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RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AGAINST

CHRISTIANS: DISRUPTIONS AND

DISTRACTIONS

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

Cover image taken after the 2018 Digana riots courtesy of the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka

(NCEASL).

This report was produced by Verité Research based on information provided by the National Christian Evangelical

Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL).

NCEASL holds exclusive intellectual property rights with respect to the information provided to Verité Research.

Verité Research holds all intellectual property rights over the analysis in this report.

NCEASL holds sole distribution rights with respect to this report.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

Acknowledgements

The study is based on data collected by the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri

Lanka (NCEASL). NCEASL works actively in three broad areas – mission and theology;

religious liberty and human rights; relief and development. NCEASL is affiliated to the

World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), a worldwide network of over 620 million Christians in

129 countries. NCEASL is led by renowned social transformation, religious liberty and

human rights activist Deshamanya Godfrey Yogarajah.

For over two decades, the Religious Liberty Commission (RLC) of NCEASL has monitored

and documented incidents of violence, intimidation and discrimination against Sri

Lanka’s Christian community. The aim of the RLC is to advance religious liberty for all Sri

Lankans through advocacy and lobbying, research and documentation and training and

education.

This study was compiled by Verité Media of Verité Research. Ranmini Gunasekara was

the lead researcher and author of the study. Mahoshadi Peiris and Rochel Canagasabey

provided editorial supervision. Ashvin Perera and Siyama Ansar generated the quanti-

tative insights. Data was tabulated by Sulangi Thumbelina. The report was language

edited by Suresh Yogasundram. Overall research supervision was provided by Deepan-

jalie Abeywardana and Nishan de Mel. Infographics were provided by Nilangika Fernando.

Formatting was done by Dinuk Senapatiratne. The author is deeply indebted and grateful

to the aforementioned individuals for their time in reviewing drafts and ideas and for

their feedback.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................................3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................................5

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................................7

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT (NOVEMBER 2021 – OCTOBER 2022) ...........................................................................8

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE........................................................................................................................11

1.2 GENDER AND INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS ...................................................................15

CHAPTER 2: VIOLENCE OVER THE YEARS: DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS ....................................................16

2.1 DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS DURING NOVEMBER 2021 – OCTOBER 2022 .......................................18

CHAPTER 3: UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS ....................................................................................................20

3.1 THE ROLE OF THE STATE ...................................................................................................................................20

3.2 THE ROLE OF OTHER IDENTIFIABLE INDIVIDUALS ......................................................................................... 26

3.3 THE ROLE OF BUDDHIST MONKS ..................................................................................................................... 27

CHAPTER 4: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE ....................................................................................28

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................31

ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS: METHODOLOGY .........................................................................33

ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS ...........................................................38

2.1 VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS ..........................................................................................................................38

2.2 VIOLENCE AGAINST HINDUS ............................................................................................................................ 47

END NOTES ...................................................................................................................................................................55

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

thno-religious violence against minority faith

groups is an entrenched issue that has persisted

As observed in past studies, an evaluation of

anti-Christian violence between November 2021

and October 2022 points to there being disruptions

and distractions that reduced the frequency of

violence. These disruptions and distractions, that

reduced the frequency of violence, were observed

primarily in the months of June and July 2022, in

the form of a national convergence around the

aragalaya,

the restrictions to mobility (caused by

severe fuel shortages and the imposition of police

curfews), and changes to Sri Lanka’s political

leadership (formal definition of the terms disrup-

tions and distractions are in page 16.

in Sri Lanka irrespective of the changes to Sri Lanka’s

socio-political and economic context. This study

examines key trends in religiously motivated violence

against Christians between November 2021 and

October 2022. Based on data collated by the National

Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), a

total of 75 incidents of violence against Christians were

analysed. Additionally, there was limited data available

on violence against Muslims and Hindus which is set out

in Annexure 2.

The analysis of anti-Christian violence is presented in

four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of violence

targeting Christians by mapping out the most prevalent

types of harm, key perpetrators and the primary targets

of violence. Chapter 2 examines the disruptions and

distractions to the upward momentum of violence

against Christians, while Chapter 3 examines the role

of the state and the Buddhist clergy in perpetrating

violence. Chapter 4 provides a breakdown of the

district-level patterns of violence against Christians.

An evaluation of district-level violence showed

that the violence that took place within the current

period under review was more spread out in

comparison to the previous period under review.

Between November 2021 and October 2022,

violence against Christians was observed in 17

of the 25 administrative districts in Sri Lanka. By

contrast, previously between October 2020 and

October 2021, anti-Christian violence was observed

only in 12 of the 25 administrative districts in Sri

Lanka (Verité Research, 2022a).

There were three key observations that emerged

from the evaluated data:

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The district-level evaluation of anti-Christian

violence further revealed that three districts–

Kalutara (13), Anuradhapura (10) and Mannar

(seven)–recorded the highest number of incidents.

The districts of Kalutara and Anuradhapura both

have similar religious compositions. Buddhists are

the religious majority in Kalutara (83 percent of the

population) and Anuradhapura (90 percent of the

population). Roman Catholic Christians (identi-

fied as Roman Catholics in the census) make up

three percent of the population in Kalutara and 0.7

percent of the population in Anuradhapura, while

non-Roman Catholic Christians (identified simply as

Christians in the census) comprise only 0.7 percent

of the population in Kalutara and 0.4 percent of

the population in Anuradhapura. The violence in

Kalutara was mainly led by Buddhist monks (six

incidents) and state officials (six incidents), while

violence in Anuradhapura was mainly led by state

officials (seven incidents) and other identifiable

individuals (five incidents). Meanwhile, Roman

Catholic Christians are the religious majority in

Mannar (52 percent), with non-Roman Catholic

Christians comprising just four percent of the

population. The violence in Mannar was led by

state officials (five incidents) and other identifiable

individuals (two incidents).

Overall, the trends and patterns identified through this

study provide greater insights into the violence against

Christians in Sri Lanka.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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INTRODUCTION

thno-religious violence has been a longstanding

issue in Sri Lanka. Violence motivated along

and distractions that affected the increasing pattern

of violence against Christians. Accordingly, this

chapter attempts to make sense of these disruptions

and distractions by contextualising the anti-Chris-

tian violence in relation to the

aragalaya,

restrictions

to mobility and the changes to Sri Lanka’s political

leadership. Chapter three sheds light on the role and

actions of the state, other identifiable individuals and

the members of the Buddhist clergy. Meanwhile, the

fourth chapter explores the breakdown of district-level

violence. The study concludes by noting key observa-

tions on the patterns of violence against Christians.

ethno-religious lines has endured in Sri Lanka irrespec-

tive of the changes to the country’s political, social and

economic landscapes. In 2022, Sri Lanka witnessed

a wave of democratic public protests (commonly

referred to as the

aragalaya

– which means, the people’s

struggle) opposing the government at the time. Despite

the national convergence and inclusivity in the

araga-

laya,

ethno-religious violence persisted both during and

after the period of the

aragalaya.

This study explores ethno-religious violence targeting

minority faith groups for the period November 2021 to

October 2022. Furthermore, it builds on previous trend

analyses of religious violence conducted by Verité

Research. This study is presented in four chapters and

takes place within the specific socio-political context

of the period under review.

The first chapter presents an overview of the incidents

of violence targeting Christians. In particular, the

chapter will expand on the types of harm, the key

perpetrators and victims of anti-Christian violence. The

second chapter will examine the temporary disruptions

This study adopted the classification system devel-

oped by Verité Research in 2014 to evaluate types

of harm, primary targets, key perpetrators and the

state’s response to the incidents (see Annexure 1 for

the complete methodology used in this study). Each

incident of violence was recorded and verified by

NCEASL. The current study does not feature a separate

analysis on the violence and discrimination directed at

the Hindu and Muslim communities. However, similar to

the previous study, Annexure 2 provides a brief descrip-

tion on the underlying narratives propelling violence

and discrimination against these groups.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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(NOVEMBER 2021 – OCTOBER 2022)

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

ver the past year, the Sri Lankan government has

come under severe public scrutiny. In particular, the

The

aragalaya,

which had emerged within the above

context, was characterised by the diversity and inclu-

sivity it demonstrated. The public protests mobilised

support from different segments of society, including

all ethnic and religious communities, social classes,

professionals and private sector entities. Since April

2022, the GotaGoGama (Gota-Go-Village/GGG), a

protest site at Galle Face Green, drew unanimous

commendation for having displayed sense of unity and

harmony by celebrating the Sinhala and Tamil New

Year, Easter Sunday and the daily Ramadan breaking

of fast, and singing the national anthem in both

Sinhala and Tamil languages at the protest site (Verité

Research, 2022c).

The

aragalaya

also drew atten-

tion for the commemoration of various events, which

were previously subjected to criticism. For instance,

the commemoration of the bereaved from the armed

conflict by protesters across different segments

of the society received significant traction both on

mainstream and social media (Srinivasan, 2022a).

Although the

aragalaya

was seen as a mark of interra-

cial solidarity within the capital of Sri Lanka, the same

was not observed in some areas of the Northern and

Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. For instance, Tamil

government of former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa

came under criticism for its mismanagement of the

economy. The government’s economic policies were

criticised for being ‘short-sighted and unsustainable’

as they resulted in depleted foreign reserves and short-

ages of essential goods (Verité Research, 2021a).

The forex crisis and the shortages of essential items and

services, including 13-hour-long daily power outages,

led to a sense of public anger, frustration and hopeless-

ness towards the government. This growing public

frustration galvanised support for a wave of democratic

public protests across the island commencing in March

2022 (Verité Research, 2022b).

The public protests, commonly known by the Sinhala

term

aragalaya

(the people’s struggle), primarily called

for the immediate resignation of President Gotabaya

Rajapaksa and members of the Rajapaksa family from

all positions of state power, followed by immediate

change in political leadership. Concurrently, protesters

carried slogans rejecting all political parties (Verité

Research, 2022b).

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT (NOVEMBER 2021 – OCTOBER 2022)

communities living in the North and East, who continue

to grieve alleged war crimes of the Rajapaksa govern-

ment such as forced disappearances during the armed

conflict, were seen protesting less frequently than

those in Colombo (Arulthas, 2022; Ellis-Petersen, 2022;

Marsh, 2022).

The

aragalaya

was also a frequent target of state

sponsored violence. In April 2022, police violence at

a protest site in Rambukkanna led to the death of a

protester and injuries to several other protesters. At the

protest site, the police reportedly used live ammunition

to disperse the protesters, which resulted in the death

and injuries to protesters (Verité Research, 2022c).

9 May, an attack on MynaGoGama (Myna-Go-Village/

MGG) a protest site near Temple Trees and GotaGoGama

(Gota-Go-Village/GGG) was carried out by a group of

supporters associated with Prime Minister Mahinda

Rajapaksa. On the same day Prime Minister Mahinda

Rajapaksa resigned (Verité Research, 2022d).

The

attack on the protesters triggered a wave of violence

across the country that resulted in the deaths of nine

people, including the death of SLPP MP Amarakeerthi

Athukorala, injured 219 people and caused extensive

property damage to the residences and businesses

of government MPs (Dhar, 2022; Farzan, 2022).

Soon

afterwards, MP Ranil Wickremesinghe, the former

prime minister of the yahapaalana government, was

sworn in as prime minister (Wipulasena, 2022).

In July 2022, the

aragalaya

movement culminated in

Colombo with the ‘Ratama Colombata’ (whole country to

Colombo) protest. The July protest prompted Gotabaya

Rajapaksa to flee to the Maldives and led to his subse-

quent resignation (Fraser, 2022; Jayasinghe, 2022;

Srinivasan 2022).

Rajapaksa’s resignation led to Prime

Minister Wickremesinghe being appointed as interim

president (Pathi et al., 2022).

On July 20, Wickremes-

inghe was elected as the eighth executive president of

Sri Lanka by a majority vote of the members of parlia-

ment (“Hon. Ranil Wickremesinghe elected”, 2022;

Srinivasan, 2022b).

Immediately

following

Wickremesinghe’s

ascend-

ency to the presidency, human rights organisations

condemned the government’s ‘aggressive crackdowns’

on protesters (Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights, 2022; Pathirana, 2022).

In August 2022,

Wickremesinghe issued detention orders on protesters

under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) (Verité

Research, 2022e).

The PTA has long been considered a

‘draconian’ piece of legislation that has been used in Sri

Lanka for over 40 years for prolonged arbitrary deten-

tion, to target religious and ethnic minorities and curtail

political dissent (Amnesty International, 2022; Human

Rights Watch, 2022).

Despite the unifying aspects of the

aragalaya,

ethno-re-

ligious tensions continued to persist elsewhere in the

country. For example, in June 2022, tensions re-erupted

at a contested sacred site in Kurunthurmalai/Kurundi-

male between the Tamil locals and politicians of the area

and the Buddhist monks, officials from the Archaeology

Department and the Sri Lankan military. In the past, the

sacred site has been contested by the Buddhists and

Hindus. While court orders were initially given to stop

construction, this judgement was later reversed (“Court

orders removal”, 2022; Gunasekara, 2022).

In April 2022, the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious

Affairs and Cultural Affairs issued a circular to the effect

that new places of worship, religious centres or prayer

centres must register with the respective divisional

secretaries for approval from the ministry (Ministry of

Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, 2022).

Organisations promoting the rights of Christians such

as the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA) and the Asia

Evangelical Alliance (AEA) have criticised the circular

as infringing the constitutionally guaranteed freedom

of religion and right to manifest religious beliefs (World

Evangelical Alliance, Asia Evangelical Alliance, Chris-

tian Solidarity Worldwide, 2022).

In September 2022, the Wickremesinghe-led govern-

ment came under heavy criticism for tabling the

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(November 2021 - October 2022)

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SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT (NOVEMBER 2021 – OCTOBER 2022)

Bureau of Rehabilitation Bill.

The proposed bill

envisions the widening of the pre-existing powers of

the bureau to ‘rehabilitate ex-combatants, members

of violent extremist groups and any other group of

persons who requests treatment and rehabilitation or

is required by law to be provided with treatment and

rehabilitation.’ Criticisms on the bill emerged over the

concerns that the bill can be used to detain individ-

uals from a broad range of groups, including those who

advocate for social and democratic rights (including

the right of freedom of religion or belief) (Perera, 2022;

Satkunanathan, 2022).

Criticisms also re-emerged about successive govern-

ments’ inability to identify the perpetrators behind

the Easter Sunday attacks. In July 2022, President

Wickremesinghe called for a full-scale probe into the

bombings and stated that he would enlist the help of

the British Police. However, the Sri Lankan Catholic

Church rejected this as an attempt to use the Easter

Sunday bombings for political gain (“Sri Lanka Catholic

church rejects”, 2022).

Against this backdrop, human

rights organisations–including the United Nations

Human Rights Council (UNHRC)–have raised concerns

over the country’s ethno-religious majoritarianism

and human rights violations.

For instance, in October

2022, a report released by the UN High Commissioner

for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet called upon the

government to address the underlying causes of the

country’s economic crisis, impunity for human rights

violations and economic crimes (Situation of Human

Rights in Sri Lanka, 2022; Sri Lanka: New government

urged, 2022).

In the past year, there have also been tensions between

different Christian denominations in Sri Lanka. In

particular, the proselytizing of mainline Christian

groups (such as the Roman Catholics) by non-main-

line Christian groups (sometimes loosely referred to

as “evangelical groups”) has been a recurrent theme

of contestation. As observed by scholars in the past,

these tensions have usually not been violent in nature

(Gunatilleke, 2015).

It is in this socio-political context that the study analyses

the prevalence of religiously motivated violence against

Christians, Muslims and Hindus from November 2021 to

October 2022.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE

CHAPTER 1:

hristians in Sri Lanka continue to be targeted

in incidents of religiously motivated violence.

Table 1 |

Categorisation of severity of violence or harm

Although the findings of this study are limited to the

period of November 2021 to October 2022, they add to

the trends and patterns of religious violence against

Christians that have been explored through previous

studies by Verité Research. Similar to the previous

studies by Verité Research (2020; 2021b; 2022a), this

study uses the same classification systems to evaluate

the nature of violence (see table below; refer Annexure

1 for a detailed description).

This section will provide

a brief overview of the violence against Christians that

took place during the period under review.

A total of 75 incidents of violence aimed at Christians

were identified during this time period. This figure

is a slight increase from the 72 incidents of violence

that were analysed in the previous study for the period

October 2020 to October 2021 (Verité Research,

2022a).

Severity of

violence or harm

Description

Most severe forms Carrying out physical violence

of violence

against persons

Severe forms of

violence

Borderline severe

forms of violence

Violence involving property

damage

Includes threats, intimidation or

coercion. This type of violence

generally does not include

physical violence or damage to

property and is generally low

in intensity. In extreme cases,

this type of violence may lead to

more severe forms of violence

Includes discriminatory action

or practices

Least severe

forms of violence

As depicted in Figure 1, the most frequent and main

type of harm (violence targeting Christians) is the

least severe forms of violence. Least severe forms of

violence include discriminatory action or practices,

which occurred in 54 instances during the period under

review. There were 22 instances of borderline severe

forms of violence, which include threats, intimidation

and coercion. Notably, this study observed a 52 percent

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE

reduction in incidents that include threats, intimidation

and coercion in comparison to the October 2020 –

October 2021 period (from 46 incidents to 22 incidents)

(Verité Research, 2022a).

Meanwhile, as observed in

the previous study (Verité Research, 2022a), incidents

involving the most severe forms of violence (physical

violence) and severe forms of violence (property

damage) remained low.

Figure 1 |

Distribution of the types of harm

*A single incident could feature more than one type of harm. Therefore, the total amount calculated within each type of harm may exceed the total

number of incidents.

Discriminatory Action

or Practices

Threats,

Intimidation or

Coercion

Property Damage

or Destruction

Physical

Violence

Hate Speech

As illustrated in Figure 2, most incidents of violence

were identified to have been committed by state

officials, followed by other identifiable individuals

(these perpetrators were all individuals that are local or

can be identified, excluding state officials, members of

the clergy and political figures) and then by members of

the Buddhist clergy. In comparison to the previous study

(Verité Research, 2022a), there is a 43 percent increase

in the number of instances where other identifiable

individuals have been identified as key perpetrators

of violence against Christians (23 incidents to 33

incidents).

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE

Figure 2 |

Distribution of key perpetrators of violence against Christians

*A single incident could feature more than one key perpetrator. Therefore, the total amount calculated within each type of harm

total number

the total

single incident could feature more than one key perpetrator. Therefore, the total key perpetrators calculated may exceed the

may exceed

number of incidents.

incidents.

**Other identiﬁable individuals are individuals that are local or can be identiﬁed, excluding state officials, members of the clergy, and political

ﬁgures.

**Other identiﬁable individuals are individuals that are local or can be identiﬁed, excluding state officials, members of the clergy, and political ﬁgures.

State Officials

Other Identiﬁable

Individual/s

Buddhist Monk

Unidentiﬁed

Individual/s

Other

Political/ Social Movements or Politicians

Religious Institutions or Clergy from Other Religions

Figure 3 |

Distribution of primary targets of violence against Christians

*A single incident could feature more than one primary target. Therefore, the total primary targets calculated may exceed the total number of incidents.

Clergy/Pastors

Place of worship

Congregants

Other

Community in the locality

and wider Sri Lankan

Christian community

Figure 3 depicts that the primary targets in incidents

of violence against Christians between November 2021

and October 2022 were predominantly members of the

Christian clergy, followed by Christian places of worship.

These findings remain consistent with the findings

of the previous study conducted by Verité Research

(2022a).

Accordingly, as depicted in Figure 4, members

of the Christian clergy faced two main types of violence,

which included borderline severe (threats, intimidation

and coercion) and least severe (discriminatory action or

practices) forms of violence.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE

Figure 4 |

Primary targets by main types of harm

*A single incident could feature more than one primary target

BORDERLINE SEVERE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

LEAST SEVERE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

82%

Threats,

intimidation or

coercion

74%

67%

Discriminatory

action or

practices

45%

36%

20%

Clergy/

Pastors

Place of

worship

Congregants

Local

community

Clergy/

Pastors

Place of

worship

Congregants

Local

community

Figure 4 also shows that despite the overall reduc-

tion in the number of incidents that included threats,

intimidation and coercion, 82 percent of incidents that

included this form of harm appeared to be directed

at the Christian clergy. Furthermore, an assessment

of the qualitative data provided by NCEASL revealed

that there were many incidents where perpetrators

would threaten or coerce the Christian clergy to cease

worship activities. For example, in an incident in Ranala,

Colombo, the police demanded that a pastor cease

all religious activities including a Christmas service.

Consistent with the findings of the previous study

(Verité Research, 2022a), the findings of this analysis

support the underlying assumption that threatening or

coercing the religious authority (clergy) could cease/

discourage Christian activities in the locality.

This

assumption is further supported by the fact that the

Christian clergy are typically viewed as the representa-

tive authority of the Christian faith in a locality.

There were also many incidents where Christian clergy

were targeted together with churches. For example,

they were questioned on the legality of their places of

worship and on whether they had obtained necessary

permissions to renovate or build new constructions

around the church. In four incidents the legality of the

place of worship was questioned with regards to circu-

lars. Two of these incidents involved the April 2022

circular released by the Ministry of Buddha Sasana,

Religious Affairs and Cultural Affairs. Additionally,

churches alone were subject to discriminatory action,

which manifested in the form of protests or petitions

demanding the cessation of worship activities. As

noted in the previous study by Verité Research (2022a),

the data suggests that discriminatory acts are generally

carried out against the tangible symbols of Christian

presence (places of worship) in addition to the main

representative authority (Christian clergy).

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE

1.2 GENDER AND INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS

The current study introduced an additional classifica-

tion of incidents, which allowed for further analysis of

incidents in respect to the gender of the (1) victims and

(2) perpetrators of violence against Christians.

The gender of the primary target (victim) was

documented in 68 percent of the incidents, while the

gender of the primary target could not be reasonably

identified in 32 percent of the incidents. Of the incidents

that specified the gender of the primary target, 78

percent were male while 27 percent were female. The

majority of the primary targets were male pastors while

only five of the primary targets were female pastors.

There were three female congregants and a pastor’s

wife who were also targeted.

Notably, the inability to identify the gender of most

primary targets and perpetrators has cast limitations

on the analysis. It has restricted the ability to uncover

statistical relationships between gender and the

incidents of religious violence against Christians.

The gender of the perpetrators was largely unknown or

unspecified in the incident reports collated by NCEASL.

There were only 10 instances where the gender of the

perpetrator was identified as male. Of the 10 male

perpetrators, nine were Buddhist monks.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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VIOLENCE OVER THE YEARS:

DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS

CHAPTER 2:

n previous studies conducted by Verité Research, any

event that led to a decrease in the overall number of

likely impacted potential perpetrators’ ability to engage

in violence.

A distraction is defined as the occurrence of events or

situations that tend to have an extraordinary impact

in diverting attention of potential perpetrators from

engaging in religiously motivated violence. For example,

the previous study (Verité Research, 2022a) explored

the connection between anti-Christian violence and

the national elections.

The connection between lower

incidence of anti-Christian violence at ground level,

and the occurrence of national elections suggests that

the latter can be viewed as a distraction or distracting

event that most likely diverted the attention of potential

perpetrators (Verité Research, 2022a).

The overlap between these disruptions and distrac-

tions and the reduction in the number of incidents of

anti-Christian violence during certain months in the

period under review are further explored below.

incidents of anti-Christian violence were described

as disruptions. However, the current period under

review saw multiple events or situations which either

prevented potential perpetrators from engaging in

violence against Christians or diverted their atten-

tion to more pressing concerns. Therefore, this study

attempts to categorise these events or situations as

either a disruption to or a distraction from the pattern

of increasing violence against Christians.

A disruption is defined as the occurrence of extraor-

dinary logistical barriers that prevent potential

perpetrators from engaging in religiously motivated

violence. For instance, the impact of the COVID-19

lockdowns on anti-Christian violence, which was

explored in the previous study (Verité Research, 2022a),

was viewed as a disruption to the pattern of increasing

violence against Christians.

Notably, the lockdowns

restricted the mobility of perpetrators, which most

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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VIOLENCE OVER THE YEARS: DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS

Figure 5 |

Number of incidents of violence against Christians by year (January 2010 to October 2022)

*This

ﬁgure

is a year-by-year comparison. 2022 data only consists of data up to October 2022

*2022 only

consists of

data up to

October

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Figure 5 is a year-by-year comparison of the total

number of incidents for each year (from January to

December). In the case of the year 2022, the total

number of incidents is from January 2022 to October

2022.

Figure 5 illustrates a pattern of increasing number of

religiously motivated incidents of violence against

Christians from 2010 to 2022. However, this consistent

pattern of upward momentum appears to encounter

certain disruptions and distractions, which are either

sporadic or cyclic in nature, especially during the year

2020 .

The first distraction explored in the previous study

(Verité Research, 2022a) was between national

elections and the reduction of incidents of anti-Chris-

tian violence. The data suggested that there was a

risk of violence regaining momentum after national

elections are conducted. This pattern appears to be

cyclic in nature as it tends to follow the election cycles.

For example, this may be seen when comparing the

pre-2015 data with the 2015 data, as both a presidential

and parliamentary election were held in 2015.

The second disruption explored in the study was

between the COVID-19 pandemic and disruptions to

the regular pattern of increasing ground-level violence

(Verité Research, 2022a).

Although, the COVID-19

outbreak was sporadic in nature, its effect on the

violence against Christians was studied during recur-

ring ‘peak’ and ‘off-peak’ COVID-19 outbreaks over the last

two years. The pandemic restricted people’s mobility

and made personal safety and health a priority. The

restrictions in movement brought about by COVID-19

related regulations appeared to have curbed perpe-

trators’ potential to regularly carry out incidents of

religiously motivated violence. The violence appeared

to regain momentum soon after travel restrictions were

not strictly enforced or/were lifted.

Similarly, in the current period under review, reduc-

tions in the incidents of anti-Christian violence can be

observed in certain months, as seen in Figure 6. This

may be attributed to certain disruptions and distrac-

tions that occurred within the time period: (1) the

aragalaya

and (2) the effects of the economic crisis.

This phenomenon is further explored below.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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VIOLENCE OVER THE YEARS: DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS

2.1 DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS DURING NOVEMBER 2021 –

OCTOBER 2022

Figure 6 shows the monthly distribution of incidents

of violence for the current period under review. The

figure illustrates that the incidents of violence rose

in frequency in March, with 14 incidents. Six of these

incidents were linked to an event in Amalgama, Galle,

which spanned several days. The event involved around

600 people including nearly 60 Buddhist monks forcibly

entering a church and threatening the pastor to cease

all religious activities and shut down the church. The

mob later assaulted a Christian congregant at the

church premises. This single event, which spanned

several days, comprised of a series of incidents each

featuring an identifiable type of harm (refer Annexure 1

for the detailed methodology).

Figure 6 |

Total Incidents of violence by month (November 2021 to October 2022)

*This is a month-by-month comparison of the period under review

Notable events:

Intermittent police curfews

Apr - Jul

Peak of

Aragalaya

Jun - Jul

Fuel shortage

Jun - Jul

Change in

political

leadership

Jul

November

December

January

February

March

April

May

2022

June

July

August

September

October

2021

Despite the perceived inclusivity and national conver-

gence of the

aragalaya,

ethno-religious violence

persisted even alongside the peak of the movement last

year. However, as depicted in Figure 6, violence targeting

Christians dropped drastically during the months of

June and July. The drop in incidents of violence appears

to suggest a connection between sporadic disruptions

and distractions that occurred during this timeline and

the reduction in ground-level anti-Christian violence.

These disruptions and distractions are characterised

as sporadic in nature due to its irregular and sudden

occurrence, unlike cyclic distractions such as national

elections which occur periodically. These distractions

and disruptions to the increasing pattern of anti-Chris-

tian violence are explored in detail below.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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VIOLENCE OVER THE YEARS: DISRUPTIONS AND DISTRACTIONS

DISTRACTIONS FROM THE PATTERN OF

INCREASING ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE

National convergence of the

aragalaya

political leadership (June and July) followed by an uptick

in the number of incidents in August.

DISRUPTIONS TO THE PATTERN OF

INCREASING ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE

Police curfews following the aragalaya

The

aragalaya,

as mentioned earlier, was a wave of

democratic protests that began in March 2022 to voice

the anger of the public over the economic mismanage-

ment, and political leadership of the country. Although

it commenced in late March 2022, the protests reached

a crescendo towards the months of June and July

(refer socio-political context section for more details)

(“Protesters continue to occupy”, 2022).

The

araga-

laya

was praised for its collective participation of

citizens irrespective of race, religion or social class. It

was also attended and led by members of clergy from

diverse religious backgrounds. For instance, during

Ramadan celebrations at GGG, Muslim protesters were

seen breaking fast alongside their Christian, Hindu and

Buddhist counterparts in a peaceful display of unity.

This brief period (and public display) of ethno-religious

harmony appears to have acted as a distraction from the

regular pattern of anti-Christian violence, most likely

contributing to the reduction of incidents of religious

violence in the months of June and July.

Change in political leadership

As explored above, national elections appear to play a

role in distracting perpetrators and thereby interrupt

increasing pattern of incidents of religious violence.

Although the appointment of President Ranil Wickrem-

esinghe in July last year did not take place following

a traditional national-level election, this period of

heightened political instability could have acted as a

distraction from engaging in anti-Christian violence.

Thus, this distracting event appears to have contrib-

uted to a decrease in the number of incidents of

anti-Christian violence. Accordingly, Figure 6 illustrates

the decrease in the number of incidents in the months

of heightened political instability and changes in the

Temporary fuel shortage resulting from the

prevailing economic crisis

Economists widely consider the prevailing economic

crisis as the worst in Sri Lanka’s post-independent

history, with record high inflation, power outages and

shortage of essential goods including fuel, food and

medicines. In June 2022, the economic crisis led to

a severe fuel shortage within the country, with many

people having to wait in long fuel queues for days

(Kurukulasuriya, 2022).

This fuel shortage resulted in

restricting the mobility of people across the country.

Thus, the restriction in movement brought about by the

fuel crisis appears to have acted as a temporary disrup-

tion to the increasing pattern of anti-Christian violence

(Verité Research, 2022f), especially in the month of

July.

In the months of April, May and July, the government

imposed a police curfew in an attempt to quell the

aragalaya

(Farzan, 2022; “Sri Lanka police impose”,

2022).

Some of these curfews were island-wide, while

some were imposed only in specific areas. Previous

studies by Verité Research (2020, 2022a) observed that

anti-Christian violence was generally perpetrated by

individuals residing in the same locality as the primary

target.

It was further established that mobility was

a necessary condition to carry out acts of religious

violence. Thus, the restrictions to mobility of the perpe-

trators may have caused a disruption in anti-Christian

violence, which resulted in a reduced number of

incidents in certain months in the period under review.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

CHAPTER 3:

3.1 THE ROLE OF THE STATE

he Sri Lankan government’s obligation in relation to

upholding the right of Freedom of Religion or Belief

previous studies by Verité Research (2021b, 2022a),

negative bias against Christians can be understood to

stem from (1) the state’s privilege to wield authority in a

formal capacity, which allows it to act with impunity and

(2) the entrenched view that the majority Sinhala-Bud-

dhist state needs protection from perceived threats

from minority groups.

Therefore, this persistent pattern of negative state bias

also raises a deeper concern over the systemic nature

of religious violence against Christians.

(FORB) is twofold. First, the state has a duty to protect

the right of religious freedom of all its citizens against

any infringement by third parties. Second, the state has

the duty to respect the right of its citizens to exercise

their FORB. To this end the state–through both local and

international legal frameworks–is afforded broad legal

powers to hold perpetrators accountable and to shield

ethno-religious groups from being targeted on religious

grounds.

3.1.1 Negative state bias: An inherent

characteristic in anti-Christian violence?

Similar to the previous periods under review, state

officials (including police officers) continued to be

identified as the perpetrators in a significant propor-

tion (56 percent) of the total incidents of violence

against Christians.

Thus, the findings of this analysis reaffirm the

entrenched pattern of the state’s ‘negative bias’ towards

the Christian community, irrespective of changes in

government or political leadership. As explored in

3.1.2 Negative state bias: State sanctioned

discrimination?

In the period reviewed previously (October 2020 –

October 2021), state officials (including the police) were

identified to be primarily responsible for perpetrating

borderline severe (threats, intimidation and coercion)

and least severe forms of violence (discriminatory

action or practices). However, in the current period

under review, state officials were primarily responsible

for least severe forms of violence (discriminatory action

or practices) which constituted 74 percent, as seen in

Figure 7.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

Some incidents of discriminatory action or practices

led by state officials included falsely accusing pastors of

not being a registered member of the Christian clergy,

refusing to accept pastors’ credentials even when the

relevant documents of proof were produced and joining

Buddhist monks in questioning the legality of a place of

worship.

The data also points to a marked reduction in the state’s

involvement in borderline severe forms of violence

(threats, intimidation and coercion) compared to the

previous study. In the previous study, state officials

(alone or together with other perpetrators) were

responsible for 79 percent of threats, intimidation and

coercion against Christians, but it had dropped to 41

percent in the current period under review.

Figure 7 |

Key perpetrators by main types of harm

BORDERLINE SEVERE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

LEAST SEVERE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Threats,

intimidation or

coercion

74%

68%

50%

41%

35%

Discriminatory

action or

practices

24%

14%

Other

identiﬁable

individuals

Buddhist

monks

State officials

Unidentiﬁed

individual/s

State officials

Other

identiﬁable

individuals

Buddhist

monks

Unidentiﬁed

individual/s

*A single incident could feature more than one perpetrator

3.1.3 Negative state bias: Negative policing

This section analyses the responses of the police in

relation to: (I) the two main types of harm; (II) the three

main primary targets; (III) the three main perpetrators

identified in the period under review. The nature of

police action is assessed using the system of catego-

risation in Table 2 (see Annexure 1 for the complete

methodology).

Out of the incidents for which there is a police response

recorded, the figures support the narrative of the

state’s continued negative bias and antipathy towards

protecting the religious freedom of Christians. These

were especially evident in instances where the police

actively or tacitly enabled acts of violence against the

Christians.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

Table 2 |

Categorisation of the nature of police responses to incidents of religious violence against Christians

Nature of police

action

Actively negative

Tacitly negative

Actively positive

Passively positive

Absent/unknown

Description

The police actively or tacitly displayed support towards/were involved in the perpetra-

tion of violence against Christians

The police were present during an incident of violence and did not act on behalf of the

victim/s

The police were present during an incident of violence and acted on behalf of the vic-

tim/s

The police took follow-up action after an incident of violence had occurred

The nature of police action was not documented or not available at the time of con-

ducting the study

How did the police respond to the two main types

of violence?

However, some positive developments can be observed

in relation to police responses to incidents of border-

line severe forms of violence (threats, intimidation

and coercion). For instance, in comparison to last

year’s study (Verité Research, 2022a), the data shows

a reduction in negative police action in relation to

threats, intimidation and coercion (from 54 percent

to 41 percent).

Additionally, in comparison to last

year’s study (Verité Research, 2022a), there is a slight

increase in the intervention rates of the police in

relation to incidents involving threats, intimidation and

coercion.

Of such incidents, the police also positively

and actively responded (was present and intervened)

in 18 percent of those incidents (a slight increase

from seven percent to 18 percent), and passively

responded (intervened after the incident) in 18 percent

of those incidents (an increase from zero percent to 18

percent).

Figures 8 and 9 summarise the nature of police action in

terms of the two main types of violence identified in the

period under review.

Accordingly, active and tacit negative police action

(actively or tacitly involved, and present and inactive)

was recorded in 41 percent of borderline severe forms

of violence (threats, intimidation and coercion) and of

an equal percentage in least severe forms of violence

(discriminatory action or practices). Additionally,

actively positive police action (present and intervened)

in response to incidents of discriminatory action or

practices against Christians was recorded in less than

10 percent of the incidents. These figures highlight

that the police were generally supportive of less severe

forms of violence against Christians.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

Figure 8 |

Police responses to borderline severe forms of violence

*A single incident could feature more than one primary target

Actively or tacitly involved

27%

Present and inactive

14%

Present and intervene (positively)

18%

Absent/Unknown

23%

Intervene after the event (general)

18%

Figure 9 |

Police responses to least severe forms of violence

*A single incident could feature more than one primary target

Actively or tacitly involved

37%

27%

Present and inactive

14%

Present and intervene (positively)

18%

Absent/Unknown

15%

23%

Intervene after the event (general)

18%

39%

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

II.

Main primary targets: How did the police respond?

targeting Christian congregants, followed by Christian

clergy and churches.

Similar to last year (Verité Research, 2022a), actively

positive police action (present and intervened) during

incidents of religious violence against the two primary

targets was low.

Although, passive positive police

action (intervened after the incident) was higher than

active police action, post-incident intervention action

was largely limited to commencing an investigation.

This finding corresponds with findings from previous

years as available data does not record any incident

where perpetrators were held accountable for their

acts of violence against the primary targets.

Figure 10 presents the data on police action in relation

to the three main primary targets — churches, Christian

clergy and congregants.

Active and tacit negative police action (actively or tacitly

involved and present and inactive) was recorded in 40

percent of incidents of violence targeting churches and

in 37 percent of violent acts against members of the

Christian clergy and congregants. The data reveals a

change in the focal subjects of negative police action

from the previous study (Verité Research, 2022a).

For instance, last year’s study noted that negative

police action was recorded predominantly in incidents

Figure 10 |

Primary targets by police response

*A single incident could feature more than one primary target

43%

38%

33%

35%

32%

19%

16%

10%

Actively / tacitly involved

Present & Intervene (positively)

Absent/ Unknown

Interneve after the event

(general)

14%

16%

Present & Inactive

Place of worship

Christian clergy

Congregants

III.

Main perpetrator groups: How did the police

respond?

Figure 11 depicts data on police action in relation to the

three main perpetrators of violence against Christians

in the period under review — state officials, Buddhist

clergy and other identifiable individuals. The figure

demonstrates that the police were more likely to be

actively or tacitly supportive of the violence carried out

by fellow state officials (45 percent) and Buddhist monks

(33 percent) in comparison to the violence carried out

by other identifiable individuals (18 percent).

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

Similar to the findings of the previous study (Verité

Research, 2022a), police responses in the period under

review appear to suggest that they are more likely to

take some actively positive action when perpetrators

do not command a high level of authority to challenge

police action.

This assumption is reinforced by the

active intervention rates of the police in incidents

that involved violence committed by other identifiable

individuals in comparison with incidents which involved

Buddhist monks or a fellow state official. Accordingly,

there is a slightly higher proportion of actively positive

police action (present and intervened) recorded for

incidents of violence committed by other identifiable

individuals. By contrast, the police only took similar

action in five percent of incidents led by Buddhist

monks and in zero percent of incidents led by fellow

state officials.

In contrast to the findings of the previous study (Verité

Research, 2022a), police responses in the period under

review note an increase in passively positive police

action (intervention after the event), especially in

relation to incidents committed by state officials (from

zero percent to 17 percent) and Buddhist monks (from

zero percent to 24 percent).

Despite this increase in

post-incident intervention which primarily involved

filing complaints and commencing investigations,

there is no available records of any positive tangible

outcomes following police intervention.

Figure 11 |

Key perpetrators by police response

*A single incident could feature more than one perpetrator

45%

38%

33%

38%

39%

24%

18%

12%

Actively / tacitly involved

Absent/ Unknown

Interneve after the event

(general)

12%

17%

18%

Present & Inactive

Present & Intervene (positively)

Institution/

public servant

Buddhist

monk

Other identiﬁable

individuals

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

3.2 THE ROLE OF OTHER IDENTIFIABLE INDIVIDUALS

During the period under review, there were 33 instances

where other identifiable individuals were observed to be

the perpetrators of anti-Christian violence. This is a 43

percent increase from the previous period under review

(from 23 instances to 33 instances) (Verité Research,

2022a).

Other identifiable individuals were usually

residents or those living in the locality of the primary

target, excluding state officials, members of the clergy

and political figures (see Annexure 1).

Figure 7 shows that other identifiable individuals were

the most involved in carrying out borderline severe

forms of violence (threats, intimidation and coercion)

as opposed to least severe forms of violence (discrim-

inatory action or practices). Meanwhile, as seen in

Figure 12, other identifiable individuals were also more

For example, in an incident that took place in Kalutara,

about seven monks and 40 villagers physically assaulted

two congregants attending a worship service held at

another congregant’s house. It was also observed that

other identifiable individuals often acted together with

either Buddhist monks or state officials. For instance,

in an incident that took place in Kandy, a group of 10

villagers along with a Buddhist monk demanded that a

pastor stop services since the village was a “Buddhist

village”. As shown in previous studies, these incidents

were typically localised and did not occur at a national

level.

likely to target congregants (68 percent) as opposed

to state officials who tend to target churches and/or

clergy more often.

Figure 12 |

Key perpetrators by primary targets

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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UNCOVERING THE PERPETRATORS

3.3 THE ROLE OF BUDDHIST MONKS

There were 21 incidents where Buddhist monks were

identified as perpetrators of anti-Christian violence in

the period under review. This figure is a slight increase

from the 17 incidents identified in the previous study

(Verité Research, 2022a).

Figure 7 shows that Buddhist

monks were more involved in carrying out acts of

threats and intimidation as opposed to discriminatory

action.

The incident reports suggest that Buddhist monks were

often accompanied by a mob, usually comprised of local

villagers. For example, in an incident that took place in

Bulathsinhala, Kalutara, about 60 villagers and three

Buddhist monks surrounded a pastor and his family

and demanded to know if the pastor was involved in

forced conversions. As observed in past studies (Verité

Research, 2014), Buddhist monks often provide leader-

ship to others in violence against Christians.

This type

of incident could range from two laypersons following a

monk to a group of monks leading hundreds of villagers.

It is also noteworthy that despite the national conver-

gence and the ethno-religious harmony displayed by

different religious leaders in the

aragalaya,

the data

suggests that some Buddhist monks continued to

be the perpetrators in religiously motivated violence

against Christians.

Figure 11 demonstrates that the nature of police action

was actively negative (actively or tacitly involved) 33

percent of the time in the cases where Buddhist monks

were involved as perpetrators, while the police were

only actively negative in 18 percent of the time in cases

where other identifiable individuals were involved. This

response by the police further signifies the ‘Buddhist

monastic exceptionalism’ or the exceptional position

and impunity provided to the Buddhist clergy by state

authorities, which was explored in previous studies.

The present data shows that this monk-mob phenom-

enon continues to persist.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF

VIOLENCE

CHAPTER 4:

iolence against Christians was recorded in 17 of the

25 administrative districts in Sri Lanka. By contrast,

However, Kalutara continues to be featured as the

hotspot with the most incidents of violence in both

the 2021 (20 incidents) and 2022 (13 incidents) periods.

Kalutara had also been featured among the top two

districts with the highest number of incidents in 2017

(18 incidents) and 2020 (10 incidents).

By contrast, in the past two periods under review

(October 2020 to October 2021 and September 2019 to

September 2020) the districts of Anuradhapura and

Mannar had not recorded any incidents of violence.

Only between the years 2015 and 2019 were there four

recorded incidents of violence from the Mannar District,

while there were 20 and seven incidents recorded

during the periods of 2010 to 2014 and 2015 to 2019 in

Anuradhapura respectively (Verité Research, 2020).

the previous period reviewed recorded anti-Christian

violence in 12 of the 25 administrative districts — with

Kalutara recording the highest number of incidents

(20), followed by Colombo (17). The data thus demon-

strates that anti-Christian violence in the current

period under review is more widespread in comparison

to the previous period (Verité Research, 2022a).

the current period, Kalutara continued to feature the

highest number of incidents of violence against Chris-

tians (13), followed by Anuradhapura (10) and Mannar

(seven).

The number of incidents recorded in the Kalutara

District has dropped since the last reporting period.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE

Figure 13 |

District-level breakdown of incidents of violence for the period under review (November 2021 – October

2022)

Jaffna

Mulaitivu

Mannar

7 Vavuniya

Anuradhapura

Puttalam

Trincomalee

Polonnaruwa

Matale

Kandy

Gampaha

Colombo

Highest

number of

reported

incidents:

Kalutara

Galle

Ratnapura

Monaregala

Number of incidents

Demographic characteristics of Kalutara,

Anuradhapura and Mannar

Similarly, Anuradhapura is a district composed of a

predominantly Buddhist population (90 percent) with a

Hindu and Muslim population of 0.3 percent and eight

percent respectively. It also has a Roman Catholic

Christian population of 0.7 percent and a non-Roman

Catholic Christian population of 0.4 percent (Depart-

ment of Census and Statistics, 2012).

By contrast, Mannar is a district comprised of a majority

Roman Catholic Christian population (52 percent), with

a non-Roman Catholic Christian of four percent. Only 1.8

percent of the population in the district are Buddhists,

while Muslims and Hindus comprise 16 percent and 24

percent of the population respectively (Department of

Census and Statistics, 2012).

This section draws demographic comparisons between

the districts of Kalutara, Anuradhapura and Mannar.

According to the latest available data from the Depart-

ment of Census and Statistics (the last census was held

in 2012), Kalutara is a district comprising of a majority

Buddhist population (83 percent), with Hindu and

Muslim populations of three and nine percent respec-

tively, and Roman Catholic Christians (identified as

Roman Catholic in the census) and non-Roman Catholic

Christian (identified simply as Christian in the census)

populations of three and 0.7 percent respectively

(Department of Census and Statistics, 2012).

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE

Not all incidents of violence documented by NCEASL

captured the religious identities of the perpetrators.

Out of all the incidents of violence recorded in Kalutara,

only six of the incidents had recorded the religious

identity of the perpetrator as Buddhist, while only two

incidents had recorded the perpetrator’s religion as

Buddhist in Anuradhapura. Similarly, in Mannar not all

incidents had recorded the religious identity of the

perpetrators, with the exception of one Roman Catholic

Christian perpetrator and one Hindu perpetrator.

As noted in the previous study (Verité Research, 2022a),

the identification of the majority community as the

offending party (or perpetrator) in some cases can be

taken as being indicative of the majority community in

that geographic area having a greater tendency to carry

out violence against the minorities in the area.

II.

Patterns of violence in Kalutara, Anuradhapura

and Mannar

Certain similarities were observed when evaluating

the types of harm between the three hotspot districts

of anti-Christian violence (Kalutara, Anuradhapura

and Mannar). Christians in all three districts were

predominantly subjected to discriminatory action or

practices — with Kalutara recording nine incidents,

and Anuradhapura and Mannar recording eight and five

incidents respectively.

Meanwhile, in the Kalutara and Anuradhapura Districts

the Christian clergy (Kalutara 11, Anuradhapura eight)

were largely targeted, while Christian places of worship

were

predominantly

subjected

anti-Christian

violence in the district of Mannar.

However, the data indicates differing patterns in

relation to key perpetrators of anti-Christian violence

in the three districts. Buddhist monks (six), followed

by state officials (six) were the actors responsible for

most incidents of violence in Kalutara. Meanwhile, in

Anuradhapura, state officials (seven) and other identi-

fiable individuals (five) were predominantly responsible.

In Mannar, state officials (five), followed by other identi-

fiable individuals (two) and a Roman Catholic priest (one)

were identified as the top-most actors perpetrating

anti-Christian violence.

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CONCLUSION

his study sought to identify key trends and patterns

concerning religiously motivated violence directed

violence. The chapter contextualises these disrup-

tions and distractions by drawing connections to the

aragalaya

and the economic crisis. It was also noted

that despite the national convergence inclusivity seen

within the

aragalaya,

ethno-religious violence persisted

during the period under review.

Chapter 3 examines the role of the key perpetrators of

anti-Christian violence. The study reveals that state

officials, other identifiable individuals and members

of the Buddhist clergy were the ones largely involved

in perpetrating violence against the Christians. The

study identifies that state officials were key perpetra-

tors in more than 50 percent of the incidents. As such,

this chapter highlights the entrenched pattern of the

state’s negative bias towards the Christian community.

Negative bias against Christians can be understood to

stem from (1) the state’s privilege to wield authority in

a formal capacity which allows it to act with impunity,

and (2) the entrenched view that the majority Sinha-

la-Buddhist state needs protection from perceived

threats from minority groups. The slight increase in the

Buddhist clergy’s involvement in perpetrating violence

was explored through the lens of ‘Buddhist monastic

exceptionalism’. Meanwhile, the study also explored the

increase in the violence perpetrated by other identifi-

able individuals.

at Christians, Muslims and Hindus between November

2021 and October 2022. In total, the study examined 75

incidents of violence directed at Christians during the

period under review. The findings of the present study

reinforce past trends and patterns that were identified

in previous studies conducted by Verité Research and

contributed to shedding light on new patterns discern-

ible from the data collated by NCEASL.

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of anti-Christian

violence and the different types of harm that persisted.

This chapter notes that the upward momentum of

violence explored in previous studies has continued.

Chapter 2 identifies certain events that may have

influenced the decrease in the incidents of violence

in certain months during the period under review and

classifies them as either disruptions or distractions

from the increasing pattern of anti-Christian violence.

Disruptions are the occurrence of extraordinary logis-

tical barriers that prevent potential perpetrators from

engaging in religiously motivated violence, while

distractions are occurrence of events or situations that

tend to have an extraordinary impact in diverting atten-

tion of potential perpetrators in religiously motivated

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CONCLUSION

Chapter 4 examines the geographical distribution of

violence by mapping out the district-level breakdown

of the violence directed at Christians. During the period

under review, Kalutara (13 incidents), Anuradhapura (10

incidents) and Mannar (7 incidents) were identified as

the three districts with the highest number of incidents

of anti-Christian violence. The chapter further notes

that unlike in the previous period under review, violence

was more widespread and occurred in 17 of the 25

administrative districts.

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ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS:

METHODOLOGY

ANNEXURES:

METHODOLOGY

identity categories tend to overlap. Thus, examining

ethno-religious violence, which captures both

identity categories, may offer richer insights into

the entrenched nature of violence aimed at minority

groups.

The study undertakes a primarily quantitative

analysis of incidents of violence targeting Chris-

tians based on the data compiled by NCEASL. Each

incident documented by NCEASL was based on the

details provided by primary sources and then verified

he methodology used in this study was created

by Verité Research in 2013 and has since under-

gone slight revisions. This report adopts a very similar

methodology to the previous report Patterns and Risks

of Religious Violence Against Christians (October 2020

– October 2021), with the addition of a new gender

component. The methodology is explained below.

DEFINITIONS AND PARAMETERS OF THE

STUDY

The study adopts a broad definition of violence that

includes physical violence (physical assault and

property damage), non-physical violence (threats,

coercion, intimidation and hate speech) and struc-

tural violence (discriminatory action or practices)

(Gunatileke, 2018).

Verité’s previous study also

classified these types of violence into severe forms

of violence and non-severe forms of violence.

Similarly, the study broadly focuses on ‘ethno-re-

ligious’ violence as opposed to ‘religious’ violence

by considering the features that are specific to the

Sri Lankan context. Distinctions between ethnicity

and religion are often blurred in Sri Lanka as these

through NCEASL’s networks and/or its regional

offices (where applicable). The incident report

compiled by NCEASL may not be an exhaustive list

that reflects the total number of incidents during

the period under review. In line with Verité’s previous

studies on religious violence, Verité has undertaken

data coding and cleaning. Verité has not verified

NCEASL’s primary data through third party sources.

NCEASL adopted the same measures to document

episodes of violence against Muslims and Hindus.

Similar to the data on anti-Christian violence, the

incidents pertaining to violence against Muslims and

Hindus may not reflect the total number of incidents

against these groups. The study noted a significantly

lesser number of incidents documented on anti-Muslim

and anti-Hindu violence in comparison to the higher

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ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS: METHODOLOGY

degree of anti-Christian violence documented by

NCEASL. Thus, owing to limitations in the documented

data, the study provides only a brief description of the

violence documented against Muslims and Hindus in

Annexure 2.

Physical violence

– violence against person/s of any

form including but not limited to forcible restraint,

assault, rape, abduction and murder.

Hate speech

– hate speech broadly encompasses

any kind of communication that attacks or uses

pejorative or discriminatory language with refer-

DATA CODING

ence to the protected characteristics of a person

or a group.

In the context of this report, hate

speech includes any printed material, meeting, rally

INCIDENT AND INCIDENT ID

The current study maintains the previous study’s refer-

ence to each event as an ‘incident’. Each individual

incident was given a unique ID based on the date

mentioned in the incident reports provided by NCEASL.

or media campaign which expresses messages to

attack or incites feelings against a religion, religious

practices, religious symbolism, places of worship,

religious community or followers of a religion based

on their religious affiliation.

Threats, intimidation or coercion

– includes any

An incident is a single data point. For a religiously

motivated act of violence to qualify as an ‘incident’,

the data should be sufficient to ascertain that the

type of harm falls under one of the categories listed

below. In some instances, NCEASL’s incident reports

documented a series of related incidents occurring at

different times in the same area. These incidents were

classified as separate incidents provided that each

incident constituted an identifiable type of harm.

verbal threats, phone calls or direct encounters

that do not result in violent acts against persons or

property but where there is a threat of force or a

forcing of person/s to perform any action against

their will. This type of harm includes threatening

or coercing Christians to cease worship activities.

This type of harm may also encompass incidents

involving surveillance or monitoring the primary

target/s in a manner that is aimed at intimidating

the primary target/s.

TYPE OF HARM

Definitions for the types of harm are listed below. An

incident that did not fit any of the five types of harm

was not classified as an ‘incident’. A single incident may

have more than one type of harm or violence.

Property damage or destruction

– unlawful forced

entry (unlawful forced entry that does not result in

property damage will be classified under threats,

intimidation or coercion), vandalism or any other

form of attack on the property of an individual,

institution or group.

Discriminatory action or practices

– any form of

discrimination on religious grounds, including but

not limited to denying or limiting services, denying

or limiting access through differential treatment in

an isolated case or a sustained policy/practice of

differential treatment. Actions in this category are

not limited to state actors but apply to any of the

key perpetrator categories listed.

Verité Research’s studies have, on occasion, used alter-

native classification systems to analyse the above forms

of harm. The current study uses two classifications to

refer to the above types of harm. The first classification

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ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS: METHODOLOGY

system is based on the intensity of violence. Incidents

involving high intensity include physical violence and

property damage. Incidents involving low intensity

include threats, intimidation, coercion, discrimina-

tory action or practices and other incidents involving

non-severe forms of violence. The second classifica-

tion system is based on the severity of harm or violence.

There are four sub-categories to assess the severity

of violence: most severe form of violence (physical

violence); severe form of violence (property damage);

borderline severe forms of violence (threats, coercion

or intimidation); least severe forms of violence (discrim-

inatory action or practices).

4. a.

Religious institution or clergy (individuals from

other faith groups linked to religious institutions)

— refers to a member of a religious order, a place

of worship or a religious institution (e.g., religious

education institute, welfare institution affiliated to

a religion), but excludes clergy formally associated

with a social/political movement, which is captured

above. This category also excludes members of

the Buddhist clergy as they are documented in a

separate category.

Buddhist monk

– refers to a member of the

Buddhist clergy. Violence perpetrated by

members of the Buddhist clergy are coded

separately due to two reasons: (i) several

KEY PERPETRATORS

Perpetrators were classified from the given list of

primary actors as identified by NCEASL incident

reports. A single incident may have more than one type

of perpetrator.

Political/social movement or politicians

—

incidents of religiously motivated violence

against minority faith groups, especially

post-war, have been perpetrated by certain

members of the Buddhist clergy; (ii) NCEASL’s

incident reports have documented many

episodes involving Buddhist monks. Past

reports for NCEASL such as

Silent Suppression:

Restrictions on Religious Freedoms of Chris-

tians 1994 – 2014 and Inaction and Impunity:

Incidents of Religious Violence Targeting Chris-

tians, Muslims and Hindus 2015 – 2019

have

thus included a separate analysis of Buddhist

monks’ involvement in incidents of violence.

refers to all groups that identify themselves by a

name or political figures who are not holding any

government office at the time of being involved in

an event.

Political/social movement comprising Buddhist

monks or led by a Buddhist monk

Unidentified individual or group

— when the affilia-

tions of perpetrators are unclear or unstated.

Institution or public servant (state officials)

— only

used when the institution or person in question has

a legal affiliation to the state, and includes elected

individuals holding public office (e.g., state-run

school, government administrator, minister).

Commercial interest group or private sector firm

– refers to a formally registered private commer-

cial entity (e.g., a company registered under the

Companies Act of Sri Lanka), business association

or any other entity involved in any form of commer-

cial activity or acting as a space for promoting

commercial activity.

Other identifiable individual/s or group in the locality

– this includes identifiable individuals or groups

including but not limited to residents and workers

in the locality, excluding state officials, members of

the clergy and political figures.

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ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS: METHODOLOGY

PERPETRATORS’ RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

This category was used if the group or individual either

self-identified or had an unambiguously identifiable

religious affiliation, otherwise classified as ‘unknown’.

Institutions, clergy, officials or public figures

— could

be a pastor, a Christian organisation or any other

Christian public figure. In the current report, this

category only included Christian religious leaders.

As such, all references to Christian religious

leaders, pastors and Christian clergy are relevant

to this category.

PERPETRATORS’ ETHNIC AFFILIATION

This category was used if the group or individual either

self-identified or had an unambiguously identifiable

ethnic affiliation, otherwise classified as ‘unknown’.

Actively/tacitly involved

— if the police play any role

actively or tacitly in perpetrating the incident. This

type of active or tacit involvement can include:

POLICE ACTION IN RELATION TO THE

INCIDENT

PRIMARY TARGETS

This section refers to the main target in the recorded

incident. The six categories represent the broader

classifications of potential targets and more than one

may be entered for a given event.

direct involvement; supporting perpetrators by

endorsing their actions; refusing to engage in

official duties when notified after an incident has

occurred. This type of police action is also referred

to as

actively negative.

Present and inactive

— if the police are present and

Individual/s (church members/congregants)

— could

include an individual or a group of individuals not

specified in any of the other categories of primary

targets, e.g., a Christian church worker or the

church congregation (not inclusive of Christian

clergy, who are documented separately). Attacks on

an individual’s property (not used for worship activi-

ties) are also documented under this category.

allow the religious persecution to continue without

intervention. This type of police action is also

referred to as

passively negative.

Present and intervene

— if the police are present

and intervene in the defence of the primary

target/s. This type of police action is also referred

to as

actively positive.

Absent/unknown

— if there is no mention of police

action during the incident or if the action is not

discernible in the incident report.

Intervene after the incident

— if the police are

called or approached after the incident and if some

follow-up action is taken. This type of police action

is also referred to as

passively positive.

Local community

– could include, for example, all

the Christian households in the village or a sect of

Christians who are targeted.

Place of worship

– could be a church or the location/

house where prayer meetings are held.

Business

– could be a Christian-owned enterprise.

Wider community

– could be used particularly in

events when many or all categories may be targeted

en masse or Christians targeted at a national level.

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ANNEXURE 1: VIOLENCE AGAINST CHRISTIANS: METHODOLOGY

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS’ ACTION IN

RELATION TO THE INCIDENT

A government official could be any employee of the

state excluding the police, e.g., an official from the

divisional secretariat, grama niladhari etc.

Actively/tacitly involved

— if a government official

plays any role actively or tacitly in perpetrating

the incident. This type of active or tacit involve-

ment can include: direct involvement; supporting

perpetrators by endorsing their actions; refusing

to engage in official duties when notified after an

incident has occurred.

Present and inactive

— if a government official is

present and allows the religious persecution to

continue without intervening.

Present and intervene

— if a government official

is present and intervenes in the defence of the

primary target/s.

Legality questioned without reference to legislation

or circular

– legality of place of worship is questioned

without reference to legislation or circular.

Legality questioned with reference to legislation or

circular

– legality of place of worship is questioned

with reference to legislation or circular.

Clarification sought

– if the legality of the place of

worship is questioned and if asked to show proof

of authorisation. Generally, the circular is not refer-

enced when proof of authorisation is requested.

Deemed illegal/unauthorised

– a place of worship

was deemed illegal if a public official e.g., a

policeman, claimed that the pastor could not

continue his worship services at a church or prayer

meeting without the necessary documentation

from the Ministry of Buddha Sasana.

GENDER

This component was added to analyse the gender of

Absent/unknown

— if there is no mention of a

government official’s actions at an event or if the

action is not discernible in the incident report.

the perpetrators as well as the primary targets of the

incidents of violence.

Male

– the perpetrator or primary target was identi-

fied in the incident as he. In the incidents where the

perpetrator was identified as a Buddhist monk, the

gender was also denoted as he.

Female

– the perpetrator or primary target was

identified in the incident as she.

Intervene after the incident

— if a government

official is called or approached after the event and

some follow-up action is taken.

LEGALITY OF THE PLACE OF WORSHIP

The question of the legality of a place of worship was

classified for all events occurring after the Ministry of

Buddha Sasana issued a circular in 2008 calling for such

places to be registered.

Other

– the perpetrator or primary target was

identified to be transgendered or gender neutral.

Absent/unknown

– if there is no mention of the

gender identity of the primary target or perpetrator

in the incident.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE

AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

his section of the study analyses incidents of

violence targeting Muslims and Hindus from

monitor violence against both religious groups more

rigorously. Therefore, the data collected for these two

groups is significantly less than the data collected for

anti-Christian violence and may not be fully represent-

ative of the acts of violence carried out against these

groups.

November 2021 to October 2022. NCEASL adopted

the same methodology and data collection methods to

monitor violence against Muslims and Hindus. However,

it is still in the process of expanding its networks to

2.1 VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS

A total of 14 incidents of violence against Muslims were

documented by NCEASL from November 2021 to October

2022. The following tables provide a brief description of

these incidents and Verité Research has provided the

underlying narratives for these incidents where appli-

cable. The incidents of violence against Muslims in the

Figure 14 |

Underlying narrative: Muslim cultural peculiarities

period under review were similar in nature to those that

occurred during the previous years. Therefore, they

are analysed under the same narratives as in the past

reports (Verité Research, 2020; 2021b; 2022a).

Cultural peculiarities: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

In the period under review, documented incidents of violence against Muslims involved discriminatory action

faced by Muslims at their workplaces (see details below).

These types of actions can be explored through the underlying narrative/perception related to Muslim ‘cultur-

al peculiarities’ that exist within certain segments of society. This perception advances the idea that certain

Islamic customs, laws and practices are ‘at odds with the customs of the Sinhala Buddhists’, and discourages

cultural assimilation (Siddiqui, 2019).

The perception that Muslims do not comply with local culture and laws

has led to Muslim attire, especially those of Muslim women, coming under increased scrutiny.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Cultural peculiarities: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

In the past, the distinct dress code of Muslim women has made them a target of anti-Muslim violence and has

led them to be discriminated against at educational and medical establishments and denied state service

(Mihlar, n.d).

For example, the ban on face veils in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks was widely con-

sidered a discriminatory measure imposed by the government (“Sri Lanka cabinet approves”, 2021).

The following incidents documented by NCEASL suggest that the narrative regarding Muslim ‘cultural peculiari-

ties’ continues to persist and acts as a basis to justify anti-Muslim violence.

Incident

no.

Date and location

2 February 2022

Trincomalee

Teacher assaulted at school:

A Muslim teacher of Shanmuga Hindu Ladies College was assaulted. Although

the teacher was appointed to this school in 2018, she was denied permission

to work at the school on the grounds that she wore an abhaya, a garment worn

by Muslim women. After filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission

of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), she received a letter of reinstatement from the Ministry

of Education.

However, once she returned to the school, a protest was staged at the school

against her, and her neck was squeezed by a person in the crowd. This led to

her being hospitalised for two days. This incident was said to have triggered

ethno-religious tensions among Tamils and Muslims in the area.

12 March 2022

Trincomalee

The assaulted teacher’s mediation notice sent to the wrong address:

The case which was scheduled for 16 March at the Court of Appeal was

postponed. It was claimed that the Trincomalee Police directed the case to

the Trincomalee mediation board commission to reach an agreement. The

assaulted teacher opposed this move. It was alleged that the board sent the

summons to the wrong address to divert proceedings on the grounds that the

teacher had ignored the summons and failed to appear. The sessions were

conducted in March in her absence.

It was claimed that officials intended to dismiss the complaint on the grounds

that the assaulted party did not attend the second session either. It was

claimed that the officials of the mediation board were trying to support the

principal of Shanmuga Hindu Ladies College.

The investigation unit of the Ministry of Education allegedly failed to expedite

measures to investigate the complaint. It was further claimed that the au-

thorities and the Ministry of Education were trying to imply that the assaulted

teacher was guilty of a crime and declare that a peaceful settlement had been

reached. The teacher was temporarily transferred to Zahira School, Trinco-

malee.

Description

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Cultural peculiarities: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

4 April 2022

Trincomalee

Assaulted teacher transferred to another school in Trincomalee:

The teacher was transferred to St. Joseph’s College, Trincomalee. The trans-

fer was granted under the guidance of the Ministry of Education. She as-

sumed duties as a teacher at St. Joseph’s College on 4 April 2022. She went to

the new school only after submitting a letter of dissatisfaction to the Ministry

of Education, in which she explained that the transfer was against her wishes.

She was given a permanent transfer while the court’s verdict is pending.

Principal released on bail:

A case was filed against the principal of Trincomalee Shanmuga Hindu Ladies

College, in the Trincomalee Magistrate’s Court for dereliction of duty.

The principal was released on two personal bails of Rs. 250,000 each by an

order issued by the Trincomalee Magistrate’s Court on 4 August.

4 August 2022

Trincomalee

Figure 15 |

Underlying narrative: Land acquisition and/or encroachment

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

In the period under review, NCEASL recorded incidents of Muslim land encroachment mainly enabled by state

officials, mostly attached to the Archaeology Department. These incidents mainly took place between Muslims

and Sinhala Buddhist groups. However, there is also a documented land grabbing incident between the Muslim

and Tamil Hindu communities.

Land disputes between the Sinhala and Muslim communities tend to be underscored by the narrative that the

latter tend to acquire or encroach on lands that have historically been owned and populated by Sinhala Bud-

dhists. However, this perception is not unique to land disputes between these two ethno-religious communi-

ties. As seen below, these perceptions are held by other ethno-religious groups as well.

As noted above, the Archaeology Department played a key role in land grabbing incidents related to Muslims.

Notably, this institution has long served as evidence of ‘negative state bias’ towards minority religious groups

and has often been accused of taking over privately-owned land via the Sacred Spaces Act.

The following incidents depict these narratives regarding land grabbing and land encroachment. While certain

incidents may not have arisen due to ethno-religious reasons, they could take on an ethno-religious tone when

the conflict between the parties intensifies.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

Incident

no.

Date and location

9 March 2022

Ampara

Description

Attempt made to erect a Buddha statue and build a vihara on private land:

Buddhist monks and Sinhala youth attempted to erect a Buddha statue and

build a vihara on a privately owned land in Ampara, which caused tension in

the area. The chief monk of the Deeghawapi Raja Maha Vihara is reported to

have led the initiative while police and soldiers dressed in civilian clothing

provided security for the Buddhist monks.

The public showed the deed of the land indicating that the site was privately

owned. A protest was also held opposing the building of the vihara.

The chairperson of the Addalaichenai Pradeshiya Sabha had stated that prop-

er permission must be obtained from the pradeshiya sabha before commenc-

ing any construction.

A former member of the Eastern Provincial Council had visited the site and

had spoken with the Buddhist monks and had asked them not to create confu-

sion. The provincial council member had also brought the issue to the atten-

tion of the district secretary and parliamentarians.

Tensions had flared up once more when the Buddhist monks visited again on

13 March. A protest was held by the Muslim youth. The area where this land is

located has been surveyed and some marker stones have also been planted by

officials of the Department of Archaeology.

10 March 2022

The matter was brought to the attention of the Ampara District government

agent (GA) and discussions were held. On 10 March, the GA visited the area and

said that he had taken steps to stop the statue from being erected.

Since 2014 there was a ban on farming in the area where almost 400 acres of

land owned by Muslims are located. It was the team that came to erect the

Buddha statue that prohibited farming, citing archaeological reasons, claim-

ing that Muslims had destroyed archaeologically significant ruins.

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader held discussions with the director general

of the Department of Archaeology regarding this matter in May. He informed

the director general that the area is free of archaeological remains, and has

been used for farming by Muslim communities for centuries, and that the land

on which a Buddha statue was to be erected belongs to Muslims. Thereafter,

steps were taken to allow farming and to stop construction of the statue.

Ampara

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

8 September 2022

A video on a website accuses Muslims of planning to create a separate nation:

A video was posted on the website of the International Broadcasting Corpora-

tion for Tamil (IBC Tamil) titled

‘Warning: An Islamic State is Rising South of India’

(https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=1SQlBuHDhpQ).

The video alleged that ‘Muslims will occupy the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka

and create a separate nation called Kizhakistan, and they have been carrying

out planned land occupation and administrative repression for a long time’.

The video further claimed that Muslims planned to occupy the Tamil areas in

the Eastern Province, as Israel planned and occupied Palestine.

Figure 16 |

Underlying narrative: Contestations over religious sites

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

In the period under review, incidents of anti-Muslim violence recorded by NCEASL included contestations over

religious sites involving Muslim places of worship.

Typically, contestations over religious sites often involve competing claims relating to the historic identity and

the ownership of the site. As discussed in a previous study by Verité Research (2020b), these incidents are

often viewed by minority ethnic groups as deliberate expressions of ‘majority dominance’, where the majority

group asserts its majority status over contested religious sites.

The following incidents recorded by NCEASL demonstrate the existence of this narrative in relation to Muslim

places of worship. While some of these incidents have occurred in historically contested sites, other incidents

have occurred in privately owned lands.

Incident

no.

Date and

location

20 January

2022

Ratnapura

Description

Monk threatens to demolish mosque in Kuragala:

A Buddhist monk, who is the founder of Nelligala International Buddhist Centre,

stated to the press that the Dafthar Jailani Mosque in Kuragala, Balangoda will be

forcibly demolished.

A stupa is currently being constructed in Kuragala at a distance of 50 meters from

the Jailani Mosque at a cost of millions of rupees. A member of the All-Ceylon Sufi

Dargah Association and chairperson of the Colombo Dewatagaha Mosque Trustee

Board, stated that steps were being taken with the support of the government to

remove historic Muslim mosques and burial sites in the area for the expansion of

the stupa.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

5 February

2022

Anuradhapura

Madrasa taken over by the Archaeology Department:

After the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019, small mounds and ancient brick-shaped

stones were found in a madrasa that is maintained by the administration of the

Asarigama Jumma Masjid, Asarigama, Thambirigaswewa, Anuradhapura. During

a siege, the army observed this and claimed it is an archaeological site and that

there had been a vihara there.

Thereafter, the divisional secretariat, the army and the Department of Archae-

ology erected a fence around the mounds in February this year, and nobody was

permitted to enter the fenced-off area.

20 February

2022

Dambulla

Buddhist monk states that a mosque should be removed:

Chief monk of the Rangiri Dambulla Vihara announced that the Dambulla Hairiya

Mosque, which is located near the main city of Dambulla, should be removed from

its current location.

A representative of the mosque’s governing body had stated that the chief monk

had announced that the mosque is adjacent to the Rangiri Dambulla Vihara and

that the majority of the Sinhala people want it removed from there, and since

work is being carried out on developing the sacred site appropriate steps will now

be taken.

The representative of the mosque’s governing body had further stated that steps

were being taken to evict 22 Muslim families who had been living in the area

around the mosque for many years. It was also mentioned that if steps were taken

to provide land for the mosque and to relocate the Muslim families, the matter will

be discussed with the council and top officials as Muslims wish to cooperate in

the development of the sacred area and to avoid ethnic clashes.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

22 February

2022

Ratnapura

Entrance arch of Dafthar Jailani Mosque demolished (Kuragala):

The entrance minarets of the Dafthar Jailani Mosque in Kuragala, Balangoda

were demolished by unidentified individuals on the night of 22 February. The next

morning, the mosque manager found out that the minarets had been removed. He

believes these minarets were removed in order to construct a Buddhist stupa in

the Kuragala sacred area.

Buddhists have been trying to remove the mosque’s entrance since 2010 and now

it has been destroyed. Many of the mosque’s buildings and flagpoles have been

demolished since 2013. The mosque is located in the Buddhist sacred area of

Kuragala, which is also an archaeological site.

This incident was not reported to the police. One of the board members of the

masjid, commented on the incident and said they are trying to find a solution

amicably.

The chief monk who is in charge of the Kuragala sacred area, confirmed the

incident. He further added that the minarets were removed as part of the Kuraga-

la development work, and that no one was using the path on which the minarets

were located. He had further stated that he had informed the mosque administra-

tion, the All-Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama and the Wakf board about a year ago that

all the buildings in the area except for the mosque and the main burial site should

be removed, but they had not responded.

A group of 26 Muslim organisations have condemned the incident and called on

the government to protect Muslim heritage sites.

10 March 2022

The minister of justice at the time, chaired a discussion at his residence to

discuss this issue. The chief monk, the chairperson and members of the board of

trustees of the Kuragala mosque, representatives of the Wakf board, Thareeqa

council members and lawyers attended the meeting.

The minister stated that he would like to resolve the mosque issue in a smooth

manner through dialogue, without pursuing legal action, and that he would like

to resolve the matter in coordination with the Department of Archaeology, the

Ministry of Buddha Sasana, the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs, the Wakf

board and the Department of Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs.

The chief monk however insisted that apart from Dafthar Jailani’s mosque and

flagpole, the tin shed structure within the mosque premises should be removed.

During the meeting, the minister appointed a four-member committee to look

into the matter and present a complete report. The committee comprises offi-

cials from the Department of Architecture and Survey.

16 March 2022

The members of the committee visited Kuragala and observed the situation and

discussed the issue with the chief monk. The observations are to be reported to

the minister of justice.

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Muslims

15 May 2022

Buddhist vihara and sacred area development project ceremonially opened at

Kuragala:

On Vesak Day (15 May 2022), the Kuragala Buddhist Vihara and the sacred area

development project were completed and ceremonially opened. The chief guest

at the event was the army commander.

The national Vesak Day celebrations were held at Kuragala this year. After the in-

auguration of the Kuragala development project on 15 May, the chief monk of the

Kuragala Buddhist Vihara stated that although he is ready to renovate the Kuraga-

la Jailani Mosque, neither the administration of the mosque nor any other Muslim

party is cooperating with it. If the Muslims cooperated, he said he would be willing

to demolish and renovate the tin shed used for prayers.

He had further stated that Kuragala belongs to the Buddhists and that people of

all religious backgrounds can visit or worship at the location. He had added that

they can focus on developing the Jailani Mosque smoothly with the cooperation

of the relevant authorities, and that Kuragala was an archaeological site with his-

torical significance and should be preserved. He had also stated that his attempt

to reach the mosque’s administration and the Department of Muslim Religious

and Cultural Affairs was unsuccessful.

Figure 17 |

Other incidents involving violence, discrimination and/or derogatory statements against Muslims

Incident

no.

Date and location

19 February 2022

Description

The Presidential Task Force for One Country, One Law, chairperson’s claim

on Christian organisations and Islamic groups:

The Presidential Task Force for One Country, One Law met with university

students at the BMICH to obtain their views on establishing one law, and the

task force chairperson, while speaking of the importance of creating one

law, had stated that “in Sri Lanka there are over 600 Christian organisations

operating to create divisions in society and there are over 100 extremist

(terrorist) Islamic groups operating.” This was telecast on

ITN

news.

27 March 2022

Muslims accused of adding contraceptives to food:

An article was published in a blog called Tamilsudarnet, alleging that Muslims

are mixing contraceptive pills in biryani and selling it to Tamils and Chris-

tians to reduce the population of Tamils and Christians.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Other incidents involving violence, discrimination and/or derogatory statements against Muslims

10 May 2022

Negombo

Muslims attacked in Negombo:

Several hotels and houses in Negombo were attacked, set on fire and looted

during the island-wide violence on 9 May 2022.

The next day, at around 6 pm, a group of people–who were not from the same

area–attacked the Muslim populated Deen junction in Periyamulla, Negombo,

alleging that the looters were Muslims. The group of attackers tried to turn

the matter into an ethnic conflict. At the time, some property belonging to

Muslims was damaged. At the Deen junction, 16 Muslim-owned shops were

attacked, and vans, three-wheelers, motorcycles and bicycles were set

ablaze.

Four persons injured in the attack were taken to Negombo Hospital. Three

were Muslims and one was Sinhala. Christian, Buddhist and Islamic clerics

arrived at the scene and sought to restore harmony. Priests and nuns from

the local churches came to the street and stopped the rioters and ensured

the safety of the people in the area.

The incident was reported to the police and complaints have been lodged

at the Negombo Police Station. As of 26 June 2022, no suspects had been

arrested.

6 July 2022

Mannar

Anti-conversion leaflets distributed to devotees:

The Thiruketheeswaram Hindu Temple was reconstructed with financial

support from the Indian government, and the maha kumbabhishekam was

held on 6 July 2022. On this day the Rudra Sena distributed leaflets on

anti-conversion–that implicated Christians and Muslims in the activity–to

devotees who attended the kumbabhishekam ceremony. The founder of the

World Saiva Council is reported to have provided financial support to print

the leaflets

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

2.2 VIOLENCE AGAINST HINDUS

A total of 19 incidents of violence against Hindus were

documented by NCEASL between November 2021

and October 2022. This was a significant increase in

documented incidents in comparison to the previous

study done by Verité Research (2022a).

However, the

underlying narratives of anti-Hindu violence remained

the same.

Figure 18 |

Underlying narrative: Contestations over religious sites

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

As explored in the section on anti-Muslim violence, contestations over Hindu religious sites continue to be a

prominent narrative.

Contestations over religious sites usually involve competing claims relating to the historic identity and the own-

ership of the site. One such notable contestation that occurred during the period under review was the con-

testation over Kurunthurmalai, which is a religious site that is claimed by both Buddhists and Hindus (see more

details below). As described above, these incidents are often viewed by minority ethnic groups as deliberate

expressions of ‘majority dominance’, where the majority group asserts its majority status over contested reli-

gious sites. The following incidents recorded by NCEASL depict the manifestation of this narrative in incidents

of violence against the Hindu community.

Incident

no.

Date and location

14 May 2022

Jaffna

Description

Monk threatens mayor over a tank contested by two communities:

The Ariyakulam tank is considered to be an ancient Tamil heritage site which

was built by an Aryan emperor from Tamil Nadu. There is a Buddhist vihara

near the tank. Every year, the army cleans this tank during the Vesak festi-

val and decorates it with lanterns. Last year, the Jaffna Municipal Council

took over the maintenance of this tank. The Jaffna Municipal Council mayor

announced at a press conference that no religious activities would be per-

mitted in Ariyakulam, and the council passed a resolution regarding this on 2

October 2021.

On 14 May 2022, the chief monk of the nearby vihara called the deputy mayor

of the Jaffna Municipal Council seeking permission to decorate the tank

with lanterns for Vesak. After he was denied permission, the monk raised his

voice and threatened that he could dissolve the municipal council with his

power.

The Ariyakulam tank is a contested site with alternative narratives regarding

its origin.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

12 June 2022

Mullaitivu

Attempts made to erect a Buddha statue in Kurunthurmalai:

Attempts were made by Buddhist monks and the army to erect a Buddha

statue and to perform a Buddhist ceremony at Mullaitivu-Thannimurippu,

Kurunthurmalai, which is a native Tamil temple site, despite a court order

given by the Mullaitivu Magistrate’s Court in 2018 that no new constructions

could take place. Due to protests by the locals those efforts were aban-

doned. A case was filed in the Mullaitivu Magistrate’s Court (hearing of this

case was fixed for 30 June 2022).

Due to the insufficiency of the report provided by the Mullaitivu Police Sta-

tion regarding this case, the police requested two weeks’ time to provide the

report. The case was refixed for 14 July 2022.

On 14 July 2022, the Mullaitivu Magistrate’s Court delivered an order in the

Kurunthurmalai case:

All newly built viharas, statues and buildings must be removed.

2. Devotees of Adi Shivan Iyanar Temple can continue to worship at the

temple.

19 July 2022

Mullaitivu

It is the police’s responsibility to ensure peace in the area and submit a

report to the court.

Motion filed seeking reconsideration of the order issued by court regarding

Kurunthurmalai:

A motion was filed by the Mullaitivu Police, Attorney General’s (AG’s) Depart-

ment and the Department of Archaeology on 19 July 2022, requesting that

the orders passed on 14 July 2022 be reconsidered.

The Department of Archaeology stated that the building built was not a viha-

ra, but instead was built to preserve archaeological materials. The Mullaitivu

Police and the AG’s Department stated that demolishing this building would

create tension between the ethnic groups.

Thereafter the Mullaitivu magistrate visited the site at around 2 pm on 19

July 2022. It was noticed that the Hindu symbols of worship found in Kurun-

thurmalai earlier had been removed. Following this, on 19 July 2022 the judge

revised the previous order, specifying that the building constructed there

could continue in the same condition, no further construction work should

be carried out and the existing building should not be demolished.

8 September 2022

Colombo

An MP’s speech on Kurunthurmalai in parliament:

An MP speaking in parliament stated that the site was a historical location in

both the Deepavamsa and Mahavamasa and that there was no evidence of a

historical Hindu temple being located at the site. He further went on to state

that all should accept that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala Buddhist country.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Contestations over religious sites: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

21 September 2022

Mullaitivu

Police arrest people protesting the violation of the court order on Kurunthur-

malai, Karaithuraipattu:

At 9 am about 100 people began protesting, asking Buddhist monks and the

Archaeology Department to stop violating the court order regarding Kurun-

thurmalai. The protest started at Kumilamunai junction and reached Kurun-

thurmalai at 10 am where the protesters listed their reasons for the protest.

The protesters included the village agriculture organisation, political parties,

social activists and the general public. In 2018 the magistrate ordered that

protection should be given only by the civil defence force and gave permis-

sion for the Hindu devotees to engage in worship.

However, the Archaeology Department still retains the military (army) for the

protection of the shrine, and the armed forces personnel do not allow Hindu

devotees to engage in worship.

13 October 2022

Mullaitivu

A motion filed against protesters in Kurunthurmalai, Karaithuraipattu:

A motion was filed in the Mulaitivu Magistrate’s Court alleging that the con-

struction at Kurunthurmalai has resumed. On the same day, Mullaitivu Police

filed a motion against a former Northern Provincial Council member and

activist regarding the demonstration held on 21 September 2022. After hear-

ing these two motions on 13 October 2022, the Mullaitivu District magistrate

stated that the case will be heard again on 27 October 2022 to issue a court

order.

Figure 19 |

Underlying narrative: Land acquisition and/or encroachment

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

The incident reports on land acquisition/encroachment prominently featured the term ‘Buddhistisation’ to de-

scribe the alleged attempts made by the state, military and the Archaeology Department to convert Hindu and/

or Tamil localities.

As explored in a previous study by Vérite Research (2020b), the terms ‘Sinhalisation’ and/or ‘Buddhistisation’ are

often used as a way to express the Hindu community’s ‘fear and insecurity over its cultural and religious rights

being under threat following the end of the war’. Certain incidents, such as the installation of Buddha statues in

areas with a Tamil majority (see more details below) were perceived as such by the local community.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

Incident

no.

Date and location

28 March 2022

Trincomalee

Description

Archaeology Department attempts to list Hindu temple as archaeological

site:

During the 1980s, a peepal tree (Bodhi tree) was found near the Kilivetti

Amman Temple. This tree was cut down by militant groups in 1981. The state

intelligence service kept a close eye on the area after receiving information

about the tree five to six years ago. Currently, the Department of Archae-

ology has contacted the Mutur Divisional Secretariat and has informed it

about the need to survey the temple to list it as an archaeological site in the

gazette. A group of archaeologists, Buddhist monks and army officials visit-

ed on 28 March 2022 between 8.30 am and 11.30 am. Those who live nearby

protested the visit.

Hindu devotees restricted from entering place of worship:

Nagammal, Lingam and Pillaiyar have been worshipped at the Rajavanthan

Malai Pillaiyar Temple since 1612. Since 2018, the military and a Buddhist

monk living in the area have occupied the temple and its adjacent 185 acres

of farmland, calling it Buddhist land. The army and navy, led by the Buddhist

monk, hid the Shiva lingam in early November 2021 and set up a vihara there.

On 23 April 2022, a group of 225 people (including 85 students, teachers and

mothers of the students) travelled to the foothills to celebrate the fourth an-

niversary of the Saiva Aranery School. The Buddhist monk, police and army

tried to stop the Hindus from entering, hurling racist abuse at them and con-

fiscating mobile phones. This hill is mentioned in the gazette as a Buddhist

archaeological site. However, 185 acres of farmland surrounding the temple

have been illegally occupied, claiming that they belong to a Buddhist vihara

without a gazette or any other proof.

Chief monk files complaint against Hindu priest at Rajavanthan Malai:

The chief monk of the Muttur Kottiyarama Mula Raja Maha Vihara filed a

complaint against a Hindu priest (kurukkal) at the office of the Assistant

Superintendent of Police (ASP) in Trincomalee, regarding the incident on 23

April 2022, alleging that the Hindu priest trespassed the lands owned by the

vihara without the permission of the chief monk. He further alleged that the

Hindu priest attempted to attack the monk.

ASP asks Hindu priest not to enter Hindu place of worship in Rajavanthan

Malai:

An investigation into the complaint lodged on 13 May 2022 took place on 17

May 2022 at the ASP’s office in Trincomalee. The Hindu priest was asked by

the ASP not to enter the vihara land provided by the government. The Hindu

priest requested the police to ensure no one damages the Pillaiyar temple

and that Hindus should be allowed to visit the temple to worship. The ASP

stated that he would visit the site with police officers and the divisional sec-

retary on 26 May 2022 and invite relevant parties for a discussion.

23 April 2022

Trincomalee

13 May 2022

Trincomalee

17 May 2022

Trincomalee

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Land acquisition and/or encroachment: An underlying narrative used to justify the targeting of Hindus

26 May 2022

Trincomalee

ASP says only monk can enter place of worship:

The chief monk of the Muttur Kottiyarama Mula Raja Maha Vihara and Hindu

priests of the Rajavanthan Malai Pillaiyar Temple went to the office of the

ASP in Muttur. The ASP informed the Hindu priests that they cannot visit the

hill and that only the monk could go there. When the Hindu priests asked that

a written restraining order be provided, it was refused. The monk respond-

ed that he didn’t want to take the matter to court as he wanted to maintain

ethnic harmony. The group of Hindu priests said that ethnic harmony could

be achieved if the following conditions were met.

The conditions were as follows:

There should be no interference in matters regarding the Pillaiyar temple

which has been built by Hindus at the foothills.

2. Hindu religious symbols found on the hills have already been destroyed.

They requested to leave the remaining symbols intact (the monk asked

for three months to discuss this with other monks).

There should be no inciting of communal tension among Hindus, Chris-

tians and Muslims in the area.

The monk agreed to the first and third conditions. Thereafter both parties

reconciled the matter.

7 March 2022

Vavuniya

New Buddha statue erected in Vavuniya:

A Buddha statue was installed at the Vavuniya South (Sinhala) Divisional

Secretariat premises located in the city limits of Vavuniya. Vavuniya South

divisional secretary and Buddhist monks jointly dedicated the Buddha statue

on 7 March 2022. The area is inhabited by a large number of Tamils and many

of the officers of the divisional secretariat, including the assistant divisional

secretary, are Tamil and Muslim.

Many members of the public have questioned whether regional activities are

complicit in the state’s ‘Buddhistisation’ plans in the North. (This divisional

secretariat was set up to provide services for Sinhala people).

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Figure 20 |

Other incidents involving violence, discrimination and/or derogatory statements against Hindus

Incident

no.

Date and location

24 December 2021

Trincomalee

Description

Attempt made to install a Buddha statue in a Hindu place of worship:

A Buddha statue was placed by unknown persons on top of the Pillaiyar stat-

ue in the Malaiyadi Pillaiyar Temple at 64th Mile Post, Muttur, Trincomalee. In

response to this, Hindu clerics and the public decided to stage a protest. The

statue was removed by police before the protest began.

Catholic statue placed near entrance to Hindu temple:

Around 6 pm a group of Catholics placed a statue of Mother Mary near the

entrance of the Thiruketheeswaram Temple. The situation was notified to

the government agent, divisional secretary and pradeshiya sabha treasurer,

but no action was taken. A complaint was filed on 13 February 2022 at the

Uyilankulam Police Station by the deputy chairperson of the Thiruketh-

eeswaram Temple administration, the deputy chairperson of the board of

trustees and two members of the board of trustees.

The Saiva Peravai raised the Hindu flag of Nandi (Bull) in front of the statue

on 28 February 2022.

14 March 2022

Jaffna

Attempts made to install a Buddha statue in a Hindu temple:

A couple of monks and army soldiers visited the Chulipuram Paralai Muru-

gan Temple and told the priest of the temple that a Buddha statue would be

placed inside the temple on the full moon (Poya) day on 17 March 2022.

The villagers and temple administration held a press conference and stated

that they have decided not to allow the Buddha statue to be placed in the

temple. During the press conference intelligence officers were present. Fol-

lowing this, the villagers and the temple administration gathered to protect

the temple.

12 February 2022

Mannar

16 March 2022

Jaffna

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Other incidents involving violence, discrimination and/or derogatory statements against Hindus

19 May 2022

Batticaloa

Activist questioned by state officers:

Tamil people of Thennamaravadi village were displaced in 1984 due to ethnic

riots. After this, the Sinhala speaking villagers living in Singapura, which is

near this village, occupied the fishing resources of Thennamaravadi. In 2010,

the Tamil villagers returned to the village. Until now, there has been tension

between the Sinhala and the Tamil people.

Pongal is prepared every full moon (Poya) day by local Hindus in the Then-

namaravadi village as a way of worshipping Lord Murugan. During this time

porridge is also distributed in many Tamil areas for the remembrance of

Mullivaikkal Day.

However, the temple management and the local people only conducted the

full moon pooja as was their usual custom, and had no connection to the

remembrance of Mullivaikkal Day. Yet, upon learning about the full moon

pooja two Criminal Investigation Department officers from Pulmodai Police

Station in Trincomalee visited the area on 19 May 2022 and inquired details

(such as who organised the pooja, where the money for the pooja was from,

whether the full moon pooja had any connection to the Mullivaikkal Day) from

a human rights activist who helped organise the pooja.

4 July 2022

Mullaitivu

Army stops Hindu devotees of the Vadduvakal Saptha Kannimar Temple:

There are 237 Hindu families residing in the Vadduvakal village. After the end

of the war in 2009 these families resettled in this area in 2010. A vihara and a

Special Task Force (STF) camp were set up near the residences of the locals

during this time. An ancient temple known as the Vadduvakal Saptha Kan-

nimar Temple is located in this village. As part of the temple’s festival, holy

water (theertham) is fetched from the sea.

The usual route villagers use to reach the sea is close to the vihara. However,

due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an alternate route was used in 2020 - 2021

to reach the beach. At 5 pm on 4 July 2022, when the devotees attempted

to go to the sea via the usual route to start the temple festival, they were

stopped by army personnel. The people then used the alternate route. At 10

pm, people went to the army checkpoint and asked the soldiers to vacate the

checkpoint, and thereafter vandalised the checkpoint (the checkpoint was

made of palmyra leaves).

The soldiers who left the checkpoint lodged a complaint against six mem-

bers of the temple administration and a former Northern Provincial Council

member and activist at the Mullaitivu Police Station on 5 July 2022. During

the investigation on 5 and 6 July, the police and military expressed their will-

ingness to resolve the dispute with the villagers in a peaceful manner.

Military officials informed the chief of the temple administration on 12 July

2022 that they would meet with the villagers and temple officials in two or

three days.

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

ANNEXURE 2: INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS AND HINDUS

Other incidents involving violence, discrimination and/or derogatory statements against Hindus

26 July 2022

A high-ranking officer and four or five army personnel visited the Vadduvakal

Saptha Kannimar Temple administration. The army stated they will discon-

tinue the checkpoint but requested ownership and control of the building

that was built by the army on the temple’s land. They also stated that the

temple could perform poojas during the temple festival and that there would

not be any disturbance.

The building erected by the army on the temple’s land was later handed over

to the army by the temple administration. When people resettled in 2010,

the army put up a building on the temple’s land which housed seven to eight

soldiers. The building has also been used as an office. It has also served as a

small military checkpoint.

On 4 July 2022, after the villagers were stopped by army personnel, the vil-

lagers damaged the fences around the building. Following this, the soldiers

had left the area that night.

14 July 2022

Trincomalee

Nandi flags at the Rajavanthan Malai Pillaiyar Temple removed by unidenti-

fied persons:

A Nandi flag (flag with the emblem of a bull) had been tied on an eight-foot-

long stick on a tree where the Pillaiyar statue is located, and it could be seen

from a distance. On the evening of 14 July 2022, the devotees observed that

both the flag and the stick had been removed. Two more Nandi flags at the

bottom had also been removed. Additionally, the sand used for the construc-

tion of the temple had been scattered and the stones around it had been

removed as well. On the advice of the district secretary and Muttur divisional

secretary, the land officer, grama niladhari and Road Development Authority

(RDA) officials had surveyed the pieces of land and demarcated the bounda-

ries. Those markers had also been removed.

A complaint was lodged in this regard at Muttur Police Station on 16 July.

5 October 2022

Trincomalee

Vehicle parked on the temple’s foundation stone:

5 October is the day of the Navaratri pooja at the Muttur Manika Vinayakar

Temple. Traditionally, on this day Goddess Ambigai’s procession arrives at

the Rajavanthan Malai Pillaiyar Temple and proceeds to the Iraiyathuveli

river bank for theerthotsavam. In the morning, when the procession reached

Rajavanthan Malai Pillaiyar Temple, there were four to six people standing on

the road and a vehicle was parked where the foundation stone of the temple

had been laid near the Nandi flag and flagpole.

The individuals were found to be suppliers who bring sand for the road con-

struction taking place around that area by the Road Development Authority

(RDA), and use that road to bring construction materials. They left the place

immediately without saying a word to the devotees. The devotees wor-

shipped and went to the river bank after the temple’s priest made a com-

plaint to the Muttur Police Station over the phone.

Mullaitivu

Religious Violence against Christians: Disruptions and Distractions

(November 2021 - October 2022)

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END NOTES

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END NOTES

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URU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 125: Materiale fra møde med delegation fra Sri Lanka v/ MF Helle Bonnesen (KF) fredag den 28. april 2023

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