2020)
Third instance courts (2020)
1 800
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
AT SE CZ HU EE BG LV RO SK DK DE PT
FI
PL
SI LT NL LU BE HR FR MT ES
IT
NO DATA
IE
EL CY
(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are available for first and second instance courts in
BE
and
BG,
for
second instance courts in
NL,
for second and third instance courts in
AT
or for third instance courts in
DE
and
HR.
There is no third instance court in
DE
and
MT. IT:
The temporary
slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic affected the disposition time. Access to a third instance court may be limited in
some Member States.
Figure 9
Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
SE HU LT BG EE PL HR LV
FI NL CZ FR AT BE ES DE
SI LU EL SK RO PT
NO
DATA
IT CY MT DK
IE
(*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK.
Pending cases include courts of all instances in
CZ
and, until 2016, in
SK. DK
and
IE
do not record administrative cases separately.
CY:
in 2018, the number of resolved cases
increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative court was set up in 2015.
Figure 10
Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2020 (*)
(1
st
and, where
applicable, 2
nd
and 3
rd
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)
First instance (2020)
Second instance (2020)
Third instance (2020)
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
SE HU BG EE
FI
LT LV CZ FR AT BE DE
SI ES NL LU SK PL RO IT
PT MT HR EL CY
NO
DATA
IE DK
(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data available for second instance courts in
BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, RO, SI, SK
and
FI,
for third instance courts in
CY, LT, LU, MT
and
PL.
The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in
CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI
and
FI.
There is no third instance court
for these types of cases in
HR, LT, LU
and
MT.
The highest Administrative Court is the first and only instance for certain cases in
BE.
Access to third instance courts may be limited
in some Member States.
DK
and
IE
do not record administrative cases separately.ö
12
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0021.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Clearance rate –
- Clearance rate –
The clearance rate is the ratio of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases. It measures whether a court is
keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance rate is around 100% or higher, it means the judicial system is able to
resolve at least as many cases as come in. When the clearance rate is below 100%, it means that the courts are resolving fewer
cases than the number of incoming cases.
Figure 11
Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in % — values higher than 100 % indicate that more cases are resolved than come in, while values below 100 %
indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
SK
FI
PL HR
IT
SE EE BG DK AT LV
SI NL HU CZ BE LT RO PT LU FR MT ES CY EL
N
O
D
A
T
A
IE DE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases,
other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in
SK. IE:
the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due
to the methodology.
IT:
different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.
Figure 12
Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in %) (source:
CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
DK PL
IT
SE
SI HU RO EE AT SK NL BE DE CZ PT LV LT
FI
FR LU MT ES EL HR
NO
DATA
IE BG CY
(*) Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK. IE:
the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the methodology.
IT:
different classification of civil cases introduced
in 2013. Data for
NL
include non-litigious cases.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
13
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0022.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Pending cases –
Figure 13
Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
200%
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
EL
IT
PT AT CZ DE BE LV HR
SI MT SE BG ES
FI
NO
DATA
LT FR PL EE HU LU SK NL CY RO DK
IE
(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in 2018 = 219%;
IT
in 2012=279.8%); Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK. DK
and
IE
do not record administrative cases separately. In
CY
the number of resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and
an administrative court was set up in 2015.
- Pending cases –
The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the end of the year in question. It
also affects disposition time.
Figure 14
Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
LU SE LT BG HU LV NL EE MT DK
FI
FR RO SK CZ
ES
SI
IT
AT CY HR EL
PL PT BE DE
IE
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases,
other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in
SK.
Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in
CZ
and,
until 2016, in
SK. IT:
different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013.
NO DATA
14
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0023.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.2. General data on efficiency
- Pending cases –
Figure 15
Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1st instance/per 100
inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
6
5
4
3
2
1
NO DATA
0
FI
NL SE AT DK LU EE HU DE LV LT SK CZ
SI
PT MT PL FR ES RO EL
IT
HR BE BG
IE CY
(*) Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK.
Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in
CZ
and, until 2016, in
SK. IT:
different classification of civil cases introduced in
2013. Data for
NL
include non-litigious cases.
Figure 16
Number of pending administrative cases in 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source:
CEPEJ study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
LV MT PL EE HU CZ SK BG LT HR
SI BE LU
IT
FR
FI
NO
DATA
ES RO NL SE PT CY AT DE EL DK
IE
(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (EL in 2012 = 3.5). Methodology changes in
EL
and
SK.
Pending cases include cases before
courts of all instances in
CZ
and, until 2016, in
SK. DK
and
IE
do not record administrative cases separately.
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and presents the average length of proceedings
(
44
) in specific areas of EU law. The 2022 Scoreboard builds on previous data for competition, electronic communications, the
EU trademark, consumer law and anti-money laundering. The four areas have been selected because of their relevance for the
single market and the business environment. Moreover, this edition provides a broader overview of efficiency of administrative
authorities: two new figures on the areas of competition and electronic communications complement such data on consumer
protection. In general, long delays in judicial and administrative proceedings may have negative impacts on rights stemming from
EU law e.g. when appropriate remedies are no longer available or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. For business
in particular, administrative delays and uncertainty in some cases can lead to significant costs and undermine planned or existing
investments (
45
).
44
The length of proceedings in specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting from the day on which an action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment
became final) until the day on which the court adopted its decision (Figures 16-21). Values are ranked based on a weighted average of data for 2013 and 2018-2020 for
Figures 16-18, data for 2013, 2018, 2019 and 2020 for Figure 19, and data for 2014 and 2018-2020 for Figures 20 and 21. Where data was not available for all years, the
average reflects the available data, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or estimations.
Figure 18 of the Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and Policy Responses, 2019 the World Bank Group.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
15
45
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3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
– Competition –
– Competition –
The effective enforcement of competition law is essential for an attractive business environment as it ensures a level playing
field for businesses. It encourages enterprise and efficiency, creates a wider choice for consumers and helps reduce prices and
improve quality. Figure 17 presents the average length of cases against the decisions of national competition authorities applying
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (
46
). Figure 18 presents the average length
of proceedings before the national competition authorities when applying Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.
Figure 17
Competition: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source:
European Commission with the European Competition Network)
2013
2018
2019
2020
Average 2013, 2018-20
3 500
3 000
2 500
2 000
1 500
1 000
500
0
NO CASES
BG EE HR LU PT
FI
LT
BE SK
IT
LV NL FR EL CZ AT RO DK SE HU
SI DE ES CY
PL MT
(*)
IE
and
AT:
the scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions.
AT:
data include cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringe-
ment of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not based on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used for
IT.
An empty column can indicate
that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is low (below five a year) in many Member States. This can make the annual data dependent
on one exceptionally long or short case (e.g. This is the case with MT were there was only one case).
Figure 18
Competition: average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities in 2020 (*)
(in
days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)
2020
2 000
1 800
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
EE
NO CASES
IE HR LT MT FI NL DK IT
NO
DATA
PL LV ES AT SE SK DE FR CZ PT LU RO SI BE EL BG CY HU
(*) In some Member States the number of cases is limited.
BE:
Data includes one cartel decision – 1 045 days and five interim measures. Total average length of all six proceedings –
2 015 days.
IT:
Proceedings I833 – Gare Consip per acquisizione beni e servizi per informatica e telecomunicazioni – launched by the Italian Competition Authority under Article 101
TFEU, are not taken into account, because at the end of the proceedings it did not find any breaches of Article 101 TFEU. It must be taken into account that some Member States
count the days for the length of proceedings from different starting points. Most Member States consider a case open when the investigation is open. In the
NL,
the case is considered
open when the Statement of Objection is sent, while in
CZ
and
SK
a case is considered open when the administrative proceedings open. In the latter case, this is an intermediate
phase between the opening of the investigation and the sending of the Statement of Objection. There are also a number of factors to take into account when it comes to the length
of proceedings before the national competition authorities. These include the nature and complexity of the case, the time it takes to collect the economic data and the conclusion of
the economic analysis, the deadline extensions at the requests of the parties, and the repetition of hearings.
46
See
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN
and Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25, in particular Articles 3 and 5.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
16
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3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
– Electronic communications –
– Electronic communications –
The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to raise competition, to contribute to the development of the single
market and to generate investment, innovation and growth. The positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective
enforcement of this legislation which can lead to lower prices for end users and better quality services. Figure 19 presents the
average length of judicial review cases against the decisions of national regulatory authorities applying EU law on electronic com-
munications (
47
). It covers a broad range of cases, ranging from more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to more straightforward
consumer-focused issues. Figure 20 presents the average length of proceedings before the national regulatory authorities when
applying EU law.
Figure 19
Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in
days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee)
2013
2018
2019
2020
Average 2013, 2018-20
2 500
2 000
1 500
1 000
500
0
NO
CASES
LU RO EE LV BG DK
IE HU LT HR FR
SI SE NL PL BE EL ES DE AT SK CZ
IT
FI MT PT CY
(*)
The number of cases varies from one Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no cases for the year (except
PT
for 2019-20, and
RO
no data). In some instances, the limited number of relevant cases (BG,
CY, MT, NL, SK, FI, SE)
can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and
result in wide variations from one year to the next.
DK:
quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance appeals.
EE:
The average length of judicial review cases in 2013 was 18 days.
ES, AT,
and
PL:
different courts in charge depending on the subject matter.
Figure 20
Electronic communications: average length of proceedings before the National Regulatory Authority in
2015, 2018 – 2020
(in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee)
2015
2018
2019
2020
Average 2015, 2018-20
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
NO CASES
BE RO FR HU LV LU AT EE HR
SI
FI NL
IE
ES CY DK
IT
NO DATA
EL MT BG CZ DE LT PL PT SK SE
– EU trademark –
Effective enforcement of intellectual property rights is essential to stimulate investment in innovation. EU legislation on EU trade-
marks (
48
) gives the national courts a significant role to play, in acting as EU courts and taking decisions that affect the single
market. Figure 21 shows the average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation between private parties.
47
The calculation has been made based on the length of cases of appeal against national regulatory authority decisions applying national laws that implement the EU regulatory
framework for electronic communications (Directives 2002/19/EC (Access Directive), Directive 2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive),
Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), as well as other relevant EU law such as the radio spectrum policy programme and Commission spectrum decisions,
excluding Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications.
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trademark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99).
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
17
48
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2690179_0026.png
3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
– EU trademark –
– Consumer protection –
Figure 21
EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights)
2013
2018
2019
2020
Average 2013, 2018-20
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
AT MT PL HU LT BG RO ES DE LU PT LV SE
FI DK EL
IE CZ FR
SI
IT
NO DATA
EE HR SK BE CY NL
(*)
FR, IT, LT, LU:
a sample of cases used for data for certain years.
DK:
data from all trademark cases (not only EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no
data on average length due to changes in data collection system.
EL:
data based on weighted average length from two courts.
ES:
cases concerning other EU IP titles are included
in the calculation of average length.
– Consumer protection –
Effective enforcement of consumer law ensures that consumers benefit from their rights and that companies infringing consumer
laws do not gain an unfair advantage. Consumer protection authorities and courts play a key role in enforcing EU consumer law
(
49
) within the various national enforcement systems. Figure 22 illustrates the average length of judicial review cases against
decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.
For consumers or companies, effective enforcement can involve a chain of actors, not only courts but also administrative au-
thorities. To shed more light on this enforcement chain, the length of proceedings by consumer authorities is presented. Figure
23 shows the average length of time it took for administrative decisions by national consumer protection authorities in 2014,
2018-2020 from the moment a case is opened. Relevant decisions include declaring infringements of substantive rules, interim
measures, cease and desist orders, initiation of court proceedings or case closure.
Figure 22
Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1st instance/in days)
(source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network)
2013
2018
2019
2020
Average 2013, 2018, 2019, 2020
2 000
1 800
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
SE HU
LT
EE
HR
PT
BG
ES
RO DK
NL
SK
SI
LV
FI
IT
FR
CZ
PL
CY
EL
IE
BE MT
NO DATA
(*)
DE, LU, AT:
scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2020
is low (fewer than five) in
IE
and
FI.
An estimate of average length was provided by
EL
and
RO
for certain years.
49
Figures 22 and 23 relate to the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC), the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) and the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
18
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3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
– Consumer protection –
– Money laundering –
Figure 23
Consumer protection: average length of administrative decisions by consumer protection authorities
in 2014, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation
Network)
2014
2018
2019
2020
Average 2014, 2018, 2019, 2020
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
HR
RO
FR
LT
BG
EE
SI
SK
CZ
IE
PT
SE
IT
CY
DK
EL
LV
HU
NL
FI
ES
PL
NO DATA
BE MT
(*)
DE, LU, AT:
scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average length was
provided by
DK, EL, FR, RO
and
FI
for certain years.
– Money laundering –
In addition to contributing to the fight against crime, the effectiveness of the fight against money laundering is crucial for the
soundness, integrity and stability of the financial sector, confidence in the financial system and fair competition in the single mar-
ket (
50
). Money laundering can discourage foreign investment, distort international capital flows and negatively affect a country’s
macroeconomic performance, resulting in welfare losses, thereby draining resources from more productive economic activities
(
51
). The Anti-money Laundering Directive requires Member States to maintain statistics on the effectiveness of their systems to
combat money laundering or terrorist financing (
52
). In cooperation with Member States, an updated questionnaire was used to
collect data on the judicial stages in national anti-money laundering regimes. Figure 24 shows the average length of first instance
court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences.
Figure 24
Money laundering: average length of court cases in 2014, 2018 – 2020(*)
(1
st
instance/in days) (source:
European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)
2014
2018
2019
2020
Average 2014, 2018-20
2 400
2 100
1 800
1 500
1 200
900
600
300
0
DK EE SE LU HR BG CY PL
FI AT NL EL FR
IE CZ HU LV PT ES LT
NO DATA
IT SK* RO SI MT BE DE
(*) No data for 2020:
BE, DE, EE, IE, HR, PL and PT. BG:
The average length of the cases is calculated from the day of opening the court case to the day of the court decision in
months.
ES, NL:
estimated length.
CZ:
Length in months.
HU:
Average number of days was calculated based only on the number of cases resolved with a conviction.
PT:
Average
number of days was calculated based on a sample.
IT:
data refer to both trial and preliminary court hearings.
CY:
Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average tried within
a year. Less serious offences, before the District Courts, take longer to be tried.
SK*:
data correspond to average length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court.
50
51
52
Recital 2 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of
money laundering or terrorist financing.
IMF factsheet, March 8, 2018:
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism
Article 44(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. See also revised Article 44 of Directive (EU) 2018/843, which entered into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member
States by January 2020.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
19
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3.1. Efficiency of justice systems
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems
General data on efficiency
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems
An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions without undue
delay. The main indicators used by the EU Justice Scoreboard to monitor the efficiency of justice systems are
therefore the
length of proceedings
(estimated or average time in days needed to resolve a case), the
clearance
rate
(the ratio of the number of resolved cases to the number of incoming cases) and the number of
pending
cases
(that remains to be dealt with at the end of the year).
General data on efficiency
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning eight years (2012-2020). This time-span
allows to identify certain trends and to take into account that it often takes time for the effect of justice reforms
to be felt.
Looking at the available data since 2012 and until 2020, in civil, commercial and administrative cases, the trends
were in most cases positive. However, in 2020, for some Member States the general data on efficiency show
a negative impact on efficiency. It is possible that it was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore is of
temporary nature.
Some positive developments can be observed in the Member States that have been considered, in the context of
the European Semester, to be facing specific challenges (
53
):
Since 2012, and based on the existing data for these Member States, and despite the COVID-19 pandemic, in
some Member States, the
length of first instance court proceedings
in the broad ‘all cases’ category (Figure
6) and the ‘litigious civil and commercial cases’ category (Figure 7) continued to decrease or remained stable.
In about half of the Member States concerned, the same two Figures 6 and 7 show an increase in the length of
proceedings, sometimes above 2012 levels. In administrative cases (Figure 9), the length of proceedings since
2012 has decreased or remained stable in about half of these Member States. Overall, about half of the Member
States saw an increase in the length of proceedings in administrative cases in 2020.
The Scoreboard presents data on the
length of proceedings in all court instances
for litigious civil and com-
mercial cases (Figure 8) and administrative cases (Figure 10). Data show that in a number of Member States
identified as facing challenges with the length of proceedings in first instance courts, higher instance courts per-
form in a more efficient manner. However, for some other Member States facing challenges, the average length
of proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts.
In the broad ‘all cases’ and the litigious civil and commercial cases’ categories (Figures 11 and 12), the overall
number of Member States whose
clearance rate
is more than 100% has decreased since last year, going back
closer to 2012 levels. In 2020, despite the decrease, the most Member States, including most of those facing
challenges, reported a high clearance rate (more than 97%). This means that courts are generally able to deal
with the incoming cases in these categories. In administrative cases (Figure 13), a bigger difference in the clear-
ance rate can be observed from one year to the next. While it generally remains lower than in other categories of
cases, some Member States continue to make good progress. In particular, more than half of the Member States
facing challenges report an increase in the clearance rate in administrative cases since 2012.
Since 2012, the situation remains stable or continues to improve in almost all Member States facing the most
substantial challenges with their
backlogs,
regardless of the category of cases. In 2020, despite the increase in
the number of pending cases in some Member States, in others substantial progress in reducing the number of
pending cases has been made in both litigious civil and commercial cases (Figure 15) and administrative cases
(Figure 16). However, significant differences remain between Member States with comparatively few pending
cases and those with a high number of pending cases.
53
HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK who received 2020 European Semester country-specific recommendations, and BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, RO, and SI, for whom the challenges
have been reflected in the recitals of their 2020 country-specific recommendations and country reports.
Differences in the results over the eight years analysed may be explained by contextual factors (differences of more than 10% in the number of incoming cases
are not unusual) or systemic deficiencies (lack of flexibility and responsiveness or inconsistencies in the reform process).
20
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems
Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
Efficiency in specific areas of EU law
Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 17-24) provide an insight into the
functioning of justice systems in concrete types of business-related disputes.
Data on efficiency in specific areas of EU law are collected based on narrowly defined scenarios, so the number of
relevant cases may appear low. However, compared to the calculated length of proceedings presented in the general
data on efficiency, these figures provide for an actual average length of all relevant cases in specific areas in a year.
It is therefore worth noting that several Member States that do not appear to be facing challenges based on general
data on efficiency report significantly longer average length of cases in specific areas of EU law. At the same time,
the length of proceedings in different specific areas may also vary considerably in the same Member State.
Finally, the new figures that focus on the length of administrative proceedings before the national competition
authorities and national regulatory authorities dealing with electronic communications provide insights
into administrative efficiency in more areas of EU law. Efficiency of the overall enforcement chain, including
administrative and judicial proceedings, contributes to a positive business and investment environment, by ensuring
timely resolution of cases and enforcement of rights
The figures for specific areas of EU law show the following trends:
For
judicial review of competition cases
(Figure 17), as the overall caseload faced by courts across Member
States increased, the length of judicial review decreased or remained stable in six Member States, while it in-
creased in five other Member States. Despite the slightly positive trend, three Member States reported an aver-
age length exceeding 1 000 days in 2020. For
proceedings before the national competition authorities,
10 Member States reported that proceedings took less than 1 000 days. Some Member States, who experience
issues with efficiency in the judicial review of competition cases, are among the more efficient when it comes to
proceedings before the national competition authorities.
For
electronic communications
(Figure 19), the case-loads faced by courts decreased compared to previous
years, continuing the positive trend regarding increased length of proceedings observed in 2019. In 2020, most
Member States registered a decrease in the average lengths of proceedings or figures remained stable, compared
to 2019, with only few showing an increase. The new figure on the
efficiency of national regulatory authori-
ties dealing with electronic communications
(Figure 20) shows that in some Member States, the average
length of proceedings is fairly stable but overall there is no clear trend over the years for which data are available.
For
EU trademark infringement cases
(Figure 21), in 2020 the overall caseload decreased. However, while
some Member States managed to cope better with their caseload, registering decreased or stable lengths of
proceedings, six others saw a clear increase in the average length of proceedings.
The possible combined effect of the enforcement chain consisting of both administrative and judicial review pro-
ceedings is presented in the area of
EU consumer law
(Figures 22 and 23). In 2020, six Member States reported
that their consumer protection authorities took on average less than 3 months to issue a decision in a case covered
by EU consumer law, while in six other Member States they took more than 6 months. Where the decisions of the
consumer protection authorities were challenged in court, in 2020 the trends in the length of the judicial review of
an administrative decision diverged, with increases in eight, and decreases in four other, Member States compared
to 2019. In two Member States the average length of a judicial review remains at over 1 000 days.
The effective fight against
money laundering
is crucial for protecting the financial system, ensuring fair competi-
tion and preventing negative economic consequences. Challenges in the length of court proceedings when dealing
with money laundering offences may influence the effective fight against money laundering. Figure 24 presents
updated data on the length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences. It shows that while in
more than half of Member States first instance court proceedings take up to a year on average, they take around
2 years on average in several Member States (
54
).
54
Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law will eliminate legal
obstacles that may delay prosecution, such as that prosecution for money laundering can only start when the proceedings for the underlying predicate offence have
been concluded. Member States had to transpose the Directive before 8 December 2020.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
21
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3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –
3.2.
Quality of justice systems
There is no single way of measuring the quality of justice systems. The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard continues to examine factors
that are generally accepted as relevant for improving the quality of justice. They fall into four categories:
1) accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses;
2) adequate financial and human resources;
3) putting in place of assessment tools;
4) digitalisation.
3.2.1. Accessibility
Accessibility is required throughout the whole justice chain to enable people to obtain relevant information – about the justice
system, about how to initiate a claim and the related financial aspects, about the state of play of proceedings up until their end –
and to access the judgment online.
– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –
The cost of litigation is a key factor that determines access to justice. High litigation costs, including court fees (
55
) and legal fees
(
56
), may hinder access to justice. Litigation costs in civil and commercial matters are not harmonised at EU level. Governed by
national legislation, they vary from one Member State to another.
Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (
57
). It allows access to justice
to people who would not otherwise be able to bear or advance the costs of litigation. Most Member States grant legal aid based
on the applicant’s income (
58
).
Figure 25 shows the availability of full or partial legal aid in a specific consumer case involving a claim of EUR 6 000. It compares
the income thresholds for granting legal aid, expressed as a percentage of the Eurostat poverty threshold for each Member State
(
59
). For example, if the threshold for legal aid appears to be at 20%, it means that an applicant with an income 20% higher than
the Eurostat poverty threshold for their Member State will still be eligible for legal aid. However, if the threshold for legal aid
appears to be below 0, this means that a person with an income below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid.
Some Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for 100% coverage of the costs linked to litigation (full legal aid),
complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal aid), the latter applying eligibility criteria different from that of
the former. Other Member States operate only a full or partial legal aid system.
55
56
57
58
Court fees are understood as an amount to be paid to initiate non-criminal legal proceedings in a court or tribunal.
Legal fees are the bill for services provided by lawyers to their clients.
Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
Member States use different methods to establish the eligibility threshold, e.g. different reference periods (monthly/annual income). About half of the Member States also
have a threshold tied to the applicant’s personal capital. This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LT, LU, NL and PT, certain groups of people
(e.g. individuals who receive certain benefits) are automatically entitled to receive legal aid in civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use, such
as the merit of the case, are not reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, in several Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, IT, NL, PL, SI) legal aid is not
limited to natural persons.
To collect comparable data, each Member State’s Eurostat poverty threshold has been converted to a monthly income. The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold is set at 60 %
of the national median equivalised disposable household income. European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, Eurostat table ilc_li01,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
databrowser/view/ilc_li01/default/table?lang=en
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
59
22
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2690179_0031.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –
Figure 25
Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2021 (*)
(differences in % from Eurostat poverty
threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (
60
))
Full legal aid
Partial legal aid
150%
110%
90%
70%
50%
30%
10%
0%
-10%
-30%
-50%
-70%
NO LEGAL AID IN SCENARIO
130%
COURT
DISCRETION
DK ES EL IT DE BE LV LT NL SE IE SI MT BG LU FI
SK FR HR RO HU CZ AT PL EE CY PT
(*)
EE:
decision to grant legal aid is not based on the level of the applicant’s financial resources.
IE:
legal aid has to also take into account the applicant’s disposable assets.
CY:
2020 data.
MT:
2020 data.
LV:
thresholds vary by municipality; the chart shows the upper limit.
PT:
the granting of legal aid is a decision taken by the public administration (P.A. in
the figure), with the Social Security Ministry assessing the applicant’s financial conditions under the law.
RO:
2020 data.
Most Member States require parties to pay a court fee when starting judicial proceedings. Recipients of legal aid are often exempt
from paying court fees. Only in Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia are recipients of legal aid not au-
tomatically exempt from paying court fees. In Czechia, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether or not to exempt a legal
aid recipient from paying court fees. In Luxembourg, litigants who benefit from legal aid do not have to pay bailiff fees. Figure
26 compares, for two scenarios, the amount of the court fee presented as a proportion of the value of the claim. If, for example,
in the figure below the court fee appears to be 10% of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court fee to
start judicial proceedings. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold for each Member State.
Figure 26
Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2021 (*) (amount
of court fee as
a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe
(CCBE) (
61
))
Court fee for a €6000 claim (in %)
Court fee for a low value claim (*) (in %)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
N
O
N
E
FR BE
IT MT SK LT
IE DK LU NL SE CZ AT PL
SI HU EL LV DE EE HR
NO DATA
FI CY BG RO ES PT
(*) ‘Low value claim’ is a claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2019, this value ranged
from EUR 193 in
RO
to EUR 1 824 in
LU). ES, PT:
no data provided.
BG, RO:
2020 data for court fee for a EUR 6 000 claim. No information on court fees for a low value claim was
provided.
CY:
2020 data.
LU:
Litigants have to pay bailiff fees to start proceedings as a plaintiff unless they benefit from legal aid.
MT:
2020 data.
NL:
Court fees for income < EUR
2 383/month.
AT:
The maximum amount of the court fee depends on the court’s instance.
SE:
Court fees differ in civil matters depending on the type of case. For disputes where
the value of the claim is < EUR 2 339, the court fee is EUR 88. In cases where the value of the claim is > EUR 2 339, the court fee is EUR 275. For other types of claims there are
other court fees.
60
2021 data collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute
of a consumer with a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold for each Member State). Given that conditions for legal
aid depend on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old employed applicant without any dependant or legal expenses insurance, with
a regular income and a rented apartment.
The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2020, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire
based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP threshold
for each Member State).
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
23
61
P.A DISCRETION
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2690179_0032.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees –
Efficient contract enforcement is essential for the economy. The likelihood of recovering the actual costs of litigation strengthens
the position of a creditor seeking to enforce a contract. Typically, the creditor, as plaintiff, is required to pay a court fee for filing
a case with the court. The courts generally order the defendant who loses to reimburse in full the court fees advanced by the
plaintiff who has won. Figure 27 shows the amount of the court fee required to start judicial proceedings in a specific commercial
case concerning a dispute between two companies in cross-border commercial litigation on enforcing a contract, with a claim
value of EUR 20 000.
Figure 27
Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific commercial case, 2021 (*)
(in EUR) (source: European
Commission with the CCBE (
62
))
1 200
1 100
1 000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
N
O
N
E
N
O
D
A
T
A
IE
ES CY RO DK IT HR SE EL
SI
FI MT LT AT EE BG LV CZ PL NL DE HU SK PT
FR LU BE
(*)
CY, LU, MT, PL, RO:
2020 data.
EL, ES:
Recovery of court fees is decided on a case-by-case basis.
HU:
There is no full recovery of court fees by the winning party.
It is common for the creditor to advance their own lawyer’s fees not only for the litigious phase but also during the pre-litigious
phase. On reimbursement, most Member States apply the rule according to which the losing party is expected to bear not only
their own legal costs, but also those of the winning party. This rule deters the filing of cases where there is a low probability of
winning, but encourages the filing of cases where there is a high probability of winning. Figure 28 shows the amount the court
would award to the successful plaintiff in a specific commercial case scenario (footnote 62).
Three main fee systems can be distinguished:
(1) in Member States with a statutory fee system, the reimbursement of legal fees depends on the level of the statutory fee for
the work carried out by the lawyer, which varies significantly from one Member State to another;
(2) in Member States without a statutory fee system, there is either full (Portugal, Finland) or partial (Latvia, Luxembourg) reim-
bursement of legal fees;
(3) in a number of Member States the issue of reimbursement is decided by the court on a case-by-case basis.
62
The data have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the scenario described above. CCBE
members were asked to provide information on the payable court fee to file the action in the case in the scenario.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0033.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods –
Figure 28
Recoverability of legal fees in a commercial trial, 2021 (*) (in EUR)
(source: European Commission with the
Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (
63
))
Amount of legal fee recovered by the winning party for legal services in the litgious phase
3 500
3 250
3 000
2 750
2 500
2 250
2 000
1 750
1 500
1 250
1 000
750
500
250
0
Statutory fee system
No statutory fee system
FULL
RECOVERY
OF LEGAL
PARTIAL
FEE BY
RECOVERY
WINNING
OF LEGAL
PARTY
FEE BY
WINNING
PARTY
COURT'S DISCRETION
N
O
D
A
T
A
AT NL CZ CY SK HR EL
SI DE MT PT
FI LV LU BE DK EE
IE
ES FR
IT
LT HU PL RO SE BG
(*) For this figure, legal fees do not include clerical costs and VAT, if payable. The hypothetical legal fee for the litigious phase provided for in the scenario is EUR 1 650. Full recovery in systems
without a statutory fee means that this amount (EUR 1 650) can be recovered. Member States with partial recovery (LV, LU) are sorted by order of the recoverable legal fee (highest to lowest,
with amounts ranging from EUR 2 200 to EUR 660). The figure does not include information on the recoverability of legal fees for the pre-litigious phase, because this is not envisaged in all
Member States.
IT:
there is a statutory fee in IT (EUR 3 235 in the scenario), but the court can decide on reimbursement within a set range.
LT:
the court decides, taking into account guidance
from the Ministry of Justice. The maximum amount in the scenario would be EUR 3 350.
HU:
There are two scenarios: the court could order a full recovery of legal fees by the winning party,
based on the legal fee arrangement between the lawyer and the client; the court could take into account the statutory legal fee system and order only a partial recovery of legal fees by the
winning party, despite the arrangement between the lawyer and the client.
MT:
there is no concept of an hourly legal fee in MT, reimbursement is determined based on the value of the claim.
AT:
scenario not fully applicable to AT’s system of reimbursement.
PL:
The minimum amount of fees is determined by law and they are dependent on the value of the subject matter of the
dispute. The court could decide to wave the fee or to order payment of the minimum fee (in case the fee is increased due to specific circumstances as set out in the relevant legislation).
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods –
Figure 29 shows Member States’ efforts to promote the voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods with specific
incentives. These may vary depending on the area of law (
64
).
Figure 29
Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
65
))
Civil and commercial disputes
Labour disputes
Consumer disputes
Administrative disputes
68
64
60
56
52
48
44
40
36
32
28
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
LT DE HU DK ES PL LV
PT NL EE FR AT CZ BG SE LU MT
SI SK BE
FI
IT
RO EL
IE HR CY
(*) Maximum possible: 68 points. Aggregated indicators based on the following indicators: 1) website providing information on ADR; 2) media publicity campaigns; 3) brochures for
the general public; 4) provision by the court of specific information sessions on ADR upon request; 5) court ADR/mediation coordinator; 6) publication of evaluations on the use of
ADR; 7) publication of statistics on the use of ADR; 8) partial or full coverage by legal aid of costs ADR incurred; 9) full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is
successful; 10) no requirement for a lawyer for ADR procedures; 11) judge can act as a mediator; 12) agreement reached by the parties becomes enforceable by the court; 13) pos-
sibility to initiate proceedings/file a claim and submit documentary evidence online; 14) parties can be informed of the initiation and different steps of procedures electronically; 15)
possibility of online payment of applicable fees; 16) use of technology (artificial intelligence applications, chat bots) to facilitate the submission and resolution of disputes; and 17)
other means. For each of these 17 indicators, one point was awarded for each area of law.
IE:
administrative cases fall into the category of civil and commercial cases.
EL:
ADR exists
in public procurement procedures before administrative courts of appeal.
ES:
ADR is mandatory in labour law cases.
PT:
for civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in
the case of justices for peace.
SK:
the Slovak legal order does not support the use of ADR for administrative purposes.
FI:
consumer and labour disputes are also considered to be civil
cases.
SE:
judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute settlement is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.
63
The data have been collected using replies from CCBE members to a questionnaire based on the same scenario as for Figure 27 (footnote 62). The following scenario was
used as a basis for calculating the legal fees: the company seeking to enforce the contract contracted a specialised and experienced lawyer. The lawyer did the following work:
in the pre-litigious phase: 3 hours of work, with one document produced for an hourly legal fee of EUR 200 (overall EUR 600); phase: 11 hours of work, with 3 documents
produced and 2 court hearings for an hourly legal fee of EUR 200 net (overall EUR 2 200). CCBE members were asked to provide information on a) the statutory fee for the
work in the (pre-)litigious phase, if existing and b) the amount of the legal fee that the court would reasonably order the losing party to reimburse. (The hypothetical hourly
legal fee has been changed compared to the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, with the result that the answers are not comparable).
The methods for promoting and incentivising the use of ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to use ADR before going to court, as such requirements raise concerns
about their compatibility with the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
25
64
65
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2690179_0034.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Specific arrangements for access to justice of persons with disabilities –
– Specific arrangements for access to justice of persons with disabilities –
As Parties to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (
66
), the EU and all its Member States are obliged to ensure
persons with disabilities have effective equal access to justice by ensuring appropriate accommodation with the aim to equality and
non-discrimination. State parties should also provide accessibility, including communication and information as well as reaffirm their
right to equal recognition before the law. Figure 30 shows selected specific arrangements in this regard, such as the availability of
information in accessible formats, the availability upon request of specific formats, or the accessibility for people with disabilities of
digital solutions for civil and commercial cases, administrative cases and criminal cases before first instance courts.
Figure 30
Specific arrangements for access to justice of persons with disabilities, 2021
(source: European
Commission (
67
))
Adjusted ADR procedures
2020 court survey on needs and satisfaction of persons with disabilities
Persons with disabilities can be listened to in person and express their will
Procedural accommodations
Accessible digital solutions at first instance courts
Braille/Sign Language/Easy to Read and other specific formats available upon request
Information in accessible formats (e.g. digital and paper)
BG DE LV AT BE
IE
LT
PL
SK ES NL
SI
SE CZ DK EE HR HU
FI
CY LU MT PT
EL
FR
IT
RO
– Judicial control over public administration in business-related scenarios –
For the first time, the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard provides an overview of selected legal safeguards regarding acts or omissions
of administrative authorities in business-related scenarios
68
. Relevant safeguards include the court review of administrative
decisions and interim measures, or possibility for financial compensation in the case of administrative silence or an ill-founded
decision. All of these contribute to the quality of the justice system, of particular relevance for the business and investment en-
vironment and the functioning of the single market.
66
67
68
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
In the first scenario, during the court proceedings related to the expropriation, the authorities order a mining company to cease mining with immediate effect; they rely on
earlier complaints made by house owners in the neighbouring village, already settled by the mining company. The company would incur a daily profit loss of EUR 8 000 if it
complied with the administrative decision. The company challenges the administrative decision in court, which eventually overturns the decision as ill-founded. In the second
scenario, a company established in Member State ‘B’ files with the competent authority in Member State ‘A’ a request for permission to build an 800 square meters retail store
in the capital city of Member State ‘A’. The company does not receive any reply from the authority in question within the statutory time limit/within what seems a reasonable
time to reply (period of administrative silence). Finally, the figure examines whether the company can seek financial compensation for the losses it incurred because of the
delay (the period of administrative silence) in granting the building permit (assuming that the building permit is finally granted) from the competent authority.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
26
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2690179_0035.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.1. Accessibility
– Child-friendly justice –
Figure 31
Legal safeguards regarding decisions or inaction of administrative authorities, 2021 (*)
(source:
European Commission (
69
))
Administrative silence means tacit refusal
Administrative silence
means tacit approval
Possibility of financial compensation in case
o damage caused by administrative silence
Court may stay the enforcement of an
administrative decision by interim measure
Possibility of financial compensation in
case of damage caused by administrative
decision that was eventually overturned by
the court as ill-founded
IT FR BE BG EL ES LU SI CZ DE EE HR CY LV LT HU NL AT PL PT RO SK SE FI DK IE MT
Court can order an authority to deal with a case of silence
– Child-friendly justice –
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard deepens the analysis of child friendly-justice compared to previous editions. Figure 32 shows
the various arrangements in Member States that make a justice system more suited to the needs of children. Figure 33 looks at
specific arrangements available when a child is involved as a victim or as a suspect/accused person.
Figure 32
Specific arrangements for child-friendly proceedings, 2021 (*)
(Civil and criminal/juvenile justice and
administrative proceedings), (source: European Commission (
70
))
Measures are in place to provide for a specific treatment of children who are deprived of liberty
Children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings have the right to legal aid
Training for judges on child-friendly and child-rights based communication with children
Evaluation of such treatment is covered by court surveys addressed to court users
Children are treated in an appropriate manner which takes into account their specific needs and rights
Specifically child-friendly designed website to provide online information about the justice system
BG DE EL LV HU EE
LT
PL DK ES FR HR
IT
AT
FI
BE
IE
NL
SI
SE CZ LU
PT RO SK CY MT
(*) Children: persons under 18 years of age. Data for MT on training for judges are for 2020.
69
70
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the European Judicial Training Network.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
27
NO DATA
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3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.2. Resources
– Financial resources –
Figure 33
Specific arrangements for child-friendly proceedings with children involved as victims or suspects or as
accused persons, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
71
))
For each Member State, the two columns represent the involvement of children as (from le to right):
1. victims
2. suspects or accused persons
Audio-visual recording of questioning of children
Children are heard in child-friendly specialised settings and may effectively participate in the hearing
Children are provided with child-friendly information about their rights and the proceedings
Children are assisted by a lawyer (always or where necessary)
BE BG CZ DE EE ES HR LT LU HU AT RO SK SE IE FR IT
(*) Children: persons under 18 years of age.
PL PT DK LV NL SI EL CY MT FI
3.2.2. Resources
Sufficient resources, including the necessary investments in physical and technical infrastructure, and well qualified, trained and
adequately paid staff of all kinds, are necessary for the justice system to work properly. Without adequate facilities, tools or staff
with the required qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality of proceedings and decisions is undermined.
– Financial resources –
The figures below show the actual government expenditure on the operation of the justice system (excluding prisons), both per
inhabitant (Figure 34) and as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 35).
Figure 34
General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(source: Eurostat)
2012
2018
2019
2020
250
200
150
100
50
0
LU DE
IE NL SE AT
SI BE
FI
IT
ES DK MT FR PL LV PT CZ EE BG HR EL HU SK RO LT CY
(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2020 (from highest to lowest). The following data are provisional: DE (2018-2020), ES (2020), FR (2019-2020), IT
(2020) and PT (2020).
71
28
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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2690179_0037.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.2. Resources
– Human resources –
Figure 35
General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(source: Eurostat)
2012
2018
2019
2020
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0,0
BG PL HR
SI LV RO HU EL DE ES PT MT
IT
CZ SK EE NL AT SE LT BE FR
FI
LU
IE DK CY
(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2020 (from highest to lowest). The following data are provisional: DE (2018-2020), ES (2020), FR (2019-2020), IT
(2020) and PT (2020).
– Human resources –
Adequate human resources are essential for the quality of a justice system. Diversity among judges, including gender balance,
adds complementary knowledge, skills and experience and reflects the reality of society.
Figure 36
Number of judges, 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe’s European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
SI HR LU EL BG LV AT HU CZ LT
PL DE RO SK
FI
PT EE NL CY BE
IT
SE ES FR MT DK
IE
(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, in accordance with the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member
States.
AT:
data on administrative justice have been part of the data since 2016.
EL:
since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and
civil justice as well as administrative judges.
IT:
Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has
been taken into account since 2018.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
29
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0038.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.2. Resources
– Training –
Figure 37
Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2019 – 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
72
))
2019
2020
2021
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
RO BG LV HU FR SK LU
SI NL AT LT DE
IT
BE HR PT EL SE CY
FI
EE
IE DK PL MT ES CZ
(*) The data are sorted by 2020 values, from the highest to the lowest.
MT:
No women on the highest court in 2019 and 2020.
Figure 38
Number of lawyers, 2012, 2018 – 2020 (*)
(per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council of Europe’s European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study)
2012
2018
2019
2020
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
LU CY EL
IT MT PT ES
IE BG DE BE PL HU RO HR DK SK CZ FR NL
SI EE LT AT
FI LV SE
(*) In accordance with the CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised by national law to plead and act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of
law; to appear before the courts or advise and represent their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the
freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer).
DE:
no distinction is made between different groups of lawyers in Germany, such as between solicitors or barristers.
FI:
since 2015,
the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector.
– Training –
Judicial training makes an important contribution to the quality of judicial decisions and the justice service delivered to citizens.
The data set out below cover judicial training in a broad range of areas, including communication with parties and the press and
judicial skills.
72
30
European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender Statistics Database:
https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt/datatable
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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2690179_0039.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.3. Assessment tools
Figure 39
Availability of training in communication for judges, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
73
))
On the use of social media and/or communication with the media.
On awareness raising and dealing with disinformation campaigns in new media (social media)
On communication with victims of domestic violence
On communication with victims of gender based violence
On communication with asylum seekers
On communication with visually or hearing impaired persons
On communication with LGBTIQ people
Communication with persons of different cultural, religious, ethnic or linguistic background
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
CZ DE FR AT PT BG IT
ES BE PL NL EL HR FI
DK EE
IE
MT LV RO LT LU SK CY SI
N
O
N
E
SE HU
(*) Maximum possible: 16 points. Member States were given 1 point if they have initial training and 1 point if they have continuous training (maximum of 2 points for each type of
training).
MT:
2020 data.
3.2.3. Assessment tools
Regular evaluation could make the justice system more responsive to current and future challenges, thereby improving its qual-
ity. Surveys (Figure 40) are essential for assessing how justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals and
court users.
Figure 40
Topics of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals, 2019 (*)
(source: European
Commission (
74
))
Accessibility of the court service
The conduct of the hearing
Needs and satisfaction of non-native speakers
General level of trust in the justice system
Other
Customer service of the court
The judgment/decision of the court
Needs and satisfaction of visually/hearing impaired
Awareness of rights
NO SURVEYS IN 2020
BG LT LV
PT DK HU
SI
SE FR RO ES PL BE CZ DE EE
IE
EL HR
IT
CY LU MT NL AT SK
FI
(*) Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of whether the survey was conducted at national, regional or court level. ‘Other topics’ include a survey
among litigants about their opinion on the new ways of improving the quality of customer service in the courts and the accessibility of the courts service (FR), a survey among judges
on topics such as the general situation of the justice system, their function and judicial independence (ES), assistance provided to crime victims (PL), general aspects of courts and
their functioning, access to information about courts, court facilities, judge responsible for the process, resources, loyalty (PT).
3.2.4. Digitalisation
The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) can strengthen the Member States’ justice systems and make them
more accessible, efficient, resilient and ready to face current and future challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has also adversely
impacted national justice systems and has highlighted a number of challenges affecting the functioning of the judiciary. At the
same time, it showed the need for the national justice systems to further improve their digitalisation.
Earlier editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard provided comparative data on certain aspects of the ICT in justice systems. As an-
nounced in the Commission’s Communication on the digitalisation of justice in the EU of 2 December 2020 (
75
), the Scoreboard
73
74
75
2021 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network.
2019 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Digitalisation
of justice in the European Union: A toolbox of opportunities’ COM(2020)710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
31
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2690179_0040.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.4. Digitalisation
– Digital-ready rules –
has been substantially augmented with further data on digitalisation in the Member States. This should allow for more in-depth
monitoring of progress areas and outstanding challenges.
Citizen-friendly justice requires that information about national judicial systems is not only easily accessible but is also tailored
to specific groups of society that would otherwise have difficulties in accessing the information. Figure 41 shows the availability
of online information and specific public services that can help people access justice.
Figure 41
Availability of online information about the judicial system for the general public, 2021 (*)
(source:
European Commission (
76
))
Non-native speakers: websites providing online information about the justice system
Compensation for victims: websites with clearly visible and understandable information how to access existing schemes
Legal aid: interactive online simulation to assess eligibility
Legal aid: information on access on websites with clearly visible and understandable information
Court fees: websites with clearly visible and understandable information about court fees and eligibility for their reduction
Legal needs: websites with contact details of other organisations outside of the existing legal aid system
Procedural rights of the citizens: websites with clearly visible and understandable information
Websites with contact forms or emails for inquiries regarding starting a judicial proceeding or being a party in a judicial proceeding
Website with links to all online forms needed to start a judicial proceeding or be a party in a judicial proceeding
Smartphone readable websites related to access to justice
Education on legal rights to the general public through online tools
NONE
BG DE ES LV NL
IE
FR
LT
PL
FI
SE DK EE
IT
SI
MT AT
SK BE HU PT
CZ LU RO HR EL CY
(*)
DE:
Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online.
– Digital-ready rules –
The use of digital solutions in civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases often requires appropriate regulation in national
procedural rules. Figure 42 illustrates the possibility for various actors to use distance communication technology (such as vide-
oconferencing) for procedures related to court cases, and reflects the current situation on the admissibility of digital evidence.
Figure 42
Procedural rules allowing digital technology in courts in civil/commercial, administrative and criminal
cases, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
77
))
For each Member State, the three columns represent procedural rules allowing digital technology in courts in the following types of cases (from le to right):
1. civil/commercial cases
2. administrative cases
3. criminal cases.
Parties/defendants/victims can be heard by distance communication technology
Experts can be heard by distance communication technology
Oral part of the procedure can be conducted entirely via distance communication
technology
Witnesses can be heard by distance communication technology
Language interpretation possible while using distance communication
technology
Admissibility of evidence filed in a digital format only
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
CZ EE ES SK SE DE LT AT NL LV SI
PT HU MT PL FI
HR IT
DK BE IE
RO BG FR LU CY EL
(*) For each Member State, the first column presents procedural rules for civil/commercial cases, the second column for administrative cases and the third column for criminal cases.
Maximum possible: 12 points. For each criterion, two points were given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases, respectively (in criminal
cases, the possibility of hearing the parties was split to cover both defendants and victims). The points are divided by two when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For those
Member States that do not distinguish between civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points has been given for both areas.
EL:
none for administrative
and criminal cases.
LU:
none for administrative cases.
76
77
32
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0041.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.4. Digitalisation
– Use of digital tools –
– Use of digital tools –
Beyond digital-ready procedural rules, courts and prosecution services need to have appropriate tools and infrastructure in place
for distance communication and secure remote access to the workplace (Figure 43). Adequate infrastructure and equipment is
also needed for secure electronic communication between courts/prosecution services and legal professionals and institutions
(Figures 44 and 45).
ICT, including innovative technology, plays an important role in supporting the work of judicial authorities. It therefore contributes
significantly to the quality of justice systems. The availability of various digital tools at the disposal of judges, prosecutors and
judicial staff can streamline work processes, ensure fair workload allocation and lead to a significant time reduction.
Figure 43
Use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
78
))
For each Member State, the two columns represent the use of digital technology in the following authorities (from le to right):
1. courts
2. prosecution service
None
Use of an electronic Case Management System
Judges/prosecutors can work securely remotely
Staff can work securely remotely
Use of distance communication technology, particularly for videoconferencing
Electronic case allocation, with automatic distribution based on objective criteria
Use of artificial intelligence applications in core activities
Use of distributed ledger technologies (blockchain)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
EE AT DE ES PT SE LU HU SI LV DK IT
LT NL FI
PL RO SK HR FR IE
EL MT BE CY BG CZ
(*) Maximum possible: 7 points. For each criterion, one point was given if courts and prosecution services, respectively, use a given technology and 0.5 point was awarded when the
technology is not always used by them.
Secure electronic communication can contribute to improving the quality of justice systems. The possibility for courts to com-
municate electronically between themselves, as well as with legal professionals and other institutions, can streamline processes
and reduce the need for paper-based communication and physical presence, which would lead to a reduction in the length of
pre-trial activities and court proceedings.
Figure 44
Courts: electronic communication tools, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission (
79
))
Availability of secure electronic communication between courts and bailiffs/judicial officers
Availability of secure electronic communication between courts and notaries
Availability of secure electronic communication between courts and detention facilities
Availability of secure electronic communication between courts and lawyers for proceedings
Availability of secure electronic communication between courts for proceedings
5
4
3
2
1
0
DK DE EE ES LV LT LU HU NL AT RO
SI
SK SE
IT
PL PT
FI
BE FR HR CZ
IE
CY EL MT BG
(*) Maximum possible: 5 points. For each criterion, one point was given if secure electronic communication is available for courts. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not
exists in all cases.
FI:
the tasks of notaries do not relate to courts. Therefore, there is no reason to provide them with secure connection.
Prosecution services are essential for the functioning of the criminal justice system. They also stand to benefit from access to
a secure electronic channel of communication, which could facilitate their work and thus improve the quality of court proceedings.
The possibility for secure electronic communication between prosecution services and investigating authorities, defence lawyers
and courts would enable a more expedient and efficient preparation of the proceedings before the court.
78
79
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
33
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2690179_0042.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.4. Digitalisation
– Online access to courts –
Figure 45
Prosecution service: electronic communication tools, 2021(*)
(source: European Commission (
80
))
Availability of secure electronic communication between the prosecution service and defence lawyers
Availability of secure electronic communication between the prosecution service and detention facilities
Availability of secure electronic communication between the prosecution service and investigating authorities
Availability of secure communication between the prosecution service and courts
Availability of secure electronic communication within the prosecution service
5
4
3
2
1
0
NONE
DK DE EE ES LU HU NL AT
PT
FI
IT
IE
LT
SE RO SK BE CZ FR MT SI HR CY PL LV BG EL
(*) Maximum possible: 5 points. For each criterion, one point was given if secure electronic communication is available for prosecution services. 0.5 was awarded when the possibil-
ity does not exist in all cases. Availability of electronic communication tools within prosecution service includes communication with lawyers employed by the prosecution service.
– Online access to courts –
The ability to carry out specific steps in a judicial procedure electronically is an important aspect of the quality of justice systems.
The electronic submission of claims, the possibility to monitor and advance a proceeding online or serve documents electronically
can tangibly facilitate access to justice for citizens and businesses (or their legal representatives) and reduce delays and costs.
The availability of such digital public services would help bring courts one step closer to citizens and businesses, and by extension
increase public trust in the justice system.
Figure 46
Digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases,
2021(*)
(source: European Commission (
81
))
For each Member State, the two columns represent the digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in the following types of cases
(from le to right):
1. civil/commercial cases
2. administrative cases
Possibility to initiate proceedings / file a claim online
Possibility for clients to access the electronic file of their ongoing cases
Official court documents can be served electronically on businesses
(when procedure is not initiated by the business)
Possibility to file an application for legal aid online
Possibility for clients to access the electronic file of their closed cases
Availability of online information about the court fees
Availability of electronic acknowledgment of receipt proving
submission of documents with the court
Official court documents can be served electronically on citizens
(when procedure is not initiated by the citizen)
Possibility of online payment of court fees
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
EE LV LT
IT
DE SK HU ES HR AT PT SE CY MT PL
SI
FI
CZ
IE
NL RO FR BE EL DK BG LU
(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial and administrative cases, respectively. 0.5 point was awarded
when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points has been
given for both areas.
The use of digital tools for conducting and following court proceedings in criminal cases, can also help guarantee the rights of
victims and defendants. For example, digital solutions can enable confidential remote communication between defendants and
their lawyers, allow defendants in detention to prepare for their hearing and help victims of crime avoid secondary victimisation.
80
81
34
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0043.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.4. Digitalisation
– Access to judgments –
Figure 47
Digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases, 2021(*)
(source: European
Commission (
82
))
Defendants can access their ongoing case electronically
Victims can access their ongoing case electronically
Victims can submit written statements online (including initial applications)
Defendants can communicate confidentially with their lawyers during remote hearings
Defendants can submit written statements online, including legal-aid application
Defendants in detention can use ICT facilities to prepare for hearings
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
EE HU AT SK DE LV
FI
ES LT
CZ
PT RO FR PL HR CY BE LU SE BG
IE
IT
DK
SI
NONE
EL MT NL
(*) Maximum possible: 6 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all criminal cases. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases.
– Access to judgments –
Ensuring online access to judgments increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens and businesses understand
their rights and can contribute to consistency in case-law. The arrangements for publishing judicial decisions online are essential
for creating user-friendly search facilities (
83
) that make case-law more accessible to legal professionals and the general public.
Seamless access to and easy reuse of case-law makes the justice system algorithm-friendly, enabling innovative ‘legal tech’
applications that support practitioners.
The online publication of court decisions requires balancing a variety of interests, within the boundaries set by legal and policy
frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (
84
) fully applies to the processing of personal data by courts. When assess-
ing what data to make public, a fair balance has to be struck between the right to data protection and the right to publicise court
decisions to ensure the transparency of the justice system. This is particularly true when there is a prevailing public interest that
justifies the disclosure of those data. In many countries, the law or practice requires the anonymisation or pseudonymisation (
85
)
of judicial decisions before publication, either systematically or upon request. Data produced by the judiciary are also governed
by EU legislation on open data and the reuse of public sector information (
86
).
The availability of judicial decisions in a machine-readable format (
87
) facilitates an algorithm-friendly justice system (
88
).
82
83
84
85
86
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
See
Best practice guide for managing Supreme Courts,
under the project Supreme Courts as guarantee for effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is more efficient if assisted by an algorithm. However, human supervision is needed, since the algorithms do not understand context.
Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90) and
Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p.
56).
Judgments modelled according to standards (e.g. Akoma Ntoso) and their associated metadata are downloadable free of charge in the form of a database or by other
automated means (e.g. Application Programming Interface).
See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions –
A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final, Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 65 final, and
Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on Best Practices regarding the Online Publication
of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, p. 2).
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
35
87
88
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0044.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.4. Digitalisation
– Access to judgments –
Figure 48
Online access to published judgments by the general public, 2021 (*)
(civil/commercial, administrative and
criminal cases, all instances) (source: European Commission (
89
))
1st instance courts (civil, commercial and admin)
2nd instance (civil, commercial and admin)
Highest instance courts
1st instance criminal courts
2nd instance criminal courts
Highest instance criminal courts
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
BG EE LT HU SK ES CY LV MT DE
IT
LU
SI
CZ RO
IE
FI
AT DK HR NL PT BE PL FR
SE EL
(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each court instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for civil/commercial and administrative and criminal cases respectively,
0.75 points when most judgments (more than 50% are available) and 0.5 points when some judgments (less than 50%) are available. For Member States with only two court
instances, points have been given for three court instances by mirroring the respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not dis-
tinguish the two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points has been given for both areas.
BE:
for civil and criminal cases, each court is in charge
of deciding on the publication of its own judgments.
DE:
each federal state decides on online availability of first instance judgments.
AT:
for first and second instance, judges decide
which judgments are published. Decisions of the Supreme Court that reject an appeal without substantial reasoning are not published. Decisions of the Supreme Administrative
Court taken by a single judge are published if the judge concerned decides to publish them. Furthermore, decisions only containing legal issues where there already is continuous
jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court and non-complicated decisions concerning discontinuance of proceedings are not published.
NL:
courts decide on publication
according to published criteria.
PT:
a commission within the court decides on the publication.
SI:
procedural decisions with little or no significance for the case-law are not published;
from decisions in cases, which are identical in substance (e.g. bulk cases), only the leading decision is published (together with the list of case files with the same content). Individual
higher courts decide which judgments can be published.
SK:
decisions on several types of civil cases, such as in inheritance matters or determining of paternity are not published.
FI:
courts decide which judgments are published.
Figure 49
Arrangements for producing machine-readable judicial decisions, 2021 (*)
(civil/commercial, administrative
and criminal cases, all instances) (source: European Commission (
90
))
For each Member State, the three columns represent the arrangements in place for the following types of cases (from le to right):
1. civil/commercial cases
2. administrative cases
3. criminal cases.
Judgments and their associated metadata are downloadable free of charge in the form of a database or by other automated means
Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is assisted by an algorithm
Rules are in place to determine whether or not personal data are revealed in online published judgments
Judgments have associated information (“metadata”) on citations and references to national and/or EU law or case law
Judgments have associated information (“metadata”) on keywords, date of the decision, etc.
Judgments are assigned a European Case Law Identifier (ECLI)
Judgments are modelled according to a standard which would enable their machine readability
Website is accessible to the general public free of charge
24
21
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
DE LV BG EE ES NL SK AT LT
PL CY HU
FI
CZ
IT
LU
IE MT RO
SI
FR HR PT BE SE DK EL
(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of case. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point can be given if all judicial decisions are covered. If only some judicial
decisions are covered at a given instance, only half a point is awarded. Where a Member State has only two instances, points have been given for three instances by mirroring the
respective higher instance as the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not distinguish between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have
been allocated for both areas of law.
ES:
The use of the General Council for the Judiciary (CGPJ) database for commercial purposes, or the massive download of information is not
allowed. The reuse of this information for developing databases or for commercial purposes must follow the procedure and conditions established by the CGPJ through its Judicial
Documentation Centre.
IE:
anonymisation of judgments is done in family law, child care and other areas where statute requires or a judge directs the identities of parties or persons
not to be disclosed.
89
90
36
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
REU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 460: Spm. om, hvor mange sager der er ved domstolene pr. 100.000 indbyggere i henholdsvis Danmark og EU-landene
2690179_0045.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems
Accessibility
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems
Easy access, sufficient resources, effective assessment tools and digitalisation all contribute to a high quality
justice system. Citizens and business expect high quality decisions from an effective justice system. The 2022 EU
Justice Scoreboard makes a comparative analysis of these factors.
Accessibility
The 2022 edition looks again at a number of elements that contribute to a citizen-friendly justice system:
The
availability of legal aid
and the
level of court fees
have a major impact on access to justice, in particular
for people living in poverty. Figure 25 shows that in some Member States, consumers whose income is below the
Eurostat poverty threshold would not receive legal aid. Compared to 2020, legal aid has become more accessible
in around a third of Member States - especially partial legal aid - and more restricted in two Member States. This
contrasts with the previous trend of legal aid becoming less accessible in some Member States. The level of court
fees (Figure 26) has remained largely stable since 2016, although several Member States have raised the level
of court fees for low value claims. The burden of court fees continues to be proportionally higher for low value
claims. Difficulties in benefiting from legal aid combined with high levels of court fees in some Member States
could dissuade people living in poverty from attempting to access justice.
The level of
court fees for commercial litigation
(Figure 27) varies greatly between Member States (ranging
from 0.1% to 6% of the value of the claim), with only two Member States having no court fee at all. Compared to
2020, the level of court fees has remained largely stable, with only two Member States lowering and one Member
State increasing the fee. Figure 28 shows to what extent legal costs can be recovered by the winning party in
a commercial case. There are large differences in the recoverability of legal fees for the litigious phase between
Member States with and without a statutory fee system, as well as within these groups (in particular between
more and less generous statutory fee systems). In addition, in many Member States the recoverability of legal
costs is at the discretion of the courts. A system’s level of generosity for recovering legal fees can either incentivise
or deter someone from filing a case, affecting overall access to justice.
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard continues to analyse the ways in which Member States promote voluntary use
of
alternative dispute resolution methods
(ADR) (Figure 29), including the possibility of using digital tech-
nologies. Compared to 2020, a third of Member States increased their promotion efforts while around the same
number decreased their efforts. In general, the number of ways to promote ADR methods tends to be lower for
administrative disputes than for civil and commercial, labour or commercial disputes, but a slightly increased ef-
fort can be observed in this area compared to 2020.
For the first time, the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard takes stock of the
specific arrangements in place to support
persons with disabilities
in accessing justice on equal basis with others. Figure 30 shows that all Member States
have at least some arrangements in place - mostly procedural accommodations or information available in acces-
sible formats. Specific formats, such as in Braille, sign language or easy-to-read, are available upon request in more
than half of Member States. Digital solutions for civil and commercial cases, administrative cases as well as criminal
cases at first instance court are also accessible for persons with disabilities in just over half of Member States.
Also for the first time, the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard maps
certain aspects of judicial control over acts
and omissions of public administration
based on specific business scenarios. Figure 31 shows that in almost
all Member States companies may receive financial compensation for damage caused by administrative deci-
sions or by administrative silence and that courts may stay the enforcement of administrative decisions. These
elements may have an impact on the investor confidence, the business environment and the functioning of the
single market, which warrants closer monitoring and analysis.
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard provides a deeper analysis of the measures Member States have in place to
ensure a
child-friendly justice system.
In particular, it refines the selection of arrangements in different types
of proceedings presented in Figure 32 and distinguishes (in Figure 33) between a child involved in the proceedings
as a victim and a child that is a suspect or accused person. Figure 32 shows that all Member States make at least
some accommodations for children, most frequently ensuring that they are treated appropriately according to
their specific needs and rights. Almost all Member States also provide training courses for judges on child-friendly
justice. Figure 33 illustrates the variation between Member States in this area, showing comparatively fewer spe-
cific arrangements available for children involved in proceedings as suspects or accused persons in about a third
of Member States.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
37
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2690179_0046.png
3.2. Quality of justice systems
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems
Resources
Resources
High quality justice systems in Member States depend on sufficient financial and human resources. This requires
appropriate investment in physical and technical infrastructure, initial and continuous training, and diversity among
judges, including gender balance. The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard shows:
In terms of
financial resources,
the data show that, overall, in 2020, general government total expenditure on
law courts continued to remain mostly stable in Member States, with significant differences in actual amounts,
both in EUR per inhabitant and as a percentage of GDP between Member States persisting (Figures 34 and 35).
Almost all Member States increased their expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2020 (an increase compared to
2019) and a majority also increased their expenditure per capita.
Women
still account for fewer than 50% of judges at Supreme Court level in most Member States (Figure 37).
Figures for the three-year period 2019-2021 show diverging levels and trends between Member States, but since
2010, the proportion of female judges at Supreme Court level has risen in most Member States.
To
improve communication with vulnerable groups
(Figure 39), most Member States provide training on
how to best communicate with victims of gender-based and/or domestic violence, and more than two thirds
provide training on communicating with asylum seekers and with people from different cultural, religious, ethnic
or linguistic backgrounds. Around half of Member States provide training on how to communicate with visually
or hearing impaired persons. Furthermore, more than two thirds of Member States provide training on the use
of social media and/or communication with the media, and around half raise awareness and provide training on
dealing with disinformation.
Assessment tools
The
use of surveys
among court users and legal professionals (Figure 40) was lower in 2020 than in the preced-
ing years, with a stable number of Member States opting not to conduct any surveys. However, the Member States
that did not conduct surveys are not always the same as last year, indicating that some of them conduct surveys
every other/every few years. Accessibility, customer service, court hearings and judgments, as well as the overall
trust in the justice system, remain recurring topics for surveys, but only a few Member States inquired about the
satisfaction of groups with special needs or about individuals’ awareness of their rights.
Digitalisation
Since its 2021 edition, the EU Justice Scoreboard includes a large section examining in detail aspects related to
the digitalisation of justice. Although most Member States already use digital solutions in different contexts and
to varying degree, there is significant room for improvement.
Almost all Member States have some
online information about their judicial system,
including websites with
visible and understandable information on how to access legal aid, and on court fees and eligibility criteria for their
reduction (Figure 41). But differences exist between Member States on the level of information and the degree to
which it responds to people’s needs. For example, not many Member States (only 13) provide an interactive online
simulation where people can find out whether they are eligible for legal aid. On the other hand, most Member
States provide a website with online forms for companies and individuals, and information for non-native speakers.
Fewer than half of Member States have
digital-ready procedural rules
(Figure 42), which allow fully for the use
of distance communication and for the admissibility of evidence in digital format only. In the remaining Member
States this is possible only in limited number of situations. Nonetheless, since 2020 there has been progress in
almost half of Member States.
On the
use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services
(Figure 43), most Member States al-
ready have various digital tools at the disposal of courts, prosecutors and staff members. Although most Member
States have case-management systems, videoconferencing systems and teleworking arrangements in place,
further progress is needed in automating case allocation systems and in making artificial intelligence and block
chain based tools more widely available.
Courts in most Member States have
secure electronic tools for communication
at their disposal. In a number
of Member States, however, courts can only communicate via secure electronic means with certain legal profes-
sionals and/or national authorities (Figure 44). In the case of prosecution services (Figure 45), more than a third
of Member States comprehensively provide for secure electronic communication with legal professionals and
national institutions, which represents progress compared to 2020.
38
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3.3. Independence
In civil/commercial and administrative cases, most Member States provide individuals and businesses (or their
legal representatives) with
online access to their ongoing or closed cases
(Figure 46), albeit to various
degrees. In more than a third of Member States, individuals and businesses benefited from an improved online
access compared to 2020. Nevertheless, in criminal cases (Figure 47) in most Member States defendants and
victims have very limited possibilities to follow or carry out part of their case electronically despite improvements
in about a half of the Member States.
The 2022 Scoreboard assesses the data on
online access to court judgments
(Figure 48) in more detail in
order to provide a more accurate picture of the situation in the Member States. The results therefore differ from
last year. In particular, on the publication of judgments at the highest instance: 22 Member States publish all civil/
commercial and administrative judgments and 22 Member States also publish criminal judgments. Nevertheless,
online publication of judgments at second instance is more rare, with only ten Member States publishing all second
instance court judgments.
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard continues to analyse
arrangements in the Member States to help produce
machine-readable judicial decisions
(Figure 49). All Member States have at least some arrangements in place
for civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases although there is considerable variation between Member
States. It appears that administrative courts are relatively more advanced in granting seamless access to and
facilitating easy reuse of case-law by ‘legal tech’ companies. In general, there is a tendency to introduce more
arrangements, particularly for the availability of metadata in judgments on key words, dates of decisions and the
regulation of personal data in the published judgments. Ten Member States reported an improvement in 2021
compared with the previous year. Justice systems where arrangements for modelling judgments according to
standards enabling their machine readability have been put in place seem to have the potential to achieve better
results in the future.
3.3.
Independence
Judicial independence, which is integral to the task of judicial decision-making, is a requirement stemming from the principle
of effective judicial protection referred to in Article 19 TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal
enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (
91
). That requirement presumes:
(a)
external independence,
when the body concerned exercises its functions autonomously, without being subject to any hi-
erarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever,
thus being protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to
influence their decisions; and
(b)
internal independence and impartiality,
when an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and
their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings (
92
).
Judicial independence guarantees that all the rights that individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values com-
mon to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (
93
). Preserving
the EU legal order is fundamental for all citizens and business whose rights and freedoms are protected under EU law.
A high perceived independence of the judiciary is paramount for the trust which justice in a society governed by the rule of law
must inspire in individuals, and is contributing to a growth-friendly business environment, as a perceived lack of independence can
deter investments (
94
). In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence from various sources, the Scoreboard presents
a number of indicators on how justice systems are organised to protect judicial independence in certain types of situations where
independence could be at risk. Reflecting the input from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network
of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC), and from the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financ-
ing of Terrorism (EGMLTF), the Scoreboard presents indicators related to security checks on judges, possibility of higher/Supreme
Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on their own initiative, safeguards in revolving doors
situations regarding judges and prosecutors, as well as a more in-depth view on the possibility to have a review of a decision of
a prosecutor not to prosecute a case.
91
92
See
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN
Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2021,
Criminal proceedings against WB and Others,
Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, judgment of 6 October 2021,
W. Ż.,
C-487/19, judgment of 15 July 2021,
Commission v. Poland,
C-791/13, judgment of 2 March 2021,
AB,
C-824/18, judgment of 19 November 2019,
A. K. and Others,
C-585/18,
C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 5 November 2019,
Commission v
Poland, C-192/18, judgment of 24 June 2019,
Commission
v. Poland,
C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 paras. 73 and 74; judgment of 27 February 2018,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,
C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para. 44;
judgment of 25 July 2018,
Minister for Justice and Equality,
C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 65.
Court of Justice, judgment of 24 June 2019,
Commission v. Poland,
C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para. 44.
In 2020 and 2021, the World Economic Forum has not published the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
39
93
94
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2690179_0048.png
3.3. Independence
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection
Figure 50
How the general public perceives the independence of courts and judges (*)
(source: Eurobarometer (
95
) -
light colours: 2016, 2020 and 2021, dark colours: 2022)
Very good
Fairly good
Fairly bad
Very bad
Don't know
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FI
DK AT LU NL DE SE IE
MT EE BE CZ FR LV EL LT CY SI
RO PT HU ES IT
BG SK PL HR
(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member
States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very
bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the inde-
pendence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage
of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.
Figure 51 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges. Respond-
ents among the general public, who rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose
between three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 50.
Figure 51
Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence
(share of all respondents -
higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (
96
))
The status and position of judges do not
sufficiently guarantee their independence
Interference or pressure from
economic or other specific interests
Interference or pressure from
government and politicians
100,0%
90,0%
80,0%
70,0%
60,0%
50,0%
40,0%
30,0%
20,0%
10,0%
0,0%
FI DK AT LU NL DE SE IE MT EE BE CZ FR LV EL LT CY
SI RO PT HU ES IT BG SK PL HR
95
Eurobarometer survey FL503, conducted between 17 and 24 January 2022. Replies to the question: ‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your
country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’, see:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en
Eurobarometer survey FL503, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice
system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’ if reply to Q1 is ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’.
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
96
40
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2690179_0049.png
3.3. Independence
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection
Figure 52
How companies perceive the independence of courts and judges (*)
(source: Eurobarometer (
97
) - light
colours: 2016, 2020 and 2021, dark colours: 2022)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
DK FI
DE IE
AT LU NL SE MT BE FR LT EL CZ RO SI
EE CY ES IT
PT HU SK BG LV HR
PL
Very good
Fairly good
Fairly bad
Very bad
Don't know
(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member
States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad or very
bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the inde-
pendence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the percentage
of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.
Figure 53 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges. Respondents
among companies, who rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between
three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 52.
Figure 53
Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence
(rate of all respondents - higher
value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (
98
))
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
The status and position of judges do not
sufficiently guarantee their independence
Interference or pressure from
economic or other specific interests
Interference or pressure from
government and politicians
DK
FI DE IE AT LU NL SE MT BE FR LT EL CZ RO SI EE CY ES IT
PT HU SK BG LV HR PL
97
Eurobarometer survey FL504, conducted between 17 and 24 January 2022. Replies to the question: ‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our
country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’, see:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en;
from 2021, the sample size of companies surveyed was enlarged to 500 for all Member States except
for MT, CY and LU, where the sample was 250. In previous years the sample size was 200 for all Member States except for DE, ES, FR, PL and IT, where the sample was 400.
Eurobarometer survey FL504; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice
system in (your country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’ if the response to Q1 was ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
41
98
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2690179_0050.png
3.3. Independence
3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection
Figure 54 shows a new indicator on how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts as
regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State.
Figure 54
How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts
(source:
Eurobarometer (
99
))
Very confident
Fairly confident
Fairly unconfident
Very unconfident
Don't know
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FI
LU IE
SE MT DK AT DE FR
SI NL CZ RO IT
EE BE HU HR LT PT ES EL BG SK LV CY PL
(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly confident in investment protection by the law and courts
(total confident).
Figure 55 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of effectiveness of investment protection. Respond-
ents among companies, who rated their level of confidence as ‘fairly unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’, could choose four reasons
to explain their rating (and some indicated “other”). The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 54.
Figure 55
Main reasons among companies for their perceived lack of effectiveness of investment protection
(source: Eurobarometer (
100
))
Unpredictable, non-transparent
administrative
conduct, and
difficulty to challenge administrative decisions in court
Frequent changes in legislation or concerns about
quality of the law making process
Other
Difficult to obtain a fair compensation/
to protect property when something goes wrong
Difficult to enforce rights in court due to concerns about quality,
efficiency or independence of justice
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FI LU
IE
SE MT DK AT DE FR
SI NL CZ RO IT
EE BE HU HR LT PT ES EL BG SK LV CY PL
99
Eurobarometer survey FL504; replies to the question: ‘To what extent are you confident that your investments are protected by the law and courts in (your country) if
something goes wrong?’ For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company owns or controls and that is characterised by
the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk.
100 Eurobarometer survey FL504; replies to the question: ‘What are your main reasons for concern about the effectiveness of investment protection?’ if the response to Q3 was
‘fairly unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’.
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2690179_0051.png
3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
The guarantees of structural independence require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the court and the appointment,
length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in
the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests
before it (
101
). Those rules must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form of instructions, but
also types of influence that are more indirect and that are liable to have an effect on the decisions of the judges concerned (
102
).
European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in the
2010 Council of Europe Rec-
ommendation on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities
(
103
). The EU Justice Scoreboard presents certain indicators
on issues that are relevant when assessing how justice systems are organised to safeguard judicial independence.
Specifically, this edition of the Scoreboard contains new indicators on: (i) authorities involved and the frequency of potential se-
curity checks on judges (Figure 56); (ii) the possibility of higher/Supreme Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law
on their own initiative (Figure 57); and (iii) the safeguards in place relating to the temporary employment of judges/prosecutors
on political posts (Figure 58) (
104
). It also presents a more detailed overview of the possibility to have a review of a decision of
a prosecutor not to prosecute a case involving crimes with a victim or a case involving ‘victimless crimes’ (e.g. corruption or money
laundering) (Figure 59), and shows the bodies with power to conduct criminal investigations (Figure 60) (
105
). The figures present
the national frameworks as they were in place in December 2021.
The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment nor present quantitative data on the effectiveness of the
safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details of the procedures and accompanying safeguards. It should
also be noted that implementing policies and practices to promote integrity and prevent corruption within the judiciary are also
essential to guarantee judicial independence. Ultimately, the effective protection of judicial independence also requires, beyond
whatever necessary norms, a culture of integrity and impartiality, shared by magistrates and respected by the wider society.
The special place of the judiciary within the system of the separation of powers and the emphasis placed upon judicial independ-
ence and impartiality require that laws regulating the assessment or evaluation of the professional duties of judges must be
worded and applied with great care and the role of the executive or legislative branches in this process should be limited to the
extent absolutely necessary (
106
).
101 See Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2021,
Criminal proceedings against WB and Others,
Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, para. 67, judgment of 6 October
2021,
W.Ż.,
C-487/19, para. 109, judgment of 15 July 2021,
Commission v. Poland,
C-791/19, para. 59, judgment of 2 March 2021,
A.B.,
C-824/18, para.117, judgment of 19
November 2019,
A. K. and Others
(Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and
122; judgment of 24 June 2019,
Commission v. Poland,
C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 paras. 73 and 74; judgment of 25 July 2018,
LM,
C-216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586,
para. 66, judgment of 27 February 2018,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,
C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para. 44. See also paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility (adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010) and Explanatory
Memorandum, which provide that the authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. With
a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other
legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an independent and
competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be
authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.
102 See Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2021,
A.B.,
C-824/18, para. 119, judgment of 19 November 2019,
A. K. and Others
(Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of
the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, para. 123; judgment of 24 June 2019,
Commission v. Poland,
C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531
para. 112.
103 See Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November
2010 and Explanatory Memorandum (‘the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’).
104 The figures are based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire
from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, are not ENCJ members, or their ENCJ membership has been suspended (CZ, DE, EE, CY, LU, AT, and PL) were
obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. Safeguards regarding prosecutors in Figure 57 are based on
responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.
105 The figures are based on responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing
of Terrorism.
106 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 819/2015 on the Draft law on integrity checking in Ukraine, CDL-AD(2015)031, 25 October 2015, para. 40, and Venice Commission, Opinion
No. 789/2014, Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court of Moldova on certain provisions of the law on professional integrity testing, CDL-AD(2014)039-e, 15 December
2014, para. 14.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
Figure 56 shows whether in Member States the National Security Agency is involved in conducting security checks on judges -
either candidate judges or existing judges, and how often they are made.
The involvement of National Security Agencies belonging to the executive in the appointment and status of judges is particularly
sensitive from the perspective of judicial independence. While there may be a legitimate interest, especially for certain specific
judicial posts, to conduct a verification of security (
107
), this should be done in full respect for judicial independence. According to
European standards, “independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence
or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch” (
108
). Security checks on judges, especially when carried out by an executive
body, may constitute such an ‘external pressure’ (
109
). When security/integrity checks are not carried out by self-governing bodies
of the judiciary themselves but by an external body, utmost consideration must be given to respecting the principles of separation
of powers and checks and balances (
110
).
Figure 56
National security checks on judges: authorities involved and timing (*) (
111
)
Upon an explicit request, the National Security Agency checks its records, whether the candidate judge has been referred to in any way - before their appointment
Judges with specific tasks on intelligence issues are subject to regular security checks conducted by National Security Agency
All candidate judges are systematically subjected to a verification procedure by the National Security Agency before their appointment
All judges are subject to regular security checks conducted by National Security Agency
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DOES NOT CONDUCT
SECURITY CHECKS ON JUDGES
BE BG
IE
EL
ES FR
PL MT CY LU NL AT RO
SI
SK
FI
SE DE CZ
IT
PT HU DK EE LV
LT
HR
(*)
DE:
In all federal states, the National Security Agency can check its records about a candidate judge before appointment upon an explicit request. In two federal states, the
National Security Agency conducts a check of its records on all candidate judges before appointment: in Bavaria (if a candidate judge does not give consent for the check of records,
they cannot be appointed); since 2021, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (not requiring their consent). By law, the National Security Agency or the agencies of the federal states
only perform verification processes if judges are to be concerned with tasks within the court administration and need to get access to classified information for that purpose. Apart
from that, judges are legally exempt from security checks when granted access to classified information, as such procedures could influence judicial independence.
EE:
The Internal
Security Service performs the security check of a candidate for judicial office, except if the candidate holds a valid access permit to access state secrets classified as top secret or
if the candidate occupies a position that provides the right by virtue of office to access all levels of state secrets. The Internal Security Service presents the information gathered
as a result of the security check to the judge’s examination committee and provides an opinion on whether a person who submitted the application meets the conditions for being
issued a permit for access to state secrets.
HR:
The Security and Intelligence Agency conducts security checks on all candidates for judges and on all existing judges every 5 years
(as well as state attorneys). According to the law, for existing judges, the Security and Intelligence Agency, after conducting a check including an interview, will send its report to the
Supreme Court President who will then assign it to a panel of five Supreme Court judges to decide if there is a security issue. If the panel finds a security issue, this will be notified to
the Minister of Justice, the Court President and Judges’ Council and the President of Higher Court where the judge in question sits. The Minister of Justice will prescribe the by-laws
regulating the procedure for conducting security checks.
FR:
As all state officials, all candidate judges are subjected to a police records check/an administrative investigation led by
the national police under the authority of the general prosecutor (checking its records, classified information, morality behaviour…).
IT:
The chart reflects the situation for judges in
civil and criminal courts. National security agencies are not involved in the procedure for appointing administrative judges.
HU:
All regional court presidents, vice presidents and judges
who permit intelligence data gathering or deal with cases related to classified information need to undergo a security check by the National Security Agency.The security check is
conducted before assuming their responsibilities and then every five years (Section 71/C, paragraph (7), of Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security and Sections 42/A to 42/C of Act
CLXII of 2011 on the Status and Remuneration of Judges).
NL:
A certificate of good conduct (VOG) needs to be handed over before a candidate judge can be appointed. This is only
done at first appointments or when a judge becomes president of a court. The organisation providing VOGs is called Justis - the screening authority that is a benefit-expense agency
with independent management, which is formally under the Ministry of Justice & Security. The authority checks whether a candidate’s (judicial) history is an objection to carrying out
the duties of the new office. Justis is not the National Security Agency (AIVD). It is the decision of Justis, whether or not to hand out a certificate of good conduct. If someone wishes
to appeal this decision, they can take the case to an administrative judge.
PL:
When a person first applies to a judicial post, the president of the competent court (where the vacant
post exists) requests information on the candidate from the Regional Head of Police.
RO:
Judges give a formal statement, on a yearly basis, that they are not operatives, including
undercover agents, informers or collaborators of the intelligence services.
SE*:
The Judicial Appointments Board, an independent judicial body, conducts the verification procedure for
all security levels for court presidents, based on a questionnaire. Each court performs the verification procedure for all security levels for first or second instance judges. The Swedish
Security Service conducts a records check (whether the candidate has been referred to in its records in any way), which is carried out before a person can take part in security sensi-
tive activities (the Service does not collect information through a questionnaire, which is the task of the Judicial Appointments Board). For court presidents, the government decides
which positions are to be classified for security on the highest security level and the Government Office decides which positions are to be classified for security on the lower security
levels. For first or second instance judges, the government decides which positions are to be classified for security on the highest security level and the court decides which positions
are to be classified for security on the lower security level.
107 “[T]he authority of a judiciary can only be maintained if (a) the legal system puts in place adequate mechanisms to ensure that candidates are not appointed as a judge if
they do not have the required competences or do not meet the highest standards of integrity; and (b) the judiciary is cleansed of those who are found to be incompetent,
corrupt or linked to organised crime.”, Venice Commission, Opinion no. 1073/2021 on the Introduction of the procedure of renewal of security vetting through amendments
to the Courts Act, CDL(2022)002, 18 March 2022, para. 14.
108 Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, para. 74.
109 Venice Commission, Opinion no. 1073/2021 on the Introduction of the procedure of renewal of security vetting through amendments to the Courts Act, CDL(2022)002, 18
March 2022, para. 13.
110 Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2021)046, Republic of Moldova - Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of
the Council of Europe on some measures related to the selection of candidates for administrative positions in bodies of self-administration of judges and prosecutors and
the amendment of some normative acts, para. 16
111 Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member
States that have no Councils for the Judiciary, are not ENCJ members, or whose ENCJ membership has been suspended, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC.
44
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
Figure 57 shows whether courts or judges have the possibility to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on
their own initiative. Such decisions could either be advisory or obligatory, and could apply only to a particular case, or to all cases
of a similar type. The figure below shows four different situations in Member States: higher courts/judges i) cannot issue such
decision on their own initiative, ii) they can issue advisory (non-binding) decisions of general application that apply to all courts/
judges in particular types of cases (e.g. practice statements), iii) they can issue obligatory decisions of concrete application that
apply only to a specific judicial decision (e.g. decision which oblige a judge/panel to adapt the draft judgment), or iv) they can issue
obligatory decisions of general application that apply to all courts/judges in particular types of cases.
Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, and higher/appeal courts in general, are essential to secure the uniform application of
the law in Member States. Nevertheless, hierarchical judicial organisation should not undermine individual independence (
112
).
Superior courts should not address instructions to judges about the way they should decide individual cases, except in national
preliminary rulings or when deciding on legal remedies according to the law (
113
). A hierarchical organisation of the judiciary in the
sense of a subordination of judges to higher instances in their judicial decision-making activity would be a clear violation of the
principle of internal independence, according to the Venice Commission (
114
). Any procedure for the unification of case-law must
comply with fundamental principles of separation of powers, and even after such a decision of a higher/Supreme Court, all courts
and judges must remain competent to assess their cases independently and impartially, and to distinguish new cases from the
interpretation previously unified by a higher/Supreme Court.
Figure 57
Possibility of higher/Supreme Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts
on their own initiative (*)
Advisory opinion of general application (for all courts/judges)
Obligatory decision of concrete application (to a specific judicial decision)
Obligatory decision of general application (for all courts/judges)
HIGHER/SUPREME COURTS CANNOT ISSUE DECISIONS ON
CONSISTENCY OF CASE LAW ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE
BE DK DE EE
IE
EL
ES FR CY
IT
LT
LU MT NL AT
PT
FI
SE CZ LV
PL
SI
HR BG HU RO SK
(*)
BG:
Not following the obligatory decision or a general direction for particular kinds of cases is taken into account during the evaluation of the magistrates, which is an objec-
tive assessment of their professional, business and moral qualities, demonstrated in the performance of their position.
CZ:
The Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court
can issue unifying opinions which are not formally binding for the courts of lower level. The binding nature of the unifying opinions is based not on their formal status but on the
authority of the Supreme Courts and the persuasiveness of their reasoning. The Supreme Court uses unifying opinions for legal questions they consider to be of special importance.
Regarding the possibility to diverge, a judge is bound only by the law in their decision-making. A diversion is thus possible but such a decision should be properly justified.
HR:
There
are registration judges on each county court and on High Commercial Court, High Misdemeanour Court, High Administrative, High Criminal Court and Supreme Court, which register
the judgments so that they can be notified to the parties, and can alert a judge/chamber when a draft judgment diverges from previously delivered case law and can propose to
discuss the divergence at a section meeting pursuant to Article 40 of the Law on Courts, in order to issue a decision of the section which is binding on all judges in the court.
LV:
The
Plenary Session (the assembly of all judges of the Supreme Court) and the general meeting of judges of the Departments of the Supreme Court can adopt opinions regarding the
issues of interpretation and application of law standards in the form of a decision, which is published on the web site.
HU:
a judge can diverge from the obligatory decision ‘only if
the facts of the case differ from the facts of the obligatory decision or with reasoning of diverging in points of law.’
PL:
Among others, the First President of the Supreme Court or
Presidents of the Supreme Court’s chambers, or the President of the Supreme Administrative Court may propose on their own initiative that an ‘abstract legal issue’ is clarified by
a panel of seven judges of the Supreme Court/Supreme Administrative Court in case of non-uniformity of judicial decisions/judgments delivered by the courts. The abstract resolution
adopted by seven judges, presenting interpretation of the law, is not binding for the lower courts and has an influence on lower court only based on the authority of the Supreme
Court/Supreme Administrative Court and on the persuasiveness of their reasoning. Such abstract resolutions may be binding on the Supreme Court only if the seven-judge panel
decides so, unless overruled by a larger bench (e.g. a resolution of a whole Chamber of the Supreme Court or by the whole Supreme Court; Art. 88 of the Law on the Supreme Court).
RO:
To ensure a consistent interpretation and implementation of the law by all courts, the High Court of Justice and Cassation in the procedure ‘appeals in the interest of the law’, ex
officio or upon request by parties, rules on legal issues that have been settled differently by courts of law. Such decisions have no effects on the court judgments being examined or
on the status of parties in those cases. According to Article 99 of Law no. 303/2004 on the statute of judges and prosecutors, not complying with the appeals in the interest of law
of the High Court of Cassation and Justice constitutes a disciplinary misconduct. This means that a disciplinary procedure against the judge concerned can be initiated.
SI:
Principled
legal opinions on issues important for the uniform application of laws have a nature of a normative individual legal act whose scope goes beyond a specific case. It is binding on all
panels of the Supreme Court and, only by force of reasoning, on lower courts, for which it is constitutionally acceptable to deviate from the adopted principled legal opinion, as in the
case of deviating from the established case-law, if such deviation is supported by reasoning.
SK:
A court/judge is bound by the obligatory decision of the hierarchically superior court.
In certain cases the inferior court is entitled to diverge from the obligatory decision of hierarchically superior courts/judges. There are three main reasons for doing so: (i) change of
facts; (ii) different legal opinion expressed in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU; and (iii) an amendment of the laws. For specific proceedings, a judge can be subject to
disciplinary proceedings at the Supreme Court.
112 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 22.
113 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 23.
114 Venice Commission, Report on the independence of the judicial system, Part I: the independence of courts, Study No. 494/2008, 16 March 2010, CDL-AD(2010)004, paras.
68 - 72.
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
Figure 58 shows the safeguards in place in situations where judges or prosecutors decide to temporarily become employed in
politically-exposed positions, notably positions as politicians, ministers, government officials, cabinet members or positions in other
political offices. The figure shows whether or not judges or prosecutors can take up such employment and afterwards return to
the position of a judge or a prosecutor, or whether specific rules are in place to safeguard their impartiality.
Figure 58
Safeguards relating to temporary employment of judges/prosecutors as politicians/ministers/
government officials/cabinet members/in other political offices (*)
For each Member State, the two columns represent the rules in place for:
1. Judges
2. Prosecutors
Authorisation from a body needed for the judge/prosecutor to leave their position temporarily
Cooling-off period required before the person can return to their position of a judge/prosecutor
Notification/declaration of the new temporary employment to a specific body by the judge/prosecutor
No specific rules in place, but the general ethical norms apply
Other rules
SUCH TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT
NOT ALLOWED
BE CZ
EL
LU MT RO BG DK DE EE
NOT ALLOWED
NOT ALLOWED
NOT ALLOWED
(*)
BG:
Magistrates can temporarily be appointed in these positions. For their re-appointment as judges/prosecutors/investigative magistrates, special procedural rules are in place
requiring an application to be submitted to the relevant panel of the Supreme Judicial Council within 14 days from the date of their dismissal from the other (temporary) position
with a view to their reinstatement.
DE:
If a prosecutor is elected to the Federal Parliament/appointed as a member of the Federal Government, the rights and duties deriving from the
public employment are suspended for the period of the mandate (with the exception of duties relating to official secrecy and the prohibition to accept rewards or gratifications); when
the mandate at the Bundestag has come to an end, the respective public servant may request (within a period of 3 month after the end of the mandate) their reinsertion into their
former service, which has to be realised within 3 month after the request and at the same or an equivalent level as the former position (if reinsertion is not requested, the rights and
duties deriving from the public employment continue to be suspended). In case of a return of a public official after a period of activity as a government member, which, in principle, is
possible with consent of both sides (otherwise a status of retirement applies), the specific rules (statutory disclosure requirements or related possibilities for a temporary prohibition
to take up certain activities) do not apply - such requirements only apply, where subsequent activities in the private sector are intended by a former government member.
DK:
It is
a prerequisite that upon returning to the prosecution service, the prosecutor can be approved and sustain the security approval provided.
EE:
Judges: Although there is no specific
regulation, which would limit the areas in which the judge could work, upon returning to judgeship, there is one important condition upon the return: a judge may return to a vacant
position of judge in the same court by giving at least one month’s advance notice thereof to the chairman of the corresponding court. If after leaving the state service, a judge does
not have the opportunity to return to a vacant position of judge in the same court and they do not desire to be transferred to another court, the judge is released from office and
receives compensation in an amount equal to their six months’ salary. Prosecutors: a prosecutor cannot be a member of a political party.
ES:
Judges: Judges who become members
of Parliament or Government can return to the same court or judicial position after their political mandate. The only exception to these rules applies to judges of the Supreme Court,
who lose their judicial position at the Supreme Court upon returning to judgeship and must sit at a lower court. Furthermore, the general rules of withdrawal and recusal apply if the
judge has to decide a case which involves politicians or political interests upon returning to judgeship. Prosecutors: Those who are returned to the prosecution service must refrain,
and where appropriate may be challenged, from intervening in any matters in which political parties or groups are involved, or those of their members who hold or have held public
office.
FR:
To return to the judgeship, a judge who has been previously politician/minister/government official/cabinet member is required to apply to a new position and the Council
must formally approve their appointment. Before returning to a position of a judge, the person must wait during a “cooling-off” period of five years in the area it exercised a public
mandate, or three years in the case of a European Parliament mandate.
HR:
There are specific rules regarding the positions to which prosecutors can temporarily be seconded as
well as procedure that must be followed.
IT:
The chart reflects the situation in the civil and criminal courts. The High Council for the Judiciary must give authorisation for judges in
civil and criminal courts. Administrative judges can work in consultative sections of Council of State or in jurisdictional sections which have no competence on matters related to the
previous activity of the judge. Prosecutors who run for Parliamentary elections may return to the prosecution service only to work in a district other than the one where they run for
election (irrespective of whether they were elected or not). Prosecutors may not run for Parliamentary elections in the district where they performed their functions in the last six
months prior to their candidacy. For regional and municipal elections, prosecutors may not run for election in the Region where they exercise their functions.
LV:
Judges cannot be
involved in any capacity in political life (even not members of a political party).
AT:
regarding prosecutors, before returning to a position of a prosecutor in a management position (i.e.
head of a public prosecutor’s office, of a senior public prosecutor’s office, of the General procurator’s office), the person must wait during a “cooling-off” period of five years.
PL:
As
regards appointment to political positions, the elected judge must renounce his judicial mandate but retains the right to return to judicial office (to the post held prior to the appoint-
ment) if the period in which the political function was exercised does not exceed 9 years. Authorisation is required by the National Council for Judiciary.
PT:
Judges and prosecutors
need a previous authorisation of the Judicial High Council or Superior Council of Public Prosecution (CSMP), respectively.
SK:
After returning to judgeship, judge must not apply for
a position of President or Vice-President of court. Notification is done to Ministry of Justice 60 days before returning to the judgeship.
NOT ALLOWED
IE
ES FR HR
IT
CY LV
LT HU NL AT
PL
PT SK
SI
FI
SE
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU –
– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU –
Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system as well as in cooperation between Member States in criminal
matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution service is crucial for the effective fight against crime, including eco-
nomic and financial crime, such as money laundering, and corruption. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to
the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (
115
), the public prosecutor’s office can be considered a Member State judicial
authority for the purposes of issuing and executing a European arrest warrant whenever it can act independently, without being
exposed to the risk of being subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, such
as a Minister for Justice (
116
).
The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no uniform model for all Member States.
However, the Council of Europe has noted a widespread tendency to have a more independent prosecutor’s office, rath-
er than one subordinated or linked to the executive (
117
). According to the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, an
effective and autonomous prosecution service committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights in the administra-
tion of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic state (
118
). Moreover, in a democratic society, both courts and the investi-
gative authorities must remain free from political pressure. The concept of independence means that prosecutors are free
from unlawful interference in the exercise of their duties so as to ensure full respect for and application of the law and the principle
of the rule of law and that they are not subjected to any political pressure or unlawful influence of any kind (
119
). Independence
applies not only to the prosecution service as a whole, but also to its particular bodies and to individual prosecutors (
120
). Whatever
the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards require that Member
States take effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and responsibilities
under adequate legal and organisational conditions (
121
) and without unjustified interference (
122
). In particular, where the govern-
ment gives instructions of a general nature, for example on crime policy, such instructions must be in writing and published in an
adequate way (
123
). Where the government has the power to give instructions to prosecute a specific case, such instructions must
carry with them adequate guarantees (
124
). According to the 2000 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe, instructions not to prosecute should in principle be prohibited or be exceptional and subject to specific safeguards (
125
).
Interested parties (including victims) should be able to challenge a decision of a public prosecutor not to prosecute a case (
126
),
which also provides a form of accountability of prosecutors (
127
).
The decision not to prosecute can create an issue in terms of accountability of prosecutors, which is why a legal remedy is impor-
tant (
128
). The figure below provides a more detailed overview of the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor not
to prosecute a case. These figures do not assess the effective functioning of the prosecution services, which requires a qualitative
assessment that takes account of the specific circumstances of each Member State.
115 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1).
116 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 May 2019,
OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Lübeck and Zwickau),
Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, paras 73, 74 and 88,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; judgment of 27 May 2019, C-509/18, para 52, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457; see also judgments of 12 December 2019,
Parquet général du Grand-Duché de
Luxembourg and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutors of Lyon and Tours),
in Joined Cases C-566/19 PPU and C-626/19, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077;
Openbaar Ministerie (Swedish
Prosecution Authority),
C-625/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078, and
Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels),
C-627/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079; judgment of
24 November 2020,
AZ,
C-510/19, para 54, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953. See also judgment of 10 November 2016,
Kovalkovas,
C-477/16 PPU, paras 34 and 36, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861,
and judgment of 10 November 2016,
Poltorak,
C-452/16 PPU, para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, ‘which must […] be distinguished, in accordance with the
principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, from the executive’. See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability
and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation xii.
117 CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - the Prosecution Service - Adopted by the Venice Commission -
at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 26.
118 Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 15 (2020) on the role of prosecutors in emergency situations, in particular when facing a pandemic.
119 Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 16 (2021) on the Implications of the decisions of international courts and treaty bodies as regards the
practical independence of prosecutors, para. 13.
120 Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 16 (2021) on the Implications of the decisions of international courts and treaty bodies as regards the
practical independence of prosecutors, para. 13.
121 Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October
2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), para. 4.
122 The 2000 Recommendation, paras 11 and 13. See also: Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of
European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendations i and iii; Group of States against corruption (GRECO), fourth evaluation round ‘Corruption prevention - Members of Parliament,
Judges and Prosecutors’, a vast number of recommendations ask for the introduction of arrangements to shield the prosecution service from undue influence and interference
in the investigation of criminal cases.
123 The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point c).
124 The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point d).
125 The 2000 Recommendation, para. 13, point f). See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of
European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation iv.
126 The 2000 Recommendation, para. 34.
127 CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - the Prosecution Service - Adopted by the Venice Commission -
at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 45.
128 CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II — the Prosecution Service — Adopted by the Venice
Commission — at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010), para. 45.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU –
Figure 59 presents the authorities that decide on a request to review a decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute in an individual
case for victimless crimes (e.g. money laundering, corruption) and for crimes with a victim (e.g. bodily harm)(
129
). It shows who
conducts a check on the work of individual prosecutors, which has an impact on the functioning of the prosecution service. In some
Member States, the decision not to prosecute is reviewed by different authorities: either superior prosecutors (including where
relevant the Prosecutor General) or a court. In some Member States, the decision is first reviewed before the superior prosecutors,
and then this decision can be challenged before a court (countries where column is in two colours). Where the column is in one
colour, either only the superior prosecutor, or only the court review the decision not to prosecute. In some of Member States, the
decision cannot be reviewed.
Figure 59
Authority reviewing a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute (*)
(Source: European Commission with the
Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)
For each Member State, the two columns represent the following two scenarios:
1. victimless crimes (e.g. money laundering, corruption)
2. crimes with a victim (e.g. bodily harm)
No review
Superior prosecutor
Court
##
*
IT
ES NL AT
EL
FR
LT
PT RO DE
IE
HU BG CZ DK LV
SK
SE LU
SI
FI
HR EE MT PL CY
NO DATA
BE
(*) For all Member States: Where such review exists, in the case of victimless crimes, the decision not to prosecute could be challenged/overruled by the superior prosecutor (in BG,
CZ, DE, ES, FR, LV, LU, PL, PT and RO), challenged by the complainant who notified about the alleged criminal offense (in DE (via disciplinary complaint), IE (National Police Service),
FR (including administrative bodies), PL (as regards state and local-government institutions, and private parties in specific cases, HR, IT, LV, HU, NL, SI and SK) or could be challenged
by others, such as persons who have presumed/legitimate interest (DK, DE, RO), the Commissioner for Legal Protection (AT), anyone (PT: for certain victimless crimes) and anyone
(FI). In the case of crimes with a victim, the decision not to prosecute can be challenged by the superior prosecutor (in BG, CZ, DE, FR, LV, LU, PT and RO), by the victim (in BG, CZ, DE,
EE, IE, ES, FR, IT, LV, HU, MT, NL, AT, PT, PL, SI and SK) or by others, such as persons who have presumed/legitimate interest (DK, RO, PL), an administration that its entitled to act (FR),
and anyone (FI). Private prosecution is possible in BG, IE, HR, HU, MT, PL, PT, SI and SE.
The symbols ‘##’ for
AT:
Austrian law knows different types of decisions not to prosecute. If the prosecution refrains from starting investigations because of the lack of an initial
suspicion, then the decision cannot be challenged (The decision is however not binding). If the prosecution decides not to prosecute after an investigation (both in certain victimless
crimes and crimes with a victim), the decision can be challenged before the court. The symbol ‘*’ for
BG:
The prosecutor decides whether the requirements of the law for initiating
preliminary proceedings are present. If not, the prosecutor issues a Decree for refusal to institute preliminary proceedings (the refusal to open an investigation). This refusal is subject
to appeal only before the higher-standing prosecutor’s office. If preliminary proceedings were initiated, once concluded, the prosecutor can terminate them or to bring the case to
the court (the decision to prosecute). The decree not to start a prosecution for crimes with a victim, is subject to appeal before court within 7 days. If this deadline is not met, the
decision can still be appealed but only before the higher-standing prosecutor’s office. In cases of victimless crimes, the decision not to prosecute can only be revoked ex officio by
the higher-standing prosecutor’s office by a signal or after self-initiation.
EE:
A victim can file an appeal against the investigative body’s decision not to initiate criminal proceedings
with the prosecutor’s office. The decision of the prosecutor’s office not to initiate or to terminate criminal proceedings can be challenged at the Office of the Prosecutor General.
The decision of the Office of the Prosecutor General can be challenged at the District Court.
ES:
The judge investigator is the authority vested with the power to decide whether to
prosecute or not. Following a decision not to prosecute, the judge investigator should inform the other parties to the process (i.e. the public prosecutor and the victim/complainant),
who are able to challenge the decision before the court.
IT:
In any criminal proceedings, if the public prosecutor deems that the conditions for prosecution are not met (e.g. due to
insufficient evidence), he/she shall file a request for dismissal with the judge for preliminary investigations who shall decide whether to accept or not the prosecutor’s request.
CY:
If
the Attorney General decides not to prosecute a case (based on the evidence at hand and recommendations of the Attorneys at the Law Office), only the Attorney General can reverse
such a decision.
LT:
The decision of a pre-trial investigation officer not to commence a pre-trial investigation is made only with the consent of the head of the pre-trial investigation
authority. The resolution not to commence a pre-trial investigation must be sent to the prosecutor within 24 hours, who checks the decision within 10 days. The rejected decision
of the prosecutor can be appealed to the court. The resolution of a pre-trial investigation officer can also be appealed to the prosecutor. If rejected, the prosecutor’s decision can
be appealed to the court. The judge’s decision again can be appealed to the superior court.
HU:
Judicial review for crimes with a victim is possible only in the framework of private
prosecution (e.g. in cases of defamation and libel) or substitute private prosecution (following a prosecutorial decision not to prosecute).
MT:
Prosecution of criminal offences is being
transferred from the police to the Office of the Attorney General. The transition is planned to be completed by the end of 2025. In October 2020, the Attorney General took over the
decision to prosecute and the institution of prosecutions before the inferior courts of specified serious crimes. Regulation, entered into effect in October 2020, provides for judicial
review (before civil courts) of decisions not to prosecute of the Attorney General on the ground of illegality or unreasonableness. When the decision to prosecute and prosecution
is vested in the Commissioner of Police, challenge proceedings may be instituted before the Court of Magistrates.
PL:
The framework differentiates between a decision to refuse
the initiation of prosecution and a decision to discontinue the prosecution. The initiation of prosecution can be challenged in front of the superior prosecutor and before court, by
the victim, State, local-government or community institution which notified the alleged offence. The discontinuation of prosecution can be challenged by the parties to proceedings,
State or local-government institution that notified the alleged offence, and, only if the alleged offence led to breach of that person’s rights, a person notifying an offence concerning
solely specific types of criminal acts listed in the law.
PT:
A prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can be reviewed either through an autonomous procedural phase, the instrução
(reopening of the inquiry), which specifically envisages the judicial confirmation of the decision to indict or to file the investigation. This reopening of the inquiry may be requested by
an
‘assistente’
if the procedure does not depend upon private prosecution. A prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute can also be reviewed before an immediate superior of the Public
Prosecutor within 20 days from the date in which the opening of the inquiry may no longer be requested.
SI:
State prosecutors cannot dismiss criminal complaints for certain crimi-
nal offences without the co-signature of the head of state prosecutor’s office. State prosecutors must inform certain categories of people and state authorities that filed a criminal
complaint about their intention and reasons to dismiss it, and enable them to give an opinion on the reasons for the dismissal. Once the decision to dismiss a criminal complaint or
to discontinue prosecution has been taken it is final, but the injured party may decide to take over the (private) prosecution.
SE:
The decision is public. The victim of a crime as well
as the suspect can ask for a review. The request is taken care of by the prosecutor who made the decision. In case of new evidence or circumstances, the prosecutor can decide to
take action. If no new information, the Development Centre decides on revision.
129 Victim, as defined by Article 2 of the Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, means a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which
was directly caused by a criminal offence, or family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a criminal offence and who have suffered harm as a result of
that person’s death.
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3.3. Independence
3.3.2. Structural independence
–Independence of Bars and lawyers in the EU –
Figure 60 presents a first overview of bodies and authorities with power to conduct criminal investigations with regard to financial
and economic crime, and all other offences. Independent and impartial justice systems that effectively enforce anti-corruption
legislation by conducting impartial investigations and prosecutions are important for an effective fight against corruption (
130
), as
well as against other financial and economic crime.
Figure 60
Bodies with power to conduct criminal investigation (*)
(Source: European Commission with the Expert Group
on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism)
BE BG CZ DK DE EE
IE
EL ES FR HR
IT
CY LV
LT
LU HU MT NL AT
PL
PT RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
Police
Public prosecutor
Investigative judge/magistrat
Gendarmerie
Military bodies
Tax authority
National security agency
Other (please specify)
(*)
CZ:
Police authorities include also the General Inspection of Security Forces, the Prison Service, customs officers, military police, and also organs of the Security Information Service
and organs of the Foreign Intelligence Service, who investigate crimes committed by members of the Security Information Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service respectively.
EE:
Secret Service is set up for the maintenance of national security through collection of information and implementation of preventive measures as well as investigation of offences.
In addition to being a security institution it is also a police-type authority conducting criminal investigations mainly regarding terrorism and grand corruption.
PL:
Agency of Internal
Security, Foreign Intelligence Agency and Service of Military Counter-Intelligence/Intelligence should transmit to public prosecutor any evidence of alleged criminal offences. Under
the category ‘other’, Member States noted:
BE:
Several public service agencies at federal level.
BG:
Investigating customs inspector.
ES:
Customs authorities.
IT:
Police includes the
following law enforcement agencies: Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza and Carabinieri. According to Articles 55 and 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure other bodies and agen-
cies may perform functions of judicial police (criminal investigations) within the limits provided for by the law (e.g. customs officials).
LV:
the State Security Service, Internal Security
Department of the State Revenue Service, the Military Police, the Latvian Prison Administration, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, the Tax and Customs Police of the
State Revenue Service, the State Border Guard, the captains of seagoing vessels at sea, the commander of a unit of the Latvian National Armed Forces located in the territory of
a foreign country, the Internal Security Bureau.
LT:
The State Border Guard Service, the Special Investigation Service, the Financial Crime Investigation Service, the Customs of the
Republic of Lithuania and the Fire and Rescue Department, the Department of Prisons.
LU:
some sworn public servants (judicial police officers) of different administrations, such
as Customs administrations.
NL:
special investigative bodies, being FIOD (financial-economic inspection), the inspection for social welfare, inspection for the environment and the
inspection for agriculture.
PL:
Border Guard, the Central Anti-corruption Bureau.
SK:
The Criminal Office of the Financial Administration (FACO) is a special unit within the Financial
Directorate of Slovakia entitled to detect and investigate criminal offences in the area of customs and tax regulations.
FI:
Customs, Border Guard and Defense Forces can also
investigate crimes. The Customs has powers to investigate money laundering cases.
–Independence of Bars and lawyers in the EU –
Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and the
strengthening of the rule of law (
131
). A fair system of administering justice requires that lawyers be free to pursue their activi-
ties of advising and representing their clients. The lawyers’ membership of a liberal profession and the authority deriving from
that membership helps to maintain independence, and bar associations play an important role in helping to guarantee lawyers’
independence. European standards require, among others, the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer, the independence
of the bar associations and lay down the basic principles of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers (
132
).
130 2020 Rule of Law Report - Communication from the Commission on the rule of law situation in the European Union, p. 13, and Council non-paper 8478/21 of 12 May 2021,
available at
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8478-2021-INIT/en/pdf
131 “Lawyers play an important role in protecting the rule of law and judicial independence, while respecting the separation of powers and fundamental rights.”, ‘Access
to a lawyer
and rule of law’,
Presidency discussion paper for the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 3 and 4 March 2022:
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-6319-2022-INIT/en/pdf
132 Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
49
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3.3. Independence
3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence
Figure 61
Independence of Bars and lawyers, 2021 (*)
(source: European Commission with the CCBE(
133
))
Disciplinary measures against lawyers are subject to a judicial review
The body taking decisions on disciplinary measures is independent
The body initiating the disciplinary proceedings is independent
Decisions on access to the profession are subject to a judicial review
The body giving autorisation for access to the profession is independent
No supervisory role of the executive
Independence of the bar from the executive
Guarantees for confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
LU PT BE
IE
ES HR FR LV
FI
SK EL NL DK AT HU
SI
SE DE CZ
IT
EE LT
PL RO BG CY MT
(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. Survey conducted end-2021. For the question related to guarantees for confidentiality of the lawyer/client relationship 0.5 points were awarded for
each of the scenarios (search and seizure of e-data held by the lawyer, search of the premises of the lawyer, interception of lawyer/client communication, surveillance of the lawyer
or their premises, tax audit of the law firm and other administrative checks) fully covered. For all other criteria fully met, 1 point was awarded, while no point was awarded where
the criterion was not met. Due to a change in the methodology the results are not comparable with those presented in Figure 58 of the 2021 Justice Scoreboard.
RO, CY, MT:
2020
replies, adapted to the new methodology.
FR:
A legislative change in 2021 established the possibility of judicial review of disciplinary measures taken against lawyers.
DK:
The
decisions concerning the authorisation to practice as a lawyer or to accede to the profession are approved by the Ministry of Justice upon recommendation and consultation with
the Danish Bar and Law Society.
AT:
The Ministry of Justice has some structural supervisory powers (related to oversight over the legality of the administrative management of the
Bar), however none regarding the day-to-day business of the bars.
SE:
The Chancellor of Justice has supervisory powers with regard to advocates and may request that disciplinary
measures are implemented by the Disciplinary Committee against a negligent member, or by the Board in respect of members who no longer fulfils the formal requirements for
membership.
CZ:
The Ministry of Justice retains a supervisory role in defined matters.
EE:
The Ministry of Justice has broad supervisory powers over the organisation of the legal aid
system.
LT:
The activities of the Lithuanian Bar Association are based on the principle of independent self-governance of advocates (lawyers), however, following the Law on the Bar
regulating the activities of the Lithuanian Bar Association, the Lithuanian Bar Association is obligated by law to coordinate the procedures, related exclusively with activities of advo-
cates with the Ministry of Justice.
PL:
The Ministry of Justice has a supervisory role over the Bar, organising the bar examinations and controlling the scheme on minimal legal fees.
3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence
Judicial independence is a fundamental element of an effective justice system. It is vital for upholding the rule of
law, the fairness of judicial proceedings and the trust of citizens and businesses in the legal system. For this reason,
any justice reform should uphold the rule of law and comply with European standards on judicial independence. The
2022 Scoreboard shows trends in the general public’s and companies’ perceptions of judicial independence. This
edition also presents some indicators on the national security checks on judges, on possibility of higher/Supreme
Courts to take decisions on the consistency of case-law of lower courts on their own initiative, on rules regulating
‘revolving doors’, as well as a more detailed insight into the possibility to have a review of a decision of a prosecutor
not to prosecute a case. The structural indicators do not in themselves allow for conclusions to be drawn about
the independence of the judiciaries of the Member States, but represent possible elements which may be taken as
a starting point for such an analysis.
The 2022 Scoreboard presents the developments in
perceived independence
from surveys of the general public
(Eurobarometer) and companies (Eurobarometer):
-
The seventh Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 50) shows that the perception of inde-
pendence has
improved
in over three fifths of Member States when compared to 2016. The general public’s
perception of independence has
improved
in half of the Members States facing specific challenges when
compared to 2016. However, compared to last year, the general public’s perception of independence
de-
creased
in more than half of all Member States and in more than half of the Members States facing specific
challenges, and in a few Member States, the level of perceived independence remains particularly low.
The seventh Eurobarometer survey among the companies (Figure 52) shows that the perception of independ-
ence has
improved
in over half of the Member States compared to 2016. Compared to last year, the compa-
nies’ perception of independence
decreased
in less than one third of all Member States (whereas last year
this was the case in over half of Member States) and in about one fifth of Members States facing specific
challenges. In a few Member States, the level of perceived independence remains particularly low.
-
133 2021 data collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire.
50
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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3.3. Independence
3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence
-
Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, the
interference or pressure
from government and politicians
was the most stated reason, followed by the
pressure from economic or
other specific interests.
Compared to previous years, both reasons remain notable for several Member States
where perceived independence is very low (Figures 51 and 53).
Among the reasons for good perception of independence of courts and judges, nearly four fifths of companies
and of the general public (equivalent to 41% and 42% of all respondents, respectively) named the
guaran-
tees provided by the status and position of judges.
-
For the first time, the EU Justice Scoreboard presents the results of a Eurobarometer survey on how companies
perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts as regards, in their view, unjustified deci-
sions or inaction by the State (Figure 54). The results suggest that administrative conduct, stability and quality of
the law-making process, as well as effectiveness of courts and property protection are key factors of comparable
significance for confidence in investment protection. Among the reasons for companies’ concerns about the ef-
fectiveness of investment protection (Figure 55), the
unpredictable, non-transparent administrative conduct, and
difficulty to challenge administrative decisions in court
was the most stated reason, closely followed by
frequent
changes in legislation or concerns about quality of the law making process
the.
Figure 56 shows whether in Member States, the National Security Agency is involved in conducting security checks
on judges, either on candidate judges or on existing judges, and what is the frequency of such checks.
Figure 57 shows whether higher courts or Supreme Courts can take a decision on their own initiative on the con-
sistency of case-law of lower courts. Such decisions could either be advisory or obligatory in nature, and could
apply only to a particular case before the lower court or to all cases of a similar type in all courts.
Figure 58 presents safeguards in place in situations where judges or prosecutors decide to temporarily become
employed in politically-exposed positions, notably positions as politicians, ministers, government officials, cabinet
members or positions in other political offices.
Figure 59 shows the safeguards in place regarding the decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a case. The
updated figure gives a more detailed overview of the safeguards available in the case of victimless crimes (e.g.
money laundering) and in the case of crimes with a victim. While in some Member States there is, in both cases,
the possibility to challenge the decision not to prosecute before a court, in the majority of Member States there
is either a review by a superior prosecutor, by a court or by both. In a few Member States there is no possibility to
review a decision not to prosecute.
Figure 60 gives a first overview of bodies and authorities with the power to conduct criminal investigations. The
figure shows that in the majority of Member States criminal investigation can be conducted not only by the police
and prosecutors, but also by various other state authorities.
Figure 61 shows that although in certain Member States the executive plays some supervisory role as regards the
Bar, the independence of lawyers is generally guaranteed, allowing lawyers to be free in pursuing their activities
of advising and representing their clients.
3. Key findings of the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard presents a diverse picture of the effectiveness of justice systems in the Member States. While
in some Member States, the high level of digitalisation of the justice system allowed for an almost unobstructed functioning of
the courts and prosecution services during the COVID-19 pandemic, in others the temporary closures of courts led to a decrease
in efficiency, particularly at first instance courts.
The updated section dedicated to the digitalisation of justice systems shows the trends on the further uptake of digital tools at
the disposal of courts, prosecutors and staff members. Challenges remain to ensure full trust of citizens in the legal systems of
all Member States. The information in the EU Justice Scoreboard contributes to the monitoring carried out in the framework of
the European Rule of Law Mechanism and feeds into the Commission’s annual Rule of Law report.
52
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