NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2022-23 (2. samling), Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2022-23 (2. samling)
NPA Alm.del Bilag 12, UPN Alm.del Bilag 121
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NATO VILNIUS SUMMIT
11-12 JULY 2023
Policy Brief
150 SPE 23 E | Original: English | August 2023
This Policy Brief is presented for information only and does not
represent the official view of the Assembly
 NPA, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 12: Policy Brief NATO Summit Vilnius 11-12 July 2023
150 SPE 23 E
I.
II.
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 1
PROGRAMME ............................................................................................................... 2
III. KEY MESSAGES IN THE NATO PA PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS AND NATO PA
PARTICIPATION IN OTHER SUMMIT-RELATED EVENTS ................................................. 2
IV. KEY OUTCOMES OF THE SUMMIT ............................................................................. 3
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Expanding political and practical support to Ukraine .................................................. 3
Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence......................................................... 6
Accelerating Sweden’s accession to NATO ............................................................... 8
Highlighting partnerships with the Indo-Pacific and the EU to address global challenges
9
Reaffirming the commitment to protecting shared democratic values ........................ 9
Taking a strong stance on Russia’s threat ............................................................... 10
Continuing the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations ................. 10
Addressing challenges in the South ......................................................................... 11
Rising to China’s challenge...................................................................................... 11
10. Strategic stability, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation ........................ 11
11. Reinforcing Allied resilience ..................................................................................... 12
12. Emerging and disruptive technologies ..................................................................... 12
13. Tackling cyber challenges........................................................................................ 12
14. Understanding and adapting to climate change ....................................................... 13
15. Intensifying NATO-EU relations ............................................................................... 13
16. Challenges and opportunities in the Western Balkans ............................................. 14
17. Enhancing the focus on the Black Sea region .......................................................... 14
18. Supporting Vulnerable partners ............................................................................... 14
19. Further priorities ...................................................................................................... 15
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150 SPE 23 E
I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
The recent NATO Summit in Vilnius took place at a critical moment for Allied security as
well as international peace and stability, as “[p]eace in the Euro-Atlantic area has been
shattered”, as the Summit Communiqué underlines.
1
The Summit
demonstrated the
Alliance’s “enduring transatlantic bond, unity, cohesion, and solidarity”
and was a
“milestone in strengthening [NATO]”.
Finland participated for the first time as NATO’s 31st
member.
2.
The Summit followed up on the transformative decisions taken at the 2022 NATO Madrid
Summit, where leaders adopted
NATO’s new Strategic Concept.
In Vilnius,
Allied leaders
took further important steps
to demonstrate support for Ukraine and reinforce the Alliance.
The two main achievements were:
•
•
the expansion of political and practical support to Ukraine
the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence
3.
The issue of
Sweden’s accession to NATO
was an important topic ahead of the
Summit, culminating with an agreement on Monday 10 July between President Erdogan,
Swedish Prime Minister Kristersson and the NATO Secretary General. The agreement
reached on several points meant that Türkiye committed to moving Sweden’s accession
process forward in its parliament.
4.
The Summit further highlighted the importance of
strengthening dialogue and
cooperation with key partners to address global challenges and defend the
international rules-based order.
A particular focus was put on the
Indo-Pacific
as Heads of
State and Government from NATO’s four partners in the region joined Allies and leaders of
the European Union (EU) for a dedicated session during the Summit.
5.
Some of the other key topics in Vilnius included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reaffirming the commitment to protecting shared democratic values
Taking a strong stance on Russia’s threat
Continuing the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
Addressing challenges in the South
Rising to China’s challenge
Strategic stability, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
Reinforcing Allied resilience
Emerging and disruptive technologies
Tackling cyber challenges
Understanding and adapting to climate change
Intensifying NATO-EU relations
Challenges and opportunities in the Western Balkans
Enhancing the focus on the Black Sea region
Supporting Vulnerable partners
6.
As per tradition,
the
NATO PA President, Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam
(France),
addressed the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Heads of State and
Government level
in Allies-only format on 11 July (read
the full speech).
She stressed three
key Assembly recommendations:
•
1
to increase both practical and political support for Ukraine;
Unless otherwise noted, all quotes refer to the
Summit Communiqué.
1
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150 SPE 23 E
•
•
to promptly implement all aspects of NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence
posture and agree an ambitious target for future defence spending; and
to operationalise NATO’s recommitment to shared democratic values, notably by
establishing a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO HQ.
7.
The President was accompanied by a delegation from the Bureau including three of the
five Vice-Presidents -
Zaida Cantera
(Spain),
Kevan Jones
(UK) and
Nicu Falcoi
(Romania) -
and Treasurer
Wolfgang Hellmich
(Germany). The delegation’s participation in the Summit
and the
NATO Public Forum,
running in parallel, was extensive (see below).
8.
Ahead of the Vilnius Summit, the Assembly had detailed its priorities in
two
declarations
(adopted at the Spring Session in Luxembourg): Declaration 481 on
NATO
adaptation for a new strategic era,
presented by Vice-President
Linda Sanchez
(United
States), and Declaration 482 on
support for Ukraine,
presented by Vice-President
Michal
Szczerba
(Poland).
9.
As this policy brief will illustrate,
the decisions taken at the Summit –
which are
outlined in a long
90-paragraph Communiqué
- and those agreed in the margins are
generally in line with Assembly recommendations.
II.
PROGRAMME
10. During the two-day
programme,
two meetings of the North Atlantic Council took
place at the level of Heads of State and Government.
The first of these was held in a format
of Allies and invitee Sweden. The second was held with Allies, Sweden, the four Indo-Pacific
Partners and the European Union (EU).
Foreign and Defence Ministers also held separate
NAC meetings.
11.
The inaugural meeting of the new
NATO-Ukraine Council
was held on the second
day, at the level of Heads of State and Government.
12. After the conclusion of the NATO Summit,
the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7)
and President Zelenskyy also signed a
Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine.
13. As in previous years, a high-level public conference –
the NATO Public Forum
– was
held in parallel to the Summit. The programme featured addresses by a range of Heads of
State, Ministers and NATO top officials.
III.
KEY MESSAGES IN THE NATO PA PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS AND NATO PA
PARTICIPATION IN OTHER SUMMIT-RELATED EVENTS
14.
In her
address to the Summit,
the NATO PA President called on NATO’s Heads of State
and Government
to accelerate NATO’s ongoing adaptation – anchored in the Alliance’s
founding values – and to firmly reiterate Allies’ resolute support for Ukraine.
15.
The President praised NATO’s ongoing in-depth adaptation,
which “rises to the
challenge of the electroshock of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”.
However, “NATO’s
adaptation will not be complete until we have effectively given substance to the
Alliance’s commitment, as enshrined in its founding treaty and now in the Strategic
Concept, to defend democratic values.”
She therefore urged leaders to endorse the
Assembly’s proposal for the establishment of a
Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO
Headquarters.
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150 SPE 23 E
16. The President underlined that
"this Summit should strongly reaffirm that we will
stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
She added that “we must go further and
chart
a clear path which will lead Ukraine towards NATO membership.
Ukraine’s place is here,
amongst us.
Until then, we must provide firm security guarantees to Ukraine”.
17. The President also reiterated the Assembly’s support for the strengthening of
NATO’s capabilities and deterrence and defence posture, particularly on the eastern
flank:
“This Summit must also demonstrate through robust commitments our unwavering
determination to defend every inch of NATO territory”. She also called for
“a new, ambitious
commitment on defence spending, with 2% of GDP as a minimum threshold, which
should be exceeded.”
18. She moreover
welcomed the agreement reached the previous day on Sweden's
accession
and called for swift ratification by the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments.
19. In addition to the President’s address, the NATO PA delegation was involved in a range
of other Summit-related events. On the first evening,
the NATO PA President attended the
dinner for the Heads of State and Government,
and
the other members of the Bureau
attended the dinner for the Foreign and Defence Ministers.
On the second day,
a high-
level women’s breakfast
was organised with ministers and invited guests,
including the
NATO PA President.
20. President Garriaud-Maylam also presented the Assembly’s priorities during
a panel of
the
NATO Public Forum
on parliamentarians and grassroots support for NATO,
where
she joined Viktorija Čmilytė-Nielsen, Speaker of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, and
US Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis.
21. In addition to informal exchanges, the delegation also had bilateral meetings with
Klaus
Iohannis, President of Romania,
and
Boris Pistorius, Minister of Defence of Germany.
Moreover, the delegation engaged with
Audronius Azubalis, Head of the Lithuanian
Delegation,
and
Yehor Cherniev, Head of the Ukrainian Delegation.
IV.
KEY OUTCOMES OF THE SUMMIT
1.
Expanding political and practical support to Ukraine
22. Once again, Allied Heads of State and Government
demonstrated their “unwavering
solidarity”
with Ukraine and
stepped-up support through a new substantial package of
expanded political and practical support
including
three key elements:
a new
multiyear
assistance programme,
a new
NATO-Ukraine Council
and a consolidated
path towards
Ukraine’s membership
in NATO.
23.
Several Allies also announced further, major increases in military support
ahead
of or during the Summit, including long-range cruise missiles, munitions, armoured vehicles
and advanced air defence systems.
Moreover, eleven Allies
2
pledged to start training
Ukrainian pilots on F-16 aircraft soon,
first in Denmark and then in a new centre in Romania.
24. After the conclusion of the NATO Summit,
the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7)
and President Zelenskyy signed a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine.
Importantly,
they notably launched negotiations to formalise support through bilateral security
commitments and arrangements.
2
Belgium, Canada, Denmark Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Sweden and the UK.
3
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150 SPE 23 E
Building out the Comprehensive Assistance Package
25. Allies agreed to
further develop the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP),
which provides non-lethal assistance to Ukraine.
The CAP will now be developed into a
multi-year programme, funded “in a sustained and predictable way”
by Allies and
partners willing to contribute. Building out the CAP “will
help rebuild the Ukrainian security
and defence sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO”,
thus
enhancing Ukraine’s deterrence and defence over the short, medium and long term.
26.
This Summit decision is fully in line with NATO PA recommendations,
notably the
calls to strengthen the CAP and putting together a strategic multi-year NATO assistance
programme.
NATO-Ukraine Council
27.
Allies and Ukraine established the NATO-Ukraine Council
to supplant the
NATO-Ukraine Commission (formed in 1997).
The Council’s goal is to “advance political
dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for
membership in NATO”.
The Council allows for
joint consultations, decision-making and
activities,
including sub-committees. Any Ally or Ukraine can request crisis consultations.
3
The Council can meet at different political or military levels.
28. The new Council marks
“a significant step to move Ukraine closer to NATO”,
according to the NATO Secretary General. In contrast to the previous Commission, all Allies
and Ukraine sit around the table as equals. The Council is thus “a much stronger, much more
important political entity than to just have a partnership”, he stressed, calling it “an instrument
of integration” rather than an “instrument of participation”.
29.
On the second day of the Summit, the Council met for the first time,
gathering all
Allied leaders, the Swedish Prime Minister and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. After joining
the 2022 NATO Madrid Summit by video link, this was his first-ever in-person participation in
a NATO Summit since being elected President.
30. While the Assembly did not specifically call for such a new Council,
the decision is very
much in line with the Assembly’s wishes
to send “a clear political signal to Ukraine” and
increase political support for Kyiv.
Ukraine’s membership path
31. Addressing Ukraine’s future in NATO, Allied leaders clearly spelled out a number of key
points:
•
•
•
•
As any sovereign and independent nation,
Ukraine has the right to choose its own
security arrangements.
Ukraine’s future is in NATO,
and
it will become a member of NATO,
as already agreed
at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
Allies felt that
Ukraine has made sufficient enough strides to obviate the need for a
Membership Action Plan
ahead of its membership. This was otherwise a key part of the
2008 decision.
Allies committed to continue to bring Ukraine closer to NATO membership,
including on interoperability and further necessary democratic and defence and security
3
On 26 July 2023, Ukraine called the
second Council meeting
for crisis consultations following
Russia’s unilateral termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative
.
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150 SPE 23 E
sector reforms. NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress, based on
Ukraine’s adapted Annual National Programme.
Allied leaders lastly noted that they would “be in a position to extend an invitation
to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met”.
This marks
the first time a Summit Communiqué includes a reference to a future invitation and
outlines two elements which would allow such an invitation to be extended.
•
32.
The decisions and statements on Ukraine’s membership path are broadly in line
with the Assembly’s recommendations to strengthen Ukraine’s membership path and
agree on the next significant steps towards membership.
G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine
33. On 12 July, the G7 leaders and President Zelenskyy signed a
Joint Declaration of
Support for Ukraine.
4
The Declaration launched negotiations to formalise support through
“specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements”.
34.
•
These commitments and arrangements will have three aims:
make sure Ukraine has sustainable forces to defend itself now and deter any future
Russian aggression
by providing security assistance and modern military equipment,
supporting the defence industry, conducting training and exercises, increasing
intelligence sharing and cooperation and aiding cyber, security and resilience efforts;
strengthen Ukraine’s economic stability and resilience and enable future
prosperity,
including through reconstruction and recovery efforts; and
provide technical and financial support for urgent needs as well as Ukraine’s
reform agenda.
•
•
35.
In case of a future Russian armed attack,
the G7 leaders stated their intention “to
immediately consult with Ukraine”
on appropriate steps. They would also intend to
supply
“swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment […], and
economic assistance, to impose economic and other costs on Russia, and to consult
with Ukraine on its needs”.
The G7 countries would also work with the country “on an
enhanced package of security commitments and arrangements in case of future aggression”.
36. In turn,
Ukraine committed to “contributing positively to partner security and to
strengthen transparency and accountability measures”
on assistance it receives and to
continue its wide-ranging reform agenda,
including in the rule-of-law, defence and security
sectors.
37. The EU and its member states “stand ready to contribute” and will soon consider
how to do so.
Moreover,
other nations can join this Declaration at any time.
38.
In declaration 482, the NATO PA had recommended that Allied leaders would
“highlight […] the need for firm future security guarantees for Ukraine until acquiring
NATO membership”.
The G7 declaration, signed by six Allies, is a significant step which
opens for a broader network of bilateral commitments and arrangements in support of Ukraine.
39.
Other commitments in the G7 Declaration are also generally in line with NATO PA
recommendations,
including on short- and long-term humanitarian, financial and material
assistance and on reconstruction and aid.
4
The G7 consists of six Allies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States),
NATO partner Japan and the EU (a ‘non-enumerated’ member).
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150 SPE 23 E
Other Ukraine-related issues
40. Allied leaders made clear that
“Russia bears full responsibility”
for the aggression
against Ukraine and
“must be held fully accountable”, with no impunity
for war crimes
and other atrocities.
41.
Belarus and Iran, the Communiqué notes, “must end their complicity with Russia
and return to compliance with international law.”
Leaders also
urged China “to play a
constructive role”,
condemn the war, abstain from supporting Moscow and from amplifying
its false narratives, adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as well as “act
responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia”.
42.
G7 leaders generally echoed these sentiments but went further, given the G7’s
different mandate.
They underlined that Russian
sovereign assets would “remain
immobilized
until Russia pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine”. They recognised
that an
international mechanism for reparation of damages, loss or injury
is necessary
and expressed their readiness to explore options. They also made clear that
costs from
sanctions, export controls and other measures must continue to increase.
They would
moreover continue “supporting
efforts to hold to account those responsible
for war crimes
and other international crimes”, including by aiding “efforts of international mechanisms, such
as the International Criminal Court”.
43.
Allies also welcomed and supported President Zelenskyy’s commitment in setting
out the principles for “a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace” through his Peace
Formula.
44.
These outcomes are in line with the NATO PA recommendations,
notably on holding
accountable the Russian regime, its co-aggressors in the Belarusian regime and other
supporters, including through national and international courts; on supporting reparation and
compensation mechanisms and considering the use of frozen Russian assets; on keeping up
the pressure of sanctions; and on support Ukraine’s efforts to promote its plan for a
comprehensive, just and sustainable peace.
2.
Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence
45. In Vilnius, Allies reaffirmed that “[d]eterrence
and defence are at the heart of the
Alliance,
underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic
bond.”. They committed to “modernising
NATO for a new era of collective defence.”
Consequently, Allies took
important decisions to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and
defence.
Notably, they agreed on the
“most detailed and robust defence plans since the
Cold War”
and
reinforced their “commitment to defence investment”,
as the NATO
Secretary General noted.
Stepping up NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in all domains
46. Notably, Allied leaders agreed on or reaffirmed
six decisions and measures to further
enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in all domains:
1.
Three regional defence
plans have been put into place
to complement NATO’s
existing strategic and domain-specific plans. These Regional Plans outline how NATO
forces would defend different areas of the Alliance.
Regional Plan - High North and the
Atlantic
is led by Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk;
Regional Plan Central
(from
Baltic to the Alps) by JFC Brunssum; and
Regional Plan – South-East
(from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea) by JFC Naples. Forces will now be able to train how
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150 SPE 23 E
to execute them. This new family of strategic, domain-specific and regional plans
“significantly improve our ability and readiness to deter and defend against any threats”.
NATO’s defence plans “are the main driver for the organization” of Allied forces
and their specific military requirements.
The new NATO Force Model is already
delivering, the Communiqué notes, and leaders also agreed to set up
“a new
multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force”
to “provide more options to
respond swiftly to threats and crises in all directions”.
NATO’s command and control will be strengthened
to enable greater agility, resilience
and capacity to execute Allied plans.
Leaders also reaffirmed decisions “to put in place
additional robust in-place combat-
ready forces on NATO’s Eastern Flank,
to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups
to brigade-size units where and when required”.
5
The readiness, preparedness and interoperability of NATO’s Integrated Air and
Missile Defence will be further improved,
especially through regular training and
rotational presence of systems and capabilities in SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility.
Work on multi-domain operations, enabled by NATO’s Digital Transformation, will
continue.
To that end, Allies adopted a new
Digital Transformation Implementation
Strategy.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
47. Allies took
further decisions and made commitments
to strengthen NATO’s
deterrence and defence posture, including to:
•
•
•
•
significantly increase stockpiles of a number of battle-decisive munitions;
reinforce training and exercises which simulate conventional and, in certain cases,
a nuclear dimension of crises and conflicts;
make progress on fuel supply distribution arrangements; and
fully develop NATO Ballistic Missile Defence.
48. Allies also reaffirmed the fundamentals of NATO’s nuclear deterrence,
noting that
“the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion
and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. As long as nuclear weapons exist,
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” Allies recommitted to “tak[ing] all necessary steps to
ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission”. They
also affirmed that “NATO is ready and able to deter aggression and manage escalation risks
in a crisis that has a nuclear dimension.”
49.
NATO’s deterrence and defence decisions correspond very well to the
Assembly’s call
“to accelerate the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO’s
enhanced deterrence and defence posture” (Declaration 481) and related recommendations.
A new defence investment commitment
50. Allies also
took important decisions on defence investment
(see here for the
latest
figures).
•
Leaders “[made] an
enduring commitment to invest at least 2% of our Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence”.
This commitment supplants the vow to
“aim to move towards the 2% guideline” until 2024, under the 2014 Defence Investment
Pledge. The Communiqué also affirms that,
often, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will
be necessary,
both to make up current shortfalls and to meet other military requirements.
Ahead of the Summit, Germany pledged to upgrade its presence in Lithuania to a robust brigade
of about 4,000 (up from a reinforced brigade of 1,000). On 10 July, Canada pledged to more than
double its troop deployment in Latvia (from c. 800 to c. 2,000). Both countries each lead a
battlegroup under NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania and Latvia respectively.
5
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•
They also stepped up their commitment on major equipment investments, including
related Research and Development.
Allies have now committed to invest at least 20%
of total defence expenditures on major equipment,
instead of merely aiming to do so
under the 2014 Pledge.
They also committed “to
contribute the necessary forces, capabilities and resources
to the full range of NATO operations, missions and activities”.
•
51.
The new defence investment commitment is fully in line with the NATO PA’s
recommendation
“to agree new defence spending and investment commitments beyond
2024, exceeding a minimum investment level of 2% of GDP for defence” (Declaration 481).
A new Defence Production Action Plan
52. To deliver on strengthening defence and deterrence,
a strong, capable and resilient
defence industry is needed.
Allies therefore endorsed
a new Defence Production Action
Plan to leverage NATO’s “role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and
aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defence industrial capacity”.
Improving interoperability and materiel standardisation will be critical. Moreover, the plan
enhances visibility of the Allied defence industry, increases aggregation of demand, promotes
cooperation and more agile procurement as well as increases transparency vis-à-vis industry.
The Communiqué also notes that
intra-Alliance obstacles to defence trade and
investment should be reduced and eliminated.
53. The new Defence Production Action Plan and other defence industry efforts outlined in
the Communiqué
correspond very well with the Assembly’s recommendations
to “adopt
a NATO defence industrial pledge” and “continue to invest in innovation and maintain NATO’s
technological edge” (Declaration 481).
3.
Accelerating Sweden’s accession to NATO
54. On the eve of the Summit,
Turkish President Erdogan, Swedish Prime Minister
Kristersson and the NATO Secretary General reached an agreement
on several points,
which meant that Türkiye committed to send the accession protocol to the Turkish parliament
and work closely with it to ensure ratification:
•
Recognising that counter-terrorism cooperation is a long-term effort,
Sweden and
Türkiye will continue their cooperation beyond the moment Sweden will join NATO.
For one, cooperation will continue
under the existing Trilateral Permanent Joint
Mechanism
(which includes Finland). In addition,
a new bilateral Security Compact
will
be set up, under which ministers will meet annually and working groups can be created.
Sweden has committed to present a counter-terrorism roadmap at the Compact’s first
meeting.
The NATO Secretary General
reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to its counter-terrorism
efforts and
announced the establishment of a new position of Special Coordinator
for Counter-Terrorism.
All three parties underlined that “there should be
no restrictions, barriers or sanctions
to defence trade and investment among Allies”
and committed to strive to eliminate
such obstacles.
The two countries also agreed to
increase economic cooperation
through the recently
established Türkiye-Sweden Joint Economic and Trade Committee.
Sweden, moreover, committed to actively support efforts to reinvigorate Türkiye’s
EU accession process.
8
•
•
•
•
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150 SPE 23 E
•
The agreement also recognises that
Türkiye will move on Sweden’s ratification,
“given the imperatives of the deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area”.
55. Allied leaders welcomed this agreement and noted that they “look[ed] forward to
welcoming Sweden as a full member of the Alliance”. The NATO President also
welcomed
the
agreement. She has since
written to the Heads of the Hungarian and Turkish delegations
to the NATO PA to support the prompt scheduling of relevant parliamentary
procedures,
in line with the Assembly’s recommendation “to finalise as soon as possible the
ratification of Sweden’s accession” (Declaration 481).
4.
Highlighting partnerships with the Indo-Pacific and the EU to address global
challenges
56. On the Summit’s second day,
Allies and invitee Sweden met with the Alliance’s four
Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) and
the European Union.
The NATO Secretary General stressed that “Beijing’s global
assertiveness and Moscow’s war against Ukraine require even closer coordination between
NATO, the EU and our Indo-Pacific partners” and that Allies and these partners, “will work
even more closely together, standing strong for the rules-based international order”.
57. The NATO Secretary General further stressed that “NATO is a regional Alliance between
Europe and North America”, but “[w]hat happens in the Euro-Atlantic region matters for the
Indo-Pacific, and what happens in the Indo-Pacific matters to the Euro-Atlantic.”
58.
The Communiqué makes clear
the Indo-Pacific region is important for the Alliance.
Allies committed to enhance dialogue and cooperation with these partners,
including
through individual tailored partnership programmes. In public remarks,
the NATO Secretary
General also confirmed that the issue of a NATO liaison office in Japan “will be
considered in the future”.
59.
This continued deepening of the Indo-Pacific partnerships and of the cooperation
with them and with the EU to address common challenges are fully in line with the
Assembly’s recommendation
“to further develop political and practical cooperation with
other like-minded partners, including Indo-Pacific democracies, to defend the rules-based
order and address common challenges” (Declaration 481).
5.
Reaffirming the commitment to protecting shared democratic values
60. The Communiqué opens with a declaration that Allied leaders are “bound
by shared
values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law”.
61.
Allies did not take any specific steps to follow up on this issue,
despite the
Assembly’s calls to operationalise the commitments made in the Strategic Concept. However,
they noted that
resilience
is not only “essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and
the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks” but also “vital
in our efforts to safeguard
our societies, our populations and our shared values”.
The Communiqué further notes
that
“Allies should also promote societal resilience”.
Moreover, it stresses that Allies
remain
united in defending our open and democratic societies” against hybrid threats
and challenges,
including through further comprehensive preventive and response options.
62. Reflecting how deeply anchored the commitment to shared democratic values is in
NATO’s approach to the challenges and threats it is confronted with, statements on their
importance are found throughout the Communiqué:
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•
•
•
•
•
Leaders note that
Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s war
is not only in defence of the
nation and land, but also in the defence of values shared between Ukraine and the
Alliance.
Beijing’s stated ambitions and coercive policies not
only challenge Allied interests
and security but also its values. In its relations with China, Allies vow to “stand up for our
shared values and the rules-based international order”.
Cooperation in the
Western Balkans
and countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration are vitally
dependent on “[d]emocratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good
neighbourly relations”.
Allies put a particular emphasis on strengthening
NATO partnerships
with those which
“share the Alliance’s values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order”.
Efforts on and approach to
emerging disruptive technologies
is founded in Allies’
“democratic values and human rights”.
63.
All of the above statements and commitments, in conjunction with the 2022
Strategic Concept, provide a sound basis for the Assembly to continue to advocate that
NATO operationalises the commitment to shared democratic values, including through
the establishment of a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO HQ.
6.
Taking a strong stance on Russia’s threat
64. The Summit Communiqué reiterates that
Russia remains “the most significant and
direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.
65. Addressing Russia’s war against Ukraine, leaders called upon Russia
to “immediately
stop this illegal war of aggression, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and
completely and unconditionally withdraw
all of its forces and equipment from the territory
of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters”.
66. However,
Russia’s threat to the Alliance goes beyond
the impact of its war. Moscow
continues its military build-up,
including its nuclear modernisation, has
increased its
presence in areas neighbouring NATO territory, continues to hold large-scale no-notice
and snap exercises, intensifies its hybrid operations
and
deepens its military
integration with Belarus,
including with an announced intention to deploy nuclear weapons
in the country.
67. On this basis,
Allied leaders made clear they cannot consider Russia a partner and
that any changes in NATO-Russia relations must be predicated on stopping its
aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law.
Still, the Alliance
remains
willing to have open channels
to Moscow for risk management and mitigation.
68.
The Allied stance on Russia reflects NATO PA recommendations,
notably the call
“to operationalise a new approach to relations with Russia based on the Strategic Concept’s
characterisation of Russia as the ‘most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security’
(Declaration 482).
7.
Continuing the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
69. The communiqué reaffirms that “[c]ountering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
is essential to our collective defence.
NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism
contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance
and is integral to the Alliance’s 360-
degree approach to deterrence and defence.”
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70. As a demonstration that Allies
fight the threat of terrorism “with determination,
resolve, and in solidarity”,
leaders tasked the NAC to update the Policy Guidelines and
Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism as well as to
reassess in which areas NATO can further
provide civil-military assistance to partners.
71. As part of the agreement between Sweden, Türkiye and the NATO Secretary General,
the latter also announced
the establishment of a new position of Special Coordinator for
Counter-Terrorism.
72.
The decisions are fully in line with Assembly recommendations
“to continue efforts
to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups” and to enhance
cooperation with partners, notably with the EU and in the South (Declaration 481).
8.
Addressing challenges in the South
73. Allies agreed to further address the interconnected security, demographic, economic,
and political challenges in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood.
74.
Leaders tasked the NAC “to launch a comprehensive and deep reflection on
existing and emerging threats and challenges, and opportunities for engagements with
our partner nations, international organisations, and other relevant actors”,
to be
presented at the 2024 Summit in the United States.
75. Allies will also
deepen political engagements and public diplomacy outreach with
regional partners.
Notably, NATO will examine
whether a NATO Liaison Office in Amman
could be set up. Allies are also considering broadening the existing NATO Mission Iraq,
as the Iraqi government has requested advice for its Federal Police.
76.
The continued Allied focus on the South is in line with long-standing positions of
the Assembly as well as its recommendations in Declaration 481.
9.
Rising to China’s challenge
77.
Allied leaders reiterated that
Beijing’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies
challenge [Allied] interests, security and values”.
They cited, inter alia, the “deepening
strategic partnership” with Russia and their attempts to undermine the rules-based
international order. However,
Allies “remain open to constructive engagement”,
for
example on reciprocal transparency or strategic risk reduction.
Leaders noted their
continued efforts to raise shared awareness, resilience and preparedness, to protect
against coercive tactics and efforts to divide NATO and to defend shared values and
the rules-based international order.
78.
NATO’s continued efforts
to address China’s systemic challenge, to ensure the
Alliance ability to guarantee its defence and security and to explore constructive dialogue
where possible are
fully in line with the NATO PA’s recommendations
(Declaration 481).
10.
Strategic stability, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
79. Once again, Allies underlined that
“[s]trategic stability, delivered through effective
deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal
political dialogue remains essential to our security”.
80. Allies
called out “Russia’s violations and selective implementation
of its arms
control obligations and commitments”. In light of the rapid expansion and diversification of
China’s nuclear arsenal, the Communiqué also
urged Beijing “to engage in strategic risk
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reduction discussions and to promote stability through greater transparency
with
regard to its nuclear weapon policies, plans and capabilities.” Allies noted their continued deep
concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and their
“clear determination that Iran must
never develop a nuclear weapon”.
Similarly, they strongly
condemned North Korea’s
WMD and ballistic missile programmes.
They urged both countries to change course.
81. Leaders stressed that the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
continues to be “the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons”.
In
contrast, they “reiterate[d] that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
stands in opposition to and is inconsistent and incompatible with the Alliance’s nuclear
deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture,
risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment.”
82. The Summit Communiqué language on strategic stability, arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation is generally in line with long-standing Assembly
recommendations and Declaration 481.
11.
Reinforcing Allied resilience
83. In Vilnius,
Allies adopted the 2023 Alliance Resilience Objectives.
The objectives
will guide nations to develop national goals and implementation plans to “strengthen NATO
and Allied preparedness against strategic shocks and disruptions”. They also committed to
“work
towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies,
including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems.”
84. To address the developing threat to critical undersea infrastructure, Allies also directed
the
establishment of a NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea
Infrastructure,
located at NATO’s Maritime Command, and of
a new network of NATO and
Allied officials, the private sector and other stakeholders
to improve information sharing
and exchange best practice.
85.
These actions are all in line with NATO PA resilience recommendations in
Declaration 481.
12.
Emerging and disruptive technologies
86. NATO and Allies continue to address both the opportunities and risks of emerging and
disruptive technologies.
NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic
(DIANA) has launched its first challenges to start-ups. During the Summit, the 23 Allies
6
participating in the NATO Innovation Fund selected the Fund’s investment team
under
whose watch investments are set to begin in the coming months. The Communiqué also noted
that
new strategies on the opportunities and risks of quantum technologies and of
biotechnology and human enhancement will be developed.
87.
These lines of effort are fully in line with established NATO PA positions,
including
the recommendation in Declaration 481 to “[shape] standards and committing to principles of
responsible use that reflect the Alliance’s democratic values and human rights”.
13.
88.
6
Tackling cyber challenges
To address growing cyber challenges,
Allies took a number of decisions.
They:
Belgium; Bulgaria; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland;
Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia;
Spain; Türkiye; United Kingdom
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•
•
•
•
•
endorsed a new cyber concept,
which will, inter alia, enhance the contribution of cyber
defence to NATO’s deterrence and defence and further integrate the political, military and
technical levels;
reaffirmed and enhanced their Cyber Defence Pledge;
committed to ambitious
new national cyber goals;
launched a new
Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability
to support national mitigation
efforts if called upon; and
vowed to further
deepen and broaden mutually beneficial and effective cyber
partnerships.
89. Moreover, a
new comprehensive NATO Cyber Defence Conference
will take place
in Berlin this November.
90.
These actions are very much in line with long-standing NATO PA positions.
14.
Understanding and adapting to climate change
91. In its efforts to become the leading international organisation when it comes to
understanding and adapting to the security impact of climate change,
NATO released three
major climate change reports during the Summit:
•
•
•
the 2023
Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment,
focusing on extreme
weather’s impact on operational stress and life cycles of military equipment;
the
Compendium of Best Practice,
providing examples of Allied efforts to adapt to climate
change; and
the
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Mapping and Analytical Methodology
with guidelines and
tools to calculate emissions from NATO’s civilian and military facilities.
92. Moreover, at the Summit,
the 12 sponsoring nations
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signed the founding document
of the Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security,
to open in Montréal later
this year.
93.
Allies thus heeded the Assembly’s recommendations
“to further boost efforts to
ensure NATO becomes the leading international organisation in understanding and adapting
to the impact of climate change on security and enhances its own contribution to combatting
climate change” (Declaration 481).
15.
Intensifying NATO-EU relations
94.
Cooperation between NATO and the European Union
– “a unique and essential
partner” – has become
more significant since Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The two
organisations have “demonstrated
unity of purpose and common resolve
in leveraging
our complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles”.
95.
Allies welcomed the recent establishment of a NATO-EU Staff Coordination
dedicated to supporting Ukraine.
Leaders also
noted progress
in several areas. However,
they also
called for additional efforts on military mobility and ensuring non-EU Allies’
fullest involvement in EU defence efforts.
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Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania,
Türkiye and the United Kingdom
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96.
The Communiqué is in line with the Assembly’s wish “to strengthen the strategic
partnership between NATO and the EU”
(Declaration 481).
16.
Challenges and opportunities in the Western Balkans
97. Allies “remain strongly committed to the security and stability” of this strategic region.
Leaders noted that “[d]emocratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good
neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration”.
98. They underlined that strengthened
“NATO-Serbia relations would be of benefit to the
Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region.”
They encouraged Belgrade “to engage with
NATO and its neighbours in a constructive manner”.
99. Leaders called the
recent escalatory actions in northern Kosovo unacceptable and
condemned the violence,
including the unprovoked attacks that caused serious injuries to
NATO soldiers.
They “call[ed] on both sides to immediately de-escalate, return to
dialogue, and engage constructively in implementing
the agreement” recently reached
Brussels and Ohrid.
17.
Enhancing the focus on the Black Sea region
100. As the Black Sea region is of strategic importance and Russia’s war has exacerbated
the situation,
Allies vowed to “further monitor and assess developments […] and
enhance our situational awareness,
with a particular focus on the threats to our security
and potential opportunities for closer cooperation with our partners in the region”.
101.
This stance is fully in line with the NATO PA recommendation on the Black Sea in
Declaration 481.
18.
Supporting Vulnerable partners
102. As Allies continue to stand by partners most vulnerable to outside interference,
they
engaged with Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova as well as with
the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including on the implementation
of their individual “tailored support” packages adopted in February 2023.
103. Concerning Georgia, the Summit Communiqué reiterated the 2008 Bucharest Summit
decisions and all subsequent decisions that
“Georgia will become a member of the Alliance
with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process”.
It notes,
however, that “Georgia
must make progress on reforms, including key democratic
reforms, and make best use of the [Annual National Programme]” to advance on its
Euro-Atlantic path.
The Vilnius Summit thus for the first time makes a clear distinction in the
way the Alliance looks at Georgia and Ukraine’s respective membership paths.
104.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Communiqué notes NATO’s strong support for the
country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability and security. Allied leaders encouraged
domestic reconciliation,
urged Bosnia and Herzegovina’s officials to
refrain from
what the
Communiqué, meaningfully, calls
“divisive and secessionist rhetoric and actions”,
and
encouraged the country
to take advantage of NATO’s continued support tools,
including
for key reforms, “without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership”.
105.
Regarding the Republic of Moldova,
Allies are “stepping
up political and practical
support to strengthen its resilience and uphold its political independence”.
They
welcomed the country’s ongoing democratic reform efforts and stand ready to further support
its European integration path.
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106. The Summit Communiqué is generally in line with established NATO PA positions
and recommendations in Declaration 481.
19.
Further priorities
107. Intelligence cooperation: Leaders vowed to
reinforce intelligence cooperation within
the Alliance and with partners
as well as
Allied security and counter-intelligence
measures.
108. Hybrid and other asymmetric challenges and threats:
Allies reaffirmed their efforts to
counter hybrid and other asymmetric challenges and threats,
including challenges to
energy security, and
reaffirmed that Article 5 could apply,
depending on the level of hybrid
operations.
109. The space domain: Leaders “committed
to enhancing the sharing of our space data,
products and services within NATO in support of the Alliance’s requirements and
defence plans.”
They also
welcomed ongoing efforts on the Alliance Persistent
Surveillance from Space (APSS) multinational programme
as well as
the establishment
of the Space Centre of Excellence in France,
which received NATO accreditation shortly
after the Summit.
110. Human Security agenda:
Leaders endorsed
the first NATO Policy on Children and
Armed Conflict
to “help enhance the ability of Allied troops to handle situations of harm to
children when in operations or during the conduct of its military activities”.
They also
endorsed an updated
NATO Policy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings,
which
“makes sure that the risk of human trafficking is fully integrated in military planning, duly
assessed and mitigated from the outset”.
111. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda: Leaders reconfirmed their commitment to
and implementation of the WPS agenda.
They decided to begin assessing and updating
NATO’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security. These actions are in line with the
Assembly recommendation
to sustain the momentum in carrying forward the WPS agenda.
112. International organisations: The Summit reaffirmed NATO’s desire to strengthen
engagement with other international and regional organisations. Notably,
Allies have begun
exploring whether to open a Liaison Office in Geneva to interact with the United Nations
and other international organisations.
113. Crisis prevention and management: Whereas the Assembly recommended in
Declaration 481 that leaders “accelerate work to define the parameters of NATO’s future
engagement in crisis management”,
the Summit did not make any specific decisions on
this issue outside its actions to step up NATO’s deterrence and defence posture.
114. Baltic airspace cooperation: During the Summit, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a
declaration to increase the airspace for use by NATO.
**********
115. Allies will next meet for the
NATO’s 75
th
anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C. in
2024.
It was announced that
the Netherlands will host the 2025 Summit.
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www.nato-pa.int
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