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H U M A N
R I G H T S
W A T C H
“Our Lives Are Like Death”
Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan
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“Our Lives Are Like Death”
Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan
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Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-62313-943-8
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez
Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses,
expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice.
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movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all.
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Washington DC, and Zurich.
For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org
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ISBN: 978-1-62313-943-8
“Our Lives Are Like Death”
Syria Refugee Returns from Jordan and Lebanon
Summary........................................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology.....................................................................................................................................7
Background...................................................................................................................................... 9
The Syrian Conflict ............................................................................................................................. 9
The Syrian Refugee Crisis.................................................................................................................. 10
Lebanon ........................................................................................................................................... 11
Jordan............................................................................................................................................... 15
The Decision to Return to Syria .......................................................................................................18
Reasons for Refugee Returns ............................................................................................................ 18
Misinformation on Conditions in Syria ............................................................................................... 22
The Process of Return ....................................................................................................................... 24
Lebanon .................................................................................................................................... 24
Jordan ....................................................................................................................................... 25
Human Rights Abuses upon Return .................................................................................................27
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention ........................................................................................................... 28
A Note on Detention Sites ................................................................................................................. 32
Military service .......................................................................................................................... 33
Torture in detention ................................................................................................................... 36
Enforced disappearances ........................................................................................................... 41
Detention with Ransom Demands ............................................................................................... 42
Spotlight on Daraa ..................................................................................................................... 43
Reconciliation, Security Clearances, and “Wanted” Lists ................................................................47
Survival Inside Syria ...................................................................................................................... 52
Economic devastation ...................................................................................................................... 57
Bribery and Extortion ........................................................................................................................ 60
Payment for Information about Missing Loved Ones .................................................................... 62
“No Refugee Should Go Back”........................................................................................................ 65
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Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 67
To the Government of Syria ............................................................................................................... 67
To the Jordanian Ministry of Interior .................................................................................................. 68
To the Lebanese Government and related Ministries .......................................................................... 68
To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ........................................................ 69
To Donor Governments ..................................................................................................................... 70
To All Syrian Refugee Host Countries .................................................................................................. 71
Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................................72
Annex I: Response from the Lebanese General Security Directorate................................................73
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Summary
Syria is a death country, a kidnapping country. Anyone coming back will
lose their money or their life.
— Salam, 26, from al-Jeza in Daraa
Syrian refugees who voluntarily returned to Syria between 2017 and 2021 from Lebanon
and Jordan faced grave human rights abuses and persecution at the hands of Syrian
government and affiliated militias, including torture, extra-judicial killings, and
kidnappings. The majority of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch also struggled to
survive and meet their basic needs in a country decimated by conflict and widespread
destruction.
After a decade-long civil war, Syrian refugees are the world’s largest refugee population.
Spread over 127 countries – with the highest absolute numbers in Turkey – Lebanon and
Jordan host the highest ratio of refugees relative to their populations. Lebanon and Jordan
at first welcomed refugees with borders kept open to facilitate large refugee flows. As the
numbers of refugees in Lebanon increased, however, Lebanon adopted a range of coercive
and abusive measures including discriminatory curfews, evictions, arrests, and other
restrictions on legal residency and access to employment and education. Amidst
Lebanon’s catastrophic economic collapse, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, over
90 percent of Syrian refugees live in extreme poverty, relying on credit and mounting debt
to survive. In Jordan, only two percent of refugee households can meet their essential food
needs. Despite these stark figures, humanitarian aid appeals remain dramatically
underfunded across the region. In 2020, only 52 percent of the amount UN agencies
requested across the five main refugee-hosting countries – Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq,
and Egypt – was funded. Lebanon was 57 percent and Jordan 47 percent funded
respectively in 2020.
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Despite increasing levels of vulnerability in Lebanon and Jordan, the number of
spontaneous refugee returns to Syria has not significantly increased. Refugees continue to
cite safety and security in Syria as their primary considerations when deciding whether to
return home. Those who do make the decision to return often do so under extreme
pressure. In Lebanon, the government continues to pursue policies designed to coerce
Syrian refugees to leave, and the acute economic crisis and staggering inflation have made
it exceedingly difficult for refugees to afford the most basic necessities. In Jordan, the
economic downturn and drastic lockdown measures have undermined the livelihoods of
thousands of Syrian refugees. Returnees often decide to go back to Syria with limited
information on conditions inside the country.
Refoulement, the return of refugees to places where their lives, physical integrity, or
freedom would be threatened, occurs not only when a refugee is directly rejected or
expelled, but also when indirect pressure is so intense that it leads people to believe they
have no option but to return to a country where they face a serious risk of harm.
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While parts of Syria have not seen active conflict hostilities since 2018, Syria is not safe.
The UN agency mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance
to refugees, UNHCR, maintains that Syria is unsafe and that it will not facilitate mass
returns in the absence of key protection conditions. It states that it will however assist
individual refugees who decide to voluntarily return by themselves. An EU Parliamentary
Resolution in March 2021 also reminded member states that Syria is not safe for
refugee return.
This report, based on 65 interviews with Syrian refugees who returned to Syria from Jordan
and Lebanon or their family members, shows why Syria is not safe for return. It documents
the grave abuses and the harsh economic realities they face upon return and describes
why some refugees are deciding to return despite these difficulties. It finds that returnees
face many of the same violations that caused their flight from Syria. These include
persecution and abuses, such as arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, torture, extra-
judicial killings, kidnappings, and widespread bribery and extortion, at the hands of the
Syrian security agencies and government-affiliated militias. It examines the practice of so-
called “security clearances” and “reconciliation agreements” – frequently used by the
Syrian government to vet returnees and people crossing checkpoints in Syria – and
demonstrates how neither process protects people from being targeted by the Syrian
government’s security apparatus. It also looks at property rights violations and other
economic hardships that have made a sustainable return impossible for many.
Refugee returnees who did not face threats to their life or physical integrity lived in fear of
the government’s targeting of civilians perceived to be affiliated or sympathetic to the
opposition or who have expressed dissent. Human Rights Watch’s interviews with
returning refugees affirmed the view of a leading expert on Syria that “nearly everyone who
returns will face some form of interrogation, whether it’s a cup of tea with the security
agencies or a full-blown torture session, they want to know why people left.” The Syrian
Human Rights Network estimates that nearly 150,000 have been arbitrarily arrested and
detained and nearly 15,000 have died due to torture between March 2011 and March 2021,
the majority at the hands of Syrian government forces.
Syria’s economy and infrastructure have also been devastated by ten years of conflict and
sanctions. The World Bank estimates that the Syrian economy has shrunk by more than 60
percent since 2010. The Syrian pound has crashed, trading at approximately 3,460 Syrian
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pounds to the dollar as of October 2021,
1
compared to 50 Syrian pounds to the dollar, pre-
war, resulting in a 6,820 percent inflation rate increase on consumer goods. As of February
2021, at least 12.4 million Syrians were food insecure, according to the World Food
Programme (WFP), an alarming increase of 3.1 million in one year. The World Health
Organization estimates that more than half the population is in dire need of health
assistance and half a million children are malnourished. People with disabilities – usually
25 percent of a country’s population – are more likely to experience poverty. Most
returnees interviewed by Human Rights Watch experienced extreme economic hardship,
unable to afford basic food items because of the inflation of the Syrian pound and a
widespread lack of livelihood opportunities. Most also found their homes either totally or
partially destroyed and were unable to afford the costs of renovation. The Syrian
government provided no assistance in repairing homes.
Despite these ongoing violations and the devastating economic and humanitarian
conditions inside Syria, countries in the region and beyond continue to promote a
narrative of post-conflict returns. Denmark has set a dangerous precedent from within the
European Union, by removing the “temporary protection” status of individuals from
Damascus or Damascus Countryside. Denmark has stripped these individuals of temporary
protection and therefore the legal right to reside in Denmark and forced them to live in
return centers or return to Syria “voluntarily.”
In Lebanon, the authorities have pursued an aggressive returns agenda, regularly
introducing new decrees and regulations designed to make Syrian refugees’ lives difficult,
and ultimately to pressure them to leave. They have forced Syrian refugees to dismantle
their concrete shelters, imposed curfews and evicted refugees from some municipalities,
obstructed the renewal of residency permits, and summarily deported Syrian refugees they
deemed to have irregularly entered Lebanon after April 2019.
1
For the unofficial exchange rate at parallel markets, see “Authorities in Syria Make Billions Arresting Foreign Currency
Merchants,” The Syrian Observer, August 25, 2021, https://syrianobserver.com/features/69112/authorities-in-syria-make-
billions-arresting-foreign-currency-merchants.html (accessed October 1, 2021); and “Hourly Black Market Exchange Rates
and Gold Prices in Syria by City,” Karam Shaar, undated, https://www.karamshaar.com/exchange-rates (accessed October 1,
2021).
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While Jordan has not publicly pushed for large-scale organized repatriations, it has over
the years of increasingly protracted displacement implemented policies such as summary
deportations and denial of access to important categories of employment. While Jordan
does not impose a formal re-entry ban on Syrian refugees, refugees nearly uniformly told
Human Rights Watch that Jordanian border guards said they could not re-enter Jordan for
three to five years. This denies returnees the right to claim asylum if, having returned to
Syria, they again face persecution.
Human Rights Watch recommends an immediate moratorium on all forced returns of
Syrians and habitual Palestinian residents of Syria to all parts of Syria from all countries.
While evidence of widespread and ongoing violence active hostilities might have
decreased in recent years, the situation is fluid and relative periods of stability fail to meet
basic conditions for safe, dignified, and durable return. Moreover, the same government is
in power that committed crimes against humanity, persecuted those that expressed
dissent, and caused millions to flee. Widespread human rights abuses continue and
refugees who return often face the same persecution from which they fled.
With no reliable information networks on which Syrian refugees can make fully informed
decisions about return and with international humanitarian agencies lacking adequate
access and therefore unable to monitor voluntary repatriation and reintegration in Syria,
Human Rights Watch calls on all countries hosting Syrian refugees to adhere to the
position that Syria is unsafe for returns. International donor governments should use their
leverage against such practices as summary deportations and forced returns of Syrian
refugees to Syria, which amount to a breach of nonrefoulement obligations.
International donor governments should help sustain this position and fully fund
humanitarian assistance programs particularly inside Lebanon and Jordan and other
neighboring countries.
For their part, Lebanon and Jordan should lift all restrictions on Syrian refugees re-entering
their countries if they were not able to re-establish themselves inside Syria, or to avail
themselves of the protection of the Syrian government. Lebanon should abolish the May
2019 Higher Defense Council decision which provides for the summary deportation of all
Syrian refugees who re-enter irregularly after April 2019, and Jordan should stop imposing
arbitrary or de facto re-entry bans on Syrian refugees and clarify that Syrians can return to
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Jordan, and the process for doing so. Denmark should repeal its decision to remove
temporary protection for Syrian refugees from Damascus and Damascus Countryside, and
European Member States should not introduce any similar legislation.
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Methodology
This report is based on interviews with 30 Syrian refugees who returned from Jordan to
Syria and 24 Syrian refugees who returned from Lebanon to Syria between 2017 and 2021.
Interviews were also conducted with nine relatives of Syrian refugees who returned to Syria
during the same time period, two of whom were living in Lebanon and seven in Jordan.
Moreover, two interviews were also conducted with Syrian refugees planning to return to
Syria from Jordan. Twenty-seven out of these 65 interviews were women. These 65
interviews were conducted between January and July 2021.
Human Rights Watch interviewed the refugees who returned from Jordan to Syria by
telephone. Human Rights Watch interviewed the refugees who returned from Lebanon to
Syria and subsequently returned to Lebanon by telephone or in person after they returned
to Lebanon. The areas inside Syria that the refugees returned to include Damascus,
Damascus countryside, including eastern Ghouta, Hama, Daraa governorate, and
Homs city.
Human Rights Watch also interviewed three lawyers from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon and
four researchers and experts on Syria, as well as nongovernmental organizations, and UN
and humanitarian agencies in Jordan and Lebanon.
Interviews were conducted in private settings – either completely alone or with the
interviewee’s family members present – with assurances of confidentiality. The researcher
informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews, and
the ways in which Human Rights Watch would use the information. All were told they could
decline to answer questions or could end the interview at any time. The researcher told
interview subjects they would receive no payment, service, or other personal benefit for
the interviews. Interviews with refugees inside Syria all took place in Daraa. Transport
costs for those inside Daraa who traveled to a safe location to conduct the interview were
covered to a maximum limit of US$10. The researcher for this project used an
Arabic interpreter.
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Human Rights Watch also reviewed reports related to Syrian refugee returns, and analyzed
relevant national and international laws, decrees, regulations and memorandums
of understanding.
To protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used for all Syrian interviewees.
Human Rights Watch wrote to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security, the
Jordanian Ministry of Interior, the Jordanian Ministry of Planning, the Jordanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Syrian Ministry of Interior.
The Lebanese General Security Directorate responded to Human Rights Watch’s letter in
October 2021, and their response letter is included at the end of this report as Annex I.
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Background
The Syrian Conflict
What started in 2011 as a peaceful uprising in Syria against a government with an abysmal
human rights record turned into an armed conflict. In the decade since, the conflict has
killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions more. Parties to the Syrian conflict,
especially the Syrian government, have committed egregious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law – from arbitrary detentions and torture to property
confiscation, indiscriminate strikes, and the use of prohibited weapons. Some of these
abuses were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian
population and thus constitute crimes against humanity.
2
In 2018, the landscape of the conflict changed drastically as the Syrian government, with
the support of its Russian ally, retook most of the territory that had been held by anti-
government armed groups. Using unlawful tactics that in some cases amounted to war
crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity, the Syrian-Russian military alliance
solidified government control in most areas through local so-called “reconciliation”
agreements, which resulted in the mass evacuation of civilians, as well as members of
non-state armed groups opposed to the government.
3
At this writing, only parts of northeast and northwest Syria remain under the control of non-
government parties.
Despite the significant decrease in active hostilities, Syrian civilians continue to face a
myriad of challenges. The Syrian government continues to abuse its citizens’ rights while
the conduct of hostilities has destroyed most of the country’s infrastructure, including
partially or completely destroying two-thirds of Syria’s medical and educational facilities
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/15/targeting-life-idlib/syrian-and-russian-strikes-civilian-infrastructure; Human Rights
Watch, “
By All Means Necessary!”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria
, December
15, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/12/15/all-means-necessary/individual-and-command-responsibility-crimes-
against-humanity.
3
Mona Alami, “Russia’s Local and Regional Approach to Syria,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 31, 2018,
2
Human Rights Watch,
"Targeting Life in Idlib": Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure
, October 15, 2020,
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76952 (accessed September 16, 2021).
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and 27 percent of the country’s housing, according to a 2017 World Bank study of
eight governorates.
4
The Syrian economy went into freefall for much of 2020, with the unprecedented
depreciation of the national currency, the imposition of further international sanctions,
and crises in neighboring countries, primarily Lebanon, where Syrian business people
relied on access to Lebanese banks and could no longer do so after October 2019 when
these banks imposed capital controls during Lebanon’s economic crisis.
5
For ordinary
Syrians, this translated into an inability to procure food, essential medicines, and other
basic necessities. At the time of writing, according to the World Food Programme, more
than 12.4 million Syrians have become food insecure and over 80 percent of Syrians live
below the poverty line.
6
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
After a decade-long civil war, Syrian refugees continue to be the world’s largest refugee
population according to UNHCR,
7
comprising approximately 25 percent of refugees
globally. Syrian refugees have sought asylum in 127 countries, but Syria’s neighboring
nations continue to host the majority spread out over Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and
Egypt.
8
Turkey hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees, but Lebanon and Jordan host
the highest ratio of refugees per capita of any countries in the world. According to recent
UNHCR figures, Lebanon hosts nearly 900,000 registered Syrian refugees, and the
government estimates another 500,000 live in the country informally.
9
Jordan is home to
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the-
conflict-in-syria (accessed August 11, 2021).
controls imposed by banks in Lebanon in October 2019 have meant that Syrian businesspeople were no longer able to
access their accounts in Lebanese banks. This in turn affected their ability to bring foreign currency into the country,
depleting foreign currency reserves and restricting the government’s ability to import food items, such as wheat.
6
World Food Programme, “Twelve Million Syrians Now in the Grip of Hunger, Worn Down by Conflict and Soaring Food
5
Experts say that while sanctions have been imposed on the Syrian government since the start of the conflict, the capital
4
World Bank, “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria,” July 10, 2017,
Prices,” February 17, 2021, https://www.wfp.org/news/twelve-million-syrians-now-grip-hunger-worn-down-conflict-and-
soaring-food-prices (accessed September 16, 2021).
(accessed October 1, 2021).
7
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), “Figures at a Glance,” June 18, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html
8
UNHCR, “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) Regional Strategic Overview 2020 – 2021,” December 22, 2019,
9
UNHCR, “Lebanon Fact Sheet,” September 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73116, (accessed August 10, 2021), p. 2.
content/uploads/sites/16/2020/09/UNHCR-Lebanon-Operational-Fact-Sheet-Sep-2020.pdf (accessed September 16, 2021).
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more than 650,000 registered Syrian refugees.
10
Both countries initially welcomed Syrian
refugees and essentially maintained an open border policy (except for Palestinian refugees
fleeing Syria) from 2011 to 2014. Since then, both have progressively adopted more
restrictive policies.
11
Lebanon
Lebanon’s sectarian state structure and related sensitivity to sectarian demographic
balances, some Lebanese political parties’ alliances with Syrian authorities, and Lebanese
authorities’ ongoing discriminatory treatment of Palestinian refugees all taint Lebanese
authorities’ perception and treatment of Syrian refugees. Lebanon already hosts a large
community of Palestinian refugees, who numbering between 174,000 (according to the
Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee) and 480,000 (according to UNHCR/UNRWA),
who have been in Lebanon for more than 70 years and who face restrictions that affect
their basic rights.
12
Lebanon treats Syrian refugees as “guests,” largely denying them the
right to legal residency and severely limiting their access to employment.
13
Syrian refugees
struggle to access quality education and health care and often live in unsafe and informal
housing cut off from the main electricity and water and sanitation networks. Lebanon has
not allowed the opening of formal refugee camps in the country.
14
According to the latest
findings of the 2020
Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
, only 20
(accessed September 16, 2021); ASILE, “Country Fiche: Jordan,” October 2020, https://www.asileproject.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Country-Fiches_Jordan_Pub.pdf (accessed October 1, 2021), p. 2.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/not-welcome/jordans-treatment-palestinians-escaping-syria.
11
Human Rights Watch,
Not Welcome: Jordan's Treatment of Palestinians Escaping Syria
, August 7, 2014,
10
UNHCR, “Operational Data Portal: Refugee Situations,” https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36
undated, https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-lebanon (accessed September 13, 2021); Lebanese Palestinian
Dialogue Committee, “Population and Housing Census in Palestinian Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon 2017, Key Findings
Report,” February 2018, http://www.lpdc.gov.lb/DocumentFiles/Key%20Findings%20report%20En-
636566196639789418.pdf (accessed August 10, 2021); and UNWRA “Where We Work,” undated,
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon (accessed August 10, 2021).
13
Syrian refugees in Lebanon are technically only allowed to work in the agriculture, construction, and cleaning sectors. See
12
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), “Protection in Lebanon,”
“Syrians Who Obtain Work Permits in Lebanon Risk Losing Refugee Aid,”
The Daily Star
, March 6, 2017,
https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Mar-06/396311-syrians-who-obtain-work-permits-in-lebanon-risk-
losing-refugee-status.ashx (accessed August 10, 2021); Carnegie Middle East Center, “Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees
Need to Return Home,” April 16, 2018, https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-
jordan-pub-76058 (accessed August 10, 2021), chap. 2.
of the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” August 8, 2014, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HousingLandand
PropertyIssuesinLebanonFINAL.pdf (accessed August 10, 2021), p. 9.
14
UNHCR and UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), “Housing, Land & Property Issues in Lebanon: Implications
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percent of Syrian refugees have legal residency, making the majority of refugees
vulnerable to harassment, arrest, and detention, particularly at checkpoints.
15
Lebanon refuses to recognize Syrians as refugees and uses the generic words for
“displaced” people in Arabic,
naziheen,
rather than the word for refugee,
laja’een
.
Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not adhere to a unified or
centralized policy toward Syrian refugees, so municipalities and local authorities are free
to adopt differing policies and strategies. The result has led to a host of coercive
regulations and ad-hoc practices designed to ensure Syrian refugees do not integrate and
eventually feel like they have no choice but to return to Syria. This coercive approach has
intensified in recent years, as has the rhetoric of government leaders and political figures
on returns.
16
Syrian refugees are subjected to arbitrary raids, ad-hoc curfews, checkpoints which apply
only to them, and arrest and detention for not having legal residency.
17
In April 2018,
Human Rights Watch documented how some municipalities forcibly evicted thousands of
Syrian refugees from their homes and expelled them from their localities.
18
In May 2019, the Higher Defense Council, Lebanon’s highest security coordination body,
adopted a series of measures intended to increase pressure on Syrian refugees to return,
including forced demolition of refugee shelters and a crackdown on Syrians working
without authorization.
19
In the summer of 2019, the Lebanese Armed Forces forced Syrian
refugees living in semi-permanent shelters on agricultural land to dismantle their own
15
UN Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, “Key Findings of the 2020 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon,” undated, https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/VASyR%202020%20Dashboard.pdf (accessed
August 10, 2021).
September 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047452 (accessed August 13, 2021); Nikolaj Skydsgaard,
“Denmark Firm on Returning Refugees to War-Torn Syria,” Reuters, April 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/
denmark-firm-returning-refugees-war-torn-syria-2021-04-27/ (accessed August 13, 2021).
17
UN Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, “Key Findings of the 2020 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in
16
“Syrian Displacement Poses ‘Serious Threat’ to Lebanon’s Development Goals, President Tells UN Assembly,” UN News,
Lebanon,” undated, https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/VASyR%202020%20Dashboard.pdf (accessed
August 10, 2021).
April 20, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/20/our-homes-are-not-strangers/mass-evictions-syrian-refugees-
lebanese.
18
Human Rights Watch,
“Our Homes Are Not for Strangers”: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities
,
Lebanon-News/2019/Jul-10/487248-labor-ministry-starts-crackdown-on-foreign-labor.ashx (accessed September 16, 2021);
Human Rights Watch,
Syrians Deported by Lebanon Arrested at Home: New Policy Forcibly Returns Thousands, No Due
Process
, September 2, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/02/syrians-deported-lebanon-arrested-home.
19
“Labor Ministry Starts Crackdown on Foreign Labor,” The Daily Star, July 10, 2019, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/
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shelters’ concrete walls and hard roofs and replace them with flimsy materials, or face
army demolition of their homes.
20
The forced shelter dismantlement significantly reduced
the adequacy of refugee housing to withstand harsh weather conditions, particularly in the
Arsal region, where winters and summers are harsh.
Lebanon’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic also put refugees at risk. In April 2020,
Human Rights Watch found that at least 21 Lebanese municipalities had introduced
discriminatory restrictions on Syrian refugees that do not apply to Lebanese residents as
part of their efforts to control the spread of Covid-19, violating Syrians’ rights and
undermining the country’s public health response.
21
Although the Lebanese government continues to publicly state its commitment to the
principle of nonrefoulement, it has deported thousands of Syrians in recent years. In May
2019, the Higher Defense Council announced that all Syrians who entered Lebanon
irregularly after April 24, 2019 would be deported and directly handed over to the Syrian
authorities.
22
In a letter to Human Rights Watch, the General Security Directorate said it
had “returned” 6,345 Syrians between April 25, 2019 and September 19, 2021 in
implementation of the Higher Defense Council’s decision. Human Rights Watch
documented that at least three Syrians deported by Lebanon were arrested in Syria.
23
Recently, Lebanese leaders have ramped up their anti-refugee rhetoric and promotion of
refugee returns.
24
In July 2020, the government issued a new “return plan” declaring that
20
“Lebanon: Syrian Refugee Shelters Demolished,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 5, 2019,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/05/lebanon-syrian-refugee-shelters-demolished.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/lebanon-refugees-risk-covid-19-response.
21
“Lebanon: Refugees at Risk in Covid-19 Response,” Human Rights Watch news release, April 2, 2020,
22
“Statement Regarding the Deportation of Refugees to Syria from Lebanon,” Save the Children Lebanon news release,
September 17, 2019, https://lebanon.savethechildren.net/news/statement-regarding-deportation-refugees-syria-lebanon
(accessed August 11, 2021). For information about raids conducted by authorities on refugee places of work or residence, see
UNHCR, “Measures Impacting Refugees in Lebanon – Raids (June – December 2019),” April 2, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/
report/lebanon/measures-impacting-refugees-lebanon-raids-june-december-2019 (accessed August 10, 2021).
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/02/syrians-deported-lebanon-arrested-home.
23
“Syrians Deported by Lebanon Arrested at Home,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 2, 2019,
24
Government of Lebanon and the United Nations joint report, “Lebanon Crisis Response Plane 2017-2021,” January 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LCRP_2021FINAL_v1.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021), p. 11; “Syrian
Displacement Poses ‘Serious Threat’ to Lebanon’s Development Goals, President Tells UN Assembly,” United Nations press
release, September 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047452 (accessed August 11, 2021).
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parts of Syria are safe and that refugees should go back.
25
Lebanon attended a
controversial Russian-backed conference on refugee returns in Damascus in November
2020, which UNHCR and EU countries declined to attend, citing it as “premature.”
26
In the last two years, Lebanon endured multiple crises, including a massive explosion in
Beirut’s port, an economic collapse with debilitating inflation, rising political instability,
and the Covid-19 pandemic.
27
The Lebanese authorities’ corruption and failure to address
these crises have resulted in a drastic deterioration of rights.
28
The economic crisis and
Covid-19 pandemic have significantly compromised the ability of hospitals to provide
lifesaving care. Electricity blackouts are becoming common, sometimes lasting up to 22
hours per day. In this increasingly insecure reality, Syrian refugees have been severely
impacted, with 89 percent living in extreme poverty and relying on credit lines and
borrowing money and food to survive.
29
Although Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the prohibition of
refoulement, which is the return of refugees in any manner whatsoever to places where
their lives or freedom would be threatened, has become a norm of customary international
law which Lebanon is bound to respect. UNHCR says that refoulement occurs not only
when a government directly rejects or expels a refugee, but also when indirect pressure is
so intense that it leads people to believe they have no option, but to return to a country
where they face a serious risk of harm.
30
https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2020/07/30/feature-01 (accessed August 10, 2021.
26
Ben Hubbard, “Syria Seeks Return of Refugees, but They Fear Leader’s Wrath,” New York Times, November 12, 2020,
25
Nohad Topalian, “Lebanon Releases Plan for Syrian Refugees' Return,” al-Mashareq, July 30, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/world/middleeast/12syria-refugees-assad.html (accessed August 10, 2021). See also
“Damascus Holds Russia-Backed Conference on Refugee Returns,” France24, November 11, 2020, https://www.france24.
com/en/live-news/20201111-damascus-holds-russia-backed-conference-on-refugee-returns (accessed August 10, 2021).
27
Human Rights Watch, Lebanon country page, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/lebanon.
28
Human Rights Watch,
“They Killed Us from the Inside”: An Investigation into the August 4 Beirut Blast
, August 3, 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/08/03/they-killed-us-inside/investigation-august-4-beirut-blast.
29
UN Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, “Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) 2020,” February
19, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/VASyR%202020.pdf (accessed August 10, 2021), pp. 82-
84.
30
See
R v. Secretary of State for Social Security, Ex parte B and Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
, QBCOF
96/0462/D, QBCOF 96/0461 and 0462/D, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), June 21, 1996,
https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_CA_CIV,3ae6b72a0.html (accessed July 20, 2021).
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Jordan
Jordan, like Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, but in 1998 entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR that removed its geographic and time
limitations on refugee protection in the country and protects refugees against
refoulement.
31
Also like Lebanon, it opened its borders to Syrian refugees in 2011 with
some exceptions, but after mid-2013 Jordanian authorities began to restrict the flow of
Syrian refugees into the country by closing informal border crossings near population
centers and forcing them to cross further and further into the eastern desert.
32
A suicide
attack against a Jordanian army post at Rukban reportedly carried out by the self-
proclaimed Islamic State led to the closure of Rukban, the final open border crossing
located near the Iraqi border.
33
While Jordan should be lauded for a more formalized approach to Syrian refugees than
most of its neighbors, which included transferring all Syrian refugees arriving through
border crossings to refugee camps where they could register with UNHCR and receive
asylum seeker certificates, its policy of excluding certain categories of refugees breached
nonrefoulement obligations: it denied entry to four highly vulnerable groups: Palestinians
living in Syria; all single men of military age; Iraqi refugees living in Syria; and any
undocumented persons, despite the widespread bombing in Syria that not only destroyed
homes and properties, but documents as well.
34
In order to leave the refugee camps, Jordan put in place a sponsorship program whereby a
Jordanian relative could “bail out” a Syrian refugee.
35
In the beginning this policy was
followed in a relatively relaxed manner and those who did not have a sponsor were still
31
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Jordan and UNHCR, April 1998, on file with Human Rights
Watch, art. 2.
32
The open border policy did not extend to Palestinian or Iraqi refugees from Syria or single men aged 18–45 without
identification. See “Jordan: Obama Should Press King on Asylum Seeker Pushbacks: Palestinian Refugees, Single Men, and
Undocumented Unlawfully Forced Back to Syria,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 18, 2013,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/21/jordan-obama-should-press-king-asylum-seeker-pushbacks.
https://fln.dk/-/media/FLN/Materiale/Baggrundsmateriale/2019/06/19/07/03/Syri1040.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021), p.
17; Ian Black, “Jordan Seals Borders after Suicide Attack,” The Guardian, June 21, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/jun/21/jordanian-soldiers-killed-by-car-bomb-outside-syrian-refugee-camp (accessed August 11, 2021).
33
European Institute of Peace, “Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity,” June 2019,
2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/23/blocking-syrian-refugees-isnt-way.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero030215 (accessed August 11, 2021).
34
Bill Frelick (Human Rights Watch), “Blocking Syrian Refugees Isn’t the Way,” commentary,
The New York Times
, April 23,
35
Middle East Research and Information Project, “Trapped in Refuge: The Syrian Crisis in Jordan Worsens,” March 2, 2015,
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able to live outside the camps and access services. In 2015, the government canceled the
sponsorship program and introduced an “urban verification exercise” which required all
Syrian refugees to register their biometric information in order to obtain a new biometric
service card. The cards were made available to all Syrians who left the camps without
being legally “bailed out” prior to July 14, 2014, but the cards were virtually unobtainable
for tens of thousands of Syrians who left refugee camps after that date.
36
As a result,
Syrians who left the camps informally after that date could not obtain the documents
required to access humanitarian assistance, subsidized health care, and enroll their
children in schools.
37
In 2017, Jordanian authorities extended the cutoff date to March 8,
2015, allowing thousands of additional Syrians to obtain service cards. In 2016, Human
Rights Watch documented how “since July 2014, Jordanian security forces have arrested
and involuntarily relocated refugees without UNHCR asylum seeker certificates or MOI
service cards to refugee camps.”
38
While Jordanian authorities continued to implement the Jordan Compact 2016 agreement
between the Jordanian government and donor countries, which aimed to improve the
livelihoods of Syrian refugees by granting new legal work opportunities and improving the
education sector, most professions (including medicine, education, and engineering)
remained closed to non-Jordanians, and many Syrians continued to work in the informal
sector without labor protections.
39
Recent evidence suggests the employment situation for Syrian refugees was better at the
beginning of 2020 compared with 2016.
40
However, many Syrians lost their jobs and others
have been subjected to reductions in their salaries during the Covid-19 pandemic. The
effects of the pandemic in Jordan have undone the progress of previous years, with
16, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/08/16/were-afraid-their-future/barriers-education-syrian-refugee-children-
jordan, p. 2.
37
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
38
Ibid., p. 14.
39
ODI, “The Jordan Compact: Lessons Learnt and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts,” February 8, 2018,
36
Human Rights Watch, “
We’re Afraid for Their Future”: Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Jordan,
August
https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/12058.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021); MENA SP Network, “The Employment of
Syrians in Jordan: Main Trends and Challenges,” November 2020, https://www.menasp.com/en/opinion/the-employment-
of-syrians-in-jordan-main-trends-and-challenges/ (accessed August 12, 2021).
accessed August 11, 2021, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/13/7234.
40
Ahmad AlShwawra, “Syrian Refugees’ Integration Policies in Jordanian Labor Market,”
Sustainability
vol. 13 (2021): 12,
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indicators in some sectors, like food security, now equating to those of 2014.
41
According
to UNHCR’s Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) for 2021 and 2022, “only 2% of
refugee households can meet their essential food needs without any negative coping
strategies, which include cutting down on meals, pulling children out of school, early
marriage and sending family members to beg.”
42
41
UNHCR, “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) Regional Strategic Overview 2021-2022,” December 31, 2020,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RSO2021.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021), pp. 7-8.
42
UNHCR, “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) Regional Strategic Overview 2021-2022,” December 31, 2020,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RSO2021.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021), p. 28.
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The Decision to Return to Syria
Reasons for Refugee Returns
Despite the coercive conditions for refugees in Lebanon, and the increased cost of living
for refugees in Jordan, protection monitoring and return-intentions data collected by
humanitarian NGOs and UNHCR consistently demonstrate that refugees across Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, and Lebanon cite safety and security in their home country as the top
consideration preventing them from return.
At least 282,283 Syrian refugees returned from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey in
a self-organized way (so-called “spontaneous returns”) between 2016 and May 2021.
43
Interviewees from Lebanon and Jordan gave various reasons for making the decision to
return to Syria, including a lack of livelihood opportunities, especially during the Covid-19
pandemic, difficulties accessing health care in Lebanon and Jordan, a desire to reclaim
their land and homes in Syria, and a belief that the security situation had improved in their
area of return.
In March 2021, UNHCR’s
Sixth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions and
Intentions on Return to Syria
found that nearly 90 percent of Syrian refugees surveyed
could not meet their basic needs in host countries. Refugees who had returned told Human
Rights Watch that the economic declines in both Lebanon and Jordan contributed to their
decision to leave. A lack of work opportunities in both countries, exacerbated by the Covid-
19 pandemic, increased their economic vulnerability and pushed many back to Syria.
Refugees in Lebanon, already economically marginalized, were severely impacted by the
Covid-19 pandemic’s disastrous impact on the economy.
44
Similarly in Jordan, interviewees
described how lockdowns undermined their ability to make a living.
43
UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, “Syria Refugee Response: Durable Solutions,”
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions (accessed August 11, 2021).
Case of Lebanon, April 2021,” April 30, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/60d1daf64.pdf
(accessed August 12, 2021). For information on Lebanon’s economic crisis, see Middle East Institute, “Lebanon’s economic
crisis: A tragedy in the making,” March 29, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/lebanons-economic-crisis-tragedy-
making (accessed August 11, 2021); Nabila Rahhal, “Impact of COVID-19 and Economic Crises on Lebanon’s Retailers,”
Executive Magazine, August 2020, https://www.executive-magazine.com/hospitality-tourism/impact-of-covid-19-and-
economic-crises-on-lebanons-retailers (accessed August 11, 2021).
44
UNHCR, “Assessing the Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19 on Forcibly Displaced Populations: Thematic Brief No. 3: The
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Adnan, a 36-year-old man from Nafaa in Daraa, described how the Covid-19 pandemic
impacted his decision to return:
Life in Jordan was good. I could work easily… I was working and I was able
to send money to my family… And then Covid-19 started. There were so
many lockdowns. I didn’t have enough food and support for my family. I
talked to my parents, and I said I wanted to go back. My family encouraged
me to go back. My work permit [in Jordan] only allowed me to work as a
barber and I couldn’t do that work at that time.
45
Yasser, a 32-year-old man from Homs, described how his inability to continue paying rent
in Lebanon influenced his decision to return to Syria:
We decided to leave because we were living in the [informal] camps in
Lebanon in Bar Elias…and [the landlord] wanted rent in dollars. We couldn’t
afford this, so we decided to leave. I wanted my kids in school and I wanted
to register them [in Syria] and to live in my house again.
46
Many refugees told Human Rights Watch they wanted to return to reclaim their homes and
live on their land again, a desire underpinned by the right to return.
47
“We wanted to get
our house back,” said Ghada, a 43-year-old woman from Eastern Ghouta. “Because people
told us it was safe there, we wanted to try and secure our lands.”
48
Others said they could not afford the health care they needed in Lebanon or Jordan and
returned in the hope of accessing cheaper health care in Syria. UNHCR subsidizes the
costs of basic medical care for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, but they rarely cover
45
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Adnan, April 28, 2021.
pound (also known as Lira) was pegged to the US dollar at a rate of 1,500 pounds per dollar. Since the crisis, however, the
pound has lost 90 percent of its value, and the unofficial exchange rate in October 2021 was 17,350 pounds per dollar having
undergone a 1,056 percent increase from its previous level. See “Dollar to Lebanese Lira Today,” Lira Rate, undated,
https://lirarate.org/ (accessed October 1, 2021).
47
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for
46
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasser, May 6, 2021. Before Lebanon’s economic crisis, the Lebanese
Refugees and Displaced Persons
, June 28, 2005, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, https://www.refworld.org/docid/41640c874.html
(accessed July 17, 2021).
48
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ghada, January 27, 2021.
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treatment for palliative care or chronic conditions.
49
Layla, a 65-year-old woman from
Hama who returned to Lebanon in 2019 after going back to Syria, said:
We went back then to Syria because…it was very hard to obtain all the
things we needed here in Lebanon: we needed medical treatment, and the
medicine [in Lebanon] is expensive… I couldn’t afford to have a separate
house here in Lebanon and my son couldn’t find a job, and the house is so
small, I didn’t want to be a burden on my son and his wife.
50
Research has repeatedly found that Syrian refugees live in precarious conditions,
and face barriers in access to adequate health care, sometimes including their
inability to afford care they need.
51
This amounts to a failure by host countries
protect the right to the highest attainable standard of health for refugees. Host
countries’ failure to ensure that refugees have access to the health care services to
which they are entitled compounds their medical conditions. When discrimination
or other factors such as fear of excessive costs impede care, including Covid-19
testing, treatment, or prevention services, refugees and migrants tend to be
diagnosed later and only treated well into the development of illness; when they
are sicker, care is more expensive, and treatment tends to be less effective. It can,
as the cases documented in this report will illustrate, create incentives for them to
return to Syria, where they may not be safe.
Citizens and permanent residents reliant on the public health systems in Lebanon
and Jordan may experience similar health access problems. Many face resource
and capacity constraints in public sector care, long wait times, and lack of essential
medicines. However, refugees experience specific abuses in addition to the
systemic failures that affect all patients, compounding the marginalization they
already face.
49
UNHCR Lebanon, “Q&A Health,” undated, https://www.unhcr-lb.org/refleborg/en/health (accessed August 11, 2021);
UNHCR Jordan, “Health,” undated, https://help.unhcr.org/jordan/en/helpful-services-unhcr/health-services-unhcr/
(accessed August 11, 2021).
50
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Layla, January 28, 2021.
51
UNHCR, “Health Access and Utilization Survey: Access to Healthcare Services Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan - December
2018,” December 31, 2018; UNHCR, “Syrian Refugee Access to Healthcare in Lebanon,” March 12, 2020, https://reliefweb.
int/report/lebanon/syrian-refugee-access-healthcare-lebanon (accessed September 14, 2021); Nour El Arnaout, Spencer
Rutherford, Thurayya Zreik, et al, “Assessment of the health needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Syria’s neighboring
countries,” Conflict and Health vol. 13 (2019), https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-019-
0211-3#citeas (accessed October 1, 2021).
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Maysa, a 76-year-old woman from Damascus Countryside, also explained how living
conditions in Lebanon convinced her to go back to Syria:
The situation was very bad in Lebanon, my husband couldn’t find work. The
house rent was around US$200 per month. At the time, that was 300,000
Lebanese pounds. The room rent was high, we don’t have furniture or
equipment. We couldn’t afford medicine. So, my husband convinced me to
go back to Syria.
52
Hassan, a 61-year-old man from Homs on kidney dialysis, made the decision to leave
Lebanon after his wife could no longer earn money to support him after she was denied
legal residency by the General Security Organization (GSO) in Lebanon, even though both
he and his wife had been sponsored by a Lebanese national for many years:
In 2018, I was accepted by the GSO for my legal residency, but my wife was
not. We went to GSO to ask why, and they said our sponsor is in debt and
has legal issues. They asked my wife to change the sponsor, but the
process would take two months. They said she needed to leave the country
and re-enter… When I got sick and couldn’t work and my wife needed to
stop working to support me...we decided to go to Syria.
53
UNHCR continues to maintain the position that it is not safe to return to Syria and it is
neither facilitating nor promoting returns.
54
In February 2018, UNHCR laid out the necessary
conditions for the return of refugees to Syria:
The government/actors in control of the return area provide genuine
guarantees that returnees will not face harassment, discrimination,
arbitrary detention, physical threat or prosecution on account of originating
from an area previously or currently under de facto control of another party
52
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Maysa, February 1, 2021.
53
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Hassan, January 22, 2021.
54
For the original statement regarding returns to Syria, see UNHCR, “Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy:
Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria,” February 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
documents/download/63223 (accessed August 11, 2021), p. 2. See also UNHCR, "International Protection Considerations
with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,” March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, https://www.
refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 17, 2021), pp. 8-10.
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to the conflict; for having left Syria illegally; for having lodged an asylum
claim abroad, or; on account of any (individual or family) diversity
characteristic.
55
In March 2021, UNHCR urged host countries to maintain asylum for Syrian refugees:
UNHCR considers that changes in the objective circumstances in Syria,
including relative security improvements in parts of the territory, are not of
a fundamental, stable and durable character so as to warrant cessation of
refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention.
56
UNHCR surveys indicate that most Syrian refugees continue to hope to return to Syria one
day, even if not in the near term.
57
While data on refugees’ intentions currently
demonstrate that most refugees intend to stay in Lebanon or Jordan for the foreseeable
future, this decision is primarily due to the barriers to return currently in place in Syria, and
not because they do not want to return to their country.
58
Misinformation on Conditions in Syria
Misinformation on the reality of life inside Syria influenced the decisions of many of the
refugees that Human Rights Watch interviewed to return. In 2018, the General Security
Organization (GSO), the Lebanese security agency responsible for the entry and exit of
foreigners, began facilitating returns for refugees to Syria. As part of the process, the GSO
obtained a “security clearance” from the Syrian authorities for any refugee who wished to
sign up for a return movement. Yasser, 32, from Homs believed this would guarantee his
safety on return to Syria. “I had been promised by the Lebanese GSO that no one would be
harmed when returning,” he said. “They said the security clearance had been done, so it
would be safe for me on return.” Instead, Yasser was detained by the Syrian Political
Syria,” February 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63223 (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 7.
55
UNHCR, “Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to
56
UNHCR, “International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,”
57
UNHCR, “Sixth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions & Intentions on Return to Syria,” March 2021,
58
Ibid.
March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 17, 2021), p. 10.
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/MENA%20regional%20survey.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021), p. 3.
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Security Agency just a day after his return and endured four months of arbitrary detention
and brutal torture.
59
“We can’t trust the Lebanese or Syrian security agencies,” a Syrian lawyer told Human
Rights Watch. He said both countries’ security agencies “behave the same way.” The
lawyer said that Lebanon’s GSO should coordinate security clearances with Syria’s office
of Immigration and Passport Control, but instead “they [GSO] do it [the security clearance]
with a few of the intelligence agencies, not always all of them, and they also clear people
when they are actually wanted. On purpose.”
60
Interviewees also told Human Rights Watch they relied on information from the media and
from family and friends who had already returned, but refugees regularly told Human
Rights Watch that the descriptions often did not match the reality. Obtaining accurate
information on conditions inside Syria is exceedingly difficult. Returnees told Human
Rights Watch that information on safety and security risks is very hard to obtain, as family
members and friends inside Syria do not want to disclose sensitive information over the
telephone. To this end, people rely on word of mouth, social media, and television news
items to reach an assessment which often turns out to be incorrect. Many people told
Human Rights Watch they were not prepared for the level of economic difficulties they
faced in Syria, nor the physical destruction of their home and area.
Humanitarian-led protection monitoring inside Syria is also extremely limited. Syrian
government-imposed access constraints have prevented UNHCR from implementing the
kind of returns monitoring mechanism that operate in other humanitarian situations.
61
The
government has also imposed limitations on the types of protection work that could be
undertaken, including the types of questions that humanitarian agencies can ask
returnees. A fear of government surveillance and a lack of stable internet connection due
to electricity cuts, means that many returnees do not or cannot report the truth of their
situation when they are back in Syria.
59
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasser, January 25, 2021.
60
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a Syrian lawyer, July 1, 2021.
61
For example, in Afghanistan or South Sudan. See World Bank, “The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social
Analysis,” February 6, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-mobility-of-displaced-syrians-
an-economic-and-social-analysis (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 32.
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Iyad, a 30-year-old returnee from Damascus Countryside, commented on how after he
returned from Syria to Lebanon, other Syrian refugees rushed to ask him questions about
life inside Syria:
I would advise no one to go back, they don’t understand what they would
face. More and more people understand that the situation is so bad in Syria
– especially the economic situation. They get information from others who
return. When I came back – many people visited me to ask whether to go
back and I advised everyone not to go back. I explained how hard it was.
62
The Process of Return
Refugees told Human Rights Watch they returned to Syria using both formal and informal
routes. Both Lebanon and Jordan impose re-entry restrictions on Syrian refugees. The
blanket imposition of re-entry restrictions and de-facto bans on Syrian returnees who
cannot re-establish themselves inside Syria is tantamount to a breach of nonrefoulement
obligations. Given the more porous nature of the border, the majority of refugees from
Lebanon returned to Syria using smuggling routes, while those interviewed by Human
Rights Watch who returned from Jordan uniformly used the formal borders.
In order to return officially to Syria either by air or land, refugees are required to produce a
valid passport, travel document (“laissez passer”), or accepted form of identification to
Syrian border authorities.
63
Lebanon
There are generally three formal routes that Syrian refugees can use to return to Syria:
individual returns through legal land border crossings or via the airport; GSO-organized
returns; and Hezbollah-facilitated returns which are coordinated with the GSO.
64
Most
refugees do not have legal residency and therefore resort to informal pathways.
62
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Iyad, May 24, 2021.
Migration Review
62, October 2019: 49, https://www.fmreview.org/return/clutterbuck-cunial-barsanti-gewis (accessed
August 11, 2021).
64
SAWA for Development and Aid, “Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees’ Conditions and Concerns,” February 2019,
63
Martin Clutterbuck, Laura Cunial, Paola Barsanti, and Tina Gewis, “Legal Preparedness for Return to Syria,”
Forced
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SAWA_Unpacking%20Return%20Report.pdf (accessed September
13, 2021), p. 23.
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As mentioned above, legal exit from Lebanon requires a regularized status, which 80
percent of refugees over the age of 15 lack.
65
In July 2018, the GSO issued an internal
memo which sets out the exit formalities of Syrians who overstayed their residency
permits, including those who first entered the country irregularly. In most cases, Syrians
are required to visit a GSO center to pay a fine and/or regularize their status, but may still
be issued a re-entry ban.
66
Despite the existence of mechanisms to regularize their status,
most of the refugees Human Rights Watch spoke to preferred to use smuggling routes to
exit Lebanon and avoid the official border crossings because they could not afford the fees
to regularize their status, their fear of GSO officers given the mistreatment that many
Syrians are subjected to at the hands of GSO, or not wanting to have a “do not enter
stamp” which may be issued on their passport for between one and five years, preventing
their re-entry.
In May 2019, Lebanon decided to deport anyone who enters or re-enters Lebanon after
April 2019 via informal routes, even if they previously resided in Lebanon.
Jordan
All interviewees who left Jordan for Syria did so formally and through the formal border
crossing at Jaber/Naseeb, which reopened in October 2018 after the Syrian government
captured Daraa and the southern border.
67
The majority visited the Syrian embassy in
Amman before returning to Syria in order to update their documentation, including
renewing their passports, obtaining a travel document, or updating their civil
documentation, such as birth, death, and marriage certificates. When leaving Jordan,
nearly all refugees said that Jordanian border guards told them they would not be allowed
to re-enter Jordan for a five-year period and the border guards took their iris scan to
register their exit from the country. Several interviewees were not told about a re-entry ban
and did not have their iris scan registered and told Human Rights Watch this is because
they had entered Jordan legally and therefore could re-enter legally.
65
UN Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, “Key Findings of the 2020 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon,” undated, https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/VASyR%202020%20Dashboard.pdf (accessed
August 10, 2021); Martin Clutterbuck, Laura Cunial, Paola Barsanti, and Tina Gewis, “Legal Preparedness for Return to Syria,”
Forced Migration Review
62, October 2019: 49, https://www.fmreview.org/return/clutterbuck-cunial-barsanti-gewis
(accessed August 11, 2021).
66
GSO, Untitled Internal Memo, July 2018, on file with Human Rights Watch.
67
“Jordan, Syria to Reopen Border Today,” The Jordan Times, October 15, 2018,
https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-syria-reopen-border-today (accessed October 1, 2021).
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Despite the almost uniform re-entry ban verbally issued to interviewees at the Syria-Jordan
land border, a Jordanian lawyer with expertise in the matter told Human Rights Watch there
is no formal Jordanian re-entry ban that restricts Syrian refugees’ re-entry to Syria.
68
However, individuals may face restrictions at the border if there is a “security-related
reason” or a problem with their documentation such as falsified civil documentation
certificates or forgeries, and this may result in a temporary ban on re-entry into the
country.
69
The lawyer explained that there is no written law, regulation, or instruction
imposing a general ban on the entry of Syrians into Jordan, instead, and depending on the
circumstances, the authorities may issue a statement announcing that the border has
been closed for a certain time period.
70
68
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a Jordanian lawyer, August 2021.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
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Human Rights Abuses upon Return
Refugees returning from Lebanon and Jordan told Human Rights Watch that the Syrian
government or its affiliated militias subjected them or their family members to arbitrary
arrest, detention, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, kidnappings, and
extrajudicial killings after their return to Syria. Human Rights Watch documented 21 cases
of arrest and arbitrary detention, 13 cases of torture, 3 kidnappings, 5 extrajudicial killings,
17 enforced disappearances and 1 case of alleged sexual violence. A further 28
interviewees who returned to Daraa described living in an insecure environment
characterized by arrests at checkpoints, kidnappings, racketeering, bribery and extortion,
assassinations, and pervasive lawlessness and lack of accountability.
These findings are consistent with those of other human rights organizations, journalists,
and the Syria UN Commission of Inquiry, which have all documented arbitrary arrests,
detention, torture and ill-treatment, involuntary or enforced disappearances, and summary
executions inside Syria. The Commission has documented abuses committed inside Syria
which amount to the crimes against humanity of extermination, murder, rape, or other
forms of sexual violence, torture, and imprisonment in the context of its widespread and
systematic detentions.
71
The Commission has also documented violations that appear to
amount to the war crimes of murder, cruel treatment, torture, rape, sexual violence, and
outrages upon personal dignity.
72
Ten years into the conflict, Syrian security forces continue to arbitrarily detain, disappear,
and mistreat people across the country, including returnees and individuals in retaken
areas.
73
In its March 2021 report, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic, the Commission stated:
Violations and abuses have been perpetrated with such consistency,
particularly by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and have been
February 3, 2016, https://www.refworld.org/docid/56b9f4c24.html (accessed August 11, 2021), p. 17.
72
Ibid., para. 99.
71
UN Human Rights Council, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/31/CRP.1,
May 21, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/21/syria-detention-harassment-retaken-areas.
73
Human Rights Watch,
Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas Media, Aid Workers, Activists, and Families Targeted
,
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reported so widely by the Commission of Inquiry and others that it is
impossible to claim that they were committed without the knowledge of the
relevant chains of command.
74
Over time, armed groups also adopted detention-related practices in the areas under their
control that were strikingly similar to those of government and pro-government forces.
75
Enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention, torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, sexual violence, and death in detention have been documented in detention
facilities operated by all parties across the country.
76
Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch were viewed with suspicion by the Syrian
authorities for leaving Syria, and faced similar threats and abuses on their return,
including to their life and liberty. The abuses, laid out in more detail below, show that
there remains a clear and credible threat of persecution to individuals who return to Syria.
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
Arbitrary arrest and detention have been a cornerstone of the Syrian government’s system
of repressive control since before the 2011 conflict, and as Human Rights Watch has
previously documented, has often led to torture and death.
77
The Syrian Network for
Human Rights estimates that nearly 150,000 people were arbitrarily arrested and detained
in Syria and nearly 15,000 died from torture from March 2011 to June 2021, the majority at
the hands of Syrian government forces.
78
According to the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “Arbitrary arrests and detention in
Syria take many forms, often targeting civilians perceived to be either supporting a party to
A/HRC/46/55, March 2, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/report-independent-international-
commission-inquiry-syrian-arab-13 (accessed July 20, 2021), para 2.
75
Ibid., para. 7.
76
Ibid., para. 7.
74
UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
,
Prisons since March 2011
, July 3, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-
torture-and-enforced-disappearances-syrias;
If the Dead Could Speak: Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria’s Detention
Facilities
, December 16, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-
syrias-detention-facilities.
77
Human Rights Watch,
Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground
toll-due-to-torture/ (accessed August 12, 2021).
78
Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Death Toll Due to Torture,” June 14, 2021, https://sn4hr.org/blog/2021/03/04/death-
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the conflict, or insufficiently loyal to another.”
79
In March 2021, UNHCR identified a list of
risk profiles for Syrians including “persons opposing, or perceived to be opposing, the
government” and ”draft evaders and deserters from the Syrian Armed Forces,”
80
and went
on to state:
Across government-held areas, returnees are reported to be among those
subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, torture
and other forms of ill-treatment, as well as property confiscation, including
on account of individuals’ perceived anti-government opinion. Men of
military age are also at risk of being arrested for the purpose of forced
conscription upon return.
81
In a February 2020 report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) commented on the
unpredictability of current threats:
…The regime’s concept of who is an opponent is not always clear or – more
dangerously – can change over time, there is no certainty about who is safe
from arrest. While before the 2011 uprising the “red lines” of the politically
permissible were knowable for most Syrians, eight years into the conflict
very little can be taken for granted.
82
“Nearly everyone who returns will face some form of interrogation,” said Suhail al-Ghazi
Syrian researcher and expert on return dynamics. “Whether it’s a cup of tea with the
security agencies or a full-blown torture session, they want to know why people left.”
83
Twenty-one interviewees or their family members told Human Rights Watch they were
arbitrarily arrested and detained when they returned from Lebanon or Jordan to Syria. The
79
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, “Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A
Way Forward,” March 8, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/AWayForward_
DetentionInSyria.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), para. 10.
80
UNHCR, “International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,”
HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, March 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 20, 2021), p. 9.
81
Ibid., p. 113.
82
International Crisis Group, “Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon,” February 13, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248836/download (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 16.
July 16, 2021.
83
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Suhail al-Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Istanbul,
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majority were arrested at checkpoints controlled by a range of military factions and
security agencies, including: the Fourth Armored Division (the “Fourth Division”), an elite
division of the Syrian Armed Forces under the command of President Assad’s brother,
Maher al-Assad; Military Intelligence; the Army; and Air Force Intelligence. All returnees
from Jordan used formal border crossings and were either arrested immediately on their
return from Jordan, at the initial checkpoints between the two countries at Jaber in Jordan
and Naseeb in Syria, en route from the border checkpoint to their hometowns, or
sometimes – from a few days to a few months – after settling back into their lives in Syria.
Those returning from Lebanon interviewed by Human Rights Watch all used smuggling
routes, apart from three who used the GSO-facilitated returns process, or the July 2017
organized return facilitated by an agreement brokered by the Lebanese Shia
group Hezbollah.
84
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that people are required to present their ID at the
many government-controlled checkpoints that demarcate neighborhoods across
government-controlled areas of the country. Checkpoints are located at most entrances to
cities and towns and on major highways (highways to and from Lebanon, Damascus
airport, and the M5 motorway, which runs from the border with Jordan through Daraa,
Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo to the border with Turkey). Retaken areas have an
especially high density of checkpoints.
85
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that
people passing through checkpoints may be asked to show their ID card, their
reconciliation card (for those from retaken areas), and telephone to check the caller
history. Nasser, a 29-year-old man who returned from Irbid in Jordan to Daraa al-Balad at
the end of 2019, said that all the access routes to the city Daraa al-Balad have checkpoints
and that “they are very hard to cross.”
86
In the summer of 2021, the Syrian government
imposed a siege on Daraa al-Balad which was lifted two and a half months later, on
September 9.
87
84
For information about the Hezbollah-facilitated return agreement, see Hassan Abdullah, “Refugees return to Syria from
Lebanon in Hezbollah-mediated deal,” Reuters, July 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
lebanon-idUSKBN19X1Y6 (accessed August 11, 2021).
HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, March 2021, https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 20, 2021), p. 20.
85
UNHCR, “International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,”
86
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Nasser, February 7, 2021.
Washington Post, September 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-civil-war-
daraa/2021/09/18/fa637108-1593-11ec-a5e5-ceecb895922f_story.html.
87
Sarah Dadouch, “In the Cradle of the Syrian Revolution, Renewed Violence Shows Reconciliation Is Still Elusive,” The
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“There are checkpoints all around the entrance to the town but not inside the town,” said
Jawad, a 49-year-old man from Tel Shihab in Daraa who left Irbid in Jordan in August 2020.
“There are a lot of arrests in the checkpoints. The checkpoints always check the youth.”
88
Salam, a 26-year-old man from al-Jeza in Daraa, described how his brother, Karim,
returned from Jordan in April 2020 because of the lack of work opportunities in Irbid, a city
in the north of Jordan near the Syrian border. Salam obtained a security clearance for Karim
from the “National Security Agency” office in Daraa that stated Karim was not wanted by
any government security agency.
89
One month after returning to al-Jeza, Karim went to
Damascus, carrying his reconciliation document, to purchase items he needed to open a
restaurant in his hometown. He was arrested on the outskirts of Daraa at the Manket al-
Hatab checkpoint, jointly controlled by Military Intelligence and the Fourth Division:
He was arrested at this checkpoint because when he was in Jordan he used
to send money back to support his family via an exchange office in Daraa.
The head of this exchange office became a member of the Fourth Division
when the regime entered Daraa and gave all the names of people sending
money to Daraa [from Jordan] to the Fourth Division. My brother was
accused of sending money to support terrorism.
90
Desperate to find out the whereabouts of his brother, Salam paid US$8,000 in March 2021
to a senior ranking official who informed Salam that Karim had died in detention in Military
Intelligence Branch 235 in Damascus (known as the “Palestine Branch”).
91
In September 2020, Abdul, a 39-year-old man from Khael in Daraa, returned from Ramtha
in Jordan, as he had heard the war in his hometown was over and he wanted to see his
family and secure his lands again.
92
After a month, he went to Damascus with a friend,
curious to see his country’s capital city again. At the same Manket al-Hatab checkpoint,
soldiers from the Fourth Division arrested and detained him after they checked his ID. They
88
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Jawad, April 21, 2021.
89
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Salam, April 28, 2021.
90
Ibid.
91
For more on the “Palestine Branch,” see Human Rights Watch,
Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced
torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-torture-and-enforced-disappearances-syrias.
92
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abdul, July 1, 2021.
Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011
, July 3, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/
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took him to a Military Intelligence detention center in Sweida where he was tortured. He
was eventually taken to Branch 291 (Military Intelligence) detention center in Damascus
where he was also subjected to torture, deprived of adequate food and water, kept in
extremely crowded and unsanitary cell conditions, and accused of financing terrorism. He
was released after four months.
Under international law, detention is arbitrary when the detaining authority violates basic
rights of due process, including for a prompt hearing before a judge. Principle 11 of the UN
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment states that a detainee must be “given an effective opportunity to be heard
promptly by a judicial or other authority,” and that a judicial or other authority should be
empowered to review the decision to continue detention. Detention is also arbitrary if it
lacks a clear basis in domestic law or if the person is detained for exercising a basic right
such as free assembly.
A Note on Detention Sites
According to the former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the security forces
conducting the arrests did not provide any legal justification for their arrest and did not tell
the detainees where they were being taken. Interviewees told Human Rights Watch they
would find out the location of their detention by asking fellow detainees.
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, the Syrian government’s intelligence agencies
have subjected tens of thousands of individuals to arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention
using an extensive network of the detention facilities. The whereabouts of most of them
remains unknown and unacknowledged by the state. Syria’s intelligence agencies have
historically operated independently from each other with no clear boundaries to their
areas of jurisdiction.
93
The intelligence apparatus has a long history of detaining people
without arrest warrants and denying detainees other due process safeguards such as the
opportunity to judicially review the detention.
93
Human Rights Watch,
Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground
torture-and-enforced-disappearances-syrias.
Prisons since March 2011
, July 3, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-
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In charge of Syria’s network of detention facilities are the country’s four main intelligence
agencies, commonly referred to collectively as the
mukhabarat
:
•
•
•
•
The Department of Military Intelligence (Shu’bat al-Mukhabarat al-‘Askariyya);
The Political Security Directorate (Idarat al-Amn al-Siyasi);
The General Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma); and
The Air Force Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya).
94
Each of these four agencies maintains central branches in Damascus as well as regional,
city, and local branches across the country. In virtually all these branches there are
detention facilities of varying size. The intelligence agencies’ prisons are located in the
basements of their buildings. In addition to these unofficial basement prisons, they also
have other secret detention sites. There are no names on these buildings and they do not
have an accessible database of prisoners.
95
Military service
The evasion of conscription is one of the primary reasons men of draft age have fled Syria.
It is also one of the primary reasons they cannot return.
96
While evasion of military service is not a ground for refugee status per se, it can be the
basis for an asylum claim if the government imputes to the draft evader a political opinion
for which it would persecute that person, if the military in which a draftee would be
compelled to serve has systematically committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
other serious violations of international humanitarian or international human rights law, or
if the asylum seeker is a conscientious objector and there is no meaningful alternative to
compulsory military service for conscientious objectors.
97
While Syria has intermittently
Prisons since March 2011
, July 3, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-
torture-and-enforced-disappearances-syrias.
95
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a Syrian lawyer, July 2021.
94
Human Rights Watch,
Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground
96
Ahmad Araman and Shaza Loutfi, “Return to Syria after evading conscription,”
Forced Migration Review
62, October 2019,
https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/return/araman-loutfi.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021).
alternative service. See UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status related to Military
Service within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee,”
November 12, 2014, https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/44586/Guidelines+on+International+Protection+
No.+10/40911bf7-ed91-46fd-8b7c-b0c3bc43132d (accessed August 12, 2021), paras. 4, and 21-23. The Military Penal Code
stipulates that draft evasion is punished by imprisonment. See UNHCR, “Syria: Law No. 61 of 1950, as amended (Military
97
The right to conscientious objection is not legally recognized in Syria and there are no provisions for substitute or
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declared amnesties for military service evaders to encourage returns, returnees have
“found themselves back on conscription lists in as little as seven days, after the
government exploited a loophole in the decree,” according to an article by Ahmad Araman
and Shaza Loutfi in the Forced Migration Review, rendering the amnesty provisions
meaningless.
98
Twenty-one interviewees told Human Rights Watch they are wanted by Military Intelligence
for desertion and military service and could face arrest and detention at any time. Article
40 of the 1973 Constitution of Syria states, “Military service is compulsory and regulated
by law.”
99
Men between the ages of 18 to 42 are required to serve, and women may
enlist voluntarily.
100
Mona, a 25-year-old woman from Sayida Zeinab in Damascus, explained how her husband
deserted the Army in 2015 and the family sought refuge in Lebanon.
101
When her daughter
developed cancer and she could not afford the costs of surgery in Lebanon, Mona and her
husband decided to travel back to Syria in 2018 to try to find cheaper hospital care:
Somebody must have told the Army that we were back. At the beginning of
2018 the Military Intelligence came and arrested my husband. They told
us…they were taking him because he had deserted the Army in 2015. He
was imprisoned for nine months in al-Balona in Homs. He did the
reconciliation and agreed to re-enter the Army and then he was released.
Penal Code),” February 16, 2017, www.refworld.org/docid/58a5e1b34.html (accessed August 12, 2021), arts. 98-99. For the
full text of Law No. 61 of 1950, see People’s Assembly of Syria (
ﺐﻌﺸﻟا ﺲﻠﺠﻣ
), Syrian Arab Republic (
ﺔﯾرﻮﺴﻟا ﺔﯿﺑﺮﻌﻟا ﺔﯾرﻮﮭﻤﺠﻟا
),
“Legislative Decree 61 of 1950: Penal Code and Military Procedures” (
لﻮﺻأو تﺎﺑﻮﻘﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻗ
:
۱۹٥۰ مﺎﻌﻟ ٦۱ ﻲﻌﯾﺮﺸﺘﻟا مﻮﺳﺮﻤﻟا"
"ﺔﯾﺮﻜﺴﻌﻟا تﺎﻤﻛﺎﺤﻤﻟا
), March 13, 1950, http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=5585&cat=11811 (accessed
August 12, 2021).
98
Ahmad Araman and Shaza Loutfi, “Return to Syria After Evading Conscription,”
Forced Migration Review
62, October 2019,
https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/return/araman-loutfi.pdf (accessed August 11, 2021).
99
Syria’s Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, formally called the “Flag Service Law,” governs compulsory and reserve military
service, and was issued by President Bashar al-Assad on May 16, 2007. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy,
“TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law,” August 22, 2019, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/
(accessed August 12, 2021). For the full 1973 Constitution of Syria, see Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution
- 1973-2012,” December 5, 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en (accessed August 12, 2021).
deferrals for compulsory service for different categories of people, including certain types of students, individuals with
specialized degrees, and those suffering from temporary health conditions. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy,
“TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law,” August 22, 2019, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/
(accessed August 12, 2021).
100
Conscripts are required to serve for 18 to 21 months, depending on their level of education. The Conscription Law permits
101
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Mona, May 6, 2021.
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When he was released, I knew he had been beaten in prison, but my
husband didn’t want to give details as he was scared. After he left the
prison, he was serving in the Army and would come back to us for some
short leave days. This went on for maybe one or two years.
He was tortured during these years … and we saw this on his body. We
asked him about the torture, but he denied it because he had been
threatened not to talk about his experience. He refused to answer when I
asked him about the marks on his body. There were a lot of marks [bruises]
on his body, red and blue... He also had burns on his body. The Army gave
him little food and he lost weight. He was not allowed to take a bath during
the time he was in the Army and in the military prison. He had lice and
scabies. He was only allowed to go to the toilet once a day. It is all because
he deserted the Army previously.
102
Exemptions from military service are permitted for certain individuals, including those who
are the only male child in their families, those deemed unfit for health reasons, and those
who are residing abroad and who have paid an exemption fee.
103
Students can defer
recruitment temporarily. Shadi, a 31-year-old man with a physical disability from Busra al-
Harir in Daraa, was arbitrarily arrested and detained at a checkpoint on his way from Daraa
to Damascus to obtain the formalized exemption from military service as a result of a leg
amputation following an airstrike in his hometown of Busra al-Harir in Daraa in April 2013
after which he sought refuge in Jordan. After seven “relatively good” years in Jordan, Shadi
traveled back to Syria in November 2020 with his family during the Covid-19 pandemic:
I had to go to the military hospital number 601 in Damascus. I directly took
a taxi to Damascus. I went through a lot of checkpoints. One was the Fourth
Division; they investigated me and humiliated me but eventually they
released me after I gave them 5,000 Syrian pounds [equivalent of US$2].
102
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Mona, May 6, 2021.
103
Syria’s Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2007, formally called the “Flag Service Law,” governs compulsory and reserve military
service, and was issued on May 16, 2007 by President Bashar al-Assad. See The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy,
“TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law,” August 22, 2019, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/
(accessed August 12, 2021).
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The next checkpoint was Manket al-Hatab [jointly controlled by Military
Intelligence and the Fourth Division]. They searched me and did a security
clearance and took my ID and the officer told me I had to do military
service. I said I knew this and that I was on the way to the military hospital
to sort this situation out. He started to mock me by saying, “Who ate your
leg?” and “You are a terrorist.” I tried to explain, instead they beat me. I
showed them the exemption [a pass he had received from the military
branch office in Daraa] but they ignored it. Two officers kicked me and used
my crutch to beat me. They forced me to crawl on the floor to their car and
arrested me.
When I got in the car, they beat me and took me through Sweida Road to
the Military Intelligence center in Kafr Souseh in Damascus…I was
interrogated every day. They asked me silly questions like what I was eating
in Jordan. I kept saying if they didn’t want anything from me, they should
give me back my document and I could go to the military hospital. After one
week they started to electric shock the stump of my amputated leg.
104
After two and a half of months of torture in detention, Shadi said he was released onto a
street in Kafr Souseh and made his way back to Daraa with help from strangers.
Torture in detention
Most former detainees interviewed told Human Rights Watch they had been subjected to
physical and mental abuse, that appeared to amount to torture and inhuman and
degrading treatment during their detention and had witnessed the torture of others.
105
Most interviewees said they had been subjected to several forms of torture, from beatings
with metal rods or wooden sticks to electric shocks, often inflicted with escalating levels of
pain. At times detainees were forced to remain naked or in their underwear while they were
tortured. Several former detainees told Human Rights Watch they had witnessed people
dying from torture in detention.
104
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Shadi, June 15, 2021.
Torture), adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984),
entered into force June 26, 1987, acceded to by Syria on August 19, 2004,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx (accessed August 12, 2021), art. 1.
105
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against
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After Abdul from Khael in Daraa was arrested at Manket al-Hatab checkpoint (described
above on page 30), he was taken to a military security detention center in Sweida, where
he said he was beaten every day for the next three weeks:
The first day I was put in a wheel –
dulab
– I stayed like this for two
continuous days, day and night. After that I met with the investigator. He
was torturing me and interrogating me for eight days. He accused me of
funding the Free Syrian Army and the opposition… I don’t have enough
money for bread, how I can fund the opposition?
After 10 days they stopped interrogating but they kept beating me. I was
beaten every day three or four times… I was beaten with sticks, the back of
their weapons, water pipes... I was forced to sign documents and I don’t
know what was written on them [as I was blindfolded].
106
After 21 days in Sweida, Abdul was taken blindfolded to Branch 291 in Damascus,
where his torture became more extreme:
I was terrified. The detainees were like skeletons. … I was put in the
shabeh
.
107
They started to beat me on my chest and broke three bones on
my chest. I fainted. On the second day I wasn’t taken to be beaten but on
the third day I was taken to be tortured using electricity. They didn’t stop
again until I fainted. They hung me on the wall and threw water on me. They
put a clip on me and one on a lamp. They started the electricity and said it
wouldn’t stop until the lamp exploded.
This went on for 10 days. I did not rest at any time. I would wake up and
hear the screams of other people being tortured. I wasn’t asked any
questions, they harassed me, teased me. It was like we were toys for the
Military Intelligence guys. They just made fun of us. After 10 days they
106
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abdul, July 1, 2021. The
dulab
is a wheel or a tire where the victim is folded
at the waist and their head, neck, and legs are put into a car tire so that they are immobilized and cannot not protect
themselves from beatings on the back, legs, and head including by batons and whips.
completely suspend the victim in the air with the entire weight on a person’s wrists, causing extreme swelling and
discomfort.
107
The
Shabeh
is used to hang the victim from the ceiling by the wrists so that the toes barely touch the ground or to
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stopped torturing me. I was forced to clean the bathrooms. This went on for
four months. I was beaten from time to time with the back of the weapons.
The situation was awful. We didn’t eat every day. We had half a loaf of
bread every two days. Even the water from the bathrooms we were not
allowed to drink when we wanted to.
108
One day in April 2021, the Branch 291 guards told Abdul he was to be hanged, but
instead they took him in a car to the Hamidye market in Damascus and threw him
onto the street:
People were looking at me as if they recognized I was a detainee that was
just released. People felt sorry for me and offered me help. I couldn’t even
remember my name and I was in shock. People took a picture of me and put
it on social media — I don’t know where — so my family could find me. My
family found me and the people who helped me drove me to Daraa. I don’t
remember much about that day, just that when the sun rose, it was
a miracle.
109
Detainees are routinely tortured to extract confessions or forced to sign or fingerprint
declarations that they are not allowed to read.
110
Several interviewees told Human Rights
Watch they were given documents to sign during their abusive interrogations. Yasser, the
32-year-old man who returned to Syria through the Lebanese GSO returns process,
described how the Political Security section in Homs tortured him to extract a confession:
The officers forced me to take off all my clothes and forced me into a cell,
one meter by one meter. I was inside this cell for three days. I know
because they brought me food three times, once per day. After three days, I
was blindfolded and taken for investigation. They didn’t start with
questions. They cuffed my hands behind me and started beating me and
using electric cables on me. They broke the bone in my shoulder. My hand
108
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abdul, July 1, 2021.
109
Ibid.
110
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
March 2, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/report-independent-international-commission-inquiry-
syrian-arab-13 (accessed July 20, 2021), para 16.
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was swollen; I couldn’t move it, they kept cuffing me anyway. I was shocked
with electricity until I fainted. I was totally naked still. They put water on me
to wake me up.
111
Yasser said the interrogations started several days later. The interrogators started by trying
to force him to admit to being a terrorist. “I first tried to be honest and said I would never
harm anyone, that I was innocent,” he said. “I was so scared, but after all this torture,” he
said, “I agreed to everything they accused me of. They gave me the words, and then I
repeated it. They brought me five papers to sign. I couldn’t even glance at them, and I
couldn’t concentrate on them. I just signed the papers.”
112
Amina, a 31-year-old woman from Qalamoun in Syria, returned to Syria from Lebanon at the
beginning of 2018 because her mother was sick in Syria and her husband abused her.
113
Prior to fleeing Syria, Amina had supported the Free Syrian Army by cooking for them. Upon
her return to Syria, she said, a neighbor denounced her. One morning at 5 a.m., men in
military uniform broke into her home and took her to a detention center in Mezzeh in
Damascus. She was put into a one-meter-by-two-meter room with 13 other women, so
overcrowded they had to take turns to lie down to sleep. She was beaten in detention and
witnessed the rape of another woman:
We got so sick and we had lice. There was one toilet in the room. Every time
they brought food, they would insult us calling us a “whore” or a “bitch.”…
The way they treated me was a bit different. I was pregnant the whole time I
was in prison, maybe that is why I wasn’t too badly treated. My charges
were only cooking for the Free [Syrian] Army. Some women were charged
with kidnapping [military] officers and they went through a lot. For example,
they would throw water on them and shock them with electricity. One young
woman … was tied up and raped every day. For me they would use their
hands to take off my hijab and pull my hair. They would slap me and punch
me in the stomach.
114
111
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Yasser, May 6, 2021.
112
Ibid.
113
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Amina, April 30, 2021.
114
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Amina, April 30, 2021.
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Amina was imprisoned for six months. She said she was consumed with self-hatred after
her release and could not bear to think about remaining in Syria. Amina returned to
Lebanon with her children in April 2020.
Shadi from Busra al-Harir in Daraa governorate told Human Rights Watch that he was
forced to watch the torture of other detainees. He also witnessed one death in detention in
January 2021:
They took me to a watch an investigation of a 60-year-old man. They ran
electricity through his body. He tried to push himself off the floor to stop
the electricity flow, but he burned his hands. They beat him until he forgot
what his name was… They interrogated another man in front of me. He was
80 years old and he had diabetes and they electrocuted him. He was
blinded. He died in our cell a few days later. We begged [the prison guards]
to take the dead man but they waited three days before they took his
body out.
115
The ban against torture is one of the most absolute prohibitions in international human
rights law. No exceptional circumstances can justify torture. Syria is a party to key
international treaties that ban torture under all circumstances, even during recognized
states of emergency, and that require investigation and prosecution of those responsible
for torture.
116
When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the
civilian population, torture constitutes a crime against humanity under customary
international law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
117
115
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Shadi, June 15, 2021.
116
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, acceded to by Syria
on April 21, 1969, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (accessed August 12, 2021), arts. 4, 7.
Convention against Torture, adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, acceded to by Syria on August 19, 2004,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx (accessed August 12, 2021).
2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), art. 7. Syria signed,
although not ratified, the Rome Statute on November 29, 2000, and so is obliged to refrain from acts that would “defeat the
object and purpose of [the] treaty.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force
January 27, 1980, acceded to by Syria in 1970,
https://www.oas.org/legal/english/docs/Vienna%20Convention%20Treaties.htm (accessed August 12, 2021), art. 18.
117
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1,
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Enforced disappearances
Most of the detention cases documented by Human Rights Watch in this report can be
characterized as enforced disappearances. In international law this is when state agents or
other persons acting with the support of the state detain someone and then refuse to
acknowledge the detention or conceal the fate or whereabouts of the detained person.
118
In most of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the detainees’ families had no
information about their fate or whereabouts for weeks or, in some cases, months following
the arrest, despite their inquiries with various intelligence agencies. The authorities did
not allow detainees to have any contact with the outside world and left their families
wondering whether their detained relatives were alive or dead. Information was only
forthcoming when surreptitious payments were made to senior ranking officials; a family
member received an updated family booklet with the death of the detainee recorded; or
the individual was released from detention.
Zubeida, a 20-year-old woman from Qalamoun, returned to Syria from Arsal in Lebanon
with her husband in July 2017 as part of an agreement brokered by the Lebanese Shi’ite
group Hezbollah.
119
After two months in Syria, she traveled with her husband and child to
visit her in-laws in an area called al-Jarjir in Damascus governorate:
On our way to the town there was a checkpoint controlled by the Fourth
Division. They took my husband… He said to me, “Don’t worry, I’ll be back
in a few days.” ...The second day the army came to our house and asked,
“Where is your husband?” I said, “You took him.” They said, “No, we
didn’t.” I explained about the checkpoint, but they kept asking about my
husband. For months, we tried to find out about my husband. After nine
months or maybe one year, we heard he was in Saydnaya prison, but we
aren’t sure.
120
118
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICCPED), adopted December 20,
2006, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (2006), entered into force December 23, 2010, https://www.ohchr.org/en/
hrbodies/ced/pages/conventionced.aspx (accessed August 12, 2021), art. 2. Syria has not ratified the ICCPED.
Lebanon in Hezbollah-Mediated Deal,” Reuters, July 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
lebanon-idUSKBN19X1Y6 (accessed August 11, 2021).
120
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Zubeida, April 30, 2021.
119
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Zubeida, April 30, 2021; Hassan Abdullah, “Refugees Return to Syria from
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Halima from Homs told Human Rights Watch that her husband returned to Syria in February
2019 after he could not find sufficient work opportunities in Lebanon.
121
After returning to
their mostly destroyed and looted home in Eastern Ghouta, Halima’s husband disappeared
after being stopped at a checkpoint he needed to pass into order to reach his house. In
January 2020, Halima received an updated copy of her family booklet from the government
which stated that her husband had died in Homs in June 2019.
122
Widespread or systematic enforced disappearances, carried out as part of a state policy,
constitute a crime against humanity.
123
Human Rights Watch has previously documented
Syrian authorities’ systematic use of enforced disappearances, which frequently result in
torture, death, and the absence of any information about the victim.
124
Detention with Ransom Demands
Human Rights Watch documented three detentions, accompanied by ransom demands of
returnees perpetrated by Syrian security forces or affiliated militias.
Tariq, a 36-year-old returnee from Nafaa town in Daraa, traveled back from Jordan in
August 2020 and was arrested immediately after the initial border checkpoint at the
Naseeb border crossing between Jordan and Syria at a joint Army and Air Force Intelligence
checkpoint.
125
He was taken to an undisclosed location where members of what he
believed was the Syrian Army or an affiliated militia demanded a ransom from his father:
I was stopped at an Army and Air Force [Intelligence] checkpoint and they
asked me for 5,000 Syrian pounds. I gave them my money. They made the
taxi I was in go ahead for two kilometers where we met a big car with a lot of
military-looking people with guns. I didn’t know if they were from the Army
or militia, but they had a picture of Assad on the car and the [Syrian] flag.
121
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Halima, January 22, 2021.
122
The family booklet is the primary civil record in Syria, and the basis for
obtaining all other civil documents.
123
Rome Statute, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-
library/documents/rs-eng.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), art. 7.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/30/syria-talks-should-address-disappeared.
125
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tariq, April 28, 2021.
124
“Syria: Talks Should Address ‘Disappeared’
,
” Human Rights Watch news release, August 30, 2017,
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They stopped the car, and took my passport, money, and phone and told
the taxi driver to go. They put me in their car…
I didn’t realize it was a kidnapping until they started talking to my family…
They asked my father for US$30,000 and they gave him 10 days to get the
money…. My father could only gather $15,000… He said [to the kidnappers],
“If you ask for more, I will tell the government.” They laughed at this, and
told my father, “We are the government, we are everything here.” My father
explained he had no more money and eventually they accepted [the
$15,000]. I didn’t know where I was. It was 10 days, from August 13 to 23,
2020. The money was transferred to a bank account.
126
Spotlight on Daraa
Daraa occupies a special place in Syria’s recent turbulent history as the site of the first
– brutally suppressed – protests in March 2011 that ignited the uprising in the
country. Daraa remained under opposition control until 2018, when the Syrian-
Russian military alliance launched a devastating air bombardment campaign that
displaced more than 270,000 civilians.
127
Unlike other areas retaken by the Syrian
government, in these areas, there was a proliferation of Russian-mediated
reconciliation agreements, and guaranteed deals between anti-government
commanders and the Syrian government. These deals allowed most anti-government
fighters to remain with their light arms, provided a vetting process to clear people of
charges by the intelligence branches, and deferred conscription for six months for
those still required to serve in the military. In return, people who chose to remain had
to sign a document indicating they would not be involved in anti-government
activities.
Former residents and experts said the result of these deals was that Daraa
governorate was divided up by various security forces, including the Army and the
126
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tariq, April 28, 2021.
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/cradle-syrias-revolution-daraa-ten-years?amp=1 (accessed August 12, 2021).
127
Tabitha Sanders, “The Cradle of Syria's Revolution: Daraa Ten Years On,” The New Arab, March 23, 2021,
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National Defense Forces, various intelligence branches, and a newly created Fifth
Division which consists of former members of the Free Syrian Army.
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that following the Russian-backed ceasefire
agreement in 2018, and despite fighters with the opposition “settling their status”
with the government or being allowed safe passage to Idlib as part of that agreement,
targeting of opposition groups and individuals continued and a general
destabilization remained. Interviewees from Daraa told Human Rights Watch that
members of the Syrian security forces, pro-government militia, and opposition groups
were involved in targeted killings and kidnappings, and that life in Daraa is
characterized by an extreme sense of insecurity and fear, with restrictions on
movements after sunset. Rashad, a 32-year-old man from Um al-Mayaden in Daraa,
returned in February 2020 from Jordan as he wanted to see his family again:
The security situation is so bad. Every morning there is news of
assassinations and kidnappings. We see corpses on the street, and no
one knows who the family is to let them know their relative is dead. We
stay in our houses in the evenings, we are all scared. There is no
curfew, but we are scared to go outside. The checkpoint on the border
of the town is for the Military Intelligence. [The officers] do security
clearances if people want to leave and enter the area and they harass
us. When people started to come back to the town—IDPs and
refugees—the Military Intelligence officers at the checkpoint would
take bribes to allow people to come into the town. The town is
controlled by the regime. I can move relatively freely in and out of the
town because I have this document that says I do not need to serve [in
the military] whereas other people who need to serve must avoid
the checkpoints.
128
“We don’t know who carries out the assassinations, but we know they are with the
regime,” said Adnan, a 59-year-old man from al-Mzaireb in Daraa who left Jordan in
128
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rashad, June 30, 2021.
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January 2019. “They are targeting members of the Free [Syrian] Army. They come on
motorbikes and do the assassinations with their face covered and then flee.”
129
Hoda, a 50-year-old widow from Um al-Mayadin in Daraa, returned from Jordan to Syria
with her son’s family in July 2020, as her son could no longer afford to support his
family living in Jordan.
130
Her son had worked with the Free Syrian Army for two months
in 2013 before he sought refuge with his mother in Jordan:
When we [Hoda and her son and his family] arrived in Daraa, our house
was ruined. We stayed in my uncle’s house for around two-to-three
months… In December 2020 it was very cold. My son was sitting in the
front door with his cousins. I invited them inside to warm up. They
joked and teased me. While I was making the tea, I heard the sound of
a bullet. I went to see what happened. I found my son lying on the
ground dead. His cousins said it was [members of the] Military
Intelligence agency who had come and shot him. He was 30 when he
was killed.
I didn’t see anything, but after the funeral, our neighbor came to our
house and told me it was Military Intelligence and it wasn’t just my
son, but a lot of men with the Free [Syrian] Army were killed by the
Military Intelligence. It was two men on a motorcycle that assassinated
him. My neighbor and my son’s cousins told me this. They were
wearing black masks. He was shot twice in the head, four times in his
chest, and twice in his right knee. The men didn’t say anything while
he was shot. They came quickly and escaped quickly.
131
On June 24, 2020, the Syrian government and its Russian ally imposed a siege on the
city of Daraa al-Balad, blocking the entry of food and other basic necessities and
intermittently shutting off electricity and water. The government also cut off main
129
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Adnan, March 26, 2021.
130
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Hoda, April 23, 2021.
131
Ibid.
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roads connecting areas controlled by anti-government groups with the rest of Daraa
governorate. The siege was lifted on September 9, 2021. The security situation in the
governorate remains unstable.
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Reconciliation, Security Clearances, and “Wanted” Lists
Returnees described a range of vetting processes they were required to undertake before
and after their return to Syria, including “reconciling” with the government, checking their
names against “wanted” lists, and being subjected to a security clearance. While
seemingly separate processes, returnees told Human Rights Watch that it was not always
clear that a distinction existed among them.
Despite most interviewees undertaking one or all of these processes, they still faced
persecution and other human rights violations on their return to Syria.
Reconciliation: Those who wish to return to Syria, particularly those returning from
opposition or former opposition areas, or who left the country without official documents
or permission, must “settle their status” and sign a so-called “reconciliation” document,
which, according to a report by the Syrian Association for Citizen’s Dignity, speaks of
“addressing the situation of Syrians who left the country illegally, due to the current
circumstances and...settling their military conscription and other security issues,
regardless of the circumstances that compelled them to leave.”
132
UNHCR has further explained that “settling one’s status” (
taswiyat al-wada)
involves a
vetting process by the security agencies that reviews “the individuals’ previous opposition
activities such as participation in anti-government protests, humanitarian activities,
fighting with anti-government armed groups, or other activities considered by the
government as ‘terrorism.’”
133
UNHCR adds that returnees seeking to settle their status are
required to pledge to abstain from any opposition activities in the future.
134
Suhail al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher, told Human Rights Watch that while the reconciliation
process was originally meant for those returning to retaken areas, the reality is that most
and Minimum Conditions for Return,” July 2020, https://syacd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/SACD_WE_ARE_SYRIA_EN.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 25.
132
Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, “We are Syria: Survey of 1,100 Displaced Syrians on the Reasons for Displacement
March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 17, 2021), p. 105.
134
Ibid., p. 105.
133
UNHCR, "International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,”
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returnees are forced to settle their status and provide personal information to
the government:
If the person says, “I left illegally,” [the Syrian authorities] immediately say,
“You need to settle your status and do the reconciliation.” If the person
says, “I left legally with my passport,” they will mostly say, “You still have
to settle your status and do a reconciliation.” It doesn’t matter anymore if
you are going back to a retaken area or a reconciled area.
135
All interviewees who returned from Jordan to Syria using the formal border crossings at
Jaber/Naseeb had to settle their status through a reconciliation document – terms they
used interchangeably – at the Syrian Embassy in Amman. Most male interviewees who
returned through Jaber/Naseeb had to “reconcile” (settle their status) with the government
both at the Syrian border checkpoint and at the embassy. Only one woman who crossed
through these checkpoints was also asked to reconcile.
Security clearances and “wanted” lists: A security clearance is essentially a background
check through which the Syrian authorities check a person’s name to see if they are
considered a security threat or on any security agency’s “wanted” list. Individuals can also
organize their own security check, by paying a middleman — essentially a broker — to
check a name against a list. Suhail al-Ghazi, told Human Rights Watch:
The [person] will send a photo of their ID and the broker will check the
name. It is a kind of security clearance process; this broker takes money for
the service. The broker is doing work for the regime. And the broker then
says, “You need to pay money to clear your name. I will be able to protect
you. If [the authorities] do anything to you, I will get you out. But this does
not guarantee an individual will not face a security interrogation.”
136
“The security clearance is extra-legal, and most people just pay someone to check for their
names on a list,” said Walid al-Nofal, an independent reporter. “There is no centralized
July 16, 2021.
136
Ibid.
135
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Suhail al-Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Istanbul,
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database for ‘wanted’ lists; if you do one security clearance, it will not necessarily include
all agencies. Some people did a clearance and then people make reports about them, and
they get arrested.”
137
A Syrian lawyer based in Daraa confirmed the extra-legal nature of both the security
clearance and the reconciliation process, saying that they violate the Syrian Constitution.
He attributed this to its political roots:
The reconciliation started as a treaty between the regime and the
opposition inside Syria. It was backed by the Russians, but the Russians
escaped from what they promised. The reconciliation is to stop the security
agencies chasing people for what they did before 2018, but what happened
is that the regime kept searching for people and investigating them. The
Russians did not hold the regime accountable for the way in which it
continued to pursue people who had “reconciled.”
138
In July 2018, the head of Air Force Intelligence, Jamil Hassan, stated in a private meeting
reported on by an opposition-affiliated news outlet that there were 3 million names on
Syria’s wanted lists, representing 12.5 percent of the pre-war population.
139
In addition to
those wanted for military conscription, wanted lists are said to include people believed to
have been involved in opposition-related activities, which range from protesting to
working in media or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights activists
and local administrative officials under opposition control.
Yasmina, a 40-year-old woman from Busra al-Harir in Daraa, told Human Rights Watch that
she could only return to Syria with her children and without her husband because despite
having completed his military service he had his name checked on the “wanted lists” and
found out he is wanted by the Syrian military.
140
137
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Walid al-Nofal, reporter, June 14, 2021.
138
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a Syrian lawyer, July 1, 2021.
139
“Jamil al-Hassan: Any and All Opposition Will Be Eliminated,” The Syrian Observer, August 2, 2018, https://syrian
140
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasmina, February 2, 2021.
observer.com/features/19769/jamil_hassan_any_all_opposition_will_be_eliminated.html (accessed August 12, 2021).
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Suhail al-Ghazi told Human Rights Watch that while there may be a centralized database of
wanted lists, different intelligence branches maintain their own lists. “Since 2011 there are
computers at checkpoints where [the checkpoint security officers] type in the name of the
person and they arrest them if the name appears.”
141
“Contrary to official statements welcoming refugees’ return,” UNHCR said in its March 2021
update, “government officials are reported to have made public threats against refugees,
indicating that those perceived to have been disloyal to the government are
not welcome.”
142
All refugees returning from Jordan to Syria that Human Rights Watch interviewed said they
had to undertake a security clearance at the Syrian embassy in Amman. One interviewee
from Lebanon completed a “security clearance” organized through the General Security
Organization (GSO)-facilitated returns process before returning. The rest of those
interviewed from Lebanon used smuggling routes to return to Syria.
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that before returning to Syria, they checked their
names against wanted lists in their area of origin. Despite undertaking these myriad
vetting processes, returnees faced violations and persecution on return to Syria.
Hassan, a 61-year-old man from Homs who is on dialysis for his kidneys, decided to return
from Lebanon after his wife was refused residency through a sponsor. She left before him
in May 2019 and checked his name against the wanted lists:
My wife went to Syria in May 2019 and she asked about me with the Syrian
security agencies. And all of them said there is no record and that I could
come back safely. In December 2019, I left [at the official Lebanese border
crossing point, Masnaa] and arrived at the Syrian border entry point.
Immediately, the Syrian border guards took me to a small room, and said I
am wanted by the Palestine security branch.
143
141
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Suhail al-Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Istanbul,
July 16, 2021.
142
UNHCR, “International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic – Update VI,”
March 2021, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/606427d97.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 112.
143
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Hassan, January 22, 2021.
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Hassan said the Syrian border guards took his ID, shoes, and money, left him in a one-by-
one meter room without a chair for six hours, and told him he would be taken away to be
tortured. “I told them I was sick… I requested a chair, but they refused. I fainted after six
hours.” Hassan was eventually allowed to leave the Syrian border checkpoint after paying
a bribe to the Syrian border guards and return to Lebanon. He now lives alone in Tripoli,
without legal residency, while his wife and daughter live in Syria.
144
There is no clear, legal procedure for Syrian refugees to check their “wanted” status inside
Syria or to obtain a reliable security clearance through the authorities. The reconciliation
process has snowballed from its original purpose of permitting opposition fighters to settle
their status with the government to another bureaucratic and insidious process for the
Syrian government to collect information on its citizens as a means of intimidation,
repression of dissent, and control. Despite assurances to the contrary, none of these extra-
legal processes protect a returnee from persecution.
144
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Hassan, January 22, 2021.
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Survival Inside Syria
The foundation of international refugee law is the principle of nonrefoulement: that no
person can be returned to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened on
account of their beliefs or identity. International human rights law provides broader
protections against forced return to places where returnees would face threats to life,
freedom, or physical integrity. Human Rights Watch documented economic and
humanitarian conditions, including widespread property destruction inside Syria, that in
aggregate can threaten returnees’ rights to life, physical integrity, and dignity. In addition
to protecting Syrians from being returned to face violence, torture, and persecution,
Human Rights Watch calls on all countries hosting Syrians to halt all forced returns to Syria
because of the inhuman and degrading conditions returnees also will likely face that can
threaten their rights to life, freedom, and physical integrity.
Property destruction
In January 2021, the country director of the Danish Refugee Council, Victor Velasco,
reflected on the scale of physical destruction in Syria, saying, “I have worked in the
humanitarian sector in more than 20 countries, and I have never seen anything like
this.”
145
The large-scale destruction is in large part the result of thousands of unlawful and
indiscriminate strikes, including on civilian infrastructure protected under law, by Syrian
government forces, with the support of their allies, Russia and Iran. Similarly, the US-led
anti-ISIS global coalition has also conducted many strikes in northeast Syria, including
indiscriminate and apparently unlawful attacks that killed civilians.
UNHCR stated in its March 2021 update that “the large-scale damage and destruction of
cities, towns and neighborhoods in retaken areas, and lack of reconstruction, have been
identified as a further obstacle to returns, with some areas remaining largely
depopulated.”
146
Areas that were under opposition control have been specifically targeted
for violations of land and property rights, according to a policy briefing by Pax for Peace in
matters/current-affairs/2021/1/the-level-of-destruction-in-syria-is-overwhelming/ (accessed August 12, 2021).
145
Danish Refugee Council, “The Level of Destruction in Syria is Overwhelming,” January 5, 2021, https://drc.ngo/it-
146
UNHCR, “International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update VI,”
March 2021, HCR/PC/SYR/2021/06, https://www.refworld.org/docid/606427d97.html (accessed July 20, 2021), pp. 48-49.
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March 2020. That briefing cited expropriation of property through legal measures as being
among the means the authorities use to violate housing, land, and property rights.
147
In addition to the widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure, Human Rights
Watch has previously documented that the Syrian government passed laws and policies to
confiscate property without due process or compensation, further preventing refugees
from returning. These include Law 10 of 2018, which ostensibly allows the government to
seize property and develop it, and the Counterterrorism Law of 2012, which the
government has used to punish entire families by arbitrarily placing them on a list of
alleged terrorists and freezing their assets.
148
In January 2021, the Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic reported:
At least 40 laws relating to housing, land and property have been passed
since 2011, indicating a systematic push to reorganize the management of
property rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, while raising concerns
regarding the ability of all Syrians with property interests, in particular the
displaced and refugee populations, to secure their rights.
149
In the same report, the Commission noted that 11.5 million people had been displaced by
the conflict and cited several sources on the extent of property damage:
In its most recent public update, in 2016, the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) placed the number of damaged
housing units in Syrian cities at 760,000. In 2017, the World Bank
estimated that 7 percent of the housing stock had been destroyed and 20
percent damaged, and, in a survey conducted in 2019 of conflict-induced
147
Pax for Peace, “Violations of Housing, Land and Property Rights: An Obstacle to Peace in Syria,” March 2020, https://
paxforpeace.nl/media/download/policybrief-syria-hlp-2020-english-10-03-2020.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 3.
syrias-new-property-law; “Syria: Suspects’ Families Assets Seized: Collective Punishment of Relatives Under Overbroad
Terrorism Law,” July 16, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/16/syria-suspects-families-assets-seized.
149
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
148
“Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law,” Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-
A/HRC/46/54, February 2021, https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/46/54 (accessed August 12, 2021), para. 44.
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damage covering 16 cities and towns, more than 125,000 damaged or
destroyed buildings were identified.
150
Out of the 65 returnees from Lebanon and Jordan interviewed by Human Rights Watch, 39
found their homes back in Syria partially or completely destroyed or looted, with
household items from furniture to kitchen appliances, electric wires to plumbing pipes,
stolen. Many could not afford the costs of renovation and were forced to live in relatives’
homes while they tried to rebuild their properties. Most people interviewed by Human
Rights Watch could not afford to renovate all their property and confined the works to one
or two rooms and lived in these limited rebuilt spaces. All said that the Syrian government
did not provide any support.
When Yasser traveled back to Homs in December 2019, he found his house completely
destroyed:
I was terrified that first night. The house was ruined. We had no electricity
and at night we heard people driving by and shooting in the air to terrify the
people. There was hardly anyone in our town. Our house was totally
destroyed. No rooms had survived. We stayed outside, there was nowhere
for us to stay inside.
151
When Yunis, a 30-year-old doctor, could not find a medical job in either Jordan or Lebanon,
he returned to his hometown in Syria, Daraa al-Balad, to offer his services there. He was
not prepared for the devastation upon his return:
I couldn’t believe the area when I arrived. It was totally ruined. You couldn’t
live there. I entered an area called al-Wadi. The people were depressed and
exhausted. I started crying. The media didn’t portray it like this. When the
taxi stopped in the road, I didn’t know how to go to my house. I had to call
150
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/46/54, February 2021, https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/46/54 (accessed August 12, 2021), para. 43.
151
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasser, January 25, 2021.
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my father to come and pick me up as I couldn’t recognize the way even
though I had lived there for 20 years.
152
Qadir, a 57-year-old man from Busra al-Harir in Daraa, decided to return from Ramtha in
Jordan to Syria because he could no longer afford the cost of living in Jordan. Before the
war he had enjoyed a decent standard of living in Syria as a car salesman. When he
returned, he could not live in either of the two houses he owned before the war:
Our two houses were destroyed and looted. The Air Force intelligence and
the al-Nimr militia [Tiger Forces] stole everything from our houses. These
were the forces that entered the area [in Daraa]. Even the doors and
windows were taken. Now we live in a rented house. We do not
feel secure.
153
Halima’s husband returned to Ghouta alone in February 2019. The authorities prevented
him from reclaiming his house and forced him to make an application through an
intelligence agency and back-pay all the utility bills. “He needed to back-pay all the bills of
the house,” she said, “even though we weren’t there for years and it had been used by
other people.”
154
Halima’s husband was later arrested at a checkpoint and died in detention.
The “Pinheiro Principles,” a widely agreed-upon set of United Nations’ principles on
housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced people, are premised on the
idea that “people displaced by forces beyond their control should never face the prospect
of losing their housing, land or property rights simply because they were violently forced to
leave or otherwise fled an insecure situation in search of protection.”
155
While non-binding,
the Pinheiro Principles underpin the right to housing and property restitution as “a core
remedy to displacement.” They encompass additional protections that apply in this
152
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yunis, February 24, 2021.
153
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Qadir, March 4, 2021.
154
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Halima, January 22, 2021.
155
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, “The Pinheiro Principles: United Nations Principles on Housing and Property
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons,” undated, https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/
organization/99774.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 3.
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situation, including protection from discrimination toward returnees and a requirement
that legislation covering housing, land, and restitution is not discriminatory and is
transparent and consistent. The Pinheiro Principles also ensure the equal right of men and
women, and the equal right of boys and girls, to housing. If a refugee or displaced person
is unlawfully or arbitrarily denied their property, the Pinheiro Principles hold they are
entitled to submit a claim for restitution from an independent and impartial body.
Principle 12 of the Pinheiro Principles states that “states should establish and support
equitable, timely, independent, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures,
institutions and mechanisms to assess and enforce housing, land and property restitution
claims,” and:
Where there has been a general breakdown in the rule of law, or where
States are unable to implement the procedures, institutions and
mechanisms necessary to facilitate the housing, land and property
restitution process in a just and timely manner, States should request the
technical assistance and cooperation of relevant international agencies in
order to establish provisional regimes for providing refugees and displaced
persons with the procedures, institutions and mechanisms necessary to
ensure effective restitution remedies.
156
In line with the Pinheiro Principles and international human rights law, the Syrian
government should set up a land and property restitution mechanism that provides for full
and fair restitution of property or compensation for all residents impacted by land and
property issues. The land and property restitution mechanism should be objective, clear,
accessible, and transparent and not discriminate on the basis a person’s displacement
either as a refugee or internally, or according to their age, socio-economic status, gender,
disability, political views, nationality, or religion. The right to housing and property
restitution should not be made conditional on the physical return of someone who has
been displaced from their home or place of habitual residence.
‘Pinheiro Principles,’” March 2007, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4693432c2.html (accessed July 26, 2021), p. 57.
156
Inter-Agency, “Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Implementing the
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Economic devastation
According to a March 2021 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) report, nearly 20 percent of
recently displaced Syrian IDPs cited economic deterioration as a significant push factor in
their displacement. NRC noted that 32 percent of those who were displaced in January
2021 said it was due to lack of access to basic services and 28 percent said it was due to
economic deterioration.
157
As of February 2021, at least 12.4 million Syrians, out of an estimated population of around
16 million, were food insecure, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), an alarming
increase of 3.1 million in one year.
158
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
WFP estimate that 46 percent of Syrian households have cut down on their daily food
rations, and 38 percent of adults have reduced their consumption to ensure that children
have enough to eat.
159
WFP reported in October 2020 that “internally displaced people and
returnees…reported worse food security levels than less vulnerable groups in Syria.”
160
In March 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that a deepening economic crisis, coupled
with the significant destruction of infrastructure over a decade of conflict had led to severe
wheat shortages.
161
The Syrian government’s failure to fairly and adequately address a
bread crisis brought on by a decade of armed conflict is forcing millions of Syrians to
go hungry.
Many of those interviewed for this report faced devastating economic circumstances on
their return to Syria and struggled to meet their most basic needs and access services.
Karida, a 32-year-old woman from western Ghouta who returned from Lebanon to Syria at
the end of 2019 with her family, told Human Rights Watch that her family could not pay for
157
NRC, “The Darkest Decade: What Displaced Syrians Face If the World Continues to Fail Them,” March 2021,
https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/2021-darkest-decade/darkest-decade/the-darkest-decade.pdf (accessed
September 16, 2021).
158
“12.4 m people food insecure in war-torn Syria: WFP,” Arab News, February 13, 2021,
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1808661/middle-east (accessed August 12, 2021).
159
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), “Syria at War: Eight Years On,” January 2021.
https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pdf/syria-at-war-report-en.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 33.
2020,” October 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000120093-compressed.pdf
(accessed August 12, 2021), p. 6.
160
World Food Programme, “The Socio-Economic Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the Syrian Arab Republic, April – June
161
“Syria: Bread Crisis Exposes Government Failure Bakeries Destroyed; Discriminatory Policies Exacerbate Wheat
Shortage,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 21, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/21/syria-bread-crisis-
exposes-government-failure.
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rent or for utilities to heat her house, and reached the point where they could no longer
afford bread:
We were eventually evicted because we couldn’t pay the rent. We moved
into my grandmother’s house, but still we couldn’t survive. We had no food
and could not afford transport. Everything closed at 4 p.m. I was scared to
go out after that. There was no electricity. We couldn’t find bread to eat.
There were queues for bread... It was 1,000 Syrian pounds (US$1.58
162
),
which is more than my husband gets in a day for work. I asked my husband
to look to rent a house outside Daraya, but the rent was too high (about
150,000 Syrian pounds or US$237)… I was saying to my husband, “Why did
you bring us here, there is nothing here.”… There was nothing for the
children, no support, and no education.
163
Karida eventually returned to Lebanon with her children in 2020 as she could not afford to
re-establish a life of dignity in Syria and wanted to ensure an education for her children.
Sahar, a 47-year-old woman from Tariq al-Sad in Daraa, said she returned from Jordan to
her home in Syria with her husband to be next to her son’s grave. But she said that upon
her return to her home in Tariq al-sad, an opposition area, “I couldn’t recognize the area, I
couldn’t renovate my house because it was totally destroyed.” She moved into her
brother’s house but has not been able to make ends meet:
Our lives are like death, although death might be better. There is no fuel, no
electricity, no essential things for livelihood, we don’t get anything without
suffering. The most heartbreaking thing I witness are mothers who can’t
find milk for their children, and they can’t breastfeed because they are not
well-nourished.
164
official exchange rate. See “Hourly black market exchange rates and gold prices in Syria by city,” Karam Shaar, undated,
https://www.karamshaar.com/exchange-rates (accessed October 1, 2021).
163
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Karida, January 28, 2021.
164
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sahar, March 4, 2021.
162
In October 2019 the unofficial exchange rate was at 634 Syrian Pounds to US$1, and at 515 Syrian Pounds to US $1 at the
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Sahar said that people are living in makeshift tents stretched across their ruined houses
and use scraps of plastic and wood to heat their tents. She said that breathing toxic smoke
makes the children sick. “When the kids suffocate from the smell of the fire,” she said,
“there are no hospitals in the area.” She said the only hospitals are in government-
controlled areas.
165
Human Rights Watch interviewed Maysa, a 76-year-old woman from Damascus
Countryside, together with her daughter Safa. Maysa returned to Syria from Lebanon in
2018, and explained how terrible the situation was on their return:
[Maysa]: We went back to our home village [in Damascus Countryside]. The
situation was terrifying. It was completely ruined. There was no electricity.
The transport was like 70 years ago… The houses were ruined. People were
trying to renovate their homes… We didn’t have real windows and doors. It
was so cold. People were freezing in their homes. There was no electricity;
it came for one hour and then cut off for six.
[Safa]: My mother is very old. My brother has a psychosocial disability, he
couldn’t work. I couldn’t make bread at home. The bread was so expensive.
The [cooking] gas came every four months… We were getting food baskets
of oil, rice, spaghetti, butter, bulgar, seeds, salt, and sugar once every three
months. It was not sufficient. It was enough for one month. We don’t know
the name of the organization that was giving the basket.
166
Maysa and Safa returned to Lebanon at the end of 2020 because they could not afford the
cost of living inside Syria.
Rasha, a 57-year-old woman also from Damascus Countryside, returned to her hometown
in 2018, as she had heard that the situation had improved inside Syria, and she was
struggling to survive in Lebanon. She found a far worse situation upon her return:
165
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sahar, March 4, 2021.
166
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Maysa and Safa, February 1, 2021.
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We had heard the situation [in Damascus Countryside] was better, but the
situation was terrible. It was hard because we stayed at my son-in-law’s
house in Deir ez-Zour and felt we were a heavy burden. We couldn’t stay at
our house because it was ruined. There were a lot of walls broken. We tried
to renovate the house, but we couldn’t. There was no electricity. We were
boiling water to drink. There were no shops. No pharmacies. No bakeries.
The bread was bad. Even if we found dough, it was bad and at a very high
price. My husband and daughter had to go to Damascus to get medicine for
my sons. They had to wait for hours in the day for the buses. It was
impossible to find work in Damascus because there was no transport to go
there, just one bus.
167
Bribery and Extortion
Members of the Syrian security agencies in government-controlled areas demand bribes in
exchange for safe passage through government-controlled checkpoints. A February 2020
International Crisis Group (ICG) report noted that “militia fighters manning checkpoints
positioned on strategic roads levy illegal fees on travelers and transporters of goods, and
exact bribes from young men on the threat of conscription or arrest.”
168
Interviewees told
Human Rights Watch they paid bribes ranging from 500 to 10,000 Syrian pounds (at US
$0.40 to US $7.96 at the official exchange rate and US $0.14 to $2.90 at the unofficial
exchange rate) with the average being approximately 5,000 Syrian pounds (at US $3.98 at
the official exchange rate and US $1.44 at the unofficial exchange rate).
169
Interviewees
told Human Rights Watch that they were often asked to pay a “sweetener” to pass through
the checkpoint with relative ease.
Dawud, a 49-year-old man from Damascus, returned to Syria to try to rebuild a life for
himself and to prepare for the return of his family, who waited in Lebanon while he
returned in September 2019.
167
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rasha, February 1, 2021.
en/file/local/2024712/211-easing-syrian-refugees-plight-in-lebanon.pdf (accessed August 12, 2021), p. 23.
168
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon,” February 13, 2020, https://www.ecoi.net/
169
In October 2021 the unofficial exchange rate was at 3,462 Syrian Pounds to US$1, and 1,257 Syrian pounds to US $1 at the
official exchange rate. See “Hourly black market exchange rates and gold prices in Syria by city,” Karam Shaar, undated,
https://www.karamshaar.com/exchange-rates (accessed October 1, 2021).
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When I had to pass through checkpoints, they [the security officers at the
checkpoint] would ask for bribes to pass, for example, between 1,000 and
2,000 Syrian pounds, which doesn’t seem much, but I had to pass through
so many. There are a lot of checkpoints… The difficulty was that I didn’t
work in the same place and I had to go many different places. I had to pay
the checkpoints all the time… Sometimes they let people go at the
checkpoint but sometimes they arrest people and take them away and no
one knows where they are.
170
Human Rights Watch found that bribes were commonly levied at checkpoints on the road
from the Jordan-Syria border crossing to Daraa. There are approximately five checkpoints
controlled by various security agencies on this road. Refugees returning from Lebanon
avoided these checkpoints by paying smugglers to circumvent them.
Jawad, a 49-year-old man from Tel Shihab in Daraa, returned with his family to Daraa from
Irbid in Jordan in August 2020. His children worked to help support the family in Jordan
and he wanted to send them back to school in Syria. He had heard the situation had
calmed and that there were no more live clashes:
Our way back to Daraa was not straightforward. Every checkpoint [from
Nasib checkpoint to Daraa] wanted money from us, between 500 and
10,000 Syrian pounds. The checkpoints belonged to the Military Security,
Air Force Security, Political Security, and the Fourth Division. We were
insulted with [security agency officers] saying that the country is only for
people who love Assad. We were cursed. They said, “If you don’t pay, we
will harm you and your family.” One military man put his hand in my pocket
and took all my money. The most savage checkpoint was the Fourth
Division. They forced us to give the most money. The military man who took
money from my pocket was from the Fourth Division.
171
In addition to the unofficial and illegal bribes extorted at checkpoints, the Syrian
government insists that each Syrian national entering Syria must exchange US$100 for
170
Human Rights Watch in-person interview with Dawud, March 30, 2021.
171
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Jawad, April 21, 2021.
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Syrian pounds at the official rate.
172
The policy was put in place in July 2020, ostensibly to
help the government replenish its foreign currency reserves amid an unprecedented
economic crisis.
173
But in reality, it has only added another obstacle to prevent Syrians
from returning.
174
The policy was partially overturned in early April 2021 to exempt displaced people.
175
Human Rights Watch also documented instances where returnees were forced to hand over
US$100 per individual when they crossed the Nasib border crossing and did not receive
the equivalent in Syrian pounds back. Rashad, a 41-year-old man from Tafas in Daraa who
returned to Syria from Amman in Jordan with his wife and three children in September
2020, said that Syrian border guards demanded US$500 from him at the Nasib crossing.
“This was not to exchange [for Syrian pounds] but just for them, but I didn’t mind as long
as they let me enter Syria.”
176
Payment for Information about Missing Loved Ones
Interviewees consistently told Human Rights Watch that they had to pay vast sums of
money to government officials, including judges and high-ranking security officers, to
obtain information about family members in detention. In April 2021, Syria Untold, an
independent digital media outlet, investigated the practice of extorting the families of
detainees arrested and detained by members of the security services and its forces:
After the arrest and the family’s realization their relative is not coming
home, they have two options. The first is to pay members of the security
services, whether directly or indirectly, in order to get information about
their relative or relatives. The second is to wait for another detainee to get
172
“Statement from the Ministry of Finance on the Council of Minister’s Decision That Returning Syrians Exchange $100 or its
173
Sara Kayyali, “Syria’s 100 Dollar Barrier to Return,” commentary, Human Rights Watch dispatch, September 23, 2020,
Equivalent in Foreign Currencies” (
وأ رﻻود
100
نﯾﻣدﺎﻘﻟا نﯾﯾروﺳﻟا فﯾرﺻﺗﺑ ﻲﺿﺎﻘﻟا ءارزوﻟا سﻠﺟﻣ رارﻗ لوﺣ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻣﻟا
ﺔﯾﺑﻧﺟﻷا تﻼﻣﻌﻟا نﻣ ﺎﮭﻟدﺎﻌﯾ ﺎﻣ
), SANA, July 11, 2020, http://sana.sy/?p=1182666 (accessed August 12, 2021).
ةرازوﻟ نﺎﯾﺑ
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/23/syrias-100-dollar-barrier-return.
174
Ibid.
Observer, April 7, 2021, https://syrianobserver.com/news/65235/certain-citizens-are-exempted-from-exchanging-100-
dollars-as-a-condition-to-enter-their-own-country.html (accessed August 12, 2021).
176
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rashad, June 30, 2021.
175
“Certain Citizens Are Exempted from Exchanging 100 Dollars as a Condition to Enter Their Own Country,” The Syrian
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out of prison, so that they might tell the family the whereabouts and
condition of their loved ones.
177
A Syrian lawyer confirmed this practice: “Most of the people are paying all they have to get
information. The information people get from the [Syrian] sergeants are for sure not
accurate. For example, people are told their family member is dead and then they find out
this is not the case; and the reverse also happens.”
178
Salam told Human Rights Watch that he paid senior members of various security agencies
to find out information about his brother Karim. His father sold his farmlands so the family
could afford the demands for payment in exchange for information:
We would meet [the senior Syrian security officers] in public places and we
would pay money. Always in dollars. We sold two of our farmlands to pay.
One time they asked us for US$2,000, but then [the senior security officer]
stopped giving us information and said, “Stop talking to me or we will put
you in jail with your son.” Finally, an official told us our brother was in the
Palestine Branch [Branch 235]. He wanted $8,000 and he would tell us if
[my brother] was alive or not. My father sold another farm, for $8,000 and
paid this man and after one week the man came and handed over my
brother’s ID, watch, and ring to the family and told us Karim was dead.
179
Yasser’s mother paid tens of thousands of dollars to senior security officials and members
of the legal profession to try to secure her son’s release from detention. “The total amount
[my mother paid] is US$70,000,” Yasser said. “She paid so many people, security
agencies, the lawyers. My mother felt like she ‘re-bought’ her son.” Yasser said he
appeared before the Counter-Terrorism Court in Damascus and his mother handed her
lawyer $45,000 after he told her the judges had demanded this sum. A Syrian lawyer told
177
“Syria’s Lucrative Detainment Market: How Damascus Exploits Detainees’ Families for Money,” Syria Untold, April 13,
2021, https://syriauntold.com/2021/04/13/syrias-lucrative-detainment-market-how-damascus-exploits-detainees-families-
for-money/ (accessed August 12, 2021).
178
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a Syrian lawyer, July 1, 2021.
179
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Salam, June 30, 2021.
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Human Rights Watch that the Counter-Terrorism Court created in 2012 is notorious for
accepting and demanding payments of money to secure the release of a detainee.
180
180
For information on the establishment of this court in 2012 in Damascus, see “Special Report on Counter-Terrorism Law
No. 19 and the Counter-Terrorism Court in Syria,” Violations Documentation Center in Syria – VDC, April 2015,
https://syriaaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Counter-Terrorism-Court-in-Syria-a-Tool-for-War-Crimes.pdf (accessed
August 12, 2021), p. 10.
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“No Refugee Should Go Back”
Human Rights Watch asked all interviewees how they felt about their decision to leave
Lebanon and Jordan and what they would say to refugees contemplating a return to Syria.
Several of their responses are recorded below.
Halim, 38-year-old man from Qunaitra who went back to Syria in the autumn of 2018:
No refugee should go back to Syria. The situation is so bad. You do a
reconciliation but [the Syrian government] aren’t committed to it. If [the
Syrian security forces] want somebody, they will arrest them. Or kill them.
No one will be safe in Syria until they stop the security agencies from
terrorizing people.
181
Halima, 45-year-old woman from Homs whose husband went back to Syria in
February 2019:
I never ever want to go back to Syria. Even if I had to live in a tent on the
road here [in Lebanon]. It is so dangerous inside Syria. I have neighbors
and friends who talk about the situation there. There is no means for
people to live, no security, no safety. The safety situation is the most
important. I have kids. I wouldn’t ever put them in danger and send
them back.
182
Amina, a 31-year-old woman from Qalamoun who went back to Syria at the beginning
of 2018:
I get this question about going back [to Syria] from people who are thinking
to go back. I tell them of my experience and what I saw. I would tell them it
is impossible. If you ever say anything bad about Assad, the security
181
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Halim, February 16, 2021.
182
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Halima, January 22, 2021.
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knows. Before I used to say things against Assad, but now I don’t.
Somehow, they find out, they know.
183
Abdul, 39, from Khael in Daraa who returned to Syria in September 2020:
In the first month [after being tortured in detention] I couldn’t walk properly.
The bones are still broken but the doctor is helping me… I can’t work and
can’t go out alone… I will never leave my town now. I am scared of anything
with a green color because it looks like the military uniforms [Military
Intelligence officers] wore when they arrested and tortured me. I was in
detention for six months. The terrorism I experienced in the jail is still with
me now. I agreed to do this [interview] because I want people to know what
happened to me when I returned to Syria.
184
183
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Amina, April 30, 2021.
184
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abdul, July 1, 2021.
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Recommendations
To the Government of Syria
•
•
•
•
•
Ensure that no refugees are targeted for their perceived or actual previous
affiliation with opposition forces, or for having left the country during the conflict.
Set up a fair mechanism that provides full restitution or compensation for losses or
damage of housing, property, and land because of the conflict.
Allow regular and unimpeded access for the UNHCR and other humanitarian
agencies to all areas of Syria.
Stop immediately all arbitrary and unlawful security vetting procedures on refugees
returning to Syria.
Appropriately discipline all members of the security forces who extort bribes at
checkpoints; conduct random checks to ensure the practice of demanding bribes
at checkpoints is abolished.
•
•
Immediately halt the practice of enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrest and
detention, particularly at checkpoints, and the use of torture.
Release all arbitrarily detained persons, including persons detained solely for their
political beliefs, and publish lists of all individuals currently in formal and informal
Syrian detention centers.
•
Provide immediate and unhindered access for recognized international monitors of
detention conditions to all detention facilities, official and unofficial, without
prior notification.
•
Provide detainees with adequate and accessible food, water, sanitation, hygiene,
and healthcare, in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on
the Treatment of Prisoners.
•
•
Suspend members of the security forces against whom there are credible
allegations of human rights abuses, pending investigations.
Publish lists of all detainees who died in Syrian government detention facilities
and prisons, including in security branches operated by Syrian intelligence
agencies and issue death certificates for all detainees known to have died
in custody.
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To the Jordanian Ministry of Interior
•
•
Respect the principle of nonrefoulement and abolish the practice of arbitrary or de
facto re-entry restrictions for Syrian refugees who first entered Jordan irregularly.
Ensure that Jordanian officials and/or UNHCR fully and accurately inform any Syrian
seeking voluntary repatriation about conditions in areas of return. Information
provided should include levels of violence and respect for human rights, economic
conditions, and access to humanitarian and reconstruction and reintegration
goods and services. Jordanian officials should clarify where international
humanitarian agencies are unable to facilitate reintegration or to provide a full
understanding of conditions in the specific areas of return to which the refugee is
intending to return.
•
•
Expand the range of sectors in which non-Jordanians can work in Jordan.
Do not participate in, contribute to, or initiate any activity designed to push for
early returns to Syria in the absence of consultation with the Syrian refugee
community and independent and concrete guarantees of safe, informed, and
dignified returns inside Syria.
•
Ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
To the Lebanese Government and related Ministries
•
Rescind the May 2019 Higher Defense Council’s decision regarding the deportation
of Syrian refugees who enter the country unofficially, and respect the principle of
nonrefoulement. This includes not deporting individual Syrian refugees without
giving them a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them and
argue their case for protection, including by giving them the opportunity to obtain
legal representation.
•
•
Place a moratorium on all GSO-facilitated returns in view of the problematic nature
of the so-called “security clearance” procedure.
Ensure that Lebanese officials accurately inform any Syrian seeking voluntary
repatriation about conditions in areas of return and refer individuals to UNHCR.
Information provided should include levels of violence and respect for human
rights, economic conditions, and access to humanitarian and reconstruction and
reintegration goods and services. Lebanese officials should clarify where
international humanitarian agencies are unable to facilitate reintegration or to
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provide a full understanding of conditions in the specific areas of return to which
the refugee is intending to return.
•
Allow UNHCR to resume registering Syrian refugees to better manage their needs in
Lebanon, as well as to prepare for safe and dignified return to Syria when
conditions are conducive for return.
•
•
•
•
•
Extend a fee waiver for all Syrian refugees that have accrued overstay and
residency renewal fees.
Allow Syrians who do not currently have legal residency to regularize their status.
End the practice of detaining refugees merely because their residency documents
have expired or because they don’t have legal status.
Expand the range of sectors in which Syrian refugees are permitted to work.
Do not participate in, contribute to, or initiate any activity designed to push for
early returns to Syria in the absence of consultation with the Syrian refugee
community and independent and concrete guarantees of safe, informed, and
dignified returns inside Syria. Ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its
1967 Protocol.
To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
•
Continue not to promote or facilitate voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees from
Jordan, Lebanon, and other host countries so long as conditions for safe and
dignified return are not in place and sustainable.
•
Provide Syrians inquiring about voluntary repatriation with up-to-date and accurate
information related to the specific areas to which the person seeks to return. Clarify
where UNHCR does not have sufficient information to make an adequate
determination regarding conditions in a specific area of return.
•
Monitor and report on conditions faced by Syrian voluntary returnees and
deportees from Jordan and Lebanon. Indicate publicly where UNHCR is unable to
monitor conditions faced by voluntary returnees, and the reasons behind these
difficulties. Ensure that there is an independent protection and monitoring
mechanism in Syria through which humanitarian organizations are able to monitor
and report on human rights violations that returnees face.
•
Continue to request full and unfettered access to monitor returnee conditions and
be transparent about the challenges in achieving such access. Redouble efforts to
impress upon donor and resettlement governments the protection imperative of
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providing adequate humanitarian assistance and resettlement places for Syrian
refugees in Lebanon and Jordan.
•
•
Continue to use the UNHCR 2018 Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee
Return to Syria as a baseline to assess conditions for return to Syria.
Ensure Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan have access to adequate and
affordable medical treatment for chronic health conditions so that older refugees
are not forced to return to Syria because of unmet health needs.
To Donor Governments
•
Ensure that any funds provided for programs aimed at rebuilding and rehabilitating
areas retaken by the government meet certain standards, including that their funds
do not contribute to the abuse of rights of Syrians, that funds do not go to entities
or actors responsible for human rights violations and violations of international
humanitarian law, and that their funding is based on independent and full needs
assessments, that beneficiary lists remain confidential, and that donors and their
implementing partners have full, unimpeded, and regular access to all areas.
•
Ensure that humanitarian programming in both Syria and host countries does not
pre-emptively focus on returns preparedness when conditions for voluntary, safe,
and dignified returns are not met, apart from improving protection and legal
programming designed to inform Syrian refugees of conditions inside Syria and
respond to civil documentation needs.
•
Provide generous financial and other support to Jordan and Lebanon to enable
them to provide safe and decent asylum space for Syrian refugees and
asylum seekers.
•
•
Fully fund UN humanitarian appeals to help meet the needs of all Syrian refugees
in Lebanon and Jordan regardless of their legal residency status in the country.
Fully fund UN humanitarian responses to meet the health needs of all Syrian
refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, including those with chronic health conditions
and including psychosocial – mental health – services.
•
Recognizing that crises and conflicts have gendered and disproportionate impacts
on refugee women and girls, ensure that humanitarian responses for these groups
are designed consultatively and through evidence-based assessments.
•
Press the governments of Lebanon and Jordan to push both countries to adopt
measures that respect refugee rights and abide by the principle of nonrefoulement
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and abolish all practices designed to deregister refugees or coerce them to return
to Syria.
To All Syrian Refugee Host Countries
•
Institute an immediate moratorium on all forced returns to Syria and repeal any
legislation that facilitates the summary deportation of Syrian refugees, including
Palestinian refugees from Syria, consistent with UNHCR’s position that Syria is not
safe to return to and that cessation of active conflict in parts of Syria cannot be
used as a reason to remove protection status from Syrian refugees.
•
•
Do not engage or otherwise legitimize Syria’s problematic and unlawful security
vetting processes for returnees.
Continue to generously provide protection space for Syrian refugees and, where
possible, provide pathways to permanent residence for those with no prospects
to repatriate.
•
•
Ensure pathways to legal residency for Syrian refugees are available and accessible
and fee waivers are implemented.
Denmark should repeal its decision to remove temporary protection for Syrian
refugees from Damascus and Damascus Countryside and European Member States
or its immigration bodies should not introduce any similar legislation or decisions.
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Acknowledgments
This report was researched and written by Nadia Hardman, Researcher in the Refugee and
Migrant Rights Division at Human Rights Watch. This report was reviewed and edited by Bill
Frelick, Refugee and Migrant Rights Director. Specialist reviews were provided by Sara
Kayyali, Researcher, who also provided research assistance, Aya Majzoub, Researcher,
Adam Coogle, Deputy Director, Michael Page, Deputy Director, all from the Middle East and
North Africa Division; Agnes Odhiambo, Senior Researcher in the Women’s Rights Division;
Emina Cerimovic and Bridget Sleap, Senior Researchers in the Disability Rights Division
and Kyle Knight, Senior Health Editor, provided a health and human rights review. Michelle
Randhawa, Officer in the Refugee and Migrant Rights Division provided research, editing,
and production assistance.
Clive Baldwin, Senior Legal Advisor, and Tom Porteous, Deputy Program Director, provided
legal and program review. Production assistance was provided by Travis Carr, Senior
Publications Coordinator.
We are grateful to all the Syrian refugees and their families who were willing to share their
experiences, including sometimes tragic personal accounts.
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Annex I: Response from the Lebanese General Security
Directorate
Translated from Arabic by Human Rights Watch
Republic of Lebanon
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
General Security Directorate
No.: 1311/AE/S
Date: October 15, 2021
Human Rights Watch Organization
Re: Your letter on the return of Syrian refugees
References:
1. Law Regulating Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon, dated July 10, 1962
2. Decree No. 10188, dated July 28, 1962 (implementing Law Regulating Entry, Stay, and
Exit from Lebanon)
3. Resolution No. 320, dated August 2, 1962 (regulating entry and exit at Lebanese border
stations)
With reference to the topic and in response to your letter containing a set of questions
regarding the return of Syrian “refugees,” before giving specific answers to each question,
we state the following:
First, it is important for the General Directorate of General Security (GSO) to clarify a range
of issues related to the term “asylum,” with the intent of establishing Lebanon’s position
on this topic within its applicable legal context.
Lebanese law regulates the issue of asylum in one place in its texts, namely in the text of
Articles 26 through 31 of the Law Regulating Entry, Stay, and Exit from Lebanon, dated July
10, 1972. Based on these texts, there is no humanitarian asylum in Lebanon, only political
asylum.
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These legal articles determined the position on the issue of “humanitarian asylum” as a
result of historical and social considerations that obligated Lebanon to adopt this
position. These considerations also led Lebanon to not signing the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention and its annexed and supplementing Protocols. This is how a “refugee”
became, according to the position of the Lebanese state in the context of a Memorandum
of Understanding it signed with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), a person on the Lebanese territory who submits an application for asylum to a
third country, and not to Lebanon.
Therefore, vis-à-vis the Lebanese state, those currently on the Lebanese territory, who are
not “Palestinian refugees,” are either displaced Syrians or asylum-seekers to third
countries registered with the UNHCR. Accordingly, the GSO does not agree with the
designation of “Syrian refugees” mentioned in your letter.
In addition to the above, and despite the Lebanese state’s decision not to sign the 1951 UN
Refugee Convention, Lebanon has abided by and applied many customary principles of the
international humanitarian law, especially the principles of non-refoulement and non-
forced deportation and the obligation of voluntary return of displaced persons, at a time
when the Lebanese context is under considerable pressure that is not easy to bear and
overcome.
In addition, it is important for the GSO to point out the fact that it is an executive
administration, i.e., it is tasked within its jurisdiction with implementing the public
policies established by the Lebanese government regarding domestic issues and
questions. However, it is not responsible for formulating or approving these policies. This
situation fully applies to the issue of the return of Syrian displaced persons and issues
related to their situation in general.
Second, in response to the proposed questions:
1. Question 1
The process of voluntary return remains ongoing. However, travel to implement this
process is suspended because of COVID-19 pandemic.
2. Question 2
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Seventeen centers for voluntary return have been established, where displaced Syrians
can present themselves to register their names. In light of this, tables are prepared by the
GSO, which are later given to the Syrian side to inform them of the date of return.
Meanwhile, the choice to return or remain in Lebanon is up to the Syrian in question.
3. Question 2(a)
Syrians present themselves voluntarily at these centers by personal choice and without
any pressure or request from any other entity. Registering at one of these centers does not
oblige them to return to Syria if they later wish not to do so.
4. Question 2(b)
The GSO does not interfere in the decision of the displaced Syrians or in their choice of
place to go, but, for organizational requirements only, the GSO asks them about the area
to which they want to return. As we indicated earlier, this is to provide the necessary
logistical requirements, specifically in terms of providing means of transportation and
identifying the land border crossing to be used by these means of transportation.
5. Question 2(c)
Lists for return are prepared by the competent authorities at the GSO after completion of
the pre-registration procedures to determine a potential date for voluntary return.
6. Question 2(d)
The aforementioned lists are sent to the competent Syrian authorities for verification. They
are then returned to the GSO after identification of the names of the people allowed to
enter [Syria] and the names of those who have measures against them, in order to notify
these registered people of the results.
7. Question 3
Between November 30, 2017 and September 21, 2021, approximately 575,767 (five
hundred seventy-five thousand six hundred and seventy-six [
sic
]) Syrians have left the
Lebanese territory voluntarily. It is not possible to determine the regions to which they
returned because, as previously indicated, this is the personal choice of each individual
returnee.
8. Question 4
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Returning the displaced Syrian to his country is a process of “return” in the legal sense and
not deportation because the person concerned is returned directly from the border before
entering Lebanese territory. This means there is no deportation process and the GSO fully
adheres to the non-deportation of any “displaced Syrians.”
Between April 25, 2019 and September 19, 2021, approximately 6,345 Syrians have been
“returned” in implementation of the Higher Defense Council’s decision.
In addition to the foregoing, reference should be made to deportations that take place in
implementation of judicial rulings issued by the competent courts, especially penal ones,
as an additional penalty to the criminal penalty imposed as a result of the foreigner
committing a criminal act.
9. Question 4(a)
Displaced Syrians are entitled to challenge the administrative deportation ruling before
the competent judge (i.e., the State Shura Council). Likewise, they can object and consult
the International Red Cross and competent organizations and have their files reviewed by
the Prosecutor-General at the Court of Cassation to make the appropriate decision.
10. Question 4(b)
The GSO is tasked with implementing the decision of the Higher Defense Council, which is
still in force in this regard.
11. Question 5
There were no deportation operations of displaced Syrians prior to the decision of the
Higher Defense Council.
12. Question 6
The jurisdiction and legal responsibility of the Lebanese state vis-à-vis displaced Syrians
exist as long as they did not leave the Lebanese territory. When they leave the Lebanese
territory, the matter falls outside this jurisdiction and has nothing to do with the Lebanese
state.
These are the GSO’s responses to the questions in your letter. We hope that you will kindly
review and accept them with respect.
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Director-General of General Security
Major General Abbas Ibrahim
Seal: Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Interior and Municipalities – General Directorate of
General Security – Director-General
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“Our Lives Are Like Death”
Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan
After a decade-long civil war, Syrian refugees are the world’s largest refugee population, and Lebanon
and Jordan host the highest ratio of refugees relative to their populations.
Syrian refugees continue to cite safety and security concerns as primary reasons for not returning home,
but some end up making the decision to return under extreme pressure. While economic downturns in
both Jordan and Lebanon have resulted in increasingly inhospitable living conditions for refugees,
government policies – particularly in Lebanon - are also increasing pressures on Syrian refugees to leave.
In
“Our Lives are Like Death,”
Human Rights Watch answers the question of what happens to Syrian
refugees when they repatriate. Following interviews with Syrian refugees who returned from Lebanon
and Jordan, the report details the grave human rights abuses and persecution faced by returnees at the
hands of the Syrian government and affiliated militias, including torture, extra-judicial killings, and
kidnappings. The majority of those interviewed also struggled to survive and meet their basic needs in
a country decimated by conflict and widespread destruction.
While parts of Syria have not seen active conflict hostilities since 2018, Syria is not safe.
Human Rights Watch recommends an immediate moratorium on all forced returns of Syrians and habitual
Palestinian residents of Syria to all parts of Syria from all countries. While active hostilities have
decreased in recent years, the situation is fluid and relative periods of stability fail to meet basic
conditions for safe, dignified, and durable return. It calls on donor countries to support Jordan and
Lebanon to enable them to provide safe and decent asylum space for Syrian refugees.
(above) A destroyed house in
Daraa, Syria in November 2020.
© 2020 Private
(front cover) A man rides a
motorcycle through a destroyed
neighborhood in al-Khaldieh
area in Homs, Syria, on
September 18, 2018.
© 2018 Reuters/Marko Djurica
hrw.org