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Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

Department for the Middle East and North Africa

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

October 2021

URU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 35: Orientering om ny fase af Dansk-Arabisk Partnerskabsprogram 2022-27

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................... III

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1

CONTEXT, CHALLENGES, RISKS, AND OPPORTUNITIES ........................................................ 2

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

EGIONAL AND COUNTRY CONTEXT

....................................................................................................................... 2

ROGRAMME CONTEXT

.............................................................................................................................................. 5

PPORTUNITIES

........................................................................................................................................................... 7

ANISH POLITICAL PRIORITIES

PAST ACHIEVEMENTS

AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

........................ 9

ANISH ENGAGEMENTS IN THE REGION

.............................................................................................................. 11

DAPP’

TRATEGIC

BJECTIVES

........................................................................................................................... 14

OUTH

MPLOYMENT AND

NTREPRENEURSHIP

.............................................................................................. 15

UMAN

IGHTS AND

NCLUSION

........................................................................................................................... 18

DDITIONAL SUPPORT INITIATIVES

....................................................................................................................... 21

VERALL BUDGET

..................................................................................................................................................... 23

VISION AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ......................................................................................... 13

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING (MEAL).................... 24

OVERALL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 25

5.1

5.2

RGANISATION

.......................................................................................................................................................... 25

ECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC TENDERS

.................................................................................................. 27

ANNEX 1

–

PROGRAMME CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 29

VERALL

EVELOPMENT

HALLENGES

, O

PPORTUNITIES

AND

ISKS

.............................................................. 29

II. P

OLITICAL

CONOMY AND

TAKEHOLDER

NALYSIS

........................................................................................... 33

III.

RAGILITY

, C

ONFLICT

AND

ESILIENCE

............................................................................................................. 37

IV.

UMAN

IGHTS

, G

ENDER

, Y

OUTH

APPLYING A

UMAN

IGHTS

ASED

PPROACH

............................... 40

V. I

NCLUSIVE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

CLIMATE CHANGE

AND ENVIRONMENT

.................................................... 45

ANNEX 1A

–

UPDATE ON THE CONTEXT IN TUNISIA .................................................................... 48

ANNEX 2

–

DETAILED RESULTS FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 49

ANNEX 3

–

DETAILED BUDGET ............................................................................................................ 53

ANNEX 4

–

PARTNER ASSESSMENT ..................................................................................................... 54

ANNEX 5

–

RISK MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................... 55

ANNEX 6

–

PROCESS ACTION PLAN ..................................................................................................... 58

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List of abbreviations

CSOs

DAPP

DDD

DEDI

DIIS

DKK

ENP

FDI

FoRB

GBV

GDP

HCE

HRBA

HRD

HRO

IFU

ILO

IMF

LGBT+

M&E

MEAL

MEII

MENA

MFA

MoU

MSMEs

NAP

NGO

NHRI

RoHA

SDG

Sharaka

SMART

SMEs

SNE

SRHR

STAs

ToC

ToR

UNDP

UNFPA

UPR

YSB

Civil Society Organisations

Danish Arab Partnership Programme

Doing Development Differently

Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative

Danish Institute for International Studies

Danish Kroner

European Neighbourhood Policy

European Union

Foreign Direct Investment

Freedom of Religion and Belief

Gender Based Violence

Gross Domestic Product

Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement

Human Rights Based Approach

Human Rights Defender

Human Rights Organisation

Investment Fund for Developing Countries

International Labour Organisation

International Monetary Fund

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender +

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning

Middle East Investment Initiative

Middle East and North Africa

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Memorandum of Understanding

Micro-, Small-, Medium-sized Enterprises

National Human Rights Action Plan

Non-governmental Organisation

National Human Rights Institutions

Just and Humane Asylum System (Retfærdigt og Humant Asylsystem)

Sustainable Development Goal

Sharaka Capital Fund

Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Timely

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

Seconded National Expert

Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Senior Technical Advisors

Technical Assistance

Theory of Change

Terms of Reference

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Population Fund

Council for Development Policy (Udviklingspolitisk Råd)

Youth Sounding Board

iii

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1 Introduction

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) has been an important instrument in

Denmark’s

foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since its establishment in

2003. The new DAPP, building on the positive experiences of the past and focusing on

employment and human rights, will continue to support Danish policy priorities in the region, and

in particular policies addressing migration. Recognising that a youth focus is key to ensuring better,

more secure, and more prosperous lives in the MENA region, the new DAPP phase 2022-2027

adopts youth as its main target group. As in the previous phase, DAPP will focus its activities in

Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. In a region of substantial turmoil, these countries present

relatively stable contextual environments for implementing long-term activities in the fields of

employment and human rights. Furthermore, they are key countries of migrant origin, transit, and

destination. By seeking to improve youth’s general conditions in their home countries, DAPP is

designed to address some of the root causes of youth migration towards Europe, which is a key

policy priority for Denmark.

The DAPP vision is to contribute to building a better life for young people in the MENA region.

Contemporary knowledge on addressing the drivers of migration tells us that the best strategic

approach is multi-faceted. Every young person is entitled to a decent and meaningful job,

individual freedom, and the chance to participate as an active member in society, free from

violence, harassment, and discrimination. DAPP is building the stepping stones to achieve this.

The new DAPP seeks simplicity and flexibility to adapt quickly and build on successful and

innovative initiatives, and alignment with other donors for greater impact. The programme

maintains the strategic partnership focus of the previous DAPP phases. It engages implementing

organisations able to deliver Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how while at the same

time having the pre-requisite international experience needed to operate effectively in the region.

As a new dimension, DAPP will integrate organisations with experience in private sector growth,

an important driving factor in creating jobs for young people.

There are two programmes under the new DAPP, with complementary strategic objectives aimed

at improving young people’s lives. The

Programme on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

(hereafter the Youth Employment Programme) aims to increase the number of young people with

jobs in the DAPP countries through entrepreneurship and enterprise development.

Unemployment and the lack of opportunity is an important driving force for migration. DAPP

will counter this by targeting youth specifically and supporting pathways for transformational

change based on a solid understanding of the dynamics of job creation, especially for the young.

The Youth Employment Programme hopes to create 54,000 new jobs and support growth in 1,400

small and medium enterprises by the end of the programme.

The Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion (hereafter the Human Rights Programme)

merges the many rights-oriented development engagements of the previous DAPP into a single

programme that will promote and protect human rights with a focus on youth. The new DAPP

will increase efforts in engaging duty-bearers (state and public institutions)

with human rights

responsibilities to strengthen their dialogue and cooperation with rights holders, such as human

rights organisations (HROs) and human rights defenders (HRDs). It also adopts a systemic

approach, aiming to foster dialogue and trust between these duty bearers and rights holders. These

efforts are expected to engage youth as active citizens and agents of change. The programme

These include national and human rights institutions, courts and tribunals, law enforcement and security services,

parliament, and local governments and administrations.

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continues to build on the important achievements of the past relating to reforms in the human

rights systems, prevention of violence and torture, victim treatment and gender-based violence,

protection of minorities (including LGBT+ and faith-based minorities), free media, and gender

equality.

DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently (DDD) including

adaptive learning and implementation according to context, underpinned by frequent and close

dialogue between the

MFA’s

MENA DAPP Team and implementing partner organisations. To

help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include two special funds, one to

accelerate

activities where things are going well, and a second to support

innovation,

where this is

deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated depending on need and

opportunity.

The new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities, which includes coordination with

other Danish instruments in the region as well as carefully considered alignment, coordination,

and cooperation with like-minded donors, including the European Union (EU), to upscale and

multiply efforts and ensure mutual benefits.

2 Context, challenges, risks, and opportunities

2.1 Regional and country context

The new DAPP will be implemented in a vulnerable region severely marked, as the rest of the

world, by the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic downturns in even the strongest economies of the

region, disillusionment and disappointment with the outcomes of the Arab uprisings, disaffected

youth unable to engage productively in society and increasingly seeking solutions beyond their

borders, and the on-going reverberations from the protracted conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and

Libya are just a few of the serious challenges confronting the region. It is against this backdrop

that DAPP will need to seek out the opportunities that exist

–

and there are many, despite the

challenges

–

building on achievements and lessons of the past while developing and applying the

right modalities and mechanisms for transformational change within the two

programmes’

selected

thematic areas.

Developing economies with significant disparities and inequalities.

Morocco, Tunisia and

Egypt are lower middle-income countries while Jordan is a middle-income country. Although there

have been moderate improvements in economic performance in some countries (at least pre-

COVID-19), notably in

Morocco

and

Egypt,

wealth and income inequality continue to prevail

across the MENA region, with significant geographical, urban-rural, religious, and gender

disparities. The COVID-19 pandemic has further revealed existing structural weaknesses. Crucial

economic sectors in the DAPP countries have been impacted, with significant job losses, adding

to the already persistently high levels of unemployment, disproportionately affecting youth.

Stability, but with underlying tensions and conflicts.

Although the four countries demonstrate

relative stability and cannot be considered fragile, tensions and conflicts exist, often driven by

geographical and socio-economic disparities, or friction between Islamic and faith-based

minorities and more secular political groups, and frequently originating in the marginalised and

underserved regions.

Morocco

has experienced protests, strikes and social tensions, but has

avoided more significant upheaval by committing to a reform agenda, one which will have to

demonstrate results to appease the youth in the country who are demanding change.

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The trajectory towards democratic transition in

Tunisia

has been significant, yet slow and uneven.

Some pre-revolutionary power structures remain relatively intact, and inertia to engage in the long-

term systemic change process needed to ensure

advances in the political, economic and social

reform agenda prevails. The recent (2021) civic

Update on Tunisia

unrest were emblematic of the youth-related

On 25 July 2021, widespread demonstrations took

place across Tunisia to protest against the

challenges the country has to address to ensure

gover e t’s poor ha dli g of the

COVID-19 crisis

continued peace and stability. In

Egypt,

as well as the dire economic situation. Protesters

conflict can potentially be driven by structural

called for the government to be dissolved. In

issues (unemployment, water and food

response,

Tu isia’s Preside t Saied

invoked Article

insecurity) as well as the restrictive political

80 of the Constitution and took executive control of

system and military control. Although scoring

the State, citing an imminent threat to the Tunisia

low on the democracy and human rights index,

State. He also dismissed the Prime Minister and

Egypt is considered largely politically stable.

suspended the parliament. The Office of the

While

Jordan

is also largely stable, it faces

President has informed that the emergency

measures will be in effect until further notice.

threats from regional conflicts (Syria and Iraq).

Further details on the current situation in Tunisia

A dearth of space for dialogue and economic,

are presented in Annex 1a.

religious and political exclusion can breed

dissatisfaction, migration, and radicalisation,

especially for youth and young men. The risk

of water-related conflicts is prevalent across the MENA region, as all countries, Jordan in

particular, suffer from severe water scarcity that will only increase over time.

Democratic development, political legitimacy, and change.

Despite some glimmers of hope,

democratic development and real political change continues to be a major challenge.

The political

space in the DAPP countries and in the MENA region in general is dominated by an older

generation of men, while the youth and women are largely left out. For the youth, protest becomes

the only means of political engagement. Throughout the region, politics is dominated by the rift

between secular leaning and Islamic oriented groupings, which stalls not only the unfolding of a

Progress on SDG 16 (access to justice and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, is discouraging,

with major or significant challenges remaining in all four countries and only Jordan showing moderate improvements.

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pluralistic democracy but also many reform initiatives including in relation to human rights. In

Morocco,

political parties are viewed as opaque and citizens lack avenues for engagement in civic

life; this has a particular impact on youth, who represent a third of the population. Despite recent

attempts at reform, existing power structures continue to dominate and remain a challenge for

progress. In

Tunisia,

the noteworthy democratic transformation in the decade after the revolution

of 2011 has been negatively impacted by recent stalemates and conflicts among key political actors

and institutions, effectively impeding possibilities for much needed political and economic

reforms. In

Egypt,

recent steps have cemented the likelihood of continued authoritarian state

control, which maintains stability but also hinders political opposition. In

Jordan,

political parties

tend to be weak, and voting for tribally affiliated independents is common. Recent elections were

marred by allegations of vote rigging

–

although the election was deemed satisfactory in the end.

Efforts towards political and administrative decentralisation both lack the vision and the

supporting policies needed for effective implementation. Trust in government is consistently low

or moderate in all DAPP countries, ranging from 20% in Tunisia to 66% in Egypt.

Individual freedoms and human rights.

Despite some important steps towards democratic

reforms, the MENA region is still far from free, with only one country,

Tunisia,

ranked as a free

democracy and the regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance.

However, even in

Tunisia there are increasing pressures on a wide array of liberties coinciding with an increasing

influence of socio-conservative political actors. Despite this, Tunisia has a reasonable civic space

and a civil society skilled at raising rights aspects, albeit limited in their ability to reach youth in the

more marginalized communities.

Morocco

has taken steps to align to international human rights

standards, including an on-going process of revising the constitution, but challenges remain at the

practical implementation level.

Egypt’s

progress on human rights remains slow, with restricted

opportunities for civil society and journalists to comment on or influence state policies and

legislation, and limited space for civil society groups and human rights defenders.

Jordan

has seen

limited progress in furthering human rights and the political context limits the space in which Civil

Society Organisations (CSOs) can operate, especially in relation to human rights issues. Challenges

pertaining to the Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB) agenda are present, albeit to varying

degrees, in all DAPP countries. Furthermore, religious considerations have been cited as one of

the reasons for considering migration.

Lack of transparency and deep-rooted corruption.

Corruption, lack of transparency, and low

accountability is widespread across the region and is an important driving force for emigration;

16% in the region cite this as a reason for wanting to leave.

There is very little transparency in

Egypt,

and in

Morocco,

despite some efforts to combat corruption, it remains widespread and a

challenge across the economy. In

Tunisia,

the post-revolutionary development process prioritised

eliminating corruption, but progress has been slow with the public sector unable or unwilling to

implement its mandate. In

Jordan

there have been some efforts to combat corruption but effective

follow-up to allegations is rare and, as in Tunisia, it is the civil society that is most active.

Climate change and environment.

Water scarcity is widespread in the MENA region and is a

major barrier to development. It can also lead to water-related conflicts, likely to increase over

time given

the region’s vulnerability to climate change. Agriculture-related

jobs, often employing

women, are closely tied to water resources, and effective water management is of particular

importance for the agribusiness sector. The DAPP countries lag in terms of renewable energy

supply and fossil fuel-based energy imports account for significant portions of their GDPs.

However,

Egypt

is currently advancing its renewable energy capacity with Danish cooperation.

https://www.arabbarometer.org/2020/06/the-arab-worlds-trust-in-government-and-the-perils-of-generalization/

https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/

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Morocco

stands out as being a world leader in solar energy and has several green economy

initiatives.

Tunisia

and

Jordan

also have aspirations in this regard. These advances present

opportunities for job creation, if the necessary and appropriate technical support is forthcoming.

Increasingly a hub for migrants and asylum seekers.

The MENA region is seeing increasing

arrivals of both economic and climate migrants as well as refugees fleeing conflicts in neighbouring

states.

Morocco

has in recent decades transformed from a transit to also being a destination

country for migrants, from mainly sub-Saharan Africa, and refugees, from mainly Syria, as well as

a departure point for people using the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic Route as a pathway

to Europe.

Tunisia,

which has not traditionally been a hub for refugees or asylum seekers, is

seeing a growth in arrivals, primarily from Syria and Cote d’Ivoire. Tunisian migrants represent the

largest group of arrivals to Italy (13,000 illegal migrants in 2020) and ambitions to migrate is

prevalent among the youth of Tunisia.

Egypt

is becoming an increasingly important hub for

economic migrants and asylum seekers.

Jordan

is home to around 1.36 million Syrian refugees of

which roughly half are registered by UNHCR, as well as nearly 100,000 Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese,

Somali, and other refugees, registered with UNHCR.

Limited opportunities are driving people, and especially the young, to ‘vote with their feet’.

Across the MENA region, youth, and young men in particular, are seeking to emigrate in search

of a better life. While most would only do this legally,

an increasing number are willing to risk the

consequences of doing so illegally. The young cite many reasons for wanting to leave, but

economic opportunities or the lack thereof is the main driving force. Dissatisfaction with

corruption and the impact this has on daily life, and the lack of individual freedoms, are also

deciding factors. Those who cannot leave risk becoming increasingly angry, frustrated, and

marginalised.

2.2 Programme context

The context assessment reveals similar challenges across the four countries for both the Youth

Employment Programme and the Human Rights Programme.

Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

The young cannot find (decent) jobs.

Capacity to create decent employment in the MENA

region remains low. When jobs are created, it does not always coincide with where jobs are most

needed or does not live up to demands for attractive or even decent employment in terms of

remuneration, working conditions, or employee relations that appeal to the young.

While prior to

COVID-19 private sector growth was at decent levels in Egypt and Morocco, the supply of labour

from the youth far outweighs the demand. The new DAPP is likely to take off in a sluggish

economic environment with demand for skilled and unskilled labour at a low point.

Unemployment is often concentrated in the lower value sectors (such as agriculture) where the

least new jobs are created. However, unemployment among the large number of university

graduates also continues to rise. The youth population is broadly affected, regardless of education

or location. This leads to frustration and dissatisfaction and increasingly the young cannot envision

a future in their home countries.

In Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia respectively, 70%, 59% and 56% of young people between the age of 18 and 29 say

they want to emigrate. Illegally, the percentages are 38%, 18%, and 40%, and 26% in Egypt (Arab Youth Survey, 2020)

According to the Arab Youth Survey (2020) 24% leave for better economic opportunities, 16% are driven away by

corruption, while 8% cite political factors including lack of individual freedom.

The four DAPP countries face major challenges in achieving SDG 8 (productive employment and decent work)

although recent trends show slight improvements. Only Egypt is ranked as ‘on track for achievement’.

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Job-skills mismatch limits growth.

Striking the right balance between job supply and demand

is an on-going challenge in all DAPP countries. Effective and efficient vocational and other

training to ensure the correct skills and match between supply and demand does not yet exist or is

only slowly emerging. This means that even if some jobs are created, finding the people to fill these

vacancies can be a challenge. Nearly 40% of employers in the region indicate that skill gaps are a

major impediment to business growth. Across the region, high population growth rates with an

increasing proportion under the age of 30 will only mean more youth unemployment, unless

concrete and effective actions are urgently taken.

Enabling Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) needs to pick up.

SMEs are a

cornerstone of MENA economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses and providing a

major source of new job creation. Recognising the important role of SMEs in delivering inclusive

and youth targeted growth, governments are developing policies and strategies targeting SME

development. Progress, however, is slow and does not address the informal economy, which

represents a significant proportion of the private sector. Business entry into the formal sector is

low, and while many young people dream of starting their own businesses, the enabling

environment for doing so is only just beginning to evolve. Access to finance is a particular problem

for small and new businesses in the MENA countries; it is estimated that up to 8 million jobs could

be created if SMEs had easier access to finance.

Business environments not conducive to growth.

Heavy bureaucracy, high taxes, and the

hidden costs of corruption are disincentives to private sector growth. If it is too complicated and

costly to start and run a business, new entrepreneurs will rather avoid formalisation. While small

start-ups, often involving youth, are becoming increasingly common in the region, as they are in

the rest of the world, support to this sector is limited. Without the needed incentives for scaling

up of emerging and promising innovative businesses, opportunities are lost. At the macro scale,

slow implementation of anti-monopoly policies, ineffective market competition regulation, and

slow and insufficient structural reforms are additional impediments.

Human Rights and Inclusion

Signs of structural human rights improvements limited.

Promotion and protection of human

rights is a sensitive and difficult topic across the region, often characterised by limited meaningful

dialogue and cooperation between duty bearers and right holders. Governments insufficiently

committed to implementing international human rights obligations are stalling advances in the

field. Space for civil society is either shrinking or remains limited, particularly during the COVID-

19 pandemic, which has implications for youth-focused HROs and HRDs. These rights holders

need to be supported to voice the concerns of the region’s youngest generations, who remain

largely disenfranchised and frustrated as they see their human and individual rights disrespected.

National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) still struggle.

Present in various forms in all

DAPP countries, these national institutions hold the mandate to address the full range of human

rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural

rights and are integral to the countries’

human rights systems. Furthermore, NHRIs are generally only one of several public institutions

that together form the respective national Human Rights System. They vary significantly in their

historical legacies, institutional capacities, and the legal frameworks under which they operate. In

all DAPP countries, however, there is room for improvement including in the methodological

stringency of their human rights monitoring and reporting within their respective national context.

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/12/13/Enhancing-the-Role-of-SMEs-in-the-

Arab-World-Some-Key-Considerations-48873

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Violence, including Gender-based Violence (GBV), and torture remain widespread.

Physical and non-physical violence continues to be prevalent, and young people are subject to

arbitrary detentions, harassment, GBV, and torture. Furthermore, young people from minority

groups, particularly LGBT+ and faith-based minorities, are also often subject to harassment. This

erodes their trust and willingness to cooperate with authorities. Inadequate access to redress and

rehabilitation of victims of

violence and torture further diminishes youth’s access to a decent life.

Rectifying this situation is urgent but complicated, as the responsibility rests both with authorities

as well as within all levels of society.

Independent and diverse media under pressure.

According to the 2020 World Press Index,

DAPP countries were ranked as either being in a problematic situation (Tunisia), a difficult

situation (Morocco and Jordan), or in a very serious situation (Egypt). Independent media outlets

remain rare and critical journalists are under scrutiny by the authorities, at times resulting in

harassment and detentions. This limits engaged and critical voices across society, particularly

marginalised youth and minority groups. It also affects reporting on human rights violations,

leading to further frustrations.

Gender equality is still a long way off.

Across all four countries, there are similar patterns of

discrimination with respect to employment, property and inheritance rights, Sexual and

Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), and GBV. Young women and minority groups are

disproportionately impacted through limited access to adequate facilities. Feminist and gender

sensitive CSOs and civil society actors struggle to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers.

They lack the capacity to influence legislative reforms in support of enhanced gender equality and

women’s empowerment as well as to monitor whether legal advances are adequately implemented.

Constitutional and legislative progress on gender equality (in both Morocco and Tunisia)

must

be balanced against the real impediments to operationalisation of these legislative changes and

tangible benefits on the ground. Progress towards gender equality is hence slow.

And it is not just about women and girls.

In many areas of the world, and the MENA region

is no exception, gender equality is most often equated with a focus on women and girls. There is

still little effort and understanding on how to integrate men into the gender equality dialogue. It is

after all men, whose role in society, politics and in the home help to cement inequalities between

men and women. Similarly, with the exception of Tunisia, there is little, if any, traction on securing

equal rights for and acceptance of the LGBT+ community.

2.3 Opportunities

While it would be easy to conclude that the challenges faced by the MENA region and the DAPP

countries are overwhelming and that little can be done, the experience of the last two phases of

DAPP has clearly shown that much can be achieved and that there are many opportunities for

contributing to positive results.

Despite the turmoil in the region and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, the DAPP

countries are expected to continue having a relatively stable context for cooperation and

partnerships. The large youth population, interested, engaged, and eager to work for a better future

In Morocco, this includes a revised family law (2004), inclusion of gender equality in the 2011 constitution, and

more recently, a new law on domestic violence (2018). In Tunisia, women had a significant influence on the 2014

constitution. Further legal protection regarding violence against

women was reached in 2017 with the passing of ‘Law

no. 58’, representing a combination of

measures for prevention of violence and support for survivors.

According to the Global Gender Gap Index, which tracks the magnitude of gender-based disparities and their

progress over time, the DAPP countries rank as follows: Tunisia (124 out of 153), Egypt (134), Jordan (138) and

Morocco (143). Trends are worsening in Morocco and Tunisia, remain unchanged in Jordan, and are improving slightly

in Egypt.

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if given the opportunity, undoubtedly represents the single most important social and economic

development potential in the region. If engaged on their terms, the young can become important

agents for change and positive development. This, however, requires that they have some hope

for the future; that they see opportunities for jobs, for participating in political life and in

influencing the direction of their lives. In spite of the many challenges, there is a strong interest by

governments and other stakeholders in the DAPP countries to promote an inclusive socio-

economic agenda, one that considers youth, women, and all vulnerable groups. The opportunities

for DAPP to engage are there.

A post COVID-19 economic upturn.

COVID-19 has brought many MENA economies to their

knees. In a post COVID-19 scenario, macro-economic stimulus and revitalisation of the

economies is needed to put private sector growth back on a positive track in the DAPP countries.

Without private sector growth, there will not be an increase in jobs. Consequently, the need for

development financing from public and private financial institutions including FDIs is huge. The

ambitions of creating employment under the new DAPP rests on the assumption that an economic

upturn slowly starts already in 2022.

There are a number of entry points

–

young people are ready.

With respect to youth

employment, some young people already have the entrepreneurial spirit as well as the interest and

commitment to start their own businesses. Supporting the enabling environment to facilitate this

process would be an important first step. There are young entrepreneurs and small start-ups across

the region, but without access to new technology and due to low innovative capacities, their

abilities to realise their full potential is limited. Existing SMEs are also an important entry point

because they are so vital to the DAPP countries’ economy and have the potential to create many

jobs. However, they also need access to technical support, innovation and finance to grow. Formal

recognition of the critical importance of jobs, especially for the young, and commitment to a

prioritised agenda, as is the case in for example Morocco and Jordan,

are positive developments

that establish an important framework for targeted support at the policy level.

Human rights and inclusion

–

building on lessons learned and capturing the energy of

youth.

Steps towards improved human rights, gender equality, and reform have already been taken

in some of the DAPP countries. The previous DAPP phases have played their part, generating

important lessons learned and creating stepping stones towards further change under the new

DAPP. Openings exist to nudge progress in the right direction building on civil society, HROs,

and HRDs working on gender equality, human rights, free media, and torture prevention, and with

the engagement of more progressive parts of state apparatus empowered to deliver on the rights

enshrined in legislation. The energy of youth-led social movements challenging the political

decision makers and demanding better protection can be harnessed and built on.

There are good reasons for Denmark to be involved.

Denmark has a longstanding presence in

the region, developed through several DAPP phases. This presence has fostered well-established

cooperation between Danish and local civil society and, to some extent, public partners. The

lessons and experiences of the past provide a realistic and pragmatic starting point for developing

a new DAPP that builds on the opportunities and entry points described above. Denmark has a

comparative advantage given the expertise and high levels of specialisation of Danish NGOs that

have implemented programmes on human rights, violence and torture prevention, media freedom,

protection of minorities, and gender equality in former DAPP phases. It also has a high credibility

In Morocco, the King has recently established a commission of renowned experts to identify a new development

model for the country and has made employment generation a top priority. In Jordan, the government has a set of

policy reforms prioritised and sequenced to

deliver on the government’s priorities on jobs, youth,

and growth.

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and is perceived (along with other Nordic countries) to be ‘leading by example’ in DAPP-related

areas. Danish businesses have strong entrepreneurial spirit, technical know-how, and innovative

capacity that, if connected to the right partners, could generate significant mutual benefits. Civil

society and private sector actors in the DAPP countries are generally open and willing to engage

in international partnerships. This is both an important pre-requisite and entry point for

collaboration.

2.4 Danish political

considerations

priorities,

past

achievements,

and

strategic

DAPP is rooted in Danish foreign and development policies and promotes the strategic

development priorities

reflected in Denmark’s

new Strategy for Development Cooperation,

‘The

World We

Share’.

Addressing migration

is a key Danish policy priority. Denmark places great importance on

ensuring stability in the EU’s Southern

Neighbourhood, and the increasingly unsustainable

pressure from refugees and irregular migrants, which in the medium to long run risks

overwhelming several potential host countries in the region.

Denmark is focusing on identifying

new and sustainable approaches that can break down current barriers between long-term

development aid and short-term humanitarian efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian-

Development-Peace Nexus.

North Africa constitutes a particular Danish priority of ensuring

stability along the EU’s southern border. As North Africa is seen as a bulwark against migration,

Denmark is committed to strengthening bilateral relations with this region. Denmark’s

youth

focus

is tied to addressing the lack of prospects and opportunities

–

especially jobs

–

that cause

young people to leave their home countries. Denmark seeks to improve the living conditions in

the countries of origin and transfer, thus reducing the need for irregular migration, especially for

young people.

In support of this process, the priorities of DAPP

–

employment and human rights

–

aim to

address the root causes of migration.

Denmark continues to apply a

human rights-based approach

(HRBA) and the promotion of

gender equality,

including improving the rights of women and girls. Denmark also supports the

FoRB agenda considering relevant international frameworks such as the Marrakesh Declaration

on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities and the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, Denmark has placed

particular emphasis on collaboration with and inclusion of young people and youth-led

organisations.

This emphasis is in recognition of youth disenfranchisement and lack of

opportunity to participate as active members of society cause frustration and anger and can lead

to radicalisation.

DAPP is built around these principles, and prioritises efforts to promote human rights,

democracy, the rule of law, and gender equality and to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society.

Denmark seeks to raise

global climate ambitions

by promoting international climate

cooperation and using strategic partnerships to move the green agenda forward, including for

North Africa. A particular focus will be on the creation of sustainable and green solutions and the

The World We Share (20212025),

Denmark’s new Strategy for Development Cooperation approved in 2021.

The

new strategy maintains the focus on preventing and combating poverty and inequality, fragility, and conflict and

displacement and irregular migration among others through strengthened efforts in neighboring areas and in fragile

countries and regions. It also places an increased emphasis on global efforts to address climate change, protect nature

and ensure environmental sustainability and on ensuring democratic principles and human rights for all.

The Four-Year Plan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Four-Year Plan of the Minister for Development Cooperation.

The World We Share 20212025.

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creation of green jobs

as part of the overall transition to more sustainable economies.

DAPP will

support this agenda through the focus on green growth when the latter presents a potential for job creation.

Denmark’s development cooperation seeks to

achieve the SDGs

by 2030.

DAPP prioritizes SDGs

related to good health and well-being (SDG 3), quality education

–

lifelong learning opportunities (SDG 4), gender

equality (SDG 5), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16).

The achievements and lessons learned from the previous DAPP phases, combined with the Danish

policy priorities described above, have been instrumental in informing the narrative and contents

of the new DAPP, which include:

(1) A stronger focus on addressing the social, economic, and human rights causes of

migration.

While these themes are being addressed in previous phases, the focus has been quite

broad, resulting in diluted and scattered efforts and less tangible results. The new DAPP will

therefore seek to establish more direct links to what drives migration and identify how this can be

more effectively targeted and measured.

(2) A more focused and streamlined programme.

There will be two programmes as opposed

to the previous six;

one programme on youth employment and entrepreneurship and a second

on human rights and inclusion. Both of these programmes will involve public tenders, as under

the previous DAPP.

(3) Fewer implementing organisations will be included.

The large number of partners,

including the many smaller NGOs, under the previous DAPP has resulted in many scattered

interventions and has been difficult to manage effectively. Moreover, it has been challenging to

measure results and benefits of some partner activities. The African Development Bank and the

Youth Innovation Grant Facility will no longer be supported.

(4) Regional efforts will be significantly reduced,

as they have not yielded the results expected

under the previous DAPP. The new DAPP will rather focus efforts at the individual country level,

where better results can be demonstrated. However, a maximum of up to 10% of both programme

budgets may be used for regional activities, if they add value to activities at the national level.

(5) Funds will be available to accelerate successful activities, to promote innovation and

ensure flexibility.

The two DAPP funds

–

Acceleration Fund and Innovation Fund

–

are in line

with the principles of Doing Development Differently and adaptive management.

(6) The focus on job creation will be increased and extended to include growth and job

creation in small and medium-sized enterprises.

This is in response to the challenge of youth

unemployment in the DAPP countries, the significant role SMEs play in the economy and in

relation to employment, and the available opportunities to support SMEs in the DAPP countries.

(7) Support to human rights defenders will be more focused; fewer and larger organisations

are expected to be involved.

Work with human rights defenders has previously been very broad

at both regional and national levels, resulting in the desired results being difficult to trace and

document. Support to HRDs under the new DAPP will be more focused by: i) selecting local

partner organisations that involve youth directly and/or have youth as a specific target group; ii)

DAPP will focus on green growth, green jobs and cooperation with the private sector on green solutions, in line

with the priorities outlined

in ‘The World We Share’.

These are called engagements under DAPP 20172022 but will now be called

‘programmes’ in line with Danida’s

revised

‘Aid

Management Guidelines for Country Strategic Frameworks, Programmes and Projects’

(2020).

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defining clearer and easier-to-measure targets; iii) reducing support to regional activities; and iv)

involving fewer implementing partner organisations.

(8) There will be a focus on strengthening dialogue and trust between all stakeholders in

the human rights system.

Under the previous DAPP, the systemic approach to human rights

involving a broad range of stakeholders in the human rights system was not strongly adhered to.

The new DAPP will increase efforts in engaging state institutions

–

with their human rights

responsibilities

–

to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between them and HROs/HRDs

claiming their rights. These efforts will contribute to widening the space for civil society and active

citizenship not least for young people as agents of change. Efforts will be carefully adjusted to the

specific opportunities of the human rights system in each DAPP country.

(9) The FoRB agenda will be pursued according to a human rights-based approach.

This

will entail work by HROs and HRDs with and for young people as well as youth groups belonging

to faith-based minorities.

(10) Algeria still under consideration.

Under the previous DAPP, Algeria was a pilot country

with a budget of DKK 28 million. Three Danish partners started preparatory activities in Algeria

in support of human rights, free media, and labour unions most of which were put on hold due to

COVID-19. Resumption of some of these activities as well as options for expansion of activities

under the Youth Employment Programme to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase.

2.5 Danish engagements in the region

Denmark engages in the MENA region through several different modalities, aimed at supporting

Danish policy objectives. Although not directly linked to these, DAPP will contribute to furthering

Danish efforts where it makes sense and is practicable to do so.

Within the area of

migration/ border security and humanitarian assistance,

Denmark is a key

contributor to the

Multi Trust Fund for Migration

and provides support to the

International Labour

Organisation’s

regional project on modernising apprenticeships, development of skills for green

transitions, and addressing challenges linked to migration in Africa, which includes Morocco. In

the area of border support, Denmark funds activities on

integrated border management

in the southern

region of Tunisia (DKK 26 million) to establish a training centre and provide education material

and plans for Tunisian border authorities. The

Multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection

Programme,

to which Denmark is a key contributor and which includes Jordan (DKK 215 million),

comprises support to i) livelihoods, ii) protection, and iii) research and advocacy. Priorities for

selection of partnerships are the engagement principles of the humanitarian-development nexus,

innovation, and localisation. The

Global Concessional Financing Facility

receives DKK 70 million (until

2023) to improve social service delivery, economic opportunities, and improved access to and

quality of infrastructure for host and refugee populations in Jordan. Strengthening of the Jordanian

health services through DKK 60 million (until 2023) to the

Joint Health Fund for Refugees

aims to

improve capacity to deliver primary and secondary health services as well as increase the utilisation

of services by Syrian refugees. The

EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis

(the Madad

Fund, in Jordan) receives DKK 100 million (until end 2021) to support a range of activities

targeting Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities. Finally, Denmark has been

implementing the

Better Work Programme

(2018-2022, DKK 20 million) in a number of countries,

including Jordan, which focuses on ensuring inclusive, sustainable growth, youth empowerment,

and gender equality through improvements in working conditions in factories, business

competitiveness, active and effectively functioning worker-management committees, and a

stronger representation of women in social dialogue. This programme is set to end in 2022.

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Within the areas of

green growth, renewable energy and environment,

Denmark provides

support to development projects in North Africa (DKK 200 million) to further strengthen Danish

engagement in the region. Commencing in 2021, support will focus on enhancing the

COVID-19

response,

strengthening

green growth initiatives,

and

climate change mitigation.

There is an obvious scope

for cooperation with DAPP on green growth and job creation.

In Egypt, the ‘Partnering with

Denmark’

initiative includes Strategic Sector Cooperation on

renewable energy

and involvement of

the Danish Energy Authority. In Morocco, there is Strategic Sector Cooperation on

reliable data

sources to facilitate transparent and knowledge-based decisions

between Statistics Denmark and the

Moroccan statistics institution, HCP (DKK 9.5 million). Also in Morocco, a one-year inception

project is currently underway under the Strategic Sector Cooperation to assess assistance in the

area of

water governance and water management

as well as water and waste water services. Denmark also

supports UN agencies and strategic NGO partners in Jordan, including UNFPA’s engagement in

the region through the regional office in Amman.

Alignment with donors and NGOs

In line with the DDD principles, the new DAPP will adopt a holistic approach for all activities.

This will include, inter alia, alignment and coordination with other Danish-funded civil society

engagements as well as like-minded donors in the MENA region, including the EU, where relevant,

to upscale efforts.

While DAPP will consist of two thematic programmes implemented by strategic partners (to be

chosen based on public tenders), the programmes will, when relevant, align their activities with

other forms of Danish civil society support such as the

Strategic Partnerships Agreements

for

Danish civil society organisations initiated in 2018 and managed by the MFA’s Department for

Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Engagement (HCE). Such alignment will be particularly

relevant should the DAPP partners also be among those organisations receiving funds through a

Strategic Partnership Agreement.

The EU cooperation with its Southern Neighbourhood takes place within the framework of the

European Neighbourhood Policy

(ENP) and includes the four DAPP countries. ENP has a

suite of programmes including on good governance, socio-economic development, and migration.

Job creation

is a priority shared by other bilateral donors and development banks in the MENA

region, including ENP, which has had some success in previous engagements such as start-ups

and entrepreneurships. In the area of

human rights and inclusion,

alignment with the ENP could add

value to the duty-bearer agenda, based on the ENP’s

unique toolbox and possibility to create

dialogue with duty bearers. It could also strengthen the strategic human rights agenda and its policy

elements, including the human rights dialogue with the DAPP countries. On work with

civil society,

alignment and cooperation would most likely be with like-minded donors and large NGOs, the

key focus being partnerships with those who can demonstrate niche advantages and comparative

values. To ensure synergy and avoid duplication of efforts, DAPP will always align with relevant

donors and others, though this will be based on a careful assessment of specific value-added

opportunities at the country level, to minimise transaction costs. Partnerships priorities within the

EU’s Southern Neighbourhood are under renewal for the period 2021-2027 and the nature of

these are still to be decided. Possible cooperation between ENP and DAPP will be clarified in

2022 before the new DAPP phase commences.

There has been successful bilateral cooperation with

like-minded donors

in previous DAPP

phases and this will continue and be further enhanced under the new DAPP, where such

cooperation can add value. In terms of strategic cooperation and supplementary donor funding

that can multiply the impacts of and/or scale up the two programmes, DAPP is aligned with the

priorities of a number of international (both multilateral and bilateral) donors. Consultations with

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a number of these point to a mutual interest in strategic cooperation. The form that this

cooperation will take will depend on the particular scope of the individual country engagements

(specifically, at partner and project level). As regards

job creation and entrepreneurship

for young people,

DAPP priorities align with a variety of stakeholders including the World Bank, ILO, EU partners

such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands as well as the UK, the US and Canada. For

human

rights and inclusion,

DAPP is aligned with priorities of donors such as the US, UK, Sweden,

Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the Council of Europe.

3 Vision and strategic objective

The vision of the new Danish Arab Partnership Programme is:

A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa

DAPP considers that every young person is entitled to having a decent and meaningful job,

individual freedom, and the opportunity to participate as an active member of society, free from

violence, torture, and harassment.

DAPP recognises youth as central to the demographics of migration.

Youth are driven to

migrate because they are dissatisfied with the living conditions in their countries, the lack of

meaningful and decent employment especially for college and university graduates, exclusion from

decision-making processes, dissatisfaction with democratic and governance institutions, and lack

of individual freedoms. Unfulfilled life-ambitions among young people often translate into

frustration, anger, protests, and ultimately migration. The result, especially when the educated

leave, is a brain-drain and loss of development potential. The young should not be driven to

migrate because they have no hope for the future. While the question of what drives migration is

the subject of much analytical and strategic debate among researchers and experts, there is some

agreement that the lack of decent and promising jobs, constrained human rights, and exclusion

from active citizenship are some of the underlying conditions playing a key role in driving

migration.

Observers and experts point to efforts comprising a broad set of interventions as the

best approach to reducing migration, and this is the approach adopted by the new DAPP.

DAPP seeks to address the root causes and drivers of migration

by creating better lives for

young people. The set of problems faced by youth in the MENA region will be addressed through

programmes for support to human rights, inclusion (including gender equality), active citizenship,

and employment generation.

Youth is the target group of the new phase of DAPP.

Overall, the programme targets mainly

young women and men from 15 to 35 years. It is recognised that there are different categorisations

of youth among countries and international donors, such as the UN that defines youth as 15 to24

years. The youth target group is obviously diverse, and the categories of youth targeted by the

programme will have multiple levels of capacity, challenges, and needs according to gender,

education, location, class, and age sub-groups as well as varying ambitions. DAPP will therefore

address different subsections of youth, and college and university graduates will be one of the

priority target sub-groups. This youth subgroup is large in the middle-income DAPP countries,

where around a third of the population has been enrolled in tertiary education, and profoundly

aware of their limitations in terms of lack jobs matching their skills and education, inclusion as

https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/

and

https://www.kas.de/en/single-title/-/content/10-years-after-the-arab-

uprisings-where-does-public-opinion-in-the-region-stand-today-2

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equal citizens, and democratic participation. This sub-group has a strong potential to engage in

human rights work and active citizenship under the new DAPP. They are also obvious candidates

for digital and technology-related jobs requiring technical and academic skills.

DAPP will continue to be founded on strategic partnerships.

This will include institutions

and organisations, experienced in the MENA region and DAPP countries and able to deliver

Danish value policy, innovation, and know-how. The current model of partnerships between

DAPP implementing partners and local organisations in the DAPP countries, primarily CSOs, has

yielded good results and will be continued. Strategic partnerships between these organisations will

continue to have a dialogue component involving professional cooperation and

‘people-to-people

exchange’

with DAPP countries.

DAPP implements the key principles of Doing Development Differently.

DDD comprises

two main strands to strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development

cooperation: i) reinforcing the holistic approach; and ii) introducing an adaptive approach with an

increased emphasis on learning. DAPP implements adaptive learning and adaptive implementation

according to context, underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and

DAPP implementing partners. Throughout the five-year period, DAPP will seize strategic

opportunities, build on a realistic understanding of where the partners are in the development

process, and seek tangible results, in other words, doing what makes the most sense and learning

from what does not work. To help in operationalising the adaptive approach, DAPP will include

two special funds, one to

accelerate

activities where things are going well, and a second to support

innovation,

where this is deemed to be strategic and necessary. These funds will be allocated

depending on need and opportunity. High level DAPP strategic monitoring will inform the

adaptive management process, and DAPP will ensure that all partners have the necessary

management set-up and Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) system to

ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure

complementarity between the interventions.

3.1

DAPP’s Strategic

Objectives

DAPP will have one overall strategic objective and two strategic programme objectives.

DAPP’s

overall strategic objective is:

Youth have better opportunities for employment and civic/human rights engagement

–

thus more likely to create a future in their own countries and less likely to migrate

Figure 1: Theory of Change for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme 20222027

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The following section unfolds these objectives and describes the main pathways that DAPP will

pursue towards achieving the strategic objectives.

3.2 Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

Objective:

Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise development

To achieve the objective, the Youth Employment Programme will target two distinct groups of

young people: A) those who are aware of opportunities for self-employment and might have

experience with entrepreneurship and starting a business; and B) young people in search of

employment opportunities who have limited exposure to the labour market and lack the necessary

skills that match employer’s needs. A third entry point, by far the most important in terms of

number of potential new jobs, are C) SMEs. Success in creating jobs for youth in SMEs will mean

success for the programme. The programme will have a particular focus on promoting SDG 4 on

inclusive and equitable quality education, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 8 on decent work

and economic growth in the four DAPP countries.

Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Programme on Youth Employment and

Entrepreneurship

The recognition of meaningful employment as essential to an individual’s well-being

is at the core

of the Youth Employment Programme, and in this sense, it also supports the human rights and

inclusion SDG agenda in the four DAPP countries. The starting point for job creation is to strive

towards decent jobs for all. However, considering the context, employment created will from the

outset not necessarily be

decent jobs

all

aspects as defined by the International Labour

Organisation (ILO). The Programme will however throughout the five-year programme period

and through targeted interventions work to a transition towards better and more secure

employment, and the decent work agenda.

The programme envisions three different pathways of transformations to achieve its goals,

corresponding to the target groups/entry points described above.

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The

first pathway (A)

will focus on giving individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit the

opportunity to influence their own future. These youth need to acquire better skills, ranging from

life skills

to more

technical skills,

and they will receive mentoring services and support to take

responsibility for their own career path and to get their commercial/business ideas kick-started.

Already established entrepreneurs will not be forgotten; they will also get the business development

service support they need to help ensure a more conducive business environment. Through these

interventions,

the individual entrepreneur is expected to have a more stable and possibly higher income but also

that she/he might be able to employ others in the business, thereby contributing to job creation.

The

second pathway (B)

takes as a starting point in the considerable mismatch between demand

and supply in the labour markets both in terms of number of jobs and of skills. To be integrated

in the labour market, youth first need to be engaged and included. For some youth, their starting

point will be low capacity, little education, and minimal stable employment experience. Others may

have some level of education and experience from different types of employment but no success

in finding employment where their skills meet the demand of possible employers. This pathway

recognises that

youth need to become more attractive in the labour market and the skills gap be closed.

The

third pathway (C)

works through already established SMEs, supporting their growth paths

to stimulate job creation in the enterprises. Technical assistance, business development services,

mentoring support, and access to finance will ensure that SMEs are able to innovate, explore new

markets,

increase their productivity and competitiveness, and ultimately expand their business, create jobs, and

employ more people.

The Youth Employment Programme has taken as a starting point the many important lessons

from the previous DAPP phases and used these to build a

more focused and targeted

programme.

Focused, in the sense of fewer and larger engagements but seeking to create a larger

number of jobs overall and adopting job creation as a common denominator across all outcomes.

Targeted, in the sense that interventions will be directed towards young women and men and

designed around a solid understanding of the characteristics of that target group, to enhance their

employability, entrepreneurship and access to finance. Interventions will also be more directly

related to preserving and/or creating new jobs to reach young women and men at a larger scale.

This has led to a stronger focus on

employment and growth in the private sector

and to the

introduction of a new private sector intervention area on

SME development

to harness their

significant job creation potential. At the same time, the programme will seek implementation

modalities that foster stronger and more institutionalised linkages between different job creation

interventions.

Funding is set aside in the budget for

‘acceleration’

of selected activities, which ensures that

successful interventions and activities can access additional funding to further accelerate their

results. It could be to replicate successful activities from one DAPP country in another or

facilitating crowding-in of other stakeholders taking on board approaches and methodologies

developed to further scale. Furthermore, the acceleration funding could support the addition of

new elements to successful DAPP initiatives with potential wider impact at sector and national

level.

Partnerships

will continue to be an important implementation modality, and the engagement of

a variety of organisations, including Danish enterprises, is foreseen, the latter with a view to

identifying commercial opportunities in the region with the ultimate aim of developing further

economic activities, growth and more job creation.

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Three outcomes corresponding to three projects will contribute to achieving the strategic

programme objective:

Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment

Project 1 Outcome:

Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship

The Youth Inclusion and Employment Project focuses on enabling that young people are inspired

and included in economic life. Both youth target groups A and B (upcoming entrepreneurs and

youth in search of employment) are targeted in this outcome. For the first group, they will be

supported through building of life skills and inclusion into relevant business ecosystems to

establish themselves as entrepreneurs and make a living by bringing their ideas to life. For the

second group, the youth will build their technical skills to ensure that they have the qualifications

needed in the labour market. All of this will aim at ensuring that their employability is enhanced

as the same time as their own capacity to secure a job is enhanced.

Project 1 will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one organisation or a consortium of

organisations implementing activities in partnership with local organisations in the DAPP

countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender further described in section 5.1.

Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator

Project 2 Outcome:

SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling of

existing solutions

The Green Growth and Job Accelerator Project focuses on existing SMEs. For youth to get a job

outside the public sector, jobs need to be created in enterprises. To address the challenges related

to lack of opportunities for already established entrepreneurs and SMEs in growing their business,

Green Growth and Job Accelerator Project facilities will be established in the countries. The

Accelerator facilities will be based on the proven concept by UNDP’s Nordic representation office

(UNDP Nordic). Under the new DAPP, the UNDP Accelerators will engage local (and Danish)

companies and work with them to support their efforts to innovate and grow through tailored

support in targeted time bound ‘business

innovation

journeys’. UNDP Nordic has developed an

innovative and adaptable methodology and has been successfully implementing similar Accelerator

concepts in a range of other countries and contexts. UNDP Nordic will engage closely with UNDP

country and regional offices as well as private service providers in the four countries. A key element

and value-driver of the proposed initiative is that it harnesses the various innovation and growth

ecosystems in Denmark, the MENA region and globally, into the Accelerators.

Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund

Project 3 Outcome:

SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and technical assistance

The Sharaka Capital Invesment Fund Project is also concerned with enterprise development but

takes another approach with a strong focus on ensuring that access to finance is available for SMEs

to facilitate their growth plans, expansion, and ultimately job creation, with a particular focus on

recruitment of youth. DAPP will engage with the Investment Fund for Developing Countries

(IFU), to strengthen access to finance for SMEs in the target countries. IFU will contribute by

capitalising the Sharaka Capital Fund (Sharaka) established by the Middle East Investment

Initiative (MEII), a US-based NGO. Sharaka will provide loan capital to SMEs combined with

Technical Assistance. Sharaka is IFU’s selected capital fund mechanism for the MENA region.

Other donors including Sweden has successfully used Sharaka as financing mechanism for enterprise development

in the region.

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The three projects, supporting the three pathways, will be facilitated through crosscutting activities

aimed at strengthening i) the framework conditions for start-ups and entrepreneurs

and women’s

participation in the labour market; ii) the business environment for and business conduct among

participating enterprises; iii) the labour market regulations and social dialogue; and iv) adherence

to the United Nations Principles on Business and Human Rights. This crosscutting support will

be part of the responsibilities of the Contractor for Project 1, to be selected through a public tender

process, and will be coordinated with Project 2 (UNDP Nordic) and Project 3 (IFU).

3.3 Human Rights and Inclusion

Objective:

Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth enhanced

The programme will continue to follow a human rights-based approach (HRBA) as conceptually

defined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG).

Accordingly, the

programme will support developing the capacities of both duty bearers (state and public

institutions) to meet their obligations and rights holders (HRDs/HROs, civil society) to claim their

rights. The objective includes youth as a particular target group. Merging all elements of human

rights, the new DAPP envisions a systemic approach to human rights supporting greater linkages

and facilitating dialogue between all human rights stakeholders in the human rights system

–

public

and private, youth and minority groups

–

with the purpose of

strengthening the social contract

between

duty bearers and rights holders.

As a certain degree of authoritarianism continues to prevail in some of

the DAPP countries, the systemic approach will be carefully adjusted to the specific conditions in

each country to minimise the potential dichotomy and tension between duty bearers and rights

holders, while also keeping in mind the vulnerability of rights holders. The programme will have a

particular focus on promoting SDG 3 on good health and well-being, SDG 5 on gender equality,

and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions in the four DAPP countries.

Figure 3: Theory of Change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion

https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/human-rights-based-approach

Defined as ‘an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits’ (Oxford

dictionary definition).

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The programme will take its point of departure from the pathways for change established under

the previous DAPP 2017-2022. However, with a stronger systemic approach and with youth as a

target group, pathways will take new turns. The

overall pathway

involves a journey of addressing

and engaging youth through the support portfolio of the programme: human rights, prevention of

violence and torture, free media, and gender equality. The journey involves

two specific pathways

of engagement with/support to both duty bearers and rights holders. It then moves on to

supporting dialogues and interlinkages between all stakeholders in the human rights system

focusing on strengthening trust and the social contract between duty bearers and especially youth

rights holders. A strengthened social contract is expected to create a larger space for youth

engagement and active citizenship thereby opening one of several pathways towards DAPP’s

vision of a better life for young people.

Duty Bearers pathway

This pathway will target the key stakeholders that are able to influence national governance

structures related to human rights issues of torture prevention, media freedom, protection of

minorities, and gender equality. These stakeholders range from NHRIs to ministerial offices and

other public institutions assigned to manage the human rights agenda. The pathway could also

include support to the development of National Human Rights Action Plans, supporting

improvements in human rights monitoring, reporting, and follow-up systems, and improving

access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence. The Human

Rights Programme will also work to enhance duty bearers’ capacity to promote inclusive civic

spaces and dialogues with various youth organisations and sub-groups.

Rights Holders pathway

This pathway involves capacity building and technical support to CSOs, media outlets, and

HROs/HRDs as well as minority groups (including LGBT+ and faith-based) and youth groups

experiencing

violations of their human rights. The rights holders’ pathway will include mobilisation

and targeted support to youth groups and youth movements enabling their participation in civil

society’s engagement with duty bearers on human rights issues.

This will also entail inter alia

initiatives that engage youth as active citizens and enable them to advocate for their rights.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme builds on the good results achieved under the

previous DAPP and has been informed by the important lessons learned.

The programme will adhere to some important guiding principles. It adopts

a more systemic

approach,

aimed at strengthening the linkages between multiple sets of stakeholders including

duty bearers and youth rights holders

–

bringing all stakeholders into one Human Rights System.

Spaces, civic engagement and partnerships

are key elements for linking duty bearers and youth

rights holders subject to the scope for doing so in each DAPP-country. The programme will build

on existing opportunities and pathways for youth HROs and HRDs to

engage and participate

in civic spaces, media, and government spaces for dialogue. Implementing partners will be

expected to identify and create opportunities for engaging less vocal or less empowered youth

groups, including those representing minorities and create new civic spaces and platforms to

ensure their voice and participation in the protection of their human rights. The rights of LGBT+

will receive particular attention. Likewise, the rights and inclusion of faith-based minorities will be

supported, where relevant, by interreligious dialogue at the community level, in villages, local urban

neighbourhoods, schools, universities and in the media

–

in other words, at the local level where

young people live their daily lives.

In practical terms, this means that the programme combines activities on human rights, prevention

of violence and torture, free media, and gender equality into

one joint programme with four

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outcomes.

The outcome areas are tailored

to the region’s challenging context with more

substantial interventions in fewer areas. Support to HROs/HRDs will be more focused involving

fewer organisations, targeting countries rather than regionally, and with youth as a target group.

Smaller initiatives for HRDs and regional cooperation are replaced with broader national

interventions. An increased focus on dialogue and trust implies increased efforts in engaging duty-

bearers with rights holders. These efforts will engage youth as active citizens and agents of change.

Four outcomes will contribute to achieving the strategic programme objective:

Outcome 1: Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach

Activities under this outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach where the various duty

bearers and rights holders, with each their mandates in the human rights system, are contributing

to the same objective, namely to protect and promote human rights with an inclusion of youth. It

will aim at gradually strengthening the social contract between rights holders and duty bearers and

creating space for youth to engage as active citizens. This entails strengthening the capacity of

reform agents within authorities that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights.

Focus will be on: i) creating networks and alliances to enhance reform efforts across human rights

areas addressed in this Programme; ii) the mobilisation of various youth groups and movements;

iii) NHRI reporting on human rights; and iv) strengthening the overall engagement and

responsiveness of NHRIs and other public institutions in dialogues with youth-focused

HROs/HRDs and representatives of minority groups.

Implementation of Outcome 1 will involve considerable resources and efforts through the

involvement of a multitude of rights holders (HROs/HRDs, CSOs, youth movements and

organisations, etc.) and duty bearers (NHRIs and other public institutions including ministries,

government agencies, municipalities, etc.). This implies that the partner(s) will need to work in a

collaborative and integrative manner, meaning that all take active part in implementing the

activities in support of Outcome 1.

Outcome 2: Prevention of violence and torture

With a focus on youth, interventions will promote legislative reforms as well as strengthen the

capacity of rights holders to engage with duty bearers to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce

preventive measures for violence. Interventions will target the capacity development of duty

bearers in order to strengthen legal frameworks, initiate necessary reforms, and change practices

with the aim of preventing torture, GBV, and violence against minorities. Furthermore,

interventions will seek to provide space for dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders and

to enhance the ability of civil society to document cases and conduct advocacy on torture

prevention, GBV, and violence against minority groups. Interventions will also seek to ensure

redress, rehabilitation, and treatment for victims of torture and violence.

Outcome 3: Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media

Interventions under this outcome will seek to improve framework conditions for independent

media as well as to ensure the safety of journalists and young media activists. This will be achieved

through dialogue between media outlets, civil society, and government bodies prioritising

mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms. Working closely with young journalists, the

capacity of media outlets and the content they produce will be improved. Similarly, the capacity of

media partners to include youth rights holders, particularly from geographically marginalised areas,

in the public debate and to report on violations of human rights will be strengthened. This includes

issues pertaining to gender equality, torture, GBV as well as LGBT+, FoRB, and other minority

groups.

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Outcome 4: Improvement of gender equality

While as a mainstreaming effort there are gender equality interventions under all four outcomes,

activities under this outcome will aim at legal and institutional reforms improving representation,

recognition, and equal access to resources. Capacity development will focus on enhancing the

ability of duty bearers and young rights holders to promote, enforce, monitor, and raise awareness

on gender equality and non-discrimination. This includes reinforcing the capacity of rights holders

to advocate duty bearers on legislative reform as well as to monitor and report on the

implementation of legislation. Particular focus will be on i) access to Sexual and Reproductive

Health and Rights (SRHR) particularly for youth, ii) equal participation of young men and women

in political life, iii) reducing GBV including prevention of domestic violence and enhancing the

protection of victims of violence and iv) civic engagement on gender equality and combatting

gender stereotypes, including in the media.

The overall budget distribution between activities with duty bearers and rights holders in estimated

to be 70% in support of rights holders and 30% in support of duty bearers.

Funding is also set aside (DKK 90 million) for a Special Support Budget to procure specialised

expertise not covered by the main implementing partners such as, possibly work with minority

groups (LGBT+ and faith-based organisations), SRHR, as well as specialised inputs by HRDs.

Acceleration funds will be used to accelerate and upscale particularly successful interventions and

activities within the programme across all outcomes.

The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme will be tendered through an open tender procedure,

like the tender for engagements under the previous DAPP. A partner or consortium of partners

will implement the programme. Hence, the partner(s) will first be known after completion of the

tender.

The Human Rights Programme will be implemented by a Contractor consisting of one

organisation or a consortium of organisations implementing activities in partnership with local

organisations in the DAPP countries. The Contractor will be selected through a public tender

further described in section 5.1.

3.4 Additional support initiatives

In addition to the two programmes described above, funding will be provided for complementary

initiatives that will contribute to achieving the overall DAPP strategic objective.

Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative

The Danish Egyptian Dialogue Initiative (DEDI) was established in 2004 to promote relationship

building between Denmark and Egypt through dialogue and partnership projects. As of 2019,

DEDI is supported by a bilateral agreement between the two countries (their respective ministries

of foreign affairs) under the 1972 Danish-Egyptian cooperation agreement on culture. DEDI has

a Danish-Egyptian governing board with alternating Danish-Egyptian chairs. DEDI generates an

element of political goodwill and diplomatic opening of doors in a strategically important region.

DEDI facilitates a unique space for dialogue between Egyptians and Danes including officials and

civil society stakeholders on DAPP related areas in an otherwise challenging context. DEDI has

been receiving funding over the past two DAPP phases with dialogue activities in the areas of civic

participation, culture, and media.

DEDI has submitted a new draft strategy 2022-2027 that emphasises partnerships and dialogue

activities with governmental, civil society, and private sector organisations in Denmark and Egypt.

Activities will be organised under the current programmes of civic participation, culture, and

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media. The development objective of the interventions is to increase the capabilities of youth and

women to assume their roles as active and responsible, global citizens, and agents of change as

well as their employability. This objective aligns well with the overall DAPP objectives. Public

meetings, called DEDI ‘Talk and Events’, will profile DEDI projects and Danish-Egyptian

cooperation. DEDI will also continue to act as implementing partner for some Danish NGOs.

The draft strategy assumes a budget of DKK 30 million.

Once approved, the draft strategy will lead to the development of a detailed proposal (programme

document) for DEDI’s activity portfolio 20222027.

The proposal will be developed according to

Danida’s

Aid Management Guidelines. The proposal will present a justification for the proposed

thematic intervention areas well as activity-based budgets, results frameworks, and a risk matrix.

The proposal will be subject to an appraisal by the MENA Department in the fourth quarter of

2021. The appraisal will also decide on the future legal status of DEDI to align with MFA rules

and guidelines. To ensure the sustainability of DEDI, options for an organisational and financial

setup for DEDI in the future will be further explored during the programme implementation.

Seconded National Expert

The previous phase of DAPP comprised funding of

Seconded National Experts (SNEs)

to the

EU. While the presence of a SNE in the EU NEAR Directorate General will continue under the

new DAPP phase, the presence of SNEs in the DAPP countries will not be continued.

The total budget allocated will be

DKK 5 million.

The SNE will be funded at the European

Commission in Brussels. The SNE refers to the heads of department at the European

Commission. Key SNE functions include analysis and advice, networking, information as well as

communication and contribution to the ENP action plans.

Acceleration and innovation funds

To operationalise the adaptive management approach and ensure financial flexibility when

promising activities emerge meriting additional attention and support, DKK 150 million will be

set aside for two special funds. During the programme inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team

will prepare a strategic note on the use of the Acceleration and Innovation Funds, detailing the

requirements and criteria on the use of the funds. This strategic note will be updated during

implementation to reflect the actual use of the funds and changing circumstances, as relevant. Both

funds will be managed according to

Danida’s

Aid Management Guidelines.

Acceleration funds

(DKK

140 million)

will support upscaling and acceleration of successful

initiatives and activities on both thematic programmes (DKK 75 million and DKK 65 million to

the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes, respectively). Activities in Algeria may

also be considered for acceleration funding.

The implementing partners will manage these funds, which will be allocated based on decisions

made by MENA after an annual stocktaking in 2023, while the remaining funds will be allocated

after a mid-term review in 2024. In order to qualify as a recipient of acceleration funds, partners

must provide an initial justification that demonstrates the success of the initiative and why it is

likely to benefit from the acceleration funding, and if relevant backed up by a proposed change to

the Theory of Change. Furthermore, partners must submit a brief project description with a budget

to qualify for

a ‘no objection’ from

the MENA DAPP Team. The no objections will consider the

partner level of financial execution, progress in terms of results, and overall absorption and

financial management capacity.

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Innovation fund

(DKK

10 million)

will be provided across DAPP to fund innovative ideas and

approaches that promote young entrepreneurs (within the realm of both programmes) and that

underpin Denmark’s visibility in the region, including through the involvement of Danish

embassies covering the DAPP countries. The innovation fund can also be used in support of

synergy between the two programmes, or for the testing of new approaches for learning and

preparation of future phases. The MENA DAPP Team will manage these funds, which will be

allocated according to a defined set of criteria and requirements (cf. above) as well as decisions

taken during the annual stock-taking exercise.

Communication

Communication of results and learning from DAPP will reinforce the two programmes’ approach

to Doing Development Differently including adaptive learning. Moreover, sharing of information

about the ‘ins and outs’ of the programmes

will be important in ensuring that young people in

MENA countries are made aware of the opportunities that exist in their own countries for a better

life, thereby reducing their incentives to emigrate. Visibility of DAPP results will also support

Danish public diplomacy and help to create awareness of Denmark’s

engagement partners in the

region as well as in Denmark.

Under the previous DAPP, DAPPCOM was responsible for providing technical support on

communication to the MENA DAPP Team. DAPPCOM is a dedicated unit located at the Danish

Institute for International Studies (DIIS) with two professional staff producing communication

for a variety of media including SoMe, newspapers, films, and podcasts. DAPPCOM also arranges

seminars and events as well as produce education materials for secondary schools. Its location at

DIIS was intended to create synergy with the Middle East and North Africa knowledge bank

driven by DIIS researchers and joint organisation of MENA and DAPP-related public events.

The Communication Unit (COM) for the new DAPP will be tendered. In addition, the MENA

DAPP Team will be directly responsible for special thematic events with a strategic foreign policy

and development policy orientation. The Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning

(MEAL) Unit (see below section 5.2) will also be assigned some communication tasks such as on

lessons learned, publication of annual reports, and impact studies. The COM Unit will cooperate

closely with the MEAL Unit, further described below.

The MENA DAPP Team will manage overall communication planning, meaning that COM and

MEAL Units’

communication activities will be implemented based on annual plans. The total

budget allocated for communication will be DKK 14 million.

3.5 Overall budget

The summary budget for the programme is presented in Table 1.

In the Danish Finance Act for 2022 and henceforth, the total allocation of DKK 1 billion for the

new DAPP will count as stakes from migration, neighbourhoods and fragile states. Of the total

DKK 1 billion, the largest portion of the budget (89,5%) is allocated to the two programmes. It is

foreseen that the budget allocated to the four DAPP countries under each programme will vary,

and the final allocation for each country will be subject to approval by the MENA DAPP Team.

Options for a potential expansion of activities to Algeria will be decided during the inception

phase.

To support the principles of adaptive management and ensure funds for this, 15% (DKK 150

million) is set aside for the acceleration and innovation funds. Since the programme is subject to

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annual appropriation in the Finance Act, the total budget is by nature an estimate, and the annual

figures (presented in the detailed budget, Annex 3) are estimates only.

Table 1 DAPP budget 2022 -2027 (DKK)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION

Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights

Outcome 2: Prevention of Torture and Violence

Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media

Outcome 4: Gender Equality

Special Support Budget

Acceleration Fund

Programme Secretariat

EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment (Tender)

Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator (UNDP)

Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund (IFU)

Acceleration Fund

Programme Secretariat

INNOVATION FUND

MEAL

COMMUNICATION

REVIEWS

SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT

DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE

UNALLOCATED

GRAND TOTAL

460 million

75 million

70 million

90 million

65 million

15 million

435 million

205 million

65 million

75 million

15 million

10 million

30 million

14 million

6 million

5 million

30 million

10 million

1,000 million

4 Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL)

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning

(MEAL) principles,

and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for

maintaining a comprehensive overview of the programme progress towards achieving outcomes

and impacts. Monitoring will be implemented at two levels,

programme results-based

monitoring

(at the programme level, for each of the two programmes) and

strategic monitoring

(at the DAPP strategic level).

Programme results-based monitoring

will provide the information needed to assess whether

programme performance is as expected. The focus will be on measuring the progress towards

achieving outputs and outcomes and will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of

monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators

defined for each programme. Programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by the

These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for

adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both

positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

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Programme Secretariats (see Figure 4 illustrating the programme organisation and management

structure). Under each programme, a designated Team Leader and a Programme Coordinator will

be responsible for managing programme results-based monitoring, assisted by a Monitoring

Officer, and a Controller.

Strategic monitoring

will provide the information and analysis needed for strategic level decision-

making by the MENA DAPP Team. The strategic level is where changes to context and overall

risks will be monitored, and it will also include special studies providing further insight into DAPP

outcomes and strategic objectives, for example related to the programme’s impact on migration.

It will be instrumental in supporting adaptive management and maintain a more holistic overview

of the programmes, thus guiding adjustment of interventions for better results or greater impact.

Strategic monitoring will also include financial management and implementation of finance-related

studies such as value-for-money assessments, as needed. The programme’s results-based

monitoring provided by the two programme secretariats, and specifically the outcome-level

progress monitoring, will provide important inputs to the strategic level monitoring.

The MENA DAPP Team will be responsible for strategic monitoring, supported by an external

MEAL Unit to be procured through an open tender. The MEAL Unit will be a crucial link between

the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations

and the MENA Department’s

oversight function. Further details on the MEAL Unit are provided in section 5.2.

Coordination

between the two levels of monitoring will take place through, inter alia, joint annual

work planning and regular M&E coordinating meetings between the two Programme Secretariats,

the MENA DAPP Team, and the MEAL Unit. Close coordination between the two levels of

monitoring will be important in ensuring that the inputs provided from the programmes are

sufficient to meet strategic level monitoring requirements, and that the strategic needs are also

clearly defined and understood at the programme level.

DAPP will produce an annual summary progress report (stocktaking) for the Council for

Development Policy (UPR) on key results and progress towards achieving outcomes and strategic

objectives. Progress will be measured against baseline conditions established during the

programme’s

inception

phase. Decisions on the allocation of the innovation and acceleration funds

will take place during the annual stock-taking exercises. In line with

Danida’s

Aid Management

Guidelines, a more in-depth midterm review will be carried out two and a half year into the

programme.

The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations will be developed

as part of the tender proposals for the two programmes (programme results-based monitoring)

and for the MEAL Unit (strategic monitoring), respectively, and will be further refined during the

six months inception phase. This is expected to include approaches such as outcome harvesting

and context related impact monitoring.

5 Overall management arrangements

5.1 Organisation

The overall programme management arrangements (including the MEAL Unit) are illustrated in

the figure below.

The DDD approach entails a programme design where space is created for adaptive and iterative processes leading

to adjustment of the intervention logic over time.

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Figure 4: Overall Programme organisation and Management Structure for DAPP 2022-

2027

The MENA Department

has the overall management responsibility for DAPP. A dedicated

MENA DAPP Team

is responsible for setting strategic direction, monitoring risks, maintaining

strategic dialogue, coordinating with partners of the two programmes, and taking day-to-day

decisions on regional and country level aspects of programme implementation. The MENA DAPP

Team is headed by a Team Leader, assisted by a desk officer and a Chief Technical Adviser. The

MENA DAPP Team liaises closely with MENA country desks, Danish embassies, and other

relevant MFA departments.

Under DAPP 20172022 there were three Senior Technical Advisors (STAs) recruited to support

DAPP activities in the four countries. These positions will no longer exist under the new DAPP.

Instead, a

MEAL Unit

(contracted through public tender), engaged to assist with the strategic

level monitoring and information sharing, will incorporate some of the tasks previously assigned

to the STAs. The MEAL Unit will also support financial management. Full MEAL Unit

responsibilities are described in section 5.2. Responsibilities of a more political and strategic nature

that cannot be implemented by the MEAL Unit will be assumed by the MENA DAPP Team. The

MEAL Unit team will liaise closely with the Monitoring officers in the two Programme

Secretariats.

The organisational set-up for the Youth Employment and Human Rights Programmes will be

similar, with minor variations due to the different programme and partnership structure. One of

the lessons from the DAPP 2017-2022 programme is that a programme with multiple stakeholders

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requires effective coordination mechanisms. In the design of the new programme, steps have been

taken to strengthen coordination. For those parts of the programmes that may be implemented by

consortia, partners will establish a

Programme/Project Management Team

(or similar) with

representatives from each organisational entity participating in the consortium. For the Youth

Employment Programme, coordination between its three projects (led by a Contractor, UNDP

Nordic, and IFU respectively) will be further ensured by a

Programme Coordination Board.

Programme Secretariat,

led by a Team Leader, will facilitate and coordinate the overall

programme and monitoring activities. Each Team Leader will be supported by a Programme

Coordinator, a Monitoring officer, and a Controller. The Team Leader will be the main point of

daily contact between the programmes and the MENA DAPP Team as well as with the MEAL

Unit. All programme partners will be responsible for all financial planning and management

according to MFA Guidelines

including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial

progress reporting, accounting, and auditing. The Programme Documents present a more detailed

description of the programme management organisational arrangements.

While DAPP is a regional programme managed by the MENA Department, the

Danish

Embassies

have a strategic role to play in relation to and in dialogue with DAPP partner

organisations at country level, both government and civil society organisations. Denmark currently

has embassies in two of four DAPP countries, Morocco and Egypt, while the two other DAPP

countries, Jordan and Tunisia, are covered by the Danish embassies in Lebanon and Algeria,

respectively. Embassies will maintain dialogue with DAPP partner organisations for recurrent

updates on challenges and opportunities related to partner activities on the ground. Embassies will

also be involved in DAPP public events whenever relevant for the embassy activity portfolio,

particularly when such events have diplomatic and public diplomacy benefits. Coordination

between the MENA DAPP Team and Embassies will include quarterly meetings and meetings on

an ad hoc basis to provide updated programme information, news sharing, and plan joint activities

as relevant.

Youth Sounding Board (YSB)

will be established in each of the four DAPP countries. The

YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of

safeguarding and strengthening young people’s voice and perspective in relation to policy,

implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of

specific interventions in order to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception

phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL Unit team

facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

5.2 Technical assistance and public tenders

Technical and management assistance will be tendered out under three separate contracts

described below. In addition, under the Youth Employment Programme, agreements will be

signed (based on agreed proposals) with the UNDP Nordic Representative Office for the Green

Growth and Job Accelerator Project and IFU for the Sharaka Capital Investment Fund Project.

Tenders will follow Danish guidelines and aligned with the EU tender procedures.

Youth Employment Programme

The Youth Inclusion and Employment Project will be subject to public tender where one or a

consortium of organisation(s) will be invited to submit proposals. The Programme Secretariat will

be included as part of the tender. Focus will be on capacity building and training including

engagement of youth, capacity building of youth organisations; skills development and

https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/

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partnerships with training institutions; training and technical assistance on rights and

responsibilities in the labour market; and entrepreneurship training, incubators, technical support

for setting up a business. There will also be initiatives focused on informal economy skills

development. In the area of access to finance, the technical assistance will support in establishing

linkages between entrepreneurships and start-ups, commercial banks and micro-finance

institutions, and facilitating access to seed capital.

Human Rights Programme

The entire Human Rights Programme, including all four outcomes and the Programme Secretariat,

will be subject to public tender where one or a consortium of organisation(s) will be invited to

submit proposals. Focus will be on ensuring overall management and coordination of the

intervention areas, as well as providing specific technical assistance related to activities under each

of the four outcome areas. This could, inter alia, include support to legal and institutional reform,

prevention of violence, GBV, and torture, the enhancement of gender equality and SRHR, the

protection of minorities as well as the improved protection of freedom of expression, and the

strengthening of independent and diverse media.

MEAL Unit

The MEAL Unit will be procured as technical assistance through an open tender and have a full-

time presence in the region, with two field offices, one in Amman covering Jordan and Egypt and

one in Tunis covering Tunisia and Morocco (and Algeria if relevant). Staffing for the MEAL Unit

will include two internationally recruited MEAL specialists, short term local specialists if and when

necessary, two financial management specialists, and four locally recruited administrative and

logistic support staff (two each in Amman and Tunis). Similar MEAL tenders have been

implemented by several Danish embassies and the MEAL contract design for the DAPP

programme will be informed by MFA experiences in this regard.

Tasks that will be implemented by the MEAL Unit include:



implementing third party monitoring focusing on quality assurance, financial management,

including due diligence on financial flows;



carrying out in-depth analyses of partner reporting;



visits to local partners for first-hand observations/spot checks and case-based learning;



undertaking context related impact monitoring to assess whether and how the programme

is evolving towards delivering the expected outcomes and overall objectives;



preparing specific studies as needed, including updated regional context analyses, ad-hoc

thematic studies, including value-for-money studies, or studies for the Mid-term Review;



planning and implementing MEAL-related learning events;



advising the MENA DAPP Team on the results and outcome of monitoring efforts as

evidence;



provision of strategic guidance to the Programme Coordinators and Monitoring officers.

The full details on the MEAL Unit will be included in the tender materials.

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Annex 1

–

Programme context

Overall Development Challenges, Opportunities, and Risks

The

Moroccan

economy has performed relatively well in the past two decades and notable

economic and social strides have been made in poverty reduction (from 15.3% in 2001 to

4.8% in 2014), access to education, health care and services, and infrastructure development.

However, these positive developments have not benefitted all geographical areas and

population groups, as there are important regional and gender disparities and large wealth

and income inequality. While the growth rates in Morocco had already been losing

momentum prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the latter has pushed the Moroccan

economy into recession for the first time in 25 years. According to the World Bank GDP is

expected to contract by 6.3% in 2020 with a return to pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022 while

the public debt is expected to exceed 76% of GDP. The Moroccan economy relies on its

performance in the agricultural sector, which accounts for nearly 15% of GDP and employs

around 40% of the workforce. Efforts have been made to attract FDI and to diversify the

economy by supporting industries such as the automotive and aeronautics sector and the

industry now accounts for approximately 25% of GDP.

Morocco is classified as a so-called

“late-dividend” country, meaning that it has a declining

share of working age population between 2015 and 2030, yet can continue to benefit from

the first demographic dividend. The unemployment rate has increased from 9.2% in 2019

to 11.9% in 2020, and has disproportionally affected youth (15-24 years) as evidenced by an

increase in youth unemployment from 24.9% in 2019 to 31.2% in 2020. Well aware of these

challenges, the Moroccan government is seeking to address them through a number of

national development plans. Of most prominence is the establishment in December 2019

by King Mohamed VI of a commission of renowned Moroccan experts who presented their

recommendations for a new development model for Morocco in May 2021, following a

large consultation process with key stakeholders in the country.

With regards to progress related to the SDGs, the country faces major challenges regarding

gender equality (SDG 5) mainly due to the ratio of male-female labour participation, where

Morocco has one of the lowest in the MENA region, and decent jobs and economic growth

(SDG 8) although both are moderately improving. In relation to peace, justice and strong

institutions (SDG 16) significant challenges remain with a stagnating trend (with the

exception of e.g. the press freedom index, which is decreasing), while challenges remain for

partnerships for the goals which has even shown a decrease in performance (SDG 17).

Morocco’s ranks 64

in the world in terms of SDG progress.

According to Freedom House, Morocco is partly free. Indeed, the constitutional reform in

2011 has given the government wider authority in that the prime minister is appointed by

the King from the party that has won most seats in the regular multiparty parliamentary

elections, but a number of civil liberties remain constrained.

Morocco faces challenges in ensuring government accountability. Corruption remains an

important challenge, which affects many sectors and transparency remains limited.

Of the four focus countries, youth in

Tunisia

have the least positive outlook on their

economic situation. Classified as a demographically ‘late-dividend’ country, Tunisia will face

a slowly declining work force within the next ten years. Even though Tunisia’s population

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is growing at a relatively modest rate (fertility rate close to replacement level) when

compared to the average for the MENA region, its youth unemployment, which stands at

36.6% (against a general unemployment of 14.9%), is among the region’s highest. Ranking

96 out

of 157 in the World Bank Human Capital Index, Tunisia’s systemically fragile

economy further deteriorated in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading international

rating agencies to downgrade Tunisia’s credit rating. Its GDP (USD 3,380 per capita) is

estimated to contract by 8.1% in 2020 and to bounce back by (only) 4.5% in 2021.

Consequently, the IMF warned in early 2021 about Tunisia’s increasing public debt against

GDP, which is forecast to rise from 72.2% of GDP in 2019 to a peak of 86.6% of GDP in

2020.

Among the sectors most negatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis are the economically

important areas of tourism, transport, manufacturing, construction, textiles, and trade. The

pandemic has thereby further catalysed existing weaknesses of the Tunisian private sector,

which, particularly since 2013, has been in a steady decline: SMEs and larger enterprises are

investing less, they are less innovative, less export oriented and therefore, less productive.

Net job creation is low and most newly created jobs have not corresponded to the areas

with highest unemployment levels

–

in terms of sectors and geographical areas. This is

leading to increased frustration in the population, especially among youth. Tunisia ranks 63

in the world in terms of SDG progress. For the DAPP it is worth noting that there are

major challenges regarding ‘decent work and economic growth’ (SDG 8)

and

‘reduced

inequalities’ (SDG 10).

Beginning its democratic transition in the years after the revolution of 2011, Tunisia has

experienced numerous successes and setbacks in terms of implementing the provisions of

its new constitution and consolidating its political institutions. The country is perceived as

a regional front-runner in terms of democratic governance; Freedom House categorises

Tunisia as the only “free” democracy in the MENA region. Its most recent presidential and

parliamentary elections of 2019 were considered as well-administered elections with calm

and orderly voting, and results being confirmed by independent civil society observers, all

granting legitimacy to the Tunisian parliament as a representative body of law-making.

However, developments since these elections have revealed how severe tensions within and

between the executive and legislative branches, as well as among key political actors, pose

risks of systemic deadlocks and decreasing public support. Combined with the ongoing

failure to set up a Constitutional Court (as stipulated in the new constitution) as well as

malpractice in the at times arbitrary judicial system, the apparent difficulties faced by

Tunisia’s key institutions in working together in an accountable and effective manner might

enhance the fragility of Tunisia’s democratic transition and reduce its public support.

The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in

Egypt

have interrupted a period of

macroeconomic stability, characterized by relatively high growth, improved fiscal accounts

and a comfortable level of foreign reserves. Yet, the pandemic also hit as longstanding

challenges continued to persist,

notably Egypt’s elevated debt-to-GDP

ratio, slow revenue

mobilisation and a below-potential performance of non-oil merchandise exports and non-

oil FDIs. While the average real growth has remained positive over the course of the year

and foreign reserves continue to be sufficient, the COVID-19 pandemic has inevitably

caused job and income losses, posing additional strains on the livelihoods of Egyptian

households, and is exacerbating the long-standing challenge of job creation in Egypt. While

the Egyptian economy has been shifting towards having a larger private sector, the latter

has not been able to provide improved job opportunities for Egyptians. In recent years, the

main drivers of growth have been gas extractives, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, real

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estate and construction. Employment remains concentrated in low value-added sectors such

as private sector agriculture (including subsistence) and public social services. The

inadequate productive and job creation capacity of the economy has prevented Egypt from

tapping into the country’s large young population. Few companies (large, small or medium-

sized enterprises) are in a position to offer employment that is attractive in terms of

remuneration, working conditions and employee relations. Furthermore, Egypt has seen a

negative correlation between productivity and employment in which the sectors that have

shown the largest shares of employment increases have seen only limited growth in

productivity. These sectors include private sector construction, ICT and both wholesale and

retail trade. The failure of high-value sectors to raise their productivity constrains their ability

to expand and create more jobs. There is currently little technology transfer and established

companies, particularly SMEs, have limited capacity for innovation. Their access to

professional consulting and implementation services is also insufficient. Business start-up

owners are often highly innovative but must contend with a state and private sector support

system that is unconsolidated and largely inadequate. State processes for setting up new

companies, particularly those with innovative business models, are cumbersome and lack

transparency.

Growth declined from 5.6% in fiscal year 2019 to 3.5% in fiscal year 2020. Under a scenario

that the pandemic will persist throughout early 2021, growth is projected to decline further

to 2.3% in fiscal year 2021 before rebounding in fiscal year 2022. The challenges of

enhancing growth and sustainable job creation strongly manifest themselves in regions

outside Cairo such as Upper Egypt, a grouping of governorates that lag significantly behind

the rest of the country in terms of economic growth, employment generation, connectivity,

and access to services.

Egypt ranks 83 out of 193 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most

relevance to the DAPP (SDGs 5, 8, 16 and 17), major challenges remain in i) achieving

gender equality and empowering women and girls; ii) promoting economic growth,

productive employment and decent work; and iii) providing access to justice and building

effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. Significant challenges also remain in

ensuring the means of implementation and revitalising the Global SDG partnership.

During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country

for economic migrants and asylum seekers. According to UNHCR, Egypt hosts refugees

and asylum-seekers from 57 different countries of origin as of 2020. A growing population

of concern is stranded in the most overcrowded and poorest neighbourhoods of its largest

cities such as Cairo and Alexandria.

Freedom House has ranked Egypt as “not

free”.

The country is governed in an increasingly

authoritarian manner. Meaningful political opposition is highly limited, as expressions of

dissent can draw criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The government has provided

little transparency regarding spending and operations. Civil society groups and independent

journalists have few opportunities to comment on or influence state policies and legislation.

The parliament plays a modest role in forming and debating laws, but it does not provide a

meaningful check on executive power. The 2019 constitutional amendments further

consolidated the authority of the president, in part by permitting him to appoint one-third

of the new Senate. The changes have also increased the military’s already considerable

independence from civilian oversight and its constitutional role in civilian governance. The

amendments allow the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to permanently control the

appointment of the defence minister, who is also the commander in chief.

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Jordan

faces structural economic development challenges that include stagnating growth,

lack of enterprise competitiveness, persistent high unemployment, dependency on oversees

remittances, difficulties in reversing negative trade balances, and persistent regional

instability. Efforts to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have reaffirmed

structural weaknesses, led to production disruptions and forced enterprises to suspend or

scale down operations, with enormous negative consequences on the economy and jobs.

The World Bank has forecast a -3.5% GDP growth rate in 2020. With a saturated public

sector, the private sector constitutes the main avenue for enhancing growth and innovation,

particularly through the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) that comprise the

vast majority of enterprises in the country. Jordan has been selectively open to FDIs in

sectors such as mining, manufacturing, energy, tourism and ICT. In 2017, FDI inflows in

Jordan increased by 8%, a reversal from the declining trend observed since 2014 but

remaining below levels recorded in 2006-2009. In 2019, Jordan adopted a Five-Year Reform

Matrix in

order to deliver on the Government’s priorities on jobs, youth, and growth. The

matrix includes a set of crosscutting and sectoral policy reforms prioritised and sequenced

over five years. More recently, the government presented and Indicative Executive Program

for 2021-2024, which has been developed during the pandemic. Priorities of the programme

include supporting macroeconomic and fiscal stability, improving public sector

performance, fostering an enabling business environment, increasing FDI and exports,

access to finance, labour market imbalances, expanding social safety nets, public

transportation, financial stability the energy sector, water sector, agribusiness and the

tourism sector.

High population growth rate and the gender dimensions of the labour force pose particularly

difficult challenges for Jordan. Over 63% of the population is under 30 years of age and

there are not enough jobs for the large number of young people that enter the labour force

every year. In 2019, only 14.4% of women were economically active in Jordan compared to

the global average of 52%. Obstacles to further economic empowerment of women include

existing societal and household norms, the general business enabling environment and

specific constraints to women's economic activity such as access to care provisions and

transport. Universities are not oriented towards the needs of the labour market, which has

resulted in low employability of graduates and a high unemployment rate among academic

youth. In addition, Jordan's vocational training system is not well-aligned to the needs of

the economy. The vocational training infrastructure, equipment, curricula and the

qualification of teaching staff are generally outdated and fall far behind private providers

while “on-the-job” training

by private sector enterprises remains limited and unsatisfactory,

with some sources indicating that a mere 3% of enterprises in Jordan provide such training.

Support to the emergence of start-ups is developed to some extent, but there is inadequate

support for rapid scaling up of high-potential innovative businesses. Innovation and

entrepreneurship in Jordan are also hampered by insufficient networks, connections and

infrastructure among key stakeholders including entrepreneurs, universities, risk capital

providers, Government, SMEs and large corporations.

Since 2011, Jordan alone has provided refuge to more than 1.36 million Syrians. Around

90% of the Syrian refugees are living in host communities, mainly in Amman and the

northern governorates, while nearly 10% live in camps. Out of the 1.36 million, nearly

655,435 Syrian refugees have registered with UNHCR. The presence of Syrian refugees

across the country continues to place pressure on Jordan’s economy, scarce natural

resources and infrastructure.

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Jordan ranks 89 in terms of progress on the SDGs. In terms of the SDGs of most relevance

to the DAPP (e.g. SDG 5, 8, 16 and 17), Jordan continues to face major challenges in

achieving gender equality and decent work and economic growth while significant

challenges remain in promoting a peaceful and inclusive society. Significant challenges also

persist in strengthening the means of implementation of the Global SDG partnership.

Freedom House has ranked Jordan as “Partly Free”. The king continues to play a

central

role in politics and governance. The parliament’s lower house is elected but the chamber

wields little power in practice. Rural and tribal voters, who make up the base of support for

the regime, continue to be overrepresented in the parliament at the expense of urban voters.

Both voters and candidates are influenced by tribal affiliations. Against the backdrop of

mounting protests, authorities have stepped up arrests of activists and journalists, aided by

the enactment of the Defence Law due to COVID-19. Jordan remains stable despite

continuing instability in the region and a worsening domestic economic and social situation.

Regional challenges include the stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria

conflict and broader regional tensions. Because of its geographical position, Jordan has

continued to play an important role in international efforts to tackle the Syria crisis and has

maintained its push for a political solution to resolve the conflict.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Arab Youth Survey 2020:

https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/

Trust in Political Institutions in the Middle East and North Africa - KAS PolDiMed Survey:

https://www.kas.de/en/web/poldimed/single-title/-/content/trust-in-political-institutions-in-the-middle-east-and-

north-africa

Freedom House:

https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

Sustainable Development Report 2020:

https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/

IMF World Economic Outlook:

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile

Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery (worldbank.org)

Note d’information du Haut-Commissariat

au Plan sur les principales caractéristiques du chômage et du sous-emploi

en 2020 (hcp.ma)

Morocco 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy | Freedom House

NDI/IRI - Tunisia International Election Observation Mission Final Report:

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Tunisia%20IOM%20final%20report_0.pdf

Teti, A., Abbott, P. and Cavatorta, F., 2017. The Arab uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, political and

economic transformations.

World Bank. Arab Republic of Egypt. Recent Developments

http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/471871570664047542/EN-MPO-OCT19-Egypt.pdf

OCHA Egypt:

Egypt | OCHA (unocha.org)

Egypt 2020: Freedom in the World Country Report | Freedom House

OECD Review of Foreign Direct Investment Statistics for Jordan: :https://www.oecd.org/investment/OECD-Review-

of-Foreign-Direct-Investment-Statistics-Jordan.pdf

World Bank. Overview of the World Bank in Jordan:

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview

UNICEF. Opportunities for Youth in Jordan:

https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/opportunities-youth-jordan

Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. Jordan Response Plan 2020-2022:

https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-response-plan-syria-crisis-2020-2022

European Commission. Report on EU - Jordan relations in the framework of the revised European Neighbourhood

Policy (2018-2019):

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/swd_2019_383_f1_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v3_p1_10494

98.pdf

Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2020. Jordan Report:

https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-

world/2020

II.

Political Economy and Stakeholder Analysis

Morocco

has experienced several waves of protests, strikes and social tension since the

Arab uprisings in 2011. The protests have been spread across the country and have often

originated in marginalized and underserved regions. These social tensions are fuelled by the

large geographic and socio-economic disparities and by youth unemployment. Nevertheless,

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there are no indications of a threat to the overall stability nor a risk of regime breakdown in

Morocco.

The government is well aware that unemployment is a key source of frustration, potential

unrest and youth becoming prone to recruitment by extremism groups and illegal

immigration and has therefore made employment generation a top priority. However, there

are a number of major challenges to youth employment. The public sector does not create

sufficient jobs to absorb the growing number of youth entering the job market each year

and the private sector faces a number of constraints. According to the World Bank,

Morocco lags behind with regards to anti-monopoly policies and market competition

regulations. Policy weaknesses, which have a negative impact on companies entering the

economy and their ability to grow and create jobs. Other challenges include limited

educational outcomes and labour force skills not aligned with labour market demands; a

business climate with important challenges due to labour regulations; lack of access to

credit; and corruption.

Extraction of rents, especially corruption, affects many sectors in Morocco, which ranks

86th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index. A majority of Moroccans

(74%) do not believe that government measures to fight corruption are effective. In general,

Moroccans display low levels of trust in politics, national governance and elected

institutions. Only 25% of the population trust trade unions and 69% do not trust political

parties. A high percentage trust non-elected institutions such as the military (83%) and

police (78%), as these are perceived to function well. In other opinion polls, youth call for

immediate political change and are far less positive in their view of the government (18%)

than the older generations.

In terms of participation of women or minorities in the political arena, there are no

limitations in the law. In the 2016 elections, a record number of women were elected in

Morocco. However, these numbers were not matched by high-level positions as

government ministers or presidents of parliamentary commissions. As regards the equal

distribution of economic resources, Moroccan women have a very low labour market

participation and men (as is the case in all MENA countries) are favoured in the law on

inheritance.

Even if successes in

Tunisia’s

ten years of democratic transition are both notable and

impressive, the uneven trajectory towards a legitimate, accountable, and effective

relationship between political actors and institutions may, looking forward, further impede

possible advances on political, economic, and social reform agendas, which are crucial also

to DAPP’s focus areas. Stalemates and conflicts in the highest levels of the political system

have proven to generate negative trickle effects in the work of relevant duty bearers in

ministries, agencies, and regional/local governance structures. This pertains in particular to

the ability of these duty bearers to engage in long-term systemic attempts at change and to

take crucial decisions in a timely and accountable manner.

In regional comparison, Tunisia’s youth shows little interest in politics and is less interested

in political issues than older generations. The dominant positions of influential elites not

only hinders the access of youth to the political sphere, but also hampers economic

participation and success. The country’s economic structures remain impacted by the pre-

revolution legacy of elitisms and crony capitalism, adding to the more general problem of

the both demographically and geographically uneven distribution of economic and financial

resources. Tunisia remains a country with widespread economic malpractices, ranking 69 in

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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, having only witnessed slight

improvements since 2012.

The World Bank concluded in 2014 “that Tunisia’s policy

environment offers a fertile ground for cronyism and other anticompetitive practices, which

hamper private sector growth and jobs creation in Tunisia”, and highlighted how these

structures are negative legacies from before the revolution. Common practices of rent

extraction include restrictions in access to markets, import protection and, discretionary

enforcement of regulations, abuse of access to public assets, etc., issues that might have

direct relevance for foreign investment support. Today, extensive and systemic economic

malpractice remain critical concerns for Tunisia’s youth, indicating that the overall situation

in the field has not significantly improved. According to the Arab Youth Survey 2020, 66

per cent of young Tunisians identify widespread corruption in their country, a higher

percentage than in any other Maghreb country.

Tunisia has, in the past ten years, witnessed a slow and insufficient frequency of structural

economic reforms. Social dialogue remains a key aspect of the Tunisian labour market,

which in the 2010s has been subject to strong increases of strikes and sit-ins. Around half

of Tunisia’s youth have formal employment, and only half hereof are on permanent

contracts. Observers assess this being partly due to the sectoral collective agreements in

Tunisia, setting starter rates at significantly higher levels than the statutory minimum wage.

There is a low participation of women in the labour force, which both challenges the

inclusiveness of the Tunisian economy and manifests itself as a major bottleneck in terms

of skills mismatch for the private sector. According to the EBRD, shortcomings include the

quality of public education, rigidity of entry-routes to vocational training and from

vocational training to employment, informality, discrimination, lack of competencies among

university graduates, low private sector capacity to drive skills demand, and an

underutilisation of women’s skills.

Egypt,

the president is elected by popular vote for up to two terms. In 2018, legitimate

opposition candidates were reportedly pressured to withdraw and the vote was marred by

low turnout, voter intimidation, and vote buying. The electoral commission threatened non-

voters with fines in an attempt to increase participation. While the electoral laws themselves

provide some basis for credible elections, electoral authorities largely fail in practice to

ensure an open and competitive campaign environment.

The constitutional amendments in 2019 added two years to the current term of the

president, extending it through 2024, at which point he would be allowed to seek an

additional six-year term. The amendments also re-established the Egyptian parliament as a

bicameral body. The upper house was restored as a 180-member Senate. Members will serve

five-year terms, with two-thirds elected and one-third appointed by the president. The

amendments reduced the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450.

By tightly controlling the electoral process, intimidating presidential candidates to withdraw,

and denying credible opposition parties the space to function effectively, the government

makes it very difficult for the opposition to gain power through elections. Against this

backdrop, neither regime breakdown nor any form of transition of power seems likely.

Women enjoy legal equality on many issues, and their court testimony is equal to that of

men except in cases involving personal status matters such as divorce, which are more

influenced by religious law. In practice, women face extensive discrimination in employment

and are at a legal disadvantage in property and inheritance matters. Societal biases also

discourage women’s ownership of land. Under the 2019 constitutional amendments, at

least

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a quarter of the seats in the new House of Representatives are reserved for female

representatives.

Jordan,

the King holds broad executive powers. He appoints and dismisses the prime

minister and cabinet and may dissolve the bicameral National Assembly at his discretion.

The King also appoints the 65 members of the upper house of the parliament, the Senate.

The lower house, the 115-seat House of Representatives, is elected for four-year terms or

until the parliament is dissolved. Its members win office through races in 23 multimember

districts, with 15 seats reserved for the leading women candidates who failed to capture

district seats. Twelve of the district seats are reserved for religious and ethnic minorities.

The electoral system favours rural and tribal voters. The largest and most popular

opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, holds only about 12% of the lower house, and

the political system limits the ability of any party-based opposition to make significant gains

. With continued flow of foreign aid and loyalty of the Armed Forces, there is low risk of

regime breakdown.

Jordan’s long-term

reform process has been implemented within a system of rent-seeking

and privileges and have preserved a network of state-business relations. The regime’s

survival considerations during the reform process have encouraged the development of a

system that allows political and business elites to block certain reform policies and

manipulate others to fit their own interests.

The last parliamentary election was marred by accusations of vote buying and interference

but was considered satisfactory from a technical standpoint. Political parties continue to be

weak and in recent parliamentary elections, most seats have gone to independents who are

often tribal figures and businesspeople that are considered loyal to the monarchy.

Jordan’s political and administrative system is characterised by a high degree of

centralisation. For decades, the national planning and development process has been

directed by the central government. The approval of the 2015 Decentralisation Law and

Municipality Law constituted an attempt to address this situation and promote a more

bottom-up approach to the identification of service needs and policy priorities in

accordance with the role of newly elected councils in municipalities and governorates.

However, many have noted that the roll-out of the decentralisation process has lacked a

clear, shared vision and a national policy on the subnational governance system reform

required to allow local authorities to fulfil their role in promoting local development. As it

stands, sub-national administrative divisions have only been able to exercise the powers that

the central government chooses to delegate.

Female candidates have in the past won seats beyond the legal quotas set for the parliament

and subnational councils. However, cultural prejudices remain an obstacle to women’s full

political participation. In the last parliamentary election (2020), additional female candidates

were not elected beyond the quota. In recent years, women have generally performed better

at the municipal and local levels but none have won mayoral posts. A total of nine seats in

the House of Representatives are reserved for Christians and three for ethnic Circassians

and Chechens. Christians are not permitted to contest non-reserved seats. Citizens of

Palestinian origin, who tend to live in urban areas, make up a majority of the overall

population but remain underrepresented in the political system.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Arab Barometer 2018-2019:

https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/

Transparency International

–

Corruption Perception Index 2020:

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020

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Danish Trade Union Development Agency

–

Labour Market Reports:

https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/materialedatabase/#mtt-search-labor-reports

Morocco Economy, Politics and GDP Growth Summary - The Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu.com)

Corruption in Morocco | Morocco Corruption Report & Profile (ganintegrity.com)

Morocco - Transparency.org

Trust in Institutions Index 2020: The Parliament and Beyond - (mipa.institute)

Arab Barometer 2019

Morocco - United States Department of StateWorld Bank - The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good

jobs and Greater Wealth to all Tunisians:

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/unfinished-

revolution

EBRD - Tunisia Diagnostic paper:

Assessing Progress and Challenges in Unlocking the Private Sector’s Potential and

Developing a Sustainable Market Economy:

https://www.ebrd.com/publications/country-diagnostics

EBRD

–

Transition Report Tunisia 2019-2020:

http://www.ebrd.com/documents/oce/transition-report-201920-

tunisia.pdf

Masri, S.M., 2017. Tunisia: an Arab anomaly. Columbia University Press.

Egypt 2020: Freedom in the World Country Report | Freedom House

Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2020. Jordan Report:

https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-

world/2020

Carnegie Papers. Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan:

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec4_alissa_jordan_final.pdf

III.

Fragility, Conflict, and Resilience

Morocco

is not in a situation of fragility or conflict and the country has avoided much of

the political upheaval and harm to its economy following the Arab uprisings in 2011, mainly

by pledging to step up economic reforms. However, persisting high unemployment rates,

economic hardship for an important part of the population, and the high proportion of

young Moroccans wishing to emigrate are all adding a sense of urgency to the situation.

Opinion polls among Arab youth reveal that in Morocco 46% of youth consider or actively

try to emigrate. Their main reason is to improve their economic opportunities followed by

dissatisfaction with corruption. Other opinion polls reveal that up to 70% Moroccans wish

to emigrate. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this tendency.

Morocco has not been spared by violent extremism and radicalisation with the murder of

the two Scandinavian tourists in end 2018 by jihadi extremists as the most recent example.

The country continuously faces threats by terrorist cells that are affiliated or claim affiliation

with ISIS, but these are regularly and effectively dismantled by the security services.

While less fragile than other countries in the MENA regions,

Tunisia’s

relative political

stability since the days of the revolution are not without concerns. Despite its democratic

transformation, Tunisian youth is subject to radicalisation from jihadists and other extremist

groups. The country has suffered numerous jihadist terrorist attacks and Tunisians formed

one of the largest national groupings of foreign fighters engaged in fighting for the so-called

Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as well as for extremist groups in Libya. Radicalisation

targeting youth is specifically present in the country’s southern regions.

While ideological

radicalisation already had a strong foothold in Tunisia’s pre-revolutionary

period, the

underlying causes for continued radicalisation

–

such as extremism in prisons, ineffective or

absent state structures and service provisions as well as socioeconomic frustrations

–

remain

matters of great concern. Acknowledging how economic hardship might affect negatively

on the country’s path to inclusive stability, and particularly responding to the 1325 agenda,

Tunisia in 2018 adopted its National

Action Plan, particularly focusing on women’s

economic inclusion and empowerment, particularly in the country’s economically

marginalised geographical areas.

Tunisia has not traditionally hosted large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers but total

numbers of these population groups have increased in recent years. In January 2021,

UNHCR registered a total of 6,744 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom originated

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from Côte d'Ivoire and Syria. In terms of emigration, Tunisians currently make up the largest

national group of migrants arriving to Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. In 2020,

approx. 13,000 Tunisians arrived illegally to Italy, representing a significant rise compared

to 2018 (5,200) and 2019 (2,654). Ambitions to migrate, both legally and illegally, are

particularly prevalent among Tunisia’s youth.

Proximate causes of conflict in

Egypt

include the country’s political system and military’s

control over the judiciary as well as migration. The economy and challenge of

unemployment, water insecurity, food insecurity and rapid urbanisation constitute structural

causes of conflict while transboundary water issues and the conflict in Libya are some of

the external pressures that contribute to conflict.

Egypt is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS whose affiliate ISIS-Sinai

Province (ISIS-SP) continues to fight security forces in the North Sinai region. Both terrorist

attacks and military operations have consistently resulted in civilian casualties. Egypt

continues to extend a 2014 state-of-emergency in the North Sinai region, where ISIS-SP

primarily operates. In 2019, nearly all terrorist attacks in Egypt took place in the Sinai

Peninsula and largely targeted security forces, but terrorist attacks targeting civilians,

tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt remained a concern. Increases in water

demand are likely to be exacerbated by significant population increases both within Egypt,

which is expected to be home to 111 million people by 2025 and in the countries along the

Nile River, which are expected to host around a billion people by 2050. The combination

of population growth and increased water demand could result in increased internal conflict

among water uses.

Egypt has not yet adopted a UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan (NAP). However, the

government of Egypt announced its intention in 2019 to develop a 1325 NAP. Given that

Egypt is an important contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and a significant

geopolitical actor engaged in several on-going peace processes, including the Libyan

conflict, Egypt could thereby play an important role in furthering the Women, Peace and

Security Agenda regionally.

Jordan

continues to be stable, despite the current instability in the region and the impact of

the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential trigger points for instability include the stalemate

in the Middle East Peace Process, the Syria conflict and broader regional tensions and the

deterioration of the domestic economic and social situation. Although territorially defeated

in Syria and Iraq, Da’esh and Al Qaeda remain a threat for Jordan, especially in the context

of the return of foreign fighters. Jordan continues to prioritise a balance between

maintaining security and stability on the one hand and enabling progress in human rights

on the other.

Regional turmoil has strongly impacted the Jordanian economy, reduced trade opportunities

and increased youth unemployment. The arrival of numerous Syrian refugees in Jordan has

created a new bottom tier of workers with few formal labour market opportunities. Without

other opportunities, many Syrian refugees in Jordan have resorted to work in the informal

economy, which is characterised by low wages and indecent working conditions.

The Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for advancing the implementation of UN

Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), and its

subsequent resolutions, was developed to respond to the country’s latest security and

military challenges. It is in line with Jordan’s commitments

to promote and respect human

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rights, justice, equality and participation. The JONAP for advancing the implementation of

UNSCR 1325 aims to integrate a gender-based

approach towards women’s participation in

prevention and protection processes during conflicts, as well as in peace building, and

maintaining stability and sustainable security.

Between 2,000 and 4,000 Jordanians fought as foreign terrorist fighters with ISIS, making

Jordan one of the world’s highest per capita contributors of foreign

fighters. The roots of

ISIS can be traced back to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was founded and led by Zarqa-

born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. While Jordan has been successful at thwarting large-scale

terrorist plots, smaller scale terrorist attacks have been carried out in recent years. Among a

number of motivations, the absence of community identity and belonging and a dearth of

spaces for open and productive dialogue have been attributed to youth vulnerability to

radicalisation in Jordan. Furthermore, one study suggests that the economic and political

exclusion, particularly of youth, that exists in Jordan breeds dissatisfaction among citizens,

which may increase the appeal of violent extremism. Furthermore, areas that host large

numbers of Syrian refugees may also be areas where dissatisfaction and frustrations are

particularly significant.

Several studies show that young Jordanians contemplate emigrating. According to the

results of a 2020 Konrad Adenaur Stiftung survey, when asked whether they have

considered migrating in the past 12 months, 36% of young respondents (aged 18 to 29) in

Jordan want to leave their homeland. The majority of those in Jordan, of all age groups,

who express a desire to emigrate say it is due to economic considerations (86%) while a

small percentage cite political reasons (5%). Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, only a small

percentage (11%) of those that want to emigrate from Jordan list Europe as a destination.

The 2021 Arab Youth Survey found that 56% of respondents in Jordan were either actively

trying to emigrate or had considered emigrating, which is the highest percentage when

compared to the remaining DAPP countries.

The influx of large numbers of refugees exacerbates challenges Jordan has faced for many

years

–

competition for jobs, overburdened infrastructure and strained social services such

as healthcare and education. The economy has declined due to the crisis and subsequent

closure of foreign markets in Syria and Iraq, as well as a decrease in Foreign Direct

Investments. Around 70% of Syrian refugee households in host communities are either

food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity and are almost completely dependent on food

assistance from the international community. More than 80% of Syrian refugees live below

the poverty line and despite the easing of access to the labour market for refugees,

unemployment rates remain high and many struggle to find decent employment

opportunities that provide fair wages and working condition. While a number of Danish

engagements directly address short and medium term needs emanating from the Syria Crisis

by applying a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, DAPP will not be directly

linked to the Syria Crisis response but complement these efforts by building stability and

promoting good governance.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

IOM

–

World Migration Report 2020:

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

Youth Arab Survey 2020

Arab Barometer 2019

UNHCR Operational Update Tunisia January 2021:

https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Tunisia%20Registration%20Factsheet_Januaru2021.pdfC

arnegie Europe

– Why Democratization Couldn’t Prevent Radicalization in Tunisia:

https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80137

Washington Institute

–

The Tunisian Jihadist Movement Ten Years After the Prisoner Amnesty:

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tunisian-jihadist-movement-ten-years-after-prisoner-amnesty

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K4D. Conflic Analysis of Egypt:

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/048 Conflict analysis of

Egypt.pdf

US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt:

https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-

on-terrorism-2019/egypt/?fbclid=IwAR18PETwV9C4ll-Vr_CD3K_19RiUZPN0gdHPaed3fM9tJTRlFa6Ga4XZXKo

USAID. Climate Risk Profile

–

Egypt:

https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-

Profile-Egypt.pdf

UN Women. Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325

on Women, Peace and Security 2018

–

2021:

https://www2.unwomen.org/-

/media/field%20office%20jordan/images/publications/2018/jonap%202018-

2021%20unscr%201325.pdf?la=en&vs=5624

IRI. Violent Extremism in Jordan: local governance, tribal dynamics and forced migration:

https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-11-7_jordan_ve_report.pdf

IV.

Human Rights, Gender, Youth, applying a Human Rights Based

Approach

The past two decades,

Morocco

has taken several steps to bring the country in line with

international human rights and gender equality standards. A process of revision of the

Constitution was initiated in 2011, which introduced a number of rights, including in terms

regards gender equality. This was followed by the adoption of a new migrant policy in 2013

and the ratification of the UN Option Protocol to the Convention Against Torture in 2014.

The National Human Rights Institution (CNDH) was appointed as the National Preventive

Mechanism in 2018. Morocco also participated in launching the Convention against Torture

Initiative aimed to achieve universal ratification and implementation of the UNCAT by

2024. Challenges remain, however, at the level of practical implementation. A number of

constitutional revisions are yet to be translated into law and into changes in practices of

persons involved in the administration of justice. Morocco faces a problem of overcrowding

in prisons, and while reported by government representatives not to be systematic, the

practice of torture continues to occur. Morocco also has a low ranking in the World Press

Freedom Index, ranking 133

out of 180 countries.

In terms of Gender Equality, a new family law was adopted in 2004 enhancing women’s

rights, the nationality code was amended in 2007, and reservations on CEDAW were

partially lifted in 2011. Reforms that are more recent include the adoption of the law on

domestic workers in 2017 (many of whom are young and female), and the adoption of a law

on Gender Based Violence (GBV) in 2018. Despite these legislative improvements, a

number of provisions continue to discriminate against gender equality and the

operationalisation of the laws is lagging behind, as are societal norms, making realities on

the ground much less promising. Morocco has a low score on most gender related

parameters, also by MENA standards, and ranks 143 out of 153 countries in the Global

Gender Gap Index. A few figures to illustrate this: only 21% of women are (formally)

working, twice as many women are illiterate (41.9%), 46.9% work in the agricultural sector,

1% of women own agricultural land, 54.4% of women are victims of violence (2019), 10%

of all marriages are child marriages (2015).

The Universal Periodic Review of Morocco was conducted in May 2017 and 61 out of 244

recommendations addressed gender equality issues. A number of them were rejected,

including on equal inheritance, banning of polygamy and of child marriage, and LGTBT

rights on the grounds that too quick changes of the family law would threaten the social

fabric. The penal code continues to criminalize adultery, sex outside of marriage and same

sex relations.

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Youth, which make up one third of Morocco’s population, lack avenues of engagement in

civic life and in the traditional political system. Less than one percent of youth are active in

political parties and trade unions. They are perceived as opaque, undemocratic and

inaccessible. Large formalised NGOs do not have much appeal to youth either, as many of

them do not enjoy much legitimacy among youth or are perhaps not focusing on the

priorities which youth find important. Issues that are important to youth, such as individual

and sexual freedoms, are only beginning to be addressed by established feminist NGOs.

Cumbersome administrative procedures are also dissuading youth from forming new

NGOs and instead youth is participating through other means, notably via social media.

Regarding freedom of religion, the Moroccan Constitution states that Islam is the state

religion and guarantees freedom of religion. Morocco has ratified the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no reservations to art. 18 and 20 that

protect Freedom of religion or belief. The penal code (art. 220) criminalises “shaking the

fate of a Muslim” and the enticements to

convert a Muslim. Islamic religious instruction is

compulsory in national schools, while private Jewish schools are allowed to teach Judaism.

No laws require the designation of religion on ID or passports and apostasy it not

criminalised under the civil or criminal law. Faith-based minorities practice their faith

discretely due to fear of societal harassment, which may imply ostracism due to conversion,

social ridicule, employment discrimination, and potential violence from “extremists.”

Compared to the high spirits of

Tunisia’s

post-revolution years after 2011, the human

rights situation has developed in an uneven, and at times deteriorating, manner. On the one

hand, Tunisia stands out as a regional role model in terms of its openness and willingness

to address HR concerns, including its welcoming attitude to relevant UN bodies as well as

its commitment to engage in dialogues on HR issues with the EU and its Member States.

On the other hand, over the past years pressures have steadily mounted on a wide array of

rights and liberties, including on freedoms of expression, equal access to justice, and socio-

economic rights. These developments conjure with a general strengthening of socio-

conservative political actors in both the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of

government as well as reoccurring reform impasses due to increasing mistrust across

political institutions and parties.

The civil unrest and demonstrations of early 2021 were emblematic of the systemic, youth-

related challenges Tunisia continues to face. Particularly young people

–

and often minors

–

from marginalized communities took to the streets, expressing their frustrations over the

lack of economic opportunities for those outside the prosperous and elitist circles. With a

fragile economy, only further weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic, Tunisian youth

continue to express their discontent over lacking economic and social investments in

marginalized areas as well as in excessive and arbitrary police violence, torture, and

corruption. Given that Tunisia remains a country with a sizeable civic space and a vocal and

a mature civil society, well-established Tunisian CSOs have been relatively successful in

raising concerns about these rights aspects. At the same time, many well-established CSOs

have experienced limitations in their ability to create networks among youth from the most

marginalized communities. Consequently, while traditional civil society actors have proven

their capability of forming new ties, the situation reflects the demand for working more

actively on enlarging their outreach to particularly marginalized youth groups.

Tunisia’s recent UPR took place early 2017. Acknowledging its important post-revolution

progress on the broader HR agenda, the UPR pointed to Tunisia’s limitations

in a number

of areas relevant to DAPP: reforms of the judicial system and combatting torture, the

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establishment of constitutional bodies, corruption, reducing extreme poverty and raising

employability, and the development of national human rights policies across sectors such as

education, health, and the environment. In 2014, Tunisia withdrew all its reservations

against CEDAW and its advances in the realm of gender equality are unquestionably notable

when compared to other countries in the MENA region. International observers concluded

that process of drafting Tunisia’s constitution of 2014 included a significant influence of

women. Among recent tangible examples of enhanced gender equality progress is the ‘Law

58’, which aims at ending violence against

women, a widespread problem as around half of

Tunisian women between 18 and 64 report having experienced violence at one point in their

lives. Tunisian women are among the few in the MENA not targeted by national laws that

constrict their access to land and water. Yet, against the backdrop of a politically and socio-

economically extremely challenging post-revolution decade, gender activists and CSOs have,

in some cases, shifted their focus in recent years on maintaining the achieved results rather

than expanding their platforms. Scepticism is particularly directed against the socio-

conservative agenda of certain political actors, also fuelling negative political campaigns

against LGBTQI+ communities, who continue to be subject of arbitrary police arrests and

violence.

According to the Constitution, Tunisia is a civil state but the country religion is Islam. The

Constitution further guarantees freedom of religion or belief, and Tunisia has ratified

ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Islamic religious education is mandatory in

public schools, and the Tunisian Press Code prohibits defamation against religions or

members of a religion. The Tunisian state has been more tolerant towards faith-based

minorities since the revolution of 2011 and the government, for instance, controls Islamic

prayer services in order to prevent “divisive” theology. Yet, there are reports of growing

influence of radical Islam. Discrimination against Christians are often hidden form the

public as some report facing societal pressure, also from within their families.

Egypt

has a poor human rights record. Issues of concern include

–

but are not limited to

–

unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, harsh prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and

detention, arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, undue restrictions on freedom of

expression including the press and internet, substantial interference with the rights of

peaceful assembly and freedom of association, government control over registration and

financing of NGOs, restrictions on political participation, use of the law and violence

targeting minority groups and use of forced or compulsory child labour. Officials who

committed abuses have been inconsistently punished or prosecuted. In most cases,

allegations of human rights abuses have not been comprehensively investigated, including

incidents of violence by security forces which has contributed to an environment of

impunity. Last year, arrests and prosecutions against women social media influencers were

made, in violation of their rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination.

This has resulted in arrests and sentencing on the basis of vague charges of violating “public

morals” and “undermining family values.”

The space for civil society groups and human rights defenders continues to be curtailed.

The government has not issued implementing regulations for the NGO law approved in

August 2019, which prohibits a wide range of activities, allows authorities to dissolve

organisations for a wide range of violations and imposes fines of up to one million Egyptian

pounds (US$60,000) for organisations that operate without a license or send or receive

funds without government approval. Human rights lawyers and defenders continue to be

detained without trial while peaceful assembly is criminalised and peaceful critics are

punished. In late 2020 alone, authorities arrested nearly 1,000 protesters and bystanders

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before and after scattered anti-government protests in towns and villages in 21

governorates. Journalists, bloggers, and critics on social media continue to be silenced amid

escalating use of the 2018 cybercrimes law while hundreds of news and human rights

websites have been blocked without judicial authorisation. The number of journalists in

prison in Egypt is among the highest numbers in the world.

Well established, independent domestic human rights NGOs struggle to operate amid

increasing pressure from security forces throughout the country. Online censorship has

diminished the roles of internet activists and bloggers in publicizing information concerning

human rights abuses. Authorities have sometimes allowed CSOs not registered as NGOs to

operate but such organisations often report harassment and interference. The government

has continued and intensified investigations into the receipt of foreign funding by human

rights organisations. Independent CSOs in Egypt are also threatened by the presence of

Government Organized Non-governmental Organisations (GONGOs) that divert

attention away from “politicised” issues raised by independent organisations. However, the

constraints imposed on NGOs has begun to encourage very loosely organised civic activity

on what resembles an underground basis. Most activist initiatives in Egypt are self-

consciously local and secretive with exchanges deliberately kept ad hoc in order to evade

regime repression. Emerging student and youth groups, professional associations and

workers have been more active especially on the deteriorating human rights situation, as

reformers increasingly lose hope in opposition political parties while the latter become less

critical of the regime. Alternative forms of activism have intensified, such as petitions,

strikes, assemblies, sit-ins, campus protests, vigils, competition around student elections,

and some momentary eruptions of citizen anger in response to killings perpetrated by the

security services. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) remains Egypt’s most powerful

movement at community level but the organisation has splintered and local, community-

level circles linked to the MB run very practical service-related activities, with little

meaningful connection to any over-arching political organisation.

Egypt was reviewed by the UPR in 2019 and 294 out of 372 recommendations received.

The bulk of the accepted recommendations pertained to legal and general framework of

implementation issues, civil and political rights and women’s rights.

The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice the three “divine” (i.e.,

Abrahamic) religions, and Egypt has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and

20. Yet, Islam is the state religion and the main source of legislation is the Islamic sharia.

The Egyptian penal code explicitly outlaws blasphemy and blasphemy cases have been

increasing since 2011. Personal status matters are based on religion and certain churches

also have religious courts to address such matters. Christians reportedly face social exclusion

and discrimination in relation to judicial questions, education, and basic citizen services.

Furthermore, Christians are particularly vulnerable to threats from extremists groups such

as ISIS.

Jordan

continues to prioritize security concerns and maintaining stability in the midst of an

economic downturn and, particularly with the added weight of the pandemic, this has come

at the expense of ensuring progress in human rights in collaboration with civil society. The

activation of the Defence Law in March 2020, and the subsequent issuance of 24 Defence

Orders over the course of 2020, led to the curtailment of personal freedoms and at times

served as justification for clampdowns and censorship of civil society actors. Over the

course of last year, gag orders were issued to the media on several occasions regarding the

teachers’ protests and

the normalisation agreements with Israel. Prominent media

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executives, journalists and cartoonists were arrested and, while they were released, this has

likely reinforced self-censorship in the media. Torture remains an issue with numerous cases

reported by CSOs of abuse, torture and inhumane treatment by the authorities in detention

and correctional facilities and the lockdown has reportedly caused an increase in Gender

Based Violence (GBV) and child labour. In response to growing conservatism among youth

and multiple waves of protests since 2011, including a surge of protests by youth-led activist

movements after 2018, the Jordanian state has worked hard to establish and enforce red

lines in order to rein in the potential impact of unified protests across the country.

Against this backdrop, the political context in Jordan continues to limit the space in which

civil society and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are able to operate, particularly those

dealing with human rights. This influences the scope of the work of CSOs as well as their

ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. One clear example of the shrinking

space for CSOs is the increasing number of laws and bylaws regulating these organisations.

CSOs fall under the Law on Societies and the Law on Non-Profit Organisations and these

and other laws curtail CSOs’ engagement in public life and support to national development

efforts. Key challenges for CSOs include the imposition of limitations on receiving foreign

and domestic funding and restrictions on the freedom of assembly. CSOs also face

challenges in ensuring coordination and coalition-building due to legislative and procedural

hindrances, as well as bureaucratic procedures put in place by governmental authorities. The

lack of sustainable funding often leads to competition among CSOs over available funds

and drives the lack of cooperation and coordination of activities and policies. The lack of

an effective and efficient mechanism for the exchange of knowledge and information

between CSOs inhibits evidence-based lobbying and advocacy. This confines the role of

CSOs to service providers and charities, rather than effective stakeholders in decision and

policy-making. Despite this, the number of CSOs has increased noticeably over the last

years, particularly after the Syrian refugee crisis. In 2018, the number of registered

organisations reached 6136 CSOs and 1180 NGOs. The credibility of a number of these

organisations have been questioned and there are marked regional differences between

them, particular with regards to access to social and financial resources. Syrian refugees are

mainly present in the Northern and Middle regions of Jordan, which gives CSOs in these

areas an advantage in terms of access to resources. CSOs in the South have expressed

frustration at being overlooked in terms of opportunities for funding and networking with

donors. This presents a barrier to reaching youth in marginalized areas. Furthermore, the

presence of Royal Non-Governmental Organisations (RONGOs) distorts competition

between CSOs. These organisations do not operate under the Law on Societies but under

Royal patronage and are exempted from various procedures required for other CSOs while

enjoying easier access to government and foreign funding. In addition to these constraining

factors, there are many challenges that hinder genuine youth participation in civil society

activities. While youth are often the beneficiaries of government and civil society

programmes, they are rarely engaged as partners in organizing activities for youth. CSOs

and government agencies working with youth tend to repeat the same activities, which

hinders motivation and participation of youth in empowerment and participation

programmes. Youth lack incentives (financial or other) to participate in CSO empowerment

projects and lack access to safe spaces which prevents them from being able to freely express

opinions.

The Universal Periodic Review of Jordan took place in 2018. Out of 226 recommendations

received, Jordan supported 149. Most of the supported recommendations pertained to the

legal and general framework of implementation, civil and political rights and women’s rights.

Two recommendations submitted by Denmark were noted (not accepted) by Jordan. One

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recommended that Jordan

“ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” and the other

recommended that Jordan “ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women”.

The Jordanian constitution declares that Islam is the religion of the state. Citizens are free

to exercise all forms of religious rites and worship and Jordan has ratified the ICCPR with

no reservations to art. 18 and 20. Jordan has rather moderate blasphemy laws, but it is still

punishable with a prison term. Apostasy is illegal and may be punished by deeming the

apostate as having “no religion”, which implies being stripped of certain rights. Islamic

religious instructions is on the basic national curriculum, but Christians may teach

Christianity in private schools. Christians reportedly face discrimination in relation to

employment as well as restrictions against public sermons.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Arab Sustainable Development Report 2020:

https://www.unescwa.org/publications/arab-sustainable-development-

report-2020

Morocco - United States Department of State Country reports on Human rights practices

WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf (weforum.org)ECFR

– Caught in Transition: Tunisia’s Protests and the Threat of Repression:

https://ecfr.eu/article/caught-in-transition-tunisias-protests-and-the-threat-of-repression/

UN Women - Tunisia passes historic law to end violence against women and girls:

https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-tunisia-law-on-ending-violence-against-women

HRW

Tunisia:

Police

Arrest,

Use

Violence

Against

LGBTI

Activists:

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists

UNDP/Inclusive Security

–

Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia:

https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Beyond-Revolution_Constitution-Making-in-

Tunisia.pdf

EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture: European Implementation Assessment:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636

OHCHR.

Universal

Periodic

Review

Egypt:

https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session34/EG/Egypt_Infographic.pdf

OHCHR.

Universal

Periodic

Review

Jordan:

https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session31/JO/infographic_Jordan.pdf

EU Delegation to Jordan. EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society in Jordan.

Open Doors Danmark. World Watch List 2021:

World Watch List 2021

—

Open Doors Danmark

U.S. Department of State. 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom:

2019 Report on International Religious

Freedom - United States Department of State

PEW Research Centre. In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a

Decade:

Government Restrictions on Religion Rise Globally | Pew Research Center (pewforum.org)

USCIRF. Annual Report 2020:

*USCIRF 2020 Annual Report_Final_42920.pdf

Humanists International. The Freedom of Thought Report:

Home - Freedom of Thought Report

(humanists.international)

UN Treaties Collection. ICCPR:

UNTC

Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change, and environment

Much like other countries in the MENA region,

Morocco

belongs to one of the most water

scarce environments in the world, making it vulnerable to climate change and to

desertification. Morocco’s economic performance is dependent on rainfall, given that its

economic growth is highly dependent on the performance of the agricultural sector, which

uses 80% of the country’s water resources. Water scarcity is

also closely linked to potential

social tensions, which became apparent by some of the protests a few years ago in Southern

Morocco because of limited access to water. Furthermore, Morocco is importing

approximately 95% of its energy. The government has thus taken important steps to reduce

this dependency and towards energy transition. A number of green economy initiatives have

been rolled out, making Morocco top the Germanwatch’ Climate Change Performance

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Index. There are many opportunities to create links

between DAPP’s job creation for youth

and Morocco’s ambitious programs regarding green and sustainable growth.

Green growth is a key aspect of

Tunisia’s

future, not least because of country’s significant

exposure to climate threats. Among various areas of intervention, Tunisia will particularly

require improved integrated water resources management, particularly in the agribusiness

sector. Tunisia relies heavily on imported fossil energy resources, yet energy subsidies and

constraints to third-party access continue to pose key obstacles to mitigate its foreign energy

dependency, only aggravated by the fact that its primary energy consumption has more than

doubled from 1990 to 2015. Even if it ranks as one of the region’s least energy and carbon

intensive economies, only a 1/10 of its primary energy supply comes from renewable

sources. Tunisia remains ambitions in transforming its energy mix in a green direction,

though requirements for foreign direct investments to advance this process are yet to be

met.

Egypt

is one of the most populous countries in the world. Between 1990 and 2015, the

population grew by 30 million inhabitants, with an annual growth rate of 2.2%, and a total

increase of 30% compared to 1990 census. High population growth rates and densities

impose huge pressures on the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of

sustainable development. Because rainfall is scarce in much of Egypt, the Egyptian

population and economy rely on the Nile River for about 95% of all water needs. There is

significant uncertainty regarding the anticipated impacts of climate change on the flow of

the Nile River. Some studies suggest increased evaporation due to rising temperatures could

decrease water availability in the Nile River by up to 70%. The vast majority of the Egyptian

population lives in close proximity to the Nile River, leaving them highly exposed to floods.

The urban poor and marginalized communities are particularly vulnerable to flood impacts.

Projected increases in temperature and potential decreases in rainfall throughout Egypt will

likely increase water demand, particularly by the agricultural sector, which consumes about

80% of all freshwater resources. Tourism is a key economic sector in Egypt and widespread

economic impacts result from tourism downturns. Erosion and inundation of beaches

affected by sea level rise and coastal storms may adversely impact the attractiveness of Egypt

as a beach destination. Sea level rise can also impact coastal tourism infrastructure and

hotels. Nearly half

of the area dedicated to the tourism sector in Alexandria’s tourism

industry could be underwater with only 0.5 meters of sea-level rise. The fertility of the Nile

Basin has allowed for robust agriculture along the river’s banks for millennia and agriculture

remains an important part of the Egyptian economy. Agriculture accounts for 12% of the

GDP and around 30% of employment in Egypt, with many more engaged in informal or

unpaid agriculture work, particularly women. The increased water demand combined with

increased variability and potential overall decreased flow of the Nile River leave agriculture

particularly vulnerable to changing climate conditions.

Jordan

is beset by a scarcity of natural resources (in particular water) and a small industrial

base within the service sector, which contributes around 70% of GDP and dominates the

economy. The rapid growth in economic activity and population as well as successive

influxes of refugees over the last decade have imposed additional demands on energy

resources. Jordan imports about 97% of its energy requirements, which includes mainly

crude oil, oil derivatives and natural gas. Local sources cover the remaining 3% of

requirements, with renewable energy contributing only a small proportion to this mix. The

import of energy accounts for almost 20% of the GDP, which makes the country completely

reliable on and vulnerable to the global energy market. Climate change is expected to affect

economic growth in Jordan, which will be significantly vulnerable to gradual increases in air

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temperature, decreases in annual precipitation and increases in heat waves, drought events,

dry days and potential evaporation. Scarcity of water resources is one of the major barriers

facing sustainable development in Jordan. Water scarcity will be exacerbated by climate

change as decreased rainfall and evaporation may result in reduced replenishment of surface

water and groundwater reserves.

The EU and EBRD have recently announced the launch of green investments in Jordan’s

private sector. Eligible investment categories include energy efficiency, renewable energy,

water savings, waste reduction and sustainable land management. Target borrowers are

primarily SMEs in the agribusiness, manufacturing and services, logistics & distribution, and

ICT sectors.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Climate Change Performance Index: Still no country good enough; EU stands at a crossroads | Germanwatch.

ECFR

–

Power Surge: How the European Green Deal can Succeed in Morocco and Tunisia:

https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-surge-how-the-european-green-deal-can-succeed-in-morocco-and-tunisia/

World Bank

–

Tunisia Economic Monitor: Rebuilding the Potential of Tunisian Firms:

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/publication/tunisia-economic-monitor-december-2020-

rebuilding-the-potential-of-tunisian-firms

UNFCCC.

Egyptian

Intended

Nationally

Determined

Contribution:

https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf

USAID.

Climate

Risk

Profile

for

Egypt:

https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2018_USAID-ATLAS-Project_Climate-Risk-

Profile-Egypt.pdf

Hashemite

Kingdom

Jordan

Intended

Nationally

Determined

Contribution

(INDC):

https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Jordan%20First/Jordan%20INDCs%20Final.pdf

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Annex 1a

–

Update on the context in Tunisia

Tunisia’s political

situation as of September 2021 and its impact on DAPP

On 25 July 2021, widespread demonstrations took place across Tunisia to protest against the

government’s poor handling of the COVID-19

crisis as well as the dire economic situation. The

protests

called for the government to be dissolved. Tunisia’s President Saied invoked Article 80 of

the Constitution and took executive control, citing an imminent threat to the Tunisian State. He

dismissed the Prime Minister (supported by the Islamist Ennahdha party), suspended the

parliament, and lifted immunity for all parliamentarians, citing the need to address widespread

corruption amongst MPs. In September, the President further suspended certain parts of the

Constitution. To underpin his executive control, the President appointed himself head of Public

Prosecution, a former national security advisor as new Minister of Interior and the head of the

presidential guard as the Acting Minister of Interior. In achieving and maintaining this temporary

political arrangement, the President is heavily reliant on the police and the military. Although the

President has not made an official statement on the length of such emergency measures, the Office

of the President has informed that the current arrangement will last until further notice. A road

map towards either new elections and a new parliament or a proposal to revise the Constitution

may then emerge, although it is also possible that the current arrangement will be prolonged.

The debates regarding the constitutionality

and legitimacy of the invocation of the Constitution’s

Article 80 are ongoing at the time of writing. Some foreign commentators describe the President’s

decisions as a coup while Tunisian commentators for the most part are describing it as a necessary

measure to end the political bottleneck that prevented the government from functioning. Analysts

also describe the situation as the result of the long-standing political feud between secular-oriented

and Islamic-oriented political groupings in Tunisia. The political situation may have an impact on

the on-going negotiations with the International Monertary Fund, although the extent and nature

hereof remains to be seen. In addition, there are emerging geopolitical factors at play.

Since his decisions of 25 July, the President has consulted with civil society and labour unions.

While some decisions taken in the aftermath of the 25 July emergency pointed to an apparent

crackdown on freedom of expression, these were met with a swift and harsh backlash from civil

society, resulting for instance in the President calling for a reversal of the arrest warrants issued

against two Islamist MPs. These efforts by civil society, including the Ordre National des Avocats

Tunisien (ONAT), the Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisien (SNJT), and the Instance

National pour la Prevention de la Torture (INPT) are encouraging signs that Tunisian civil society

is strong and capable of defending human rights and liberties gained in the 2011 revolution. It also

demonstrates that the democratic foundation at the level of civil society and dialogue between civil

society and the state remains intact as one of the key democratic outcomes of the 2011 revolution.

Tunisian civil society remains vigilant, watching the developments closely and with the freedom to

speak out critically and effectively against infringements of rights and liberties. Many organisations

have pledged their commitment to continue playing this watchdog role, while at the same time

contributing to the democratic process. There do not appear to be any current concerns with

continuing to work on the protection and promotion of human rights in Tunisia for national and

international organisations, including those related to DAPP. However, the situation is still

unsettled and the new DAPP will have to adjust to one or a combination of the following scenarios:

a prolonged status quo of the current situation, a return to full parliamentary democracy or a more

volatile situation with incursions on democratic freedoms. DAPP is designed to navigate under

any of these circumstances.

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Annex 2

–

Detailed results framework

Strategic level

Danish Arab Partnership 20222027

Vision statement

Programme

Programme Objective

Impact Indicators

A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa

Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship

Increased employment of young people through entrepreneurship and enterprise

development

SDG 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have

relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and

entrepreneurship

SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere

SDG 8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities,

decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the

formalisation and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including

through access to financial services

SDG 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all

women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal

pay for work of equal value

SDG 8.6 (By 2020) substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment,

education or training

Project 1 Title (Tender)

Project 1 Outcome

Outcome indicators

Baseline

Target

Year

2022

Year

2027

Youth Inclusion and Employment Project

Young women and men have enhanced employability and engage in entrepreneurship

a) Number of young women and men who become employed or have established

themselves as entrepreneurs

b) Number of young people who have been reached by the project and enhanced their

employability

a) 0

b) 0

a) 20,000 young people are employed or have established themselves as entrepreneurs

(minimum 50% young women)

b) 100,000 young people (minimum 50% young women)

SDG Accelerators for Job Creation

SMEs grow and create jobs through development of new innovative solutions or scaling

of existing solutions

a) No. of new jobs created by entrepreneurs and SMEs that have been part of the

SDG Accelerator for Job Creation



Proportion of new jobs created for women



Proportion of new jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)

b) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in employment as

an effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation (disaggregated by gender and

age)

c) Proportion of entrepreneurs and SMEs who report an increase in turnover as an

effect of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation

a) 0

b) -

c) -

a) 4,000 new jobs created in the targeted 800 companies



40% of jobs created for women



70% of jobs created for youth (up to 35 years)

b) 70% experience an increase in company employment as an effect of the SDG

Accelerator for Job Creation

c) 50% experience an increase in company turnover the following years as an effect

of the SDG Accelerator for Job Creation

Project 2 Title (UNDP)

Project 2 Outcome

Outcome indicators

Baseline

Target

Year

2022

Year

2027

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Project 3 Title (IFU)

Project 3 Outcome

Outcome indicators

Baseline

Target

Year

2022

Year

2027

Establishment of Sharaka Capital Fund

SMEs grow and create jobs through improved access to finance and Technical Assitance

a) Number of new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs

(disaggregated on gender and age)

b) Average Revenue Growth in SMEs

a) 0

b) -

a) 30,000 new jobs created or improved (sustained) in targeted SMEs (disaggregated

on women and youth)

b) Average growth rate of 20%

Programme

Programme Objective

Impact Indicators

Human Rights and Inclusion

Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth

SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care

services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration

of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.

SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere

SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and

private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

SDG 5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation

and equal opportunities for

leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life

SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure

equal access to justice for all

SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in

accordance with national legislation and international agreements

Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach

Human rights alliances and networks strengthened

Human rights standards enhanced

Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved

Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus

HROs/HRDs enhanced

MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting,

number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc.

Morocco

Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the

practical administration of justice. NHRI and human rights reporting with

limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life

and in the political system.

Tunisia

The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including

youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been

established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and

corruption. Sizeable civic space but with limited inclusion of youth from

the most marginalized communities.

Egypt

Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without

a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid

increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among

youth outside established organisations and structures.

Jordan

The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus.

Decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs

with limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth

lack incentives to participate in CSO youth empowerment projects.

Morocco

To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or

Tunisia

consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will

Egypt

be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the

Jordan

winning partner or consortium of partners.

Outcome 1

Outcome indicators

Baseline

Year

2022

Target

Year

2027

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Outcome 2

Outcome indicators

Prevention of violence and torture

Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened

Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened

Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced

Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence

improved

MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports

on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc.

Baseline

Year

2022

Morocco

The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently

rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted

in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Youth

vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present.

Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient

rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called

‘Law 58’, but comprehensive implementation is not yet ensured.

Radicalisation targeting youth is particularly present in the country’s

southern regions.

Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison

conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic

violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance

and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile

environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.

Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases

of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to

radicalisation due to political and economic pressures.

To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or

consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will

be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the

winning partner or consortium of partners.

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Target

Year

2027

Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Outcome 3

Outcome indicators

Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media

Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists

enhanced

Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened

Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened

Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced

MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media

stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc.

Baseline

Year

2022

Morocco

The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys

some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less

on issues specific to red lines such as Islam and the Monarchy.

Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in

comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists report facing

pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about

enhanced political influence over private media outlets.

Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is

dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-

oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens

press freedom.

Tunisia

Egypt

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Jordan

The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained.

Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists

frequently practice self-censorship.

To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or

consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will

be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the

winning partner or consortium of partners.

Target

Year

2027

Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Outcome 4

Outcome indicators

Improvement of gender equality

Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources

strengthened

Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced

GBV reduced (including prevention of domestic violence) and protection of victims of

violence enhanced

Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced

Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in

the media enhanced

MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics,

civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc.

Baseline

Year

2022

Morocco

Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal

provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last

revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind.

Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical

disparities in relation to access to services. Child marriages remain an

important challenge in Morocco.

Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding

gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs

focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR

policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services

and education.

Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of

discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded

substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female genital

mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.

Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status

code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth

insufficiently covered in national policy documents.

To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or

consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will

be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the

winning partner or consortium of partners.

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Target

Year

2027

Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

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Annex 3

–

Detailed budget

DANISH ARAB PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME BUDGET 2022 – 2027

(DKK million)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCLUSION

Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights

Outcome 2: Prevention of Violence and Torture

Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media

Outcome 4: Gender Equality

Special Support Budget

Acceleration Funds

Programme Secretariat

EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Project 1: Youth Inclusion and Employment (Tender)

Project 2: Green Growth and Job Accelerator (UNDP)

Project 3: Sharaka Capital Investment Fund (IFU)

Acceleration Funds

Programme Secretariat

INNOVATION FUNDS

MEAL TA

COMMUNICATION

REVIEWS

SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERT

DANISH EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE INITIATIVE

UNALLOCATED

GRAND TOTAL

102,0

4,0

2022

39,0

5,0

8,0

7,0

10,0

2,0

58,0

21,0

10,0

25,0

2,0

2023

90,0

16,0

15,0

14,0

15,0

13,0

3,0

94,0

41,0

10,0

25,0

15,0

3,0

2,0

6,0

2,0

1,0

6,5

2,0

204,5

2024

101,5

16,0

15,0

14,0

20,0

19,5

3,0

107,5

42,0

15,0

25,0

22,5

3,0

4,0

6,0

3,0

2,0

1,0

6,5

2,0

233,5

2025

114,5

16,0

15,0

14,0

20,0

32,5

3,0

92,5

42,0

10,0

37,5

3,0

4,0

6,0

3,0

2,0

1,0

6,0

2,0

231,0

6,0

3,0

1,0

6,0

2,0

150,0

2,0

3,0

1,0

4,0

2,0

79,0

2026

81,0

16,0

15,0

14,0

20,0

2,0

50,0

38,0

10,0

2027

34,0

6,0

7,0

5,0

2,0

33,0

21,0

10,0

Total

460,0

75,0

70,0

90,0

65,0

15,0

435,0

205,0

65,0

75,0

15,0

10,0

30,0

14,0

6,0

5,0

30,0

10,0

1000,0

46,0%

7,5%

7,0%

9,0%

6,5%

1,5%

43,5%

20,5%

6,5%

7,5%

1,5%

1,0%

3,0%

1,4%

0,6%

0,5%

3,0%

1,0%

100,0%

2,0

1,0

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Annex 4

–

Partner assessment

Under the Youth Employment Programme, DAPP has identified two partners UNDP Nordic

(Project 2) and IFU (Project 3), both of which are described in the Programme Document for

Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship. The Programme’s remaining partner(s), a Contractor

responsible for the implementation of Project 1, will be procured through a public tender.

The Human Rights Programme does not have any pre-identified partner(s); a Contractor will

also be procured through a public tender.

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Annex 5

–

Risk management

Contextual risks

Risk Factor

Overall risk factor

Worldwide pandemic or

health crisis.

Likelihood

Likely

–

Almost Certain

Impact

Significant

Risk response

Activities carried out

digitally or with few

participants respecting

sanitary measures.

Residual risk

Short-term risks are

reduced substantially due

to commitment to health

and safety measures.

However, general risk of

curbing of rights and

potential unrest prevails if

crisis is prolonged.

The risk is minor and

actions can be taken by

Denmark to mitigate the

situation.

Background to assessment

The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession

and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest,

and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have

enforced full or partial lockdown, impeding and delaying

activities.

Bilateral/diplomatic

relations between

Denmark and DAPP

countries worsen.

Political

Increasing political

instability with potential

for civil unrest.

Very unlikely

Major

Danish government and

representatives to

ensure and foster

bilateral relations with

all DAPP countries.

Significant deterioration

could lead to a reduced

scope of activities in

affected countries.

Denmark has longstanding relations with all DAPP focus

countries.

Likely

Major

Increasing authoritarian

rule, repression of

minorities, and abuse of

power by security

apparatus.

Likely

Major

The Human Rights and

Inclusion Programme

aims to address these

issues through

collaboration with duty

bearers and right

holders.

Risk continues to be

substantial. The situation

will be carefully

monitored and

appropriate actions taken

as needed in close

collaboration with other

development partners.

Risk remains but varies

among the DAPP

countries. Mitigation

through the programme is

limited to engagement of

government stakeholders

on specific human rights

and youth employment

issues.

Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall

political context remains prone to destabilisation.

Affects possibilities of strategic partners to collaborate with

most critical parts of civil society and may deter new potential

local partners from civic engagement.

URU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 35: Orientering om ny fase af Dansk-Arabisk Partnerskabsprogram 2022-27

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

Risk Factor

Continued presence of

private and public sector

corruption.

Economic

Potential international

economic crisis affects

main trading partners

(such as the EU) and has

a negative impact on

trade, remittances and

FDIs to the focus

countries.

Worsening economic

situation and further

polarization of wealth is

leading to increased

poverty, potential societal

and political unrest and

migration.

Partial or complete

breakdown of financial

institutions and banking

systems or impediment of

cross-border financial

transactions.

Societal

Increasing conflict

between

population groups; social

and religious tension.

Likelihood

Likely

Impact

Major

Risk response

Difficult to mitigate

through instruments

available to the

programme.

DAPP aims to improve

economic conditions,

especially for youth.

However, difficult to

mitigate this risk solely

through DAPP.

DAPP aims to mitigate

economic and social

exclusion of youth.

Residual risk

Short- and long-term risks

remain.

Background to assessment

Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and affects many

sectors, including hampering the business environment.

Likely

Major

Residual risk remains.

However, actions taken

by programme and other

donors can mitigate the

situation.

The economic downturn in the EU following the financial

crisis had a direct impact on the DAPP partner countries.

Almost certain

Major

Risk not substantially

reduced by DAPP alone.

However, actions taken

by programme and other

donors can mitigate the

situation.

Short- and long-term risks

remain but are unlikely.

Risk in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth

and redistribution of wealth. However, IMF programmes

under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to

ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain

sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves

remain adequate.

DAPP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial

infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The

MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe

depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising

inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and

wealth of their respective populations.

Unlikely

Major

While DAPP aims at

improving economic

condition in its focus

countries, developments

in currency and financial

markets are difficult to

mitigate.

DAPP is sensitive

towards the inclusion of

various social

/urban/rural (youth)

groups and minorities.

The programme has an

inclusive approach to

various population

groups, but cannot

mitigate these risks

Unlikely

Major

The short-term residual

risk is not reduced.

However, DAPP aims at

including youth and

minorities and will in the

medium and long-term

contribute to bridging

divides between

urban/rural groups and

minorities.

Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus

countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other

minorities.

URU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 35: Orientering om ny fase af Dansk-Arabisk Partnerskabsprogram 2022-27

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

Risk Factor

Likelihood

Impact

Risk response

through tools available

to the programme.

DAPP aims to promote

the inclusion of youth

–

socially, politically and

economically by

addressing their specific

challenges and needs.

Residual risk

Background to assessment

Generational gap widens

with a growing youth

population that rejects

tribal/communal/age

hierarchies leading to less

social cohesion and

possible youth-led

protests.

Environment

Environmental

degradation, increased

water scarcity, etc. might

lead to internal migration

e.g. rural exodus which

puts pressure on large

cities.

Security

Deterioration of domestic

security context and

occurrence of terrorist

acts.

Likely

Major

Residual risk is not

reduced in the short term.

However, DAPP will

address youth needs and

challenges and in the long

term contributing to

reduce youth frustration.

Youth are not included and experience a growing frustration

and lack of trust in institutions.

Likely

Minor

DAPP will support job

creation and growth in

the green sector and

seek to address root

causes of migration.

The short-term risk is

minor and can be

mitigated by the inclusive

approach of DAP.

All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity

and vulnerable to climate change.

Likely

Major

Increased instability in

border regions due to

violent conflicts in

neighbouring countries.

Unlikely

Major

DAPP and partners to

have strong focus on

safety, maintain

situational awareness,

prepare contingency

plans, and ultimately

phase out projects.

DAPP and partners to

maintain situational

awareness, prepare

contingency plans, and

ultimately phase out

projects. Projects to be

implemented in

geographical areas

deemed as relatively

safe.

Short term risk is reduced

due to safety measures

and contingency plans,

but overall risk prevails.

Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus

countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through

spill over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

Residual risks reduced by

selecting safe areas.

However, the risk is

outside the sphere of

influence of DAPP.

Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAPP focus countries,

such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities.

While border regions to these countries might experience spill-

over by conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain

intact.

URU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 35: Orientering om ny fase af Dansk-Arabisk Partnerskabsprogram 2022-27

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

Annex 6

–

Process action plan

4 January 2021

Start of identification and formulation of new DAPP Employment Programme

15 January 2021

Establishment of MFA task force for preparation of new DAPP

15 January 2021

Start of formulation of new DAPP Human Rights Programme

2 February 2021

Approval of strategic priorities for the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

17 February 2021

Start of preparation of Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP

6 April 2021

Deadline for submission of draft DAPP

Strategic Framework Document to Danida’s Programme

Committee

29 April 2021

Draft Strategic Framework Document for new DAPP presented to Danida’s Programme

Committee

5-29 May 2021

MFA (ELK) appraisal of draft new DAPP programmes for Human Rights and Employment

11 June 2021

Deadline for submission of final draft Strategic Framework Document and Programmes for

Human Rights and Employment to the Council for Development Policy

30 June 2021

Approval (with recommendation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) of final draft Strategic

Framework Document and Programmes for Human Rights and Employment by the Council for

Development Policy

23 September 2021

Formal approval of the new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs

September-October 2021

Preparation of tender material for tender process/procurement of strategic partners

14 October 2021

The Foreign Affairs Committee (Udenrigsudvalget, URU) is informed about the new DAPP

14 October 2021

Start of tender process

8 February 2022

Tender process is completed

URU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 35: Orientering om ny fase af Dansk-Arabisk Partnerskabsprogram 2022-27

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027

Strategic Framework Document

9 February 2022

Contracts with partners are finalised

March-May 2022

Detailed results framework and supporting documentation finalised and approved by MENA

DAPP Team

March-April 2022

Launch of new DAPP by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (date TDB)

1 July 2022

Start of the new DAPP 2022-2027