OSCEs Parlamentariske Forsamling 2022-23 (2. samling)
OSCE Alm.del Bilag 19
Offentligt
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OSCE PA debate Helsinki +50
Vienna, Ho�½urg
22 February 2023
Madame President, Mr. Secretary General,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Exactly one year ago I was in the Hague to launch my book:
Security through Cooperation.
As you can imagine, there were a few remarks about whether that was the best �½me or the
worst �½me to be promo�½ng a book about coopera�½ve security.
One year a�½er Russia’s invasion of Ukraine I believe the message of such a book is more
relevant than ever.
The sub-�½tle of my book is “To the Same End”. It is a play on words. The defini�½on of
coopera�½on is to work together to the same end. But if we fail to cooperate we will meet the
same end.
In that respect, I would
like to
re-enforce the case for coopera�½ve security.
Let me start by stressing that coopera�½on is
not
appeasement, and it is not pacifism.
Nor should coopera�½on be viewed as the absence of conflict; rather it is a reac�½on to conflict,
or an effort to prevent it. If we all lived in harmony there would be no need for coopera�½ve
security organiza�½ons.
Therefore, coopera�½ve security is usually an aspira�½on rather than a fact. In coopera�½ve
security arrangements countries seek to work together in order to manage their rela�½ons
peacefully, to increase predictability or to de-escalate tensions
–
as opposed to collec�½ve
security arrangements where the partners are more or less like-minded, and usually united in
a defensive alliance. Think of the difference between the OSCE and NATO.
There is a place for both collec�½ve and coopera�½ve security. Think back to the late 1960s when
the NATO doctrine was based on deterrence and détente.
However,
today
there is no talk of détente. Many leaders
admit
that the war in Ukraine can
only end with media�½on. But at the moment there is litle sign that media�½on will end the war.
Both sides seem to think that �½me is on their side, the enemy is a threat to their existence,
and that the war will end in victory.
President Pu�½n seems to have the same mindset as Vladimir Lenin who said “You probe with
bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you find steel, you withdraw”. Over the past year, I
think Moscow has been surprised at the steely resolve of Ukraine, and its allies in the West.
But can Pu�½n afford to withdraw?
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 OSCE, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 19: Report: Informal Call for Action - Helsinki +50 meeting, 22 February 2023
Ladies and Gentlemen, at some point, Russia and Ukraine will have to make peace. They
cannot change their geography. They will have to find a way to live beside each other. The
stronger Ukraine is, the greater the incen�½ve for Russia to cooperate: not only with Kyiv, but
with the West. But the more Moscow feels threatened, the greater its desire to defend itself
–
which could cause instability in its neighborhood.
The warning signs of this “security dilemma” were evident for years, at least as far back as
Pu�½n’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.
That unresolved dilemma has resulted
in
two simultaneous conflicts: one between Russia and
the West, and one between Kyiv and Moscow. It will be hard to solve one without the other.
The OSCE’s role in ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will probably be limited. At
the same �½me, its work is almost paralyzed as a result of that conflict.
That said, it is vital for the OSCE
to
survive since it will be the logical place to rebuild the
European security architecture a�½er the war.
I would therefore raise the following ques�½ons for your considera�½on:
-
-
-
For those who say that Russia should be kicked out of the OSCE, what would be the
added value of the OSCE without Russia?
And for those
–
including Russia
–
who think that it is important to maintain channels
of dialogue; my ques�½on is, dialogue to what end?
For those who say there can be “no business as usual” I would ask
–
“does that mean
no business at all”? Or should we be doing things differently?
What I am driving at is that those who s�½ll believe in coopera�½ve security and an inclusive pan-
European security arrangement should be thinking about what post-war Europe will look like,
and what lessons can be learned from this horrible war, and the period leading up to it.
Concretely, I think that lessons can be learned from conversa�½ons held during the darkest days
of World War Two when a group of countries came together at Dumbarton Oaks to create a
new interna�½onal organiza�½on out of the ashes of the League of Na�½ons. Or the early 1970s
when consulta�½ons were held in Finland and Switzerland to discuss problems rela�½ng to
security and coopera�½on in Europe.
It may be difficult to have those conversa�½ons among the 57
–
at least at the moment. But
crea�½ve formulas could be found for informal dialogue. And it will be important to engage civil
society and parliamentarians. Let us not forget the important role played by Helsinki
Commitees in the 1970s and 80s.
I would like to believe that there is a cri�½cal mass of people across the OSCE area who do not
want nuclear war, a return to dictatorships, and a divided Europe. Their voices need to be
heard.
In that spirit, we need to mobilize all those who want to stop Russia’s aggression, to halt the
escala�½on of this conflict, and to urgently seek ways of rebuilding peace, stability and good-
neighborly rela�½ons in line with the OSCE’s founding principles.
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 OSCE, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 19: Report: Informal Call for Action - Helsinki +50 meeting, 22 February 2023
At a minimum, this requires:
-
-
-
Keeping open channels of dialogue and using them construc�½vely and crea�½vely;
Keeping the OSCE alive;
And holding informal consulta�½ons on the future of European security.
As it says in the Parliamentary Assembly Call for Ac�½on “we need decisive leadership to steer
the OSCE community towards the vision and the ambi�½ous goals set out by our former leaders,
a vision we share and feel bound to promote, and to help our Organiza�½on navigate the
troubled waters ahead.”
The war has shown what happens when coopera�½on fails. The alterna�½ve is doing what our
predecessors understood in 1945, in 1975, and in 1990: namely fostering security through
coopera�½on.
Thank you for your aten�½on and I look forward to the debate.
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