UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2021-22
UUI Alm.del Bilag 120
Offentligt

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)

FFM REPORT

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2021-22

UUI Alm.del - Bilag 120

Offentligt

JUNE 2022

Syria

Military recruitment in Hasakah

Governorate

us.dk

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey of

all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other country

of origin information available on the topic.

The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information

does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any

particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be

regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

The report is a synthesis of information gathered from different sources, and it

brings together condensed information in a relevant manner for the reader’s COI

needs and it organises information together thematically to form a coherent whole

of the topic in question, instead of listing or quoting information source by source.

Front-page picture depicts members of the Self-Defence Forces. The picture has

been provided to the Danish Immigration Service by the Representation of AANES in

Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The Danish Immigration Service

Farimagsvej 51A

4700 Næstved

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

us.dk

June 2022

The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk/landeoplysninger

The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source

reference.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Executive summary

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) largely respect the law on military service

(the so-called Mandatory Self-Defence Duty) that is implemented in most areas under their control, which

includes most of Hasakah Governorate. The Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) are generally not used in

combat. However, there have been cases of conscripts being sent to frontlines in force majeure situations

as well as in situations, where conscripts have volunteered to fight at the frontline. DIS has not found

reports of HXP committing violations against civilians.

Non-Kurdish ethnic minorities are not discriminated during their service in HXP. Minors are not recruited to

the HXP, and women can join these forces on a voluntary basis.

If caught by the authorities, draft evaders and deserters from the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty are sent

back to service, sometimes following a short period of detention. There are no reports of mistreatment

during the detention. Deserters may be subject to prosecution depending on the circumstances of their

desertion. Evasion and desertion has no consequences for the families of evaders and deserters other than

potential questioning.

Recruitment of men and women to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) takes place on a voluntary basis.

The number of minors in the SDF has decreased since 2020. However, minors are still being recruited to the

SDF. Most of the recruited minors are released after a short period. There are reports of the SDF having

committed violations against civilians.

There are no reports of direct recruitment to the PKK taking place in AANES territories. However, a youth

organisation called Revolutionary Youth is believed to recruit minors to its ranks in order to prepare the

youth for later recruitment to the PKK.

The Government of Syria (GoS) does not recruit conscripts for military service in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

in AANES-controlled areas. It is unclear whether or to what extent recruitment to the SAA takes place in

areas controlled by GoS in Qamishli and Hasakah City.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Table of contents

Executive summary ................................................................................................................................ 1

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 4

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 6

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................. 7

1. Background ........................................................................................................................................ 8

1.1. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria ............................................................................ 8

1.2. Mandatory Self-Defence Duty ................................................................................................................ 9

2. Self-Defence Duty............................................................................................................................. 11

2.1. Self-Defence Duty Law .......................................................................................................................... 11

2.1.1. Who are required to serve? ........................................................................................................... 11

2.1.2. Postponement and exemptions from the Self-Defence Duty ....................................................... 12

2.1.3. Length of the Self-Defence Duty .................................................................................................... 14

2.2. Conscription process............................................................................................................................. 15

2.3. Service in the Self-Defence Duty Forces ............................................................................................... 16

2.3.1. Place of service .............................................................................................................................. 17

2.3.2. Violations against civilians ............................................................................................................. 17

2.3.3. Treatment of ethnic minorities during service .............................................................................. 17

2.4. Evasion and desertion from the Self-Defence Duty ............................................................................. 18

2.4.1. Consequences of draft evasion ...................................................................................................... 19

2.4.2. Consequences of desertion ........................................................................................................... 19

2.4.3. Consequences for family members to draft evaders and deserters ............................................. 20

2.5. Recruitment of minors .......................................................................................................................... 20

2.6. Recruitment of women ......................................................................................................................... 20

3. Recruitment to SDF .......................................................................................................................... 21

3.1. Recruitment process ............................................................................................................................. 22

3.2. Recruitment of minors .......................................................................................................................... 23

3.3. Recruitment of women ......................................................................................................................... 25

4. Recruitment to the PKK .................................................................................................................... 26

4.1. Recruitment to PKK/HPG ...................................................................................................................... 26

4.2. Recruitment to Revolutionary Youth .................................................................................................... 27

5. Recruitment to the Syrian Arab Army................................................................................................ 29

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

5.1. Conscription to SAA .............................................................................................................................. 29

5.2. Voluntary recruitment to the SAA ........................................................................................................ 30

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 31

Annex I: Meeting minutes .................................................................................................................... 36

Annex II: Copy of military booklet......................................................................................................... 73

Annex III: Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................... 92

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Introduction

This report focuses on recruitment to military forces

i S ia s

Hasakah Governorate. This includes the

Mandatory Self-Defence Duty, recruitment to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), recruitment to the

ilita

i g of Ku dista Wo ke s Pa t PKK

as well as military service in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

The purpose of the report was to collect updated information on the issues relevant for the processing of

asylum cases. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the report were drawn up by the Danish Immigration

Service (DIS) in consultation with the Secretariat of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board as well as an

ad iso g oup o COI Refe e eg uppe .

The ToR are included in the end of the report (Annex III).

The report is written in accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology.

The report is a synthesis of the information obtained from oral and written sources and does not include all

details and nuances provided by the sources. In the report, care has been taken to present the views of the

sources as accurately and transparently as possible. The individual sources should not be held accountable

for the content of the report.

The majority of the oral sources were interviewed during a fact-finding mission conducted by the Country

of Origin Information Division of DIS to Erbil and Suleimania, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), from 25 January

2022 to 2 February 2022.

During the mission, meetings were held with six sources, while eight additional meetings were held through

Skype or WhatsApp. All consulted sources have been selected by virtue of their expertise on the topics of

this report.

Meeting minutes have been drafted from each meeting. These were forwarded to each source for

approval, providing the source an opportunity to amend, comment or correct statements so that the

minutes reflect the information shared most accurately. All sources approved their statements. The

minutes are attached as an annex to this report (Annex I).

For the sake of transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the meeting minutes have been given consecutive

numbers, which are used in the report when referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes.

The consulted sources were informed about the purpose of the meetings and the fact that their statements

would be included in a public report. Ten out of fourteen sources requested varying degrees of anonymity.

During the meetings, sources also touched upon topics that are not addressed in the ToR. However,

whenever such topics could be relevant for asylum cases, the information has been included in the minutes

but not addressed in the report.

The group consists of the Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International in Denmark, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Dignity,

representatives a Christian organisation (Danish European Mission) and the Danish Bar and Law Society (representing asylum

lawyers).

EASO,

EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology,

June 2019,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Interviews for the report were conducted in January and February 2022. The situation regarding military

recruitment in Hasakah Governorate has been monitored continuously during the subsequent writing

process in order to avoid the inclusion of outdated information.

It should be noted that although this report mainly focuses on military recruitment in Hasakah

Governorate, the information collected indicates that the situation regarding military recruitment is in

many ways the same in the other parts of North and East Syria (NES).

Attention should be called to the changeable and unstable situation in Syria, including in Hasakah

Governorate, and the fact that the information provided in this report may become outdated. Therefore,

the issues addressed in this report should be monitored periodically and brought up to date accordingly.

DIS has observed conflicting information in the written sources, specifically regarding the accurate

affiliation of different actors in the governorate. Attention should thus be called to the fact that many

sources may confuse different actors present in Hasakah Governorate (e.g. Self-Defence Forces and SDF, or

Revolutionary Youth and SDF) due to the close relationship between these actors. When reading these

sources, care has been taken to establish to which actor the specific information concerns.

The research and editing of this report was finalised on 17 June 2022.

The report can be accessed from the website of DIS,

www.us.dk,

and is available to all stakeholders working

within the field of refugee status determination as well as to the general public.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Abbreviations

AANES

COI

DIS

EASO

GoS

HPG

HXP

KRI

NES

PKK

PYD

SAA

SDF

SNA

YPG

YPJ

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

Country of Origin Information

Danish Immigration Service

European Asylum Support Office

Government of Syria

People s Defe e Fo es

Self-Defence Duty Forces

Islamic State

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

North and East Syria

Ku dista Wo ke s Pa t

Democratic Union Party

Syrian Arab Army

Syrian Democratic Forces

Syrian National Army

People s P ote tio U its

Wo e s P ote tio U its

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Glossary

AANES

Asayish

Child Protection Office

Political entity that administers areas in north-eastern Syria.

Police force of the AANES areas.

Abbreviation for the Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict, an

AANES institution, which was established to prevent recruitment of minors to

the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Person required for military service.

Soldier who has left her/his post without permission and is thus no longer in

active military service.

Person required to perform military service, who has not enlisted in due time.

Areas that are administered by AANES.

A military force comprised of several armed groups.

Conscript

Deserter

Draft evader

North and East Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

2019, pp. 116-117

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

1. Background

Hasakah Governorate is located in the north-eastern part of Syria (see location on Map 1 on page 10). The

Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of the governorate to be 1,803,000 in 2019.

The ethnic composition of the governorate is a mix of Arabs and Kurds with smaller populations of

Assyrians, Armenians and Yezidis.

In July 2012, Kurdish forces took control of most of the areas in northern Syria with a Kurdish majority,

including Hasakah Governorate.

The same year, a civil administration was established. It was renamed

several times, most recently in September 2018 to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

(AANES).

Today, AANES administers almost 25 % of Syria, including most of Hasakah Governorate, as well as parts of

the governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ezzour and Aleppo.

Security in these territories is mainly managed by the

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the internal security forces, the

Asayish.

The term North and East Syria

(NES) is used in this report to describe the AANES-controlled areas.

The Government of Syria (GoS) controls smaller areas in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli, in addition to

Qamishli Airport. GoS and its Russian allies also have a presence close to the Syrian-Turkish border.

A strip

of land between Tel Abyad in Raqqa Governorate and Ras Al-Ayn in Hasakah Governorate is controlled by

Syrian National Army (SNA), a Turkish-backed opposition group.

On 23 May 2022, the Turkish president

Erdogan announced Turke

s i te tio to e pa d

this area via a military operation.

1.1. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) is the executive body of AANES. SDC is ruled by a coalition dominated

by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD; Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat).

Although AANES institutions are

EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 158

EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 22; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of

origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

pp. 11-12

Allsopp, H.,

The Kurds of Syria,

2015, p. 1; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 159

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding the Model and

Experience,

7 March 2022,

url,

pp. 11-12; SDC,

Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria,

n.d.,

url

EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

pp. 22, 157-160; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

pp. 11-12, 15, 22

DIIS,

Mosaics of Power: Fragmentation of the Syrian state since

2011, 2018,

url,

p. 19; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

pp. 22-23; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June

2021,

url,

p. 12

EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

pp. 157-160; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

p. 25

ICG,

Steadyi g the Ne Status Quo i Sy ia s No th East,

27 November 2019,

url;

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

pp. 12, 25; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 159

Turkey, Presidency of the Turkish Republic,

NATO u ge işle esi ko usu daki yaklaşı ı ız te ö le

ü adele ko usu

daki ilkeli

tutu u uzda kay akla ıyo [Ou app oa h to the e la ge e t of NATO ste s f o ou p i ipled sta e i the fight agai st

terrorism],

23 May 2022,

url

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria,

2019, pp. 2, 95-97; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 24; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

officially

sepa ate f o the Ku dista Wo ke s Pa t PKK , there

are close ties between the political and

military leadership of AANES and the PKK.

AANES is divided into seven administrative areas (previously called cantons

): Jazire, Euphrates, Manbij,

Deir Ezzour, Tabqa, Raqqa and Afrin.

Though Afrin is an administrative area of AANES, it is under control

of SNA today.

The administrative area of Jazire roughly corresponds to Hasakah Governorate.

1.2. Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

The Mandatory Self-Defence Duty (hereafter:

the Self-Defe e Dut

is a compulsory military service for

young men in the AANES-controlled areas.

Conscripts who perform the duty are serving in the Self-

Defence Duty Forces (HXP; Hêzên Xweparastinê).

The Law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty in the Democratic Autonomous Areas (hereafter:

Self-Defence

Duty Law)

was passed in July 2014.

In the latest version of the law from June 2019, the Self-Defence Duty

des i ed as

a national, human and moral duty

AANES implemented conscription in 2014. The conscription was introduced following a need for a larger

military force in the fight against the Islamic State (IS).

The Self-Defence Duty was initially only mandatory for Kurds, as AANES feared that Arab communities

would oppose it. However, due to dissatisfaction with this practice among Kurds, in the last two years, it

has been extended to cover Arabs as well.

Three residents of NES

and a university professor interviewed

by DIS for this report mentioned that AANES is very attentive to the public opinion with regard to the Self-

Defence Duty.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a journalist and author on several books on Kurds in Syria, explained that the

Self-Defence Duty partly serves the purpose of introducing the AANES system and ideology to the

conscripts.

Fabrice Balanche: 19; Journalist and writer: 39-40; Political analyst: 2; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 15-16; University professor: 10

EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 158

Representation of AANES in KRI: 2; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url;

SDC,

Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria,

n.d.,

url;

Wilson Center,

SDF s A a Majo ity Ra k Tu key as the Biggest

Threat to NE Syria,

2019,

url,

p. 7

Representation of AANES in KRI: 2; Fabrice Balanche: 4

Representation of AANES in KRI: 2; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

p. 158

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

2019, p. 99

Representation of AANES in KRI: 1

Denmark, DIS,

Syria: Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,

September 2015,

url,

p. 21; Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria,

24 January

2018,

url,

p. 25

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Expert from International Crisis Group: 1

These residents have general knowledge on recruitment in the NES based on their civil and social activities, as well as from their

personal experience of serving the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty. For reasons of anonymity, these activities will not be further

elaborated on.

Local residents: 23; University professor: 2

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 13

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

The Self-Defence Duty is one of the push-factors that make people leave the AANES territories.

According

to Fabrice Balanche, associate professor at the University of Lyon 2, this is not as much due to the duty

itself. Rather it is the result of the

dut s

economic consequences for the conscript

family, as the wage

during service is very low.

Map 1. Map of Syria. Hasakah Governorate is highlighted in dark yellow

Fabrice Balanche: 1; Local residents: 22; Political analyst: 3; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 9; Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The

Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

2019, p. 22; Enab Baladi,

Under guise of duty: patterns of coercion

e a led y SDF s d aft la

, 15 April 2021,

url;

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the

Autonomous Administration in Syria,

24 January 2018,

url,

p. 27

Fabrice Balanche: 1

The map has been edited by DIS and is based on a United Nations map. The designations employed and the presentation of

material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of DIS concerning the legal status of any

country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

2. Self-Defence Duty

2.1. Self-Defence Duty Law

2.1.1. Who are required to serve?

According to Article 1 in the Self-Defence Duty Law from 2019, which currently regulates the Self-Defence

Duty, men above the age of 18 deriving from NES are required to perform military service. In practice, the

Defence Office of the AANES in each administrative area decides the age range of those required for

serving.

Previously, the differences in age requirements between different areas under AANES control have created

some confusion about who were required to serve.

However, at the time of writing, the duty is, pursuant

to Decree No. 3 of 4 September 2021, only compulsory for men between the age of 18 and 24 (born in

1998 and later), which is the same across all areas. Prior to this decree, the age range was higher, and has

been as high as 18 to 40 years old.

The decree does not apply to those who currently serve and to

deserters from the SDF and Asayish.

The Self-Defence Duty is mandatory in every region governed by the AANES.

Yet, there are areas where

protests have led to temporary suspensions of the duty.

This has happened in e.g. Deir Ezzour

and

Manbij in June 2021.

It is unclear whether the Self-Defence Duty is applicable for a person from Afrin,

which no longer is under AANES control. According to the AANES representation in KRI and an article in

news outlet Kurdistan24, conscription is not mandatory for persons from Afrin

, while Professor Fabrice

Balanche stated the contrary.

The duty does not apply to individuals residing in or originating from other areas than NES.

However, if such

persons have resided in NES for more than five years, the law would also apply to them.

If someone is

recorded as originating from Hasakah in his ID card, but has lived in e.g. Damascus his entire life, AANES

would consider him to be from NES and he would be required to perform the Self-Defence Duty.

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Expert from International Crisis Group: 5; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 2

Representation of AANES in KRI: 4, 9; Journalist and writer: 1; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 2; North Press Agency,

Sy ia s AANES

Determines Age Required For 2021 Self-Defense Duty,

3 May 2021,

url

AANES,

٣/ مقر رارق

[Decree Number 3],

4 September 2021; Kurdistan24,

Kurdish-led forces in northern Syria ease conscription

conditions,

4 September 2021,

url

Representation of AANES in KRI: 4; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 3; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 1

Expert from International Crisis Group: 4; Representation of AANES in KRI: 4; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 3

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 4

Representation of AANES in KRI: 4; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 3; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 4

Representation of AANES in KRI: 26; Kurdistan24,

Syrian Kurds pause conscription for people displaced from Turkey-held areas,

June 2021,

url

Fabrice Balanche: 4

Journalist and writer: 4; Representation of AANES in KRI: 26

Journalist and writer: 4, 18; Representation of AANES in KRI: 26; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and

East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Representation of AANES in KRI: 26

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

All ethnicities as well as stateless Kurds are required to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

Arabs were initially

not asked to serve. However, this has gradually changed since 2020.

2.1.2. Postponement and exemptions from the Self-Defence Duty

The law contains provisions that allow persons required to serve the Self-Defence Duty to have their service

postponed or to be exempt from it, depending on the individual circumstances.

These rules, which among

others include exemptions due to medical issues

and postponement for persons living abroad,

are

enforced and respected by AANES.

A person who has been exempted or is discharged from the Self-

Defence Duty will have this written in the Self-Defence Duty booklet (see Chapter 2.2).

Some exemptions are temporary and given on basis of a financial guarantee.

According to an article from

the news outlet Al-Monitor, potential conscripts sometimes avoid applying for exemption, as it can be

costly and difficult.

The below subsections concern different circumstances under which postponement or exemption from

serving the Self-Defence Duty are granted.

2.1.2.1. Education

According to the Self-Defence Duty Law, a person studying at pre-university and university level can have

the duty postponed until he finishes his education.

The postponement is valid for one year at a time.

Postponement based on education is only given to persons of a certain age group, depending on what

educational level the individual is studying on. For instance, postponement for secondary school students

can only be given until the age of 21, pursuant to Article 14 in the law.

According to the representation of AANES in KRI, an individual who had the Self-Defence Duty postponed

beyond the age of 24 due to education is no longer required to serve.

DIS has not been able to

corroborate this information from other sources.

The provisions regarding education are generally enforced.

However, in 2018, in conjunction with armed

clashes against the Islamic State (IS), there were examples of conscription of men who previously had their

duty postponed on education grounds.

Journalist and writer: 4; Representation of AANES in KRI: 24; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 3

Expert from International Crisis Group: 2, 4; University professor: 1

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Expert from International Crisis Group: 7; Journalist and writer: 5-7

Journalist and writer: 12

Fabrice Balanche: 3; Journalist and writer: 5; Local residents: 15; Political analyst: 5; University professor: 2

Journalist and writer: 14

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Al-Monitor,

I Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

url

Journalist and writer: 6

Local residents: 15; ; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Representation of AANES in KRI: 9

Fabrice Balanche: 3; Expert from International Crisis Group: 7; Local residents: 15

Enab Baladi,

Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority,

12 July 2019,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

2.1.2.2. Medical reasons

A person can either have his duty postponed or be exempt from serving due to medical reasons, depending

on the nature of the medical issue.

Persons with major medical issues (i.e. blindness or missing the ability

to speak) would be exempt altogether. However, if a visually impaired person were able to see a little bit,

he would be asked to perform special tasks such as cooking.

Temporary medical issues (i.e. recovering

from a surgery) could mean that the person would have his service postponed.

A medical committee will assess the situation of the individual in order to decide whether he is fit for

service.

Everyone who are eligible to serve the Self-Defence Duty is required to undergo a medical

examination prior to enrolment.

2.1.2.3. Staying abroad

Individuals of conscription age living abroad can pay a fee of 400 USD to have their Self-Defence Duty

postponed for one year in order to visit the AANES-controlled territories and exit the area again. This

option is not possible for men living in Iraq and Turkey.

According to the AANES representation in KRI, a

person who paid to have his Self-Defence Duty postponed in this way would not be required to serve if he

returned to NES after turning 25 years old.

If someone left NES while he was obliged to serve his Self-Defence Duty (i.e. evaded) and returns after

turning 25 years old without having paid for postponement, he would be required to serve. However, if he

left NES before turning 18 years old and thus was not required to serve when he left NES, he would not be

required to serve after turning 25 years old.

Persons required for Self-Defence Duty who return to settle in the AANES territories after a stay abroad can

have their duty postponed for six months, according to Article 25 of the Self-Defence Duty Law.

2.1.2.4. Family

If a man is the only son in his family

, or if all other brothers are disabled, he can be exempt from serving

the Self-Defence Duty. The exemption is not permanent until the mother either has passed away or is

above 50 years old. Until then, the individual is temporarily exempt from serving and will have his case

reviewed every two years.

Journalist and writer: 7; Local residents: 11; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June

2020,

url

Journalist and writer: 8

Journalist and writer: 8; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 8

Journalist and writer: 7; Local residents 11

Enab Baladi,

Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority,

12 July 2019,

url;

RIC,

Translation:

Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Journalist and writer: 12; Representation of AANES in KRI: 11; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 8; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 6; Xeber24,

ن تسدرك ي فآ جورل ةيتاذلا ةرادلإل يتاذلا ع فدلا جاو نون ق …ليصفتل ب

[In Detail… The Law of Self-Defense Duty of the Autonomous

Administration in Rojava, Kurdistan],

19 June 2019,

url

Representation of AANES in KRI: 11

Representation of AANES in KIR: 11

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Journalist and writer: 11; Local residents: 11; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June

2020,

url

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Family members of a martyr registered in the Committee of the Families of the Martyrs registry are exempt

from serving the Self-Defence Duty. A family member of a father or brother who died or was injured in the

war, but who is not found in the aforementioned registry, can have his duty postponed for one year.

Article 24 of the Self-Defence Duty Law states that only one brother from each family should serve at a

time.

However, three residents of NES interviewed by DIS explained that someone, whose brother is

already serving, could choose between serving simultaneously with his brother or postponing his service

u til his othe s

service period has ended.

An individual who has a brother or sister in other security forces (e.g. Asayish or SDF) can apply to have his

service postponed. This is not an option, however, if the sibling serves in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

Yet,

three residents of NES interviewed by DIS noted that this rule has not been enforced for the last four

years.

DIS has not found information that corroborates the statements of these residents.

2.1.2.5. Other reasons

An individual who has served out his contract in SDF (see Chapter 3) is exempt from the Self-Defence

Duty.

Contrarily, a person who has completed his military service in the SAA is not exempt from duty.

An expert from International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that previous exemptions for civil society workers,

NGO workers, teachers and doctors are no longer enforced systematically.

The AANES representation in

KRI confirmed that medical workers, NGO employees and teachers are generally not exempt from the Self-

Defence Duty.

It is not possible to omit serving for conscientious reasons, according to the two sources who have been

consulted on the topic.

2.1.3. Length of the Self-Defence Duty

The Self-Defence Duty had an initial duration of six months. The period was extended to nine months

following amendments of the law in January 2016.

As of June 2022, Article 2 in the law sets the conscription

period to one year.

Generally, people will be discharged after having served for one year.

Local residents: 12; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Local residents: 13

Journalist and writer: 10

Local residents: 11

Local residents: 14

Fabrice Balanche: 23; Representation of AANES in KRI: 5

Expert from International Crisis Group: 7

Representation of AANES in KRI: 12

Journalist and writer: 13; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 12

Enab Baladi,

Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority,

12 July 2019,

url;

Omran Center for

Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria,

24 January 2018,

url,

p. 26

Journalist and writer: 15; Political analyst: 6; Representation of AANES in KRI: 1; RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service

in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

Journalist and writer: 15; Fabrice Balanche: 3

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Conscripts who evade service will be punished with an additional month of service, according to Article 15

in the Self-Defence Duty Law.

These rules are enforced in practice, although some sources were unaware

of any cases where conscripts had to serve additional time due to evasion.

A Syrian-Kurdish journalist and

writer interviewed by DIS mentioned that a deserter would be asked to serve longer than one additional

month with the exact length being decided depending on the circumstances of the desertion.

In force majeure situations, the service length can be extended. The decision to extend the service period is

made in each administrative area.

Two residents of NES interviewed by DIS explained that they had their

Self-Defence Duty extended for one month in 2018 due to the situation in Baghouz where SDF was fighting

IS.

Similarly, the service period in Afrin was extended two months at three different occasions in 2016 and

2017. This was due to the instability in the Afrin area and fears of a Turkish attack.

The representation of

AANES in KRI also informed DIS of cases of persons who had their Self-Defence Duty extended for a couple

of months.

Men who have completed their Self-Defence Duty enter the reserves and could be called up by the Defence

Office in force majeure situations.

The decision to call up reserves is made by the Military Council in each

area.

None of the sources consulted by DIS had heard of persons being called up for reserve duty.

2.2. Conscription process

Call-ups to the Self-Defence Duty happen yearly through media, where it is announced that men of a

certain age group are required to serve.

Individual notifications will not be sent to the homes of the

conscripts.

Individuals required to serve should enlist at the Self-Defence Duty office in their area to get a booklet in

which a person s Self-Defence Duty status is recorded. For instance, it would appear in the booklet if a

person is exempt or discharged from duty.

The booklet is the only document issued in connection with

the Self-Defence Duty.

A copy of the Self-Defence Duty booklet has been provided by the AANES

representation in KRI and is found in Annex II of this report.

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url;

Xeber24,

ع فدلا جاو نون ق …ليصفتل ب

ن تسدرك ي فآ جورل ةيتاذلا ةرادلإل يتاذلا

[In Detail… The Law of Self-Defense Duty of the Autonomous Administration in Rojava, Kurdistan],

19 June 2019,

url

Fabrice Balanche: 3; Journalist and writer: 20; Political analyst: 6; University professor: 2

Journalist and writer: 20

Journalist and writer: 15; Representation of AANES in KRI: 1

Local residents: 16

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria,

24 January 2018,

url,

p. 31

Representation of AANES in KRI: 7

Journalist and writer: 15-16; Representation of AANES in KRI: 1

Representation of AANES in KRI: 1

Journalist and writer: 17; Local residents: 16; Political analyst: 7; Representation of AANES in KRI: 6; University professor: 7;

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 14

Expert from International Crisis Group: 5; Representation of AANES in KRI: 13

Expert from International Crisis Group: 5

Journalist and writer: 14; Representation of AANES in KRI: 14, 23

Representation of AANES in KRI: 23

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

2.3. Service in the Self-Defence Duty Forces

The Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) is a force that is administered by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC).

It is separate from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

and has its own military commanders. However,

SDF assigns tasks to the HXP and decides where HXP is to be deployed.

The HXP are considered to be auxiliary forces to SDF.

100

They are generally not deployed in active battle

101

but are rather used for guarding checkpoints

102

and AANES buildings

103

or conducting other security tasks in

the cities.

104

The representation of AANES in KRI explained that HXP could also be used for logistical support

to fighting forces.

105

HXP have also been used for guarding prisons.

106

During prison riots in Hasakah in

January 2022, HXP was involved in fighting IS. At least nine HXP soldiers died during these battles.

107

A Syrian Kurdish journalist mentioned that the HXP could be used for fighting in times of conflict.

108

Conscripts were e.g. involved in battles against IS in Raqqa in 2016-2017.

109

The AANES representation in

KRI and a political analyst noted that some persons serving in HXP fight voluntarily at the frontline.

110

The HXP consist of both conscripts and persons who have joined voluntarily.

111

Conscripts in the HXP are

paid a symbolic salary.

112

According to three residents of NES interviewed by DIS, the monthly salary for

conscripts is 80,000 SYP (approximately 21 USD (unofficial rate) or 28 USD (official rate) by April 2022

113

114

An article in news outlet Enab Baladi from April 2021 put the conscription wage at 50,000 SYP, while a

volunteer would be paid 420,000 SYP.

115

In addition to the wage, a conscript receives food and free medical

treatment.

116

Conscripts receive 45 days of initial training during which it is not possible to get a leave of absence. After

the initial training, conscripts are allowed a leave of absence for up to seven days per month.

117

The training

Journalist and writer: 3; Representation of AANES in KRI: 4

Representation of AANES in KRI: 3; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 14; Al-Monitor,

I Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s

li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

url;

Wilson Center,

SDF s A a Majo ity Ra k Tu key as the Biggest Th eat to NE Sy ia,

2019,

url,

Aram Hanna: 18; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

100

Fabrice Balanche: 9; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

101

Expert from International Crisis Group: 8; Fabrice Balanche: 9; Journalist and writer: 21; Local residents: 17; Representation of

AANES in KRI: 6, 18; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 11; University researcher: 11; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

102

Aram Hanna: 19; Expert from International Crisis Group: 8; Fabrice Balanche: 9; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

103

Aram Hanna: 20; Representation of AANES in KRI: 18

104

University professor: 7

105

Representation of AANES in KRI: 18

106

Local residents: 18; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 17

107

Local residents: 18

108

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 11

109

Local residents: 18; Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

2019, p.

119

110

Political analyst: 8; Representation of AANES in KRI: 18

111

Aram Hanna: 23; Representation of AANES in KRI: 27; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 5

112

Local residents: 1; Representation of AANES in KRI: 22; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 15

113

WFP,

WFP Syria Country Brief,

April 2022,

url,

p. 5; WFP,

vam: food security analysis,

n.d.,

url

114

Local residents: 1

115

Enab Baladi,

U de guise of duty: patte s of oe io e a led y SDF s d aft la

, 15 April 2021,

url

116

Representation of AANES in KRI: 22

117

Local residents: 2; Representation of AANES in KRI: 20

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

consist of basic military training as well as political education.

118

Generally, the training that HXP recruits

receive depends on the tasks they are going to perform.

119

2.3.1. Place of service

The sources disagreed as to whether a conscript in the HXP will be posted to the area where he lives. Some

sources, including the representation of AANES in KRI, mentioned that conscripts are assigned to serve in

the areas they live in

120

, while others claimed that they may be assigned to serve anywhere in NES.

121

One

source mentioned that the purpose of assigning people to areas far from their home area was to secure

that they did not have any emotional attachment to where they serve.

122

In a 2019 article from news outlet Enab Baladi, it was stated that conscripts who sign up for the Self-

Defence Duty within the time announced by the authorities will be trained in Amouda, Hasakah or

Qamishli, while those caught at checkpoints will be sent to Raqqa and Deir Ezzour as a form of

punishment.

123

Fabrice Balanche assessed

that it p o a l ould e possi le to se e i o e s o a ea usi g

connections (wasta in Arabic).

124

A Syrian Kurdish journalist also explained that connections or bribes could

make it possible for a conscript to serve closer to home.

125

2.3.2. Violations against civilians

Sources consulted by DIS on this issue mentioned that they had not heard cases of HXP committing

violations against civilians

126

, and DIS could neither find written sources reporting about such violations

committed by the HXP. It should however be noted that there are records of the SDF (see Chapter 3) having

committed different kinds of violations against civilians.

127

2.3.3. Treatment of ethnic minorities during service

The sources consulted by DIS generally agreed that Arabs or other minorities in NES do not face

discrimination in the HXP.

128

According to a university professor, one cannot rule out the possibility that an individual commander could

have a certain discriminating attitude towards persons who do not belong to his ethnic group. However,

Local residents: 2; Representation of AANES in KRI: 21

Aram Hanna: 22-23

120

Expert from International Crisis Group: 8; Representation of AANES in KRI: 19

121

Fabrice Balanche: 11; Local residents: 19; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 10

122

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 10

123

Enab Baladi,

Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority,

12 July 2019,

url

124

Fabrice Balanche: 11

125

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 10

126

Fabrice Balanche: 10, 13; Local residents: 21

127

EASO,

Syria: Targeting of Individuals,

March 2020,

url,

pp. 39-45; HRW,

Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in

Siege Unknown,

2 April 2022,

url;

SNHR,

At Least 194 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in April 2022, Including Six

Children and Three Women,

7 May 2022,

url,

p. 10; SNHR,

101 Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women and Six Victims Who Died

Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in April 2022,

1 May 2022,

url;

TIMEP,

Part 2: Violations by Nongovernment Actors,

4 February 2021,

url

128

Expert from International Crisis Group: 6; Fabrice Balanche: 5; Journalist and writer: 20; Local residents: 4-5; Syrian Kurdish

journalist: 4; University professor: 3, 6; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 7; Al-Monitor,

I Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s

li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

url,

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous

Administration in Syria,

24 January 2018,

url,

p. 29

119

118

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

the source had never heard of cases of Arabs or other ethnic groups being subjected to discrimination in

the HXP.

129

According to an expert from ICG, Arab conscripts are dissatisfied with being assigned to serve the Self-

Defence Duty in their home areas due to a stronger presence of IS in Arab-majority areas.

130

The same

source mentioned that some discrimination might happen on political grounds as conscripts with political

views opposing PKK and PYD would lack influence and privileges.

131

2.4. Evasion and desertion from the Self-Defence Duty

The military police is present at some checkpoints in NES with the purpose of checking a person s

documents. If they catch a draft evader, he will be sent to serve his Self-Defence Duty.

132

Checkpoints are

found many places in Hasakah Governorate, mostly at the entrance to a city, but not in the cities

themselves.

133

The sources disagreed as to whether an evader caught at these checkpoints would be sent directly to serve,

or if the person would be allowed to go home before serving.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg explained that a person who is stopped at a checkpoint and cannot provide

sufficient documentation (a military booklet) is asked to get the document and come back.

134

The

representation of AANES in KRI stated that an evader who is stopped at a checkpoint would be warned

twice, while he would be taken directly to service by the military police if caught for the third time.

135

Three other sources mentioned that an evader caught at a checkpoint would be sent to serve his duty. They

pointed out that there is no policy of detaining draft evaders.

136

Fabrice Balanche explained that an evader caught at a checkpoint would either be sent directly to a training

camp or be detained for one or two days to clarify his conscription status before being sent directly to the

Self-Defence Duty.

137

Three residents of NES interviewed by DIS made a similar statement, though stating

that the detention could be for up to two weeks to find a proper location where the evader can serve.

138

The sources who reported the occurrence of detainment of draft evaders and deserters prior to serving the

Self-Defence Duty had not heard of any mistreatment of those detained.

139

129

130

University professor: 3

Expert from International Crisis Group: 8

131

Expert from International Crisis Group: 9

132

Expert from International Crisis Group: 6; Fabrice Balanche: 5; Local residents: 4-5; University professor: 3, 6; Syrian Kurdish

journalist: 4 Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 7; Al-Monitor,

Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

url,

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria,

24 January

2018,

url,

p. 29

133

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 9

134

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 8

135

Representation of AANES in KRI: 15

136

Expert from International Crisis Group: 6; Journalist and writer: 20; Political analyst: 9

137

Fabrice Balanche: 5

138

Local residents: 5

139

Fabrice Balanche: 5; Local residents: 7

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

The sources disagreed on the subject of house searches. Four sources mentioned that the authorities also

conducted house raids to find draft evaders and deserters

140

, while another three sources explained that

house raids do not take place.

141

Three residents of NES interviewed by DIS explained that an evader gets

two notifications at his house, before the military police will take him by force.

142

The two sources stating

that house raids take place, explained that family members are not harmed during these raids.

143

2.4.1. Consequences of draft evasion

The representation of AANES in KRI stated that draft evaders will not be subject to any punishment.

144

mentioned in Chapter 2.4, two sources explained that evaders could be detained for a period before being

sent to serve.

145

Otherwise, according to the consulted sources, evaders are neither fined nor

imprisoned.

146

A journalist and writer interviewed by DIS did not know of any mistreatment of former draft evaders while

serving their Self-Defence Duty.

147

Neither had three residents of NES interviewed by DIS heard of such

cases.

148

During service, draft evaders can ask for a leave of absence. However, this will only be granted if the

authorities do not expect that the evader will flee.

149

2.4.2. Consequences of desertion

Deserters will be asked to resume their Self-Defence Duty in case they are caught by the authorities.

150

However, depending on the circumstances of the desertion, a deserter could be detained. In case the

desertion has caused serious damages, the person could be tried before a military court

151

. Otherwise, the

deserter would simply continue his service.

152

A Syrian Kurdish journalist interviewed by DIS confirmed that

a deserter could be detained. However, the journalist did not know of cases where this had in fact

happened.

153

Three residents of NES explained that deserters could be detained for one to two months.

154

A person who has been imprisoned due to his desertion would still be required to serve out the rest of his

Self-Defence Duty.

155

Sources interviewed by DIS had not heard of mistreatment of former deserters while

they served their remaining Self-Defence Duty.

156

140

141

Journalist and writer: 19; Local residents: 4; Political analyst: 10-11; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 4

Expert from International Crisis Group: 6; Fabrice Balanche: 6, 8; University professor: 6

142

Local residents: 4

143

Journalist and writer: 19; Political analyst: 10

144

Representation of AANES in KRI: 15;

145

Fabrice Balanche: 5; Local residents: 5

146

Fabrice Balanche: 7; Journalist and writer: 20; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 5

147

Journalist and writer: 20

148

Local residents: 8

149

Political analyst: 9

150

Representation of AANES in KRI: 17; University professor: 4

151

According to the Representation of AANES in KRI, the law does not stipulate a certain punishment for desertion. It is the military

court that decides about the punishment (Representation of AANES in KRI: 17).

152

Fabrice Balanche: 7; Representation of AANES in KRI: 17

153

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 6

154

Local residents: 22

155

Representation of AANES in KRI: 17

156

Journalist and writer: 20; Local residents: 8

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

2.4.3. Consequences for family members to draft evaders and deserters

Most sources agreed that family members of draft evaders and deserters do not face any consequences

due to the evasion/desertion.

157

Fabrice Balanche mentioned that authorities could ask the family members

about the whereabouts of the wanted person but would not exert additional pressure on families other

than conduct visits to the house of family members.

158

One Syrian Kurdish journalist mentioned that in

addition to the questioning, the military police could also put pressure on the family in other ways, but the

source did not know what such pressure specifically entailed.

159

2.5. Recruitment of minors

Minors are not asked to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

160

A Syrian Kurdish journalist told DIS that reports

from Rudaw, a Kurdish news agency, indicate that some minors, particularly from families who do not

support AANES, have been taken to serve the Self-Defence Duty. The source could, however, not provide

links to these reports upon request

161

and DIS has not been able to identify these articles on the website of

Rudaw.

2.6. Recruitment of women

Women are not required to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

162

However, there are women among the

volunteers in the HXP

163

, which is possible under Article 3 in the Self-Defence Duty Law.

164

157

158

Fabrice Balance: 12; Local residents: 23; Political analyst: 10 University professor: 4-5

Fabrice Balanche: 12

159

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 7

160

International humanitarian coordinator: 10; Journalist and writer: 18

161

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 2

162

Journalist and writer: 18; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 1; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 5

163

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 5

164

RIC,

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

10 June 2020,

url

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

3. Recruitment to SDF

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is an umbrella organisation comprised of several armed groups,

including the

People s P ote tio U it

(YPG; Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) and the

Wo e s P ote tio U it

(YPJ; Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê). It was established in October 2015, shortly after Russia intervened in the

conflict in Syria.

165

It is ethnically diverse with both Arab, Christian and Kurdish soldiers.

166

In the AANES system, the SDF is separate from the Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP)

167

; however, in general,

many consider the HXP to be a part of the SDF.

168

The SDF falls administratively under the Board of Defence

(corresponding to a Ministry of Defence) of the AANES, while the HXP is under the Syrian Democratic

Council (SDC)

169

, which is the executive body of AANES.

170

The HXP has its own military commanders but

the SDF assigns tasks to the HXP and decides where the HXP are deployed to.

171

Recruitment to the SDF only takes place on a voluntary basis.

172

Many people decide to join the SDF due to

the relatively high wages.

173

SDF spokesperson Aram Hanna explained that the minimum monthly salary for

its employees is 300,000 SYP (approximately 77 USD (unofficial rate) or 106 USD (official rate) by April

2022

174

175

Other sources mentioned that the monthly salary in SDF is 100-250 USD

176

or 200 USD.

177

In addition, the SDF is not in need of soldiers

178

, and a crucial criterion for being allowed into the forces is

loyalty.

179

According to an expert from ICG, there are more than 100,000 persons employed in the SDF and

in the internal security forces (Asayish).

180

ICG,

Steadying the New Status

Quo i Sy ia s No th East,

27 November 2019,

url;

Knights, M. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

Accidental

Allies: The U.S.-Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State,

2021,

url,

pp. 84-85; Omran Center for Strategic

Studies,

The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding the Model and Experience,

7 March 2022,

url,

p. 12

166

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

2019, p. 66; ECFR,

Syrian

Democratic Forces (Syria),

10 November 2020,

url;

Sweden, Migrationsverket,

Syrisk militärtjänst [Syrian military service],

22 April

2022,

url,

p. 17; Wilson Center,

SDF s A a Majo ity Ra k Tu key as the Biggest Th eat to NE Sy ia,

2019,

url,

p. 2

167

Representation of AANES in KRI: 3; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 14; Al-Monitor,

I Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s

li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

url;

Wilson Center,

SDF s A a Majo ity Ra k Tu key as the Biggest Th eat to NE Sy ia,

2019,

url,

168

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 14

169

Representation of AANES in KRI: 3

170

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria,

2019, p. 96

171

Aram Hanna: 18; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 16

172

Expert from International Crisis Group: 10; Fabrice Balanche: 14; Journalist and writer: 29; Local residents: 3, 24; Political

analyst: 12; Representation of AANES in KRI: 28; University professor: 8; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 19-20

173

Expert from International Crisis Group: 10; Fabrice Balanche: 14; Political Analyst: 12; University professor: 1; Wladimir van

Wilgenburg: 20

174

WFP,

WFP Syria Country Brief,

April 2022,

url,

p. 5; WFP,

vam: food security analysis,

n.d.,

url

175

Aram Hanna: 11

176

International humanitarian coordinator: 8

177

Local residents: 1

178

Fabrice Balanche: 14; University professor: 9

179

Fabrice Balanche: 15

180

Expert from International Crisis Group: 3

165

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Some individuals also join the SDF to protect their local area

181

, or because the SDF are viewed favourably

due to its past records.

182

An ICG expert pointed out that Arab tribes put young men at the

SDF s

disposal in

exchange of status and protection.

183

A journalist and a university researcher specified that recruitment to the YPG and the YPJ, two of the major

SDF groups, is also voluntary.

184

The university researcher mentioned that some might join the YPG and the

YPJ due to pressure from their families, and that women could join the YPJ to avoid a marriage.

185

It should be noted that several written sources report about forced conscription to the SDF. However, it

appears from the examples and specific cases mentioned in these sources that they sometimes refer to

recruitment to the Self-Defence Duty (i.e. to the HXP) or recruitment to other groups than recruitment to

the SDF.

186

3.1. Recruitment process

Recruitment to the SDF happens through local military councils

187

found in each area (e.g. Raqqa, Deir

Ezzour, Qamishli and Tel Tamer).

188

According to the SDF spokesperson Aram Hanna, the military councils

announce if they need new recruits. Representatives from different forces under the SDF are present in the

military council buildings, and the recruit can choose which group s/he wants to join.

189

SDF fighters sign contracts with the SDF of varying length.

190

The SDF spokesperson explained that contracts

typically last for one year and eight months.

191

Other sources mentioned that contracts generally last for

two or five years.

192

As for the YPG and the YPJ, a recruit will receive three months of training, including ideological training,

before getting a five-week leave of absence. Subsequently s/he will have to decide whether to sign a

contract.

193

DIS has not looked into whether other SDF groups have a similar process of initial training and

leave before entering into an agreement with the SDF.

According to SDF spokesperson, Aram Hanna, it is possible to leave the SDF before the contract period

ends. In this case, the person should send a request to the local military council, explaining the reason why

s/he wants to stop before the end of the contract period. The local military council will forward the request

to the General-Command of the SDF who will decide whether the contract can be terminated. A mere

181

182

Journalist and writer: 29; Political analyst: 12; University professor: 9

University researcher: 1

183

Expert from International Crisis Group: 10

184

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 13; University researcher: 1

185

University researcher: 5

186

Examples of this is for instance found in: COAR Global,

Syria Update (Vol. 4, No. 22): Deadly SDF Crackdown as Conscription

Sparks Menbij Unrest,

7 June 2021,

url;

New Arab (The),

SDF begins forced conscription campaign amid Turkish security

threats, 26

October 2021,

url;

SNHR,

At Least 156 Children Still Conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces,

16 December 2021,

url;

187

Military councils are mechanisms to coordinate security on a local level. They are organised in three different military regions:

Jazire, Euphrates and Eastern (Knights, M. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

Accidental Allies: The U.S.-Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership

Against the Islamic State,

2021,

url,

pp. 185-186)

188

Aram Hanna: 2

189

Aram Hanna: 3-4

190

Aram Hanna: 5-6; Fabrice Balanche: 14; Local residents: 3; University researcher: 2

191

Aram Hanna: 6

192

Fabrice Balanche: 14; Local residents: 3; University researcher: 2

193

University researcher: 2

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

desire to stop is not sufficient to have the request approved. If the request is approved, the person will be

considered a civilian. However, if it is rejected and the person nonetheless leaves the SDF (i.e. deserts),

there are legal procedures to follow up on this.

194

3.2. Recruitment of minors

The SDF does not knowingly recruit minors today, according to three of the consulted sources.

195

Professor

Fabrice Balanche elaborated that he did not believe that forced recruitment of minors to the SDF takes

place due to the many people who wants to join voluntarily.

196

In the past, there were cases of minors joining the SDF voluntarily

197

, including girls joining the YPJ.

198

The

minors in the SDF underwent military training and performed tasks such as guard duty and combat.

199

However, according to the representation of AANES in KRI and a university professor, recruits who have

been identified as minors have now been dismissed.

200

However, two consulted sources claimed that there are reports of SDF recruiting minors today, sometimes

by force.

201

One of these sources pointed out that it is not possible to verify these reports, as they are

based on the accounts of parents, who could have an interest in altering the story to hide that their

children have been recruited voluntarily against the

pa e ts

will.

202

The other source explained that the

SDF could have an interest in intentionally recruiting minors at checkpoints and bringing them to

enlistment centres, only to release them less than a day later to demonstrate compliance with a UN

agreement on eliminating the use of minors in the SDF (see below).

203

Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) stated in a report from December 2021 that SDF forcibly recruit

minors. However, the report counts recruitment by a group separate of SDF, namely the Revolutionary

Youth (see Chapter 4.2), as SDF recruitment.

204

In June 2019, an agreement between the SDF and the UN was signed, which resulted in the establishment

of The Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict (hereafter: The Child Protection Office), which is a

part of the AANES system.

205

The Child Protection Office is present in nine different locations in NES

(Qamishli, Hasakah, Deir Ezzour, Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, Kobane, Tel Abyad and Al-Shahba).

206

Anyone who suspects that there is a minor in SDF can file a complaint to one of these offices, who will

forward it to their headquarters in Raqqa, where the case will be investigated. If needed, The Child

194

Aram Hanna: 7-10

Child protection officer: 9; Fabrice Balanche: 18; University professor: 13

196

Fabrice Balanche: 18

197

Aram Hanna: 12; Child protection actor: 2; International humanitarian coordinator: 1; Journalist and writer: 30; University

professor: 13; Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 21

198

University researcher: 4

199

Child protection actor: 8-9; International humanitarian coordinator: 9; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

p. 44

200

Representation of AANES in KRI: 29; University professor: 13

201

Child protection actor: 2; International humanitarian coordinator: 6

202

International humanitarian coordinator: 6-7

203

Child protection actor: 3-4

204

SNHR,

At Least 156 Children Still Conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces,

16 December 2021,

url,

pp. 6-10

205

Aram Hanna: 13; Child protection actor: 1; International humanitarian coordinator: 2; Journalist and writer: 31; UN,

Syrian

Democratic Forces Sign Action Plan to End and Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children,

1 July 2019,

url

206

Child protection officer: 1; International humanitarian coordinator: 2

195

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Protection Office will take up communication with the SDF.

207

The process from filing a complaint until a

minor is returned to her/his family can take up to four months.

208

A child that has been released or

excluded from duty receives an exit form as proof of her/his service and release.

209

As a consequence of the

agreement with the UN and the establishment of The Child Protection Office, there has been a decrease in

the number of minors in the SDF.

210

Some families have complained of being prevented from filing a case at The Child Protection Office,

allegedly due to busyness.

211

Yet, others view The Child Protection Office as genuine in their desire to

return children to their families.

212

Recruitment of minors to SDF has also taken place after The Child Protection Office was established. The

UN had verified the recruitment of 127 children to SDF in the period between October 2019 and December

2020.

213

A confidential source provided information to the Dutch MFA in January 2021, claiming that at

least 34 cases of child recruitment to SDF without parental consent had happened since May 2020, of

whom 13 had been returned to their families.

214

Despite the attempts to avoid the presence of minors in SDF, some minors were still in its ranks in the

beginning of 2022

215

, while there are allegedly no minors in YPJ anymore, according to a child protection

actor interviewed by DIS.

216

The SDF spokesperson mentioned that economic hardship sometimes made minors forge documents in

order to be allowed into SDF and receive a salary.

217

Similarly, two other sources explained that economy is

a major incentive for minors to join SDF, as they receive the same salary as adults. Economic incentives are

particularly prevalent among children from rural areas.

218

A child protection officer from The Child

Protection Office added that escaping social issues and the idea of being in the military could also attract

minors to SDF.

219

A Syrian Kurdish journalist also pointed out that social problems could be a reason for a

minor to join.

220

Since the enactment of the agreement with the UN, about 700-750 minors have been released from SDF.

221

SDF reported to the UN that in the first half of 2021, 71 children were demobilised and 242 additional

Child protection officer: 2

Child protection officer: 3

209

Child protection actor: 5

210

Journalist and writer: 31; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 13; UN,

Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic: Report of the

Secretary-General,

23 April 2021,

url,

p. 4

211

Child protection actor: 10

212

Al-Monitor,

Child recruitment leaves parents heartbroken in northeast Syria,

20 January 2022,

url

213

UN,

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,

6 May 2021,

url,

pp. 1, 24

214

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

url,

p. 44

215

Child protection actor: 2; Local residents: 25

216

Child protection actor: 6

217

Aram Hanna: 12

218

Child protection actor: 7; International humanitarian coordinator: 8

219

Child protection officer: 10

220

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 13

221

Child protection actor: 2; International humanitarian coordinator: 2

208

207

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

children were prevented from joining as they were assessed to be minors during the recruitment

process.

222

The Qamishli branch of The Child Protection Office received 90 complaints of minors in the SDF in the

period between its inauguration in 2020 and February 2022. Of these, 50 minors were returned to their

families, while the minor in some of the remaining cases reached the age of 18 during the processing of the

case.

223

3.3. Recruitment of women

The SDF deny that women have been forced to join the YPJ.

224

Other sources correspondingly explained

that the SDF and the YPJ do not forcibly recruit women.

225

The YPJ is reluctant to recruit women in Arab

communities, as they fear that it will provoke negative reactions.

226

222

UN,

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,

4 January 2022,

url,

p. 5

223

Child protection officer: 5

224

Aram Hanna: 14

225

Fabrice Balanche: 14; Local residents: 24; Political analyst: 12

226

Fabrice Balanche: 17

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

4. Recruitment to the PKK

The Ku dista Wo ke s Pa t PKK; Pa ti a Ka ke ê Ku dista

as esta lished i Tu ke i

written sources, the original ideology of the PKK has been described as a mix of Kurdish nationalism and

Marxism-Leninism.

227

At the time of writing, the PKK was sanctioned by the EU under the combating

terrorism sanctions regime.

228

AANES and SDF are formally independent, however, several sources pointed

to links between them and the PKK.

229

A university professor described the SDF and AANES as having a pro-PKK ideology, and that the PKK has

some influence within the leadership ranks of these institutions.

230

This view was shared by a political

analyst and a university researcher, who also underlined the ideological similarities between the Kurdish

administration in Syria and the PKK.

231

The current SDF leader, Mazloum Abdi, was previously a member of

PKK.

232

There are many pictures of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in official buildings in North and East

Syria (NES). After the establishment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES),

many Syrian PKK members joined the YPG.

233

The university researcher explained that it is easy to distinguish visually between the SDF and the

PKK s

military wing, People

s Defe e Fo es

HPG; Hêzên Parastina Gel), as the former wear military uniforms

while the latter wear traditional Kurdish garment.

234

However, two journalists consulted by DIS explained

that some people in NES do not distinguish between the SDF and the PKK as they consider them essentially

the same.

235

This perception is particularly found among people who oppose the Kurdish authorities in

NES.

236

4.1. Recruitment to PKK/HPG

Sources interviewed by DIS did not believe that the PKK, including its military wing, HPG, recruits new

members in NES

237

, or

–

if they do

–

they do it by force.

238

A Syrian Kurdish university professor stated that no forced recruitment to the PKK is taking place in NES.

This is partly because force is generally not the method used by the PKK to recruit new members, and

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding the Model and

Experience,

7 March 2022,

url,

p. 20; White, P.,

The PKK

–

Coming Down from the Mountains,

2015, pp. 18, 29

228

European Council,

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/152 of 3 February 2022 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject

to Articles, 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and

repealing Decision (CFSP) 2021/1192,

4 February 2022,

url

229

Journalist and writer: 39-40; Political analyst: 2; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 15-16; University professor: 10; EASO,

Syria: Security

Situation,

July 2021,

url,

pp. 24-25; Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to

Understanding the Model and Experience,

7 March 2022,

url,

pp. 149-150

230

University professor: 10

231

Political analyst: 2; University researcher: 7

232

University researcher: 8; ECFR,

Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria),

10 November 2020,

url

233

University researcher: 7-8

234

University researcher: 9

235

Journalist and writer: 40; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 15

236

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 15

237

Fabrice Balanche: 19; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 16

238

Journalist and writer: 39; Local residents: 28; University professor: 14; University researcher: 10

227

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

partly because a great number of current PKK members come from NES, and it would be strategically

unwise to use force to recruit new members in their own communities.

239

4.2. Recruitment to Revolutionary Youth

The Revolutionary Youth (Ci

a ê Şo eşge

) is an organisation that some sources suspect to be affiliated

with the PKK.

240

It provides ideological and political training, and encourages young people to join

PKK/HPG.

241

According to Fabrice Balanche, despite the fact that the PKK officially does not recruit new

members in NES, they lay the groundwork for future recruitment of members through their influence on

AANES and via Revolutionary Youth (see below).

242

Three residents of NES interviewed by DIS mentioned

that Revolutionary Youth also wants its members to join the SDF.

243

The Revolutionary Youth is a political group

244

that has offices several places in the AANES territories,

including Qamishli, Hasakah and Raqqa.

245

The three residents of NES consulted by DIS stated that members of the Revolutionary Youth are usually

below the age of 30. Among other things, they initiate demonstrations and student meetings to influence

the youth politically. Their members do not wear uniforms, however they are identifiable by e.g. the way

they behave, speak and what music they listen to. Thus, it is easy to identify them. The group uses student

meetings and activities at cultural centres to encourage minors to join them.

246

The Revolutionary Youth recruits minor boys and girls.

247

Today, the majority of its members are boys.

248

The UN had verified 31 cases of child recruitment to the Revolutionary Youth in the period between

October 2019 and December 2020.

249

Syrians for Truth & Justice, an NGO, documented the recruitment of

at least 17 minors to the Revolutionary Youth between October and December 2021 alone.

250

The circumstances under which the Revolutionary Youth recruits its members are unclear. Some of the

consulted sources mentioned the use of force as a way to recruit minors to the Revolutionary Youth.

251

University professor: 14

Fabrice Balanche: 19; Journalist and writer: 33; Local residents: 26; University professor: 10; Al-Monitor,

Child recruitment leaves

parents heartbroken in northeast Syria,

20 January 2022,

url

241

Expert from International Crisis Group: 12; Fabrice Balanche: 19; University professor: 10-11; Journalist and writer: 33, 36; Syrian

Kurdish journalist: 14; Al-Monitor,

Child recruitment leaves parents heartbroken in northeast Syria,

20 January 2022,

url;

Syrians for

Truth & Justice,

No theaste Sy ia: Co plai ts a out Child Soldie s Falli g o the Auto o ous Ad i ist atio s Deaf Ea s,

January 2022,

url

242

Fabrice Balanche: 19

243

Local residents: 25-26

244

Fabrice Balanche: 19; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 14

245

Fabrice Balanche: 19; Journalist and writer: 33; Local residents: 27

246

Local residents: 25, 27

247

International humanitarian coordinator: 3; Journalist and writer: 34; Local residents: 24; Political analyst: 13; Syrian Kurdish

journalist: 14; University professor: 12; Al-Monitor,

Child recruitment leaves parents heartbroken in northeast Syria,

20 January

2022,

url;

Sweden, Migrationsverket,

Syrisk militärtjänst [Syrian military service],

22 April 2022,

url,

p. 20

248

International humanitarian coordinator: 4

249

UN,

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,

6 May 2021,

url,

pp. 1, 24

250

Syrians for Truth & Justice,

No theaste

Sy ia: Co plai ts a out Child Soldie s Falli g o the Auto o ous Ad i ist atio s Deaf

Ears,

13 January 2022,

url

251

Expert from International Crisis Group: 12; International humanitarian coordinator: 4; Journalist and writer: 35; Political analyst:

240

239

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

According to an expert from ICG, it can be difficult to establish whether it has happened through actual

force

252

, an assessment supported by an international humanitarian coordinator.

253

More sources underlined that the available information on forceful recruitment comes from the families of

the children. Some of the children who ostensibly have been recruited by force might actually have joined

voluntarily without the consent of their families.

254

A university professor stated that, generally, the

recruitment of youth by force is not the modus operandi of the Revolutionary Youth.

255

A number of sources explained that the Revolutionary Youth takes advantage of the different social,

economic, cultural and family problems that young people are facing.

256

A Syrian Kurdish journalist and writer explained that Revolutionary Youth recruits are sent to particular

training centres where they receive ideological training. The source did not know whether the group also

train its members militarily.

257

Since 2020, several examples of recruitment to the Revolutionary Youth have gone viral.

258

The Syrian

Kurdish journalist and writer explained that the recruitment of minors by the Revolutionary Youth has

created a large amount of discontent in the AANES territories, but that the SDF and the Asayish do not

seem to prevent the recruitment of minors.

259

An officer at The Child Protection Office explained to DIS that

they were unable to react to complaints over recruitment of minors to the Revolutionary Youth as they

only deal with recruitment to the SDF.

260

252

253

Expert from International Crisis Group: 1

International humanitarian coordinator: 4

254

International humanitarian coordinator: 4-7; Journalist and writer: 35; Political analyst: 14

255

University professor: 11

256

Expert from International Crisis Group: 12; University professor: 11; Syrian Kurdish journalist: 13; Local residents: 25

257

Journalist and writer: 36

258

Expert from International Crisis Group: 13

259

Journalist and writer: 37-38

260

Child protection officer: 17

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

5. Recruitment to the Syrian Arab Army

The Government of Syria (GoS) controls small areas in the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah known as

security

squares

(Al-Morab

at Al-Amniya).

There are different functioning GoS public offices, including offices

dealing with recruitment to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

261

The Syrian authorities recruit conscripts and

reservists in most areas under its control. However, recruitment in the security squares differs from the rest

of the GoS-controlled parts of Syria (see below).

262

On 14 April 2022, the SDF and the Asayish took over GoS buildings in the Qamishli security square, but

withdrew the following day. The takeover was reportedly a response to a GoS siege of the Kurdish-majority

neighbourhood Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City.

263

5.1. Conscription to SAA

The Syrian authorities are generally unable to recruit residents in the AANES-controlled areas for military

service.

264

There is divergent information as to whether a man living in NES who is wanted for military service in the

SAA, could be forcibly recruited if he enters the GoS-controlled security squares in Hasakah and Qamishli.

Four sources explained that a person who evaded his military service or has deserted from the SAA would

likely be arrested if he entered the security squares.

265

In case the person is detained, the AANES will

sometimes detain elements affiliated with the GoS in order to allow for a prisoner exchange.

266

According

to three residents of NES interviewed by DIS, AANES is only interested in doing so if the detained individual

is affiliated with AANES.

267

Freelance journalist, political analyst and author of several books on Kurds in Syria, Wladimir van

Wilgenburg contrarily explained that there is a de facto ban on recruitment to the SAA in the security

squares, as the SDF has opposed this. Rather, as a part of reconciliation agreements, the SAA attempts to

recruit Arabs by convincing them of joining the SAA in the GoS-controlled areas outside of Hasakah

Governorate.

268

Similarly, a journalist explained that men wanted for conscription in the SAA would not face problems when

entering the security squares.

269

This is concordant to information from a 2020 report from DIS where

Fabrice Balanche: 22; Journalist and writer: 24; EASO,

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

url,

pp. 161-162; Sweden,

Migrationsverket,

Syrisk militärtjänst [Syrian military service],

22 April 2022,

url,

p. 17

262

Denmark, DIS,

Syria: Military Service,

May 2020,

url,

pp. 10-11

263

New Arab (The),

Syrian Kurdish-led forces withdraw from regime zones in Qamishli,

15 April 2022,

url

264

Journalist and writer: 25; Denmark, DIS,

Syria: Military Service,

May 2020,

url,

pp. 56, 60; EASO,

Syria: Military Service,

April

2021,

url,

p. 18; Sweden, Migrationsverket,

Syrisk militärtjänst [Syrian military service],

22 April 2022,

url,

p. 17

265

Fabrice Balanche: 20; Journalist and writer: 27; Local residents: 29; Representation of AANES in KRI: 31

266

Journalist and writer: 27; Local residents: 29; Representation of AANES in KRI: 31

267

Local residents: 29

268

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: 24-25

269

Syrian Kurdish journalist: 17

261

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

consulted sources unanimously stated that no conscription to the SAA took place in the GoS-controlled

areas of Hasakah Governorate.

270

Meanwhile, a political analyst explained that a Kurd wanted for military service in the SAA would most

likely not be forced to serve, while a person of Arab origin faces a high risk of being taken.

271

As regards conscription of residents of the security squares, Fabrice Balanche informed DIS that persons

living in the GoS-controlled parts of Hasakah Governorate are required to serve in the SAA

272

, while a Syrian

Kurdish writer and journalist claimed that persons living in those areas would not be forcefully recruited to

the SAA.

273

One would not be exempt from performing the mandatory military service in the SAA even if he finished his

Self-Defence Duty.

274

5.2. Voluntary recruitment to the SAA

Residents of the AANES-controlled areas can choose to join the SAA voluntarily. The SAA has recruitment

offices in the security squares in Qamishli and Hasakah City.

275

In a 2020 report by DIS, several sources

confirmed that voluntary recruitment to the SAA took place in the GoS-controlled territories in NES.

276

South of Qamishli there are villages where the inhabitants sympathise with GoS and who might decide to

join the SAA voluntarily.

277

According to Fabrice Balanche, these SAA recruits will serve in their own villages

rather than elsewhere in Syria.

278

270

271

Denmark, DIS,

Syria: Military Service,

May 2020,

url,

p. 10

Political analyst: 15

272

Fabrice Balanche: 21

273

Journalist and writer: 25

274

Fabrice Balanche: 23; Representation of AANES in KRI: 5

275

Fabrice Balanche: 22; Journalist and writer: 25

276

Denmark, DIS,

Syria: Military Service,

May 2020,

url,

pp. 10-11

277

Fabrice Balanche: 21; Journalist and writer: 28

278

Fabrice Balanche: 21

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Bibliography

Consulted sources

Aram Hanna

Child protection actor

Child protection officer

International Crisis Group

Fabrice Balanche

International humanitarian coordinator

Journalist and writer

Political analyst

Syrian Kurdish journalist

Three local residents

University professor

University researcher

Wladimir von Wilgenburg

Written sources

Allsopp, H.,

The Kurds of Syria,

I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2015

Allsopp, H. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflict,

I.B.

Tauris, London and New York, 2019

Al-Monitor,

Child recruitment leaves parents heartbroken in northeast Syria,

20 January 2022,

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/01/child-recruitment-leaves-parents-heartbroken-northeast-

syria,

accessed 2 June 2022

Al-Monitor,

I Sy ia s Dei ez-Zo , SDF o s iptio se e s li elihoods

, 22 February 2021,

https://www.al-

monitor.com/originals/2021/02/syria-conscription-sdf-is-army-volunteer.html,

accessed 2 June 2022

AANES (Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria),

٣ / مقر رارق

[Decree Number 3],

4 September

2021

COAR Global,

Syria Update (Vol. 4, No. 22): Deadly SDF Crackdown as Conscription Sparks Menbij Unrest,

June 2021,

https://coar-global.org/download/55697/,

accessed 10 June 2022

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies),

Mosaics of Power: Fragmentation of the Syrian state since

2011,

2018,

https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/2374386/DIIS_Report_04_Mosaics_of_power_WEB.pdf,

accessed

2 June 2022

Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service),

Syria: Military Service,

May 2020,

https://us.dk/media/9425/report_syria_military_service_may_2020.pdf

, accessed 2 June 2022

Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service),

Syria: Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

and Recruitment to the YPG,

September 2015,

https://us.dk/media/9447/syrienffmrapport2015.pdf,

accessed on 2 June 2022

EASO (European Asylum Support Office),

Country of Origin Information (COI), Report Methodology,

June

2019,

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

EASO (European Asylum Support Office),

Syria: Security Situation,

July 2021,

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_07_EASO_COI_Report_Syria_Security_situatio

n.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

EASO (European Asylum Support Office),

Syria: Targeting of Individuals,

March 2020,

https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/easo-coi-report-syria-targeting-individuals.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations),

Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria),

10 November 2020,

https://ecfr.eu/special/mena-armed-groups/syrian-democratic-forces-syria/,

accessed 2 June 2022

Enab Baladi,

Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority,

12 July 2019,

https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2019/07/compulsory-military-recruitment-in-jazira-region-sdf-

imposing-their-authority/,

accessed 2 June 2022

Enab Baladi,

U de guise of duty: patte s of oe io e a led y SDF s d aft la

, 15 April 2021,

https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/04/under-guise-of-duty-patterns-of-coercion-enabled-by-

sdfs-draft-law/,

accessed 2 June 2022

European Council,

Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/152 of 3 February 2022 updating the list of persons, groups

and entities subject to Articles, 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific

measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2021/1192,

4 February 2022,

https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D0152&from=EN,

accessed 10 June 2022

HRW (Human Rights Watch),

Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in Siege Unknown,

2 April

2022,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/04/northeast-syria-fate-hundreds-boys-trapped-siege-

unknown,

accessed 2 June 2022

ICG (International Crisis Group),

Steadying the New Status Quo in Syria

s No th East,

27 November 2019,

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/b72-steadying-new-

status-quo-syrias-north-east,

accessed 2 June 2022

Knights, M. and van Wilgenburg, W.,

Accidental Allies: The U.S.-Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership

Against the Islamic State,

I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2021,

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/4640

accessed 2 June 2022

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Kurdistan24,

Kurdish-led forces in northern Syria ease conscription conditions,

4 September 2021,

https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/25449-Kurdish-led-forces-in-northern-Syria-ease-conscription-

conditions,

accessed 10 June 2022

Kurdistan24,

Syrian Kurds pause conscription for people displaced from Turkey-held areas,

10 June 2021,

https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/24711-Syrian-Kurds-pause-conscription-for-people-displaced-from-

Turkey-held-areas,

accessed 10 June 2022

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,

Country of origin information report Syria,

June 2021,

https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documenten/reports/2021/06/14/country-

of-origin-information-report-syria-june-2021/EN-AAB-Syrie-juni-2021.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

New Arab (The),

SDF begins forced conscription campaign amid Turkish security threats,

26 October 2021,

https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/sdf-begins-forced-conscription-campaign-amid-turkish-threats,

accessed 10 June 2022

New Arab (The),

Syrian Kurdish-led forces withdraw from regime zones in Qamishli,

15 April 2022,

https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/syrian-kurdish-led-forces-leave-regime-zones-qamishli,

accessed 13

June 2022

North Press Agency,

Sy ia s AANES Dete i es Age Re ui ed Fo

https://npasyria.com/en/58794/,

accessed 17 June 2022

Self-Defense

Duty,

3 May 2021,

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in

Syria,

24 January 2018,

https://omranstudies.org/publications/reports/download/68_d403f01ed28320cb2e67b13cffb381c7.html,

accessed 2 June 2022

Omran Center for Strategic Studies,

The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding

the Model and Experience,

7 March 2022,

https://omranstudies.org/publications/books/download/144_02c552ab01a4c1d821e516fc160fcc0b.html,

accessed 2 June 2022

RIC (Rojava Information Center),

Translation: Law concerning military service in North and East Syria,

June 2020,

https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2020/06/translation-law-concerning-military-service-in-

north-and-east-syria/,

accessed 2 June 2022

SDC (Syrian Democratic Council), U.S. Mission,

Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria,

n.d.,

https://www.syriandemocraticcouncil.us/1418-2/,

accessed 2 June 2022

SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights),

101 Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women and Six Victims

Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in April 2022,

1 May 2022,

https://snhr.org/wp-

content/uploads/2022/05/M220501E.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights),

At Least 156 Children Still Conscripted by Syrian Democratic

Forces, 16 December 2021,

https://snhr.org/wp-

content/pdf/english/At_Least_156_Children_Still_Conscripted_by_Syrian_Democratic_Forces_en.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights),

At Least 194 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in

April 2022, Including Six Children and Three Women,

7 May 2022,

https://snhr.org/wp-

content/uploads/2022/05/M220502E.pdf,

accessed 2 June 2022

Syrians for Truth & Justice,

Northeastern Syria: Complaints about Child Soldiers Falling on the Autonomous

Ad i ist atio s Deaf Ea s,

13 January 2022,

https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-complaints-about-

child-soldiers-falling-on-the-autonomous-administrations-deaf-ears/,

accessed 2 June 2022

Sweden, Migrationsverket,

Syrisk militärtjänst [Syrian military service],

22 April 2022,

https://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentAttachmentId=49046,

accessed 2 June 2022

TIMEP (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (The)),

Part 2: Violations by Nongovernment Actors,

February 2021,

https://timep.org/explainers/part-2-violations-by-nongovernment-actors/,

accessed 2 June

2022

Turkey, Presidency of the Turkish Republic,

NATO u ge işle esi ko usu daki yaklaşı ı ız te ö le

ü adele ko usu daki ilkeli tutu u uzda kay akla ıyo [Ou app oa h to the e la ge e t of NATO

stems from our principled stance in the fight against terrorism],

23 May 2022,

https://tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/138032/-nato-nun-genislemesi-konusundaki-yaklasimimiz-terorle-

mucadele-konusundaki-ilkeli-tutumuzdan-kaynaklaniyor-,

accessed 3 June 2022

UN (United Nations),

Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic: Report of the Secretary-

General,

23 April 2021,

https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/398&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC,

accessed 2

June 2022

UN (United Nations),

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,

6 May 2021,

https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/437&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC,

accessed 2

June 2022

UN (United Nations),

Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General for Children and Armed Conflict,

4 January 2022,

https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/49/58&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC,

accessed 2

June 2022

UN (United Nations),

Syrian Democratic Forces Sign Action Plan to End and Prevent the Recruitment and

Use of Children,

1 July 2019,

https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2019/07/syrian-democratic-forces-

sign-action-plan-to-end-and-prevent-the-recruitment-and-use-of-children/,

accessed 2 June 2022o

White, P.,

The PKK

–

Coming Down from the Mountains,

Zed Books, London, 2015

Wilson Center,

SDF s A a Majo ity Ra k Tu key as the Biggest Th eat to NE Sy ia,

2019,

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/sdf_arab_majority_rank_t

urkey_as_biggest_threat.pdf

, accessed 2 June 2022

WFP (World Food Programme),

WFP Syria Country Brief,

April 2022,

https://reliefweb.int/attachments/6c78a123-3555-4926-a629-

8e4ebf4f12e5/2022%204%20Syria%20Country%20Brief.pdf,

accessed 13 June 2022

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

WFP (World Food Programme),

vam: food security analysis,

n.d.,

https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/prices?adm0=238,

accessed 13 June 2022

Xeber24,

ناتسدرك يافآ جورل ةيتا لا ةرادلإل تا لا عاف لا بجاو نوناق …ليصفتلاب

[In Detail… The Law of Self-Defense

Duty of the Autonomous Administration in Rojava, Kurdistan],

19 June 2019,

https://xeber24.org/archives/187499,

accessed 2 June 2022

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Annex I: Meeting minutes

WhatsApp meeting with Aram Hanna, SDF spokesperson, 31 January 2022

Syrian Democratic Forces

1. There is no forced recruitment to the Syrian Democratic Forcs (SDF). All its members has joined

voluntarily.

2. SDF recruits through local military councils that are found in each area (e.g. Raqqa, Deir Ezzour,

Qamishli and Tell Tamer). When the council identifies a need for new forces, they announce that

they need more people to join voluntarily.

3. The local military council covers a specific area. Representatives of all SDF forces as well as the Self-

Defence Forces (HXP) are present in the local military council. The local military council is under the

General Military Council of North and East Syria (NES), where the SDF is in charge and where the

high command of the HXP also is represented. It is the General Military Council that decides on

military defence, operations and war.

4. Representatives of the different forces under the SDF are present in the military council buildings.

The person can decide himself/herself which of the SDF forces (e.g. YPG, Syriac Military Council,

Northern Brigade, Army of Revolutionaries) to join.

5. The recruit signs a contract that is being sent to the General-Command Office of the SDF for

approval.

6. The contract is signed between the recruit and the SDF. It contains a specified period for which the

person is working for the SDF. The length of the contract is individual, but generally, a contract

could last for one year and eight months. The contract also contains provisions about free medical

se i e fo the e uit as ell as fo the e uit s fa il .

7. It is possible to stop before the contract period ends. In this case, the person can send a request to

local military council explaining the reasons for wanting to leave his work. The request will be sent

to the General-Command, which decides on the case.

8. The possibility to get an approval for terminating the work in the SDF depends on the reason for

wanting to stop. A mere desire to stop is not sufficient for getting an approval to stop.

9. If the person is being allowed to stop, he/she will be considered a civilian again.

10. It is not possible to stop before the contract period, unless the person sends a request. If the

person does not have an approved request and deserts, there are legal procedures to follow up.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

The military police could be involved.

11. SDF pays its employees a salary of minimum 300,000 SYP per month. The salary can be higher, and

depends on several factors, including what force the person joins and to where he is assigned

geographically.

12. There have been cases of minors who have joined the SDF. Due to economic hardship in the region,

some children or their families have resorted to faking or forging some documents that will show

them older to join the force.

13. SDF has been honest about the organisational shortcomings that have existed during the

recruitment process on the part of some commanders. Training courses have been set up to make

the commanders aware of the recruitment process to avoid recruiting persons who do not meet

the conditions. This training was intensified after the agreement with the UN and the Office of

Protection of Children in Armed Conflict was also established. SDF makes these courses to prevent

the shortcomings of the past and which might still happen.

14.

So e of SDF s ad e sa ies ha e lai ed that YPJ fo efull e uits adult o e to its a ks,

ho e e o adult o e ha e ee fo efull e uited. It has al a s ee ased o the o a s

own decision. There are sometimes social issues in the society, e.g. disputes with husband or family

members that are factors making the woman want to join the YPJ.

15. All SDF members will have some form of documentation that proves membership of the SDF.

During the service, they will have an identity card. While on leave, they will also have papers that

confirm the time of their leave. After one year of SDF membership, the person will also get a

document that confirms his/her continued service or dismissal from the force.

16. In an October 2019 cease fire agreement between the US and Russia, it was decided that the SDF

generally had to withdraw from the area between the Turkish-backed groups and NES, e.g. in Tell

Tamer. This means that only members of the local military councils in these areas can be deployed

there, and the soldiers present there can only carry individual weapons such as small firearms. SDF

do not have heavy weapons divisions in that area. However, the SDF still supports these military

councils.

Self-Defence Forces

17. The Self-Defence Forces (HXP) are both linked to the SDF and to the Autonomous Administration of

North and East Syria (AANES).

18. SDF and HXP are militarily linked. It is the SDF that gives the HXP the assignments and decides to

where they should be deployed. However, HXP has its own commanders.

19. Under normal circumstances, the SDF will be deployed to the frontline as the primary fighting

forces to attack or defend an area. Once an area has been liberated or protected, the HXP is

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

deployed to guard the area, but not to fight. This has happened in e.g. Afrin, Tell Abyad and north

of Tell Tamer.

20. HXP also falls organisationally under the AANES, because they guard the AANES buildings. The HXP

is also linked to the AANES as the law on Self-Defence Duty is founded and amended by the AANES,

including provisions on whom is being recruited.

21. HXP has different branches and divisions, and perform a range of tasks. Most of the HXP forces

guard the borders to areas controlled by the Government of Syria, and the border to Iraq.

22. The training that the HXP recruits undergoes depends on the duties they are going to perform. HXP

in the northern areas will receive training in how to defend the areas in which they are located,

while those in Deir Ezzour where there are more IS sleeping cells will receive training to deal with

them.

23. There is both forced and voluntary recruitment to the HXP. Professional soldiers within the HXP will

likely get more training than those who are conscripted.

Skype meeting with a child protection actor, 27 January 2022

The child protection actor works in Syria, and monitors the recruitment of children to armed forces in North-

East Syria.

1. SDF and AANES signed an agreement with the UN to facilitate the release of children recruited

within their ranks, as well as excluding new recruits. The agreement was implemented in 2019. A

part of the agreement with the UN was to implement an age assessment tool that could estimate

the age of the recruits.

2. Since the agreement was signed, about 700 minors, who have gone through military training, have

been released from the SDF. However, the international humanitarian actor believes that the

number of children in the SDF continues to be relatively high, even if the SDF claims otherwise.

Many of the children enlisted have done so voluntarily, though reports circulate that children have

been abducted and or forced to enlist.

3. There are many informal reports of minors being picked-up at checkpoints and taken to SDF

enlistment centres for the purpose of excluding them from training. This is particularly prevalent in

Hasaka City, Raqqa City and in certain pockets of Deir Ezzour. The minor in such cases is usually

being excluded less than a day after being taken at the checkpoint.

4. The international humanitarian actor believes that the SDF deliberately does this to demonstrate

compliance with the UN agreement.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

5. Released and excluded minors alike should receive an exit form upon release/exclusion as proof of

service and release.

6. Recruitment of girls has allegedly stopped, and those having been released from the YPJ have gone

through a rehabilitation programme at a boarding school. The SDF recently announced all girls had

completed their schooling and returned to their homes.

7. There is a high number of children trying to join the SDF for economic reasons. This is more

common in rural areas where jobs are scarce and there are few economic or educational

opportunities. The age range of those wanting to join is between 8 and 17 years old.

8. Minors going through military training are being treated as adults, and are being paid like adults as

well.

9. The most common work tasks within the SDF that the released minors performed were for boys (in

order): Guarding, fighting, administrative work, cooking and cleaning; and for girls: cooking,

cleaning, administrative work, guarding and fighting.

10. There are many reports of parents going to the Child Protection in Armed Conflicts Office of the

SDF (the complaint mechanism to facilitate the release of children) to submit a complaint about the

recruitment of their children to the SDF. However, the parents may wait in line for even a whole

day and then be told that the office does not have time that day, and that they should come back in

following day. It varies between cases whether the minors are in contact with their families after

having joined SDF.

Whatsapp meeting with a child protection officer, 31 January 2022

The source is working at the Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict in Qamishli. The office was

established after an agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the UN in 2020. The main

assignment is to protect children in armed conflict and remove them from any force falling under the SDF.

The office is present in different cities in North and East Syria, including in Hasaka Governorate.

Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict

1. The Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict falls under the Autonomous Administration

of North and East Syria (AANES). The Office deals with minors that have joined any force under the

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including the YPG and YPJ. The Office communicate directly with

SDF.

2. The Office is present in 9 different locations in the AANES territories: Qamishli, Hasaka, Deir Ezzour,

Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij, Kobane, Tel Abyad and Al-Shahba. The headquarters is located in Raqqa city.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

3. Anyone, who want to file a complaint about a minor in SDF, can visit the Office in any of its

locations. The officers present will gather information regarding names, dates, documents (ID cards

and/or family booklets), when the child left the family, what has happened, and will occasionally

also be provided a picture of the child. Once the file is made, it will be sent to the headquarters in

Raqqa that will take up communication with SDF. It is then the responsibility of SDF to identify the

minor. SDF relies on the information provided by the Office and does not conduct its own

i estigatio of the i o s age.

4. It can take up to 3-4 months from the complaint has been received before the minor has been

returned to the family. Occasionally, the minor has provided false information to the SDF upon

recruitment, which can delay the case processing time.

5. The number of complaints filed in Qamishli since the inauguration of the office is 90. Of these, 50

minors has been returned to their families. Some of the remaining 40 persons reached the age of

18 after the complaint was filed. A quarter of the 90 cases are girls. One of the 90 cases concerned

a Christian family while the remaining cases concerned either Arabs or Kurds.

6. It varies over time, how many complaints the Qamishli office receives. There are times when the

office does not receive any complaints for two or three weeks, and other times when a couple of

cases are reported in one week. The child protection officer has no information about why there is

this variation over time.

7. The Qamishli office has not had cases where the minors were Ajanib or Maktoumin, and who had

no ID documents, and therefore the Office has not established procedures for processing

complaints for these groups.

8. The Office does not visit military camps to check if they have minors, but only report and document

cases based on complaints filed to them.

Recruitment of minors to armed forces in North and East Syria

9. The SDF does not forcibly recruit minors by kidnapping them or take them from their houses.

10. The minors who have joined the SDF have done so voluntarily. There are three main reasons for

minors to join the SDF. The primary reason is due to family issues, where the child decides to run

away from a dispute to join the SDF. Second, minors might join for the salaries in order to provide

economic support for their families. Third, some join because they are attracted to the idea of

being a part of a military force.

11. Some minors will provide false documents to the SDF when joining. Others will say that they do not

have any identity documents. In this case, the SDF will rely on the physical appearance of the

person to determine his/her age. In most cases, it has been difficult to see if the person has been

minor or adult, and SDF has therefore allowed them into its ranks; however, there are examples of

minors who have been returned to their families after having been with the SDF for one-two days,

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

because they were assessed to be below 18 years old. In these cases, the families would not have

had time to complain to the Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict.

12. The source does not know what groups within the SDF the minors join, as the SDF does not provide

this information.

13. The majority of minors who join the SDF are from Hasaka Governorate, while there are fewer cases

from Arab areas such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzour governorates.

14. The minors who join SDF are mainly between 15-18 years old.

15. Some minors are detected before they have received any military training, i.e. they have only

received ideological training, while others mange to receive military training before being detected.

Either way, the SDF will dismiss the minor when he/she is detected. A few minors, mainly 17-year-

olds who turn 18 one or two months later, refuse to leave the SDF. They will not be armed but

perform civil work until they turn 18.

16. There are different ways that the family of a minor become aware that the minor has joined an

armed force. Sometimes, the minor has stated before joining that he or she would join a military

force. At other times, relatives or friends of the minor tell the family that their child has been seen

at a military camp.

17. The child protection officer is aware of families who have complained about their children having

joined the Revolutionary Youth, however, it is not until the child joins an SDF force that the Office

can intervene.

Skype meeting with Fabrice Balanche, 9 February 2022

Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2. He has

conducted field studies and research and written books and articles about Syria, including the Kurdish areas

of Syria. His last field study in the Kurdish areas of Syria was carried out in January-February 2022.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

The local population’s support for the Self-Defence

Duty

1. There are many young men who flee the AANES-controlled areas and go to neighbouring countries

to avoid the Self-Defence Duty. This is not because of the duty itself, but rather due to the dire

socio-economic situation in the area with severe poverty and a high unemployment rate. During

the Self-Defence Duty, the conscript receives a very low salary (approximately 10 USD/month),

which is far from enough

to o e his a d his fa il s asi li i g e pe ses du i g the se i e.

2. In general, an atmosphere of despair is dominating the Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East

Syria, and people have lost their hopes for a better future, even among those working in the

Auto o ous Ad i ist atio of No th a d East S ia AANES . This o i ed ith the a ea s poo

economic conditions have pushed many young people to leave the country in order to find better

living conditions in neighbouring countries or in Europe as soon as they can afford paying a human

trafficker. There are well-organised smuggling networks in the area facilitating smuggling of people

for different prices depending on the destination (e.g. 1,000 USD for Turkey and 15,000 USD for

Germany or Sweden).

Implementation of the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law

3. The Mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law is enforced and respected by AANES in the areas under its

control. It means that conscripts are discharged upon completing their one-year Self-Defence Duty,

and that those who according to the law are to be exempted from the duty (e.g. only sons, persons

with medical issues etc.) are exempted, and that students can have their service delayed due to

their studies.

4. Persons from Afrin, which is under Turkish control, are considered to be from AANES territories and

are also obliged to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

At he kpoi ts, people s ID-cards

are checked, and if a person evades his Self-Defence Duty, he will

be caught by the military police and sent directly to training camps to serve his duty. Sometimes, it

may take one-two days before the Self-Defence Duty status of a person caught at a checkpoint is

clarified, and the person is detained during the clarification process. The source has not heard of

cases of ill-treatment during the detention.

6. The AANES authorities do not conduct house searches to find draft evaders or deserters. A draft

evader in a village or neighbourhood does not risk being taken to the Self-Defence Duty as long as

he stays in his area, but he will be caught as soon as he approaches a checkpoint.

7. A draft evader is not fined or imprisoned. Deserters will be trialled and punished with

imprisonment; however, the source have not heard of specific cases of deserters being trialled.

8. The source has not heard of cases of the military police doing house searches in order to find

evaders or deserters.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

9. The conscripts are not used in active fighting as the Self-Defence Forces (HXP) are auxiliary forces,

which for instance are used for guarding checkpoints etc. However, there are cases of conscripts

being killed while guarding a checkpoint. The source mentioned the case of a conscript in from

Kahtanieh east of Qamishli who was killed by a sniper in Deir Ezour area.

10. The source has not heard of cases of violations against civilians committed by the HXP, e.g.

attacking a civilian area etc.

11. Conscripts may also be sent to other areas to do their duty. The source assumes that by using a

mediator with connections to the Kurdish authorities (so-called

Wasta

in Arabic), it is possible to be

assigned to do the Self-Defe

e Dut i o e s o a ea.

12. Evading or deserting from the mandatory Self-Defe

e Dut does ot ha e o se ue es fo o e s

fa il . The autho ities a ask fa il e e s a out the e ade s/dese te

s whereabouts, but

they do not put pressure on family members or bother them in any other way in order to make the

evader/deserter to report.

13. The source has not heard about any discrimination of Arabs or other minorities in the HXP. Neither

has the source heard of any human rights violations against civilians committed by the HXP.

Recruitment to SDF

14. Recruitment to SDF takes place on a voluntary basis, and there are many men and women who are

willing to join the force, which among others is due to the relatively high salaries paid to those who

are recruited. There are two types of contracts, which the new recruits can enter into with SDF:

two-year and five-year contracts. The salary in both types of contracts are good, but you are better

paid if signing a five-year contract compared to those of two years.

15. It is generally not so easy to join SDF forces, as loyalty is a crucial criterion for recruiting new

members. However, using a mediator with connections in SDF (so-called

Wasta

in Arabic) could

ease the process.

16. Upon completing the mandatory Self-Defence Duty, the conscripts are encouraged to join SDF

forces.

17. In Arab communities of northeast Syria, AANES does not try to encourage women to join YPJ, as

they do not want to provoke the local people who are not in favour of their women joining SDF.

Previously, AANES tried to change the local culture in the Arab communities, for instance through

campaigns against polygamy or efforts to promote the Kurdish language, but due to negative

reactions from these communities, they stopped doing this.

18. Regarding recruitment of minors in SDF, the source does not believe that SDF or AANES authorities

kidnap minors to make them join the SDF forces, as there are already many volunteers who are

interested in joining SDF

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

19. The source assumes that Revolutionary Youth, which is a PKK-affiliated political group with offices

in for instance Qamishli, Hasakah and Raqqa, tries to politically and ideologically encourage and

prepare minors to join PKK in Qandil Mountains. Despite the fact that PKK officially does not recruit

new members in northeast Syria, the organisation lay the groundwork for future recruitment of

new members through their significant influence on AANES and via activities of Revolutionary

Youth.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

20. A person, who has evaded or deserted from the military service in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), will

be arrested if he enters the areas controlled by the Government of Syria (GoS) in Hasakah

Governorate. Because of this, if such a person wants to have a document issued by either GoS, he

or she would have to get a family member or a legal representative to go into these areas and do

the paperwork.

21. Persons living in the security squares in Qamishli and Hasakah must serve in the Syrian Arab Army.

There are 12 Arab villages south of Qamishli belonging to the pro-regime Tay tribe that are under

control of GoS as well. The villagers from there must serve in the SAA; however, the recruits will

serve in their own villages and not elsewhere in Syria. In case an inhabitant from the mentioned

villages or from the security squares, who is obliged to serve the Self-Defence Duty, enter the

AANES-controlled areas, he will be taken to serve in the HXP.

22. SAA has recruitment offices in the security squares in Qamishli and Hasakah.

23. A person, who has completed the mandatory Self-Defence Duty, is still obliged to do military

service in the SAA, and vice versa.

Local militias

24. Each village has a local militia (so-called

Mahalliyin

in Arabic) consisting of volunteers. The

volunteers are also women and elderly people. The local militias are not a part of the SDF but they

have a close relationship.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Skype meeting with an expert from the International Crisis Group, 17

February 2022

The source has worked on Syria in the past seven-eight years, and has worked for the International Crisis

Group for last three years. The source travels to Syria regularly, particularly to northeastern and

northwestern Syria.

Self-Defence Duty

1. The mandatory Self-Defence Duty was enforced in North and East Syria (NES) as the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) needed a large military force in order to fight the Islamic State (IS).

Initially, the conscription only applied to Kurdish communities as the Autonomous Administration

of North and East Syria (AANES) did not want to antagonise the Arab population of NES. This

created a backlash among the Kurdish communities who complained over that they were forced to

serve while the Arabs were not.

2. In the last two years, the mandatory Self-Defence Duty has been gradually imposed on the Arab

areas as well. Initially, this was confined to the periphery like Raqqa countryside, but subsequently

it was also imposed in Raqqa city and Deir Ezzour city. This led to demonstrations, and many young

men decided to flee the area to avoid the compulsory conscription.

3. Today, the fight against IS is a security rather than a military issue, so the need for a large military

force does not exist any more. There are more than 100,000 employed in the SDF and a large

security apparatus (i.e. Assayish) as well. However, the Self-Defence Duty is still mandatory, which

has created controversies among both Arab and Kurdish communities.

4. In 2020, the AANES announced a decision saying that the Self-Defence Duty was going to be

universal across all cantons under its control. However, it is still erratically enforced and not

implemented in all areas. Sometimes, when there is public uproar against the Self-Defence Duty,

the conscription will be halted periodically and then at some point implemented again.

5. Conscription takes place through the media, where it will be announced what age group is required

to serve. It is then the obligation of the person to enlist. Individual notifications will not be sent to

homes of the wanted recruits. The age groups that are required to serve sometimes differ from

area to area, which can confuse a person as to whether he is required for service.

6. There are makeshift checkpoints where IDs are checked. In the event a draft evader is stopped, he

will be taken to serve his duty. There is no policy of detaining draft evaders. There are no house

raids to find draft evaders, and family members are not being harassed in order to find draft

evaders.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

7. Exemption rules regarding medical issues and postponement of service based on education are

enforced. However, previous exemptions for civil society workers, NGO workers, teachers and

doctors are no longer enforced consequently, as there have been sporadic recruitment among

medical personnel and teachers throughout 2021. This has created discontent among the

population and protests against this have taken place in Deir Ezzour.

8. The Self-Defence Duty conscripts are assigned to serve in their own province, usually manning

checkpoints. Arabs complain that the provinces they serve in are less secure, as there are more IS

attacks there than other areas of NES. They believe that the SDF leadership does not invest enough

in securing these areas.

9. The source has not heard of ethnic discrimination during service, however discrimination takes

place on political groups; a person who is opposed to the PKK or PYD will be considered as second-

tier and will lack influence and privileges.

Recruitment to SDF

10. Today, recruitment to SDF takes place on a voluntary basis. There are relatively good salaries, so

there are many people who volunteer.

11. The SDF has also made use of deals with Arab tribes, who put their young men at their disposal in

exchange of protection and status.

Recruitment to PKK

12. PKK and Kurdistan Communities of Women (KJK) often recruits minors in North and East Syria

through a proxy group called the Revolutionary Youth. The Revolutionary Youth recruits by both

exploiting a social vacuum that children face when having social issues, and by forceful recruitment.

The source pointed out that it can be difficult to establish whether a minor has been recruited by

actual force or whether he or she has been lured into joining in another way. Once recruited, the

child will often be sent to PKK camps outside of Syria.

13. Some cases of recruitment to the Revolutionary Youth have gone viral, particularly in late 2020 and

in 2021, where parents reported of their children being recruited by the Revolutionary Youth.

Skype meeting with an international humanitarian coordinator, 27 January

2022

The source works in Syria on the issue of child protection and recruitment of minors to armed groups.

1. Child recruitment had happened at a high level in North and East Syria (NES), both by the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Islamic State. Child recruitment used to be more prevalent in

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Hasaka city and Hasaka Governorate than elsewhere in NES.

2. SDF has signed an action plan with the UN and have begun releasing minors. The number of

released and excluded has reached 750.

3. The international humanitarian coordinator still receive reports about recruitment of minors taking

place. These cases revolve around the Revolutionary Youth, which is allied with the SDF but has not

signed the action plan.

4. Today, it is almost only males who face forced recruitment. The recruitment happens to

Revolutionary Youth. The cases of forced recruitment are rare, and it is impossible to conclude that

a child has been forcibly abducted into an armed group, unless the child is being interviewed, as

the information comes from the parents of the children,

5. It is the families of the minors that reach out to the international humanitarian coordinator and

explain that the minor has been forcibly recruited. The parents usually explain that the minor

suddenly disappeared, and that they later learned from friends that the minor was taken by a

specific force.

6. There are also reports by families that SDF has forcibly recruited children, but the international

humanitarian coordinator has been unable to verify that. The source pointed out that in a conflict

situation it can be difficult to find out to where a minor has been recruited.

7. However, the source further pointed out that the international humanitarian organisation does not

receive information from the minors themselves and its information is solely bases on the reports

f o the i o s fa ilies. The fa ilies ould ha e a i te est i telli g a alte ed sto , a d that

the i o s ould ha e de ided to joi olu ta il agai st thei pa e ts ill. So eti es, the

parents also explain that their children have been subject to some sort of propaganda.

8. Some minors join SDF for economic reasons. SDF pay its employees between 100-250 USD/month,

which is a high salary by local standards. Due to the lack of livelihood opportunities and a high

number of female-headed households, children, particularly boys, are pressured to join SDF. At

least 500 minors reach out to SDF each month. The source believes that SDF rejects most of these

children.

9. Before the action plan was signed, children as young as 12-13 years old were deployed by SDF to

battles. However, when the child was very young, he/she was used to guard checkpoints, distribute

food and for logistical tasks. From the age of 15 and above, when they could carry weapons, the

minors were also placed at the frontline.

10. The source has not heard of recruitment of minors to the Self-Defence Forces (HXP).

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

11. In an assessment of minors associated with armed groups in NES from April 2021, 87% on the

respondents had poverty as their main fear and 61% of the minors were engaged in child labour.

98% of the children explained that they could not leave the armed groups when they wanted to, as

the armed groups did not allow them to do that.

Meeting with a journalist and writer, Erbil, 27 January 2022

The source is a Kurdish-Syrian journalist and writer from Qamishli, who has been living in Erbil for nine

years. He travels to Syria regularly. He has worked as a journalist since 1990.

Implementation of the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law

1. Self-Defence Duty is mandatory for men between the ages of 18 and 24. The Self-Defence Duty Law

was lastly amended in December 2021, when the age criteria was lowered from 18-40 years to the

current one.

2. Women are not required to serve, but can join the Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) voluntarily.

3. HXP falls under the supervision of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

4. The Self-Defence Duty law applies to anyone who comes from Autonomous Administration of

North and East Syria (AANES) areas, irrespective whether the person is Kurd, Arab, Christian, Syrian

citizen, Ajanib or Maktoumin. The law does not apply to people who come from outside AANES

areas but who live there.

5. The rules in the Self-Defence Duty Laws with regard to both exemptions and postponements are

being respected and implemented in practice.

6. It is possible to postpone the Self-Defence Duty for persons studying at pre-university and

university level until the studies have finished.

7. Depending on the individual circumstances and the type of disease or disability, a person with

medical issues can have his Self-Defence Duty postponed or be exempt. There are medical

committees who assess the medical situation of the individual to determine whether he is fit for

serving.

8. Those with major medical issues (e.g. cannot see or speak) would be exempt altogether. If the

person can see a little bit, he might be used in what is called

stable services

e.g. as a cook, but not

for military tasks. If the medical issue is temporary, for instance the person has to recover from a

surgery, he can have his service postponed.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

9. The Syrian Arab Army has a similar system, but is more strict in granting exemptions to person with

major medical issues.

10. A man who has a brother in other military or security forces (e.g. Asayish and the SDF) can apply for

postponement of his service. This does not apply if the brother serves in the Syrian Arab Army

(SAA).

11. The only son in the family will be exempt from Self-Defence Duty.

12. Men, who originate from the territories administered by AANES, and who live abroad, can pay a

certain amount of money on arrival to North and East Syria (NES), to get a 1-year exemption from

service and travel around without fearing to be conscripted. This rule does not apply to men living

in Iraq and Turkey. The source has not heard of any cases where a person was taken to serve his

Self-Defence Duty despite having paid for this exemption.

13. Conscientious objection to Self-Defence Duty is not an option.

14. When a person is exempted or discharged from the Self-Defence Duty, this will be noted in his Self-

Defence Duty booklet. The booklet is green on the outside.

15. The length of the Self-Defence Duty is one year. The person would usually be discharged after this

period. However, if a major conflict arises, the Office of Defence has the right to order the recruit

to serve for longer.

16. After being discharged, a person would be a part of the reserve, which the Office of Defence has

the right to call up in force majeure situations, e.g. in case of war.

17. The source has not heard of people being called up for service from the reserve, or of cases of

extension of service beyond the one year duty.

18. No one has been taken to Self-Defence Duty outside the provisions of the law. There are no women

or minors who have been required to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

19. Draft evaders and deserters can be found at checkpoints or through house raids. House raids are

conducted by Asayish. There have been no consequences for family members during these house

raids.

20. A person caught by the AANES authorities for having evaded or deserted from his Self-Defence

Duty will not be detained irrespective of whether his is a draft evader or a deserter. Instead he will

be taken to the HXP to serve his Self-Defence Duty. A draft evader will be asked to serve his Self-

Defence Duty for an additional month, while a deserter will also be asked to serve longer

–

the

exact length will depend on the circumstances of his desertion. The source has not heard of

mistreatment of draft evaders or deserters during their service because of their evasion or

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

desertion.

21. Generally, HXP does not engage in active fighting, which is done by other and more trained forces.

However, considering the fact that Self-Defence Duty is a military service, it is possible that military

commanders decide that HXP should be used for fighting as well.

22. According to the source, most people serve their Self-Defence Duty without objections, however

there are also opponents to the duty in the AANES areas.

23. HXP does not discriminate against Arabs during the service. In many places in NES, such as Deir

Ezzour, there is an Arab majority, and many members of the SDF are Arabs.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

24. There are so-called

security squares

in the cities of Qamishli and Hasaka, where the Government of

Syria (GoS) has the authority. There are different GoS offices in these areas, for instance courts,

intelligence offices and other offices such as passport offices that provide public services to anyone

living in the AANES areas.

25. The GoS is not able to recruit people to SAA in the areas controlled by AANES forcefully. Neither

does GoS conscript persons living in the

security squares.

However, it is possible to join the SAA

voluntarily, and there are recruitment offices in the

security squares

in cities of Hasakah and

Qamishli.

26. The relationship between AANES and the GoS is a neutral and two-sided relationship. On the one

hand, the GoS does not recognise any of the AANES institutions; on the other, there is an

understanding that persons from AANES territories can go to the

security squares

to do

government paperwork without the GoS preventing them to do so.

27. However, if a person

–

Kurd or Arab

–

who is wanted for military service in SAA enters the

security

squares,

he could be detained by the GoS. There have been cases of individuals in both Qamishli

and Hasakah who have been detained for this reason, and although the AANES cannot officially put

pressure on the GoS, they have detained elements affiliated with the GoS in order to make a

prisoner exchange with those detained by the GoS.

28. South of Qamishli there are a number of villages inhabited by tribes that are sympathetic to GoS,

and who do not recognize AANES. Individuals from these villages could join the SAA voluntarily.

There might be some Kurds who would do the same.

Recruitment to SDF

29. Recruitment to the SDF takes place on a voluntary basis and the SDF does not recruit any soldier by

force. The main reason for persons wanting to join the SDF is that the people of the region want to

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

protect their area and their people.

30. There have previously been cases of minors having joined the SDF, however, this has only been on

a voluntary basis.

31. After a memorandum of understanding was signed between the SDF and UN agencies, an office

was established within the SDF called the Office for Protection of Children. This office has returned

a large number of minors back to their families in the last two years.

32. The source is not aware of minors still serving within SDF ranks, but he does not rule out the

possibility that there are still

so e i o s i the SDF despite the SDF s effo t to elease the .

Revolutionary Youth

33. The Revolutionary Youth is an organisation for young people that has offices in North and East

Syria. The organisation is not a part of the SDF or any other AANES institutions, however they have

offices all over the AANES area. The source believes that the Revolutionary Youth is affiliated with

the PKK.

34. The Revolutionary Youth has recruited young men and women, including minors, to their ranks for

ideological purposes.

35. According to the families of the recruits, the recruitment happens through groups of young people

driving by schools in cars or vans taking the recruits by force from there. The source pointed out

that this information is solely based on the accounts of the families of the recruited children, and

that it is possible that some of the children have been ideologically encouraged to join the

Revolutionary Youth without the consent of their families.

36. The recruits are taken to particular training centres where they receive ideological training. The

source is unaware of whether the minors also receive military training, as the public does not have

access to these camps.

37. The practices of the Revolutionary Youth have created a large amount of discontent in the AANES

areas, however, the SDF and the Asayish have not taken any measure to prevent the organisation

from recruiting young people. The general-commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, visited the

offices of the Revolutionary Youth recently.

38. There are tens of minors who have disappeared in recent years and the families are unaware of

their whereabouts and thus do not know whether they have been recruited by the Revolutionary

Youth or another group. However, the only group that the source is aware of who recruits minors is

the Revolutionary Youth. The official institutions of AANES, including the Asayish and the SDF has

not been able to follow up on it.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Recruitment to PKK

39. PKK has a major influence in the AANES territories, but HPG , which is the military wing of PKK, does

not recruit forcefully in these areas. The only forced recruitment taking place in North and East

Syria is the recruitment to the Revolutionary Youth.

40. There is a lack of differentiation between the PKK and AANES/PYD among people, particularly those

who are opposed to AANES/PYD as they consider the PKK to be behind AANES/PYD and everything

they do.

Other information

41. There are so-called neighbourhood watches that take care of the security in their local area. These

consist of adult civilians, both men and women.

42. The Afrin region was almost solely inhabited by Kurds before the Turkish invasion in March 2018.

After the invasion, more than 70 % of the Kurds in the areas fled, and today only 25-30 % of the

population there are Kurds.

Meeting with a political analyst, Erbil, 31 January 2022

The source is a Syrian Kurd with many years of experience as a political analyst. He resides in the Kurdistan

Region of Iraq. He has commented on the political situation in North and East Syria (NES) on several

Kurdish, Arabic and international media.

The local population’s support for the Self-Defence

Duty

1. In the beginning of 2010s, when the Autonomous Self Administration of North and East Syria

(AANES) was established, a majority of the North and East Syria (NES) population was in favour of

having strong security forces, which could protect the NES society against several national and

international security threats at that time. By the emergence of the Islamic State, YPG, YPJ and the

newly established Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) gained further support both from the

international community and among the population in NES, and many joined these forces

voluntarily. Due to this massive popular support, the failure and shortcomings of the AANES and

the security forces were ignored.

2. However, when the IS was defeated and the NES society were not facing threats to the same extent

as before, the AANES failed to maintain the broad popular support and convert it to establishing a

unity among different ethnic and political groups living in NES. This was partly due to the lack of

leadership experience and partly because of the divisive ideology of the PKK, which has a huge

influence on the AANES and its policies. As a result, the NES society was politically polarised

between two antagonistic groups: those who support the AANES and the ruling PYD on the one

hand and the opposition groups on the other.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

At the sa e ti e, the AANES fu the pushed to i ple e t a a dato e uit e t of ou g

people to the HXP in a population, who were used to join the security forces voluntarily, and at a

time when the socio-economic situation worsened, an increasing opposition to the Self-Defence

Duty emerged and a considerable number of young people fleeing to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

and Europe.

4. With the political field polarized between the pro- and anti-AANES groups, the information and the

reports about the Self-Defence Duty is often subject to manipulation and exaggeration. Whilst the

AANES try to make light of the shortcomings in the HXP and the Self-Defence Duty, the opposition

groups tend to manipulate and exaggerate about the negative aspects of the Self-Defence Duty law

and the HXP. For instance, if someone appears on TV and complains about a situation related to the

AANES o

the Ku dish fo es, the oppositio g oups a e ploit a d a ipulate the pe so s

statement and present it as if the statement is about the negative consequences of the Self-

Defence Duty although the complaint is about something else. On the other hand, the supporter of

the ruling party and the AANES ignore the fact that their insisting on compulsory conscription in an

area, which is suffering from socio-economic problems (unemployment, damaged infrastructure,

lack of education etc.), have led to many people fleeing the area.

Implementation of the law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

5. The political analyst has not heard of cases of persons being conscripted despite being eligible for

exemption from the Self-Defence Duty. The exemption provisions of the Self-Defence Duty Law are

being implemented.

6. The source has not heard of conscripts being forced to do service longer than the one year

stipulated by the law.

7. The political analyst has not heard of persons being called up for reserve duty.

8. The source knew of persons, who during their service in HXP were deployed to the frontline, but

they did it voluntarily.

9. If an evader is caught by the authorities, he would immediately and directly be taken to a HXP

training camp to start his Self-Defence Duty. He would not be allowed to go home, collect his stuff

and say goodbye to his family. The person can ask for permission to leave and visit his family during

his service. However, if the authorities suspect that he may take advantage of the leave to desert

and flee the area, he will not be given permission to leave. After completing his service, the person

will though be discharged and his evasion does not have any impact on the length of his service.

10. Evasion or desertion would not have any consequences for the

e ade s fa il e e s i the

sense that the authorities would harass the family or take a family member. However, the

authorities would conduct house searches to find the evader. The political analyst has five siblings

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

who all evaded their Self-Defence Duty. The authorities once searched for the evading siblings at

the a al st s othe s house.

11. The military authorities made house raids in a village in Derek in 2017 to find evaders from the Self-

Defence Duty. 552 young men from the village fled the area to evade the Self-Defence Duty. The

political analyst did not know of similar cases of house raids taking place in recent years.

Recruitment to SDF

12. SDF, including YPG and YPJ, does not recruit people by using force in the sense that they would

harm the person or his/her family if the person does not join them. In fact, the people of NES are

generally not opposed to these forces, because persons serving in these forces are from the local

area, they defend the area and they earn salaries to support their families.

13. However, within the last three years, a group called the Revolutionary Youth has contacted boys

and girls aged 15-17 and brainwashed them into leaving their families to join them. They do it by

inculcating their militant ideology into the minds of youth by using an emotional Kurdish-patriotic

te i olog , e.g. fighti g agai st ou e e ies , ho ela d , esista e et ., i o de to

encourage them to join their ranks. There is a widespread discontent among the local population

with the activities of the Revolutionary Youth as people are afraid that the group convince their

children to follow their militant path and leave their families.

14. The Revolutionary Youth mostly encourage the youth to join them, but they may resort to using

force if they do not succeed in convincing the minor to join them. The source knew of a case where

a 16-year-old girl in a village close to the Iraqi border was, according to her father, recruited

forcefully to the Revolutionary Youth. The source did however not have specific information about

the fo i le atu e of the gi l s e uit e t.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

15. If a person of Kurdish origin, who is wanted by the Government of Syria (GoS) for military service,

enters the areas in Qamishli and Hassakah controlled by the Syrian forces, he will most likely not be

taken and sent to military service in the Syrian Arab Army. This is because the Syrian authorities do

not want to provoke the AANES by detaining Kurdish residents of the area. However, if the person

is an Arab, the risk of being taken would be high.

Ajanib

16. As far as the political analyst knows, all Ajanib have obtained Syrian citizenship and Syrian

documents after the implementation of Decree 49 in 2011. The political analyst was a part of the

Kurdish delegation that was consulted by the GoS in connection with the implementation of Decree

49.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Meeting with Representation of the Autonomous Administration of North

and East Syria (AANES) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Suleimania, 29

January 2022

The office of Representation of the AANES in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is the diplomatic representation of

the AANES in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The office was established in 2015.

Implementation of the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law

1. According to the Self-Defence Duty Law, the Self-Defence Duty takes 12 months. The length of the

service can be extended (so-called

Ehtefaz

ظ فتحا

in Arabic) in emergency situations. In addition,

after completing the Self-Defence Duty and being discharged, a certain group of persons (for

instance a certain age group) can be recalled to serve in the Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) as

reservists for a certain period of time (so-called

Ehtiat

ط يتحا

in Arabic), which also happens in

force

majeure

situations. The decision on

force majeure

or special emergency circumstances, which

determines the extension of the Self-Defence Duty or calling up reservists in each area is taken by

the E e uti e Cou il of the a ea ased o a p oposal f o the a ea s Milita Cou il. I ea h a

ea,

there is a Military Council, Executive Council and Legislative Council. In each area, there is also a

Committee of Defence which is also involved and consulted in discussions about approval of

force

majeure

in the area.

B a ea , the sou e ea s the se e ad i ist ati e a eas defi ed the AANES, that is Jazi e,

Euphrates (Furat), Manbij, Deir Ezzor, Tabqa and Raqqa (the seventh area is Afrin, which is

currently under the control of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army). Jazire has almost the same

boundaries as the Government of Syria (GoS)-defined Hasakah Govoernorate.

3. The HXP and the SDF are two separate forces. Whilst the SDF is administratively under the Board of

Defence (corresponding to a Ministry of Defence) of the AANES, the HXP is administered by the

Syrian Democratic Council (Majlis

Syria Al-Dimoqratiya

in Arabic; SDC), which is the political wing of

the SDF. SDC is a council for advising and conducting dialogue and talks in order to resolve the

challenges faced by all Syrians with regard to establishing a democratic system in Syria.

4. The Self-Defence Duty Law is being enforced in all six areas under the control of the AANES

mentioned above. However, due to the discontent with the law in some Arab-populated areas,

particularly in Manbij, the AANES had to show some flexibility and adjust the law and its

implementation in these areas in order to stem the discontent. For example, when there were

protests in Manbij in 2021, the representatives of the AANES met with the protesters and the

elders in the area in order to have the protests stopped. Based on these talks with the community,

the AANES paused the implementation of the Self-Defence Duty Law in Manbij and started

reviewing the implementation of the law in Manbij. This resulted, for instance, in a change of the

age criterion in Manbij from 18-40 to 18-24. However, the amendment of the law in Manbij,

including the new age criterion, was later also implemented in other areas.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

5. Conducting military service in the Syrian Arab Army does not exempt the person from the Self-

Defence Duty and vice versa. This is because the GoS does not recognise the AANES, and there is no

coordination between the GoS and the AANES on such issues.

6. No reservist has ever been recalled to serve in the HXP. This is because there are other and more

professional forces, i.e. the SDF, that are used in the

force majeure

situations, and the HXP are

mainly not used as a fighting force.

7. There have been cases of extension of the Self-Defence Duty. In such extension cases, the person

had to serve another couple of months upon completing his Self-Defence Duty.

8. If a person got a medical issue after being discharged from the Self-Defence Duty, he would not be

recalled for reserve.

9. Previously, persons between 18 and 40 were obliged to do Self-Defence Duty, but after an

amendment of the law in 2021, the age limit changed, so now it is persons between 18 and 24 who

are called up. A person who had his Self-Defence Duty postponed due to education and is older

than 24 years when he finishes his studies is not obliged to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

10. If a person evades his Self-Defence Duty and flees to another country, he must still do his Self-

Defence Duty upon return to North and East Syria (NES) even if he is older than the maximum age

of the Self-Defence Duty. If the person was younger than 18 when he left Syria and returns to

Rojava after turning 25, he will not be required to do the Self-Defence Duty.

11. Original residents of NES, who stay in other countries (except Turkey and Iraq), and who are obliged

to do the Self-Defence Duty, can have their service delayed for one year by paying a 400 USD fee.

By paying this fee, the person can enter Rojava and leave again without any problem. The delay can

be extended by paying 400 USD every year until the person complete the maximum age of 24. After

this age, he will be completely exempted. The complete exemption by paying a fee is not an option

according to the Self-Defence Duty Law, and the individual can only have his Self-Defence Duty

delayed by paying the 400 USD fee.

12. Medical workers, NGO employees and teachers are currently not exempted from the Self-Defence

Duty.

13. Calling up to the Self-Defence Duty is announced every year through different public media in NES

such as newspapers, TV etc. For instance, it is announced that persons born between this year and

that year should enlist for the Self-Defence Duty.

14. The individuals liable for the Self-Defence Duty must report to the Self-Defence Duty offices in their

areas and obtain a Self-Defe

e Dut ooklet i hi h the pe so s Self-Defence

Duty status is

recorded.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

15. If a person does not enlist and obtain the Self-Defence Duty booklet in due time and he approaches

a checkpoint, he will be alerted by the military police present at checkpoints about his duty to

enlist. After being alerted twice, if he still has not enlisted, he will be taken to the Self-Defence Duty

directly by force if he is caught by the military police for the third time.

16. There is no punishment for individuals evading the Self-Defence Duty; they are merely required to

do their Self-Defence Duty.

17. As regards deserters caught by the authorities, depending on the conditions of desertion, the

deserter may be brought before the military court. If his desertion has caused serious damages, he

might be punished; otherwise, he will merely be required to complete his service. The law does not

stipulate a certain punishment for desertion; it only says that the military court decides about the

punishment. If the military court decides that a deserter should be detained, for instance, for 15

days, these 15 days will not count as a part of the remaining duty period.

18. In general, the mission of the HXP is to fill the security vacuum in NES, i.e. to carry out the security

tasks not undertaken by the professional forces primarily responsible for defending the region. For

instance, in the urban areas, the

HXP is espo si le to gua d the pu li uildi gs a d the AANES s

institutions. The HXP may also be deployed to the frontlines to provide support to professional

forces fighting at the forefront (e.g. logistics, guarding the captured areas etc.). Generally, the HXP

are generally not used for or required to fight at the forefront, and any participation of individual

HXP e e s i fighti g is e el ased o the i di idual s olu ta de isio .

19. Under normal circumstances, Self-Defence conscripts receive their training and do their duty in

their own area, and will not be deployed to other areas. For instance, Self-Defence conscripts from

Hasakah will not be deployed to Deir Ezzour to do their service there. However, in

force majeure

situations and in special circumstances, the conscript can be requested to do his service in other

areas.

20. The Self-Defence conscripts stay at the HXP headquarters in the area they service. After completing

the initial 45 days training, conscripts can request and be granted leaves for seven days per month

to go home. During the training period, conscripts are not allowed to leave their training camp.

21. During the training period, conscripts receive military training as well as training in political

orientation. In the political training, the individual is taught in the political system in NES, and

uestio s su h as h a e e doi g Self-Defe e Dut ? a e a s e ed.

22. During the Self-Defence Duty, conscripts receive a symbolic salary, which changes occasionally. In

addition, they are provided with food while serving in the HXP, and they receive free medical

treatments during their service at certain hospitals that have agreement with the HXP. The free

treatment only covers the conscript, and not his family.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

23. The Self-Defence Duty booklet is the only document issued in connection with the Self-Defence

Duty. When the conscript finishes, his booklet is stamped as a proof of completing the Self-Defence

Duty.

24. The Self-Defence Duty also applies to every original resident of NES living within the boundaries of

the AANES, including Ajanib and Maktumin Kurds. This means that the AANES consider Ajanib and

Maktumin Kurds equal to all other residents of NES, and does not recognise the statelessness of

these groups imposed by the GoS.

25. However, there are not many Ajanib Kurds left in NES as the vast majority of them have obtained

Syrian citizenship and Syrian documents after the law passed in 2011 made it possible. There might

still be some Ajanib, who have deliberately refrained from obtaining Syrian citizenship to avoid

military service in the Syrian Arab Army. The source assumes that around 20,000 Maktumin Kurds

are presently living in NES.

26. The Self-Defence Duty Law does not apply to Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are not original

residents of NES. If a person has an ID card issued in NES, for instance in Hasakah, and he has

always lived outside NES, e.g. in Damascus, he will be considered an original resident in NES, and

the Self-Defence Duty Law applies to him. The law also applies to individuals from outside NES, who

have resided in NES for more than five years; this rule is still in force after the 2021 amendment to

the law. An IDP from Afrin would currently not be required to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

27. A person from outside NES residing in NES can join the HXP and do the Self-Defence Duty on a

voluntary basis.

Recruitment to SDF

28. Recruitment to all forces under the SDF takes place on a voluntary basis.

29. There have been cases of minors manipulating their ID documents in order to meet the SDF

minimum age criterion (18 years) and join the SDF. However, whenever the SDF finds out about

such cases, the individual will be dismissed immediately.

30. The Revolutionary Youth considers itself as a civil organisation, whose activities are focused on

young people in NES, for example preventing the youth from being dragged into drug abuse,

immoral actions or deeds etc. In addition, the Revolutionary Youth sees it as tis duty to promote

the general idea of self-defence in the NES society.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

31. Individuals, who are wanted by the GoS for military service, will most likely be taken by the GoS

authorities if they enter the areas in NES controlled by the GoS. If the GoS authorities detain such

person in for example Qamishli, they will send him to other areas under their control, for instance

to Damascus, and he will not be allowed to do his military service in Qamishli. The AANES security

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

forces occasionally intervene in such cases by detaining some of the GoS personnel and exchanging

them with the NES residents taken by the GoS.

Meeting with a Syrian Kurdish journalist, Erbil, 31 January 2022

The source is a Syrian Kurdish journalist working for a large international news company covering Syria. The

source is located in Erbil.

Implementation of the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law

1. The Self-Defence Duty is compulsory for adult men. The Syrian Kurdish journalist did not know of

any women having been forced to serve the Self-Defence Duty.

2. Reports from the news agency Rudaw indicate that some minors have been taken to serve the Self-

Defe e Dut . Ho e e , the sou e ould ot p o ide li ks to these epo ts o the delegatio s

request. It is especially families who are not affiliated with or sympathetic to the Kurdish

authorities whose children risk being conscripted to the Self-Defence Duty.

3. Theoretically, the Self-Defence Duty Law covers all areas of the Autonomous Administration of

North and East Syria (AANES) equally. However, since May 2021, conscription in Manbij has been

suspended following protests there. The Syrian Kurdish journalist has not heard of any suspension

being in force in other places in the AANES territory.

4. Draft evaders can be taken at checkpoints and through house raids.

5. If a draft evader is caught, he will be taken to the military headquarters. The evader will then be

sent to an area that is located far away from his home and given hard tasks. Draft evaders are not

fined.

6. A deserter could be detained. However, the Syrian Kurdish journalist did not know of any cases

where a deserter was actually caught and detained.

7. If the wanted recruit does not show up, the military police will visit his house to take him to the

service or gather information about his whereabouts. This puts a psychological pressure on the

family. It is possible that family members are called in for questioning as well. During the

uestio i g, the fa il e e s ill e asked a out the e ade s he ea outs a d h the

evader did not appear for service. If the military police are unhappy with the answers they will try

another way of pressure. However, the source did not specify what kind of pressure this is. This

practice is ongoing. The source has this knowledge from eyewitnesses and from stories of people

who the source knows.

8. Anyone from North and East Syria who is obliged to serve his Self-Defence Duty can pay 400 USD to

visit these areas and leave again without risk of being taken and forced to serve. This exemption is

valid for a year. It does not apply to persons living in Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Persons who have paid this amount has not faced any problems when visiting the AANES

territories.

9. The majority of people in North and East Syria opposes the Self-Defence Duty, which is reflected in

the number of people fleeing the service.

10. Conscripts in the Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP) are assigned to duties in other areas than their

home area, in order for them not to have an emotional attachment to where they serve. However,

persons with connections or money can take advantage of this to serve close to their home.

11. HXP is usually not deployed to the frontline; however, the force can be used for fighting in times of

conflict.

12. The Syrian Kurdish journalist has not heard of any discrimination of minorities during the in HXP.

Recruitment to SDF

13. There is no forced recruitment to the YPJ or the YPG. However, there are cases of minors who have

been encouraged to join. The encouragement can happen if there is a

so ial a uu i the i o s

personal life (e.g. love problems or family disputes) or through cultural activities. The agreement

between the UN and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led to a decrease in the number of minors in

the SDF.

Revolutionary Youth

14. The Revolutionary Youth is a political organisation. It does not have weapons, but it is used to

recruit minors to military forces. The organisation was established to relieve pressure from the SDF,

as it essentially has taken over the role of the SDF with regard to recruiting children.

Recruitment to PKK

15. PKK is the actual decision maker in the AANES. Some people in North and East Syria do not

distinguish between the SDF/AANES and the PKK, as they are considered as essentially the same.

16. There is no recruitment, forced or voluntary, to PKK/HPG in the AANES territories, but cadres from

PKK take up positions in AANES.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

17. The Syrian Kurdish journalist does not expect that young men wanted for conscription in the Syrian

Arab Army will face problems when entering the security squares in Qamishli and Hasakah.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Skype group meeting with three local residents, 1 February 2022

The sources are three individuals living in the area under the Kurdish self-administration.

279

Source 1: A

-year-old man from the city of Kobane.

Source 2: A 35-year-old from the city of Amuda. In 2018, he had to stop at his work and enlist for Self-

Defence Duty.

Source 3: A 35-year-old man from the township of Jawadieh in Hasaka Governorate. He has served the Self-

Defence Duty together with source 2.

The local population’s support for the Self-Defence

Duty

1. The vast majority of persons conducting the Selt-Defence Duty are those who are recruited at

checkpoints. One of the main reasons why people refrain from enlisting for the Self-Defence Duty is

the very low salary received during the duty. While the monthly salary in the Self-Defence Forces

(HXP) is approximately 22 USD (80.000 SYP), the salary of a SDF fighter is around 200 USD/ month.

Implementation of the law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

2. At the beginning of Self-Defence Duty, one receives 45 days of training, which consists of classes in

politics and ideology, physical training and military training.

3. There is a big difference between the mandatory Self-Defence Duty and serving in the SDF. For

instance, while the Self-Defence Duty is compulsory, serving in the SDF is voluntary. In addition, the

length of the service is different in these forces; whereas you only serve for one year in the HXP,

members of the SDF sign contracts of at least two years. Moreover, whilst SDF are professional

fighters, the HXP members are only trained for simple military tasks. Because of these differences,

the training received in these two forces is very different. Unlike the training in SDF, the military

training in the HXP is a very basic training, which means basic military exercises and a rudimentary

training in how to use an AK47. On the other hand, the SDF members receive training in different

types of weaponry. Source 2 mentioned that the military training received during his Self-Defence

Duty was so basic that even at the end of his Self-Defence Duty, he was not able to use an AK47 in a

professional way.

4. The authorities notify an evader twice about his duty to enlist by sending a notice to his house, and

if he does not show up, the military police will search for him at his address. However, most draft

evaders are identified and caught at checkpoints.

5. When an evader is identified and caught by the authorities, he may be detained one-two weeks

(depending on how the evasion has been and how the person is taken) until a proper training

location is found for him.

279

In addition to their personal experience from serving the Mandatory Self-Defense Duty, three residents have general knowledge

on recruitment in the NES based on their civil and social activities. For reasons of anonymity, these activities will not be further

elaborated on.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

6. Source 2 received two written notices sent to his residence. As he ignored the notices, the Asayish

searched for him at his address, but because he was not home, they looked for him at his

workplace and detained him near his workplace. He was in detention for five days after which he

was taken to a training camp and started serving his Self-Defence Duty.

7. Detained evaders are not subjected to ill-treatment during the detention period. Source 2 was not

beaten or ill-treated, and he was provided the same food as other inmates. The detention period is

ot edu ed f o the detai ee s Self-Defence

Duty period. The Self-Defence Duty period starts the

day, a person is deployed to a training camp.

8. According to what the sources have experienced during their Self-Defence Duty and what they

have heard from others, evasion will not have any impact on treatment of the conscripted evader

during the Self-Defence Duty, and the evaders will not be treated differently during the Self-

Defence Duty than other conscripts. What is important for the authorities is that people enlist and

do their Self-Defence Duty, and once they have started their duty, they do not care about whether

the person has been an evader or not.

9. No discrimination against minority groups (Arabs, Christians etc.) takes place during the Self-

Defence Duty, and the sources have not heard of or seen cases of discrimination against Arabs or

other minorities during their service. Source 3 mentioned that on the contrary, the ethnic

minorities could even be treated slightly better than Kurds during their service, because the

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is a predominantly Kurdish

administration, and the authorities are not interested in being known for ill-treating ethnic

minorities. For example, a Kurdish conscript may have to ask for permission to leave (to visit his

family etc.) three-four times before he is permitted, whilst an Arab conscript can be granted

permission immediately. According to source 3, the only discrimination, which the source has heard

of, is that well-educated conscripts may receive a relatively better treatment during their service

compared to those with a lower educational background. An example of this difference in

treatment is that a well-educated conscript can become commander of a small group whilst a lower

educated conscript cannot.

10. As regards the age of conscription, in 2018, the authorities called up persons born between 1986

and 2000. Now, due to a recent decision, they conscript persons born in 1997 and later.

11. In the event a person can present evidence and convince the authorities that he suffers from

certain disabilities or diseases (e.g. cancer or other chronical diseases), which according to the Self-

Defence Duty Law makes him eligible for exemption, he will go through medical examination. Slight

diseases, e.g. scars after an accident, would not lead to medical exemption. Only sons are still being

exempted. Previously, if a person had a brother or sister, who were serving or had served in other

forces [e.g. YPG, YPJ etc.], he could according to the law be exempted from the Self-Defence Duty,

but this exemption has not been enforced within the last four years.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

12. Family members to a martyr are being exempted from the Self-Defence Duty.

13. Two brothers in a family, who are in the Self-Defence Duty age and are thus obliged to do their

service, can either do their service one by one or they can do it simultaneously depending on their

own preferences.

14. A person, who joins SDF and serves the period stipulated in his contract with SDF (e.g. two years),

will be exempted from the Self-Defence Duty after leaving the SDF.

15. The law provision regarding delaying the Self-Defence Duty is being enforced and students can

have their Self-Defence Duty delayed by one year at a time.

16. There have been cases of Self-Defence Duty period being extended. The Self-Defence Duty period

of source 2 and 3 was extended with one month in 2018 due to the extraordinary security situation

in Baghouz where the SDF were fighting against the Islamic State. The sources have not heard of

cases of persons being called up as reservists upon completing their Self-Defence Duty.

17. In general, the HXP are not used for fighting at frontlines. For instance, the main task of the group

within the HXP, which source 2 and 3 belonged to during their service, was to protect and secure

the road between the Al-Omar oil field and Al-Tanak oil field in the Deir Ezzour Governorate.

Another example of tasks conducted by the HXP is the protection of the three main dams in Syria,

which are located in the areas controlled by the AANES.

18. However, there have been situations where the authorities have used the HXP for fighting, for

example during the operation in Raqqa in 2017 and in the recent prison riot in Hasakah in January

2022. During the prison riot in Hasakah, nine members of the HXP who were guarding the prison,

were killed during the clashes with the IS.

19. It is the authorities, who decide where a conscript should serve his Self-Defence Duty, and this

de isio is take o the asis of the i di idual s assig e t. Although oth sou e a d

are from

the Hasakah Governorate, they served their Self-Defence Duty in the Deir Ezzour Governorate.

20. After October 2019, as a part of ceasefire deal, two agreements were concluded between Turkey

and Russia and between Turkey and the USA. According to these agreements, the AANES forces

should keep a distance of at least three kilometres from Kobane. Because of this, around 70 % of

the HXP in Kobane have had to conduct their Self-Defence Duty in the Hasakah Governorate

despite that Kobane is a part of the Aleppo Governorate.

21. The sources have never heard of cases of violation against civilians, e.g. attacks against civilian

areas, arbitrary arrests or torturing civilians etc., committed by the HXP. These forces have their

well-defined rules, duties and activities, which is mainly focused on defending and protecting

buildings, roads, installations etc. and are thus not involved in activities, which could lead to

violations against civilians.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

22. The sources knew of many cases of persons who deserted from their Self-Defence Duty upon

completing the initial training. As an example, source 2 and 3 mentioned that when they started

their Self-Defence Duty training, they were part of a group of around 1,200 conscripts. After

completing the training, many asked for a short leave to visit their families. However, there were

only 500 who returned to their duties; the rest had deserted. Whilst some deserters, particularly in

Arab populated areas, go to their villages and stay with their families until they are caught, others

flee the area and leave the country. There are formal penalties for deserters who are caught, and

they may be sentenced to two months imprisonment. However, the authorities at certain

occasions, e.g. Nawrooz (the Kurdish new year), issue amnesties lifting the punishment against

deserters. There are also amnesties addressing evaders or deserters who are not caught yet. In

such cases, the authorities forgive evasion or desertion if the evaders or deserters in turn enlist for

the Self-Defence Duty within a given deadline.

23.

E asio o dese tio has o o se ue es fo the e ade s o dese te s fa il e e s a d the

authorities will not touch the parents or the relatives of the person. The authorities may conduct

house search to find a deserter or evade

, ut the ill, ased o the sou es e pe ie es, e e

take family members. Previously, it was the Asayish that conducted house raids, but since the

establishment of the military police department three-four years ago, it is the military police who

out house sea hes. I the sou es e pe ie es, that the AANES a e ge e all e se siti e

about their reputation in the media and among the population, and are not interested in doing

something, which may damage their reputation. This applies not only to how their behaviour is

perceived with regard to the implementation of the Self-Defence Duty, but also to other fields of

administration.

Recruitment to SDF

24. Recruitment of men and women to the SDF takes place on a voluntary basis and the sources have

not heard of any case of forced recruitment to these forces. The only forced recruitment occurring

in the areas under AANES is the recruitment to the HXP. The Kurdish forces and their affiliates may

take advantage of the poor socio-economic conditions or the family issues, which young men and

women face to encourage them to join their forces as a way to escape from these problems.

However, they never grab and kidnap anyone in order to recruit him or her by force.

25. One finds minors in the ranks of SDF. However, the minors join the SDF because they are

encouraged to join, and not because they or their families have been terrorised. An organisation

alled the Re olutio a Youth RY use eeti gs ith stude ts a d a ti ities at ultu al e t es

such as music to encourage the minors to join them. Even though these activities may not

necessarily lead to the individual minor deciding to join the SDF, he or she would gradually get

convinced that he or she could join the SDF as the first place of refuge whenever facing social,

economic or family issues.

26. The RY will not immediately use their new members for military purposes. They are instead

ideologically prepared through training courses to advance within the ranks of the RY and gradually

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

get the impression of being important to the group. Eventually, some of these young recruits will

end up joining SDF. According to the sources, although the RY would like to present and identify

itself as a civil group or organisation, the fact that the activities would eventually lead to

recruitment of some of minors to military groups raises suspicion about the true nature of the

organisation. The sources do not believe that the RY is affiliated with any parts of the AANES; they

rather assume that the organisation is connected to some unknown shadow groups or

organisations. This is because there are even persons in the AANES, whose children have joined the

RY, and the parents do not know what happens to their children in the RY, what they do and where

they are. However, even if it is difficult to know for certain that the RY are affiliated to the PKK, the

la k of o e tio to the AANES a d the si ila it of the RY s s

ols a d flags to those of PKK

makes it difficult to conclude otherwise.

27. The RY has offices in almost all cities in NES. Their members are young people (mostly under 30

years old). The members run their offices, and they for instance initiate demonstrations and

student meetings to agitate the youth whenever there is a political issue going on. Their members

do not wear uniforms, however they are identifiable by the way they carry themselves around, the

way they gathe, the way they speak, the special terminology used by them, the music they listen to

etc. Thus, it is easy for normal people to identify them and to distinguish between them and other

youth.

Recruitment to the PKK

28. The PKK has never recruited members by force in NES, neither in the past nor at present.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

29. If a person, who is wanted by the Government of Syria (GoS) for military service or for other

reasons, enters the areas controlled by the GoS in Qamishli and Hasakah, he will be in high risk of

being arrested by the Syrian authorities. There have been cases of persons being arrested when

entering into these areas, but then released because the Asayish succeeded in exchanging them

with GoS-affiliated persons whom the Asayish had in their custody. However, in such cases, the

person detained by the GoS is usually affiliated with the AANES, i.e. serving in the AANES or being

connected to someone in the AANES. The AANES will not interfere and try to release a civilian who

is not affiliated with the self-administration.

Meeting with a university professor, Erbil, 28 January 2022

The source is a Syrian Kurdish university professor and lecturer in politics and philosophy at a university in

the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The source has written several books and articles about Kurds in Syria. He is

used as an expert by a number of international media on the political and military situation in the North and

East Syria (NES).

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

The local population’s support for the Self-Defence

Duty

1. Due to the Kurdish-ideological nature and foundation of the Self-Defence Duty, the population in

the Arab-populated areas of North and East Syria (NES), e.g. Deir Ezzour, Raqqa, has rejected to do

service in the Self-Defence Duty Forces (HXP), and the Self-Defence Duty has not been

implemented in these areas to the same extent as in the Kurdish-populated areas (e.g. Hasakah). In

addition, because of the dire socio-economic situation and high employment, the Arab population

prefer to join the ranks of the SDF to receive better salaries and services offered to the SDF

members. Many Arab members of the SDF were previously members of the Syrian opposition

groups.

Implementation of the mandatory Self-Defence Duty Law

2. The exemption rules stipulated in the Self-Defence Duty Law are implemented in practice. The

source has not heard of cases of extension of the Self-Defence Duty beyond the mandatory service

of one year. Generally, there is a very sensitive public opinion in Rojava and the Autonomous

Administration of North and Easy Syria (AANES) authorities are very careful about their reputation

in media with regard to implementation of the AANES laws and regulations

3. Arabs or other minority groups are not being subjected to discrimination during the Self-Defence

Duty. One cannot rule out the possibility that an individual commander could have a certain

discriminating attitude towards persons who do not belong to his ethnic group. But the source has

never heard of cases of Arabs or other ethnic groups being subjected to discrimination in the HXP.

4. Evaders will be forced to do their Self-Defence Duty if they are caught by the military police. The

source assumes that Arab evaders would not be forced to join the HXP to the same extent as

Kurdish evaders would. Evasion will not have any impact on the family members of the evader. The

source know of several young Syrian Kurds, who evaded the Self-Defence Duty, fled to the

Kurdistan Region of Iraq and joined the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces whilst their families are still

living in NES, and nothing has happened to their families.

5. Deserters will be forced to resume their Self-Defence Duty and complete it in the event they are

caught by the authorities. There is a large number of Self-Defence Duty deserters who have fled to

and live in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Desertion will not have any consequences for the family

members of the deserter. This is because the authorities in general are not interested in having the

society turned against them by subjecting the families of deserters or evaders to a type of

treatment, which would provoke protests and discontent. In addition, in most families in NES, there

is at least one family member who has voluntarily joined one of the Kurdish forces in NES. Against

this background, it would be very difficult for the authorities to put pressure on the families

because of the desertion or evasion of a family member.

6. The source has not heard of cases of house raids where the authorities try to find evaders or

deserters at their home. Evaders and deserters are usually taken at checkpoints.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

7. HXP is not meant to be used for fighting at the forefront. The ideological purpose of the Self-

Defence Duty is to prepare the youth for emergency security situations. The Self-Defence

conscripts are mainly used for internal security tasks in the cities. The source has not heard of cases

of Self-Defence conscripts being deployed to the forefront for fighting.

Recruitment to SDF

8. The source has not heard of specific cases of individuals being recruited into the ranks of the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) by force.

9. After the battle of Kobane in January 2015, YPG and YPJ achieved a huge international popularity,

and many Kurdish men and women wanted to join these forces. Later on, the SDF was built on this

popularity, which further increased by the emergence of the Islamic State and the necessity to

protect the Kurdish population against such threats. Thus, the SDF has so far not faced challenges

with regard to recruitment of people wanting to join them voluntarily.

10. However, the SDF as well as the AANES in general are ideological institutions, whose pro-PKK

ideolog akes the ul e a le to PKK s i flue e a d i te fe e e i thei de isio s a d p a ti e

as an independent force or an independent bureaucratic state administration respectively. The PKK

has thus some influence within the leadership ranks of the SDF and the AANES. Because of this

influence, pro-PKK groups such as the Revolutionary Youth have free hands to recruit and train

young people and prepare them ideologically and militarily to join the PKK outside NES (i.e. Qandil

Mountains). The reason why the PKK tries to recruit young members through the Revolutionary

Youth in NES is that they cannot do it as freely in the Kurdish areas of Turkey as in NES, due to the

strict monitoring and control measures the Turkish authorities have adopted on the Turkish side.

11. There is, in general, no forced recruitment of young people to groups like the Revolutionary Youth

by a car coming and kidnapping them on the street. There might be a few cases like this, but in

general, mafia-like methods of terrorising people or kidnapping is not the modus operandi of such

groups. It is rather a combination of a number of social and psychological factors, which makes

young people to join these groups voluntarily; factors like poor educational background, social

problems, which the individual is facing in his or her community and in Syria in general, ideological

propaganda by the Revolutionary Youth etc. For instance, when a girl leaves her family because of

social and cultural issues, she faces a vacuum, which is filled and exploited by the Revolutionary

Youth. Once a young person is recruited to the Revolutionary Youth and has been through their

ideological programs and training in their training camps, his or her mind will be so affected by the

g oup s ideology,

he or she will not even wish to return to his or her community and family. The

fact that new recruits live in a training camp and see other young people like themselves, and that

the a e o sta tl o a ded the g oup s ideolog has a huge ps hological

impact on their

minds. Those, who join the Revolutionary Youth, will eventually join the PKK and not the SDF.

12. Among the pro-PKK groups, it is only the Revolutionary Youth who recruit minors into their ranks.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

13. As far as the source is informed, the SDF do currently not recruit minors. Previously, the source

knew of individual cases of minors being recruited to the SDF, as these cases came to public

attention. However, those identified cases were resolved as the minors in question were dismissed.

The source does not know of new cases of SDF recruitment of minors. According to the source,

reports about the recruitment of minors are sometimes politically motivated by the political

fractions who are opposed to the AANES and the SDF.

Recruitment to the PKK

14. No forced recruitment to the PKK is taking place in NES, partly because using force is generally not

the method used by the PKK to recruit new members, but also because a great number of current

PKK members come from NES, and it would be strategically unwise to use force to recruit new

members in their own communities.

Ajanib Kurds

15. There are not many Ajanib Kurds left in NES as they have obtained Syrian Citizenship and

documents after the implementation of Decree 49 in 2011. The source was a participant in the

delegation that negotiated the issue of Ajanib with the GoS at the Republican Palace in 2007.

Skype meeting with a university researcher, 19 January 2022

The source is a Danish researcher. The source has done research on Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq.

Recruitment to SDF

1. Recruitment to the YPG and YPJ is voluntary. Soldiers are given a salary of 200 USD/month. In

addition, YPG and YPJ soldiers are seen as heroes by many who want to join them

2. A recruit to YPG/YPJ is initially given three months of training, including a lot of ideological training,

before being given a five-week leave. After this period, the person can sign a 2-year agreement

with YPG/YPJ. It is not possible to become a cadre already after the initial training.

3. Cadres can fulfil military as well as civilian assignments. It is possible to stop working as a cadre, but

the person risk being condemned by others.

4. The source has never personally met a minor soldier in YPG or YPJ. However, the source

interviewed once a 20 years old YPJ member, who said that she had joined YPJ when she was 15.

The woman underlined that at that time, the YPJ did not want her to join the force at that time

because of her age, however she insisted on staying in the forces and refused to go home. As far as

the source was informed by the YPG and YPJ members during his research, these forces generally

did not recruit minors. Nevertheless they added that some minors were recruited by the YPG and

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

YPJ during the fights against the Islamic State.

5. There can be a sort of social pressure for a person to join the YPG/YPJ, for instance if other family

members are or have been a part of these forces. Some women also decide to join the YPJ in order

to avoid marriage.

6. In addition to Kurds, the SDF also has Christians, Arabs and other minorities under its umbrella.

More than half of the Asayish are Arabs.

Recruitment to PKK/HPG

7. It is difficult to prove if there is an organisational link between YPG and HPG or between PYD and

PKK; however, they share the same ideology. There are many pictures of the PKK leader Abdullah

Öcalan in official buildings in North and East Syria (NES).

8. The SDF leader Mazloum Abdi is a former member of the PKK. After the establishment of the

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), many Syrian PKK members joined

YPG.

9. There is a visual difference between HPG and SDF forces, as the former wear traditional Kurdish

garments while the latter wear military uniforms.

10. PKK/HPG do not recruit members by force in AANES.

The Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

11. There is a mandatory Self-Defence Duty in the Kurdish-administered areas in NES. The purpose of

the duty is to prepare people to defend themselves, and the conscripts are not used at the

frontlines.

Meeting with Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Erbil, 26 January 2022

Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a freelance journalist, political analyst and author of several books on Kurds in

Syria. He has worked on the topic since 2005 and has been based in Erbil since 2014.

Implementation of the law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

1. The Self-Defence Duty is mandatory in every region governed by the Autonomous Administration

of North and East Syria (AANES). However, in recently taken (Arab-majority) areas like in Deir ar

Zour, Raqqa, and Manbij, the AANES have been more careful to implement conscription, since they

do not want the population to turn against them

2. The rules of the Self-Defence Duty Law are being implemented differently in different parts of the

AANES-controlled area. For instance, the age limit of those wanted for military service differs from

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

area to area. However, the AANES tries to change this to have only one age range.

3. Arabs are also called up for the Self-Defence Duty, and they are treated similarly to Kurds during

their service. Maktoumin and Ajanib are also required to serve the Self-Defence Duty. But in some

majority Arab areas they are more careful to fully implement the duty.

4. Recently, the AANES has made some exemptions to conscription in some the Arab-majority areas,

e.g. all of Deir Ezzour. There have also been suspensions of conscription in areas in Manbij.

5. Women are not required to serve the Self-Defence Duty, however, there are women who join the

Self-Defence Forces (HXP) voluntarily.

6. It is possible for individuals residing abroad, who are obliged to do the Self-Defence Duty, to pay

money to postpone the duty in order to be allowed to visit the AANES territory and leave again.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg is not aware of whether it only applies to people in Europe or also for

those in KRI, and does not have detailed information on the enforcement of exemption rules.

7. There is a special military police who sometimes check IDs at checkpoints to see whether the males

passing through the checkpoint are wanted for the Self-Defence Duty. This is not conducted at all

checkpoints, but happens randomly.

8. If the person stopped at a checkpoint does not have the necessary document (i.e. military booklet)

showing that he is serving or have served the Self-Defence Duty, he will be asked to get the

document and come back.

9. There are checkpoints many places in the Hasaka Governorate. They are mostly located at the

entrance or exit a city, but not in the city itself. It is difficult to omit these checkpoints unless you

live by a small village road or similar.

10. The source has not heard about the possibility of conscientious objections to conscription in the

HXP.

11. Wladimir van Wilgenburg has not heard of examples of house raids in order to find draft evaders or

deserters.

12. The source has not heard of cases of persons being called up again as reservists after being

discharged from the Self-Defence Duty.

13. The Self-Defence Duty is partly an ideological move to get people to know the AANES system and

ideology.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Self-Defence Forces

14. In the AANES system, the HXP is not a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). There is a special

commander for the HXP. However, in general and in the media, HXP is regarded as a part of the

SDF.

15. The HXP pay their conscripts a symbolic amount during the service.

16. Generally, HXP is meant to be an auxiliary force, which means that it is not an active fighting force

used at the frontline; its main task is to protect supply lines in the background. When the SDF

needs forces, the HXP can be allocated to a specific area, e.g. for guarding checkpoints. Initially, the

HXP was also meant to be border guards, but it is no longer part of their tasks to guard the borders.

17. The HXP is not a law enforcement force and it is not its duty for instance to imprison people. There

have been reports of arbitrary arrests of the KNC supporters. However, these arrests have been

conducted by the Assayish or proxy groups, and not by the HXP.

18. As far as Wladimir van Wilgenburg is aware, there are no HXP forces inside the IS camps, e.g. Al-Hol

Camp, in Hasaka governorate. However, HXP might be placed around those camps for guarding.

Asayish is responsible for the security inside Al-Hol Camp. There were also reports HXP was

involved in guarding prisons.

Recruitment to SDF

19. The SDF has enough soldiers and do not need to recruit by force.

20. There is no forced recruitment to any of the SDF groups. People sometimes join the SDF for

economic reasons, i.e. good salary.

21.

The e ha e ee e a ples of i o s ho a ted to joi the SDF ithout thei pa e ts app oval.

These minors ran away and joined the SDF voluntarily, whilst their parents called it kidnapping.

According to the source, it is often a matter of definition when it is reported by the parents that

thei hild has ee kid apped ; the pa e ts te d to

consider recruitment of minors without their

o se t as kid appi g although the i o has joi ed the SDF his o he o

ill.

Violations committed by SDF

22. There have been areas where the Islamic State was present (Manbij and Tishreen Dam), which was

the reason why the SDF did not allow displaced civilians from these areas to return for a certain

period. The SDF was accused of discriminatory treatment of people. However, according to the UN

Secretary-General, the lack of IDPs access to the areas was not based on a discriminatory treatment

of them due to their ethnic origin. Now, those IDPs they have been allowed to return to their areas.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

23. Wladimir von Wilgenburg has not heard of reports of SDF jailing people without trial, but noted

that it is possible that it could happen. However on the contrary, media has reported that

thousands of suspected Islamic State members are put on trial by the AANES.

Conscription to the Syrian Arab Army

24. The SDF does not allow the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to conscript people in the areas in Hasakah

Governorate where the Syrian authorities are in control. In the past there has been some issues

with that, but there has a

de facto

ban on the recruitment by the SAA based on the SDF control, but

that does not mean that the Government of Syria (GoS) is not trying to conscript in AANES.

Previously, there have been fights and discussions between SDF and SAA regarding recruitment in

the AANES areas.

25. As a part of reconciliation agreement, the SAA asked Arabs from AANES areas to travel to areas

where the GoS is in control to join the SAA.

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Annex II: Copy of military booklet

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 120: Orientering om ny rapport vedrørende situationen i Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

S YRI A

–

MI LI TA R Y RE C R UI T ME N T IN HA S AK AH G OVE RNO R AT E

Annex III: Terms of Reference

1. Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate

1.1. Implementation of the Law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

1.1.1. Discharge of conscripts upon completing Self-Defence Duty

1.1.2. Prevalence of reconscription after being discharged

1.1.3. Enforcement of exemption rules with regard to recruitment to the Self-Defence Forces

(HXP)

1.1.4. Prevalence of forced recruitment of women to HXP

1.1.5. Prevalence of forced recruitment of minors to HXP

1.1.6. Ethnic groups recruited to HXP and treatment of minority groups (e.g. Arabs) while serving

the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

1.1.7. Consequences of draft evasion and desertion from the Mandatory Self-Defence Duty,

ludi g o se ue es fo the pe so s fa il

1.1.8. Documentation of having performed Mandatory Self-Defence Duty

1.1.9. Involvement of HXP in active fighting

1.1.10. Involvement of HXP in violations against civilians or other types of human rights violations

1.2. Prevalence of forced recruitment to SDF

1.2.1. Prevalence of forced recruitment of men

1.2.2. Prevalence of forced recruitment of women

1.2.3. Prevalence of forced recruitment of minors

1.3. Prevalence of conscription to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

1.4. Prevalence of recruitment to HPG (PKK)