Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2021-22
UUI Alm.del Bilag 119
Offentligt
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COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)
BRIEF REPORT
Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2021-22
UUI Alm.del - Bilag 119
Offentligt
JUNE 2022
Afghanistan
Taliban’s impact on the
population
us.dk
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This report is not, and does not purport to be, a detailed or comprehensive survey of
all aspects of the issues addressed. It should thus be weighed against other country
of origin information available on the topic.
The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations. The information
does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any
particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be
regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.
The report is a synthesis of information gathered from different sources, and it
brings together condensed information in a relevant manner for the reader’s COI
needs and it organises information together thematically to form a coherent whole
of the topic in question, instead of listing or quoting information source by source.
© 2022 The Danish Immigration Service
The Danish Immigration Service
Farimagsvej 51A
4700 Næstved
Denmark
Phone: +45 35 36 66 00
us.dk
June 2022
All rights reserved to the Danish Immigration Service.
The publication can be downloaded for free at us.dk/landeoplysninger
The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source
reference.
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Executive summary
The conditions for vulnerable groups in Afghanistan, women in particular, have been impacted by the
Taliban takeover, e.g. strict rules for covering their bodies and their freedom of movement.
Regarding the
state s a ilit a d illi g ess to p o ide p ote tio fo o e , the legal f a e o k put i
pla e to p ote t o e s ights has e oded afte the Tali a assu ed po e , si e sha ia la o
constitutes the only legal framework in Afghanistan.
The Taliban has issued guidelines for reporting in Afghanistan, which has limited the journalistic space, and
there have been reports of violations against journalists, as well as human rights defenders.
The number of conflict related security incidents have remained somewhat low compared to before the
Tali a s takeo e ith the ota le e eptio of
the month of Ramadan (March and April 2022) with
several explosions in Hazara and Shia communities causing several casualties. Many of which the Islamic
State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has accepted the responsibility for, generating questions among Afghans, on
whether the Taliban government is capable and willing to protect all Afghans against ISKP, including the
minorities.
On the other hand, the crime level has gone up since mid-August. The rise in crime in Afghanistan has
especially affected Kabul and other big cities, where financially motivated enrichment crimes such as
robberies and kidnappings have spiked since August 2021.
Even though a large number of Afghans affiliated with the former government were evacuated abroad,
many employees of the former government remain in the country. This includes former
Afghanistan
National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF), government personnel, police officers as well as their
families, who have been subjected to different forms of violations, including killings, arrests, house
searches etc.
The Taliban generally has a well-developed intelligence network throughout the country, especially in the
rural parts of Afghanistan, where they have had a strong presence as an insurgency. On the other hand,
their intelligence network is less developed in areas where they had little or no presence prior to August
2021.
The information regarding the prevalence of Afghans who have returned from Europe since August 2021,
including Afghans who were evacuated from Afghanistan is highly limited, since return programmes are no
longer in place in the country.
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Table of contents
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................ 1
Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 4
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Map of Afghanistan................................................................................................................................ 7
1.
Background..................................................................................................................................... 8
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
Access to information in Afghanistan ................................................................................................ 8
Taliban governance ........................................................................................................................... 9
An unfolding humanitarian crisis ..................................................................................................... 10
Health care sector under pressure .......................................................................................... 10
1.3.1.
2.
3.
Insecurity and crime levels ............................................................................................................ 12
Targeted individuals ...................................................................................................................... 14
3.1.
Afghans with links to the former government ................................................................................ 14
Armed forces ........................................................................................................................... 15
Civil servants ............................................................................................................................ 17
3.1.1.
3.1.2.
3.2.
Employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs, or foreign
embassies in Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................ 18
3.2.1.
3.2.2.
3.3.
3.4.
4.
5.
6.
Employees of foreign troops ................................................................................................... 18
NGOs, international organisations and foreign embassies ..................................................... 18
Journalists ........................................................................................................................................ 19
Human rights defenders .................................................................................................................. 21
Family members to targeted individuals ........................................................................................ 22
Monitoring and intelligence gathering ........................................................................................... 23
Vulnerable groups ......................................................................................................................... 25
6.1.
Women ............................................................................................................................................ 25
Freedom of movement ............................................................................................................ 25
Women without a male support network ............................................................................... 26
Wo e s a ess to jo
a kets
.............................................................................................. 26
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.1.4.
6.1.5.
6.2.
Women who defy the Taliban ................................................................................................. 27
Gender-based violence (GBV).................................................................................................. 27
Ethnic and religious minorities, including converts......................................................................... 28
Shia .......................................................................................................................................... 29
6.2.1.
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6.2.2.
6.2.3.
6.3.
Sikhs, Jews, Salafis, Christians and converts............................................................................ 29
Other ethnic minorities ........................................................................................................... 30
LGBT ................................................................................................................................................. 31
Change in the situation for LGBT since August 2021............................................................... 31
Treatment of LGBT people by families and local communities ............................................... 32
Accessibility of health care for LGBT people ........................................................................... 32
6.3.1.
6.3.2.
6.3.3.
6.4.
7.
Musicians, well-educated and members of the intelligentsia......................................................... 32
Rule of law.................................................................................................................................... 34
7.1.
7.2.
7.3.
Honour-related conflicts.................................................................................................................. 34
People with a personal conflict with members of the Taliban........................................................ 35
Wo e s a ess to seek ed ess
..................................................................................................... 35
Shelters and safe houses ......................................................................................................... 36
7.3.1.
7.4.
7.5.
7.6.
8.
Situation for children ....................................................................................................................... 36
Mi o ities a ess to seek ed ess
................................................................................................... 37
LGBT people s a ess to seek ed ess
............................................................................................. 37
Conditions for Afghans returned to Afghanistan ............................................................................ 38
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 39
Written sources ........................................................................................................................................... 39
Annex 1: Terms of Reference (ToR), 3 March 2022 ............................................................................... 48
Annex 2: Meeting minutes ................................................................................................................... 49
Skype meeting with an international organisation ..................................................................................... 49
Skype meeting with an international humanitarian organisation............................................................... 55
Meeting with IOM........................................................................................................................................ 64
Meeting with a representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan ........................................ 68
DACAAR, Skype meeting, 18 March 2022.................................................................................................... 73
Meeting with Amina Khan ........................................................................................................................... 77
Minutes
f o
I te ie
ith L
e O Do
ell
........................................................................................... 81
Minutes from Interview with male human rights defender ........................................................................ 85
Written answers by a UN national staff in Afghanistan .............................................................................. 87
Online meeting with a member of civil society in Afghanistan ................................................................... 89
A well-informed journalist with years of experience covering Afghanistan ............................................... 91
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Introduction
This present report is a product of a Danish Immigration Service (DIS) mission to Islamabad, Pakistan from
28 March to 5 April 2022. The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information on the situation
for the civilian population in Afghanistan since the Taliban assumed power in August 2021. The report
distinguishes between targeted individuals and vulnerable groups . Targeted individuals include
government officials, journalists, human rights defenders, Afghans employed by foreign forces and
international organisations as well as former members of the Afghan security forces. Vulnerable groups
include women and girls, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities and members of the intelligentsia in
Afghanistan. Moreover, the report covers the the Rule of Law as well as crime levels and the conditions for
returnees.
The report at hand is an update of several sections in the reports by DIS:
Afghanistan: Recent events
which
was published in December 2021 and
Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact on
civilians and targeted individuals
published in September 2021.
The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the mission were drawn up by DIS after consultation with the defined
target users of the report, in particular the Secretariat of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board and the Asylum
Division of DIS as well as a Danish advisory group on COI.
1
ToR is included in Annex 1 of this report.
In the process of compiling this report, the delegation interviewed 13 sources comprising non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists, think-tanks, human rights defenders and international
organisations. The sources interviewed were selected by the delegation based on their expertise, merit and
experience relevant to the mission. Multiple sourcing is implemented to ensure that the collected data is
precise and balanced. The objective is to present a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues
relevant to ToR at the time of publication. The sources consulted are listed in Annex 2. In addition to the
information gathered from the interviews, the report is also based on available reports as well as articles of
relevance for ToR.
The interviews were conducted in either English or Danish. Some interviews were conducted during
meetings in Islamabad, while others were conducted via Skype.
Prior to the interviews, all interlocutors were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the mission and
the fact that their statements would be included in a report made publicly available. The interlocutors were
asked how they wished to be introduced and quoted, and all sources are introduced and quoted according
to their own wishes. All but four sources preferred anonymity.
All meeting minutes were forwarded to the interlocutors for their approval and amendment, allowing them
the opportunity to offer corrections or make comments on their statements. All but two sources responded
and approved their statements. The two sources in question were informed that in case the delegation did
not receive a response to its request for approval within a specific deadline, the delegation would consider
the meeting minutes approved. The meeting minutes are thus included in the report. The statements of
1
The group consists of the Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International in Denmark, the Danish Institute for Human Rights,
Dignity, representatives of Danish European Mission and Open Doors, the National Commissioner of Police and the Danish Bar and
Law Society (representing asylum lawyers).
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two additional sources are not included in the report, since both sources chose to withdraw the
information given.
The report is a synthesis of the sources' statements. Care has been taken to present the views of the
interlocutors as accurately and transparently as possible. For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency
and accuracy, paragraphs in the minutes of the interviews in Annex 2 have been numbered in a consecutive
order, used in the report when referring to the statements of the sources in the footnotes.
The uotatio
a ks
a e ot used i the epo t he e e
the text is a copy of the meeting minutes,
however, a reference is made in the footnotes to the paragraphs where the text is cited from.
During the interview, the source may have highlighted issues that are not addressed in the ToR. As these
issues could be relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the meeting summary in
Annex 2, but not in the report.
Attention should be called to the volatile and unstable situation in Afghanistan and the fact that the
information provided may quickly become outdated. Therefore, the issues addressed in this report should
be monitored regularly and the information be brought up to date accordingly. The rapid change in the
control and security situation across the country in recent months can also have led to underreporting and
the reporting of false information regarding security incidents and targeted attacks against the civilian
population, especially in the remote parts of Afghanistan.
The report has been externally peer reviewed by the Norwegian COI-unit, Landinfo, in accordance with the
EASO COI Report Methodology.
2
The research and editing of this report was finalised on 10 June 2022.
2
EASO,
EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology,
June 2019,
url
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Abbreviations
AAN
AIHRC
ANDSF
COI
GBV
DACAAR
EASO
EUAA
HRW
IED
IFJ
ISKP
IOM
NDS
RSF
ToR
UNAMA
UNHCR
WHO
Afghanistan Analysts Network
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
Country of Origin Information
Gender-Based Violence
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
European Asylum Support Office
European Union Asylum Agency
Human Rights Watch
Improvised Explosive Device
International Federation of Journalists
Islamic State of Khorasan Province
International Organization for Migration
National Directorate of Security
Reporters Without Borders
Terms of Reference
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
World Health Organisation
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Map of Afghanistan
Map 1: Afghanistan, Map No. 3958 Rev. 7, June 2011, UNITED NATIONS
3
3
UN, Afghanistan, Map No. 3958 Rev. 7, June 2011,
url
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1. Background
1.1. Access to information in Afghanistan
The flow of information in Afghanistan has been affected by the Taliban assuming power, and local Afghan
edia ha e e pe ie ed a ollapse si e August
.
4
Many Afghan news outlets have closed since the
Taliban takeover, in part because many Afghan journalists have fled the country and in part because of the
economic crisis in Afghanistan.
5
For more in this,
see section 3.3. Journalists.
According to International
Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the number of operating newspapers in Afghanistan shrunk from 114 to 20
between August 2021 and February 2022.
6
Moreover, five sources consulted for this report noted that the
Taliban has clamped down on independent journalism and targeted Afghan journalists who criticized the
new authorities in the country.
7
There have also been cases of local Taliban leaders trying to censor local
news reports by reviewing journalistic pieces before publication.
8
The remaining Afghan news outlets have had to adapt their content to the new conditions and limitations
in terms of what can be reported. This has had an effect on both the volume of reporting coming out of
Afghanistan
–
especially the peripheral parts of the country
–
as well as the content of the reporting.
9
In the wake of the Taliban conquest of the country, many international news outlets have retracted their
staff, and they now cover Afghanistan without permanent presence in the country.
10
International news
outlets have also been subject to censorship by the Taliban leadership since assuming power. In March
2022, Deutsche Welle (DW) had a political talk show cancelled, the BBC had their news bulletins in Pashto,
Persian and Uzbek taken off air and the Voice of America (VOA) blocked from broadcasting in Afghanistan.
11
Because of this tightening of media control and the decline of media outlets in Afghanistan, many have
resorted to social media platforms as their sources of information. The flow of information from social
media is much harder to fact check and verify, and so the risk of spreading misinformation rises when one
becomes too reliant on social media.
12
As such, these depictions of the tightening of the journalistic space in Afghanistan largely mirrors the trends
in the flow of information reported by DIS in December 2021.
13
IFJ (International Federation of Journalists),
New report reveals catastrophic scale of media collapse in Afghanistan,
3 February
2022,
url
5
IFJ (International Federation of Journalists),
New report reveals catastrophic scale of media collapse in Afghanistan,
3 February
2022,
url;
A well-informed journalist: 27
6
IFJ (International Federation of Journalists),
New report reveals catastrophic scale of media collapse in Afghanistan,
3 February
2022,
url
7
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 19; A human rights defender: 4; A well-informed journalist: 11,
; L e O Do ell: ; A i a Kha :
8
A well-informed journalist: 11; DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
p. 8; HRW
(Human Rights Watch),
Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening Provincial Media; Journalists Detained, Beaten; Media Outlets Closed,
7
March 2022,
url
9
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
p. 8; A well-informed journalist: 27
10
Landinfo,
Afghanistan Talibans regime
–
situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen,
9 March 2022,
url,
p. 7; DIS (Danish Immigration
Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
p. 8
11
L
e O Do ell: ; DW Deuts he Welle ,
Taliban hits DW, BBC with broadcast bans in Afghanistan,
17 March 2022,
url
12
A well-informed journalist: 27
13
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp. 8-9
4
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1.2. Taliban governance
The administrative procedures have changed since mid-August 2021.
14
According to DACAAR, many of the
personnel in the new Taliban administration are without previous experience nor knowledge and are in top
positions.
15
This lack of experience within the administration often results in varying rules and conditions
throughout the country, because different people interpret the rules differently. As such, the specific
conditions in a given location often depends on personal relationship with the local authority rather than a
set of rules.
16
The representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan shared this assessment,
and further explained, that it is often unclear which entity constitutes the relevant authority, and that
individuals sometimes have more authority than institutions. : A powerful individual can have more
authority and impact on setting the local rules than the responsible ministry. Moreover, it is often unclear
what role in local society a given person of authority occupies; In some parts, a local warlord would be in
charge, in other parts members of an Elder Council set the local rules.
17
According to the representative of an international organisation, the fact that authority and power on local
level are often coupled with specific individuals rather than institutions, result in varying sets of rules
imposed on the public throughout the country.
18
IOM also pointed out, local leaders can issue new
instructions from week to week resulting in requirements changing at the local level.
19
According to the United States Department of State (USDOS), the Taliban have sought to identify people of
ad ha a te
within the administration. On 25 December 2021, a Taliban spokesperson stated that nearly
2,000 individuals were dismissed from service; those charged with corruption and theft were referred to
the legal authorities. Similar measures have been taken on provincial and local level, but USDOS advised
that
[l]ittle
information was available regarding how individuals were identified, investigations were
o du ted, o hat thei out o es e e
.
20
This loose relationship with rules and administration is not limited to management level. It is often very
unclear to the public to what extent new rules and edicts are enforced, and it often hinges on the individual
Taliban soldier and his personal views whether certain rules are enforced or not.
21
According to Amina Khan, the organisational structure and the lack of control over the low-ranking
members is one of the biggest challenges of the Taliban leadership now. Their organisational structure was
set up for fighting an insurgency, and now they have to perform a completely different task.
22
A well-informed journalist opined, this varying degree of law enforcement extends beyond the rules and
edicts. Thus the individual Taliban soldier might enforce his personal view on women regardless of whether
it is consistent with a rule. The same source stated that this sort of behavior further adds to the complexity
14
15
DACAAR: 3, 4; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 4; IOM: 15
DACAAR: 3, 4
16
DACAAR: 3, 4
17
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 4
18
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 4, 6, 27
19
IOM: 15
20
United States Department of State,
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
21
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27; A well-informed journalist: 24; International humanitarian
organisation: 22
22
Amina Khan: 12
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of the situation in Afghanistan at the moment, and it is very difficult to draw any general conclusion from
one or even a few specific cases. This not only applies to the situation of women in Afghanistan, but to all
matters in society.
23
In this connection, an Afghan analyst quoted by Landinfo stated that the government
has limited control over the Taliban foot soldiers and commanders and that the allegiance of the foot
soldiers often lies with local strongmen and commanders rather than with the central government.
24
1.3. An unfolding humanitarian crisis
In January 2022, The United Nations stated that Afghanistan currently faces a multitude of crises: A growing
humanitarian emergency, a massive economic contraction as well as the crippling of its banking and
financial systems.
25
In March 2022, UNFPA stated that the situation had deteriorated in recent months, in
part due to the political power shift as well as the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and drought across
much of Afghanistan.
26
These ises ha e esulted i
o e tha half of Afgha ista s populatio fa i g a ute food i se u it a d 9
% of Afghans are not eating enough food on a daily basis.
27
As a result, acute malnutrition amongst the
population is above the emergency threshold in 25 of 34 provinces.
28
If current trends are not curbed, 97 %
of Afghans could face living conditions below the World Bank-designated international poverty line of $1.90
a day by mid-2022.
29
The deteriorating economy have resulted in 82 % of Afghan families losing wages since August 2021, and
many public employees, including health workers, have reportedly not been paid since the Taliban assumed
power.
30
Concurrent with the recession in Afghanistan, prices of basic food staples such as flour and oil
have doubled since August 2021, and economic hardship have sparked a rise in people adopting negative
coping mechanisms across Afghanistan. Examples of this include the selling of internal organs and children
as a way of generating income, and a countrywide increase in drug abuse.
31
For more on conditions for
children, see
section 4.4. Child protection issues.
1.3.1.
Health care sector under pressure
,
Afgha ista s health a e se to has also ee se e el affe ted the e o o i ollapse. I Ja ua
o l
% of the ou t s o e tha
,300 health clinics were functional, and the sector is lacking
23
24
A well-informed journalist: 24
Landinfo,
Afghanistan Talibans regime
–
situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen,
9 March 2022,
url,
p. 10
25
United Nations General Assembly Security Council,
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and
security,
28 January 2022,
url,
p. 1
26
UNFPA,
UNFPA Afghanistan Humanitarian Appeal 2022,
March 2022,
url,
p. 1
27
Al Jazee a, I Afgha ista , people selli g a ies, ou g gi ls to su i e ,
Ma h
,
url;
WFP (World Food Programme),
Afghanistan Emergency,
13 April 2022,
url; World Bank,
Afghanistan Update: Towards Ecnomic Stabilization and Recovery,
url, p. i
28
WFP (World Food Programme),
Afghanistan Emergency,
13 April 2022,
url
29
International Rescue Committee (IRC), Six months on from change in power,
IRC warns starvation could kill more Afghans than
last twenty years of war as 97 per cent of population faces poverty,
15 February 2022,
url;
The New Yorker, Afghanistan has
e o e the Wo ld s la gest hu a ita ia
isis, Ja ua
,
url
30
HRW (Human Rights Watch),
Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis,
1 March 2022,
url;
The New Yorker,
Afgha ista has e o e the Wo ld s la gest hu a ita ia
isis, Ja ua
,
url;
The Wall Street Journal,
No Father Wa ts to
Sell His So s Kid e . Afgha s Pushed to Desperate Measures to Sur i e,
19 April 2022,
url
31
The Wall Street Journal,
No Father Wa ts to Sell His So s Kid e . Afgha s Pushed to Desperate Measures to
Survive,
19 April
2022,
url;
International humanitarian organisation
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personnel.
32
Since August 2021, much of the economic funding from the international donors for the health
care sector have stopped.
33
Lacking the necessary funding to operate on full capacity, the health care
infrastructure in Afghanistan has been suffering from an unstable flow of both water and electricity as well
as insufficient medicines and equipment.
34
The humanitarian crisis in the country has further put pressure on an already pressured health care sector
as increasingly more patients are in need of treatment.
35
According to Save the Children cited in a New York
Times article, the number of children suffering from malnutrition have doubled since mid-August 2021, and
the health care clinics around the country are further pressured by outbreaks of diarrhea, polio, malaria,
dengue fever and a fourth wave of COVID-19.
36
The New Yorker, Afghanistan has become
the Wo ld s la gest hu a ita ia
isis, Ja ua
,
url;
Landinfo,
Afghanistan
Talibans regime
–
situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen,
9 March 2022,
url,
p. 29
33
The New York Times,
Afgha ista s Health Care S ste
Is Collapsi g U der Stress,
14 February 2022,
url;
Landinfo,
Afghanistan
Talibans regime
–
situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen,
9 March 2022,
url,
p. 29
34
The New York Times,
Afgha ista s Health Care S ste
Is Collapsi g U der Stress,
14 February 2022,
url
35
Landinfo,
Afghanistan Talibans regime
–
situasjonen etter maktovertakelsen,
9 March 2022,
url,
p. 29
36
The New York Times,
Afgha ista s Health Care S ste
Is Collapsi g U der Stress,
14 February 2022,
url
32
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2. Insecurity and crime levels
Since the Taliban assumed power in mid-August 2021, the overall security situation in Afghanistan has
changed as conflict related security incidents such as armed clashes, air strikes and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) have decreased significantly.
37
As reported by DIS in December 2021, this has made many
areas safer, especially the rural parts of Afghanistan, which has made cross-country travel possible.
38
One
source consulted for this report in late March 2022 echoed this, and elaborated that Afghanistan has
witnessed significantly fewer security incidents since August 2021 compared to before the Taliban
takeover, and added that the overall security level has remained somewhat stable.
39
However, since this
source was consulted, there has been several incidents of attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province
(ISKP) against Shia-Muslim communities in particular, across Afghanistan.
40
For more in this,
see section 6.2.
Ethnic and Religious Minorities.
While the number of conflict related security incidents have remained somewhat low relative to before the
Taliban conquered Afghanistan, the crime level has gone up since mid-August.
41
There is no publicly
available statistics on crime in Afghanistan
42
, but four sources consulted for this report stated that the
crime levels in Afghanistan have risen concurrently with the deepening of the humanitarian and economic
crisis in the country.
43
The rise of crime in Afghanistan has especially affected Kabul and other big cities,
where financially motivated enrichment crimes such as robberies and kidnappings, but also petty crimes
such as theft, have spiked since August 2021.
44
Local business owners and their children had been common
kidnapping targets.
45
Other examples include the kidnapping of a doctor and a former member of national
security forces in Kunduz.
46
According to a representative of an international organisation, the authorities in Afghanistan are having
issues solving criminal incidents and the representative has assessed that the crime level likely is
underreported and many kidnapping cases are resolved internally between the parties. The issue of solving
37
United Nations General Assembly Security Council,
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and
security,
28 January 2022,
url,
pp. 4-5
38
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
p. 17
39
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 1.
40
The New York Times, With Spate of Attacks,
ISIS Begins Bloody New Chapter in Afghanistan,
1 May 2022,
url;
The New York
Times,
Explosion at Afghan Mosque Kills at Least 10,
21 April 2022,
url;
The Wall Street Journal,
Kabul School Blasts Kill Six as
Afghanistan Violence Continues,
19 April 2021,
url;
The New York Times,
Blasts at Schools in Shiite Area of Kabul Kill at Least 6,
19
April 2021,
url
41
International humanitarian organisation: 44; DACAAR: 17; Tolo News,
Young Man Killed by Unknown Attackers in Western Kabul,
26 February 2022,
url;
BAMF,
Briefing Notes Group 62
–
Information Centre for Asylum and Migration,
31 January 2022,
url;
Afghan
Voice Agency,
Kunduz Residents Complain of Assassinations and Kidnappings Amid Rising Poverty,
5 December 2021,
url;
Foreign
Policy,
Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban Dystopia,
29 October 2021,
url;
Tolo News,
Kabul Residents Urge Govt to Tackle Crime,
26 November 2021,
url;
Hasht-e-Subh Daily,
Crime Rates in Afghanistan Remain High,
22 May 2022,
url;
Protection Cluster,
Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update
–
Q4,
February 2022,
url;
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan:
2; An international organisation: 32
42
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
p. 8
43
An international humanitarian organisation: 44; DACAAR: 17, 18; A representative of an international organisation in
Afghanistan: 2, 3; An international organisation: 32.
44
An international humanitarian organisation: 44; DACAAR: 17, 18; A representative of an international organisation in
Afghanistan: 2, 3; An international organisation: 32.
45
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 2
46
Afghan Voice Agency,
Kunduz Residents Complain of Assassinations and Kidnappings Amid Rising Poverty,
5 December 2021,
url
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crime cases reflects the Taliban's little or no experience in conducting police work. As a result, Taliban
members have sometime resorted to a deterrence strategy in order to try to contain the crime levels. As an
example of this, the source pointed to the public display of the bodies of two alleged kidnappers in Herat
City.
47
In this connection, Amina Khan, Director of Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East & Africa (CAMEA) at the
Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI), Islamabad proved an outlier in relation to the other sources consulted.
She advised that while petty crimes had risen since the Taliban takeover, serious crimes such as kidnapping
had de li ed as the Tali a s eputatio fo ha sh pu ish e ts had dete ed the pu li .
48
47
48
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 3
Amina Khan: 17
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3. Targeted individuals
3.1. Afghans with links to the former government
Si e the Tali a s takeo e of Afgha ista o
August
, thei leade ship has a ou ed a ge e al
amnesty for former government officials and members of the Afghan National Security Defence Forces
(ANSDF). On several occasions, the Taliban ministers called on Taliban fighters to respect the general
amnesty and to refrain from harming former government officials.
49
Du i g the eeks that follo ed Tali a s takeo e ,
,
people e e e a uated a oad.
50
According to
numbers in The New York Times, 80,000 people out of the total number of evacuees were Afghans.
51
Left
behind were, according to The New York Times, tens of thousands of Afghans, including former members of
the security forces
52
, some of whom left their homes to hide from the Taliban.
53
An international organisation claimed that the amnesty was in some cases used to identify targets.
54
The
UN has received credible allegations regarding the killing of more than 130 former ANSDF personnel,
government personnel or their family members. Of them, around 100 were extrajudicial killings attributed
to the Taliban or their affiliates.
5556
The
reported killings occurred in the period from 24 August 2021 to
February 2022, but it is not clear exactly when these killings took place or whether there is a trend going up
or down in the killings.
57
There has been revenge attacks and revenge killings of former government employees since August 2021,
but not in the same scale as when the Taliban was overthrown in 2001.
58
Some attacks were caused by
personal revenge rather than by systematic targeting..
59
In terms of degree of persecution of employees of the former government, sources had different views:
The UN e p essed o e s ega di g the Tali a s o goi g p a ti es of
arrests, incommunicado
detentions and alleged torture and ill-treatment of individuals suspected of being affiliated with the former
government and ANSDF.
60
An international humanitarian organisation opined that the targeting depends on the targeted individual
s
employer, their position as well as on other types of background affiliation. An individual, who worked for
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 25; HRW,
No Forgiveness for
People Like You,
November 30, 2021,
url;
DIS,
Afghanistan
–
Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp 22-25
50
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
30
October 2021,
url,
p.39
51
The New York Times,
U.S. Struggles With Afghan Evacuees Weeded Out, and Now in Limbo,
3 November 2021,
url
52
The New York Times,
U.S. War in Afghanistan Ends as Final Evacuation Flights Depart,
30 August 2021,
url
53
USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
54
An international organisation: 19
55
Different sources gave different numbers of government employees, including security forces that were killed or forcibly
disappeared. Whether or not these sources are pointing to the same cases or not is unclear
56
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 25
57
An international organisation: 19
58
A well-informed journalist: 1, 3, 5, 7
59
An international organisation: 21; Amina Khan: 1; An international humanitarian organisation: 35
60
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 31
49
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the US military, would be more vulnerable compared to Afghans who worked for other government forces.
In case someone was very vocal on social media against the Taliban and if they worked for an embassy,
then this person would be at risk as well.
61
Two sources stated that there has not been a large scale of systematic targeting people associated with the
former government.
62
In opposition to this, Lynne
O Do ell,
author and columnist at Foreign Policy, noted
that people who worked in any capacity for the former government are targeted, i.e. being detained, kept
in secret prisons, beaten, tortured and in some cases killed in Afghanistan today.
63
Amina Khan viewed the
incidents of targeting that have occurred because of personal grudges and previous disputes.
64
This
assessment was shared by the well-i
fo ed jou alist, ho added that o e s p e ious o upatio ould
be used against the person in question if they have a dispute with a Taliban-member.
65
The well-informed journalist also stated that Taliban made systematic effort to obtain information,
especially on the population of Kabul regarding professional positions and affiliations.
66
In February 2022, a citywide house search campaign,
67
led by the Taliban, took place in Kabul. The
authorities were looking for weapons and went from house to house.
68
The search instigated fear in people
in Kabul who had worked for the previous administration.
69
During the house search campaign, people associated with the former government, who were in
possession of vehicles and houses, received varying treatment by the Taliban.
70
The well-informed
journalist noted that some of the people associated with the former government were arrested for a
couple of days, while others were taken in for questioning and released afterwards.
71
Other sources stated
that some former government employees were held incommunicado.
72
3.1.1. Armed forces
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
Former members of ANDSF, including pilots from the former air force and police officers, have been subject
to a wide range of treatment from the Taliban, including arrests, house searches, and detention as well as
being shot and killed. Most of these attacks against former security forces were concentrated in Kabul and
the south and southeastern parts of Afghanistan.
73
61
62
An international humanitarian organisation: 33
A well-informed journalist: 2; Amina Khan: 1
63
L
e O Do ell:
64
Amina Khan: 1
65
A well-informed journalist: 8
66
A well-informed journalist: 2
67
HRW,
In Afghanistan, Burning Our Past to Protect Our Future,
March 1, 2022,
url;
Jurist,
Afghanistan dispatch: Taliban house-to-
house searches raise privacy concerns, fear in those still trying to leave,
27 February 2022,
url;
A well-informed journalist: 2; Lynne
O Do ell:
68
HRW,
In Afghanistan, Burning Our Past to Protect Our Future,
March 1, 2022,
url;
Jurist,
Afghanistan dispatch: Taliban house-to-
house searches raise privacy concerns, fear in those still trying to leave,
27 February 2022,
url
69
A well-informed journalist: 2; An international organisation: 20
70
A well-informed journalist: 2
71
A well-informed journalist: 2
72
HRW,
No Forgi e ess for People Like You” E e utio s a d E for ed Disappeara es i Afgha ista u der
the Taliban,
30
e O Do ell:
November 2021,
url;
L
73
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 13
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Different sources gave different numbers of government employees, including security forces that were
killed or forcibly disappeared. It is unclear whether or not these sources are pointing to the same cases or
not. Amnesty International (AI) reported that 100 former members of the security forces were killed or
forcibly disappeared by the Taliban between mid-August and the end of December.
74
Human Rights Watch
(HRW) documented executions and enforced disappearances of 47 former members of the ANDSF
–
military personnel, police, intelligence service members, and paramilitary militia
–
who either had
surrendered to or were apprehended by Taliban forces between 15 August and 31 October 2021. Taliban
leaders denied that these killings reflected an official policy and claimed that many were attributed to
personal disputes.
75
The DIS also reported on these incidents in December 2021.
76
The UN gave an example on the killings, which took place on 4 November 2021, in Balkh province where
seven members of the Taliban entered a private residence, shot, and killed two women and two men. Both
women and one of the men were former ANSDF employees.
77
Another example was presented by Amnesty
International, in which the Taliban conducted door-to-door searches in the village of Urmaz in Panjshir to
identify persons suspected of working for the pre-August 15 government. Taliban fighters executed at least
six civilian men, with eyewitnesses saying that most had previously served in the ANSDF.
78
In May 2022, fighting in the centre and south of Panjshir Province increased. The National Resistance Front
(NRF), partly made up of civilians and former ANSDF employees, is fighting the Taliban leading to causalities
on both sides, including civilians.
79
For more on this, see
Section 6.2.4 Other Ethnic Minorities.
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan assessed those individuals most at risk of
being targeted are the remaining members of ANDSF. It is however unclear whether they are targeted
solely for belonging to the security forces or because of personal reasons.
80
The source added that he knew
of a great deal of incidents in which Afghans, including interpreters, were arrested or killed without an
apparent motivation or legal ground.
81
A well-informed journalist opined that
the Tali a s ta geti g a d
treatment of the ANDSF depends on
the pe so s deeds
rather than his rank.
82
In most cases, the mid and low level officers were targeted, and this distinction might be due to the fact
that former low-level officers accepted bribes, or the fact that it simply is easier to target people in lower
ranks, because it does not cause a stir, compared to targeting people in senior positions would.
83
AI
–
Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22;
The State of the World's Human Rights; Afghanistan 2021,
29
March 2022,
url
75
HRW,
No Forgiveness for People Like You,
November 30, 2021,
url
76
Denmark, DIS,
Afghanistan
–
Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp 24-25
77
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 25
78
AI
–
Amnesty International,
Afgha ista : Go er
e t ollapse arked
repeated ar ri es a d rele tless loodshed
, 15
December 2021,
url
Afgha ista : Go e
e t ollapse a ked
epeated a i es a d ele tless loodshed –
new report
79
Radio Free Europe (RFE),
New Reports Of Fighting In Afghanistan's Panjshir Trigger Fresh Claims Of Taliban War Crimes,
13 May
2022,
url;
BBC,
Afghan resistance attack Taliban, sparking reprisals in Panjshir,
16 May 2022,
url
80
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 13
81
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 13
82
A well-informed journalist: 4
83
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 13
74
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National Directorate of Security (NDS) and police
The Taliban has targeted people associated with the NDS.
84
Some of these NDS units, were trained by the
CIA during the last five years of the former government, are mainly subjected to persecution because these
units have committed severe human rights violations against many Taliban members in the past.
85
No one
has the full overview of how many NDS members have been targeted, but to
A i a Kha s
knowledge, the
Taliban has mostly persecuted people in mid and high level positions, many of whom have been outspoken
critics of the Taliban.
86
The Ministry of the Interior under the Taliban rule called former police officers to return; however, returns
were slow due to fear of retaliation and lack of salary payments.
87
In spite of this, many former officers of
the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are still working, but they do not wear
uniforms because they are not receiving salaries.
88
As an example on targeting, a former police officer was assassinated in front of her family members at her
home in Ghor.
89
Another example on targeting of former police officers, a source noted that a police
woman went missing days after the Taliban takeover in Mazar-e Sharif.
90
In a third example, Taliban
fighters executed two senior police officials
–
Haji Mullah Achakzai, the security director of Badghis
Province, and Ghulam Sakhi Akbari, the security director of Farah Province.
91
3.1.2. Civil servants
Many civil servants employed by the previous government have returned to their former positions,
including local governments in the provinces below a certain rank.
92
Around 80 % of the civil servants
employed by the previous government have returned to work. However, members of the Taliban occupy
the higher leadership positions.
93
Some cases of high-level officials, such as the deputy finance minister,
have been allowed to return to former positions.
94
Women are barred from working in the public domain
except in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and at the airport in Kabul, where some women
conduct security searches and passport check for female travelers.
95
Many civil servants were wary of returning to their positions immediately after August 2021 because of the
uncertainty of how the Taliban would govern.
96
Members of the Taliban have targeted a number of civil
A well-informed journalist: 4; Amina Khan: 3
A well-informed journalist: 4
86
Amina Khan: 3
87
USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
88
Amina Khan: 2
89
BBC Persian,
دند شاهداونا یاض ا لباقم د ن
یلپ کی لتق هب مهتم نابلاط,
5 September 2021,
url,
[The Taliban have been accused of
killi g "a p eg a t fe ale poli e offi e ]; The Gua dia ,
To orro the ill kill e : Afgha fe ale poli e offi ers li e i fear of
Taliban reprisals,
10 September 2022,
url
90
L
e O Do ell: ,
91
BBC,
Amid violent reprisals, Afghans fear the Taliban's 'amnesty' was empty,
31 August 2021,
url
92
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 14; A well-informed journalist: 1; An international humanitarian
organisation: 34; Amina Khan: 2
93
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 14; A well-informed journalist: 1
94
Amina Khan: 2
95
A well-informed journalist: 23
96
Amina Khan: 2
85
84
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servants employed by the former government. This was due to a personal dispute rather than their
previous positions.
97
3.2. Employees or former employees of international companies,
foreign troops, NGOs, or foreign embassies in Afghanistan
3.2.1. Employees of foreign troops
The extent to which former Afghan employees of foreign troops have been subject to persecution depends
on several factors. A factor potentially leading to persecution is if employees of foreign troops have
previously been engaged in combat with the Taliban.
98
Another factor is the extent to which the surrounding community and the Taliban are aware of the previous
function of the employee.
99
A well-informed journalist noted that there has been cases of local villagers
sharing information with the Taliban on interpreters employed by foreign divisions, who had behaved
poorly towards the local community. The Taliban are often woven into the local communities in
Afghanistan, and therefore have excellent intelligence on who has worked for foreign troops.
100
A third factor mentioned by the sources is individual circumstances such as the job, the employer and
family background.
101
Previous occupation could be used against individuals in a personal vendetta.
102
Likewise, if they had family affiliations, who had problems with the Taliban, that would make them more
vulnerable.
103
Two sources assessed that people employed at military facilities in low-level positions, who were not
associated with active combat, would not be persecuted solely based on their previous jobs.
104
Another
source, however, opined that former employees of foreign troops constitute a risk profile.
105
An international humanitarian organisation assessed that, people are less targeted in the rural areas.
People who are high profiled or senior positioned would be in more danger - and these profiles tend to live
in urban environments.
106
3.2.2. NGOs, international organisations and foreign embassies
A
o di g to the Tali a s offi ial li e, people ho o ked fo the e assies, i te atio al o ga isatio s
and NGOs will not face persecution. If a person in one of these groups were harassed or assaulted, it was
due to a number of factors related to personal or family background rather than their former employer.
107
A well-informed journalist: 3
An international organisation: 21; A well-informed journalist: 5; An international humanitarian organisation: 36
99
An international organisation: 21
100
A well-informed journalist: 6
101
An international organisation: 21; A well-informed journalist: 5
102
A well-informed journalist: 7; An international organisation: 21
103
An international humanitarian organisation: 36
104
A well-informed journalist: 8; An international humanitarian organisation: 36
105
An international organisation: 21
106
An international humanitarian organisation: 37
107
An international humanitarian organisation: 35
98
97
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Local Afghans, who work for NGOs and international organisations, are often treated roughly at
checkpoints because they are perceived as linked to foreigners.
108
NGOs
An international humanitarian organisation assessed that a former employee of an international NGO,
would not be especially targeted.
109
However, there have been examples of assaults on NGO employees
handing out aid.
110
A well-informed journalist noted that the Taliban are often a part of the local
communities and therefore know NGO affiliated employees.
111
An international organisation highlighted that those who were operating safe houses had to relocate the
safe houses.
112
During the house search campaign in mid-March 2022, the local NGO employees received a harsh
treatment by the Taliban.
113
These encounters vary to a high degree depending on the Talib in charge of
that specific house search.
114
Employees of foreign embassies
Most of the former employees at the foreign embassies were evacuated in August and September 2021,
115
making it difficult to give
a
ualified assess e ts of these people s isk p ofiles i Afgha ista toda .
116
An international humanitarian organisation assessed that an Afghan would be more vulnerable if he was
employed at a foreign embassy with troops on the ground in active combat with the Taliban.
117
For the vast
majority of embassy workers, the Taliban did not see them as a threat.
118
A representative of an
international organisation in Afghanistan assessed that the Taliban would know of the identity of low-rank
employees at foreign embassies, such as gardeners and electricians. The Taliban are well entrenched within
the local communities, especially in rural settings.
119
3.3. Journalists
According to a UN report, the space for independent media and civil society has changed since 15 August
2021. During the former government, freedom of expression had expanded; but on 19 September 2021,
the Taliban issued guidelines on media operations for all print, audio and video media outlets. These
include advice to the media: not to publish issues contrary to Islam or Sharia, to strictly avoid disrespecting
national and influential figures, as well as national and personal privacy etc. The enforcement of these rules
108
109
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 12
An international humanitarian organisation: 41
110
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 16
111
A well-informed journalist: 14
112
An international organisation: 22
113
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 15; DACAAR: 18
114
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 16
115
An international humanitarian organisation: 38; A well-informed journalist: 9
116
A well-informed journalist: 9
117
An international humanitarian organisation: 38
118
An international humanitarian organisation: 38
119
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 12
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varies across the country, especially at the provincial level.
120
For more information, please refer to
section
1 Access to information in Afghanistan.
A well-i
fo ed jou alist opi ed that the Tali a s app oa h to jou alists a d jou alis at la ge i o s
other totalitarian governments across the world;
121
there are allegations of extrajudicial killings of
journalists that have taken place.
122
The Afghan Journalist Safety Committee as cited in by Amnesty
International announced that at least 12 journalists have been killed and 230 assaulted in the 12 months to
November 2021.
123
However, it should be noted that the source did not make a distinction between the
periods before and after the 15 August 2021. A human rights defender said that a journalist, he knew,
wrote critically on Facebook and the Taliban executed him in the Helmand province around January
2022.
124
Journalists had been detained after expressing critique of the Taliban,
125
and a source counted 24 incidents
between August 2021 and March 2022, in each of them which at least one journalist was detained.
126
Furthermore, journalists were subject to ill-treatment during detention,
127
abduction and physical
punishment because of their reporting since August 2021.
128
Because of this, journalists feared for their
safety and some have fled the country, while others are in hiding.
129
In a recent example, given by a well-informed journalist, the Taliban picked up two journalists, because
the
ote a sto o the Tali a a i g i te atio al TV sho s. To the sou e s k o ledge, the
journalists detained have all been released after a couple of days in detention.
130
Another example of the
issues journalists have been harassed with is their coverage of protests against the Taliban, particularly
those led by women.
131
The well-informed journalist assessed that the Taliban will not target a journalist solely based on their
former employer. The Taliban has visited the offices of the media organisations to check the employees,
taxation and registration of cars.
132
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 40-41
121
A well-informed journalist: 11
122
USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
123
AI
–
Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22;
The State of the World's Human Rights; Afghanistan 2021,
29 March 2022,
url
124
A human rights defender: 4
125
A well-informed journalist: 11; An international organisation: 27; A representative of an international organisation in
Afgha ista : 9; L
e O Do el:
-8; Amina Khan: 7; USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
126
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 19
127
A well-informed journalist: 11; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 19
128
Amina Khan: 7
129
A i te atio al o ga isatio :
; L e O Do ell:
-8; USDOS
–
US Department of State: 2021 Country Report on Human
Rights Practices: Afghanistan, 12 April 2022,
url
130
A well-informed journalist: 11
131
USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url;
ACLED
–
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Author), APW - Afghan Peace Watch (Author):
Tracking disorder during Taliban rule
in Afghanistan;
A Joint ACLED and APW Report, April 2022,
url,
p.2
132
A well-informed journalist: 13
120
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3.4. Human rights defenders
There are reports of human rights abuses and atrocities against human rights defenders,
133
such as killings,
enforced disappearances, incommunicado detention, attacks, harassments, threats
134
and arrests by the
Taliban.
135
Since 15 August 2021, ten civil society activists have been killed; five of whose deaths were
attributed to the Taliban. Another 36 have been arrested, beaten or threatened by the Taliban.
136
Unknown
actors carried out numerous targeted killings of civil society advocates.
137
Due to the climate of uncertainty and fear created by the Taliban, many activists and human rights
defenders have left the country.
138
Several female-led protests resulted in the arrest of women activists, either on site or subsequently after
the protest.
139
These arrests are an attempt by the Taliban to suppress the protests and likely to send a
message to other potential voices of protests that dissent will not be tolerated.
140
Many women do not
publicly talk about their time in detention, due to the high risk of being the centre of ill-meant assumptions,
such as rape, which is perceived shameful for woman.
141
La e s defe di g o e s ights p ofiles ha e
gone into hiding.
142
An international organisation pointed to two different types of response met by protesters from the
Taliban: There are isolated responses in which protestors are dispersed with some level of violence; and
there are more coordinated responses.
143
For instance the arrest of 29 women and their family members
that took pla e i Fe ua
due to thei asso iatio ith o e s p otests a d the ta geti g of a
prominent academic.
144
A human rights defender informed the delegation that he had received life-threatening threats from people
he does not know on Twitter, Facebook and via phone calls. He added that the threats he received on the
ground by individual Talibs do not reflect policies of the ministries.
145
USDOS
–
US Department of State:
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April 2022,
url
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 52-53
135
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 52-53; Amina Khan: 6
136
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url,
section 52-53
137
USDOS
–
US Department of State: 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan, 12 April 2022,
url
138
USDOS
–
US Department of State: 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan, 12 April 2022,
url;
Amina Khan:
6
139
A i te atio al o ga isatio :
; L e O Do ell:
140
An international organisation: 23
141
L
e O Do ell:
142
An international organisation: 22
143
An international organisation: 26
144
The Guardian,
Taliban have detained 29 women and their families in Kabul, says US envoy,
12 February 2022,
url;
Al Jazeera,
Taliban releases prominent Afghan professor from custody: Family
, 11 January 2022,
url
145
A human rights defender: 1-3
133
134
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4. Family members to targeted individuals
The sources consulted for this report differed in their views on the degree to which family members of
targeted people were targeted:
The well-informed journalist assessed that family members of people with links to the former government,
employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs, foreign embassies in
Afghanistan or journalists are generally not a target. However, this very much depends on the profession of
the person belonging to one or more of the above-mentioned categories, as well as whether this person
had a prior personal dispute with a member of the Taliban, the character of the dispute and whether it can
be resolved by the village elders.
146
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Afghan Peace Watch (APW) assessed that
the families of former government officials and security forces have faced abuse. In one case, the brother
of a senior security officer was killed when the Taliban could not reach the officer in question. The officer
had reportedly fought on the frontlines against Taliban forces in past years.
147
An international humanitarian organisation assumed that family members of former NDS employees would
be interrogated about their whereabouts. Whether or not the family members are at risk themselves, is not
entirely clear to the source.
148
According to Amina Khan, the Taliban has not targeted the family members
of NDS officials.
149
A former employee at the Ministry of Interior Affairs
MoI ho has left Afgha ista told L e O Do ell
that the Tali a gu e keep isiti g his ho e a d his pa e ts ho e i Ka ul. The kept
looking for him,
and have even shot at his doors and windows with guns.
150
The source added that when the Taliban is
looking for members of the former security forces, they use their weapons against relatives who might still
be there or against neighbours. There are cases of extrajudicial killings occurring.
151
A human rights defender informed the delegation that even though he is very active, the Taliban has not
attacked him nor his family members and elaborated that he is of an influential family in a conservative
part of Afghanistan.
152
When asked if family members of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) affiliates are persecuted, an
international humanitarian organisation replied that he did not know for sure, but he believed that the
family members would have a legitimate reason to be concerned.
153
The well-informed journalist: 16
ACLED and APW,
Tracking Disorder during Taliban Rule in Afghanistan,
April 2022,
url,
p. 5
148
An international humanitarian organisation: 42
149
Amina Khan: 4
150
L
e O Do ell:
151
L
e O Do ell:
152
A human rights defender: 1-3
153
An international humanitarian organisation: 43
147
146
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5. Monitoring and intelligence gathering
Several sources consulted for this report stated that the Taliban generally has well-developed intelligence
networks throughout the country, and especially in the rural parts of Afghanistan, where they had a strong
presence as an insurgency.
154
The representative of
a i te atio al o ga isatio i Afgha ista ad ised that the Tali a s a s of
monitoring the population and gathering intelligence is different from that of the former government.
Where the former government relied on foreign technology as a means of gathering intelligence, the
Taliban utilises their deep roots in the local communities throughout Afghanistan.
155
The well-informed
journalist echoed this assessment and elaborated that the Taliban are very good at knowing what goes on
at the local level, because they have been woven into the local population throughout the last 20 years.
Local Taliban members are taking part in the conversations in the towns and at the local mosques, which
gives them a solid sense of what people within the given local community are doing. In other words, they
are of the villages and know how villages and local communities throughout Afghanistan function. This way
of obtaining intelligence within a local community also means that the Taliban is better skilled to gather
intelligence in the Pashtun dominated areas and the areas, where they had a lot of presence as an
insurgency.
156
On the other hand, these intelligence networks are less developed in other parts of the country where the
Taliban had little or no presence prior to August 2021.
157
Thus, in larger cities, the Taliban are installing
checkpoints. According to Khan, the leadership developed this policy and it serves two purposes: First, this
way of questioning the local population serves as a means to extract information concerning local activities.
Secondly, it is meant to show the Afghans that the Taliban should not be feared.
158
The representative of an
international organisation in Afghanistan stated that the Taliban uses these checkpoints in cities to scan
phones of perceived problematic content.
159
The Taliban also has a strong presence on social media platforms, and they are increasingly utilising these
platforms as a means of engaging with the public.
160
However, it is unclear to what extent the Taliban
actually monitors activates on social media and uses the information against the population in
Afghanistan.
161
One source assessed that the Taliban likely have some idea of the information flows on
social networks, and they are increasingly utilizing these means of communication themselves. However,
the source assessed that the posts one writes and shares on social media platforms are unlikely to have
o se ue es u less the lead to so eo e s death o i p iso e t.
162
Amina Khan stated that the Taliban
154
A well-informed journalist: 14, 15; Amina Khan: 8, 9; An international humanitarian organisation: 39; A representative of an
international organisation in Afghanistan: 11
155
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 11, 12
156
A well-informed journalist: 14
157
A well-informed journalist: 14
158
Amina Khan: 8
159
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 10
160
Amina Khan: 10; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 10; A well-informed journalist: 15
161
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 10
162
A well-informed journalist: 15
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has a strong presence on Twitter especially and they monitor the activities in Afghan circles, and engage in
discussions in a non-confrontational manner with people they disagree with.
163
However, there have been reports of the Taliban arresting and even killing Afghans because of their
activities in social media.
164
The Taliban banned TikTok on 21 April 2022. According to a spokesperson as cited by the BBC, the ban was
necessary to prevent the younger generation from being misled .
165
Two sources referred to reports of the Taliban gaining
a ess to the Natio al Di e to ate of Se u it s NDS
headquarters as well as biometric data systems after their takeover, but it is unclear to what extent they
are able to utilize the databases.
166
The internet has been cut
off fo NDS data ase a d so e of the
archives were burned or hidden, which means that the Taliban does not have the full information
available.
167
163
164
Amina Khan: 10
France 24,
Taliban arrest Afghan professor after social media criticism,
9 January 2022,
url;
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
'Tortured From Head To Toe': Taliban Accused Of Killing Afghan Man Over Critical Facebook Post,
3 December 2021,
url
165
BBC,
Afghanistan: Taliban orders TikTok, PUBG ban for 'misleading' youths,
22 April 2022,
url
166
An international organisation: 33; An international humanitarian organisation: 39, 40; HRW,
New Evidence that Biometric Data
Systems Imperil Afghans,
30 March 2022,
url
167
An international humanitarian organisation: 40
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6. Vulnerable groups
6.1. Women
6.1.1. Freedom of movement
Freedom of movement for women in Afghanistan has been restricted to a varying degree, depending on
regional customs.
168
A i te atio al o ga isatio fu the ela o ated that o e s f eedo of o e e t
is context specific.
169
A policy introduced by the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of
Vice in December 2021 prevented women from traveling more than 72 km without a
mahram
170
,
171
including air travel.
172
During March 2022, an international organisation received information regarding
how women without a
mahram
had been denied the right to cross land borders to Pakistan and Iran. Some
of them were allowed to pass,
173
while others had been returned, with the request for a legitimate
mahram
to accompany them.
174
Three sources elaborated that in many provinces, the need for a
mahram
is not new and was already part
of the local custom in conservative areas of Afghanistan, but it is a new phenomenon in cities like Kabul.
175
According to Amina Khan, there are mixed signals regarding what women can and cannot do in the city. On
the one hand, many beauty shops are still open, but on the other hand, women can no longer attend cafés
without a
mahram.
The Taliban has also restricted access to parks and theme parks, so that women and
men cannot attend these public spaces on the same day.
176
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan stated that these profound changes and
mixed signals have created insecurity and uncertainty in different regions with a deterrent effect on
women. Thus, women tend to dress more conservatively to be on the safe side, because the rules are
unclear. It is often up to the individual Talibs monitoring at the checkpoints whether the woman standing in
front of him lives up to the rules or not. Overall, the source assessed that recent events indicate that the
o se ati e oi es ithi Tali a ha e the uppe ha d o e i g o e s issues
- with a reference to
the recent gender divisions in parks and universities.
177
This indication was further fortified on 7 May, when
a de ee f o the Tali a s sup e e leade Hi atullah Akhu dzada, uled that all Afgha o e
ust
cover their faces. If a woman defies this edict, her father or closest male relative will be visited, and
eventually imprisoned or fired from his job within the government.
178
The three-step rule, in case a woman
defies,
egi s ith a pa i g a isit to the o a s add ess a d ad isi g he ale elati es; su
o i g
168
An international organisation: 7; Amina Khan: 14; DACAAR:7; An international humanitarian organisation: 16; A representative
of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27;
169
An international organisation: 7
170
Mahram refers to a man's close female relatives. In Islamic law, mahram connotes a state of consanguinity precluding marriage.
Oxford Islamic Studies Online,
Mahram,
n.d.,
url
171
Al Jazeera,
No long-distance travel for women without male relative: Taliban,
26 December 2021
url
172
An international organisation: 8; A male human rights activist: 5
173
A male human rights activist: 5
174
An international organisation: 8
175
Amina Khan: 14; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27
176
Amina Khan: 14; CBS News,
Taliban denies Afghan women solo air travel, segregates parks by sex and sends home men with
short beards,
29 March 2022
url
177
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27
178
Reuters,
Taliban order Afghan women to cover faces again,
7 may 2022
url
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her male relatives to the relevant Taliban office; c) detaining her male relatives for three days followed by a
punishment decided by the Taliban.
179
The edict further suggests that women should not leave their homes
unless necessary.
180
6.1.2. Women without a male support network
An international humanitarian organisation assessed that conditions in Afghanistan have always been very
challenging for lone women without a network.
181
However, the situation for lone women has worsened
since august 2021.
182
Some of the reasons indicated for the deterioration by different sources include:
the de
fa to go e
e t s la k of suppo t fo o e shelte s
183
the fact that two third of the population are affected by the current food insecurity
184
the difficulties for female heads of households to fulfil their role as breadwinners due to restriction
put by the Taliban
185
An international humanitarian organisation opined that a single mother would not live on her own, but
more likely would move in with male relatives if possible. This applies everywhere in the country and
exceptions to this are rare.
186
DACAAR emphasised that because a lone woman without a male support
network in Afghanistan is associated with social and cultural stigma, widows often remarry in order to re-
enter into a social support structure. As an example, the source stated that when one of his colleagues died
in a car crash, his widowed wife married the brother of the deceased so that he could provide for her. Due
to the disappea a e of p i ate fu di g fo shelte s, o i ed ith de fa to go e
e t s la k of suppo t,
187
the numbers of female beggars on the streets in Afghanistan have been on the rise.
6.1.3.
Wo e s a ess to jo
arkets
Wo e s a ess to the jo
a ket has o e all o se ed si e August
2021.
188
DACAAR noted that
o e s a ess to the jo
a ket a depe di g o hi h p o i e the find
themselves in, as it was the
case prior to August 2021.
189
An international humanitarian organisation differed on this and advised that
i
te s of egio al diffe e es i o e s a ilit to o k he did ot see a diffe e e.
190
The recent restrictions in
f eedo of o e e t ha e eated halle ges fo o e s a ess to the jo
markets.
191
There are more day-to-day inspections concerning traveling in some provinces.
192
Recently,
Afghanistan International,
دننا وپب ا دو ت وص مامت درک دیدهت ا نان نابلاط ؛نادن ات اک ق بل ا,
7 May 2022
url;
[From deprivation of
the right to work to imprisonment; the Taliban threatened women to cover their entire faces]
180
AP News,
Taliban divisions deepen as Afghan women defy veil edict,
9 May 2022
url
181
An international humanitarian organisation: 25
182
DACAAR: 10; An international humanitarian organisation: 25; An international organisation: 9
183
DACAAR: 10; An international humanitarian organisation: 25
184
UN News,
Afgha ista : Food i se urit a d
al utritio threate a e tire ge eratio
, 15 March 2022,
url;
World Food
Program (WFP),
WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report,
4 March 2022,
url
185
An international organisation: 9; Tolo, Afghan Woman Journalist Working as Street Vendor in Kabul, 12 November 2021,
url
186
An international humanitarian organisation: 26
187
DACAAR: 10
188
DACAAR: 9; An international organisation: 6; An international humanitarian organisation: 17
189
DACAAR: 9; An international humanitarian organisation: 21
190
An international humanitarian organisation: 21
191
An international humanitarian organisation: 16, 19; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27; An
international organisation: 6
192
An international humanitarian organisation: 16
179
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women have been denied entry to the ministries, and female NGO directors have been denied entry at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not being accompanied by a
mahram.
193
According to an international organisation, female staff of partner organisations, i.e. national NGOs, in
certain locations have not been able to work to this day. Moreover, the situation at checkpoints is
unreliable; Taliban members manning the checkpoints may require a
mahram
for female NGO employees
one day, and turn a blind eye the next day.
194
These regulations from the Taliban have affected and
di i ished o e s se
se of security.
195
The main type of jobs that are open for women in Afghanistan are teachers, health care workers or at
NGOs, even though some teachers and health care workers have not been paid for months.
196
Women can
work in the media as well; the Taliban have ordered female Afghan TV presenters to cover their faces while
on air.
197
They are banned from working in the government
198
, with the exception of the Ministry of
Education and the Ministry of Health.
199
Some of the women who have not yet returned to the public
positions are still receiving salaries.
200
Female taxi drivers are allowed to operate in Kabul at the moment,
but on 5 May 2022, the Taliban stopped issuing driving licenses to women in Kabul and other provinces.
201
In other sectors, women have not been allowed to return to their former professions.
202
Wo e s a ess to the jo
a ked is also i pa ted the i te atio al sa tio s, e ause positio s
funded by large government schemes, e.g. by the World Bank, no longer exist.
203
6.1.4. Women who defy the Taliban
The Taliban does not have a uniform reaction, when women defy them by not wearing the clothing
perceived as correct or refusing to travel with a
mahram.
It depends on the situation and the personality of
the Talib in charge at the given place and time.
204
Women arrested during protests are in some cases
released after weeks,
205
but without publicly available details about their experiences or their arrests and
disappearances.
206
6.1.5. Gender-based violence (GBV)
In the assessment of an international humanitarian organisation, rates on GBV has increased since August
2021, and two sources pointed to the deteriorating economy and the socioeconomic situation as possible
193
194
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 27
An international organisation: 6; A well-informed journalist 24
195
An international organisation: 5
196
An international humanitarian organisation: 18, 20; A well-informed journalist: 17
197
BBC,
Afghanistan's female TV presenters must cover their faces,
say Taliban, 19 May 2022,
url
198
An international humanitarian organisation: 20
199
A male human rights activist: 5
200
A male human rights activist: 5
201
Independent,
Taliban regime stops issuing driving licences to women, reports say,
5 May 2022,
url
202
Amina Khan: 15
203
An international humanitarian organisation: 18
204
An international humanitarian organisation: 22
205
BBC,
Afghan woman activist released after arrest in January,
13 February 2022
url;
WION,
Taliban releases 14 women prisoners
in Kabul amid global pressure,
5 February 2022,
url;
The Guardian,
Taliban have detained 29 women and their families in Kabul, says
US envoy,
12 February 2022,
url
206
HRW,
Afgha Wo e s Rights A ti ists For i l Disappeared,
24 January 2022
url
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reasons.
207
Another related reason is the large number of men who are currently out of work, stuck at
homes, using negative coping mechanisms. Moreover, there are many drug abusers among the male
returnees from Iran, which has a correlated effect to GBV and households.
208
An international organisation
emphasised the fact that the monitoring of GBV, which took place prior to August 2021, is no longer in
place.
209
This is due to the restrictive environment created by the Taliban government, and the required
cautious approach to collect new information on GBV.
210
In addition to that, men who have formally been
convicted of GBV in the past have been released, as prisons were opened and prisoners released following
the take-over of Kabul.
211
An international organisation added that there is a high level of trauma in the country and some women
have indicated that their trauma is linked to domestic violence.
212
When asked to what extent the Taliban will be able to protect women from GBV, an international
humanitarian organisation
eplied that a o di g to the Tali a s i te p etatio of the th eshold of
violence, hitting is allowed, but not too often and not too severely.
213
According to UNAMA, nine out of ten
women in Afghanistan experience at least one form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime.
214
According to a research by Amnesty International, the most common cases of GBV involves beating, rape,
other forms of physical and sexual violence, and forced marriage. Survivors often need urgent medical
treatment.
215
6.2. Ethnic and religious minorities, including converts
It has been reported that religious minorities, including nonbelievers and Muslims with diverging beliefs
from the Taliban, were harassed and their houses of worship desecrated.
216
According to an international
humanitarian organisation, there are regional differences in the treatment of religious minorities, notably
Shia Muslims. In the west and the north of the country where minorities co-exist, it is more peaceful,
whereas in the south and the east, religious minorities are definitely treated worse than in Kabul. It is
harder to be a Shia in the south and east of the country than other areas, because the regions are more
conservative and the Taliban has always had a stronghold.
217
An international humanitarian organisation: 27; An international organisation: 13
An international humanitarian organisation: 27
209
An international organisation: 11
210
An international organisation: 12
211
BBC,
Female Afghan judges hunted by the murderers they convicted,
18 September 2021,
url
212
An international organisation: 14
213
An international humanitarian organisation: 28
214
UNAMA,
UN calls for solidarity and commitment to end violence against women and girls amidst humanitarian crises,
25
November 2021
url
215
Amnesty International,
Afghanistan: Survivors of gender-based violence abandoned following Taliban takeover
–
new research,
6
December 2021
url
216
USCIRF
–
US Commission on International Religious Freedom: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
2022 Annual Report; USCIRF
–
Recommended for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC): Afghanistan,
April 2022,
url
217
An international humanitarian organisation: 9
208
207
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6.2.1. Shia
Since the sources were interviewed several attacks have been launched mainly towards the Shia minority in
Afghanistan, most of which ISKP has claimed the responsibility for; on 19 April,
218
21 April,
219
28 April,
220
29
April
221
and 1 May
222
- tallying up to more than 100 deaths in attacks over the period of two weeks.
223
The situation for the Shia community is the same as for the Hazaras.
224
Three sources consulted for this
report opined that the Hazara population is not exposed to a systematic and large-scale persecution based
on their minority status by the Taliban.
225
An international humanitarian organisation opined that there are
attempts to intimidate the Hazaras in order to prevent them from accessing certain livelihood opportunities
that existed prior to August 2021 and to impose a culture of fear. It is more about a threat of violence
rather than actual violence.
226
In this respect, HRW are highlighting the hundreds of Hazara families
forcefully evicted from their homes in the provinces of
Daykundi, Uruzgan, Kunduz, and Kandahar in
September and October 2021.
227
According to two sources, Hazaras and Shias are generally considered as
apostates by the Taliban and therefore, probably regarded inferior as human beings.
228
O Do ell poi ted
to the large number and Shias who have been targeted and killed in the past by the Taliban. The source
knows of high profiled Shias and Hazaras who have left Afghanistan since August 2021, assuming their lives
were in danger due to their ethnicity.
229
As law enforcement, Taliban has attempted to deploy members to protect Shia mosques and to a certain
degree to allow Shias to protect themselves with weapon towards ISKP.
230
6.2.2. Sikhs, Jews, Salafis, Christians and converts
Only a very small community of Sikhs are left in Afghanistan today; either because of the discrimination
that they have faced from the rest of the society in the past, or because they were evacuated in August
2021.
231
India airlifted in December 2021, 94 Afghan Hindus and Sikhs out of Afghanistan, along with three
scriptures saved from defunct temples.
232
The sources deemed it hard to evaluate whether Sikhs are more persecuted today compared to prior to
August 2021. DACAAR believed that living conditions for Jews and Sikhs in Afghanistan have been on a
France 24,
Several killed in twin explosions at Shiite school in Afghan capital,
19 April 2022
url
France 24, IS group claims deadly blast at Shiite mosque amid series of attacks across Afghanistan, 21 April 2022
url
220
Al Jazeera,
Twin blasts kill at least nine in northern Afghanistan,
28 April 2022
url
221
The Guardian, Blast at Kabul mosque kills more than 50 worshippers, 29 April 2022
url
222
France 24,
Islamic State group claims responsibility for Kabul bus bombing,
1 May 2022
url
223
The New York Times,
With spate of attacks, ISIS begins bloody new chapter in Afghanistan,
1 May 2022
url
224
The consulted sources used the terms Hazaras and Shias interchangeably to describe the same demographic in Afghanistan.
225
An international humanitarian organisation: 8; A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 22; Amina Khan:
11
226
An international humanitarian organisation: 1
227
HRW,
Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia,
22 October 2021
url;
HRW (Human Rights Watch),,
Afghanistan, Events
of 2021,
13 January 2022,
url
228
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact on civilians and targeted
individuals,
September 2021,
url,
p. ; L e O Do ell:
229
L
e O Do ell:
230
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 22; An international humanitarian organisation: 9; Amina Khan:
11
231
DACAAR: 16; An international humanitarian organisation: 7; A well-informed journalist: 20
232
The Tribune,
Afghan Sikhs, Hindus among 104 airlifted, scriptures brought back,
11 December 2022,
url
219
218
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downwards trajectory for years now, and this trend has not changed significantly since August.
233
According
to USCIRF, by the end of 2021, there appears to be no remaining Jews in Afghanistan.
234
Because of the activities of ISKP, the Salafist communities have been targeted in the south and eastern
provinces, such as Kunar, since the 2021 Taliban takeover.
235
As for conditions for religious converts from Islam to Christianity, an international humanitarian
organisation was aware that in the northeast of the country, there are certain rather secretive faith based
organisations and missionaries. The large faith based organisations in Afghanistan do not proselytize, but
there are smaller organisations proselytizing.
236
In October 2021, a Taliban official reportedly declared a
prominent U.S.-based humanitarian aid organisatio
a e e of the state . Tali a fo es o upied the
organisatio
s Ka ul offi es, seized thei ehi les, a d a ed that NDS offi ials e e dete i ed to
pu ish the o ga isation
on alleged charges of Christian proselytization. Faced with mounting hostility and
threats to arrest staff, the organisation suspended its operations. The organisatio
s Ka ul offi es e ai ed
occupied by the Taliban.
237
According to a well-informed journalist, there is no real Christian community in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is
a conservative Muslim country, and conversion from Islam to other religions is inacceptable to the ordinary
Afghan. This was also the case prior to August 2021. The source has not heard of any cases of conversion
from Islam to Christianity.
238
According to USCIRF, Ch
istia s, Ah adi a Musli s, Baha is, a d o elie e s a e u a le to e p ess thei
faiths or beliefs openly because they face dire consequences, including death, if discovered by the Taliban
or ISIS-K.
239
6.2.3. Other ethnic minorities
According to a representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan, recently, there was a higher
level
–
or perceived higher level
–
of threat in Kabul towards Tajiks from Panjshir. The focus seemed to be
on confiscating weapons in homes linked to the National Resistance Front (NRF) in the north,
240
because
Panjshiris are perceived as a hot bed of potential or real resistance.
241
On 7 May, attacks by the Taliban
against members of NRF resulted in ongoing combat in Panjshir province.
242
At the time of writing, the
DACAAR: 16
USCIRF
–
US Commission on International Religious Freedom: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
2022 Annual Report; USCIRF
–
Recommended for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC): Afghanistan,
April 2022,
url
235
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 21
236
An international humanitarian organisation: 10
237
US Department of State,
Afghanistan 2021 Human Rights report,
url,
p. 24
238
A well-informed journalist: 21
239
USCIRF
–
US Commission on International Religious Freedom: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
2022 Annual Report; USCIRF
–
Recommended for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC): Afghanistan,
April 2022,
url
240
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 20
241
L
e O Do ell:
242
Afghanistan International,
دنداد ت نلاغب تیلاو د نابلاط هیل ک ر م تایلم
ت
ا آ ا یدا آ ههب و تمواقم ههب
, 7 May 2022
url,
[The
ر
Resistance Front and the Freedom Front announced the launch of a joint operation against the Taliban in Baghlan Province]
234
233
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combat has caused several casualties on both sides, in addition to civilian deaths and torture
243
in several
areas in the Panjshir province.
244
There are, however, Tajiks and Uzbeks in the northern and northeastern areas, who are not systematically
targeted by the Taliban.
245
Since the north has always been perceived as a more liberal part of the country
compared to the south and east,
246
the Taliban has put in place provincial governors from other parts of the
country, who are more hardliners and have been assigned to exert more control to make the message
clear, that these parts of the country need to get in line with the values of the Taliban.
247
6.3. LGBT
6.3.1. Change in the situation for LGBT since August 2021
Life has changed dramatically for LGBT, a UN national staff in Afghanistan explained. Previously, they could
have hidden lives; they could secretly party, have relationships, etc. However, due to threats from the
Taliban, they are now completely in hiding.
248
Even though the human rights abuses faced by the LBGT community were severe during the rule of the
former government, any hope for improvement under Taliban rule is completely abandoned, one source
stated.
249
Beatings, detention and rapes at checkpoints are not uncommon.
250
Targeted killings of LGBT people by the Taliban have taken place, according to a member of civil society in
Afghanistan.
251
The source added that under the previous government, some LGBT people worked as
dancers, sex workers or worked in restaurants, which is no longer possible under the Taliban rule. Two
sources stated that reporting and collecting information about the LGBT community is currently challenging
for organisations.
252
There are no regional differences concerning the treatment of LGBT people by the Taliban.
253
Often, LGBT
people flee from their families and many of them settle in major cities like Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif. Their
way of life is perceived unacceptable and in opposition to religion everywhere in Afghanistan.
254
Afghanistan International,
دننکمی بوک و تل و ه نک " ا ا بآ و ه د قطانم مدرم نابلاط ؛تر نپ د تمواقم همادا",
8 May 2022
url
[Continued
resistance in Panjshir; Taliban "torture and beat people in valley and waterfall areas"]; Human Rights Watch,
Afghanistan: Taliban
Torture Civilians in Panjshir,
10 June 2022,
url
244
Afghanistan International,
دندرک نا اب
تت" تر نپ د ا کیلم درف ۷ نابلاط :لی م عبانم",
9 May 2022,
url;
[Local sources: the Taliban "shoots"
ر
seven civilians in Panjshir]
245
An international humanitarian organisation: 4;
246
An international humanitarian organisation: 4
247
An international humanitarian organisation: 4
248
A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 1
249
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 1
250
HRW, Afghanistan:
Taliban Target LGBT Afghans, Surge in Threats, Rape, Assault, Wrongful Detention,
26 January 2022
url
; A
member of civil society in Afghanistan: 1
251
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 1
252
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 1; A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 1
253
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 2; A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 2
254
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 2
243
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6.3.2. Treatment of LGBT people by families and local communities
It is not simply the Taliban who finds homosexuality inacceptable; it is also the families of the LGBT-person
who finds this inacceptable.
255
Few families accept homosexuality, as long as it is not practiced openly.
256
A
UN national staff in Afghanistan personally knew of a gay man, who escaped death threats from his family.
His own brother had set a reward if anyone should find him.
257
Similar cases occurred under the previous
government as well, where families either attempted to kill their son, or succeeded at killing him upon
discovery of his sexual orientation.
258
A member of civil society in Afghanistan stressed the importance of maintaining the family honour in
Afghanistan. A son or a daughter having same-sex relation will bring shame on the rest of the family.
259
The
source added that relation cut-offs and honour killings of LGBT people have taken place, not merely by
close family members, but killings executed by the extended family members such as uncles and cousins.
According to two sources, LGBT people have been persecuted by their own family members with close links
to the Taliban.
260
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan knows of a case, in which three men were
attacked, jailed and accused of being gay
–
after which, the elder men in their community initiated a
negotiation process with the Taliban to release them.
261
6.3.3. Accessibility of health care for LGBT people
Two sources consulted on the matter stressed the limitation of services and healthcare facilities since August
2021 for two reasons; lack of funding and the fear of being identified by the Taliban, if LGBT people seek
help.
262
6.4. Musicians, well-educated and members of the intelligentsia
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan stated that there are several examples of
individuals belonging to the well-educated class and members of the intelligentsia being targeted since
August 2021.
263
Several cases have been covered by news outlets; the case of Faizullah Jalal, a university
professor who was arrested
264
and detained at an unknown location for four days, as a consequence of his
critical remarks about the Taliban.
265
Zabihullah Mujahid, the de facto go
e
e t s spokespe so t eeted
after the arrest, that the statements made by Jalal on social media were "trying to instigate people against
the s ste ", a d that Jalal had ee a ested so that othe s do 't ake si ila se seless o
e ts... .
266
255
256
A well-informed journalist: 22
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 3; A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 3
257
A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 3
258
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 3
259
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 3
260
HRW, Afghanistan:
Taliban Target LGBT Afghans, Surge in Threats, Rape, Assault, Wrongful Detention,
26 January 2022
url
; A
member of civil society in Afghanistan: 1
261
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 23
262
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 5; A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 5
263
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 24
264
DW,
Taliban release prominent Afghan academic Faizullah Jalal,
11 January 2022,
url
265
The Print,
Taliban warns retired professors of Kabul University to vacate government homes,
23 March 2022,
url
266
France 24,
Taliban arrest Afghan professor after criticism,
9 January 2022
url
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Another university professor, Sayed Baqir Mohsini, disappeared for two days on 4 March 2022, after
accusing the Taliban of censorship on Facebook.
267
On 12 February 2022, Etilaatroz wrote of an incident in the residence of Nekouei Khoonavaloud, a
u i e sit p ofesso a d e pe t o politi al affai s i Ka ul. Etilaat oz ited the p ofesso s update o
Facebook, according to which gunmen with "identification cards" from Taliban entered his home, and
battered his daughter and severely injured his wife.
268
Furthermore, on 23 March the Taliban warned the
professors at Kabul University to evacuate government homes as soon as possible.
269
An international humanitarian organisation stated on 31 March that some of those arrested who are part
of the well-educated class and members of the intelligentsia were still in detention. Some were awaiting
trials in which the charge was promotion of values that are not in line with Sharia values or violation of the
principle of the Quran, while others were under house arrest or killed. The intelligentsia of Afghanistan is
mainly based in the urban areas, for instance in Kabul, which is where the persecution is taking place.
270
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan advised that some musicians have been
physically attacked and have had their instruments destroyed,
271
publicly humiliated and have been
arrested.
272
These sporadic examples have been seen all across the country, in conservative as well as in
more liberal communities and cities.
273
Furthermore, there have been two documented examples of killings
as a consequence of playing music at weddings.
274
The Taliban has banned music at weddings and in public.
Ho
e e , a o di g to the Tali a s spokespe so , killi g people fo pla i g usi is ot allo ed.
275
267
The Washington Post,
Taliban arrests Canadian aid worker amid widening crackdown on activists and foreigners,
7 March 2022
url
268
Etilaatroz,
دند می یوکن
بماک تر د و سرمه ؛لباک د هاگ ناد دات ا کی ی هنا هب هنا ل م ی هلم
, 13 February 2022
url;
[Armed attack
ی
on the home of a university professor in Kabul; Kambakhsh Nekouei's wife and daughter were injured]
269
The Print,
Taliban warns retired professors of Kabul University to vacate government homes,
23 March 2022
url
270
An international humanitarian organisation: 13
271
NDTV,
Video: Taliban burn instrument in front of Afghan musician as he cries,
16 January 2022
url;
A representative of an
international organisation in Afghanistan: 25
272
The Print,
Taliban humiliates musicians by hanging instruments around their necks,
5 March 2022
url;
A representative of an
international organisation in Afghanistan: 25
273
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 25
ر
274
Rooziato,
قی وم
ن
پ مر هب نات ناغفا د سیور ن کی د رفن ۳ تر ک,
1 November 2021
url,
[Three people killed at a wedding party
in Afghanistan for playing music]; Hasht-e Subh Daily,
Taliban bans playing music in public,
12 March 2022
url
ر
ن
275
Rooziato,
قی وم
پ مر هب نات ناغفا د سیور ن کی د رفن ۳ تر ک,
1 November 2021
url,
[Three people killed at a wedding party
in Afghanistan for playing music]
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7. Rule of law
Taliban courts across Afghanistan often interpret sharia law inconsistently, and this means that different
courts will likely reach different verdicts in similar cases.
276
This assessment was shared by the international
organisation who elaborated that the rule of law and the previously existing legislative framework have
been undermined, degraded and replaced with an ad-hoc application of sharia law; the Taliban is not a
homogenous unit, and they are undisciplined in following any particular policy instruction. This means that
it is very difficult to draw any general conclusion regarding the treatment of people who have a personal
conflict with members of the Taliban.
277
As such, this depiction of the judicial system under the Taliban
largely mirrors the depictions reported by DIS in December 2021.
278
Moreover, the well-i
fo ed jou alist assessed that judges ithi the Tali a s justi e s ste a e to so e
degree prone to corruption. The source assessed that corruption is perceived by the population as far less
likely to occur now because the judges have to refer their verdicts to Islamic law. According to the same
source, this further ensures that a person can generally expect a fair trial if they have a conflict with a
Taliban member, but this depends on the context of the conflict. The source assessed that Hazaras are
likely to be discriminated by the court system, but elaborated that his assessment is based on past
treatments of Hazaras rather than on incidents since August 2021.
279
7.1. Honour-related conflicts
Premarital relationships have long been unacceptable to many within Afghan societies. A well-informed
journalist advised that premarital relationships are usually dealt with and resolved within the families,
rather than involving the authorities. This was the case prior to August 2021 and is still the case. This
behaviour is not acceptable to the surrounding society and the families will try to resolve this issue without
the interference from outside.
280
As such, there are not many cases bringing premarital relationships before
a court in Afghanistan after mid-August.
281
However, the international organisation stated that if two
people are in a relationship outside marriage, they risk being accused of committing
zina
282
since the
Taliban government is applying sharia law as the basis for their current justice system.
283
In this connection,
a well-informed journalist advised that people have been brought before Taliban-courts, accused of
forming premarital relationships.
284
Moreover, the international organisation stated that women are now
especially vulnerable should they end up in an honour-related conflict. This is because there is no
possibilities for a woman in an honour conflict to seek redress, as the Taliban are not respecting the justice
276
277
Amina Khan: 16
An international organisation: 31; DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp. 10-14
278
DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp. 10-14
279
A well-informed journalist: 26
280
A well-informed journalist: 25
281
A well-informed journalist: 25
282
Unlawful sexual intercourse; fornication or adultery. A criminal offense in Islamic law. Oxford Islamic Studies Online,
Zina,
n.d.,
url
283
An international organisation: 28
284
A well-informed journalist: 25
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system that existed under the previous government. The rule of law has been significantly degraded across
the board -
espe iall o e i g the issue of o e s ights.
285
7.2. People with a personal conflict with members of the Taliban
There have been examples of discrimination against people in a personal conflict with members or affiliates
of the Taliban in judicial courts. An example of this took place in Daikundi where Hazaras had land disputes
with local Taliban members or people affiliated with the Taliban. The Hazaras were driven away from their
land and the court ruling gave a preferential treatment to the Talibs or people linked to the Taliban.
286
In
this connection, the representative of DACAAR advised that many land disputes across Afghanistan have
resurfaced since the Taliban assumed power. Many of these conflicts have persisted for decades
throughout the country and now, after the power-shift, people try to take advantage of this new situation
to assert their own agenda in the hope that the Taliban will side with them.
287
The well-informed journalist further assessed that if a person affiliated with the former government has a
personal dispute with a member of the Taliban, this affiliation with the former government would be used
against the person in question.
288
7.3.
Wo e ’s a ess to seek redress
The legal f a e o k put i pla e to p ote t o e s ights has e oded afte the Tali a assu ed po e ,
since sharia law now constitutes the only legal framework in Afghanistan.
289
According to DACAAR, some
Afghan women have approached the Taliban courts in order to resolve disputes with their husbands
because the Taliban courts are perceived as less corrupt compared to the courts of the previous
government. That said two sources assessed that the Taliban courts very rarely side with the women in
cases concerning marriage disputes.
290
The representative of the international humanitarian organisation stated that the Taliban widely regards
domestic violence as acceptable, thus, the courts are unlikely to side with women in cases of domestic
abuse or gender-based violence.
291
For more on
Gender-based Violence, see section 6.1.5.
A o di g to a i te atio al o ga isatio , o e s shelte s a d
safe houses in Afghanistan have seized to
operate.
292
Another source advised that there are still some shelters operating in Kabul and other provincial
capitals.
An international organisation: 16
A representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan: 8; Hasht-e Subh Daily,
Taliban Not Allowing the Displaced
Villagers in Daikundi to Return Home,
23 October 2021,
url
287
DACAAR: 14; New York Times (The),
I Afgha ista , Who Has the Gu s Gets the La d
,
December 2021,
url
288
A well-informed journalist: 8, 10
289
An international organisation: 15; DIS (Danish Immigration Service),
Afghanistan: Recent events,
December 2021,
url,
pp. 11-14
290
DACAAR: 12; Amina Khan: 16
291
An international humanitarian organisation: 28
292
An international organisation: 15; 16
286
285
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7.3.1. Shelters and safe houses
Many women and girl survivors had access to a nationwide network of shelters and services prior to August
2021.
293
Although the system was far from perfect, the access included pro-bono legal representation,
medical treatment, and psychosocial support.
294
However, the organisations running safe houses had to
close down, and according to an international organisation, prior to August 2021, there was a legal
framework and a justice system to deal with these types of complaints, but that is no longer functioning
and no longer applies under the new government.
295
Private shelters still exist in Kabul as well as in the provincial capitals, but they are severely underfunded. In
some places, the shelters for women closed down but not everywhere. The closure of some shelters may
be related to their leaders leaving the country in addition to the funding shortages.
296
7.4.
Situation for children
There are several child protection issues relevant to all children in Afghanistan. An international
organisation consulted on this issue pointed to the risk of child recruitment by the Taliban authorities and
other armed groups. Furthermore, there is a very high level of child labour that exposes the child to human
rights violations, from exploitation to physical harm, etc.
297
Yet, another risk is that due to the current
economic climate, a child
is also pe ei ed as a o
odit . Child e a e sold i etu fo a
bride
price
298
. An international humanitarian organisation noted that there has been an 11-15 % increase in early
marriages.
299
These challenges will also apply to unaccompanied minors.
300
Cases have appeared of internal
organs belonging to children being sold through private distribution to ensure the economic survival of the
whole family.
301
According to a human rights defender with 12 years of experience working with children without a
guardian in the civil society across different regions of Afghanistan, the living condition of children without
a guardian can be compared to child labour; they are either beggars or street workers.
302
An international
humanitarian organisation confirmed this point and added that even though there is an increase in the
number of children in Kabul city living on the streets it is still rare for a child to be left completely alone.
Social obligations within family networks in Afghanistan is quite strong.
303
According to an international humanitarian organisation, the same number of orphanages still exist in
Afghanistan as to prior to August 2021, although the funding has decreased a good deal. The quality of
Amnesty International, Afghanistan:
Survivors of gender-based violence abandoned following Taliban takeover
–
new research,
6
December 2021,
url
294
An international organisation: 15; Amnesty International, Afghanistan:
Survivors of gender-based violence abandoned following
Taliban takeover
–
new research,
6 December 2021,
url
295
An international organisation: 15
296
An international humanitarian organisation: 29
297
An international organisation: 29
298
The Times,
Joy as Fatima, 8, sold by her starving family, is allowed to go to school,
20 March 2022,
url
; An international
organisation: 29
299
An international humanitarian organisation: 32
300
An international organisation: 32
301
The Wall Street Journal,
No Father Wa ts to Sell His So s Kid e . Afgha s Pushed to Desperate Measures to Sur i e,
19 April
2022,
url
302
A human rights defender: 7
303
An international humanitarian organisation: 30
293
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these facilities are quite low and there is less food, clothing and hygiene facilities available since August. In
case a child is not able to get support from his family, they can go to an orphanage.
304
There are no
orphanages in rural areas.
305
7.5. Minorities’
access to seek redress
According to an international humanitarian organisation, the Taliban has not explicitly said that they will
protect the minorities. The Taliban considers their judicial system as more efficient, direct, reliable and
consistent than the judicial system of the former government. However, the source questioned the
reliability of the system. The source confirmed that the Taliban certainly do take care of matters more
quickly and transparently than the former administration, where many things were resolved by bribing.
306
The Tali a s ea tion
to the recent attacks has been interpreted as indicative of the fact that they have
done little to protect the minorities.
307
Amina Khan has noticed that senior Taliban members have made an effort to reach out to the Shia
community in Afghanistan.
308
The Taliban have also welcomed Shia Hazara commanders as well as Tajik and
Uzbek in some provinces across the country. Based on these efforts, Khan assessed that the Taliban in 2022
are more willing to engage with Shia Muslims, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and so on, than they were in the
past.
309
However, despite these efforts from/by the leadership, there are still incidents of ethnic minorities
in Afghanistan being harassed and discriminated against by low-ranking members of the Taliban.
310
None of
the sources consulted for this report had any information regarding the possibility for protection of Sikhs
and Christians.
7.6. LGBT people’s
access to seek redress
According to two sources, it is not possible for LGBT people to seek protection from the authorities.
311
Not
even during the previous administration was protection a possibility, according to a member of the civil
society, because the law enforcement was one of the main perpetrators engaged in the abuse against LGBT
people, when they sought help and protection.
312
Human Rights Watch published a report in January 2022,
describing threats, assaults and gang rapes by the Taliban forces.
313
304
305
An international humanitarian organisation: 30
An international humanitarian organisation: 31
306
An international humanitarian organisation: 5
307
Vox,
Deadl atta ks o Afgha
i orities sho the Tali a is t keepi g its pro ises,
23 April 2022
url;
War on the rocks,
Brutally ineffective: how the Taliban are failing in their new role as counter-insurgents,
29 November 2022,
url;
The Print,
Tali a s
promises to protect Afghan minorities falling apart amid a spate of attacks: Report,
26 April 2022,
url
308
US Department of State, Afghanistan 2021 Human Rights report,
url,
p. 51; Amina Khan: 11
309
Amina Khan: 11
310
Amina Khan: 12
311
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 4; A UN national staff in Afghanistan: 4
312
A member of civil society in Afghanistan: 4
313
HRW, Afghanistan:
Taliban Target LGBT Afghans, Surge in Threats, Rape, Assault, Wrongful Detention,
26 January 2022
url
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8. Conditions for Afghans returned to Afghanistan
Two sources consulted for this report did not have any information regarding the prevalence of Afghans
who have returned from Europe since August 2021, including Afghans who evacuated from Afghanistan.
314
The representative of DACAAR stated that very few Afghans have returned to Afghanistan from the West
since August 2021.
315
The representative of DACAAR noted that it was not his impression that Afghans returning from the West
would be subject to targeting by the Taliban, unless it is a result of a personal dispute or vendetta.
316
Rega di g the Tali a s a ilit to o ito a d gathe i tellige e o etu i g Afgha s, the IOM stated that
the infrastructure of the Taliban is extremely weak, and thus the Taliban would not be able to track and
monitor the returnees.
317
However, on the ground, at village level, the local leaders will know who has
returned. However, the information will most likely not reach the Taliban government in Kabul.
318
IOM stated that the conditions for returnees returning from Pakistan have worsened since August 2021.
319
Due to the economic crisis, it has become increasingly harder to find a source of income as well as
accommodation.
320
Furthermore, the sources did not know of any return programs operating in
Afghanistan, and thus having a social network who can provide for the returnee has become increasingly
important for returnees.
321
An international humanitarian organisation commented that people who are eager to leave Afghanistan
and obtain a visa abroad, are overstating the risks they are facing; the source emphasized this does not
apply to everyone trying to leave.
322
Between May 2021
–
April 2022, 2,554,615 Afghans have returned from Pakistan and 1,171,251 from
Iran.
323
These returns from neighbouring countries are due to a variety of reasons, including labour
migration, personal safety, the risk of deportation and economic hardship abroad.
324
314
315
IOM: 1, 2; DACAAR: 19
DACAAR: 19
316
DACAAR: 20
317
IOM: 21, 22
318
IOM: 24
319
IOM: 12, 19
320
IOM: 8
321
IOM: 11, 12
322
An international humanitarian organisation: 33
323
IOM,
Movements in and out of Afghanistan 7 May to 13 May,
18 May 2022,
url
324
IOM: 4
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May 2022
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Radio Free Europe (RFE),
New Reports Of Fighting In Afghanistan's Panjshir Trigger Fresh Claims Of Taliban
War Crimes,
13 May 2022,
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-panjshir-taliban-
atrocities/31848654.html,
accessed 17 May 2022
Reuters,
Taliban announce women must cover faces in public, say burqa is best,
7 may 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-announce-women-must-cover-faces-public-say-burqa-
is-best-2022-05-07/
, accessed 16 May 2022
Rooziato,
یقیسوم ش پ ج هب تسن غفا ر یس ع نشج کی ر فن ۳ نتشک
, [Three people killed at a wedding party in
Afghanistan for playing music], 1 November 2021,
url,
accessed 16 May 2022
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS,
30 October 2021,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf
,
accessed 16 May 2022
Tolo News,
Young Man Killed by Unknown Attackers in Western Kabul,
26 February 2022,
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-176879
, accessed 16 May 2022
Tolo News,
Kabul Residents Urge Govt to Tackle Crime,
26 November 2021,
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175632
, accessed 16 May 2022
Tolo, Afghan Woman Journalist Working as Street Vendor in Kabul, 12 November 2021,
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/attack-mediajournalists-175423
, accessed 16 May 2022
Times (the),
Joy as Fatima, 8, sold by her starving family, is allowed to go to school,
20 March 2022,
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/joy-as-fatima-8-sold-by-her-starving-family-is-allowed-to-go-to-school-
3386hqnff
, accessed 16 May 2022
Tribune (the), Afghan Sikhs, Hindus among 104 airlifted, scriptures brought back, 11 December 2022,
Tribune%20(The),%20Afghan%20Sikhs,%20Hindus%20among%20104%20airlifted,%20scriptures%20brough
t%20back,%2011%20December%202022,%20url
, accessed 16 May 2022
UNAMA,
UN calls for solidarity and commitment to end violence against women and girls amidst
humanitarian crises,
25 November 2021,
https://unama.unmissions.org/un-calls-solidarity-and-
commitment-end-violence-against-women-and-girls-amidst-humanitarian-crises
, accessed 16 May 2022
United Nations General Assembly Security Council,
The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security,
28 January 2022,
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_afghanistan_january_2022.pdf
, accessed
16 May 2022
UN News,
Afgha ista : Food i se urit a d al utritio threate a e tire ge eratio
, 15 March 2022,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113982
, accessed 16 May 2022
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UNFPA,
UNFPA Afghanistan Humanitarian Appeal 2022,
March 2022,
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/HRP2022_Afghanistan.pdf
, accessed 16 May 2022
USCIRF (US Commission on International Religious Freedom), United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom
2022 Annual Report; USCIRF
–
Recommended for Countries of Particular Concern (CPC):
Afghanistan,
April 2022,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071903/2022+Afghanistan.pdf
, accessed 16
May 2022
USDOS (US Department of State)
2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,
12 April
2022,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2071122.html
, accessed 16 May 2022
Vox,
Deadl atta ks o Afgha
i orities sho the Tali a is t keepi g its pro ises,
23 April 2022,
https://www.vox.com/2022/4/23/23038561/afghanistan-terror-attacks-targeted-afghan-minorities
,
accessed 16 May 2022
Washington post (the),
Taliban arrests Canadian aid worker amid widening crackdown on activists and
foreigners,
7 March 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/07/afghanistan-canada-
nadima-noor-taliban/
, accessed 16 May 2022
WFP (World Food Programme),
Afghanistan Emergency,
13 April 2022,
https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/afghanistan-emergency
, accessed 16 May 2022
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Taliban releases 14 women prisoners in Kabul amid global pressure, 5 February 2022,
Taliban
releases 14 women prisoners in Kabul amid global pressure - South Asia News (wionews.com),
accessed 17
May 2022
WSJ (Wall Street Journal),
Taliban Want to Control Aid Funds, a Red Line for Donors,
31 March 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-taliban-want-to-control-aid-funds-a-red-line-for-donors-11648735574
,
accessed 16 May 2022
WSJ (Wall Street Journal),
No Father Wa ts to Sell His So s Kid e . Afgha s Pushed to Desperate
Measures to Survive,
19 April 2022,
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afghans-pushed-to-desperate-measures-to-survive-11650360705
, accessed 16 May 2022
WSJ (Wall Street Journal),
Kabul School Blasts Kill Six as Afghanistan Violence Continues,
19 April 2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kabul-school-blasts-kill-six-as-afghanistan-violence-continues-11650377572
,
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World Bank,
Afghanistan Update: Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery,
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World Food Program (WFP),
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4 March 2022,
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, accessed 16
May 2022
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Annex 1: Terms of Reference (ToR), 3 March 2022
1. Targeted individuals
a. Afghans with links to the former government
b. Employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs, or
foreign embassies in Afghanistan
c. Journalists
d. Human rights defenders
2. Family members to targeted individuals
3. Monitoring of targeted individuals
4. Vulnerable groups
a. Women
i. Situation for lone women without a male support network
ii.
The state s a ilit to p o ide
protection against persecution
b. Unaccompanied children
c. Ethnic minorities
d. Religious minorities, including converts
e. LGBT
f. Westernized people
g. Well-educated and members of the intelligentsia
h. People with a personal conflict with members of the Taliban
5. Conditions for Afghans returned to Afghanistan after being evacuated
a. Afghans convicted of a crime abroad
6. Insecurity and crime levels
7. Honour related conflicts
8. Regional differences
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Annex 2: Meeting minutes
Skype meeting with an international organisation
4 April 2022
1. The source pointed to important factors in the current developments in Afghanistan, including the
fact that the de facto authorities in Afghanistan have side-lined the parliamentary process and are
ruling by decree. Importantly, the statements by the de facto authorities are often made to
reassure the vulnerable groups in Afghanistan but are actually often contradicted on the ground.
Constraints on reporting in Afghanistan include media organisations and journalists that are being
targeted which implies a dearth of data available on country of origin information.
2. The International organisation recognized the relevance of the 2022 UNHCR Guidance Note on the
International Protection Needs of People Fleeing Afghanistan to many of the topics covered in the
call, including on the availability of information, the situation of women and other vulnerable
groups and on the actions of the
de facto
authorities.
3. The source considered that there are various risk groups facing heightened risks in Afghanistan,
including but not limited to women and girls, those associated with the former government or
international community, including former embassy staff, employees of international organisation,
former members of the Afghan security forces and Afghans associated with military forces,
journalists and media workers, human rights defenders, ethnic and religious minority groups,
persons of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities and family members and others
closely associated with those who are at risk of persecution themselves.
4. During the meeting, the source referred to written material on each topic that have been inserted
in the footnotes of the minutes at hand.
325
Conditions for women
Wo e s situation
5.
The sou e had o tai ed i fo atio o o e s situatio
speaki g to Afgha fe ale staff
members of the organisation. There was a time after the change in government where the de facto
government took the position that there was a full stop to women working. Later on, there was a
relaxation of the rules and it was indicated that female staff working for international organisations
could work and subsequently some of the staff started to return, while others were reluctant
because they were afraid. These stipulations from the de facto government have affected and
di i ished o e s se se of se u it .
325
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
UNHCR Guidance Note on the International Protection Needs of People Fleeing
Afghanistan,
February 2022,
url
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6. Some female staff of partner organisations, i.e. national NGOs, in certain locations are not able to
work to this day. In other locations women are able to work, however, they may face problems at
checkpoints where the given Taliban members who are manning the checkpoints ask where or who
is the
mahram.
An extension of this is that on one day it may be accepted that the female staff do
not have a
mahram,
whereas the next day the authorities do not accept women not to be
accompanied by a
mahram.
Wo e s freedo
of
o e e t
7.
The sou e stated that o e s f eedo of o e e t is o te t spe ifi . The e is a poli
introduced by the Ministry of Vice and Virtue that women could not travel more than 70 km
without a
mahram.
There are anecdotal reports of women being denied rides in taxis and public
transport.
8. In the last couple of weeks the source had received information about women without a
mahram
who have been denied the right to cross the land border to Pakistan and Iran. Some of them have
been turned back and the authorities at the land border had insisted that the women be
accompanied by a legitimate
mahram,
because not any man can act as a
mahram
to a given
woman. Coupled with this the source had heard that women in the past two weeks have been
actively prevented from boarding international flights. Two local carriers are still conducting
international flights: Kam Air and Ariana Afghan Airlines.
Single women without a male support network
9. For female heads of households, it is difficult for them to fulfil their role as breadwinners. Tolo
News wrote an article about a female journalist who had been forced to resort to work as a street
vendor selling clothes.
326
10. Two thirds of the population are affected by the current food insecurity, including female-headed
households among whom almost a hundred percent were receiving insufficient food for
consumption.
327
Gender-based violence
328
11. The source pointed to the fact that the monitoring on gender-based violence which took place prior
to August 2021, is no longer taking place because of data protection concerns as well as a concern
to do no harm given the current circumstances.
12. Currently, there is a far more cautious approach to collecting information on gender-based violence
due to the more restrictive environment given by the de facto government. As noted, sometimes,
female staff are not able to come to work and it is not possible for a male enumerator to speak to a
326
327
Tolo, Afghan Woman Journalist Working as Street Vendor in Kabul, 12 November 2021,
url
UN News,
Afgha ista : Food i se urit a d al utritio threate a e tire ge eratio
, 15 March 2022, url; World Food
Program (WFP),
WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report,
4 March 2022,
url
328
Protection Cluster,
Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update
–
Q4,
February 2022,
url
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woman during household level assessments. For this reason, in order to be able to reach women
and girls and speak to them directly, a focus is being placed on conducting focus group discussions,
which can be conducted in more private settings and it will also be permissible for female staff to
speak to women and girls.
13. The source assessed that gender-based violence is potentially taking place at a higher level,
because of the critical economic situation in the country in which many men have lost their jobs
and are staying at home, unable to feed their families.
14. There is a high level of trauma in the country and some women have indicated that their trauma is
linked to domestic violence.
Safe houses and legal redress
15. The organisations that are running safe houses had to close down.
329
Prior to the takeover by the
de facto
authorities there was a legal framework and a justice system to deal with these types of
complaints, but that is no longer functioning and no longer applies under the new government as
the rule of law has been undermined. While the previous system was imperfect, it had previously
been possible to file a complaint. It remains unclear if that possibility to seek redress still exists,
although that appears highly unlikely.
Possibility to seek redress in instances of women affected by GBV or those persons contravening Islamic
norms or laws as interpreted by the Taliban
16. There is no possibility for a woman in an honour conflict to seek redress; the current
de facto
authorities are not respecting the justice system that existed under the previous government. The
rule of law has been significantly degraded across the board but especially when it comes to the
issue of o e s ights. The sou e poi ted to the fa t that o e s shelte s ha e ee losed
and people who have been formally convicted of gender-based violence in the past have been
released, as prisons were opened and prisoners released following the take-over of Kabul.
330
The
source summed up in saying that there would not be any recourse to justice for a woman in an
honour-based conflict or a victim of gender-based violence.
17. The source had also received some anecdotal information from families themselves imposing
restrictions on their female family members. This could be for two reasons: First, they want to live
up to the expectations from the community on the new normative framework, so they are afraid of
the harm that could be done to the family if the women do not conform to these expectations.
Secondly, some families agree with the new restrictions on women and have taken it as a carte
blanche to impose further restrictions on the women of the family.
Amnesty International, Afghanistan:
Survivors of gender-based violence abandoned following Taliban takeover
–
new research,
6
December 2021,
url
330
BBC,
Female Afghan judges hunted by the murderers they convicted,
18 September 2021,
url
329
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18. Under these circumstances, in a country where cultural honour values are important, a woman
who is perceived as transgressing social norms and somehow causing shame on a family will be in a
very difficult situation.
Targeted groups
Armed forces
331
19. The source referred to information given by the UN Human Rights Council in which more than 130
former Afghan National Defence and Security forces (ANDSF) have been killed after the change of
government.
332
The de facto government issued a general amnesty for employees who worked for
the former government, but the amnesty was in some cases used to identify targets. The reported
killings occurred in the period from 24 August 2021 to February 2022, but it is not clear exactly
when these killings took place and whether there is a trend in the killings going up or down.
20. In February 2022, a city-wide house search campaign
333
in Kabul led by the
de facto
authorities took
place. This was reported by media and by HRW. The authorities were looking for weapons and
went from house to house. The reports highlighted the fear of people in Kabul who had worked for
the previous administration. The source has received reports that such people, including ANDSF
members, are still afraid of being targeted.
21. When asked to what extent former employees of foreign troops are at risk of being persecuted as a
result of their previous job, the source confirmed that they constitute a risk profile. The source
highlighted that the difference in risk regarding this group depends on the function of each
individual and on how aware the surrounding people and the Taliban are of their previous function.
It comes down to individual circumstances, including the job, the employer, their family
background and whether they had any interaction with the Taliban, noting that under the
circumstances, it is also possible for private vendettas to be acted on.
Human Rights NGOs
22. With regard to persecution of Human Rights defenders working in Afghanistan, the sources pointed
to the Afgha ista I depe de t Hu a Rights Co
issio that pu lished a state e t i
September 2021 on how they were unable to conduct their activities. Another smaller NGO named
Hu a Rights Defe de s i di ated last ea that the e e o lo ge a le to pe fo thei
activates and were going underground. The source did not have precise information on the
situation of the employees of these organisations, but highlighted that other people, for instance
those who were operating safe houses had to relocate these safe houses. The source added that
la e s ho e e defe di g o e s ights e t i to hidi g a d had to o e f o lo atio to
331
Hasht-e-Subh, US,
NATO s I
-Cou
tr E plo ees Ca
ot Lea e Afgha ista , Sa s Tali a s I terior Mi istr
, 28 February 2022,
url
HRC
–
UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):
Situation of human rights in Afghanistan;
Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/49/24], 4 March 2022,
url
333
HRW,
In Afghanistan, Burning Our Past to Protect Our Future,
March 1, 2022,
url;
Jurist,
Afghanistan dispatch: Taliban house-to-
house searches raise privacy concerns, fear in those still trying to leave,
27 February 2022,
url
332
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location as a way to conceal their identities.
Protesters
23. There was some tolerance vis-à-vis protesters from the de facto government in the initial days after
the change of government; however, subsequently there was a change of tactics in that some of
the protests were met with some measure of violence. More recently, several female-led protests
resulted in women activists being arrested either on site or subsequently after the protest. These
arrests are an attempt by the
de facto
government to suppress the protests and likely to send a
message to other would-be protestors that dissent will not be tolerated.
24. There is no one size fits all approach taken by the Taliban in Afghanistan; for example the extent to
which girls can go to school and whether women should have a
mahram
differs throughout the
country and many factors come into play such as the scope of their activism, location and
connections.
25. A woman who is not conforming to the conservative perception on how women should behave is
somehow perceived as transgressing the Islamic law or Afghan cultural values or a combination of
the two. The same benchmark is not applied to men.
26. There are different types of responses to protesters by the de facto government: There are isolated
responses in which protestors are dispersed with some level of violence; and there are more
coordinated responses, for instance the arrest of 29 women and their family members that took
pla e i Fe ua
due to thei asso iatio ith o e s p otests a d the ta geti g of a
prominent academic.
334
The source also noted that protests took place against the renewed
prohibition in March 2022 on secondary school girls attending school.
335
Journalists
27. The source had received reports about journalists, including female journalists who are fearing for
their safety. The
de facto
government are targeting journalists who criticize them. The de facto
government wishes to express control of the narrative and to instil fear in journalists. According to
HRW (March 2022) female journalists are facing the most intense repression.
336
A prominent
academic was arrested due to his criticism of the de facto government.
337
Men who are transgressing Sharia law and honour killings
28. The source noted that it is known from background knowledge that if two people are in a
relationship outside marriage, they are open to claims of
zina
and we know that the de facto
334
The Guardian,
Taliban have detained 29 women and their families in Kabul, says US envoy,
12 February 2022,
url;
Al Jazeera,
Taliban releases prominent Afghan professor from custody: Family
, 11 january 2022,
url
335
The Guardian,
Protesters all for the Tali a to reope Afgha girls s hools,
26 March 2022,
url
336
HRW,
Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening Provincial Media; Journalists Detained, Beaten; Media Outlets Closed,
7 March 2022,
url;
International Federation of Journalists,
Afghanistan: 87% of women journalists have suffered discrimination under Taliban rule, 9
March 2022,
url
337
Al Jazeera,
Prominent Afghan professor arrested for criticising Taliban rule,
9 January 2022,
url
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government is applying sharia law as the basis for their current justice system. The source had no
further information on the issue.
Unaccompanied children
29. There are several child protection issues relevant to all children in Afghanistan. The source pointed
to the risk of child recruitment by the
de facto
authorities and other armed groups. There is a very
high level of child labour that exposes the child to human rights violations, from exploitation to
physical harm etc. The other risk, assessed by the source, is viewed in the perspective of the
current economic climate, in the se
se that a hild is also pe ei ed as a o
odit . Child e a e
sold i etu fo the
ide p i e . These halle ges ill also appl to u a o pa ied i o s.
Hazaras
30. The source did not have much information on the Hazaras but said that there have been reports of
forced evictions of the Hazaras, but some of these evictions are also intermingled with other
complicated issues related to land rights.
Personal conflicts
31. The rule of law and the previously existing legislative framework have been undermined and
degraded with an ad-hoc application of sharia law taking their place; the
de facto
authorities are
not a homogenous unit that is very disciplined in following any particular policy instruction. Thus,
within this context, given the economic situation, the crime rate has increased significantly. Against
this background, the source found it impossible for them to say what the outcome of a given land
conflict would be. The source did not have substantial information about this.
Crime level
32. The economic situation and the power vacuum have resulted in criminal opportunism in order to
find a means to survive. There is now an increased environment for crimes, including robberies and
kidnapping for ransom.
338
Monitoring
33. The source referred to articles on biometric registration of employees of the former government.
339
Databases left by the former government had registers of biometrics of former government
employees and some of the databases also contained information on their relatives. It is however
an open question to what extent these databases have been used by the de facto government.
Tolo News,
Young Man Killed by Unknown Attackers in Western Kabul,
26 February 2022,
url;
BAMF,
Briefing Notes Group 62
–
Information Centre for Asylum and Migration,
31 January 2022,
url;
Afghan Voice Agency,
Kunduz Residents Complain of
Assassinations and Kidnappings Amid Rising Poverty,
5 December 2021,
url;
Foreign Policy,
Afghan Crime Wave Adds to Taliban
Dystopia,
29 October 2021,
url;
Tolo News,
Kabul Residents Urge Govt to Tackle Crime,
26 November 2021,
url;
Hasht-e-Subh Daily,
Crime Rates in Afghanistan Remain High,
22 January 2022,
url;
Protection Cluster,
Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update
–
Q4,
February 2022,
url
339
HRW,
New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans,
30 March 2022,
url
338
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Skype meeting with an international humanitarian organisation
31 March 2022
Ethnic minorities
Hazaras
1. There is still a large degree of intimidation and fear among the Hazaras. However, the situation is
ot as se e e as it as i the p e ious Tali a egi e i the 9 s he e the e as la ge-scale
persecution. However, there are definitely attempts to intimidate the Hazaras in order to prevent
them from accessing certain livelihood opportunities that existed prior to August 2021 and to
impose a culture of fear. It is more about a threat of violence rather than actual violence. There
have been targeted persecutions as well that were more related to professional affiliations and
history in addition to a number of different factors that make Hazaras especially vulnerable. The
situation is worse in the provinces where the Hazaras are predominately present (e.g. Bamyan), but
it is still concerning elsewhere.
2.
It as o se i the 9 s e ause the Tali a the a a a ti e p og a of pe se utio s of eth i
and religious minorities in the country; whereas the current Taliban government has not issued
that kind of edicts since August 2021. The Taliban has made efforts to establish a degree of
legitimacy that did not exist in the old Taliban regime. It was the impression of the source that the
Taliban is aware that if they want international recognition and legitimacy they cannot start a
campaign to persecute ethnic minorities, but that does not mean that things are not happening
behind the scenes and that they are not doing things to cause fear for people.
3. The driving force behind the persecutions of the Hazaras that have taken place is mostly the
Taliban, who is trying to promote a set of values and assert their predominance of the authority of
the Pashtun ethnicity. However, at a more social level there has always been discrimination against
the Hazaras. They have had difficulties in accessing certain job opportunities and are treated like
second-class citizens and this is not a new dynamic in the country. The source did not have enough
evidence to say whether the discrimination towards Hazaras has changed since August 2021.
Other ethnic minorities, e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks etc.
4. Tajiks and Uzbeks are not systematically targeted by the Taliban. These minorities are mainly
present in the northern and northeastern areas. The north has always been perceived as a more
liberal part of the country compared to the south and east.
In the north and northeastern areas, the Taliban has put in place provincial governors from other
parts of the country. These governors are more hardliners and they have been assigned to exert
more control and to make the message clear that these parts of the country need to get in line with
the values of the Taliban. The source has not seen reports indicating that people in the north and
northeastern areas are treated in a worse way than in the rest of country because of their ethnicity.
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Protection of the minorities
5. When asked if the Taliban is willing to prosecute crimes committed against the minorities or in
other ways willing to protect them, the source replied that to his knowledge, the Taliban has not
said explicitly that they will protect the minorities. What they have said is that their judicial system
is a lot more reliable and consistent than the judicial system of the former government - and added
that crimes are crimes; however, what counts is the
Tali a s defi itio of a i e. The Tali a
perceive their judicial system as direct and efficient, nevertheless, the source questioned the
reliability of the system. The source confirmed that the Taliban certainly do take care of matters
much more quickly and transparently than the Ghani administration where many things could be
resolved if you paid cash under the table.
6. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has a small footprint in the eastern part of the country and
pockets in isolated areas in other parts of the country where they caused serious problems,
including active recruitment. However, it is not clear whether they have the manpower to launch a
full scale spring offensive like the Taliban did prior to August 2021. There has been large-scale
campaigns by the Taliban to attack the ISKP forces and to make sure that they do not pose a large-
scale threat in the whole country. In recent months, these campaigns have been largely successful.
It is not clear how successful ISKP has been in recruiting people. There are many rumors saying that
they are quite effective in recruiting people and at the same time other sources say that this is
overstated and a result of ISKP propaganda.
Religious minorities
7. With regard to the Sikhs, after the large-scale evacuation in August 2021 there is only a miniscule
number of them left in the country to the extent that it would be hard to analyse whether there are
changes in their situation in terms of persecution.
8. As for the Shia community, their situation is the same as for the Hazaras in the sense that they are
not exposed to a large-scale persecution. That said, their daily lives might be harder and the
security situation might be more vulnerable. They would be much more targeted, if ISKP were to
grow and launch larger attacks. Their degree of vulnerability has heightened since August 2021, but
there has not been a systematic persecution of them based on their minority status.
9. When asked if there are any regional differences in how religious minorities are being treated, the
source replied that in the south and the east they are definitely treated worse than in Kabul. There
are more security protocols in place, e.g. the Shia mosques have additional layers of security,
created by themselves. In the west and the north of the country where many minorities co-exist it
is a little more peaceful. It is harder to be a Shia in the south and east of the country because these
are more conservative regions, where the Taliban has always had a stronghold.
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10. As for conditions for religious converts from Islam to other religions, the source was aware that in
the northeast of the country there are certain rather secretive faith based organisations and
missionaries. There is not much clarity on how they operate. The large faith based organisations in
Afghanistan do not proselytize, but there are smaller organisations proselytizing.
LGBT
11. Obviously, there is a culture of secrecy in the Afghan LGBT community. Afghanistan is a horrible
environment in which to identify as LGBT. It is a very challenging dynamic for people even to talk
about their sexual preference.
Westernised Afghans
12. When asked to what extent westernised Afghans are being discriminated in Afghanistan, the source
informed that the Taliban two days ago issued an edict saying that any Afghan government workers
or people that want to visit government buildings must have a beard and cannot wear western
clothes. The Taliban is at a stage where certain protocols are in the process of being introduced.
The source still sees men in western clothes around Kabul; outside of Kabul city, the communities
are much more conservative and protocols are much more strictly enforced, particularly in the
south. The source summed up in saying that people are not yet being persecuted for having
westernized attitudes; however, the source saw a pattern heading in that direction. In this respect,
the source pointed to the decision on keeping secondary schools for girls closed, and because the
international community reacted negatively to that, the Taliban is responding by issuing new
directives that are more strict, e.g. the reinforcement of the
mahram
policies. On this basis, the
source saw what he perceived as an escalation taking place between the international community
and the Taliban.
Well-educated and members of the intelligentsia
13. The source perceived journalists as being persecuted, in particular those being prominent under
the Ghani administration. He added that certain writers and broadcasters were also persecuted.
With regard to university professors, it depends where they are and what their affiliations have
been in the past. Some journalists have been killed, professors have lost their jobs, and some have
been arrested and detained. When asked what happened to those who were arrested, the source
replied that some are still detained, some are awaiting trials in which the charge is to promote
values that are not in line with Sharia values or violating the principle of the Quran, some are under
house arrest and some have been killed; it is a mixed picture.
The intelligentsia of Afghanistan is mainly based in the urban areas, for instance in Kabul, for which
reason that is where the persecution is taking place.
People with a personal conflict with members of the Taliban
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14. Land issues have existed prior to August 2021 and there never really was a good way to resolve
disputes over land rights in the sense that legislation was never put in place. The source had not
heard of changes in this dynamic since August 2021.
When asked what position a civilian claiming land rights has in opposition to a person with links to
the Taliban, the source replied by giving two scenarios. First, if it is a dispute between neighbors, in
which one of them is a Taliban soldier it would get resolved through a normal traditional legal
process. Differently, if someone is going up against a high-ranking Taliban or someone who is well
connected, he may be treated in a very different way. The source emphasized that there is no
precise overview on how conflict resolutions are managed or applied in Afghanistan.
15. The previous administration had introduced female judges, but after the takeover by Taliban there
are no more female judges in Afghanistan. Using the judicial system is a way to enforce and
interpret sharia law in line
ith the Tali a s alues a d i te p etatio of it. The sou e added that
since the handover of power was so sudden the bureaucratic structure of the judicial system has
not changed that much, but what has changed is the people enforcing the law and the way they
interpret it.
Women
Freedom of movement
16. Since August 2021, the freedom of women is getting progressively more restrictive. The
mahram
as
a requirement is getting more enforced for female NGO workers. Female beneficiaries of aid
assistance need to be accompanied by a
mahram.
There are more day-to-day inspections around
some traveling in some provinces. Women cannot sit up front in a taxi; if they are sitting on the
back seat, they cannot sit next to a male stranger. It is becoming harder and more expensive for
women to get around.
Wo e s a ess to ork
17. In many places outside Kabul, the burkas have been more strictly enforced. In Kabul there is more
international media to report on it. So far, women are allowed to work in most places with the
exception of government jobs. Early after the Taliban took power, they made clear that health care
workers should go back to work including the female workers. The day-to-day restrictions are
visible and it has become challenging for women to live in Afghanistan - and professional women
even more so.
18.
Wo e s a ess to the jo
a ked is i pa ted the sa tio s. Wo e ho o ked i jo s that
were funded by these large government schemes, e.g. by the World Bank, no longer exist. Teachers
and health care workers have not been paid for months. The NGO job market is still working for
women.
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19. When asked to what extent the new requirement of a
mahram
has affected the possibility for
women to find jobs, the source replied that even though NGOs want to hire women, the
requirement of a
mahram
on a daily basis becomes expensive for the donors. The source added
that it will not become part of a job description that an employee should have a
mahram
to
become employed, but at the same time this government restriction made the recruitment process
more complex. The source emphasized that he could only speak on behalf of his own organisation.
20. The main type of jobs that are open for women in Afghanistan are teachers, health care workers
and NGOs. Women can also work in the media but not in front of a camera. Women are banned
from working in the government.
21.
I te s of egio al diffe e es i o e s a ilit to o k, the sou e oted that he did ot see a
difference. Only in the east, it might be more dangerous for women to work but it has always been
like that.
Women who defy the Taliban
22. For women who defy the Taliban, for instance, in not wearing the correct clothing or refusing to
travel with a
mahram,
there is no uniform answer to the reaction from the Taliban. It depends on
the situation and on the personality of the soldier that a given women will meet at a given place
and time. It is more about the lack of guaranty of being able to travel safely.
23. The source had not seen cases of women who were sanctioned publicly for not complying with the
restrictions imposed by the Taliban. The source commented that a better understanding is needed
on what happens after the protests, and what the repercussions are when the cameras are no
longer there.
24. When asked about the typical profile on women protesters, the source commented that women
who are participating in the protests are typically affiliated with civil society organistations and
their leaders, who had a publicly known profile before the takeover of power by the Taliban. This is
providing a shield for these women because of the attention that it would draw if they were to be
persecuted. The female protesters are often from urban areas, they are better educated and come
from more liberal households with more financial resources. The source does not see women from
rural areas in a restrictive environment protesting, but that was not seen prior to August 2021
either.
Lone women without a network
25. It is the same as it always has been. Afghanistan is a very challenging environment for lone women
without a network. The difference since August 2021 is that there are fewer resources in the sense
that o e s shelte s ha e ee losed do , a se i es o ge de ased iole e eithe
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need to be restructured or are no longer available. The issue is more on what type of services a
lone woman can expect rather than her status, which has always been very challenging.
26. The source opined that a single mother would not live on her own, but more likely she would move
in with male relatives somehow. The exceptions to this are rare and that applies everywhere in the
country.
Gender based violence
27. The rates on gender-based violence has increased since August 2021, mainly due to the
deteriorating economy and the socio economic situation. Many men are out of work and are stuck
at home which implies why the rates of violence increased. The increasing gender based violence is
also linked to returnees coming from Iran. They recently came back in high numbers and many of
whom are out of jobs and thus using negative coping mechanisms. Moreover, there are many drug
abusers among the male returnees from Iran correlated effect to gender based violence and
households.
28. When asked to what extent the Taliban will be able to protect a women from gender based
iole e, the sou e eplied that a o di g to the Tali a s i te p etatio of the th eshold of
violence, it is allowed - but not too often and not too severely. The source did not have knowledge
of court cases and the outcomes.
Shelters
29. Shelters in Kabul as well as in the provincial capitals still exist but they are severely underfunded. In
some places, the shelters for women closed down but not everywhere. The closure of some
shelters, may be related to their leaders leaving the country in addition to the funding shortages.
The source was not aware of the Taliban issuing an edict saying the shelters are not allowed.
Unaccompanied children
30. Orphanages exist in Afghanistan and they are the same in numbers since August 2021, only the
funding has decreased a good deal. The quality of these facilities are quite low and there is less
food, clothing and hygiene facilities available since August. The source further pointed to an
increase in the number of children in Kabul city who are living in the streets since August 2021. He
also noted that the social family network in Afghanistan is quite strong. It is very rare that a child is
completely alone. In case a child is not able to get support from his family, s/he can go to an
orphanage.
31. In the rural areas, there are no orphanages. Lone children living in a rural area will need to go to a
provincial capital to access an orphanage.
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32. Girls are being married off much younger; there has been an 11-15 % increase in early marriages,
and they are being sold for much less money. Which means that a man does not need to save up
for years to pay for a child bride any more, which again means that girls can be married off at a
much younger age. The source has heard stories of girls as young as 9 and 10 years old that have
ee
a ied off. A e dotall , the sou e also hea d sto ies of pa e ts selli g thei hild e s
organs in order to pay off their household debts.
Targeted individuals
Afghans with links to the former government
33. When asked to what extent Afghans with links to the former government are in risk of being
persecuted in Afghanistan as result of their previous job, the source replied that it depends on
whom they worked for, in what capacity as well as on other types of background affiliation. If they
worked for the US military, they will be more vulnerable than Afghans who worked for other
government forces for whom the risk is much lower. In case someone was very vocal on social
media against the Taliban and if s/he worked for an embassy, then this person would be at risk. The
source commented that people who really want to leave the country and obtain a visa are playing
up the risks they are facing; the source emphasized this does not apply to everyone trying to leave.
34. In terms of civil government employees in Afghanistan, it is an important point that if someone
before August 2021 worked for a ministry below director level, which is the vast majority of the
government employees, and did not leave the country, this person is still in the same job. When
the source visits the Afghan ministries, he meets with people who were there prior to August 2021.
The Taliban wanted them to return to work in order to keep the bureaucracy going. The source
added that it is a misperception in the international community that there was a complete turnover
over staff. That was not the case. The same situation applies for local governments in the provinces
below a certain level.
35. The official line of the Taliban is that people who worked for the embassies, international
organisations and NGOs are not going to be persecuted. If something happened to certain
individuals, it was due to a number of factors in their background or in their family. The source
stated that they have been clear with their staff in saying that the staff is not in danger for having
worked for the NGO per se.
36. In terms of low-level workers for the foreign troops, e.g. drivers, cooks, mechanics etc., who were
seen entering the military base on a regular basis, the source opined that, as a general rule,
workers in that type of functions would not face risks, but it would depend on other factors
involved in terms of their passed affiliations. The source elaborated in saying that at that level of
jobs, if they were in combat supporting a troop unit that was in active combat with the Taliban that
would make them more vulnerable. Likewise, if they had family affiliations who had problems with
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the Taliban that would make them more vulnerable.
37. According to the source, people are less targeted in the rural areas. People who are more high
profile or more senior would be in more danger and these profiles tent to live in more urban
environment.
38. With regard to people who work for the foreign embassies, most of them were evacuated in
August. Embassy workers who are still in Afghanistan they will feel abandoned. If there are any US
embassy workers left they are probably trying to keep a low profile while they wait to get
evacuated. The mere fact that one has worked for a western embassy does not put him/her at risk.
However, if you were working for an embassy that had troops on the ground in active combat with
the Taliban, then you are more vulnerable. For the vast majority of embassy workers, the source
opined that the Taliban did not see them as a threat.
39.
Co e i g the Tali a s a ilit to o ito a d o tai i tellige e ega di g the e plo e of a
given individual, the source noted that one of the first organisations that the Taliban took over
afte
August
as the fo e i tellige e se i e, Natio al Di e to ate of Se u it NDS ,
that had all the information on people. Those are the resources that the Taliban is relying on, as
well as on their social networks that are very strong. At the same time, it is easy to reach out to
community members and find out where a given person works. Members of the NDS are more
persecuted than members of other forces.
40.
The i te et has ee ut off fo NDS data ases a d some
of the archives were burned or hidden,
which means that the Taliban does not have the full information available. Some of the data was
paper based.
Rights based NGOs
41. Some of the larger INGOs who worked closely with the former government have left the country.
As a former employee of one of these INGOs, one would not be especially targeted. There are still
rights based NGOs in Afghanistan, however, they re-shifted on how they speak of their activities
and how they broadcast themselves. The source would not apply a blanket statement on the
eradication of the human rights initiatives in the country.
Family members to targeted individuals
42. Family members of former NDS employees would be interrogated about his whereabouts. But
whether or not the family members are at risk themselves is not entirely clear to the source.
43. The source did not know for sure if family members of ISKP affiliates would be persecuted, but the
source believed that the family members would have a legitimate reason to be concerned.
Insecurity and crime levels
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44. There is a rise in crime levels, particularly in Kabul and other urban areas. The type of crime that
has gone up is primarily theft and robberies. In terms of kidnapping, there have been incidents
related to car robberies, which means that if a car is hijacked and if a passenger does not get out in
time, then they are going with the car and the robbers.
Conditions for Afghans returned to Afghanistan after being evacuated
45. There are many involuntary returns to Afghanistan from
Eu ope a d f o Afgha ista s
neighboring countries; if it is voluntary, then the source questioned the definition of voluntary. It is
mostly labour migrants unable to find work in other countries and are returning.
46. The source assessed that the Taliban would make a distinction between returnees who applied for
asylum in Europe due to their work history and returnees from the region, but he could not tell for
sure.
47. As a final statement, the source opined that the Taliban is making things difficult for a number of
groups in the population. It should be considered that the economy has worsened since August
2021. The conditions in the country are miserable.
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Meeting with IOM
30 March 2022
IOM Pakista s a date is the Afgha populatio i Pakista ho
are undocumented, holders of Afghan
itize s ards as ell as the host o
u ities. Their fo us is o prote tio as ell as li elihood a d
community integration.
1. IOM has a flow monitoring activities displayed at the data site funded by the EU.
340
The data shows
the return of the undocumented Afghans or the Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC) holders from Pakistan
to Afghanistan, which is produced every two weeks. Since August 2021, the IOM had a regional
perspective on population movements in and outside of Afghanistan. They do not conduct
registration and they do not report people as individuals - but they observe the movement of
people between the two countries.
Conditions for returnees in Afghanistan
2. IOM stated that they do not have information on the prevalence of returned Afghans who were
e a uated out of Afgha ista afte Tali a s takeo e i August
.
3. With regard to the prevalence of Afghans who returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan after 15
August, IOM pointed to available data on their website
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, but emphasized that it is hard to say how
many have returned, because the circular migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is ongoing.
When the border is open, migration in both directions continue.
4.
A o di g to IOM s i te al data, the e is a t e d ithi the
groups of individuals returning; a
combination of those who came to Pakistan temporarily, and those who stayed longer. The data
included a high number of Afghan people with need for medical care, who came to Pakistan on a
regular basis and who never intended to stay. At the same time, there are a number of people who
voluntarily returned to Afghanistan with the intention of settling in Afghanistan. The reason for this
could be, that returnees assessed that the hardship in Afghanistan seemed like the better option
rather than staying in Pakistan and facing the challenging living conditions. Meanwhile, others
viewed the change of government in Afghanistan as an improvement and went back for that
reason. IOM further assessed, that for undocumented Afghans in Pakistan it may be safer to return
rather than face deportation, if they are caught by the authorities. This, combined with the
aforementioned economic hardship in Pakistan, for some Afghans, returning home may end up
being the better option.
5. IOM is tracking the return flows rather than verifying each individual. The Pakistani government has
si e august
t a ked peoples ID do u e ts at the o de to k o
ho is o i g a d lea i g.
The source summed up and stated that it is difficult to say precisely how many Afghans are
returning to Afghanistan.
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IOM referred to data on their website:
FLOW MONITORING / SITUATION REPORTS,
n.d.,
url;
Displacement Tracking Matrix
(DTM) Pakistan,
n.d.,
url
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International Organization for Migration (IOM), AFG_MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT (19 MAR-25 MAR 2022) (iom.int),
url
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6.
The e is a aila le data o IOM s e site o Afgha ista that gi es so e e pla atio o h so e
Afghans are returning. IOM has staff at the border crossing points where they interview returnees,
specifically Undocumented or ACC holder. However, they do not interview every single person. The
given reasons for returning are related to family and economy, but other than that, IOM does not
know the specific reasons why some Afghans are returning. IOM added that when interviewing
Afghans returning, livelihood and shelter are always on top of the list of reasons for return rather
than physical security per se.
Profiles of returnees
7. The first question to answer when somebody returns is what kind of assistance would the person
need upon return. Right now, the challenge is that there is a lack of infrastructure to support the
assistance, e.g. there is a lack of physical cash in the country. This situation has slightly improved
since August and September, but it still poses challenges for the IOM.
8. According to the IOM, it is challenging for returnees, including returnees from the middle class, to
access the housing market in Kabul at the moment because of the economic situation in
Afghanistan. Kabul, being a big urban center and expanding rapidly, would be the hardest place to
esettle, e ause the it s i f ast u tu e a ot a so all the e o e s.
9. For single women without a male support network, it would be very difficult to return, because the
concept hardly exists in the country. A single woman cannot rent a place to live. However, there are
many female-headed households, but the perception among people is that these women must be
under the protection of a male relative.
10. Concerning unaccompanied minors, IOM is not aware of returns from beyond the region, but from
the Iranian border, many below the age of 18, return to their families in Afghanistan after seeking
opportunities abroad. They seek work to help their families.
Re-integration
11. Asked about how returnees in Afghanistan are re-integrating into the Afghan society, IOM stated
that their Pakistan Office does not have the information. The Afghanistan Office, on the other hand,
has a protection program financed by ECHO and implemented by IRARA that is following up on the
returnees from the region as well as from European countries. However, the Assisted Voluntary
Return and Reintegration projects from European countries are on hold for the time being. The
IOM Afghanistan Office does not yet have information to share on returnees and their situation in
Afghan society.
12. When asked if IOM knows of NGOs in Afghanistan who work with reception of returnees, IOM
noted that according to their knowledge ACE and IRARA are no longer implementing projects in
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Afghanistan; however, IOM referred to the organisation for confirmation. It is very challenging to
implement projects due to the lack of cash in the Afghan society and the organisations could not
pay salaries to the employees. Another reason why it is currently challenging to implement projects
in Afghanistan is the communication challenges that IOM faces due to physical conditions and for
technology reasons, e.g. the low internet speed.
13. IOM added that a relationship with the de facto government is challenging. On the ground, IOM
ust oo di ate ith the de fa to go e
e t to e su e the staff s safet , ut IOM does ot seek
any approval from them.
14. The de facto government requires female staff to have a male escort (mahram) which IOM does
not accept. But if someone is in danger, because she does not have a
mahram,
the IOM does not
demand of her to come to work. The scope of activities are not consistent throughout the country
but is dependent on the local authorities. In a limited number of provinces, the local leaders accept
the IOM staff, whereas in other parts of the country they have very different requirements.
15. The source gave an example on how requirements sometimes change at the local level. For
example, the staff is allowed to access certain communities one week and the next week the
leaders issue an instruction saying that the team cannot revisit the same communities.
16. IOM highlighted that the lack of cash in Afghanistan is a challenge for organisations working in
Afghanistan. The source exemplified this by saying, that as of December 2021, there was no cash in
Afghanistan, which meant that they could not pay for anything such as fuel
–
and if they cannot pay
their partners, the activities will not take place.
17. The majority of Afghans have a family member who have been displaced at least once in their
lifetime - either internally, regionally or internationally. Another aspect is that families invest in a
family member to go abroad. They borrow a large amount of money to pay a smuggler to facilitate
migration. The expectation is that the investment will succeed. The obligation to provide for family
members extends as far as second cousins or further out.
18. IOM opined that a distinction must be made between voluntary return and involuntary return. The
latter is generally targeting undocumented Afghans, which by the law are subject to deportation; it
may also include minority members, although not targeted per se, for instance from the LGBT
community. A person from such a community will be in danger if they return, because
homosexuality is perceived as unacceptable in Afghanistan. The source knew about cases from
before August 2021 of LGBT people who returned and experienced difficulties.
19. On the importance of having a network upon return, IOM commented that it goes without saying,
that for returnees their whole life is based on their network. Everything is about extended family.
Returnees will check who in their family is left in the country, and whether housing is available.
Those who have resources are less dependent on their network. Others who have fewer resources
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would turn to their tribe for assistance. In times of economic hardship, and when resources are
scarcer, the network becomes more important.
Discrimination
20. When asked to what extent returned Afghans face discrimination, IOM stated, that their office in
Afghanistan was unaware of any cases of discrimination due to return, or the way they left the
country or the way they arrived.
Monitoring
21. When asked, to what extent Afghans are monitored by the de facto government upon return, the
source replied that the infrastructure of the de facto government is extremely weak. IOM has a
team at the border crossing points in Jalalabad which hands out small cash grants to returnees for
transportation to their final destination. IOM noted that they used to be able to share the
information on somebody returning with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation that had a local
office in each province. At the time, this meant that the returnee could register with the local office
of the ministry. However, currently, this system is not working. The source assessed that the de
facto government does not have the capacity to track returnees.
22. In terms of regional differences in how returned Afghans are treated, the source stated that the de
facto government does not have the infrastructure to monitor returnees.
23. Returnees from Pakistan go back to a top 6-7 provinces along the border between Pakistan and
Kabul where they have their connections. The majority of Afghans in Pakistan are Pashtuns; after
August 2021 more Hazaras travelled to Pakistan. IOM further noted that Afghans without
connections in Pakistan do not go there. Which is very different from Iran where many more go and
seek for job opportunities.
24. When asked, how Afghans convicted of a crime abroad were treated by the authorities upon return
to Afghanistan, IOM replied that they do not have data, but the source assessed that the de facto
government does not have the capacity to systematically track people who are coming back.
However, on the ground at village level, the local leaders will know who has returned back, but the
information will most likely not reach the de facto government in Kabul.
25. Regarding the targeted individuals (Afghans with links to the former government), IOM does not
know; but it depends on the position of the person in question.
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Meeting with a representative of an international organisation in
Afghanistan
Islamabad, 29 March 2022
The overall security situation across Afghanistan today
1. According to the representative of an international organisation in Afghanistan, one of the main
differences after the Taliban takeover is the easier access to different regions because of safer
travel conditions across Afghanistan and fewer combat activities. Security has been somewhat
stable since August 2021 with a significantly lower number of conflict incidents, which means an
increased freedom of movement on the ground for the civilians.
Crime levels
2. The crime level is increasing in Afghanistan
–
from petty crime to serious types such as kidnapping
–
and the source linked this increment to the economic situation in the country. The common
nominator for the types of crime the source knows of are financially motivated. Kidnapping cases
seem planned to a degree, because the victim usually is someone who has a firm daily pattern of
movement. These kidnappers usually target local business owners and their children.
3. Because of the difficulties linked to tracing crime, the source assessed that the crime level is
underreported and many kidnapping cases are dealt with internally between the parties. In some
cases, the Taliban has as law enforcement killed the kidnapper, as in the case in Herat, and
displayed the body around the city on cranes as a deterrence strategy. They do not have the
necessary education as police enforcement; they are an insurgency group, and are not familiar with
regular policing. There is a large degree of autonomy within the Taliban, in a city like Herat for
instance, either the police or the DGI is responsible for criminal cases such as these.
Power structures within law enforcement entities
4. When asked about the power structures within law enforcement entities, the source replied, it is
not always clear who has the last word when it comes to decisions in a given situation; is it the
province or the district authorities. Sometimes individuals have more authority than institutions. An
individual who does not work at a ministry can have more authority regarding permissions for
NGOs, than the ministry. That individual could be a warlord in a part of the country, and in other
pa ts, it ould e a e e of a elde s ou il.
Edicts concerning women’s
rights
5. Based on these edicts, the source assessed that the Taliban was moving towards a more
conservative direction:
Secondary schools for girls did not reopen as promised earlier
Requirements for a
mahram
(male company) was placed for all women who leave their homes
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Gender segregation at public parks was effectuated
In Bamiyan, women were prohibited at state facilities
6.
I He at Cit , the e ha e ee se e al ases of a ests of people e gagi g i i
o al elatio s ,
which means premarital relationships. The source had not seen similar cases in eastern and south-
eastern parts of Afghanistan, likely because these communities are much more conservative
compared to the more liberal areas such as Herat, where enforcement is deemed necessary. This
also highlights the lack of central policies and rules. Thus, there have been sporadic cases of
barbershops that are shut down in some areas, while thriving in others. In the aftermath of the
takeover, the Taliban showed a willingness to accommodate local practices in various parts of
Afghanistan, but they have since retracted this approach to some extent.
Land conflicts
7. Regarding conflict resolutions the source emphasized that back tracing the origin of a conflict can
sometime be very difficult. There are many land disputes at the moment because they have a
seasonal dynamic. When nomads enter the southern areas for instance, disputes can occur over
who has the right to the land. Many of those types of disputes in Daikundi and Ghazni occurred
shortly after the Taliban took over in 2021. Typically, these types of land dispute eventually fade
out, not because they are resolved, but because the nomads move on. In the south-eastern and
southern parts of the country, the source noted a rise in conflicts due to the cultivation season.
Resolving conflicts usually involves the participation of the local elder council and the Taliban.
However, solutions for land disputes are usually difficult to reach because they stretch back
generations and have witnessed land reforms, land distributions, various ownerships and different
regimes. So, the complexity makes it challenging to reach a resolution.
8. In Daikundi, the source pointed to examples of land disputes between local and Taliban members
or people affiliated with the Taliban. In these cases, the locals were driven away from their land
and the court ruling gave a preferential treatment to the Talibs or people linked to the Taliban. The
source assessed, there can be advantages in being close to the Taliban, but this can vary from
province to province.
Honour conflicts
9. In Herat City, arrests have occurred based on moral values. Young women and men who used to
study together have been arrested because they were seen in public drinking coffee together. This
used to be acceptable in Herat City prior to August 2021. There have been other examples of
arrests
– so fa o e i ide t of a o a a d a a ho e e hipped i He at s judi ia
compound, because they breached the moral conduct, according to the Taliban. Other examples
included exchanges of text messages between men and women. The source noted that the
outcome of honour conflicts are difficult to monitor since these conflicts are subdued by the
families and they are not solved in public. The Taliban leaves the impression that all contacts
between men and women, who are not
mahram,
is unacceptable.
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Tali a ’s a ility to
o itor
10. Many are stopped at checkpoints where their personal phones are checked for content perceived
as problematic. The source did not know to what degree the Taliban monitors social media
platforms in a systematic manner. The source pointed to the house searches as a mean of
monitoring as well. Data on former employees belonging to the former government at offices and
embassies are also used to monitor. However, the source was uncertain, and to what extent to
Taliban are able to access and utilise the data.
11. The strength of Taliban as a local monitor is linked to their local presence, which again varies from
province to province. Their weakness compared to the former government lies in the lack of foreign
technology as a means to gather intelligence.
Targeted individuals
Employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops and foreign embassies in
Afghanistan
12. The source does not know of any Afghans linked to the former embassies, who have not been
evacuated yet. On whether the local Talibs would know of low-rank employees at foreign
embassies, such as gardeners and electricians, the source assessed that the Taliban would know of
their identity. The Taliban are well entrenched within the local communities, especially in rural
settings. The source added that local Afghans who work for NGOs and international organisations,
are often treated roughly at checkpoints because they are related to foreigners.
13. The individuals most at risk of being targeted are the remaining of the former security forces. It is
unclear whether they are targeted because they belonged to the security forces or other whether
they are targeted for personal reasons. The source added that he knew of a great deal of incidents
where Afghans, including interpreters who were arrested or killed without an apparent motivation
or legal ground. Members of the former security forces in Afghanistan have been subject to a wide
range of treatment from the Taliban including arrests, house searches as well as being shot and
killed after been detained by the Taliban. Most of these attacks against former security forces were
concentrated in Kabul and the south and southeastern parts of Afghanistan, including pilots from
the former air force and police officers. The sources added that members of the special forces were
targeted and killed in Khost. Tribal cultures in these areas had a direct effect on the power
dynamics between the Taliban and former security forces. Generally, on targeting of the armed
forces, it was mostly the mid- and low-level officers who were targeted. This distinction might be
the result of former low-level officers who accepted bribe, or the fact that it simply is easier to
target people from the lower ranks because it does not cause a stir in the same manner as
targeting people in senior positions.
Bureaucrats in public offices and ministries
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14. According to the source, many have returned to their former positions. However, higher leadership
positions are occupied by members of the Taliban while people employed in lower positions such
as the passport office or the counter at the foreign ministry have returned to their jobs.
NGO workers
15. According to the source, there has been pattern in the way Western journalists and foreign
employees at the NGOs have had their homes searched by the Taliban in the recent weeks. The
patterns is that foreigners have generally received a softer treatment, while local Afghan
employees who are very scared of the Taliban, have had a harsher experience. For instance, the
Taliban has been more aggressive in some houses and ripped up pillows. Other local Afghans have
been better at de-escalating their encounter during these home searches and therefore
experienced a softer treatment as well.
16. Recently, the Taliban has been trying to interfere in which local NGOs in which area ought to be
beneficiary. According to the source, there has been examples of assaults on NGO employees who
are handing out aid. Traveling for NGO workers is easier under the Taliban due to improved
security; however, principled humanitarian assistance is harder now because of the interference.
The source has met Taliban commanders across Afghanistan, and has a strong impression that the
Taliban is trying to reroute the NGO beneficiaries towards the areas that are home to their own
support base. In Ghor Province, the Taliban commander has called NGOs to shut down their
activities and has tried to interfere.
17. NGOs are not allowed to carry out rights-based work in Afghanistan.
18. The source assessed that these encounters to a high degree varies depending on the person who is
in charge of that specific house search. The house searches have also included homes of Talibs,
who have gathered weapons and vehicles without permission in the recent months. The source
added that these searches is a way to clean out after the takeover, to secure and ensure that new
hu s of st o g e do ot g o a o g Tali a s o fo es.
With regard to searches in houses owned by Tajiks, the conducted search was more thorough. This
could be linked to a perceived threat of a spring attack by the National Resistance Front (NRF). The
search focused on members of the former government forces, especially the commanders.
Journalists
19. The source has listed 24 incidents since August 2021, where at least one journalist has been
detained by the Taliban. Critique of the Taliban prompts arrests, according to the source, and it
could seem that these arrests are meant to have a deterrent effect. Journalists are often treated
roughly and in one incident, the detained journalists was beaten. The soured does not know how
journalists are treated once arrested.
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Vulnerable groups
Ethnic minorities
20. In Kabul, there have recently been a higher level
–
or perceived higher level of threat - towards
Tajiks from Panjshir. The focus seems to be on confiscating weapons in homes linked to the NRF in
the north.
Religious minorities, including converts
21. The Salafi communities have been exposed since the 2021 Taliban takeover. Because of the
a ti ities of the Isla i State Kho asa P o i e s ISKPs Salafist o
u ities ha e ee ta geted
in the east and south-eastern provinces, such as Kunar.
22. Shia communities are not as exposed as they were in the past. The source assessed that the Taliban
a e spe ifi all ot ta geti g the Haza a Shia o
u ities. So e of the Tali a s foot soldie s i
Bamyan and Daikundi are Shia Muslims themselves. As law enforcement, Taliban has attempted to
deploy members to protect Shia mosques and to a certain degree to allow Shias to protect
themselves with weapon towards ISKP.
LGBT
23. The LGBT community is invisible in Afghanistan, because they live in hiding. There has been
incidents where the Taliban has arrested people and accused them of homosexuality. In one case
three men were attacked, accused and later jailed
–
where after, the elder men in their community
started a negotiation process with the Taliban to free them.
Well-educated, members of the intelligentsia and artists
24. The source stated, that there are several examples of individuals belonging to this group, who have
been targeted by the Taliban. The source highlighted a university professor who was critical of the
Taliban in the media who was arrested as a consequence of his critical remarks. The source did not
know what happened to the people once arrested. Vocal people on social media are also being
arrested.
25. Some musicians have been physically attacked, have had their instruments destroyed and have
been arrested. These sporadic examples have been seen all across the country, in conservative and
in more liberal communities and cities as well.
Treat e t of Wester ised Afgha s
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26. Men who shave, dress differently or generally look different, are to some degree harassed and
assaulted at checkpoints. In Kabul, this moral code is less enforced than elsewhere in the country.
Women
Regional differences for women
27. Rural areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country, practiced the same treatment of
women prior to August 2021 as Taliban does today. Beside the differences between the rural and
urban settings, other parts have experienced more profound changes as well. In Herat, women
have been approached and asked why they are not accompanied by a
mahram,
but in the north
women feel insecure and are uncertain to what degree this rule is enforced. This insecurity has a
deterrent effect on women. In Kabul city, there has not been a demand of a
mahram.
Women tend
to dress more conservatively to be on the safe side, because the rules are unclear. It is often up to
the individual Talib monitoring at the check points whether the woman standing in front of him
lives up to the rules or not. Overall, the source stated that recent events indicates the conservative
oi es ithi Tali a ha e the uppe ha d i ega ds to o e s issues, ith a efe e e to the
recent gender divisions in parks and universities. Recently, women have been denied entry to the
ministries and female NGO directors have been denied entry at Ministry of Foreign Affair for not
being accompanied by a
mahram.
DACAAR, Skype meeting, 18 March 2022
DACAAR operates exclusively in Afghanistan, and in various locations throughout the country.
18 March, Skype interview
Ability to operate in Afghanistan
1. DACAAR operates at the intersection between development work and humanitarian work, which
have allowed them to continue their work in Afghanistan, because this work is not affected by the
sanctions imposed on the Taliban leadership. However, DACAAR noted that the sanctions have
made it more challenging to operate.
2. The apparent need for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan meant that the Taliban were quick to
allow DACAAR to continue their work after they assumed power in August 2021. The nature of the
needs-based work has also meant that local disputes rooted in tribal or ethnic disagreements have
not stopped them from operating.
3. The relationship with the authorities in Afghanistan have changed since August. It is
DACAAR s
assessment that there is less corruption within the bureaucracy, which DACAAR deals with, but
many of the old bureaucrats who worked from the former government have returned to their
former jobs which means that DACAAR deals with many of same issues they dealt with in their
corporation with the bureaucracy of the previous government. The source senses a greater need in
the current bureaucracy to control the processes and this has resulted in DACAAR getting
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permission at a slower pace than under the previous government. This could be due to the fact that
a lot of new personnel with no previous experience or knowledge of humanitarian aid have been
installed in top positions in the ministry and in the provincial administrations throughout the
country.
4. The working conditions and relationship with the local authorities varies throughout the country.
As many of the local leaders are newly appointed and often have little experience in working the
NGOs the working conditions often comes down the a personal relationship with the local authority
rather than a set of rules. Therefore, DACAAR have employed local Afghans with a religious
background to engage in negotiations with the local Taliban leadership.
Wo e ’s rights
5. When asked if there is a change of attitude in the new government towards women, the source
replied that the confidence of the female population has grown tremendously. The source also
pointed to a development for women in the country in terms of education: as from 2005 7,000 girls
attended schools and currently there 5,000,000 educated females.
6.
The Tali a app oa hes the issue of o e s ights a d o e s ole i so iet diffe e t
throughout the country. In Badghis, the local leadership put forward a draft list of rules for females
in the province, and stated that females who did not comply with the rules should be shot. This was
after a week edited out of the final rules list following a meeting with the governor of Kabul, a
meeting with the UN who intervened; in this case the local leadership listened to Kabul. The source
stated that local conditions for women and the general public are often put in place by individual
Talibs at the top rather than as a result of broader consensus-based process.
7.
DACAAR ad ised that o e s ight to o k a d
freedom of movement vary a lot in Afghanistan
depending on the setting. Generally, women in the bigger cities enjoys wider freedoms than
women in the rural areas. This trend has not changed with the change in government. To illustrate
this, the DACCAR representative shared an episode that took place two years ago: DACAAR had a
big program in Kandahar in a rural area, housing IDPs from Lashkargah. The program offered
shelter, water and livelihood to both men and women. In the attempt of giving the women a long
term solution, a cake and biscuit factory was set up. The local community signed the program off
and the twenty women who worked in the factory were able to go out to a larger extent than
before. Within six weeks the local community got under a lot of pressure from other people and
the factory hat to close down. In this respect, the DACAAR representative summed up that for the
last five or ten years the NGOs have been able to do a lot less for women in the rural areas than in
the cities.
8. The source ela
o ated that DACAAR s use of
mahrams
for their female employees have not
changed in the areas they work in since August. However, it is his belief that there are more areas
in Afghanistan where women has to be accompanied by a mahram now than before August 2021.
Whether this is a knee-jerk reaction or a change in local policies is too early to conclude. In terms of
o e s f eedo , ou g o e ha e ee see i Ka ul ithout fa e ask a d ea i g jea s
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and they do not seem to be harassed; however, the source did not know if this is a directive from
the central government.
Access to the job market
9.
Wo e s a ess to the jo
a ket has o se ed si e August. Ho e e , it is diffi ult to dete i e
whether this is due to discrimination or whether this is due to the high unemployment rates in
Afghanistan. The male population tend to be better educated and so they are often picked for a
positio at the e pe se of o e due to thei ualifi atio s. DACAAR st essed that o e s
access to the job market vary depending on what province they find themselves in, but this has not
changed since August. DACAAR have not laid off any of their female staff since Taliban assumes
power in Afghanistan.
Lone women without a male support network
10. The situation for lone women without a male support network has worsened since August because
u h of the suppo t st u tu es su h a o e s shelte s ha e disappea ed si e August. This
includes orphanages. This is because the government is not supporting shelters and the private
funding has disappeared. As a result, the source have observed a rise in female beggars on the
streets in Afghanistan. DACAAR pointed out that because being a lone woman without a male
support network in Afghanistan is associated with social and cultural stigma, widows often remarry
in order to re-enter a social support structure. As an example hereof, the source stated that when
one of his colleagues died in a car crash, his widowed wife married his brother so that he could
provide for her.
Marriage and conflict
11. The source noted that there have been a rise in marriage around August 2021 because families did
not want their daughters to be married off to Taliban officials.
12. DACAAR have heard of some Afghan women approaching the Taliban courts in order to resolve
disputes with their husbands because the Taliban courts are perceived as less corrupt than the
ou ts of the p e ious go e
e t. That ei g said, it is the sou e s o e all assess e t that the
Taliban courts very rarely sides with the women in cases concerning marriage disputes.
13.
O e all, the sou e ad ised that o e s ights i Afgha ista should e assessed o e ti e
because there is room for gradual improvements.
Land disputes
14. According to the representative of DACAAR, many land disputes across Afghanistan have
resurfaced again since the Taliban assumed power. Many of these conflicts have persisted for
decades throughout the country and now that there has been a power-shift, people try to take
advantage of this new situation to assert their own agenda.
Ethnic and religious minorities
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15. The Source assessed that the overall conditions for ethnic minorities have slightly improved since
August. This is because a lot of the fighting took place in areas where there were many ethnic
minorities. The DACAAR representative is not an expert of the ISIS position right now in the
country; however, there has been a few attacks over the last few months in the Shia community in
south-west part of Kabul. The threat from ISIS towards the minority groups are bigger than the
negative feelings from the Taliban or ex-Taliban members.
16.
To the sou e s k o ledge, the e has ot ee i t odu ed a legislatio f o the Tali a that
tightens the rights of ethnic minorities in Afghanistan. The situation for religious minorities such as
Jews and Sikhs in Afghanistan have been on a downwards trajectory for years now, and it is not the
sou e s opi io that these t e d has ha ged sig ifi a tl si e August.
Insecurity and crime levels
17. Crime levels have gone up across Afghanistan because of the high employment rates and the
challenging humanitarian situation. As anecdotal evidence of this, the representative of DACAAR
advised that his Kabul office usually had one or two incidents of theft per year, but that his office
have experienced six of such incidents in the past six months alone.
18. The Taliban conducted a citywide house-to-house search in Kabul in mid-March, and the searched
the ep ese tati e of DACAAR s house. The house-searchers
were polite and agreed to the
ep ese tati e of DACAAR s te s fo sea hi g his house. It is his pe eptio , ho e e , that ot
everyone in Kabul received to the same polite treatment as he did. The source see this
comprehensive house search operation as the Taliban wanting to show strength and to send the
message that they are in control of the city and the security of the city. They also found weapons
and vehicles.
Returnees
19. The representative of DACAAR advised that very few Afghans have returned to Afghanistan from
the West since August, and as such, it is very difficult to assess their situation in Afghan society at
time moment. He has heard of one episode of former National Directorate of Security (NDS)
employee whose family was chased down by the Taliban because of his previous work. The Taliban
had received this information from members of the local community and it is the representative of
DACAAR s elief that the Tali a ould ot ha e ee a le to gathe this i fo atio the sel es.
20. Generally, it
is ot the sou e s i p essio that Afgha s etu i g f o the West ould e su je t
to targeting from the Taliban unless it is a result of a personal dispute of vendetta.
21.
The ep ese tati e of DACAAR s stated that Afgha s ho appea
este ised a e i
a more
vulnerable position than other Afghans are. As an example of this, the source stated that members
of the Taliban detained a staff-
e e s fa il fo a eek e ause the had ee ea i g este
lothi g a d e ause the had este
usi a d a ti-Taliban
content on their phones.
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Meeting with Amina Khan
Islamabad, 31 March 2022
Amina Khan is the Director of Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East & Africa (CAMEA) at the Institute of
Strategic Studies (ISSI), Islamabad, where she oversees research and advocacy-related work on all facets of
CAMEA. Prior to this, she served as a Research Fellow and a Senior Research Fellow at the ISSI, focusing on
Afghanistan. Over a period of fifteen years, she has published extensively on Afghanistan, and has
presented her research at multiple national and international forums.
Targeted individuals
Afghans with links to the former government
1. There have been incidents of people associated with the former government being killed or
arrested since August 2021, but according to Khan, there has not been a large scale systematic
targeting of people associated with the former government. Khan views the incidents of targeting
that has occurred as a result of personal grudges and disputes.
2. The Taliban lacks experience in administration and governing, and therefore they have allowed
many of the bureaucrats from the Republic back into their old positions. This is mostly true of
people in mid and low-level positions, but there are also some cases of high-level officials, such as
the deputy finance minister, who has been allowed to return to his former position. Khan stated
that many were wary of returning to their position immediately after August 2021 because of the
uncertainty of how the Taliban would govern, but many have since returned despite concerns of
what might happen to them. Many former Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police
(ALP) officers are still working, but they do not wear uniforms because they are not receiving any
salaries. In general, the Taliban is struggling to find sufficient and qualified personal for many of the
tasks they need to carry out now, because of the salary issue. According to Khan, many Afghans
have left the country, not because of threats from the Taliban or general security issues, but
because of the economic situation in Afghanistan. Rather, the security situation have improved
since August 2021, and people are now able to travel safely between cities and town across
Afghanistan for the first time in years.
3. People associated with the National Directorate of Security (NDS), on the other hand, have been
subject to targeting from the Taliban and many of the people in senior positions within the NDS
have fled the country. Khan stated that no one has the full overview of how many NDS members
have been targeted but to her knowledge, the Taliban has mostly targeted people in mid and high
level positions, many of whom have been outspoken critics of the Taliban. People in these positions
have been targeted regardless of their ethnic background. According to Khan, the general amnesty
issued by the Taliban also includes low-level NDS officers. The incidents that have been recorded
against low-level personnel should be seen as a result of a personal vendetta rather than the
official policy of the Taliban. This is a general issue throughout Afghan society, and many Afghans
are taking advantage of the current situation to advance their own agenda. This was also the case
when the Taliban was toppled in 2001 and this is the case today.
4. According to Khan, the family members of NDS officials have not been targeted by the Taliban.
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Employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs, or foreign embassies in
Afghanistan
5. Khan advised that the Taliban leadership has shown that they are willing to work with prominent
Afgha s, ho ha e ee
iti al of the i the past a d a ti el o ked agai st the Tali a s
agenda. To Khan, this signals that the Taliban leadership are aware that they cannot persecute or
target every Afghan who have worked with western organisations or embassies because they need
legitimacy amongst the population as well as the neighboring countries.
Journalists and human rights defenders
6. There have been incidents of human rights defenders who have fled Afghanistan as a result of
persecution. Khan also pointed out that other human rights defenders have been put under house
arrest due to their activism. However, the Taliban have engaged with other human rights activist
such as aforementioned Mehbobah Seraj,
ho ha e ee ad o ati g fo o e s ights a d
criticizing the Taliban for years.
7. Concerning journalists in Afghanistan, Khan stated that many have fled the country since August
2021, especially those associated with the international press. TOLO News are still allowed to
operate in Afghanistan with female hosts and anchors, despite being a staunch critic of the Taliban
in the past. Khan added that they operate with constraints and that there have been cases of TOLO
journalists being detained for a number of days because of content critical of the Taliban.
Nevertheless, Khan has been surprised that TOLO has been allowed to continue to operate, as this
was unthinkable in the past.
Despite this, there have been cases of Afghan journalists who have been abducted and punished
physically because of their reporting since August 2021.
Monitoring
8. The Taliban has trained their personnel at checkpoints in the cities to obtain information about
people passing by through questioning. According to Khan, this has been a policy developed by the
leadership, which serves two purposes: First, this way of questioning the local population serves as
a means to extract information about what is going on in the local communities, but it is also meant
to show the Afghans that the Taliban should not be feared. The idea is that if Talibs engage with the
local population in a polite manner, this will convince Afghans
–
especially in the cities
–
that
Taliban should not be feared.
9. In many parts of rural Afghanistan, the Taliban has long had a strong presence, and they have been
good at obtaining information about what goes on in the local community through everyday
interactions with members of the local community.
10. Khan stated that the new generation of Taliban are very tech savvy and they have a strong
presence on social media platforms, especially on Twitter. Here, they monitor the activities in
Afghan circles, and they will engage in discussions in a non-confrontational manner with people
they disagree with.
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Vulnerable groups
Ethnic minorities
11. Khan has noticed that senior Taliban members have made the effort to reach out to the Shia
community in Afghanistan. The Taliban have also welcomed Shia Hazara commanders as well as
Tajik and Uzbek in some provinces in Afghanistan. On the basis of these efforts, Khan assessed that
the Taliban in 2022 are more willing to engage with Shia Muslims, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and so
on, than they were in the past. Moreover, the Taliban has also showed a willingness to protect Shia
mosques in the aftermath of attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Khan further
stated that this new way of engaging with the ethnic minorities is part of the explanation of how
the Taliban was able to conquer all of Afghanistan in a matter of months. During their past reign in
the 99 s the e e a aged to o ue the o th. I pa t e ause the had little suppo t
amongst the local population in the north which is largely comprised of Tajiks and Uzbeks. This has
now changed to some degree because they are treating ethnic minorities in a more inclusive way.
12. Despite these efforts from the leadership, there are still incidents of ethnic minorities in
Afghanistan being harassed and discriminated against by low-ranking members of the Taliban.
According to Khan, the organisational structure and the lack of control over the low-ranking
members, is one of the biggest challenges of the Taliban leadership now that they are the de facto
government. Their organisational structure was set up for fighting an insurgency, and now they
have to perform a completely different task. This requires a restructuring of the Taliban, and this
takes time.
Women
13.
The Tali a ha e e e tl est i ted o e s ights i Afgha ista ith ega ds to the a i g of
girls attending secondary school. This was a surprise to Khan, because the Taliban leadership had
been sending the message that girls would be allowed back in schools when they reopened in
spring. This backtracking is a sign of internal power struggles within the Taliban leadership. After
the banning of girls attending secondary school was announced, spontaneous protests erupted in
various places throughout Afghanistan, where father and daughters protested side by side against
the decision. The fact that this was allowed further goes to show that there is internal division
within the Taliban, according to Khan.
14.
The e has also ee a li iti g of o e s f eedo of o e e t i Afgha ista ith the i posed
need for a
mahram.
Khan elaborated that in many provinces, the need for a
mahram
is not new
because this was already part of the local custom in many conservative areas of Afghanistan, but it
is a new phenomenon in cities like Kabul. According to Khan, Kabul is an interesting example of
o e s f eedo s i Afgha ista , e ause there
are mixed signals regarding what women can and
cannot do in the city. On the one hand, many beauty shops are still open, but on the other hand,
women cannot attend cafés without a male companion any longer. The Taliban has also restricted
access to parks and theme parks, so that women and men cannot attend these public spaces on the
same day.
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15. In the health sector, women are allowed back to work and women taxi drivers are allowed to
operate in Kabul, but in many other sectors women have not been allowed to return to their
former professions.
Conflict resolution
16. One of the appeals that Taliban had amongst the general public when they were an insurgency, was
their ability to deliver speedy justice. This meant that people often went to the local Taliban courts
rather than the formal justice system because this was perceived as corrupt, slow and inefficient.
According to Khan, the Taliban has an issue with regards to the interpretation of the law, however.
This means that different Taliban courts can reach different verdicts in similar cases across the
country. As an example of this, Khan highlighted a case where a woman from rural Afghanistan
sought divorce from her husband. The rural court decided that she could not be allowed a divorce,
but local Talibs interfered and brought the case to Kabul where she was allowed to divorce her
husband. To Khan, this shows that different courts reach different verdicts, and she further
stressed that this verdict is an unusual ruling within the Taliban court system, and that women are
not often allowed a divorce.
Khan stated that within the areas of rulings over inheritance, the Taliban court are very close to the
text with regards to Sharia law.
Insecurity and crime
17. According to Khan, there has been a decline in the crime levels in Afghanistan since August 2021.
Due to the economic crisis, people are engaging in petty crimes to sustain themselves, but the scale
of serious crimes such as kidnapping with declined because people are afraid of the punishments
from the Taliban.
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Mi utes fro
1 April 2022
I ter ie
ith Ly
e O’Do
ell
L
e O Do ell is a olu ist at
Foreign Policy
and an Australian journalist and author. She was the
Afghanistan bureau chief for Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press between 2009 and 2017.
Taliban structure
1.
O Do ell elie ed that de isio s a e still ade i a
Shura-style
with discussions on issues, which
then are arbitrated on from above. Many say there are differences within the Taliban between the
Haqqani and the Kandahar fractions.
O Do ell did ot elie e the e a e diffe e es he it o es
to core issues such as how women should be treated or whether girls should be allowed to go to
s hool. The Tali a s p io it lies ith e ei i g diplo ati e og itio as the legiti ate
government of Afghanistan. The source stated that she cannot give an analysis on the decision-
making process within the Taliban, because they are still in the process of dividing positions and
areas to govern among themselves.
Regional differences
2. To the question on whether there are any regional differences in how the Taliban treats local
populatio , O Do ell said, the e a e so e, espe iall i the o th he e the e a e Tali s ho a e
ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks.
To what extent are the following groups and individuals targeted by the Taliban?
Afghans with links to the former government, employees or former employees of international companies,
foreign troops, NGOs, or foreign embassies in Afghanistan
3.
A o di g to O Do ell, people ho o ked i a
apa
ity for the former government are
targeted, detained, kept in secret prisons, beaten, tortured and in some cases killed in Afghanistan
toda . The Tali a isits people s ho es a ed, looki g fo e e s of the fo e se u it fo es.
They use their weapons against relatives who might still be there or against neighbours. There are
cases of extrajudicial killings occurring. People who worked for the former government are in
danger for their lives.
4. A police women went missing days after the Taliban takeover in Mazar-e Sharif. She has not been
seen or heard of since. Other women received text messages calling them to the airport in Mazar-e
Sharif to onboard flights to leave the country. This was a method of luring them out. Later their
bodies were found.
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5. Lower level bureaucrats and technocrats might be less of a target, but if they are of a contentious
ethnicity or religious belief
– the the stakes a e highe . O Do ell s o e all i p essio is that the e
is a lack of discipline and a rule of law in the Taliban security forces. In the absence of a trickle
down authority, many things are happening arbitrarily. When people address the central
authorities regarding the whereabouts of their relatives, they are told that stories of detained
relatives are lies. These are results of a broken chain of authority and accountability. People are in
da ge fo a oad a ge of easo s, a d O Do ell does ot elie e the e is a diffe e e i
whether people were sitting in the back or in the front of the office.
6.
O Do ell
emphasizes that the nature of the people who have taken over in Afghanistan, leads
back to generations of boys who have been absorbed into a broad system of
madrasa
schools on
the Pakistani side of the border. They have essentially been taught very little other than recitation
of the Quran. So this ignorance means that they are approaching Afghan society from a complete
ultu al defi it. I ge e al, O Do ell elie ed a of the ta geted i di iduals a e pe se uted fo
political reasons. However, she cannot rule out the possibility of personal vengeance as the motif.
Journalists
7.
O Do ell spe t the last th ee o ths of the a t a eli g i Afgha ista . The a eas take o e
the Taliban had either closed down or taken over the local media organisations. Journalists were
forced to flee and felt their lives were in danger. In August 2021, many journalists had come to
Kabul from provinces, and many of them are still trapped there or in hiding. Journalists were
amongst the first targets after the fall of Kabul,
the e e eate , a d O Do ell has itte a out
their situation extensively. VOA, DW and BBC have closed down. Journalists are generally not able
to do journalism. Prior to August 2021, there were very good journalists that reflected modern
values of f
ee spee h. O Do ell added that she has o ked ith Afgha jou alists losel fo a
very long time.
8. Social media is at the moment the only source of information on the situation for journalism in
Afgha ista , e e though u h is u e ifia le. O Do ell
emphasized, that she cites sources she
knows and trusts because they verify their information prior to circulation. She believed that her
information on this topic is less anecdotal and more factual, and there is a wholesale targeting on
women
–
because they are being the most vocal.
Human rights defenders
9.
O Do
ell had ot see a
de o st atio s
e .
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10. There are many examples of female rights defenders who are being targeted. Women especially
seem to be leading the charge against the way the wholesale cancelation of their rights, which they
won under the constitution. Right from day one, women were being specifically targeted. Women
are being detained and badly treated for demonstrating and speaking out against the way they are
being treated. Many are not talking publicly about being detained because there is a high risk of
assumption that they might have been raped. Gang rapes are happening to women who have been
imprisoned
–
but admitting to being raped means taking the blame. There are stories of young
women who are killed by their families based on rumors of them being raped in detention. This is
linked to the idea of losing your honor.
Family members
11.
Mu h of the sou e s i fo atio o fa il e e s of ta geted people is a e dotal. O Do ell
used the example of a photographer from a high profile Shia family, who left Afghanistan in August.
Today, his family is in danger by association, and because they are Shia Muslims, and because his
father and grandfather are central figures in their community.
12.
I a diffe e t a e dote, L e O Do ell efe ed to a pe so i a se io positio at the fo e i e
p eside t s offi e, hose fa il s life is i da ge e ause the a e asso iated to hi . I
Afghanistan, family is everything and the deeds of the fathers trickle down to the sons and the
daughters, and the nieces and the nephews.
13. A former employee at the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) who has left Afghanistan told the source
that the Tali a gu e keep isiti g his ho e a d his pa e ts ho e i Ka ul. The a e looki g
for him and have shut down his house, by emptying magazines on his doors and windows. Some
Afgha s e ei e th eate i g ight lette s . The e has ee house sea hes a d so e o e ha e
been taken away in the middle of the night. Overall, there is an atmosphere and feeling, in which
people feel in danger because they see what is happening to others.
Monitoring
14. Media organisations are monitored and regularly visited. Under the new rules, they are not
supposed to do a
epo ti g, u less, it is app o ed Tali a s o e sight o
ittee. Tali a s
presence in bureaus is intimidating. Many journalists operate from outside of Afghanistan, using
sources inside the country.
15.
To the uestio o ho the Tali a
o ito s the populatio , O Do ell a s e ed that i ti idatio
and fear are powerful tools to control the action of the people. Streets are relatively empty and
many people stay at home. This is partly due to the economic situation and partly fear.
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16. The source pointed to the assistance that the de facto government is receiving from the Chinese
government to monitor social media and summarized, that monitoring the civilian population on
digital platforms is imaginable.
Vulnerable groups
Ethnic and Religious minorities
17. Hazaras and Shias are generally considered as apostates, and probably regarded as inferior as
human beings. They have been targeted in the past by the Taliban and killed in large numbers.
O Do ell k o s of high p ofiled Shias ho ha e left Afgha ista si e August
, ho ightfull ,
O Do ell added, assu ed thei li es e e i da ge . Haza as i he et o k ha e left Afgha istan
because they felt scared and were threatened due to their ethnicity. Panjshiris are being targeted
e ause the a e the
o g t i e a d a hot ed of pote tial o eal esista e. It is diffe e t ith
Tajiks and Uzbeks.
18.
I O Do ell s ie , the Taliban
is a Pashtun nationalistic movement, which is not inclusive.
Therefore, abuse will be part of the movement. The source did not view the situation safe for
Hindus nor Sikhs. Christians have never been safe. If you are not a Pashtun, your status is
contentious.
19. To the question on to what extend the de facto government is able and willing to protect the
i ilia populatio f o the Isla i State Kho asa P o i e ISKP O Do ell stated that the a e
not willing at all. In her view, there are in some cases symbiotic relations between the Taliban and
ISKP. The latter has been very useful to the Taliban in many ways. A useful deflection of blame for
their own activities. The source added that some of the attacks blamed on and even claimed by
ISKP have actually been carried out by or for the Taliban.
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Minutes from Interview with male human rights defender
1 April 2022
Human rights defenders
1. On the question on how the source is treated by the de facto government, the source answered
that he has received life-threatening intimidations from people he does not know on Twitter,
Fa e ook a d ia pho e alls, sa i g: We ill kill ou , a d ou elo g to este
ou t ies . The
source explained that in the view of the Taliban and many conservative-thinking Afghans, human
rights ideas belong to the West. He added that the threats he has received on the ground by
individual Talibs does not reflect policies of the ministries, which he has accessed. The source also
added that even though he is very active, the Taliban has not attacked him nor his family members
and elaborated that he is of an influential family in a conservative part of Afghanistan.
2. In his personal view, many activists state that the Taliban is targeting them and their families, so
they can reside in the West. The source viewed himself as an example of how that fear does not
apply to all human rights activists.
3. When the co-workers at the NGO travel together for work, the women can no longer accompany
them. Co-gendered meetings at the office are still possible. During work related journeys, the
source fears that the Taliban might look through his cellphone at checkpoints, and question him as
they have questioned others, regarding his contacts and the photos taken of the people involved in
awareness campaigns in different areas in Afghanistan.
Journalists
4. Journalists cannot cover any issues that contradict the Taliban. According to the source, the Taliban
monitors the mainstream media and the social media. To exemplify this, the source mentioned an
acquaintance of his, who wrote critically of the Taliban on Facebook, which resulted in the Taliban
executing him in the Helmand province around January 2022.
Women
5. Immediately after the takeover in August 2021, the Taliban declared that women could not work at
NGOs any longer. Thus, their NGOs ceased their activities with female employees shortly hereafter.
After a while, the Taliban permitted the women to return to their work at NGOs. However, women
at governmental offices have received some salaries but are not officially allowed to return to their
positions. Female teachers at secondary schools are also still at home. Some university classes are
open for attendance and female students in Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif are told they can
return if they wear hijab. Traveling by air without a
mahram
is not possible any longer. The source
used the airports at Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul as examples where he personally experienced this
ban in female travel without a mahram. Although, by the borders of Spin Buldak and Torkham,
women are traveling on foot without a
mahram.
In the view of the source, the Taliban sometimes
lift restrictions, when they see that the population are not following them.
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Female human rights activists
6. To the question on whether male and female rights activists face same restrictions, the source
answered, based on his experience female volunteers often can enter inside houses, which is
restricted for male volunteers. On the other hand, female volunteers can no longer travel from
province to province, as they could prior to August 2021. In additions to that, our source asked his
female volunteers to wear hijab during office meetings in case the Taliban suddenly enters.
Unaccompanied children
7. The source has 12 years of experience working with unaccompanied children in the civil society and
in his view, the status of these children at the moment can be compared to child labour. They are
either beggars or street workers.
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Written answers by a UN national staff in Afghanistan
27 April 2022
1. To what extent has the situation for LGBT people in Afghanistan changed since August 2021?
After 15 August 2021, several LGBTQ people escaped from the country. Some of them could reach Europe or
other safe countries; however, many are still stuck in Pakistan and Abu-Dhabi. Those who remained in
Afghanistan are hiding everywhere. Life has changed dramatically for LGBTQ. Life has been eliminated for
everyone, especially for LGBTQ. Previously, they could have hidden lives; they could secretly party, have
relationships, etc. However, due to threats from the Taliban, they are hiding completely. I do not have
examples of what happened to LGBTQ people because the media is censored, and such events do not become
public. I know only of one case of a gay boy who the Taliban flogged.
As another example, my boyfriend, whom I was in relationship over four years, disappeared after August
2021. I do not know what has happened to him. Being LGBTQ under the Islamic law, especially the Taliban,
leads to death. Hence, the LGBTQ community in Afghanistan spend their days and nights in fear of when they
will be trapped and killed by the Taliban. Including myself.
2. To what extent are there regional differences in the treatment of LGBT people?
Whe
e sa the Tali a , e ea a te o ist a d eligious e t e ist g oup. Those ho do ot a ept
women nor the education of girls and children, can never accept LGBTQ. So, in every part of Afghanistan, the
Taliban has the same attitude towards LGBTQ - that is, killing of LGBTQ people. Although homosexual
behaviors are evident among the Taliban very clearly, but still, they eliminate everything under the name of
LGBTQ.
3. How are LGBT people being treated by their own families and the local community in case their sexual
preference is revealed
?
A number of families do not have a problem if their children are not very open with their sexual orientation.
But it is not acceptable for any family if their child clearly behaves homosexual. I know someone who is
obviously gay and who escaped death threats from his family. His brother has set a reward if anyone should
find him. It is not acceptable in the society neither - however some people misuse them sexually.
4. To what extent can LGBT people seek protection by the authorities?
There is no opportunity nor option for the LGBTQ to seek protection at all. Everywhere in this country is a
nightmare here nowadays. Any door they knock on leads them to being caught and they fall in disaster.
5. To what extent is health care accessible for LGBT people?
There were two clinics in Kabul, one in Mazar for the LGBTQ to access health services in the past, however,
now they are partly active, and LGBTQ hesitate to go there because they fear being identified by the Taliban.
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Online meeting with a member of civil society in Afghanistan
3 May 2022
In Afghanistan, the LGBT issue is very sensitive, especially in the current context. The source is engaged to
help the LGBT community in Afghanistan.
1. To what extent has the situation for LGBT people in Afghanistan changed since August 2021?
During the rule of the former government, the Human Rights abuses faced by the LGBT people were severe
compared to their health needs. Discrimination against LGBT people took place at community level as well
as from the government and the law enforcement officials.
Any hope for improvement under Taliban rule is completely abandoned. Possibilities for support and
protection services is not feasible. The LGBT people are currently living in a very threatening situation. The
Taliban is actively looking for individuals who are trans-women or trans-men and there are examples from
checkpoints in the cities where the Taliban members stop anyone looking differently in appearance. For
trans-men and trans-women, who undergo searches at the checkpoints, it is a big issue.
The Taliban members are very harsh at the checkpoints and some trans-people have been beaten and
detained for hours. Based on religious principles, the Taliban is against LGBT persons, and for this reason,
there is plenty of hostility against the LGBT community. Large parts of the LGBT community have moved to
Iran and Pakistan; in Afghanistan, many are living in hiding. This is why, organisations are finding it
challenging at the moment to reach and establish contact with the community.
There is a fear among the LGBT community of being detained by the Taliban. In case an LGBT person is
detained, the primary fear is the implementation of sharia law that under Taliban rule could include public
punishment without any judicial process.
Targeted killings of LGBT people by the Taliban have taken place. Under the previous government, some
LGBT people worked as dancers and sex workers and worked in restaurants, which is no longer possible
under the Taliban rule. The LGBT community now fears that incidents of killings might take place due to
events in the past in which LGBT people were trapped and killed by the people, who knew them as dancers.
Not long ago, two young boys were brutally killed in a province in a similar situation.
In terms of how LGBT people are treated by their own families, sometimes the family members establish
linkages with the Taliban in order to show their support, and then family members act as informants who
provide information about an LGBT member of the family, for instance on activities perceived as immoral.
The stoppage of relevant services has been challenging for organisations, who aim to support the LGBT
community by documenting and reporting incidents. Against this background, the source has a feeling that
the violence against LGBT people has increased, but it is not possible to document it. The source has
received reports on ten LGBT individuals who were tortured and beaten.
2. To what extent are there regional differences in the treatment of LGBT people?
There is no big
diffe e e i the Tali a s t eat e t of LGBT people i the p o i es. LGBT people a e
perceived unacceptable and in opposition to religion everywhere in Afghanistan. Often LGBT people live in
the cities. They flee their families and most of them are living in major cities like Kabul and Mazar.
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3. How are LGBT people being treated by their own families and the local community in case their
sexual preference is revealed?
In rare cases the families would accept a son as being homosexual, but normally there is no acceptance in
the families of their son or daughter having same sex relations. There has been cases under the previous
regime, in which the family discovered their son was homosexual and they either attempted to kill or
succeeded at killing him.
In Afgha
ista , it is i po ta t to ai tai the fa il s ho ou ; a d a so o a daughte ha i g a sa e se
relation will bring shame on their family. Honour killings of LGBT people have taken place. It is not only the
close family members like a brother or father who might execute the killing, but also the extended family
members like uncles and cousins will try to kill an LGBT person within the family.
A community member known to the source, who is still living in Kabul, experienced that all of his family
members cut off relations with him, because the family discovered his different sexual behaviour. The man
is married and has children.
4. To what extent can LGBT people seek protection by the authorities?
It is impossible for an LGBT person as such to seek protection from the authorities. It is even unthinkable
that an LGBT person would seek protection. During the rule of the former government, there was no
protection either. The law enforcement is one of the main perpetrators who were engaged in abuse against
LGBT people. There were cases under the previous government in which LGBT people went to the police
station to report sexual abuse only to be further abused and raped by the police. Currently, it is unthinkable
for an LGBT person to seek protection at a police station. In the current context, there is no functioning
judiciary in Afghanistan. Most of the protection mechanisms that existed in terms of Human Rights
protection and child protection are almost no longer functioning. There are no specific protection
mechanism for LGBT people.
5. To what extent is health care accessible for LGBT people?
In terms of health care services for LGBT people, the source pointed out, that very limited health care
services existed during the former government. However, following the Taliban takeover, the funding of
the those program stopped and therefore the services stopped as well, and there is no longer access to
health interventions in Afghanistan.
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A well-informed journalist with years of experience covering
Afghanistan
Islamabad, 2 April 2022
Targeted individuals
Afghans with links to the former government
1. There has been revenge attacks and revenge killings of former government employees since August
2021, but not in the same scale as when the Taliban was ousted in 2001. The sources assessed that
around 80 % of the bureaucrats employed by the previous government have returned to work
again. This mostly concerns mid and low-level employees since the Taliban have employed people
from within their own ranks at the top-level positions at the ministries and local administrations.
The source knows of former employees under the previous government, at the Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Transportation, who have now returned to their positions.
2. According to the journalist, there has been no systematic persecution of employees of the former
government. There has however, been a systematic effort by the Taliban to obtain information,
especially on the population of Kabul regarding professional positions and affiliations This has been
expressed through house searches, confiscations of vehicles and houses belonging to the former
government. People in possession of vehicles and houses received varying treatment by the
Taliban. Some were arrested for a couple of days, some were not and some again were taken in for
questioning and released afterwards. The source advised that these house searches and efforts to
o tai i fo atio o the Tali a s pa t ha e stoked fea a o gst the i ilia populatio .
3. The source stated that members of the Taliban have targeted some bureaucrats employed by the
former government. This was due to a personal dispute rather than because of positions previously
held.
4. On the other hand, people employed by the former intelligence service, National Directorate of
Security (NDS), have been subjected to targeted persecution by the Taliban. Some of these NDS
units, who have been trained by the CIA during the last five years of the former government, are
mainly subjected to persecution because these units have committed severe human rights
violations against many Taliban members in the past. As for the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) and whether or not they are targeted by the Taliban, it depends on what a
given soldier did rather than his rank.
Employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs
or foreign embassies in
Afghanistan
5. The source stated that whether an Afghan who has worked as an interpreter for the international
troops in Afghanistan, including the Danish troops, would be subject to persecution, depends on
the circumstances surrounding the tasks they performed, as well as individual circumstances. If the
division the interpreter in question worked for has engaged in combat with members of the
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Taliban, the interpreter would risk persecution. There has also been cases of local villagers sharing
information with the Taliban on interpreters employed by foreign divisions who behaved poorly
towards the local community.
6. The source further elaborated that the Taliban are often woven into the local communities in parts
of Afghanistan, and therefore have excellent intelligence on who has worked for foreign troops,
NGOs and so on.
7. The source stated that if an interpreter had behaved poorly toward an Afghan from the local
community, it would not be unlikely for that person to inform the Taliban about the interpreter as a
way to seek revenge. People have long memories in Afghanistan and disputes are not always
settled easily.
8. The source assessed that people employed at military facilities in low-level positions, who were not
associated with active combat, would not be persecuted solely based on their previous jobs. The
source added that previous occupation could however be used against individuals in a personal
dispute.
9. The source has not heard of any former employees at Western embassies who has been
persecuted by the Taliban as a result of previous position, but added that almost all of the former
embassy employees were evacuated in August and September, and therefore, it is difficult to make
a
ualified assess e ts of these people s isk p ofile i Afgha ista .
10. Afghans who were employed by foreign troops of Western embassies are thus in a more vulnerable
position as it can be used against them, but are not targeted solely based on jobs they held.
Journalists
11.
The Tali a s app oa h to jou alists a d jou alis i ge e al la gel
mirrors other totalitarian
governments across the world. This means, if you as a journalist publish criticism of the Taliban,
you will risk detention and persecution. There have been recent examples of journalists being
detained by the Taliban because they expressed critique of the Taliban. In a recent example two
journalists were picked up by the Taliban, because they wrote a story on the Taliban saying no
o e i te atio al se ies e e allo ed. To the sou e s k o ledge, the jou alists ho ha e ee
detained have all been released again after a couple of days of detention, but some of them were
subjected to ill-treatment during detention. The Taliban will not target a journalist solely for the
employer s/he works for.
12. The source mentioned an Afghan news organisation has more women journalists working than
men.
13. Taliban did not target Afghan journalists because they were employed at an American news
organisations; however, they have visited the offices of the organisations to check the employees,
taxation, and registration of cars
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Monitoring
14. The Taliban has a very good intelligence network and are very good at knowing what goes on at the
local level, because they have been woven into the local population throughout the last 20 years.
Therefore, local Taliban members are taking part in the conversations in the towns and at the local
mosques, and this gives them very good sense of what people within the given local community is
doing. In other words, they are of the villages and know how villages and local communities
throughout Afghanistan function. This way of obtaining intelligence within a local community also
means that the Taliban are better able to gather intelligence in the Pashtun dominated areas and
the areas, where they had a lot of presence as an insurgency. On the other hand, these intelligence
networks are less developed in other parts of the country where the Taliban had little or no
presence prior to August 2021.
15. The source assessed that the Taliban have some idea of the information flows on social networks,
and they are increasingly utilizing these means of communication themselves. However, the source
assessed that the posts one writes and shares on a social media platforms are unlikely to have
consequences unless they lead to someone
s death o i p iso e t.
Family members
16. The source assessed that family members of people with links to the former government,
employees or former employees of international companies, foreign troops, NGOs, foreign
embassies in Afghanistan or journalists are generally not a target. However, this very much
depends on the profession of the person belonging to one or more of the above-mentioned
categories, as well as whether this person had a prior personal dispute with a member of the
Taliban, the character of the dispute and whether it can be resolved by the village elders .
Vulnerable groups
Ethnic minorities
17. Ethnic minorities are generally more vulnerable now than prior to August 2021. The ethnic groups
in Afghanistan have a long history of rivalry and competition for resources, including over access to
land. Now that those in power are predominantly Pashtuns, other minorities fear that the Pashtuns
in the country
–
regardless of whether they are with the Taliban
–
will take advantage of this new
situation to assert themselves vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. According to the source, the Taliban
have not really addressed this fear amongst the ethnic minorities precisely because they have been
excluded from leading positions in the government and elsewhere.
18. Ethnic Hazaras, who for the most part are Shia Muslims, have been targeted by the Islamic State
Khorasan Province (ISKP) before and after the Taliban takeover. The ISKP have carried out attacks
on Hazaras in the bigger cities where the Hazaras constitute a minority and are easily identifiable
because they tend to form communities in cities like Kabul, Ghazni, Kunduz and Gardez. As such,
the source assessed that Hazaras in these areas would be in a more vulnerable position than in
Daykundi, Ghor or Bamyan, where they make up the majority of the population. Despite the
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Tali a s p e ious attitude to a ds eth i Haza as, the ha e sho
Hazara community since assuming power in August 2021.
illi g ess to p ote t the
19. The source stated that ethnic Tajiks from the Panjshir Valley have been scrutinized by the Taliban
since August 2021 because the National Resistance Front (NRF) emerged from the Panjshir Valley.
Therefore, Panjshiris are generally treated with greater suspicion than other Tajiks are, and there
have been incidents of attacks against this demographic. The source further elaborated that Tajiks
from Panjshir fear that they will be subject to blackmail because of their background.
Religious minorities
20. There is a very small Sikh community in Afghanistan. In the past, this community was bigger but
because they faced discrimination from the rest of society, many emigrated. The source assessed
that the conditions for Sikhs in Afghanistan have not changed considerably since August 2021.
21. According to the source, there is no real Christian community in Afghanistan. On the question of
conversion from Islam to Christianity, the source advised that Afghanistan is a conservative Muslim
country, and so this behavior is inacceptable to the ordinary Afghan. This was also the case prior to
August 2021. The source has not heard of any such cases of conversion from Islam to Christianity.
LGBT
22. There is an LGBT community in Afghanistan but it is very difficult to assess the size of this
community given the secrecy shown by its members. Homosexuality is inacceptable in Afghanistan,
and so the source assessed that they conditions are just as harsh now as prior to August 2021. It is
not just the Taliban who finds homosexuality inacceptable; it is also the families of the LGBT-person
who finds this inacceptable.
Women
23. Women are barred from working in the public domain except in the Ministry of Education, the
Ministry of Health and at the airport in Kabul, where some women conduct security searches and
passport check for other female travelers. In many organisation where women used to work before
the takeover of power by the Taliban, the female employees have not come back to their jobs.
24. Recently, several new rules have been imposed on women in Afghanistan. As predicted of the
Taliban leadership, women can no longer travel or leave the country without a
mahram,.
According to the source, these edicts are not always enforced. They are valid on a regional level,
but on an individual level; one Taliban guard can enforce the need for a
mahram,
while the next
guard will let the women pass without one. This varying behavior extends beyond the edicts and
the individual Talib might enforce his only personal view on women whether or not it is a rule. The
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source stated that this sort of behavior further adds to the complexity of the situation in
Afghanistan at the moment, and it is very difficult to draw any general conclusion from one or even
a few specific cases. This not only applies to the situation of women in Afghanistan, but to all
matters in society. The situation in Afghanistan is very fluid and susceptible at the moment.
Honour-related conflict
25. The source advised that premarital relationships are usually dealt with and resolved within the
families, rather than involving the authorities. This was the case prior to August and is still the case.
This behaviour in not acceptable to the surrounding society and the families will try to resolve this
issue without the interference from outside. There have been cases where someone was accused
of forming a premarital relationship with a non-family member, and this way the case was brought
before a court.
26. The Taliban court system has a reputation for swift justice, and this was part of the appeal to the
public in the past, as the justice system of the republic was widely regarded slow and corrupt.
Judges within the Taliban justice system are prone to corruption, but the source assessed that it is
far less likely to happen now because the judges have to refer their verdicts to Islamic law. This also
ensures that a person can generally expect a fair trial if they have a conflict with a Taliban member,
but again this depends on the context of the conflict. The source assessed that Hazaras are likely to
be discriminated by court system. This assessment is based on past treatments of Hazaras rather
than on incidents since August 2021.
Access to information on Afghanistan
27. The flow of information out of Afghanistan have changed since August 2021. Many journalists were
evacuated in the autumn of 2021, and many local news organisations have gone out of business
because of the economic crisis the country is facing. Moreover, the Taliban have clamped down on
independent journalism and gone after some journalists who offered criticism of the new
authorities. These changed on the Afghan landscape of information have meant that people now
are more reliant on social media for information. The flow of information from social media is much
harder to fact check and verify, and so the risk of spreading misinformation rises when one
becomes too reliant on social media.
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