

Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027



Programme Document Human Rights and Inclusion

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List of abbreviations

AMG	Aid Management Guidelines
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAPP	Danish Arab Partnership Programme
DKK	Danish Krone
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FoRB	Freedom of Religion or Belief
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
HRD	Human Rights Defender
HRO	Human Rights Organisation
ISA	International Standards of Auditing
LGBT+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender +
MFA	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAP	National Human Rights Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRI	National Human Rights Institutions
PANDDH	National Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
ToR	Terms of Reference
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
YSB	Youth Sounding Boards

1 Introduction

The present Programme Document outlines the background, rationale and justification, objectives, and management arrangements for the Danish Arab Partnership Programme (DAPP) 2022–2027 for Human Rights and Inclusion (henceforth the Human Rights Programme), funded and managed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Programme will be implemented in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan (the DAPP countries) from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2027. The Human Rights Programme constitutes one of two programmes under the new DAPP; the other focuses on Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship.

The Danish Arab Partnership Programme has been a key Danish foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since its inception in 2003. In DAPP 2017-2022, three separate engagements under the Governance Thematic Programme focused on human rights, gender equality, and free media. The current human rights contexts in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan show some promising developments but remain difficult with limited room for youth participation. The situation in the DAPP countries, coupled with the Danish policy focus on migration and youth, provides a strong justification for more focused support to the promotion and protection of rights for and by youth. Creating better circumstances for and by young people by promoting and protecting their rights to fully participate in civil society and political dialogue, addresses one of the important root causes of youth disenfranchisement.

The Human Rights Programme will adopt a systemic approach, supporting all stakeholders engaged in the human rights system – rights holders as well as duty bearers. This will inter alia entail support to rights holders such as human rights defenders (HRDs) and human rights organisations (HROs) in their engagements with duty bearers and vice versa. The Programme will support this focus by i) selecting local partner organisations that have youth as a specific target group; ii) concentrating on country level activities; and iii) defining clearer and easier-to-measure targets.

In reducing the number of partner organisations (compared to the previous DAPP phase), the Human Rights Programme will consist of one or a consortium of implementing partner(s), selected through a tender process to collectively address the four outcome areas. Moreover, funding is set aside for support to particular expertise not covered by the implementing partners. This could entail work with minority groups, implemented by specialised HRDs/HROs, LGBT+, and faith-based minorities or specific intervention areas such as Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR). Acceleration funds will be used to accelerate and upscale particularly successful interventions and activities within the programme across all outcomes.

The Human Rights Programme will establish links to the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme by supporting activities aimed at labour market regulations relevant for private sector engagement, e.g. regarding the United Nations Principles on Business and Human Rights and the ‘decent jobs’ agenda. The coordination and synergies between the two programmes will be managed by their respective Programme Management Team/Programme Coordination Boards and Programme Secretariats. Furthermore, the DAPP Youth Sounding Boards, to be established in each DAPP country, will provide guidance on opportunities for synergies and learnings between the two programmes.

2 Context, strategic considerations, and justification

2.1 Programme context

Despite the political, socio-economic, and security-related turmoil in the MENA region, the DAPP countries have generally provided stable contexts for cooperation and partnership building. This stability, however, has yet to be translated into the needed conditions for ensuring a broad respect for human rights and inclusion across societies and generations. With certain notable exceptions, signs of structural human rights improvements have been limited during the previous DAPP 2017-2022 and the promotion and protection of human rights continues to be a sensitive and challenging topic. In all DAPP countries, there is a lack of meaningful cooperation and trust between stakeholders in the human rights system, encompassing state institutions as well as civil society. Governments make insufficient commitments to international obligations and the implementation of national laws, and in some cases actively work to thwart advances in the field. In the case of Tunisia, recent developments are unsettling but there does not appear to be any current concerns with continuing to work on the protection and promotion of human rights for national and international organisations, including those under DAPP.¹

The space for civil society action remains limited or is shrinking in the DAPP countries. The COVID-19 pandemic has further challenged the work of HROs and HRDs and the region's youngest generations remain largely disenfranchised and frustrated. Youth lack the needed avenues to express their concerns or to act as agents of change in meaningful engagements with duty bearers and remain largely excluded from any dialogue on political, economic, and societal progress. This is illustrated by an increase in youth-led movements across the MENA region that challenge political decision makers' commitment to human rights and demand better protection and inclusion through duty bearers. As these youth movements and protests are often driven by the daily frustrations faced by young people, their demands are not necessarily aligned with those of conventional HROs and HRDs.

2.1.1 Specific challenges related to human rights and inclusion

By focusing on four selected outcomes, the Human Rights Programme seeks to build on previous engagements and to expand interventions in particularly promising areas, while bearing in mind the significant contextual differences in the four DAPP countries that all involve challenges and opportunities justifying DAPP's continuous presence.

The National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and other public institutions working in the human rights field continue to struggle in all the DAPP countries. Present in various forms in all DAPP countries, NHRIs generally hold the mandate to address the full range of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and are integral to the countries' human rights systems. These and other public institutions working in the human rights field fulfil important monitoring roles while also serving as entry points to the government and public duty bearers responsible for upholding human rights standards in law and practice as well as maintaining a dialogue with rights holders. The NHRIs vary significantly in their historical legacies, institutional capacities, and the legal frameworks under which they operate. These parameters influence how the public institutions in the human rights field are perceived by youth focused HROs and young HRDs. However, there is room for improvement in their ability to perform methodologically stringent and comprehensive human rights monitoring and reporting in their respective national contexts. It is expected that facilitating the engagement of NHRIs and other public institutions with youth groups and right holders can make the DAPP countries' human rights systems more inclusive and robust. It would provide young people exposed to

¹ Please see Annex 1a for further details on the current (September 2021) situation in Tunisia.

human rights violations with the chance to have their voice heard and help establish pathways for meaningful dialogue with governments and other duty bearers on important rights issues. The degree to which this systemic approach can be achieved will vary between the DAPP countries.

Harassment, violence including Gender-based Violence (GBV), and torture remain widespread. Physical and non-physical violence continues to be prevalent, and young people are subject to arbitrary detention, harassment, GBV, and torture. This erodes their trust and hope for the future. Inadequate access to redress and rehabilitation of victims of violence and torture further diminishes youth's access to a decent life. Addressing these issues is urgent yet complicated as the responsibility rests not only with the authorities, but with all levels of society. Duty bearers need support and technical assistance for i) improving conditions in detention and prison facilities; ii) ensuring that they live up to their international obligations; iii) protecting citizens from gender-based and other forms of violent behaviour; and iv) guaranteeing decent and safe protection and rehabilitation services.

Independent and diverse media under pressure. According to the 2020 World Press Index, DAPP countries were ranked as either being in a problematic situation (Tunisia), a difficult situation (Morocco and Jordan), or in a very serious situation (Egypt). Independent media outlets remain rare and critical journalists are regularly subjected to harassments, surveillance, detentions, and targeted violence. This limits the critical voices across society, particularly for marginalized youth and minority groups. It also induces self-censorship and silences reporting on human rights violations, leading to further frustrations. Civil society and independent media organisations are in need of improved legal frameworks and a diverse media to enable public debates on issues salient for youth in all parts of society.

Gender equality continues to be a human rights challenge, also among youth. While Tunisia and Morocco have witnessed legislative improvements over the last decades, implementation of laws in support of gender equality lags behind in all four countries. The lack of gender equality particularly affects young women, e.g. those that suffer from dominating gender stereotypes and poor access to maternal health facilities, particularly in rural areas. Female genital mutilation (FGM), internationally recognized as a human rights violation, continues to have social acceptance in Egypt. Young men are likewise affected by gender stereotypes, such as seeing themselves as the main breadwinners, and are the ones most likely to migrate, e.g. due to their inability to start a family because of a lack of opportunities. Feminist and gender-sensitive civil society organisations (CSO) should be further supported to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers and enhance their capacity to both influence legislative reforms and monitor whether legal advances are adequately implemented. In this difficult context, previous DAPP phases have demonstrated a range of opportunities for working in partnerships with both rights holders and duty bearers in order to improve such conditions.

2.1.2 Programme target groups and stakeholders

While human rights violations affect everyone, they often affect **youth** disproportionately. At the same time, young people are a part of various sub-groups that have different needs according to gender, education, rural-urban living situations, socio-economic backgrounds, and age. While they might share similar challenges, each sub-group also has its special characteristics, predicaments and challenges. Each sub-group carries different ambitions. In acknowledging contextual nuances and various youth categories and their needs, and to obtain the best results in terms of ensuring a greater **inclusion** of youth, the Human Rights Programme will generally address two different categories of youth:

Young people with the potential to work through HROs and act as HRDs. In middle-income DAPP countries, where around a third of the population has been enrolled in tertiary education, **college and university graduates** represent one of these subgroups. Well-educated youth are profoundly aware of their limitations in terms of the mismatch between available jobs and their skills and education, as well as the significant limitations to their active participation in civic life. They also have great expectations and ambitions for a better life, which if not fulfilled can lead to despair and the desire to seek opportunities outside their home countries. This sub-group has strong potential to engage in human rights work and active citizenship under the new DAPP.

Young people from marginalised communities. Another target sub-group will be those present in less-structured youth movements in both urban and rural areas, including young women and men from poorer urban neighbourhoods and geographically marginalised areas with lower levels of education. Disenchanted and frustrated, these groups are prone to be ‘left behind’ and willing to seek illegal, and often dangerous, ways to emigrate from their home communities. This sub-group rarely finds its voice heard in rights holders’ dialogues with duty bearers and thus require safe, convening, and inclusive spaces for youth learning and democratic engagement.

In addition, the Human Rights Programme will have a particular focus on **including minority groups** such as LGBT+ and faith-based groups, both of which might face specific challenges and are particularly vulnerable to experience both every-day and systemic harassment and violence.

2.2 Strategic considerations

While **youth** is far from being a homogeneous group, the DAPP 2022-2027 aligns with the Danish MFA’s general definition of youth as being aged from 15 to 35 years of age,² thereby ensuring that the programme addresses the needs and concerns of youth all the way to adulthood.

The Human Rights Programme will be explicitly sensitive to variations within youth’s specific needs, not least in terms of gender, location (urban/peri-urban/rural localities), levels of education, etc. This also considers the fact that traditional civil movements in the DAPP countries have not always been successful in including various types of youth focused HRDs and HROs, contributing to an impending ‘generation gap’ and a disconnect between established civil society actors and vocal youth groups.

As human rights programming in the MENA region often addresses the most educated and urban parts of the population, the programme will explicitly focus on including youth voices from geographically marginalised areas.

Respect for **human rights** and **civic inclusion** are essential elements in societies based on the rule of law and democracy. The DAPP 2022-2027 aims at improving civic engagement, particularly for and by youth, by enhancing duty bearers’ capacity to promote and protect human rights, and to provide a space for rights holders and media to voice respect for rights and inclusion. In addition

The world’s largest generation of children and young people is a huge resource for sustainable and lasting change. It is essential that the development cooperation be driven with and by young people instead of for young people only. Across the whole world young activists are at the forefront in the fight for equality, democracy, human rights and the climate. They are united in youth organizations, movements and loosely coordinated networks. [...] Across our development efforts, we will support young people, who work to create positive change. We will ensure possibilities, so that they will be listened to and be included as equal and meaningful partners in the development of their societies.

The World We Share
(Translated from “Fælles Om Verden”)

² Danida AMG: Youth in Development. <https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/youth-in-development/>

to its explicit focus on youth, the Human Rights Programme maintains DAPP's strong support for **gender equality** and DAPP partners are expected to integrate a gender sensitive approach across all outcome areas.

By integrating its four outcomes, the Human Rights Programme aims to explicitly work, whenever possible, with both rights holders and duty bearers following a **systemic approach** to human rights. This means that the promotion and protection of human rights is seen as one interlinked and organic system comprising multiple stakeholders upholding human rights standards as well as addressing human rights violations. All interventions need to consider and identify suitable pathways to enhance synergies and collaboration between relevant stakeholders in each national human rights system. The degree to which this systemic approach can be achieved will vary between the DAPP countries. Implementing partner(s) should be able to benefit from and utilise existing networks and partnerships in the DAPP countries and to apply a strategic and collaborative approach that draws upon multiple sources of expertise and competence.

Denmark has supported human rights, gender equality, and free media in the region and in DAPP countries for many years. There is a well-established cooperation between Danish and local NGOs and, in some instances, with state partners. DAPP's **partnership approach** of supporting rights holders and engaging with duty bearers differentiates it from those of many other international donors. This type of civil society partnership, building on a bottom-up approach and multi-annual partnerships and budgets, has proven to be a Danish comparative advantage in the field of governance and inclusion in the MENA region. The new DAPP will continue to build on the partnership approach to strengthening CSOs and civil society, thereby enabling the civic engagement of youth and influencing duty bearers through a bottom-up approach.

The Human Rights Programme is designed and will be implemented in the spirit of **Doing Development Differently (DDD)**, which was introduced in 2020. The previous DAPP already follows the key DDD principles of adaptive learning and adaptive implementation according to context – underpinned by frequent dialogue between the MENA DAPP Team and partner organisations. DDD comprises two main strands that strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of Danish development cooperation: i) reinforcing the holistic approach; and ii) introducing an adaptive approach with an increased emphasis on learning. DAPP will focus on ensuring that the different projects across the Human Rights Programme have the necessary management set-up and monitoring system to ensure close coordination and learning between the different projects. This will also help to ensure complementarity between the interventions.

The Programme will seek to ensure **complementarity with other interventions supported by Denmark** in the DAPP countries. One key element is the alignment with other forms of Danish civil society support such as the Strategic Partnerships Agreements (SPA) for Danish civil society organisations, which is particularly relevant should the new DAPP partners also be among those organisations receiving SPA funds. Furthermore, DAPP activities are seen as complementary to Denmark's active support for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), whose southern dimension includes the DAPP countries. ENP has a suite of programmes including on good governance, socio-economic development, and migration. In the area of human rights and inclusion, alignment with the ENP could add value to the duty-bearer agenda, based on the ENP's unique toolbox and possibility to create dialogue with duty-bearers. It could also strengthen the strategic human rights agenda and its policy elements, including the human rights dialogue with the intervention countries. Similarly, and where relevant, there will be close alignment with the new MENA North Africa development initiative (DKK 200 million 2021-2024) aimed at strengthening relations between Denmark and the North Africa region under the political priority of addressing migration. For Jordan, Denmark supports a long range of interventions aimed at alleviating the external consequences and human suffering of the Syria Crisis. This includes the

Global Concessional Financing Facility, which receives DKK 70 million (until 2023) to improve social service delivery, economic opportunities and improved access to and quality of infrastructure for host and refugee populations in Jordan. Strengthening of the Jordanian health services through DKK 60 million (until 2023) to the Joint Health Fund for Refugees aims to improve capacity to deliver primary and secondary health services as well as increase the utilization of services by Syrian refugees. Finally, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the Madad Fund) in Jordan receives DKK 100 million (until the end of 2021) to support a range of activities targeting Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities.

2.2.1 Lessons Learned and how they have informed the strategy

Anchored by a longstanding presence in the MENA region, DAPP 2022–2027 builds on the lessons learned and experiences from past programme phases, including recent findings from the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of DAPP 2017-2022 conducted in November 2020. The MTR concluded that engagements concerning human rights, gender equality, and free media had achieved results in most DAPP countries, while also noting that future ambitions needed to be better linked to contextual developments and realities on the ground. Specifically, the MTR recommended that the theories of change for human rights and gender equality be reformulated in a less optimistic manner, given that anticipated developments in the context had not materialised. The new Human Rights Programme is developed with a view to guarding the realism of interventions in a difficult implementation context while maintaining its ambitious approach to the promotion and protection of human rights. Together with the overall Strategic Framework Document for DAPP 2022-2027, the Human Rights Programme is based on an updated context analysis (see in particular Annex 1).

Based on the MTR and other lessons learned under DAPP 2017-2022, the Human Rights Programme will take a point of departure in the following **guiding principles**:

- **Systemic approach** reinforcing the linkages between multiple sets of stakeholders including state institutions and civil society with different mandates and roles in the Human Rights System to strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights,
- **Participation and dialogue** as key instruments for state institutions to engage with civil society to promote human rights. Focus will be on ensuring not only meaningful participation but also the influence of youth on key issues that affect them;
- **Spaces, civic engagement, and partnerships** as key pathways for state institutions and youth civil society;
- **Inclusion and outreach** to ensure that disenfranchised youth from minority groups, urban and rural areas etc. are included and provided with opportunities for cross learning and scaling. A particular focus will also be to strengthen partnerships with youth-led movements and CSOs.

2.2.2 Synergies

The MTR of DAPP 2017-2022 concluded that the envisaged synergies across various programme elements did not fully materialise. To enhance synergies, break with ‘silo thinking’, increase the coherence of interventions, and – hence – a systemic approach, the new Human Rights Programme **integrates activities on human rights, violence and torture, media, and gender equality** into one joint programme with four outcomes. The outcome areas are tailored to the region’s challenging context with more substantial interventions in fewer areas. The previous emphasis on regional efforts and cooperation is reduced and replaced with broader national interventions that include a greater focus on interactions between stakeholders in the human rights system.

The Human Rights Programme will establish links to the **Youth Employment Programme** by supporting activities aimed at labour market regulations relevant for private sector engagement, e.g. regarding the United Nations Principles on Business and Human Rights and the ‘decent jobs’ agenda. This support could be aimed at activities that seek to improve the DAPP countries’ business environment through: i) skills development of tri-partite partners to engage in dialogues on decent jobs; ii) dedicated initiatives that improve legal frameworks and practices to enhance women’s participation in the labour market; and iii) dedicated initiatives to enhance responsible and rights-focused business conduct. Coordination and synergies between the two programmes will be managed by their Programme Management Teams/Programme Coordination Boards and Programme Secretariats. Furthermore, the DAPP Youth Sounding Boards, to be established in each DAPP country, will provide guidance on opportunities for synergies and learnings between the two programmes.

While the partnership approach under DAPP is considered justified, there is potential for more **alignment with like-minded donors** to upscale and multiply efforts. DAPP’s priorities in the field of human rights and inclusion are aligned with the EU’s ‘New Agenda for the Mediterranean’ launched in early 2021. Like-minded donors in the region are supporting programmes and projects that complement and align well with the interventions under the Human Rights Programme. Examples include projects that i) promote human rights standards; ii) support the independence of the judiciary; iii) build the capacity of judges, lawyers and medical professionals to prevent torture and support victims; iv) support independent journalism, access to information and inclusive media spaces; v) support women’s equal participation in political and economic activities; and vi) address GBV. Whenever possible, DAPP will establish formal or informal cooperation with other like-minded donors, particularly the EU and Member States, but also with the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, and Canada, as well as programming conducted by multilateral institutions and United Nations agencies. Given that DAPP’s activities are implemented in different national contexts, options for donor cooperation will be identified on a case-by-case basis, with a view to enhancing the sustainability of DAPP-funded activities. Implementing partner(s) will be tasked, in consultation with the MENA DAPP Team, to map options for cooperation with other donors in DAPP’s inception phase.

2.3 Justification

Danish development cooperation builds on the key principle of **partnerships**. Denmark and Danish stakeholders work in mutually beneficial partnerships with organisations and institutions in partner countries. Through its foreign policy and development cooperation, Denmark fights poverty and promotes sustainable growth and development, economic freedom, peace, stability, and gender equality. At the same time, Denmark aims to counter threats against its own security and way of life and promote the principles, values, and human rights upon which the open and democratic Danish society rests. This is what is presented in Denmark’s Strategy for Development Cooperation, *The World We Share*, and in the Danish Government’s priorities for development cooperation in 2021.

Addressing **migration** is a key Danish policy priority. Limiting irregular migration from North Africa is of great importance to Denmark to ensure stability along the southern border of the EU. Migrants from the MENA region are predominantly young and largely unemployed. According to IOM data, nearly 73% of migrants from the region in 2018 were between the ages of 18 and 35 while 65% were unemployed.³ Results from the 2020 Arab Youth Survey showed that the main reasons that cause young people to consider migrating include economic factors, corruption, lack of security, lack of personal freedoms, and political factors². Based on this situation, DAPP’s youth

³ <https://rocairo.iom.int/regional-migration-data>

focus is tied to its commitment to addressing the lack of prospects and opportunities for the future, in terms of i) employment; ii) inclusion in all aspects of society; and iii) rights, that cause young people to leave their home countries. The Human Rights Programme particularly addresses the two latter factors. Denmark seeks to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin and transfer, thus reducing the impetus for irregular migration, especially among young people.

In addition to the link with migration, the emphasis placed by Denmark on the **inclusion of young people** and collaboration with youth-led organisations is also tied to a recognition that disenfranchisement and lack of opportunities for youth to participate as active members in society causes frustration and anger. The Human Rights Programme builds on these principles and prioritises efforts to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, gender equality and to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society, particularly for the benefit of the large youth populations.

The Human Rights Programme is grounded in international human rights standards including the three principles of applying a **Human Rights Based Approach** (HRBA), as conceptually and strategically defined by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG),⁴ **Leaving No One Behind**, and **Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**.⁵ It does so by working actively to ensure alignment with the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency. *Participation* is ensured by working directly with young people and by including a wide range of youth organisations that represent different segments in society. Relevant youth organisations, as well as the foreseen Youth Sounding Board, will be invited to participate in developing and conceiving specific activities under the programme. *Accountability* is a key principle in Danish development cooperation, and partners engaging in the programme are considered accountable to the MFA as their donor, their own organisations, as well as to the constituencies they work for both outside and within the DAPP countries. *Non-discrimination* is ensured by working in different settings in the countries, ensuring low entry barriers for participation and by working with those HRDs and HROs that are particularly focused on geographically marginalised areas. In terms of *transparency*, clear rules and procedures will be established, both in terms of programme management and in terms of the projects that constitute the interventions of the Human Rights Programme. Through their rights-based work, implementing partners supported through the programme will contribute to promoting the principle of **leaving no one behind**, which will be respected and proactively considered across programme interventions to ensure, to the extent possible, the inclusive and meaningful engagement of vulnerable and disadvantaged people and communities.

Denmark also supports the **Freedom of Religion or Belief** (FoRB) agenda by taking into account relevant international frameworks such as the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The rights and inclusion of faith-based minorities will be supported by interreligious dialogue at the community level, in villages, local urban neighbourhoods, schools, universities and in the media – in other words, at the local level where young people live their daily lives. Challenges pertaining to the FoRB agenda are present, albeit to varying degrees, in the DAPP countries. According to the Arab Youth Survey, religious considerations were also cited as some of the reasons for considering migration.⁶

⁴ <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/human-rights-based-approach>

⁵ <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values>

⁶ https://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/downloadwhitepaper/AYS%202020-WP_ENG_0510_Single-Final.pdf

2.3.1 Alignment with national/regional/global priorities (including SDGs)

The Human Rights Programme outcomes are generally aligned with policy ambitions as they pertain to the **UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**, in particular SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). Despite various signs of progress, these focus areas remain a challenge in the DAPP countries. Working on human rights and inclusion remains challenging in all four DAPP countries. The table below provides a brief overview of key priorities in various country contexts.

Figure 1: Progress on SDGs relevant to the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion



2.3.2 Programme design justification based on OECD DAC criteria

The Human Rights Programme is **relevant** in relation to the situation in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as it addresses the human rights challenges and exclusion experienced by a large number of young people by providing support to youth, HRDs, HROs, CSOs, and minority groups in need of protection, redress, treatment or rehabilitation. At the same time, it is relevant in relation to Danish foreign policy as it combines the policy priorities of i) ensuring a better life for people in Europe’s southern neighbourhood; ii) promoting partnerships between stakeholders in Denmark and the MENA region; and iii) limiting migration flows.

The challenges related to human rights and inclusion in the DAPP countries are widely acknowledged and addressed by other donors such as the EU, the UN, and bilateral donors. The Human Rights Programme will seek strategic **coherence** and alignment with initiatives that are mutually beneficial and reduce duplication. The successful bilateral cooperation with other donors in previous DAPP phases will continue and be further enhanced.

The programme’s **efficiency** is increased by integrating three existing engagements into one programme with fewer partners and outcomes and a more targeted approach for creating spaces and partnerships between duty bearers and rights holders.

The programme’s **effectiveness** is enhanced through lessons learned that point to a systemic approach that strengthens the linkages between the various human rights stakeholders in the human rights system. This includes dialogue and engagement, when feasible, between rights holders (youth HRDs, HROs, CSOs, and minority groups) and duty bearers (government and state

institutions). The programme will also employ a holistic approach to the challenges addressed by applying multiple intervention streams well adapted to each country and its specific target groups. Effectiveness will also be ensured through a strong focus on learning and an adaptive approach throughout the programme period.

The programme interventions will have an **impact** when DAPP partnerships show tangible results in building the capacities of HRDs and HROs to engage and participate in dialogues on human rights, gender equality, prevention of torture, GBV, and violence against minorities as well as strengthening the general capacities and quality of human rights reporting across rights holders and duty bearers. Furthermore, media content and public debates will contribute to the promotion of human rights.

Capacity strengthening of local partner institutions and organisations will be an integral part of the programme and will help to ensure the **sustainability** of interventions. After support from the programme has ended, both the individual youth and local partner organisations will have improved their capacity and built knowledge and experience, which will help them to continue their activities beyond the programme phase.

3 Programme objective and theory of change

3.1 Programme objective

The Human Rights Programme's overall objective is **the promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth**.

The objective links to DAPP's overall vision of **a better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa** as young people need to experience opportunities for being active and protected citizens in order to create a better life for themselves in their home countries.

In accordance with Danish development policy, the programme will continue to follow a **Human Rights Based Approach**. Accordingly, the objective includes developing the capacities of both duty bearers (state and public institutions) to meet their obligations and rights holders (HRDs/HROs, civil society) to claim their rights, and includes youth as a particular target group. Merging all elements of human rights, relative to different and independent engagements from the existing programme, the new DAPP envisions a systemic approach to human rights. A systemic approach will support possible linkages and seek to facilitate dialogue between all stakeholders in the human rights system including public and private, youth and minority groups, with the purpose of strengthening the 'social contract'⁷ between duty bearers and rights holders. As degrees of authoritarianism continue to prevail in some of the DAPP countries, the systemic approach will be carefully adjusted to the specific conditions in each country to reduce the potential dichotomy and tension between duty bearers and rights holders, while also keeping in mind the vulnerability of rights holders. Non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency, and accountability are overarching human rights principles and cut across all outcome areas.


3.2 Theory of Change

Across the MENA region – including in the DAPP countries – daily violations of human rights are preventing youth from expressing themselves freely and exercising their basic rights. NHRIs often lack the capacity and leadership to produce regular and quality reporting. The persistence of torture and GBV, restrictions on media and free expression, and the lack of gender equality and of protection of minorities constitute key challenges to a just and sustainable development.

⁷ Defined as 'an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits' (Oxford dictionary definition).

With the overall objective of promoting and protecting human rights for and by youth, the Theory of Change is based on four interlinked outcome areas. Interventions support and develop capacities of rights holders (youth HRDs, HROs, and CSOs) and duty bearers (state and government institutions) to: i) improve legislation, reforms, and practices on human rights; and ii) engage in dialogue whenever possible. Important intervention areas include the prevention of torture and violence, the enhancement of gender equality and SRHR, the improved protection of freedom of expression, and the strengthening of independent and diverse media.

Figure 2: Theory of Change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion



The programme will adopt a systemic approach in order to create meaningful linkages within the individual DAPP countries' **National Human Rights Systems** that should guarantee human rights and protection to everyone. This protection can only be ensured when human rights actors, frameworks, and processes are in place within a country and if these fulfil their obligations effectively. Only under such conditions can the state comply with its human rights obligations, and only then will all rights holders be better able to claim their rights. All interventions need to consider suitable pathways to enhance synergies and collaboration between relevant stakeholders. The partners will pursue and establish suitable pathways for the changes and outcomes outlined in the programme document.

While this may be the ultimate goal it is also an ambitious one given the challenging context in the DAPP countries. The Programme will therefore choose the transformational pathways and target groups that are most likely to lead to success and have an impact on the ground. In contrast to past efforts, the Human Rights Programme will put more emphasis on supporting the social contract between duty bearers and rights holders. This implies, where feasible, supporting dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders to create space to 'meet in the middle' or narrow the gap where this is feasible. Recognising the value of this path in order for youth to gain trust in authorities and see a future for themselves in their home countries, while at the same time ensuring their protection of harassment and harm, the programme acknowledges that certain country contexts might mean that success in achieving such dialogues could be limited.

Duty Bearers pathway


The Human Rights Programme will be implemented wherever duty bearers show willingness to move forward with human rights reforms, both legal and institutional. The Programme will

support this engagement on a broad range of issues that are relevant to the implementation and enforcement of human rights obligations, with a particular thematic focus on i) the prevention of torture, GBV and violence against youth and minorities; ii) the support to free and diverse media among and for youth; and iii) the enhancement of gender equality.

This pathway will target the key stakeholders that are able to influence national governance structures related to human rights issues. These stakeholders range from NHRIs to ministerial offices and other public institutions assigned to manage the human rights agenda. The pathway could also include support to the development of National Human Rights Action Plans, supporting improvements in human rights monitoring, reporting, and follow-up systems, and improving access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence. The Human Rights Programme will also work to enhance duty bearers' capacity to promote inclusive civic spaces and dialogues with various youth organisations and sub-groups.

These actions will be further strengthened through alignment with regional and international frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and UN human rights instruments when opportunities emerge, and through timely engagement with national networks and institutions with similar objectives to those of DAPP.

Figure 3: Target groups and pathways of change for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion



Rights Holders pathway

CSOs, media outlets, youth movements, journalists, and HROs/HRDs as well as minority groups (including LGBT+ and faith-based) and youth groups experiencing violations of their human rights will receive technical support and capacity in areas considered imperative to enhance youth and civil society role in the human rights system and, when possible, their social contract with duty bearers. This could include capacity development for improved dialogue, public debates, creation of civic spaces, and facilitating participation in legislative and policy work on prevention of violence and torture, gender equality including in political and economic life, and rights of minorities and marginalised groups.

The rights holders' pathway will include mobilisation and targeted support to youth groups and youth movements enabling their participation in civil society's engagement with duty bearers on human rights issues. This will also entail initiatives that engage youth as active citizens and enable them to advocate for their rights.

Rights holders, and coalitions of these, will further be supported in Universal Periodic Review (UPR) reporting and/or drafting shadow reports to the treaty bodies. The programme and its

partners will also support rights holders' access to EU and UN human rights mechanisms when this can benefit local work at country level.⁸ Work on instruments relating to the Council of Europe will be supported, in particular the standard setting Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. For this work to be efficient, it is important to act in complementarity with other initiatives and strengthen coordination with these.

Bringing these elements together under a single programme will provide more tools, and more flexibility, in order for DAPP to act in the volatile environment of the MENA region and strengthen the effects of the programme.

3.3 Programme interventions

The Human Rights Programme addresses four interlinked outcomes. Considering the needs and opportunities for programme engagement with rights holders and duty bearers, the overall budget distribution between these two categories is estimated at 70% for rights holders and 30% for duty bearers.

Outcome 1: Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach

Activities under this outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach that supports greater linkages and facilitates dialogue between all relevant stakeholders in the human rights system. This includes activities aimed at increasing the space for civil society as well as, wherever possible, at strengthening the social contract between duty bearers and rights holders. The Programme targets those stakeholders, with different mandates in the human rights system, who are willing to contribute to the same objective, namely to protect and promote human rights with an inclusion of youth. This entails strengthening the capacity of reform agents within authorities that promote and protect human rights, including minority rights. The focus will be on: i) creating networks and alliances to enhance reform efforts across human rights areas addressed in this Programme; ii) the mobilisation of various youth groups and movements; iii) NHRI reporting on human rights; and iv) strengthening the overall engagement and responsiveness of NHRIs and other public institutions in dialogues with youth-focused HROs/HRDs and representatives of minority groups.

Implementation of Outcome 1 will involve considerable resources and efforts through the involvement of a multitude of rights holders (HROs/HRDs, CSOs, youth movements, and organisations, etc.) and duty bearers (NHRIs and other public institutions including ministries, government agencies, municipalities, etc.). This implies that the partner(s) will need to work in a collaborative and integrative manner and that all take active part in implementing the activities in support of Outcome 1.

In **Morocco**, constitutional revisions have yet to be translated into the practical administration of justice. Young generations generally lack avenues for engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. The NHRI and human rights reporting have only a limited focus on the inclusion of youth.

In **Tunisia**, the traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as it has been envisioned in the constitution of 2014, is yet to be established. Youth is subject to arbitrary violence, torture, and corruption. There is limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalised communities in the civic space.

In **Egypt**, the human rights record continues to be poor. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs are struggling to operate amid increasing

⁸ Such as bi-lateral subcommittees on human right; the European Parliament sub- committee on human rights; the EU Special representative on human rights; and EU civil society forums related to the EU's Neighborhood policy.

pressure from security forces. There is an intensifying activism among youth outside established CSOs and structures.

In **Jordan**, the NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus and there is decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs have limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth, and youth lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects.

To address the above challenges, the main **pathways** to change will comprise capacity development and awareness raising within state and national institutions promoting and protecting human rights for and by youth. This outcome will centre on ensuring a systemic approach across all outcome areas where the various stakeholders – both duty bearers and rights holders – operate in the same sphere for and with youth.

Outcome 2: Prevention of violence and torture

With a focus on youth, interventions will promote legislative reforms as well as strengthen the capacity of rights holders to engage with duty bearers to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures for violence. Interventions will target the capacity development of duty bearers to strengthen legal frameworks, initiate necessary reforms, and change practices with the aim of preventing torture, GBV, and violence against minorities. Furthermore, interventions will seek to provide space for dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders and to enhance the ability of civil society to document cases and conduct advocacy on torture prevention, GBV, and violence against minority groups. Interventions will also seek to ensure redress, rehabilitation, and treatment for victims of torture and violence.

In **Morocco**, the practice of torture continues to occur, and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. There are problems of overcrowding in prisons. The GBV law of 2018 is challenged at the level of practical implementation.

In **Tunisia**, torture remains a major concern in prisons, and there is insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV is addressed through the adoption of ‘Law 58’ but effective implementation remains a challenge.

In **Egypt**, there are concerns about arbitrary arrest and detention, forced disappearances, harsh prison conditions, and continuing incidences of torture. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems and societal resistance and poor law enforcement hinder progress.

In **Jordan**, torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. There is an increasing number of cases of GBV, including domestic violence.

The main **pathways** to change will comprise capacity development of key agents within state institutions and CSOs to strengthen legal frameworks, consultations, monitoring, reforms, and practices for the prevention of torture and violence. Through the enhanced participation and capacity of youth, civil society will engage and work with duty bearers on preventive measures to torture, GBV, and violence against youth and minority groups. Providing access to redress, treatment, and rehabilitation for victims of torture and violence is an important pathway to enhance trust between duty bearers and youth rights holders.

Outcome 3: Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media

Interventions under this outcome will seek to improve framework conditions for independent media as well as to ensure the safety of journalists and young media activists. This will be achieved through dialogue between media outlets, civil society, and government bodies prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms. Working closely with young journalists, the capacity of media outlets and the content they produce will be improved. Similarly, the capacity of media partners to include youth rights holders, particularly from geographically marginalised areas,

in the public debate and to report on violations of human rights will be strengthened. This includes issues pertaining to gender equality, torture, GBV as well as LGBT+, FoRB, and other minority groups.

In **Morocco**, the state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies, but less when reporting on issues sensitive to the government.

In **Tunisia**, there is a substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with the rest of the MENA region. However, journalists are still facing pressure and intimidation and there are concerns about enhanced political influence on private media outlets.

In **Egypt**, independent media operates under challenging circumstances. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom.

In **Jordan**, the agency of independent media actors is constrained and media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced. Journalists frequently practice self-censorship.

The main **pathways** to change towards enhanced independent and diverse media are through legal and institutional reform, strengthening media outlets, youth movements and youth CSO participation. The pathway towards free, independent and diverse media involves building the capacity of a diverse set of media outlets and youth CSOs using media to raise debates on human rights. To facilitate the pathway towards institutional and legal reform, the programme will support partnerships and dialogues between media outlets, young journalists, youth movements, youth activists, CSOs, and duty bearers.

Outcome 4: Improvement of gender equality

Interventions under this outcome will aim at legal and institutional reforms that improve representation, recognition, and equal access to resources. Capacity development will focus on enhancing the ability of young rights holders and committed duty bearers to promote, enforce, monitor, and raise awareness on gender equality and non-discrimination. This includes reinforcing the capacity of rights holders to advocate duty bearers on legislative reform as well as to monitor and report on the implementation of legislation. Particular focus will be on i) access to Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) particularly for youth; ii) equal participation of young men and women in political life; iii) reducing GBV including prevention of domestic violence and enhancing the protection of victims of domestic violence; and iv) civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media.

In **Morocco**, there are important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist. There are improvements in SRHR, though the lack of financial resources and geographical disparities hampers access to services. Child marriages continues to constitute a challenge.

In **Tunisia**, important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality establish Tunisia as a front-runner in the MENA region. Important achievements notwithstanding, Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure women and girls' access to services and education.

In **Egypt**, legislative and institutional reforms on gender equality are being implemented, but there is a persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. FGM is prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.

In **Jordan**, legislative and institutional reforms on gender equality are being implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth is insufficiently covered in national policy documents.

Core gender equality activities will be conducted under Outcome 4 (further detailed in the results framework, Annex 2). In addition, gender equality interventions will be included throughout the Human Rights Programme's Outcomes 1, 2, and 3.

The main **pathways** to change are through strengthening of gender equality legislation and reforms, as well as the dialogue between rights holders and duty bearers responsible for securing equality in economic, political, and social rights. Furthermore, the programme will strengthen the capacity of youth in civil society to participate in government spaces and dialogues on gender equality legislation and reforms as well as the overall monitoring of and reporting on the enforcement of legal frameworks. Additionally, strengthening equal participation of young women and men in political life and public debates and work on SRHR and LGBT+ rights is considered a critical pathway towards enhanced gender equality.

Key critical assumptions

For the outcomes to be achieved several risks and critical assumptions will have to be addressed and considered. Contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks are presented in Annex 5. The main critical assumptions for a successful implementation of the new programme include:

- The implementing partner(s) will be able to address all four outcome areas based on adequate and contextual knowledge and thematic expertise to support relevant partners in the four countries;
- The implementing partner(s) will be able to transmit knowledge and expertise relevant to the needs and demands of local partners;
- The implementing partner(s) has/have extensive experience in managing a programme with a similar scope and budget;
- Political, economic, and social conditions in the DAPP countries are conducive to the establishment of partnerships between the implementing partner(s) and its local partners;
- Rights holders and duty bearers in the DAPP countries have the capacity to absorb and adequately manage the support from the implementing partner(s);
- The implementing partner(s) can build on existing partnerships and established networks.

4 Summary of the results framework

The results framework below presents the programme objective and the four programme outcomes. The detailed results framework – including indicative outputs for each outcome – is included in Annex 2.

Based on the four pre-determined programme outcomes, the tendering organisation(s) will prepare a results framework as part of the tender process in which the Tenderer will specify deliverables at output level and include SMART outcome and output indicators, Means of Verification as well as detailed baselines and targets. Indicators in the proposed results framework should be disaggregated in terms of gender, age, and various youth target groups. It is anticipated that the Tenderer will be able to clearly demonstrate the added value of its expertise, document how it will transmit this expertise to local partners, and prepare the detailed results framework based on its key competencies and opportunities to deliver in the DAPP countries. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.

Programme	Human Rights and Inclusion
Programme Objective	Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth
Impact Indicators	<p>SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.</p> <p>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.</p> <p>SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.</p> <p>SDG 5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life.</p> <p>SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.</p> <p>SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.</p>

Outcome 1		Promotion and protection of Human Rights through a systemic approach enhanced	
Outcome indicators		<p>Human rights alliances and networks strengthened</p> <p>Human rights standards enhanced</p> <p>Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved</p> <p>Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Jordan</p>	<p>Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI and human rights reporting with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system.</p> <p>The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but with limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities.</p> <p>Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures.</p> <p>The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage with human rights issues. CSOs with limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO youth empowerment projects.</p>
Target	Year 2027	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Jordan</p>	<p><i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i></p>

Outcome 2		Prevention of violence and torture	
Outcome indicators		<p>Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened</p> <p>Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened</p> <p>Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced</p> <p>Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted

		Tunisia	in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present.
		Egypt	Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58' but comprehensive implementation is not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is particularly present in the country's southern regions.
		Jordan	Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures.
			<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Outcome 3		Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media	
Outcome indicators		Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced	
		Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened	
		Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened	
		Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced	
		MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc.	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines.
		Tunisia	Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists reports facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets.
		Egypt	Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom.
		Jordan	The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Outcome 4		Improvement of gender equality	
Outcome indicators		Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened	
		Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced	

		<p>GBV reduced (including prevention of domestic violence) and protection of victims of violence enhanced</p> <p>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced</p> <p>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Jordan</p>	<p>Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Child marriages remain a challenge in Morocco.</p> <p>Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education.</p> <p>Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female genital mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.</p> <p>Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents.</p>
Target	Year 2027	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Jordan</p>	<p><i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i></p>

5 Budget

The budget for each outcome is presented in the table below.

Outcomes	Budget (DKK million)						TOTAL
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	
Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights	5	16	16	16	16	6	75
Outcome 2: Prevention of Violence and Torture	8	15	15	15	15	7	75
Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media	7	14	14	14	14	7	70
Outcome 4: Gender Equality	7	14	14	14	14	7	70
Special Support Budget	10	15	20	20	20	5	90
Acceleration Funds (including pilot activities in Algeria, if feasible)		13	19,5	32,5			65
Programme Secretariat	2	3	3	3	2	2	15
TOTAL	39	90	101,5	114,5	81	34	460

A budget line for **Special Support** is included to cater for specific and targeted interventions by Danish NGOs or other specialised entities with expertise and experience, beyond those of the lead partner or the consortium partners, needed to fulfil the outcomes. The implementing partner(s) will manage the Special Support for smaller project-based interventions. Interventions are subject to no-objection from the MENA DAPP Team.

In line with the adaptive approach of DDD, DKK 65 million have been allocated to an **Acceleration Fund**. Successful engagements under the outcomes with potential scaling will benefit from this allocation. Programme reviews will provide input to the decision of the MENA DAPP Team on how these funds will be allocated. Activities in Algeria may also be considered for acceleration funding.

The **Programme Secretariat** (see section 6.2) will support the financial management of the Programme according to MFA guidelines as well as be responsible for programme monitoring, reporting, and communication. The budget for the Programme Secretariat will cover salaries, office space, IT, travel, etc.

Annex 3 includes the outcome-based budget. A detailed output-based budget will be prepared by the implementing partner(s). It is foreseen that the budget allocated to the respective four DAPP countries will vary. All budgets prepared by the three projects will include a split between the four DAPP countries for approval by the MENA DAPP Team. Options for a potential expansion of activities to Algeria will be decided during the inception phase. In support of a systemic approach at the national level, a maximum of 10% of the budget may be earmarked for regional activities.

Beyond the budget available at programme level, a budget line for innovation is available at DAPP level. Detailed procedures for how these funds will be activated are to be developed in the inception phase.

6 Implementation and management arrangements

6.1 Programme partners

The Human Rights Programme will be tendered through an open tender procedure similar to the tender for engagements under the previous DAPP and implemented by a partner or a consortium of partners. Hence, the partner(s) will not be known until after completion of the tender.

The partner(s) are expected to have extensive knowledge and experiences in addressing the areas of intervention under each of the four outcome areas. The partner(s) will identify suitable local partners in the four countries of cooperation and in partnerships deliver according to the agreed results framework. The partner(s) will be civil society organisation(s) and/or other independent state-funded institution(s). The partner(s) will be expected to have physical and lasting representations in the four countries.

6.2 Organisational set-up

A lesson from the DAPP 2017-2022 is a need for better coordination among involved partners in the management of a programme with multiple stakeholders. In the design of the new programme, steps have been taken to strengthen coordination.

The programme will be managed and implemented by a partner or a consortium of partners winning the tender.


All single Tenderers shall propose a suitable management set-up in Denmark as well as in the four countries in their tender proposal.

All tendering Consortia shall propose a suitable management set-up in Denmark as well as in the four countries in their tender proposal based on the following guiding principles:

A **Consortium Agreement** will formalise cooperation between the participating organisational entities and is to be included in the tender proposal. The agreement shall outline the mutual obligations and decision-making structure between the Consortium partners. They are expected to establish a **Programme Management Team** (or similar) with representatives from each organisational entity and headed by a **Team Leader**, appointed by the implementing partners. The

Programme Management Team will be collectively responsible for overall programme decisions and strategic dialogue with MENA.

Figure 4: Programme organisation for the Programme on Human Rights and Inclusion



The implementing partners will be expected to establish a **Programme Secretariat** and will propose a suitable management set-up in the tender proposal. The Secretariat will be in Copenhagen while the implementing partner(s) awarded the tender will have a physical presence in each of the four DAPP countries.

The Programme Secretariat will be led by the **Team Leader**, who will represent the Consortium in all operational relations and contractual obligations to MENA, which includes compliance with MFA rules and procedures on e.g. financial management, anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, PSEAH, etc. The implementing partners must further appoint or recruit a Programme Coordinator (subject to a no-objection from MENA), a Monitoring Officer, and a Controller as Programme Secretariat staff.

The **Programme Coordinator** will facilitate and coordinate the overall programme management and ensure that the Consortium partners prepare and plan, implement, and report against the same formats and procedures. She/he will ensure collaboration between Consortium partners, facilitate learning, synergy, and adaptive management and be responsible for compiling and managing all required reporting to MFA. The **Monitoring Officer** will be responsible for i) the programme monitoring system with inputs to be provided by the Consortium partners; and ii) liaising with the MEAL Unit. The **Controller** will be in charge of i) financial management and accounting of the programme, including the Special Support Budget and the Acceleration Budget, according to MFA Guidelines; and ii) liaising with controllers from the participating organisational entities and facilitating joint annual financial reports to MENA.

Besides ensuring proper management of the implementation of the Human Rights Programme, the Secretariat will also assist the Programme Management Team and serve as a link between the implementing partners and the third party monitoring (MEAL Unit) to be engaged directly under the MENA DAPP Team, cf. Section 6.3.

As such key tasks of the Programme Secretariat will be:

- Harmonisation and streamlining of the monitoring set-up between the four outcomes;
- Coordinating M&E data collection between the four outcomes;
- Linkages to strategic MEAL Unit (c.f. section 6.3);
- Streamline reporting to MENA DAPP Team;
- Dialogue with MENA DAPP Team and Embassies;
- Secretariat for the Programme Management Team;
- Advise and support to streamline financial management arrangements to MFA requirements;
- Convene space for coordination across countries.

The implementing partners will be responsible for staffing the Secretariat appropriately and will propose a suitable management set-up in the tender proposal. The Secretariat will be in Copenhagen while the implementing partner(s) (single partner or consortium of partners) awarded the tender for the Human Rights Programme will have a physical presence in each of the four DAPP countries.

A **Special Support Budget** is included to cater for specific and targeted interventions by NGOs or other specialised entities, which are outside of the capacity of the implementing partner or consortium of partners. The implementing partner(s) (if in a consortium, through its Programme Secretariat), will manage the Special Support Budget for smaller project-based interventions subject to a no-objection from the MENA department. In order to qualify for special support funds, partners must justify the need for specific expertise, and demonstrate that the expertise is beyond the capacity of the partners, in order to implement specific activities. The implementing partner(s) will also be required to specify which outcomes and outputs the specialised NGOs will be contributing to and how much funding will be allocated to each of them. Furthermore, MoUs for each proposed partnership between the implementing partner(s) and specialised NGOs must be included in the tender material.

The budget likewise includes **Acceleration funds** to support the upscaling and acceleration of successful initiatives and activities under the programme. The implementing partner(s) will manage these funds, which will be allocated based on decisions made by the MENA DAPP Team after an annual stocktaking in 2023 and a mid-term review in 2024. To qualify as a recipient for acceleration funds, the implementing partner(s) must provide an initial justification that demonstrates the success of the initiative and why it is likely to benefit from the acceleration funding, and if relevant backed up by a proposed change to the results framework and Theory of Change of the programme to accommodate the effects of upscaling and acceleration at the output level. Furthermore, the implementing partner(s) must submit a brief project description and a budget to receive a 'no objection' from the MENA DAPP Team. No objections will consider the partner level of financial execution, progress in terms of results, and overall absorption and financial management capacity.

A **Youth Sounding Board (YSB)** will be established in each of the four DAPP countries. The YSB is a group of young people who will function as a consultative group with the purpose of safeguarding and strengthening young people's voice and perspective in relation to policy, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The YSBs will provide their views on the design of specific interventions to ultimately ensure a better programme. During the inception phase, the MENA DAPP Team will in consultations with the Embassies and the MEAL Unit facilitate the set-up of YSBs and identification of relevant candidates.

6.3 Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning

DAPP will be monitored according to Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) principles,⁹ and the MENA DAPP Team will have the overall responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive overview of the progress towards achieving outcomes and impacts of DAPP.

Monitoring at the Human Rights Programme level

Results-based monitoring at programme level will provide the information needed to assess whether programme performance is as expected. It entails measuring progress towards achieving outputs and outcomes. It will include the compilation, assessment, and presentation of monitoring information according to the agreed results-based frameworks and SMART indicators defined for the programmes.

The DDD approach entails a programme design with space for adaptive and iterative learning processes leading to adjustment of the intervention logic over time. A fundamental basis for succeeding with this approach is that implementing partners have analytical capacity and a strong and well-functioning MEAL system capable of collecting data, tracking results and accumulate learning. The detailed methodologies for implementing MEAL by partner organisations at the programme level will be developed as part of the tender proposals (programme results-based monitoring) and further refined during the six months inception phase. The partner(s) will be responsible for compliance of all MFA strategies and requirements on fraud and anti-corruption, safety and safeguarding, PSEAH, etc. The level and quality of all reporting to MFA will follow the requirements outlined in the AMGs and follow the DDD principles.

If in a consortium, programme results-based monitoring will be implemented by the Programme Secretariat. If in a consortium, each implementing partner is responsible for reporting on the results frameworks of their respective projects based on collecting, validating, analysing, and reporting data and evidence of results from their partnerships and activities in the DAPP countries. The Programme Secretariat will ensure that each implementing partner prepares plans, implements and reports against the same monitoring and reporting formats. The Programme Secretariat will also facilitate and coordinate the collaboration between the partners and act as secretary of the Programme Management Team. The Monitoring officer in the Programme Secretariat will be responsible for compiling and formatting inputs from the partners' monitoring officers. The Programme Secretariat will facilitate consolidated annual programme progress reports, work plans, and other relevant reporting to the MENA DAPP Team.

The partner(s) will also prepare a plan for the communication of results including to a broader audience.

MEAL at the strategic DAPP level

The MENA DAPP Team and an externally recruited MEAL Unit will together be responsible for MEAL at the strategic DAPP level. The MEAL Unit will be a crucial link between the implementation level on the ground by partner organisations and the DAPP MENA Team's oversight function. It will have a full-time presence in the region, with two field offices in Amman (Jordan) and Tunis (Tunisia), to undertake third party monitoring in all DAPP countries, focusing on quality assurance as well as strategic and impact monitoring for both programmes (Youth Employment and Human Rights). The MEAL Unit will also provide relevant input in terms of the adaptive approach of the programme as the MEAL Unit will have a more holistic overview of the programme and can provide input in terms of how the different interventions might be adjusted

⁹ These five principles include (1) tracking real-time progress, (2) continuous learning and identifying needs for adjustments, (3) ensuring the information exists for adaptive management, (4) documenting unintended effects, both positive and negative, and (5) assessing real impact on the ground.

for better results or greater impact. Further details on the MEAL Unit are provided in the Strategic Framework Document (section 5.2).

7 Financial management, planning, and reporting

7.1 Financial management

Management of the Danish funds will be undertaken by the partners in accordance with MFA's Financial Management Guideline for Development Cooperation:

<https://amg.um.dk/en/tools/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing/>

The partner(s) will sign a contract with the MFA and be responsible for all financial planning and management according to MFA Guidelines including e.g. procurement, work planning, narrative financial progress reporting, accounting, and auditing.

The partner(s) will be responsible for all financial management including funds allocated from the Special Support and Acceleration Fund. Allocation from these budgets will be subject to a no-objection from the MENA Department.

The Programme Secretariat will assist the partner(s) in preparing annual programme financial management report to the MFA.

7.1.1 Disbursement & accounting

Funds will be disbursed by MFA directly to the lead partner based on annual budgets and work plans. Funding requests will be in accordance with the MFA guidelines and will be submitted before any disbursements are carried out.

The lead partner will establish designated bank accounts for the MFA funds. Procedures regarding cash handling, approval of expenditures, reporting, budget control and other internal control, including control of assets (fixed assets, stores, debtors and cash) shall be based on sound financial management procedures and International Accepted Accounting Standards.

7.1.2 Audits

The partners are audited on an annual basis. The audit period follows the calendar year. Audits shall be carried out as a stand-alone or special purpose audit i.e. covering only income and expenditure for the particular activities funded through DAPP. The audits will be conducted in accordance with International Standards of Auditing (ISA) and should include elements of compliance and performance audit. The audit report shall include a management letter/report.

It is the responsibility of the Team Leader to ensure that any sub-grantees and sub-contractors are audited on an annual basis, that the audit reports are received timely and that these reports are consolidated into the overall audit reports. The Team Leader shall ensure that any material issues raised in the auditor's report are followed up on in a timely and appropriate manner and that necessary actions taken. The MENA DAPP Team reserves the right to claim full reimbursement of expenditure regarded as ineligible according to the agreement between the parties. The accounting documentation shall at any time be available for scrutiny by the MFA and the Danish Auditor General.

7.1.3 Anti-corruption

Upon suspicion or awareness of specific cases of corruption involving staff members and/or implementing partners, the implementing partner is obliged to notify the Team Leader, who is obliged to immediately notify the MFA's MENA Department in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Policy of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs ("Zero tolerance").

The below standard corruption clause applies between the parties of this Programme and should be inserted in agreements signed with sub-partners:

Corruption Clause: *No offer, payment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which could be regarded as an illegal or corrupt practise, shall be made, promised, sought or accepted – neither directly nor indirectly – as an inducement or reward in relation to activities funded under this agreement, incl. tendering, award or execution of contracts. Any such practise will be grounds for the immediate cancellation of this agreement and for such additional action, civil and/ or criminal, as may be appropriate. At the discretion of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a further consequence of any such practise can be the definite exclusion from any tendering for projects or other funding from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

7.2 Reporting

The partner or consortium of partners will produce yearly progress reports (narrative and financial). If the tender is awarded to a consortium of partners, the Programme Secretariat will prepare and submit annual progress reports and work plans to the MENA DAPP Team. The following shall be addressed in the narrative reporting:

- An assessment of developments in the contextual framework during the past year and how they specifically relate to, affect, and are affected by Programme outcomes/outputs;
- Implementation of the work plan and budget based on output targets for the reporting period, including brief explanations of challenges encountered and deviations from targets/milestones and how these have been assessed and handled;
- Progress to date compared to output and outcome targets for the entire programme period as stipulated in the results framework (mainly annual reports);
- An analysis of risks, including both reflection on the reporting period and the upcoming reporting period;
- Challenges encountered and specification of recommended changes and adjustments (including budget re-allocations) for approval by the relevant authorities;
- Update on implementation of decisions, follow up on recommendations from reviews, audits, monitoring visits, etc.

Financial reporting shall as a minimum include:

- The same level of detail as the approved output-based budget;
- Budget figures, actual spending and variance for the period under reporting and for the entire engagement period;
- A listing of funds received during the period and accumulated;
- Explanations of deviations and any budget reallocations within the period, including details on the written approval of the reallocation/adjustment.

Monitoring, meetings and reviews: The MFA is entitled to carry out technical and/or financial missions, reviews, evaluations and audits during the grant period either themselves or through the third-party monitoring contract. The annual progress reporting and documentation on monitoring and evaluation will be the basis for continued support and development of new work plans, as well as for continuous assessment of and adjustments to risks. Through the MEAL Unit, the MENA DAPP Team will facilitate coordination, learning and synergies across the programmes. A number of reviews are foreseen as input to the management of the programme:

- An inception review after six months to assess the start-up process and the result frameworks established and to possibly adjust indicators, baseline values, etc.;

- An annual stocktaking in 2023 and in 2026 to assess progress. The annual stocktaking in 2023 will furthermore provide recommendations related to the potential use of the Acceleration Funds;
- A mid-term review (MTR) in 2024 to assist in planning the second half of the programme period and adapt the programme to changing circumstances. The MTR will have a particular focus on emerging opportunities for scaling synergies on human rights and business interventions between the Youth Employment Programme and the Human Rights Programme, and provide recommendations related to the potential use of the Acceleration Funds.

8 Risk management

DAPP operates in a high-risk environment and implementation is likely to be affected by the fragile political, security, and economic situation in the region.

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic will most likely continue to affect countries, societies, and communities in the region, including the four intervention countries, for the foreseeable future. The pandemic is a risk factor for the overall implementation of the programme. However, the previous DAPP 2017-2022 has demonstrated flexibility and capacity to adapt and address such risk factors.

The tendering partners for the new programme will provide an overall risk management framework for all risk management and mitigation measures including how the partners will address current and possible new risks that have emerged after the tender.

Despite differences in the level of risk in the DAPP countries, some of the main contextual, programmatic, and institutional risks – some of which are naturally interlinked – include the following:

Contextual risks: Contextual risks include worsening economic situations and political destabilisation in one or more DAPP countries. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic represents a significant contextual risk as it is leading to economic recession, causing higher levels of unemployment, and consequently increasing the likelihood for unrest.

The risk that a worsening economic situation and further polarisation of wealth will lead to increased poverty and migration is present in all four DAPP countries. Economic crises will make the prospect for private sector-led growth and entrepreneurship difficult.

Politically, the risk of decreasing political stability is considered likely, which could lead to stalling constitutional, legal, and political reforms. While the overall political context remains relatively stable, all four DAPP countries can be considered prone to destabilisation. Worst case scenarios could lead to a phase out of a DAPP focus country, although this is considered unlikely.

Programmatic risks: Key risks at the programmatic level relate to securing an enabling environment for civil society and HROs/HRDs. Programme partners might experience a narrowing space for civil society as well as a continued tightening of control due to security concerns and public discontent, as also experienced in some countries during the previous DAPP phase.

Institutional risks: A likely institutional risk is the loss of human resource capacities following a high turnover of partner organisations' key staff, which has been experienced in earlier programme phases. Earlier phases have also experienced challenges related to the effective cooperation among consortium partners, which has hampered an efficient programme implementation. A repetition of this scenario is considered unlikely as there is a strong focus on ensuring an appropriate organisational set-up in a new management structure.

The partner(s) are expected to present a detailed Risk Management Framework. The risk matrix in Annex 5 further details risks and mitigating measures.

9 Closure

As the programme is a fixed five-year programme, the partner(s) will, as part of the inception phase, prepare outlines for exit strategies with all chosen partners in the four intervention countries. Partners and programme sustainability will be subject to monitoring and reporting on an annual basis.

Overall, a key feature of DAPP is the facilitation of partnerships between implementing partners and organisations in the DAPP countries. Lasting partnerships are expected to be built, which will also contribute to strengthened capacity of local partners to continue activities post-DAPP.

Annex 1 – Programme context

Reference is made to Annex 1 in the Strategic Framework Document, which includes a full standard Annex 1 with a detailed context analysis. Here, only key information related to the human rights and inclusion agenda in the four countries is included.

Over the course of the last two decades, **Morocco** has taken several steps to bring the country in line with international human rights and gender equality standards. A process of revision of the Constitution was initiated in 2011, introducing a number of rights. This was followed by the adoption of a new migrant policy in 2013 and the ratification of the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture in 2014. The National Human Rights Institution, CNDH, was designated as the National Preventive Mechanism in 2018. Morocco also participated in launching the Convention against Torture Initiative aimed at achieving universal ratification and implementation of the convention by 2024. However, while reported by authorities not to be systematic torture continues to occur. Similarly, press freedom remains a concern in Morocco, which ranks 133 of 180 in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. In terms of gender equality, recent reforms include the adoption of the law on domestic workers in 2017 and the adoption of a law on GBV in 2018. Nevertheless, despite these and other legislative improvements, discriminatory provisions continue to exist and the implementation of the laws is lagging behind, as are societal norms, making realities on the ground less promising. Morocco has a low score on several gender related parameters, also by MENA standards, and ranks 143 of 153 in the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index. Indeed, only 21% of women are (formally) working, illiteracy remains higher among women, and more than half of women are victims of violence. Furthermore, important SRHR inequalities exist, although Morocco has improved access to contraceptives and reduced maternal and infant mortality, namely in urban areas.

In terms of Freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), the Moroccan Constitution states that Islam is the state religion and guarantees freedom of religion. Morocco has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no reservations to art. 18 and 20 that protect freedom of religion or belief. However, faith-based minorities practice their faith discretely due to fear of societal harassment.

As regards inclusion and participation of youth, which make up one third of Morocco's population, they lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the traditional political system. Less than 1% of youth are active in political parties and trade unions, both of which are perceived by youth as opaque, undemocratic and inaccessible. Large and established CSOs do not generally appeal to youth, given that many of them do not enjoy legitimacy among youth or do not focus on issues or key interests of youth. Instead, youth are participating in civic life through other means, notably social media.

Compared to the high spirits of **Tunisia's** post-revolution years after 2011, the human rights situation has developed in an uneven, and at times deteriorating, manner. The new constitution of 2014 manifested Tunisia's role as a regional role model, not least paving the way for a constitutional court and a range of independent instances to oversee rights and liberties, including a new NHRI. However, several of these important legal advances are yet to be implemented in practice. Civil society has experienced increasing pressures on freedom of expression, equal access to justice, and socio-economic rights, all of which conjures with a general strengthening of socio-conservative political actors and distrust in and across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Tunisia's advances in the realm of gender equality are unquestionably notable when compared to other countries of the MENA region. As a case in point, Tunisian women are among the few in the region not targeted by national laws that restrict their access to land and water. Among recent

examples of legal progress on gender equality is ‘Law 58’ aiming at ending violence against women – a widespread problem, as around half of Tunisian women between the ages of 18 and 64 report having experienced violence at one point in their lives. Important capacities notwithstanding, Tunisia lacks policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to SRHR services and education. Scepticism of gender activists and CSOs in particular is a key element of the socio-conservative agenda of certain political actors, also fuelling negative political campaigns against LGBT+ communities, whose members are often subject to arbitrary police arrests and violence.

In its last UPR in 2017, Tunisia accepted 189 of 248 recommendations, which amongst other things pointed to limitations in reforms of the judicial system and the combatting of torture, the establishment of constitutional bodies, corruption, reducing extreme poverty and raising employability, and the development of national human rights policies across sectors such as education, health, and the environment.

Even if Tunisia remains a country with a sizeable civic space and a vocal and mature civil society, many well-established CSOs have experienced limitations in their ability to create networks among youth from the most marginalized communities. Consequently, while traditional civil society actors have proven their capability of forming new ties across the country, the situation reflects the demand for HROs and HRDs to work more actively to ensure a broad and meaningful outreach to various youth groups.

The Tunisian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion or belief, and Tunisia has ratified ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. The Tunisian state has been more tolerant towards faith-based minorities since the revolution of 2011. However, discrimination against Christians is often hidden from the public as some report facing societal pressure, also from within their families.

Observers note that **Egypt** has a poor human rights record. Civil society actors have reported on a number of issues of concern that include – but are not limited to – torture, arbitrary detention, interference with privacy, undue restrictions on freedom of expression and interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. Other human rights issues reported include use of the law and violence to target minority groups and forced or compulsory child labour. In many cases, authorities have not comprehensively investigated allegations of human rights abuses, including incidents of violence by security forces, contributing to an environment of impunity. Authorities reportedly maintain tight control over registration and financing of NGOs and have imposed restrictions on political participation and peaceful assembly, thereby curtailing the space for civil society. Human rights lawyers and defenders reportedly continue to face detention without trials while journalists, bloggers, and critics on social media have been silenced amid the escalating use of the 2018 cybercrimes law. Hundreds of news and human rights websites have been blocked since 2017. The number of imprisoned journalists in the country remains very high according to human rights groups. Most media outlets in Egypt are pro-government while a number of critical or opposition-leaning outlets have been shut down. Egypt ranked 166 out of 180 in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. In recent years, a number of private television channels and newspapers have been launched or acquired by pro-establishment businessmen and individuals with ties to the military and intelligence services. Journalists who fail to align their reporting with the interests of owners of these outlets or the government risk dismissal.

Gender equality activists have recently experienced an uptick in arrests and prosecutions on the basis of vague charges of violating “public morals” and “undermining family values”. While Egypt has achieved a significant improvement in matters related to maternal health, including important progress in ensuring widespread access to reproductive health services, serious SRHR issues remain of concern. FGM is still a prevalent practice in Egypt that receives wide social acceptance. A 2014 survey found that 92% of ever-married women (age 15-49) and 61% of girls (age 15-17)

had been circumcised. The majority of FGM cases had been performed by medical doctors, which constitutes a key hurdle to ending FGM in Egypt.

Egypt was reviewed by the UPR in 2019, accepting 294 out of 372 recommendations, the bulk of which pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation issues, civil and political rights as well as women's rights.

Well established, independent domestic human rights NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces, which further limits civil society's outreach to various youth groups. At the same time, the restrictive environment have increasingly encouraged very loosely organised civic activity, on what resembles an underground basis. Emerging student and youth groups, professional associations and workers have been more active as they lose hope in the formal political opposition. Alternative forms of activism have intensified, such as petitions, strikes, assemblies, sit-ins, campus protests, and some momentary eruptions of citizen anger in response to killings perpetrated by the security services.

The Egyptian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice the three Abrahamic religions, and Egypt has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. The Egyptian penal code explicitly outlaws blasphemy and blasphemy cases have been increasing since 2011. Christians reportedly face discrimination and are particularly vulnerable to threats from extremist groups.

Jordan continues to prioritise security concerns and maintaining stability in the midst of an economic downturn. With the added weight of the COVID-19 pandemic, progress in human rights has been limited in recent years. Torture remains an issue, and CSOs have reported numerous cases of abuse and inhumane treatment by the authorities in detention and correctional facilities while the lockdown has reportedly caused an increase in GBV and child labour. The activation of the 2020 Defense Law and the subsequent issuance of numerous Defence Orders led to the curtailment of personal freedoms and at times reportedly served as justification for clampdowns and censorship of civil society actors. Over the course of last year, gag orders were issued to the media on several occasions. Prominent media executives, journalists and cartoonists have been arrested and, while they were later released, this has likely reinforced self-censorship in the media.

Jordan ranked 128 out of 153 in the 2020 Global Gender Gap report. While women have equal political rights, cultural norms remain an obstacle to full participation. In other areas, women face discrimination both in law and in practice. This includes the inability of women to pass citizenship on to their children and women's unequal access to property under Sharia-based inheritance rules. Discrimination against LGBT+ people is prevalent in society and includes the threat of violence although consensual same-sex sexual activity is not specifically prohibited by law. During COVID-19 related lockdowns, women and girls faced significant challenges in accessing SRHR services.

In its most recent UPR of 2018, Jordan supported 149 out of 226 recommendations. Most of the supported recommendations pertained to the legal and general framework of implementation, civil and political rights and women's rights.

In response to growing conservatism among youth and multiple waves of protests since 2011, including a surge of protests by youth-led activist movements after 2018, the Jordanian state has worked hard to establish and enforce red lines in order to rein in the potential impact of unified protests across the country. This has had a negative influence on CSOs, including their ability to reach out to various youth groups. Key challenges include the imposition of limitations on receiving foreign and domestic funding and restrictions on the freedom of assembly. Despite this, the number of CSOs has increased noticeably over the last years, particularly after the Syrian refugee crisis, reaching 6136 CSOs and 1180 NGOs registered in 2018. Syrian refugees are mainly present in the Northern and Middle regions of Jordan, giving CSOs in these areas an advantage in

terms of access to resources compared to this in the South. This presents a barrier to reaching youth in marginalised areas. In addition to these constraining factors, there are many challenges that hinder genuine youth participation in civil society activities. While youth are often the beneficiaries of government and civil society programmes, they are rarely engaged as partners in organising activities for youth and lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects. The lack of access to safe spaces prevents youth from being able to freely express opinions.

The Jordanian constitution declares that Islam is the religion of the state. Citizens are free to exercise all forms of religious rites and worship and Jordan has ratified the ICCPR with no reservations to art. 18 and 20. While Jordan has relatively moderate blasphemy laws, blasphemy is still punishable with a prison term. Christians reportedly face discrimination.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Arab Sustainable Development Report 2020: <https://www.unescwa.org/publications/arab-sustainable-development-report-2020>
- UN OHCHR. Universal Periodic Reviews: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx>
- Morocco - United States Department of State Country reports on Human rights practices
- WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf (weforum.org) ECFR – Caught in Transition: Tunisia’s Protests and the Threat of Repression: <https://ecfr.eu/article/caught-in-transition-tunisia-protests-and-the-threat-of-repression/>
- UN Women - Tunisia passes historic law to end violence against women and girls: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/8/news-tunisia-law-on-ending-violence-against-women>
- HRW - Tunisia: Police Arrest, Use Violence Against LGBTI Activists: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists>
- UNDP/Inclusive Security – Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia: <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Beyond-Revolution-Constitution-Making-in-Tunisia.pdf>
- EU external financing instruments and the post-2020 architecture: European Implementation Assessment: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU\(2018\)615636](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2018)615636)
- UN Women. Egypt: Gender Justice and the Law: <https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/fieldoffice/arabstates/attachments/publications/2018/gender%20justices%20and%20the%20law%20in%20the%20arab%20region/country%20summaries/egypt%20country%20summary%20-%20english.pdf?la=en&vs=1857>
- EU Delegation to Jordan. EU country roadmap for engagement with civil society in Jordan.
- UN Women. Jordan: Gender Justice and the Law: <https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/fieldoffice/arabstates/attachments/publications/2018/gender%20justices%20and%20the%20law%20in%20the%20arab%20region/country%20assessments/jordan%20country%20assessment%20-%20english.pdf?la=en&vs=501>

Annex 1a – Update on the context in Tunisia

Tunisia’s political situation as of September 2021 and its impact on DAPP

On 25 July 2021, widespread demonstrations took place across Tunisia to protest against the government’s poor handling of the COVID-19 crisis as well as the dire economic situation. The protests called for the government to be dissolved. Tunisia’s President Saïed invoked Article 80 of the Constitution and took executive control, citing an imminent threat to the Tunisian State. He dismissed the Prime Minister (supported by the Islamist Ennahdha party), suspended the parliament, and lifted immunity for all parliamentarians, citing the need to address widespread corruption amongst MPs. In September, the President further suspended certain parts of the Constitution. To underpin his executive control, the President appointed himself head of Public Prosecution, a former national security advisor as new Minister of Interior and the head of the presidential guard as the Acting Minister of Interior. In achieving and maintaining this temporary political arrangement, the President is heavily reliant on the police and the military. Although the President has not made an official statement on the length of such emergency measures, the Office of the President has informed that the current arrangement will last until further notice. A road map towards either new elections and a new parliament or a proposal to revise the Constitution may then emerge, although it is also possible that the current arrangement will be prolonged.

The debates regarding the constitutionality and legitimacy of the invocation of the Constitution’s Article 80 are ongoing at the time of writing. Some foreign commentators describe the President’s decisions as a coup while Tunisian commentators for the most part are describing it as a necessary measure to end the political bottleneck that prevented the government from functioning. Analysts also describe the situation as the result of the long-standing political feud between secular-oriented and Islamic-oriented political groupings in Tunisia. The political situation may have an impact on the on-going negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, although the extent and nature hereof remains to be seen. In addition, there are emerging geopolitical factors at play.

Since his decisions of 25 July, the President has consulted with civil society and labour unions. While some decisions taken in the aftermath of the 25 July emergency pointed to an apparent crackdown on freedom of expression, these were met with a swift and harsh backlash from civil society, resulting for instance in the President calling for a reversal of the arrest warrants issued against two Islamist MPs. These efforts by civil society, including the Ordre National des Avocats Tunisien (ONAT), the Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisien (SNJT), and the Instance National pour la Prevention de la Torture (INPT) are encouraging signs that Tunisian civil society is strong and capable of defending human rights and liberties gained in the 2011 revolution. It also demonstrates that the democratic foundation at the level of civil society and dialogue between civil society and the state remains intact as one of the key democratic outcomes of the 2011 revolution.

Tunisian civil society remains vigilant, watching the developments closely and with the freedom to speak out critically and effectively against infringements of rights and liberties. Many organisations have pledged their commitment to continue playing this watchdog role, while at the same time contributing to the democratic process. There do not appear to be any current concerns with continuing to work on the protection and promotion of human rights in Tunisia for national and international organisations, including those related to DAPP. However, the situation is still unsettled and the new DAPP will have to adjust to one or a combination of the following scenarios: a prolonged status quo of the current situation, a return to full parliamentary democracy or a more volatile situation with incursions on democratic freedoms. DAPP is designed to navigate under any of these circumstances.

Annex 2 – Detailed results framework

Strategic level	Danish Arab Partnership Programme 2022-2027
Vision statement	<i>A better life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa</i>

Programme		Human Rights and Inclusion
Programme Objective		Promotion and protection of human rights with a focus on youth enhanced
Impact Indicators		<p>SDG 3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes.</p> <p>SDG 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere</p> <p>SDG 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation</p> <p>SDG 5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life</p> <p>SDG 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all</p> <p>SDG 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p>
Baseline	Year 2022	Youth is prevented from acting freely and democratically in inclusive civic spaces and experience violence, torture, restrained freedoms of media and expression as well as gender inequality and the inadequate protection of minorities.
Target	Year 2027	Youth is strengthened to act freely and democratically in inclusive civic spaces with protection from violence and torture, improved freedoms of media and expression as well as enhanced gender equality and inclusion of minorities.

Outcome 1		Promotion and protection of human rights through a systemic approach enhanced	
Outcome indicators		<p>Human rights alliances and networks strengthened</p> <p>Human rights standards enhanced</p> <p>Inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth improved</p> <p>Capacities of NHRIs and other public institutions to engage and respond to youth-focus HROs/HRDs enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, human rights situation reports, treaty body reporting, number and quality of state consultations with relevant youth stakeholders, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	Some constitutional revisions yet to be translated into changes in the practical administration of justice. NHRI reporting on human rights with limited inclusion of youth. Youth lack avenues of engagement in civic life and in the political system.
		Tunisia	The traditional NHRI reports infrequently on human rights, including youth. The new NHRI, as foreseen in the constitution, has not been established. Youth subject to arbitrary police violence, torture, and corruption. Sizeable civic space but limited inclusion of youth from the most marginalized communities.
		Egypt	Poor human rights record. The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Independent NGOs struggle to operate amid increasing pressure from security forces. Intensifying activism among youth outside established organisations and structures.
		Jordan	The NHRI publishes infrequently and without a specific youth focus. Decreasing space for CSOs to engage in human rights issues. CSOs have limited ability to reach out to key demographics such as youth. Youth lack incentives to participate in CSO empowerment projects.

Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>
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Output 1.1	NHRIs and public institutions are strengthened to deliver inclusive human rights reporting with a focus on youth		
Output indicators	National strategies, Action Plans, SOPs etc. promoting and protecting HR including focus on youth Inclusive national and international reporting processes		
Baseline	Year 2022		NHRIs in all countries deliver Human Rights Reports infrequently and with insufficient focus on and inclusion of youth
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 1.2	Capacity of NHRIs to promote and protect human rights, particularly among youth, enhanced		
Output indicators	Capacity to plan and conduct inclusive human rights reporting Capacity to enforce recommendations for protection of human rights Capacity to engage and focus on youth		
Baseline	Year 2022		NHRIs in all countries deliver Human Rights Reports infrequently and with insufficient focus on and inclusion of youth.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 1.3	Dialogue between duty bearers and rights holders enhanced		
Output indicators	Dialogue spaces between government authorities and HROs/HRDs enhanced Capacity of youth HROs and HRDs to engage in and address human rights reforms and reporting with state institutions enhanced Capacity of minority groups e.g. LGBT+, faith-based organisations, people with disabilities, youth movements and ethnic groups to gain access to spaces and dialogues on protection of human rights enhanced		
Baseline	Year 2022		Social contract between HROs/HRDs and state institutions is weak. Space for civil society, ability of youth-led HROs/HRDs and minority groups to engage in human rights reforms, reporting, and dialogue is tangible but limited (Tunisia), narrow and shrinking (Morocco and Jordan), or endangered (Egypt)
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Outcome 2	Prevention of violence and torture		
Outcome indicators	Legislation for the prevention of violence and torture strengthened Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened Prevention of GBV and violence against youth and minority groups enhanced Access to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of victims of torture and violence improved MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, civil society reports on evidence-based cases, number and quality of spaces and dialogues, etc.		

Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The practice of torture continues to occur and victims are not sufficiently rehabilitated. Problem of overcrowding in prisons. Law on GBV adopted in 2018 but challenged in terms of practical implementation. Existing youth vulnerability to violent extremism and radicalisation present.
		Tunisia	Torture remains a major concern in prisons with insufficient rehabilitation of victims. GBV addressed through adoption of so-called 'Law 58', but comprehensive implementation not yet ensured. Radicalisation targeting youth is present, particularly in the country's southern regions.
		Egypt	Forced disappearances, torture, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention are prevalent. Domestic violence and sexual harassment are acute problems. Societal resistance and poor enforcement hinder progress. Prisons continue to be a fertile environment for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.
		Jordan	Torture remains an issue with numerous cases reported. Increasing cases of GBV, including domestic violence. Existing youth vulnerability to radicalisation due to political and economic pressures.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Output 2.1		Legislation and capacities for prevention of torture among youth strengthened	
Output indicators		Legal frameworks supporting prevention of torture strengthened Knowledge and capacity of CSOs and public institutions to plan, implement, monitor and enforce torture preventive measures strengthened	
Baseline	Year 2022		Lack of effective legal frameworks and particularly widespread challenges of insufficient implementation of existing laws to prevent torture. CSOs not sufficiently capacitated to engage in effective torture prevention measures.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 2.2		Capacities and spaces for dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention targeting youth strengthened	
Output indicators		HRDs/HROs' capacities to document cases of torture targeting youth strengthened Young rights holders' capacities to enter spaces of dialogue and advocacy on torture prevention strengthened Spaces for dialogues between public institutions and HRDs/HROs enhanced	
Baseline	Year 2022		HRDs/HROs and civil society not adequately capacitated to document cases of torture and to effectively advocate duty bearers on torture prevention, including torture targeting youth, and extremism.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 2.3		Prevention of GBV, youth violence, and violence against minority groups (e.g. LGBT+, faith-based groups, migrants, refugees, displaced, etc.) and youth movements strengthened	
Output indicators		Legislation and reforms promoting prevention of GBV, and violence against youth, youth movements, and minority groups strengthened	

			Knowledge and capacity of CSOs and public institutions to plan, implement, monitor, and enforce preventive measures strengthened Capacity of CSOs to gain access to spaces and dialogues with public institutions strengthened.
Baseline	Year 2022		Legal frameworks to prevent violence either insufficiently formulated or implemented. CSOs not adequately capacitated to document cases of torture and to effectively advocate duty bearers on GBV, violence against youth and minorities, and prevention of violent extremism.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 2.4			Access and support to redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of young victims of torture and violence strengthened
Output indicators			HROs/HRDs monitoring and promoting access and support to redress for victims of torture and violence enhanced HROs/HRDs monitoring and promoting access to rehabilitation and treatment of victims of torture and violence including e.g. Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support Capacity of health professionals providing health services to victims of torture and violence increased
Baseline	Year 2022		CSOs and health professionals inadequately capacitated to assist the redress, rehabilitation, and treatment of torture and violence victims.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Outcome 3			Strengthening of free, independent, and diverse media
Outcome indicators			Framework conditions for independent media and protection of young journalists enhanced Capacity of youth-driven media outlets strengthened Inclusion of youth in the public debate strengthened Media reporting on human rights violations against youth enhanced MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, diversity of media stories, quotations in national/international media outlets, etc.
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	The state dominates the broadcast media. The independent press enjoys some freedom when reporting on economic and social policies but less on issues specific to red lines.
		Tunisia	Substantial degree of press freedom and a variety of media outlets in comparison with rest of the MENA region. Journalists report facing pressure and intimidation from government officials. Concerns about enhanced political influence over private media outlets.
		Egypt	Independent media operates in a repressive context. The media sector is dominated by pro-government outlets while most critical or opposition-oriented outlets have been shut down. The legal environment threatens press freedom.
		Jordan	The agency of independent media actors is significantly constrained. Media laws are restrictive, vague, and arbitrarily enforced while journalists frequently practice self-censorship.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be</i>

		Egypt Jordan	<i>approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>
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Output 3.1		Dialogues and reforms to improve framework conditions for independent media and protection of journalists including youth media and journalists enhanced	
Output indicators		Dialogues and partnerships promoting conducive framework conditions enhanced Media outlets and CSOs participating in prioritising mechanisms to advance legal and institutional reforms in the media sector enhanced	
Baseline	Year 2022		Framework conditions not conducive for independent media. Lack of inclusion of media outlets and CSOs in advancing reforms in the sector. Threats to journalists range from pressure and intimidation (Tunisia) to detention and arrest (Egypt).
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 3.2		Capacity of media outlets to report accurately on human rights and human rights violations	
Output indicators		Institutional capacity of media outlet partners strengthened Technical and managerial capacity of content producers strengthened Youth-led media outlets strengthened Reporting focusing on human rights violations based on gender (including GBV, LGBT+) or targeted at other minority groups (e.g. faith-based groups, migrants, refugees, displaced, etc.) strengthened	
Baseline	Year		The institutional and technical capacity of content producers, and particularly youth-led media outlets, is limited. Reporting on human rights violations is generally weak (with the exception of Tunisia).
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 3.3		Diverse and quality media content guided by public interest strengthened	
Output indicators		Technical and managerial capacity of content producers strengthened Media content tailored to new and existing audiences, including youth, on public interest topics that contribute to shaping public opinion enhanced Local media in rural areas strengthened Youth-led media content targeting diverse youth groups strengthened	
Baseline	Year		Youth-led media content producers generally lack the capacity to produce high quality public interest stories tailored to diverse audiences.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 3.4		Inclusion of young rights holders in the public debate strengthened	
Output indicators		The capacity of media partners to include a variety of youth rights holders strengthened HRDs/HROs technical capacity to participate in and contribute to public debates on human rights strengthened	

		Youth movements' capacity and associated media platforms targeting youth groups strengthened	
		The scope of strategic interventions led by CSOs focusing on gender equality, prevention of torture and GBV, rights of youth, LGBT+ and minority groups strengthened	
Baseline	Year		The contribution of a diverse and representative set of CSOs to the public debate on human rights standards, gender equality, prevention of torture and GBV, rights of youth, LGBT+, religious and minority groups is limited. CSO contributions are dominated by resource-strong civil society actors in the capitals in the four DAPP countries.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Outcome 4		Improvement of gender equality	
Outcome indicators		<p>Legislation addressing representation, recognition, and equal access to resources strengthened</p> <p>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) enhanced</p> <p>GBV reduced (including prevention of domestic violence) and protection of victims of violence enhanced</p> <p>Equal participation of young men and women in political life enhanced</p> <p>Civic engagement on gender equality and combatting gender stereotypes, including in the media enhanced</p> <p>MoV: Universal Periodic Reviews, Human Rights situation reports, national statistics, civil society reports and evidence-based studies, etc.</p>	
Baseline	Year 2022	Morocco	Important advances in legislative and institutional reforms, yet legal provisions discriminating against women persist e.g. in the family law (last revised in 2004) and in the penal code while implementation lags behind. Improvements in SRHR but lack of financial resources and geographical disparities in relation to access to services. Morocco has a high proportion of child marriages.
		Tunisia	Important advances in legislative and institutional reform regarding gender equality make Tunisia a front-runner in the MENA region. CSOs focus on maintaining rather than expanding results. Tunisia lacks SRHR policies and institutional mechanisms that ensure broad access to services and education.
		Egypt	Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, but persistence of discriminatory laws. Coverage of maternal health services has expanded substantially, yet serious SRHR issues of concern remain. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) prevalent and enjoys wide social acceptance.
		Jordan	Legislative and institutional reforms implemented, yet personal status code and the nationality law remain discriminatory. SRHR for youth insufficiently covered in national policy documents.
Target	Year 2027	Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan	<i>To be determined in the results framework that will be developed by the partner or consortium of partners as part of the tender proposal. The final results framework will be approved by the MENA DAPP Team and be part of the agreement with the winning partner or consortium of partners.</i>

Output 4.1	Legal frameworks and reforms promoting, enforcing and monitoring gender equality and non-discrimination focusing on gender and youth enhanced
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Output indicators		Capacity of state institutions to address gender equality legislation and reforms in dialogue with HRDs/HROs enhanced.	
		Capacity of HRDs/HROs to access and participate in dialogues on gender equality legislation and reforms strengthened	
		Partnerships between HRDs/HROs and state institutions on monitoring of the implementation of gender equality legislations and reforms enhanced.	
		Capacity of partners to report on gender equality and SDG 5 strengthened	
Baseline	Year 2022		Persistence of discriminatory legal provisions regarding gender equality. Limited genuine dialogue between CSOs and duty bearers on gender equality monitoring and implementation of law.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 4.2		Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) among youth enhanced	
Output indicators		Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions on legislations and reforms promoting SRHR enhanced	
		HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to support the implementation of legislation and reforms including protection, acceptance and non-discriminatory access to SRHR strengthened	
		HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to monitor and report on implementation of laws and reforms promoting and protecting SRHR strengthened	
		HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to engage in public debates on gender equality in SRHR strengthened.	
Baseline	Year 2022		Limited access of youth to SRHR. Persistence of harmful traditional practices, such as FGM and child marriages.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 4.3		GBV including prevention of domestic violence and protection of victims of violence enhanced	
Output indicators		Percentage reduction in documented GBV cases in partner countries	
Baseline	Year 2022		
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 4.4		Equal participation of young men and women in politics enhanced	
Output indicators		Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions promoting gender equality in politics enhanced	
		Enhanced gender equality in political spaces including for youth	
		HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to monitor and report on implementation of laws and reforms on gender equality strengthened	
Baseline	Year 2022		Limited participation and inclusion of youth in politics. Limited inclusion of youth by state institutions in dialogues and consultations on reform, policies, strategies etc. Lack of space for youth movements and CSOs to engage in debates on gender norms and stereotypes.

Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Output 4.5	Civic engagement combatting gender stereotypes enhanced		
Output indicators	<p>Dialogues and partnerships between HRDs/HROs, youth movements and state institutions to combat gender stereotypes enhanced</p> <p>Enhanced public focus on LGBT+ rights, including for youth</p> <p>HRDs/HROs and youth movements' capacity to engage in public debates on gender norms, LGBT+ rights, stereotypical perceptions and attitudes strengthened.</p>		
Baseline	Year 2022		Limited participation and inclusion of youth in politics. Limited inclusion of youth by state institutions in dialogues and consultations on reform, policies, strategies etc. Lack of space for youth movements and CSOs to engage in debates on gender norms and stereotypes.
Target	Year 1		
Target	Year 3		
Target	Year 5		

Annex 3 – Budget

Outcomes	Budget (DKK million)						TOTAL	In %
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027		
Outcome 1: Systemic Approach to Human Rights	5	16	16	16	16	6	75	16.3
Outcome 2: Prevention of Violence and Torture	8	15	15	15	15	7	75	16.3
Outcome 3: Free, Independent, and Diverse Media	7	14	14	14	14	7	70	15.2
Outcome 4: Gender Equality	7	14	14	14	14	7	70	15.2
Special Support Budget	10	15	20	20	20	5	90	19.6
Acceleration Funds (including pilot activities in Algeria, if feasible)		13	19,5	32,5			65	14.1
Programme Secretariat	2	3	3	3	2	2	15	3.3
TOTAL	39	90	101,5	114,5	81	34	460	

Annex 4 – Partner assessment

The partner composition for the Human Rights Programme will be determined by a public tender. It can be an individual organisation or a consortium of organisations consisting of e.g. NGOs, business member organisations, trade unions, private companies, etc. The organisations can be Danish or international, but emphasis will be placed on ensuring clear and strong linkages to the Danish resources base. This is to ensure the Danish Arab Partnership Programme notions and that Danish value policy, innovation and know how is integrated into the partnership that will be created.

Annex 5 – Risk management

Contextual risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Overall risk factor					
Worldwide pandemic or health crisis.	Likely – Almost Certain	Significant	Activities carried out digitally or with few participants respecting sanitary measures.	Short-term risks are reduced substantially due to commitment to health and safety measures. However, general risk of curbing of rights and potential unrest prevails if crisis is prolonged.	The COVID-19 pandemic is leading to economic recession and causes higher levels of unemployment, potential unrest, and limitation of rights and liberties. Governments have enforced full or partial lockdown, impeding and delaying activities.
Bilateral/diplomatic relations between Denmark and DAPP countries worsen.	Very unlikely	Major	Danish government and representatives to ensure and foster bilateral relations with all DAPP countries.	The risk is minor and actions can be taken by Denmark to mitigate the situation.	Denmark has longstanding relations with all DAPP focus countries.
Political					
Increasing political instability with potential for civil unrest.	Likely	Major	Significant deterioration could lead to a reduced scope of activities in affected countries.	Risk continues to be substantial. The situation will be carefully monitored and appropriate actions taken as needed in close collaboration with other development partners.	Risk varies considerably from country to country, but overall political context remains prone to destabilisation.
Increasing authoritarian rule, repression of minorities, and abuse of power by security apparatus.	Likely	Major	The Human Rights and Inclusion Programme aims to address these issues through collaboration with duty bearers and right holders.	Risk remains but varies among the DAPP countries. Mitigation through the programme is limited to engagement of government stakeholders on specific human rights	Affects possibilities of strategic partners to collaborate with most critical parts of civil society and may deter new potential local partners from civic engagement.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
				and youth employment issues.	
Continued presence of private and public sector corruption.	Likely	Major	Difficult to mitigate through instruments available to the programme.	Short- and long-term risks remain.	Corruption is pervasive in focus countries and affects many sectors, including hampering the business environment.
Economic					
Potential international economic crisis affects main trading partners (such as the EU) and has a negative impact on trade, remittances and FDI to the focus countries.	Likely	Major	DAPP aims to improve economic conditions, especially for youth. However, difficult to mitigate this risk solely through DAPP.	Residual risk remains. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation.	The economic downturn in the EU following the financial crisis had a direct impact on the DAPP partner countries.
Worsening economic situation and further polarization of wealth is leading to increased poverty, potential societal and political unrest and migration.	Almost certain	Major	DAPP aims to mitigate economic and social exclusion of youth.	Risk not substantially reduced by DAPP alone. However, actions taken by programme and other donors can mitigate the situation.	Risk in all focus countries. Bleak outlook for economic growth and redistribution of wealth. However, IMF programmes under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provide incentives to ensure that macro-economic and financial policies remain sound, reforms on track and that fiscal buffers and reserves remain adequate.
Partial or complete breakdown of financial institutions and banking systems or impediment of cross-border financial transactions.	Unlikely	Major	While DAPP aims at improving economic condition in its focus countries, developments in currency and financial markets are difficult to mitigate.	Short- and long-term risks remain but are unlikely.	DAPP focus countries have varying degrees of stable financial infrastructures and access to international credit markets. The MENA region has in recent years witnessed either severe depreciation or near collapse of national currencies and rising inflation, all of which puts pressure on the livelihood and wealth of their respective populations.
Societal					
Increasing conflict between population groups; social and religious tension.	Unlikely	Major	DAPP is sensitive towards the inclusion of various social /urban/rural (youth) groups and minorities.	The short-term residual risk is not reduced. However, DAPP aims at including youth and minorities and will in the	Social tension and unrest already seen in several focus countries. High risk of persecution of religious and other minorities.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
			The programme has an inclusive approach to various population groups, but cannot mitigate these risks through tools available to the programme.	medium and long-term contribute to bridging divides between urban/rural groups and minorities.	
Generational gap widens with a growing youth population that rejects tribal/communal/age hierarchies leading to less social cohesion and possible youth-led protests.	Likely	Major	DAPP aims to promote the inclusion of youth – socially, politically and economically by addressing their specific challenges and needs.	Residual risk is not reduced in the short term. However, DAPP will address youth needs and challenges and in the long term contributing to reduce youth frustration.	Youth are not included and experience a growing frustration and lack of trust in institutions.
Environment					
Environmental degradation, increased water scarcity, etc. might lead to internal migration e.g. rural exodus which puts pressure on large cities.	Likely	Minor	DAPP will support job creation and growth in the green sector and seek to address root causes of migration.	The short-term risk is minor and can be mitigated by the inclusive approach of DAP.	All focus countries are considerably prone to water scarcity and vulnerable to climate change.
Security					
Deterioration of domestic security context and occurrence of terrorist acts.	Likely	Major	DAPP and partners to have strong focus on safety, maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and ultimately phase out projects.	Short term risk is reduced due to safety measures and contingency plans, but overall risk prevails.	Terrorist attacks against public experienced in several focus countries. Extremist tendencies might be catalysed through spill over from regional conflicts in e.g. Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Increased instability in border regions due to violent conflicts in neighbouring countries.	Unlikely	Major	DAPP and partners to maintain situational awareness, prepare contingency plans, and	Residual risks reduced by selecting safe areas. However, the risk is	Conflicts in neighbouring countries to DAPP focus countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, create regional instabilities. While border regions to these countries might experience spill-

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
			ultimately phase out projects. Projects to be implemented in geographical areas deemed as relatively safe.	outside the sphere of influence of DAPP.	over by conflict and violence, borders are likely to remain intact.

Programmatic risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Narrowing space for civil society and continued tightening of control due to security concerns and public discontent.	Likely	Significant	Policy dialogue by strategic partners through national HRIs and other partners. Careful assessment of 'do-no-harm' principle when collaborating with local human rights defenders.	The risk remains likely and cannot be mitigated solely through DAPP.	Experienced in all focus countries. Strategic partners are vulnerable as they base a large part of their programmes on collaboration with CSOs.
Foreign and local NGOs denied authorisation, banned or harassed, e.g. by money transfer controls.	Likely	Major	Engagement in civil society donor groups and policy dialogue with bilateral and multilateral partners.	The residual risk is likely to remain high for NGOs in general, particularly in partner countries where civil society is already under pressure.	The risk varies from country to country, but is significant in Egypt and is increasing in the other countries. Affects the cohesiveness and effectiveness of civil society and prevents youth from engaging through formal means.
Financial mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.	Likely	Major	Strict financial management requirements and vetting of partners imposed on both strategic and local partners. No tolerance policy implies phase out in serious cases of corruption.	Significant reduction of the risk given the strict control mechanisms in place.	Potentially damaging but limited evidence of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds in the past.
Conflicting/non-aligned/duplicated development efforts.	Likely	Minor	Increased efforts towards strategic coordination,	The residual risk is reduced. In general, donors have a common	Coordination remains challenging but efforts to align in the preparation of DAPP and established donor coordination platforms reduces risk of duplication.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
			collaboration, and joint programming with other donors, CSOs, and key stakeholders.	interest and obligation to align activities and avoid duplication.	
Insufficient engagement from duty bearers to secure an enabling environment.	Likely	Major	Increased dialogue with duty bearers and support to rights holders on human rights issues. Longstanding partnerships and engagement between DAPP partners and duty bearers in DAPP may contribute to risk mitigation.	The residual risk remains high in the short term, as these processes take time and cannot be addressed solely by DAPP.	The risk varies across the four DAPP countries.
Disappointment, lack of interest, possible drop-out of youth participating in the programme.	Likely	Major	In the preparation of DAPP, research will be conducted on youth challenges and needs and a rigorous selection of beneficiaries will be carried out.	The residual risk is significantly reduced, as the programme will be demand-driven and tailored to needs.	In all DAPP countries, traditional civil society actors struggle to include diverse groups of youth, leading to increased polarisation.
Constitutional, legal, and political reforms stall.	Likely	Major	Strengthening of collaboration with duty bearers and of advocacy efforts by strategic and local partners.	Residual risk remains high as DAPP's possibility to advance framework conditions is dependent on duty bearers' willingness to engage processes of reform and change.	Experienced in all focus countries. Has a significant impact on programmes targeting human rights and inclusion.
Religious radicalisation and increased conservatism affects gender equality and minority groups.	Likely	Major	DAPP engages with duty bearers on gender conservative norms.	The residual risk remains high in the short term. Processes take time and cannot be addressed by DAPP alone.	Strong socio-conservative religious movements and tendencies in all focus countries seeking to impede on progressive gender norms and equality.
Social norms as well as gender and age stereotypes prevent youth	Almost certain	Major	DAPP aims to address negative stereotypes and gender norms through	The residual risk remains high in the short term, as these processes take time	All focus countries have prevalence of GBV, lacking SRHR, child marriages, FGM, etc.

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
participation and progress towards gender equality.			engagement with duty bearers and rights holders.	and cannot be addressed solely by DAPP.	

Institutional risks

Risk Factor	Likelihood	Impact	Risk response	Residual risk	Background to assessment
Lack of coordination and synergy between programme partners and intervention areas.	Unlikely	Major	Strong focus on adequate organisational set-up in management structure. Integrative approach to outcomes.	The risk response is based on lessons learned from DAPP and is likely to significantly reduce the residual risk	Earlier programme phases have experienced how Consortium partners struggle to cooperate effectively, hampering efficient programme implementation.
Loss of human capacities due to frequent turnover of staff in country offices and headquarters.	Likely	Minor	Emphasis on the need for partners to monitor HR developments and react adequately and quickly to changes in personnel.	Emphasis on the need for partners to monitor Human Resource developments and react adequately and quickly to changes in personnel.	Earlier programme phases have experienced high turnover of partner organisations' key staff.
Insufficient contextual understanding affecting the quality of intervention.	Likely	Major	Partners to ensure equal distribution of local staff across countries and to consult with adequate and well-informed local actors.	Partners will ensure frequent consultations with key local and international stakeholders.	Earlier programme phases have experienced inadequate use of partners' contextual insights in order to inform and adapt programming.