UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 101: Orientering om afgørelser fra Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol i klagesager vedrørende frakendelse af dansk statsborgerskab og udvisning, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2021-22
UUI Alm.del Bilag 101
Offentligt

SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 26781/19

Anis LARABA

against Denmark

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on

22 March 2022 as a Chamber composed of:

Carlo Ranzoni,

President,

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,

Egidijus

Kūris,

Pauliine Koskelo,

Jovan Ilievski,

Saadet Yüksel,

Diana Sârcu,

judges,

and Stanley Naismith,

Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 May 2019,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

A. The circumstances of the case

1. The applicant, Mr Anis Laraba, has dual nationality, Danish and

Algerian. He was born in Denmark in 1995 and lives in Horsens. He was

represented before the Court by Mr Michael Juul Eriksen, a lawyer practising

in Aarhus.

2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised

as follows.

3. In spring 2016 the Danish Security and Intelligence Service received a

list from Interpol with the names of persons believed to have been recruited

by the terrorist organisation Islamic State and to have operated in Syria. The

applicant’s name was on the list.

4. On 7 April 2016 the applicant was arrested and provisionally charged

on the basis of information that he had allegedly entered Syria and had

UUI, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 101: Orientering om afgørelser fra Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol i klagesager vedrørende frakendelse af dansk statsborgerskab og udvisning, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION

accepted his recruitment by the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and

the Levant (ISIL). The following day the applicant was remanded in custody.

5. By a District Court (Retten

i Glostrup)

judgment of 13 December 2017,

the applicant was convicted of a violation of Article 114c(3) and

Article 114d(3) of the Penal Code for having joined Islamic State from July

2013 to April 2014 with the purpose of committing terrorist crimes. He was

sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, he was deprived of his Danish

citizenship and his expulsion from Denmark was ordered with a permanent

re-entry ban.

6. On appeal, on 22 November 2018 the judgment was upheld by the High

Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre

Landsret).

7. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) was refused on

7 March 2019 by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet).

8. The Danish courts noted from the outset that, according to the

preparatory work on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality, the

assessment of whether to withdraw a person’s citizenship should be based on

a weighing up of the severity of the offence and the impact on the person

concerned of the withdrawal of his or her citizenship.

9. As to the severity of the offence, the courts noted that the applicant had

been convicted of very serious terrorist crimes under the Penal Code.

10. As to the impact on the applicant of the withdrawal of his citizenship,

they took into account that the applicant had been born and raised in Denmark

to a Danish mother and an Algerian father who had later also acquired Danish

nationality. The applicant’s parents and siblings lived in Denmark. He did not

have a family of his own. He had family in Algeria, where he had been on

holiday with his father around 2011. He spoke Danish and, by his own

account, some Arabic. The District Court noted, however, that the applicant

had corrected the Prosecutor, when the latter was referring to an Arabic

translation during the criminal proceedings. Moreover, in 2016 the applicant

had been admitted to the University in Medina to study Sharia in Arabic, but

he had been detained in this case before he could go.

11. After having weighed the severity of the offence against the impact of

withdrawal of the applicant’s citizenship based on an assessment of his

situation, including his ties with Denmark and Algeria, his family situation

and his language skills, the courts found that his Danish citizenship should be

withdrawn. It also found that the conditions in the Danish Aliens Act for

expelling the accused had been met. It found that none of these measures

would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

B. Relevant domestic law and Council of Europe documents

12. The relevant domestic law and Council of Europe documents were

recently set out in

Adam Johansen v. Denmark

(dec.), no. 27801/19, §§ 21-28,

1 February 2022.

LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION

COMPLAINT

13. The applicant complained that the order to withdraw his Danish

citizenship and to expel him from Denmark was in violation of Article 8 of

the Convention.

THE LAW

14. The applicant relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as

follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his

correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right

except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in

the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the

country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,

or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A. Deprivation of citizenship

15. The Court notes that the general principles applicable to cases

involving deprivation of nationality are well-established in the Court’s

case-law (see, for example

K2 v. the United Kingdom

(dec.), no. 42387/13,

§§ 49-50, 7 February 2017,

Mansour Said Abdul Salam Mubarak v. Denmark

(dec.), no. 74411/16, §§ 62-63, 22 January 2019,

Ghoumid and Others

v. France,

no. 52273/16, §§ 43-44, 25 June 2020,

Usmanov v. Russia,

no. 43936/18, §§ 52-54, 22 December 2020, and

Adam Johansen v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above, §§ 44-45 and 52-55).

1. Arbitrariness

16. The decision to deprive the applicant of his Danish citizenship was

based on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality. The Court is satisfied

by the clarity of the domestic law and can therefore conclude that the decision

was “in accordance with the law” (see also,

Mansour Said Abdul Salam

Mubarak v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above, § 64, and

Adam Johansen

v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above, § 47).

17. The applicant had an opportunity to contest the prosecuting

authorities’ request to strip him of his Danish citizenship before the domestic

courts at two levels of jurisdiction, and he has not alleged any procedural

shortcomings in this regard. Accordingly, the applicant was afforded the

procedural safeguards required by Article 8 of the Convention (see,

contrario, Usmanov,

cited above § 66).

18. The Court is also satisfied that the authorities acted diligently and

swiftly. It observes that in spring 2016 the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service received information from Interpol, leading to the applicant’s arrest

LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION

on 7 April 2016. On 13 December 2017 the applicant was convicted by the

District Court. The judgment was upheld by the High Court on 22 November

2018 and became final on 7 March 2019, when leave to appeal was refused

by the Appeals Permission Board.

19. Finally, the revocation of the applicant’s Danish citizenship was the

consequence of his conviction for a very serious terrorist crime under articles

114c(3) and 114d(3) of the Penal Code. The deprivation of his Danish

nationality complained of was thus to a large extent a result of the applicant’s

own choices and actions (see,

inter alia, Ramadan v. Malta,

no. 76136/12,

§ 89, 21 June 2016). Moreover, as the Court has underlined on numerous

occasions, terrorist violence, in itself, constitutes a grave threat to human

rights. Accordingly, the Court considers it legitimate for Contracting States

to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it

cannot condone in any circumstances (see, for example,

Ghoumid,

cited

above, § 50, and the references mentioned therein).

20. The Court therefore concludes that the decision of the Danish courts

to deprive the applicant of his Danish citizenship was not arbitrary.

2. Consequences of the revocation

21. It is not in dispute that the applicant was not rendered stateless by the

decision to deprive him of his Danish citizenship (see also, among others,

v. United Kingdom,

cited above, § 62).

22. The preparatory work on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality

set out that the assessment of whether to withdraw a person’s citizenship

should be based on a weighing of the seriousness of the offence and the

impact on the person concerned. Accordingly, the domestic courts carefully

assessed the consequences for the applicant of a revocation of his Danish

citizenship in the light of his ties with Denmark and Algeria.

23. The courts took account of the fact that the applicant was born in

Denmark, to a Danish mother and an Algerian father who had later also

acquired Danish nationality. The applicant had therefore acquired dual

nationality by birth. He had strong ties with Denmark, where his parents and

siblings lived. He did not have a family of his own. He spoke Danish. They

also found that the applicant had some ties with Algeria. He had been there

on holiday with his father around 2011. Although he claimed to speak only

some Arabic, it was noted that he had corrected the Prosecutor, when the latter

was referring to an Arabic translation during the criminal proceedings.

Moreover, in 2016 he had been admitted to the University in Medina to study

Sharia in Arabic (see paragraph 10 above). In conclusion, based on an overall

balancing test, the Danish courts found that the deprivation of the applicant’s

Danish nationality would not be a disproportionate sanction.

24. The Court finds reason to emphasise that, as opposed to section 8b of

the Act on Danish Nationality and, for example, the compatibility of an

expulsion order with Article 8 of the Convention, the compatibility of

withdrawal of a person’s citizenship is not based on a balancing test of

LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION

specific criteria, but on the requirement that two separate issues have been

addressed: whether the revocation was arbitrary and what the consequences

of revocation were for the applicant (see, for example,

Adam Johansen

v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above, § 68).

25. In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts

diligently addressed the consequences of depriving the applicant of his

Danish citizenship.

26. Moreover, in the Court’s view, taking into account that the applicant

was convicted for having joined Islamic State with the purpose of committing

terrorist crimes, which themselves constitute a serious threat to human rights

and which to a large extent showed his lack of attachment to Denmark and its

values (see,

mutatis mutandis, Ghoumid and Others v. France,

cited above,

§ 50), the fact that the applicant in the present case had obtained Danish

nationality by birth does not significantly alter or add to the consequences for

him (see also

Adam Johansen v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above, § 70).

3. Conclusion

27. In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts’

assessment of the decision to revoke the applicant’s nationality was adequate

and sufficient, and does not disclose any appearance of arbitrariness or

omission with regard to the applicant’s arguments. Consequently, this part of

the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to

Article 35 § 3(a) and 4 of the Convention (see also

Ghoumid and Others

v. France,

cited above, §§ 51-52,

K2 v. United Kingdom

(dec.), cited above,

§ 67,

Mansour Said Abdul Salam Mubarak v. Denmark

(dec.), cited above,

§ 71, and

Adam Johansen v. Denmark,

cited above, § 71).

B. The order to expel the applicant from Denmark

28. It is not in dispute that there was an interference with the applicant’s

right to respect for his private life within the meaning of Article 8, that the

expulsion order was “in accordance with the law” and that it pursued the

legitimate aim of preventing disorder and crime.

29. The relevant criteria to be applied in determining whether an

interference is necessary in a democratic society are well established and set

out in,

inter alia, Üner v. the Netherlands

[GC] (no. 46410/99, §§ 54-55 and

57-58, ECHR 2006-XII) and

Maslov v. Austria

[GC] (no. 1638/03, §§ 68-76,

ECHR 2008).

30. In respect of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, the

domestic courts took the same factors into account as when assessing the

impact on the applicant of revocation of his Danish citizenship.

31. These factors included the nature and seriousness of the offence

committed by the applicant, the length of the applicant’s stay in the country

from which he was going to be expelled, the nationalities of the various

persons concerned and the solidity of his social, cultural and family ties with

LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION

the host country and with the country of destination. Thus, the Danish courts

took into account, among other things, that the applicant was born in

Denmark and had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for serious

offences committed as an adult (see, also for example,

Levakovic v. Denmark,

no. 7841/14, 23 October 2018,

Balogun v. the United Kingdom,

no. 60286/09,

10 April 2012, and

Mutlag v. Germany,

no. 40601/05, 25 March 2010).

32. The expulsion order in the present case was issued together with a

lifelong ban on re-entry. The Court notes in this context that the duration of

a ban on re-entry is an element to which it has attached importance in its case-

law. In the present case, the Court is convinced that the applicant’s crime

leading to the expulsion order was of such a nature that he posed a serious

threat to public order (see also,

inter alia, Mutlag v Germany,

cited above,

§§ 61-62, and

Balogun v. the United Kingdom,

cited above, § 53).

33. In conclusion, the domestic courts found that there were compelling

reasons to expel the applicant, and that respect for the applicant’s private life

in Denmark did not make the deprivation of his Danish nationality and

expulsion conclusively inappropriate.

34. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court is satisfied

that the Danish courts made a thorough assessment of the applicant’s personal

circumstances, carefully balanced the competing interests, took into account

the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law and explicitly assessed whether the

expulsion order could be deemed contrary to Denmark’s international

obligations. “Very serious reasons” were adequately adduced by the national

authorities when assessing his case, and the expulsion order cannot be said to

be disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely, the protection of

the public from the threat of terrorism (see,

inter alia, K2 v. United Kingdom,

cited above, § 66, and

Adam Johansen v. Denmark,

cited above, § 84; see

also, among many others,

Ndidi v. the United Kingdom,

no. 41215/14, § 76,

14 September 2017, and

Levakovic v. Denmark,

cited above, § 45).

35. Consequently, this part of the application must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 § 3(a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares

the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 14 April 2022.

Stanley Naismith

Registrar

Carlo Ranzoni

President