FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

Forsvarsudvalget 2022-23 (2. samling)
FOU Alm.del Bilag 34
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ART

ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH TEAM

16 February 2023

THE EU: FROM MARITIME ACTOR

TO SEA POWER

Source: ART

Disclaimer:

The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s). In no case should they be considered or construed as representing an official position of the

Council of the European Union or the European Council. © European Union, 2023 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Any question or comment should be addressed to

[email protected].

FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

INTRODUCTION

Why are the oceans so critical today and why

should Europeans take the strategic

importance of the sea more seriously?

Oceans

have long played an important role in the

pursuit of military, commercial and political power.

They have helped determine the rise and fall of

nations. Control of sea routes has often proved to

be a source of confrontation, but the seas are also

essential to the survival of humanity. Oceans are a

measure of the state of both international relations

and the health of the planet. In today’s world where

the post-war rule-based system is increasingly

being undermined, the environment is being

degraded, and there is ever greater competition for

critical but limited resources, the

oceans highlight

three of the most pressing geopolitical

challenges for Europe in their role as a source of

(1) power, (2) resources and (3) vulnerabilities.

million km

, the EU rarely regards the role and

importance of the oceans as central to the political

debate. Yet the oceans are key to its prosperity,

influence, and security.

Other global and regional powers embrace the

strategic importance of the sea.

This is reflected

in increasingly assertive action by state and non-

state actors, some of whom are pursuing their

maritime interests through force as a way of

appropriating space, exploiting resources and

weaponising dependencies on martitime flows.

The recent sabotage of the Nordstream pipeline in

the context of the Russian war of aggression of

Ukraine is one of many reminders of

our increased

dependence on the sea for energy, information,

trade, and food and marine ressources.

Overall,

90% of goods globally are transported by sea. For

Europe, 77% of its foreign trade and 35% of goods

moved internally travel by sea.

The maritime dimension is therefore key to

EU's

strategic autonomy.

The aim of this note is to

draw attention to the many ways in which maritime

issues are critical to the military, environmental and

commercial interests of the EU, and to suggest that

they be brought to the heart of the political debate.

Despite Europe seeing itself as a global maritime

actor

the EU is not a genuine sea power.

The EU

Member States have different interests and

traditions and a maritime presence which depends

almost entirely on their history and geography.

Despite having 70,000 km of coastline (spanning 22

Member States) and direct access to 4 seas and 2

oceans, as well as an Exclusive Economic Zone of 19

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

THE OCEANS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN RACE

•

Oceans are essential to human life. They cover 80% of the surface of our planet. They are host to a

significant share of wildlife and natural resources. They are a crucial regulator of the climate by

producing half of the oxygen on earth and absorbing 25% of CO

Oceans offer immense opportunities as a way of connecting distant lands and facilitating exchanges

and trade, ensuring food security, generating wealth through the blue economy (shipping, tourism,

seaweed…) and providing medical breakthroughs.

They act as sources of energy through the extraction of fossil fuels and gas, but also as providers of

renewable energy through wind and tidal turbines and the exploitation of wave power.

They host a critical part of the infrastructure of the digital economy, with hundreds of submarine

cables used to transfer data (more than 95% of data is sent by cables

Source: ART

January 2023

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

Looking at the world through the sea: thinking as a global seapower

Source:

Europe, Cooperating for a Naval Ambition,

Etudes marines n°21, CESM, June 2022.

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

1. A RENEWED THEATRE OF POWER RIVALRY

Growing tension between maintaining the

openness of the seas and appropriation

The growing appropriation of the oceans by states

challenging the rules of international maritime law

undermines the notion of the sea as an open

space for movement and trade.

Appropriation

can be motivated by a desire to exploit the seas for

natural resources, such as illegal gas drilling in the

Mediterranean

, or to restrict access to parts of the

sea for reasons of territorial interest, such as in the

China Sea. Appropriation runs the risk of generating

territorial disputes backed by the implicit or explicit

threat of the use of force (South China Sea, Eastern

Mediterranean, or Arctic Ocean).

Many states, including EU Member States, are

committed to maintaining open and safe access to

the high seas based on the principle of freedom of

navigation and overflights. They deploy forces to

ensure respect for international law and to protect

their sovereignty and long-term interests. For

example, the US is conducting Freedom of

Navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China

Sea. Appropration policies based on the exercise of

power are in direct opposition to the rules-based

order enshrined in the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which reflects

customary rules governing the sea, as well as

international humanitarian law

Rivalry at sea

Source: Brèves Marines n°243,

Combattre pour l'usage de la mer,

CESM, octobre 2021.

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

More assertive behaviour in a context of

rapid naval rearmament

Military incidents have become increasingly

frequent in a range of locations.

In 2020, a French

frigate was illuminated in the Mediterranean Sea by

a Turkish Navy ship to prevent it from controlling a

cargo ship it was escorting to Libya

. In 2021, a

British frigate passing through territorial waters off

Crimea was denied innocent passage by Russia,

which gave rise to incidents involving at least three

ships and dozens of aircraft

. In the Pacific Ocean,

Australian and Canadian patrol aircraft were

"chaffed" in international waters by a Chinese

aircraft on the grounds that their behaviour was

considered provocative and endangered China’s

security.

These types of incidents risk escalating

into direct confrontation.

Incidents involving civilian vessels operating on

behalf of criminal organisations are also posing an

increasing threat. Maritime insecurity is growing,

with illicit trafficking (drugs, fisheries, migrants,

weapons) becoming more prevalent, piracy and

maritime robbery on the increase while the threat

of terrorism remains.

The dynamic of power assertiveness is fuelled

by a naval rearmament on a scale not seen since

the Second World War.

Since the late 2000s, there

has been a rapid increase in the growth of combat

units across the globe, although this is uneven, with

a particularly strking expansion in Asia. Chinese's

rearmament (+138% in global tonnage expected

between 2008-2030) is driving expansion in India

(+40%), Japan (+24%) and South Korea (+101%) as

well as leading to extensive redeployment of US

naval forces over the last decade

. Rearmament is

also significant in the Eastern Mediterranean, with

an increase of about 50% in naval combat capability

over the last decade, coupled with significant

technological advancement

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The tension between appropriation of the sea

(Mare

Clausum)

and maintaining the right to free

passage (Mare

Liberum)

has always been a part of

maritime history

. But as geopolitical insecurity

grows, aggressive posturing and provocative

unlawful acts at sea have become increasingly

common.

Evolution of global tonnage of the main combat naval units

Source: Cols Bleus n°3103, février 2022, Marine Nationale.

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

This arms race is the result of a vicious circle in

which the growing ambitions of different

powers are perceived as a threat by other

powers.

Some states see naval power as a way of

asserting their control and influence in a particular

region and/or globally. Political ambitions lead to

the enhancement of naval capabilities as a way of

providing protection from a dominant or

aggressive competitor. Navies are the main

instrument to protect economic flows and

maritime resources and can provide for the

protection of their own nationals in the event of a

crisis. But they are also a powerful tool for exerting

political influence (eg. the closing by Turkey of

access to warships between the Mediterranean and

the Black Sea, or the provision of aid to countries

affected by natural disasters). They may also be

used for the purposes of intimidation or coercion. A

strong actor is even able to leverage the potential

threat of fleet mobilisation without even leaving

port to impose its agenda ("fleet in being" effect).

Naval rearmament does not necessarily lead to

confrontation. However, the concentration of naval

force in a particular theatre against the backdrop of

increasing tension can intensify the risk of

miscalculation and accidental confrontation.

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EU navies risk seeing their relative weight

diminish

The ongoing shift in naval power towards Asia

is set to continue until at least 2030.

This is a

result of both a longer-term decline in defence

budgets in Europe (despite the recent increases in

response to the war in Ukraine), but also the

dynamism of Asian economies. During the Cold

War the most powerful navies were mostly

concentrated in Europe. But by 2030 the largest

naval powers after the US will be (together with the

UK) China, India and Russia, with Japan and South

Korea also fielding increasingly large and modern

navies.

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At the global level, naval rearmament depends on

the capacity to operate fleets on the high seas with

strike capability and the ability to project power.

This means first and foremost vessels such as

aircraft carriers and (ballistic) submarines.

Automation, drones, and data are also increasingly

important, as well as the development of

hypersonic capacities. China is building up its

armed forces at an astonishing rate and deploying

them around the world. Russia is also modernizing

its navy by upgrading its frigates, amphibious

vessels, and submarine force. Other regional actors

such as Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, and Israel are also

expanding their naval assets. By contrast, without

adequate investment,

European navies risk

becoming operationally obsolete, leading to a

significant shift in the balance of power away

from Europe.

More hybrid threats

Power competition is also based on

hybrid threats

and lawfare operations

. The Chinese playbook

of maritime bullying incorporates the use of naval

militia composed of civilian ships as a proxy, in

combination with the use of the coast guard.

Although apparently harmless, fishing vessels

engage in harassment, dangerous navigational

practices, or even intentional ramming as a way of

asserting Chinese territorial claims or fishing rights

in the EEZ

. Clashes between military ships and

Chinese fishing vessels, such as that in March 2020

involving a Japanese destroyer

are increasing.

Russia, which has a long tradition of lawfare, uses it

to try to secure the Northern Sea Route as well as in

the Crimean Sea.

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The blockage of a chokepoint (ports, harbours,

straits, and canals), even temporarily, can result in

severe economic damage

. Cyber espionage and

physical sabotage operations are being used to

target cables and pipelines, both to destabilise

economies but also generate costly pollution. Ports,

ships, and maritime companies have already been

targeted by cyber attacks. Other infrastructure such

as desalinisation plants remain highly vulnerable to

cyberattack. The protection of undersea

infrastructure remains difficult and costly. Migration

in the form of dangerous and illegal sea crossings is

also being weaponised.

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

EUROPEAN NAVIES UNDER PRESSURE

The EU has underlined its determination to be a global maritime security actor. It is expanding its maritime presence

in different theatres and in different formats (PSDC, Coordinated Maritime Presence, ad hoc). But the number of

areas where it has vital interests and the scale of the critical infrastructure which needs protection are increasing

rapidly.

European navies are being challenged by global powers such as China, Russia, as well as regional powers such as

Turkey, all of whom are investing heavily in more modern naval capabilities. In addition to the provision of new

aircraft carriers and submarines, this

renewed naval arms race

is heavily dependent on new technologies and data-

centric systems. European navies find themselves exposed to ever more aggressive and unlawful behaviour at sea.

At the same time the number of

maritime areas

that are of vital strategic interest for the EU is expanding. These

include not just neighbouring areas such as the Mediterranean and the Baltic Seas, but increasingly also more distant

regions such as the Indo-Pacific and the Polar regions. The

protection

of maritime resources and biodiversity will

require an appropriate level of capabilities. Beyond deployment on the sea itself, navies have been using

outer

space

for decades for the transit of ballistic missiles and the use of satellites for navigation, surveillance,

communication, and intelligence. They are increasingly operating in

cyber space

as well as on the

seabed.

The

low level of investment by EU Member States in their naval forces by comparison with other major regional or global

powers is a matter of concern.

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European navies must be strengthened if they are to face future challenges

Source: ART

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

2. CRUCIAL RESOURCES FOR HUMANITY

Oceans are crucial for life but are increasingly

suffering as a result of human activity

The oceans play a major role in climate

regulation and biodiversity.

These natural carbon

sinks absorb 25% of the CO

emitted on Earth and

90% of the extra heat resulting from the GHG

effect

. Plankton provide half of the oxygen

produced on Earth

. Unsustainable human activity

is leading to

profound and irreversible

transformations in the oceans.

The absorption of

and heat causes ocean warming and

acidification, which is highly damaging. This includes

sea level rise due to ice melting

, modification to

marine currents, the multiplication of extreme

phenomena, coral bleaching

, stratification,

deoxygenation, dead zones and changes to

biological productivity and to the distribution of

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species and habitats. Marine protected areas only

accounted for 5.3% of coastal and marine areas in

2020, well short of the target of 10% set by the

Convention on Biological Diversity signed in Nagoya

in 2010.

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There will soon be more plastic than fish in the

oceans

(they already contain 300 million tons of

plastic, with an annual increase of 10 million tons per

year

). Giant areas of accumulated microplastic are

drifting, the largest being an area of 3 million km

the Northern Pacific. All this has a profound impact

on maritime wildlife as well as on the value of the

oceans as a source of food (fish remains the staple

diet for one third of the world's population).

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There is increasing competition over the

exploitation of the oceans

Like other shared spaces such as outer space and

cyber, the oceans face

increasing predatory

pressure over time.

The oceans are literally being

drained of their fishery resources

. 55% of the

surface of the oceans (i.e. 4 times the area devoted

to agriculture) is affected by industrial fishing

activity.

llegal, unreported and unregulated

(IUU) fishing

is on the rise. This is a highly lucrative

activity supported not only by criminal organisations

but also in some cases by states for destabilising

purposes. IUU fishing is estimated to account for

more than 30% of total global catches and results in

an estimated annual loss for the legal fishing industry

of between $26 and $50 billion a year.

The

decrease in global biomass of marine animal

communities

and of fisheries catch potential, as

well as a shift in species composition, could lead to

existing international fisheries agreements being

contested and even to a greater risk of international

conflict. In twenty years, China has built up the

largest deep-sea fishing fleet, with around 3,000

vessels. After depleting the resources near its

coasts

, Chinese fishermen are now deployed at an

unprecedented scale across the globe, including off

Ecuador, Peru and as far south as the coast of

Argentina in the South Atlantic.

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Other ways of exploitating the oceans could give rise

to tensions.

Algaculture

water security

through desalination to obtain drinking water is

likely to be one area. China is interested in the

desalination of icebergs, which is linked to its wider

ambitions in the Arctic and Antarctic, the latter

containing 70% of the globe’s freshwater reserves

The need to produce energy could also be a source

of competition, an example being the use of

seawater to extract deuterium, an isotope of

hydrogen, to fuel nuclear fusion

. Tensions could be

sparked by concerns over the environmental impact

of certain activities such as desalination

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Geopolitical tensions may also arise around

responses to climate change. There is increasing

interest in

ocean-based geo-engineering,

called

carbon dioxide removal (CDR) activities, such as

carbon capture and sequestration in sub-sea

geological formations or ocean fertilisation. Disputes

could arise between neighbouring states over the

use of geo-engineering and how this might affect

the environment and biodiversity as well as the

associated social, economic, and cultural impact.

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The seabed as a new field of potential conflict

The

seabed,

which is the subject of scientific,

technological, and military competition, could end

up being a new area of conflict. Like space, the sea is

increasingly seen as a territory that can be colonised.

Many powers have flagged their ambitions in this

area to different degrees. The US is looking at "Full

Spectrum Undersea Warfare", and the Chinese have

a similar project for a "great underwater wall", based

on sonars and unmanned vessels/drones

. Russia

has a long tradition of special mission submarines for

seabed warfare and espionage and is ramping up

this capability

. The UK has set out its ambitions

over the seabed in its 2021 Integrated Review. Some

Member States recently published a Seabed Warfare

strategy

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space, these territories are attracting growing

economic interest. The biotechnology industry is

focussing on the ocean floor and its micro-

organisms to develop rare properties in the fields of

medicine, science, food or cosmetics. Since the early

2000s, the combination of a growing demand for

materials, technological progress and the scarcity of

raw materials on land has prompted a new industrial

race to the bottom of the oceans.

. New forms of

exploitation such as offshore drilling platforms, water

extraction, and deep-sea mining are being added to

more traditional activities such as fishing and

shipping.

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There is also technological competition over the

charting and collection of data related to the deep

seabed: a vast, highly coveted but largely unknown

area. The deep seabed is defined as lying at depths

greater than 200m and covers about two-thirds of

the total seafloor

. Attempts are being made to

expand the investigation of the seabed down to

6,000 m deep. In 2020, the Fendouzhe, a Chinese

manned submersible, reached the bottom of the

Mariana Trench (approx. 11,000 m). The

establishment of an experimental autonomous

platform in abyssal waters (4,000 m) is one of China's

10 priorities. Space agencies are also drawing

parallels between Earth's abysses and the oceans of

other planets (eg. NASA's Subsea programme).

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The Chinese are taking a long view on seabed

mining. The interest by the US in particular in the

extraction of raw materials for its electric vehicles

industry could lead to extraction competition with

Chinese companies.

Some nations hope that the

renegotiation in 2048 of the Madrid Protocol to the

1950 Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1991, which

prohibits any activity related to the exploitation of

subsoil resources, will be modified to allow for

mining. Even if the exploitation of the oceans were

seen as an opportunity for Western countries to

break free from the Chinese monopoly on rare

earths, the EU has nevertheless called for the

continuing prohibition on deep-sea mining until

science allows for a clearer picture of the impact.

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The seabed is expected to host an extremely rich

biodiversity, with millions of species inhabiting the

abyssal plains. As sources of food, raw materials and

The EU consistently promotes coordinated

multilateral responses and a rules-based

international system for the governance of

exploitation and sharing of maritime resources

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FOU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 34: Opfølgende henvendelse af 2/3-23 vedrørende Forsvarets Thetis-skibe, fra Danske Maritime

Source: International Seabed Authority (ISA).

3. VULNERABILITY OF MARITIME ROUTES AND INFRASTRUCTURES

Maritime flows are critical to global stability

The flow of goods, energy, food and information

are dependent on the seas.

Oceans are crucial to

international trade (90% of world goods - almost 12

billion tonnes - are transported by sea. About two-

thirds of the world’s oil and gas supplies either come

from the sea or move by sea

. Energy is also

exchanged through underwater pipelines. More

than 400 optic fibre cables, with a total length of 1.3

million kilometres, now constitute a vast undersea

communications web, with a constant expansion in

the flow of data (between 2010-19 this increase was

running at nearly 50% annually

Our own security

and prosperity, as well as global stability,

depend on the smooth functioning of these

connections and facilities.

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on trade between Asia and Europe. Some countries

could try to insulate themselves from European trade

or sanctions issues

. The war in Ukraine has also led

to more land-based transportation and has

generated uncertainty in the shipping industry.

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The future of global maritime flows is however

uncertain.

In line with emerging patterns of global

trade

, they could evolve into a mix of

interdependencies and concentration, supported by

regional and interregional flows. Current forms of

decoupling, through regionalisation and the

shortening of supply chains, could have an impact

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The shipping industry itself is also changing.

Disrupting factors such as volatility in container

prices (which rocketed from an average of 2,000€ in

late 2019 to 13,000€ in late 2021

), rising insurance

premiums as a result of conflicts or extreme weather

events

, the expected decline of energy

commodities trade

, and the transformation of

shipping

industry

itself

(decarbonisation,

automation… ) could also affect the nature of and

demand for maritime trade. Conversely,

diversification could lead states to look at a wider

geographic spread to reduce risks. New maritime

routes could bring a substantial boost and

considerable change to the configuration of

maritime trade flows, not least the Belt and Road

Initiative, or the future Northern Sea Route in the

Arctic if this fully materializes.

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Weaponisation of (inter)-dependencies

European daily life depends very much on maritime

flows.

Energy supplies are likely to be

increasingly imported to the EU by sea.

Like other

manufacturing-dependent regions, the EU has

increased its relative reliance on imports, unlike

resource-dependent regions such as the US, which

have tended to see a decrease in imports. Europe

(EU27 + Norway, UK, and Switzerland) currently

imports more than 50% of its energy resources

. As

demonstrated by the Russian blockade on Ukrainian

exports,

food security

is heavily dependent on

maritime trade.

This dependency can be

weaponized by hostile actors.

This can be directed

against the EU itself or its neighbourhood, for

example the North Africa and Middle East region (as

seen with the blockade of grain exports from the

Black Sea).

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As pointed out in the Strategic Compass,

maritime

zones, critical sea lanes of communication and

several maritime chokepoints, as well as

seabeds, are increasingly contested.

There are at least

9 strategic maritime zones for

the EU:

5 neighbouring basins (the English Channel

and the North Sea, the Atlantic, the Baltic Sea; the

Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea) but also 4

overseas theatres (the corridor from the Gulf of Aden

to the Strait of Hormuz, the Indo-Pacific including the

Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Taiwan and the Canal

of Mozambique

, the Gulf of Guinea; and the two

poles

). Those zones contain

chokepoints

that are

key for the EU’s security, economic development,

trade links, transport, food, and energy security. They

become even more critical when there is no

comparable alternative route available. These

chokepoints, which constitute funnels for key

maritime routes, are also of strategic interest to an

increasing number of parties. The reliance, and

consequently the importance, of chokepoints is

likely to grow in the foreseeable future. They may be

vulnerable to a range of security threats such as

geopolitical competition, war, political instability,

piracy, organized crime and/or terrorism.

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The main strategic maritime zones for the EU

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Today, no state is entirely self-sufficient, and all

regions remain interdependent, albeit to differing

degrees (eg. European access to raw materials from

China vs access to European markets for Chinese

products). In the short term, a relatively high level of

interdependency is likely to persist, not least since

diversification takes time. A closure of the Malacca

Strait would not only hurt European's interests and

South Asia countries but also China itself, most of

whose oil imports (almost 80% in 2016.

) pass

through the South China Sea via the Strait of

Malacca. Interdependency does not necessarily lead

to cooperative and responsible behaviour.

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The EU should be ready to protect these spaces

from assertive powers and be prepared to

respond to military confrontation.

However, the

capacity of the EU and its Member States to deploy

maritime assets in several different theatres at the

same time is questionable. With the US pivoting

towards Asia, Russia and Turkey are today the most

active players in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Although China's actual military presence in the

region remains very limited, it is focusing on its

economic interests, principally by securing a hold on

key ports such as Suez and Piraeus as part of its new

silk road initiative. However, it is not excluded that

China could establish a permanent naval base in the

region to support its expanding interests, as it has

done already in the Indian Ocean.

Towards an EU maritime strategic autonomy

The EU's competitors are harnessing seapower

for political influence and the promotion of an

alternative global order.

The Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), which includes a maritime dimension

("The road"), is the main tool through which China

hopes to realise its objective of self-sufficiency. It

constitutes a security and development package,

combined with a standard-related narrative, which is

offered as an alternative to that proposed by the

US/western-led international order. This strategy

puts European strategic autonomy at risk. Chinese

firms already control 10% of European shipping

and now own Pireaus harbour, having taken

advantage of the financial difficulties of the Greek

government. The recent takeover in Hamburg

triggered intense debate. Greater Chinese control

over global shipping flows and ownership of

European ports means more influence not only over

commercial supply chains but also European politics.

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Private actors also play a vital role.

States must

deal increasingly with powerful private actors at sea.

In some cases, NGOs can play a role in compensating

for a lack of state capabilities. For instance, Gabon

and Liberia have delegated part of their surveillance

operations over their marine protection zone to Sea

Shepherd, which is also engaged in the fight against

illegal fishing. Private actors also increasingly control

digital infrastructure and data through the

ownership of maritime cables. Since 2010, Google

has invested in 15 submarine cables, five of which it

owns exclusively. Meta's cable 2Africa - the world

longest marine cable at 45,000 km

,- and Google's

Equiano are expected to make a huge impact on the

continent of Africa. Some expect US big tech

companies to end up controlling 95% of

transatlantic communication capacity.

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Strategic autonomy in this area also entails having

the

domestic industrial capacity

to build and step

up the production of civilian and military vessels.

With its strong civilian shipbuilding industry, China

today has a potential in this area which most

Western countries are unable to match.

Research

capabilities and maritime knowledge are also crucial

assets. The EU will need to develop close links

between several different aspects, for instance by

connecting security with trade, digital partnerships,

and the connectivity agenda (Global Gateway).

In the foreseeable future, new floating territories

could constitute a new type of sovereign actor.

Aquatic urban projects intended to relieve

overcrowded coastlines threatened by rising sea

levels are being planned. For example, Oceanix City

aims to create floating cities of 10,000 inhabitants.

These projects are made up of small island states that

are submerged or severely threatened by rising seas

or tsunamis. They are also political projects funded

by tech sector or NGOs.

Some foresight work even

raises the possibility of communities of political and

climate refugees gathering along the coasts and

living as a network of boats in large floating cities

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IN CONCLUSION: 5 KEY QUESTIONS

Greater attention should be given by the EU to the strategic role of the oceans. In the face of increasing

military tension at sea, accelerating climate change, heightened pressure on maritime resources, and

the major disruptions in trade patterns,

the following issues merit attention at political level:

•

Are we ready for more confrontation at sea?

The growing pressure for the control of the same

critical chokepoints, the unilateral appropriation of resources and renewed power rivalry risk leading

to direct confrontation, including the possibility of high-intensity combat at sea.

How will the EU establish a balance between exploiting and protecting the oceans?

The

green and digital transitions both require energy and ressources, which could be extracted from

the sea or seabeds, in apparent contradiction with the EU’s climate and environmental goals.

Should the EU’s response to the Maritime Silk Road Initiative be more ambitious?

While the

BRI is a political project based on global economic and security goals, combining civil and military

maritime assets, the EU Global Gateway initiative is currently focusing on cables, marine ecosystems,

and ports. The full range of instruments should be mobilised by the EU in support of its maritime

interests.

How can we enhance our resilience in addition to protecting our maritime infrastructure?

Our vulnerabilities at sea are extensive and growing. They come in addition to the full range of

threats and risks with which the EU is already confronted, meaning that total security is unrealistic.

How can the EU ensure a greater commonality of vision amongst Member States on how to

defend and promote the EU’s maritime interests?

The various threats to the EU’s maritime

interests suggest a need to move from multiple and fragmented forms of cooperation to a more

comprehensive and strategic approach.

•

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REFERENCES

The five Oceans and the many seas are delimited by geographical conventions. In short, the seas are the maritime spaces bordering

the oceans and close to a continent («Géopolitique de la mer - 40 fiches illustrées pour comprendre le monde», Julia Tasse &

Sébastien Abis, 2022).

The EU is very active in the field of maritime security (Strategic compass, EU Maritime Security Strategy, CSDP missions, Coordinated

Maritime Presence, TF 150, Euronavfor…), as well as in many sectorial aspects coordinated through the integrated maritime policy.

The EU is also active in international fora such as IMO or the UN. Strong commitments have been taken by 41 Heads of States and

Governments at the One Ocean Summit organized by the French Presidency of the Council on 11 February 2022.

Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU,

DG EXPO, European Parliament, April

2022.

The discovery of gas deposits in the Mediterranean subsoil is attracting the interest of Egypt, Israel, Turkey (which has not ratified

the UNCLOS), Cyprus, Lebanon and Libya. Around Cyprus, claims are thus based on rights of a state not recognised by the

international community (the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"), and the deployment of Turkish ships, in a context of

competition for competition for the exploitation of gas fields.

Despite the US are not party to the UNCLOS, they are firmly committed into freedom of navigation and rules.

Incident avec la Turquie : La France suspend sa participation à l'opération Sea Guardian, menée par l'Otan - Zone Militaire

(opex360.com)

The HMS Defender Incident: Lawfare, Optics, and a Changing European Strategic Direction | Center for International Maritime

Security (cimsec.org).

On this, President Vladimir Putin declared: "Even

if we had sunk that ship, it would still be hard to imagine that the

world would be on the brink of a Third World War". Naval rearmament in the world,

Marine & Océans / CESM, 1

trimestre 2022

China Denies Harassing Canadian, Australian Patrol Aircraft in the Western Pacific - USNI News

In response to Dutch Hugo Grotius

Mare Liberum

(1609), British John Selden coined the term

Mare Clausum

(1635). This dispute

took place during the fierce competition between Netherlands and UK for world trade's domination.

Naval rearmament in the world,

Marine & Océans / CESM, 1

trimestre 2022.

Naval rearmament in the world,

Marine & Océans / CESM, 1

trimestre 2022.

A strong dissymmetry in naval capabilities would force the weakest fleet to give up confrontation as an option.

Naval rearmament in the world,

Marine & Océans / CESM, 1

trimestre 2022.

Which Navies Will Be the Most Powerful In the World in 2030—and Why? | The National Interest

Hybrid threats means acting below the threshold of an armed conflict. Lawfare concept (legal warfare) was coined by Charles

Dunlap as a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realising a military objective, including as a form of asymmetrical

warfare ("Russian

Lawfare – Russia’s Weaponisation Of International And Domestic Law: Implications For The Region And Policy

Recommendations",

Mark Voyger, December 2018).

Pentagon Official: Chinese Military Actions Against Foreign Ships, Aircraft Are No Accidents — They're Policy - USNI News

Brèves Marines n°239,

Les Milices Maritimes: une "troisième marine" dans la stratégie navale chinoise,

CESM, mars 2021.

Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation - Lawfare (lawfareblog.com).

Russia has initiated a

national law that would require diplomatic clearance for any foreign warships transiting the straits of the Northern Sea Route. Russia

announced the closing off portions of the Black Sea off the Crimean Peninsula and near the Kerch Strait to foreign warships and

other state vessels during one week of April 2021.

The cost of blockage of the Suez Canal by the container ship Ever Given in 2021 was estimated to $10 bn in trade per day. It was

refloated following a six-day salvage operation (What

to Know About the Suez Canal, and How a Cargo Ship Got Stuck - The New

York Times (nytimes.com)).

Disorganising ports (strikes), establishing control zones at sea or blocking SLOCs for a shooting exercice

are credible scenarios (NEW_Handbook-on-maritime-threats_RGB.pdf

(hybridcoe.fi)).

Cols bleus N° 3104.pdf (defense.gouv.fr)

The oceans provide more oxygen than all forests combined (JOIN (2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022).

«Géopolitique de la mer», Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis.

The mean sea level will continue to rise to around 0.3 metre by 2050 and 2 metres by 2100 under the very high greenhouse gas

emissions scenario – risking forced human displacement – up to 340 million people by 2050 and 630 million people by 2100 (JOIN

(2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022).

More than 99% of coral reefs would be lost with warming by 2°C (JOIN (2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022).

Aires marines protégées (France, monde) — Géoconfluences (ens-lyon.fr).

By the end of 2016, 10.8% of the surface of Europe's

seas had been designated as MPAs, ranging from 27.1% of the Greater North Sea to 2,9% of Aegean-Levantine Sea (Marine

protected

areas - European Environment Agency (EEA) (europa.eu)).

« Géopolitique de la mer», Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis, 2022.

34% of the world’s marine fisheries are overfished (JOIN (2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022).

«Géopolitique de la mer», Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis, 2022.

Brèves Marines n°242,

The illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,

mai 2021, CESM.

Marine species are disappearing at twice the rate of those on land due to warming (JOIN (2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022). Some

practices such as bottom trawling degrades deeply coral reef.

China is by far the largest fishing country in the world (15 million tons per year versus 5 for the UE, the US, India or Russia), the

world's number one exporter with Norway (average sales of $10 to 15 billion), as the leader of aquaculture supply (50 million tons)

(«Géopolitique de la mer», Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis, 2022).

China has colonised the very fishy waters of the Galapagos. In the summer of 2020, nearly 300 Chinese boats were operating

around the Ecuadorian archipelago, accounting for 99% of the catch. IUU also originates from other countries (Russia, India). It's

particularly widespread in artisanal fishing communities on the West African and Asian coasts.

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Algae are one of the most important untapped resources, capable of feeding people with many nutritional benefits, storing carbon

and de-acidifying the oceans, increasing the number of juvenile fish. It could also create jobs in the blue economy (fertilisers, biofuels,

cosmetics, etc.).

"Les

enjeux polaires",

Yves Frénot and Martin Motte, Stratégique 2018/3 n°120. Only 1% of the water we drink comes from the

oceans, whereas 97% of the world's water comes from the sea. The global desalination market is estimated at $18 billion and should

double by 2030 («Géopolitique de la mer», Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis, 2022).

Distilling seawater allows to obtain deuterium. Every cubic metre of seawater contains 33 grams of deuterium, which is routinely

extracted for scientific and industrial purposes (Les

combustibles (iter.org)).

Brèves Marines n°235,

Les usines de dessalement, nouveaux enjeux géopolitiques,

juin 2020.

Originally conceived as a simple method for injecting CO

into the ocean to reduce the atmospheric burden of the greenhouse

gas, today geo-engineering refers to a wide set of methods for voluntarily modifying the system on large scale, mainly Carbon

Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management (SRM). (JRC99777_01

geoengineering.pdf).

The undersea monitoring system has both military and civilian purpose (China

Is Building a "Undersea Great Wall" To Take on

America in a War | The National Interest).

The Defense Ministry Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research 10th Department (called "GUGI") was established in 1976, responsible

for Russian ‘underwater engineering’. An Army force of "Hydronauts" was trained for submarine intelligence (listen to

communications cables, install motion sensors, as well as collected from the seabed shipwrecks, planes and satellites). (Main

Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (Military Unit 40056) GUGI - Russia (globalsecurity.org)).

GUGI operates specially-equipped surface

vessels, including "Yantar".

France Unveils New Seabed Warfare Strategy - Naval News

The seafloor includes abyssal plains 3,500m–6,500m below the sea surface, seamounts (volcanic underwater mountains),

hydrothermal vents with bursting water heated by volcanic activity, and deep trenches such as the Mariana Trench.

Deep-sea

mining - resource | IUCN

Deep sea mining, which refers to the extraction of minerals in marine areas at depths of 1,400 to 6,000 metres, seeks to mine a

huge variety of raw materials (gold, silver, copper, manganese, cobalt, zinc, nickel, lead, lithium and rare earths), in "Forages

en eaux

profondes: cartographie d’une controverse",

Clémence Seurat, AOC, 10 février 2022.

The Ocean Edge | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The EU supports the UN Resolution A/RES/76/296 of 21 July 2022 endorsing the Declaration entitled "Our ocean, our future, our

responsibility" adopted by the 2nd UN Ocean Conference ("Lisbon Declaration"). See the joint Communication JOIN (2022) 28 final

of 24.6.2022 on the

EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda: "Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet".

JOIN (2022) 28 final of 24.6.2022 on the EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda.

global-flows-the-ties-that-bind-in-an-interconnected-world-vfinal.pdf (mckinsey.com)

the-future-of-trade-issues-paper-22-september-2021.pdf (europa.eu)

Countries maintaining normal relations with Russia (e.g., China or India) may seek to shield themselves against secondary sanctions

by selectively decoupling their supply chains (Why

global industrial supply chains are decoupling (ey.com)).

« Géopolitique de la mer », Julia Tasse & Sébastien Abis, 2022.

After the Gulf of Aden was classified as a war risk area due in 2008, premiums surged from $20,000 to $150,000 (How

Much Trade

Transits the South China Sea? | ChinaPower Project (csis.org)).

future-maritime-trade-flows.pdf.

Shipping volumes of fossil fuels will fall further in the long term, with trade in energy commodities

declining after a peak by 2030. Natural gas – as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) – should experience

sustained growth in the short and medium term.

For example, ageing populations demand more services than goods. However, trade in manufactured goods have proven pretty

resilient in 2021 and should continue growing faster than GDP despite new disruptions in 2022 (global-flows-the-ties-that-bind-in-

an-interconnected-world-vfinal.pdf (mckinsey.com)).

global-flows-the-ties-that-bind-in-an-interconnected-world-vfinal.pdf (mckinsey.com)

For the EU, this region is spanning from the East Coast of Africa to the Pacific Island States (JOIN (2021) 24 final of 16.9.2021 - The

EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific) - The term was first coined by Japan Prime Minister during a visit in India in 2007.

Council Conclusions (16 April 2021).

JOIN(2021) 27 final of 13.10.2021

A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic.

How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? | ChinaPower Project (csis.org)

COSCO takes stake in Hamburg Port terminal | Merics

2Africa will make 46 landings and connect 33 countries, running the length of Africa's east and west coasts (it will connect Kenya,

Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique and Nigeria), and with an extension linking India, Pakistan and the Gulf states (Google,