UFU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 124: Orientering om offentliggørelse af Udvalg om retningslinjer for internationalt forsknings- og innovationssamarbejdes afrapportering og retningslinjer, fra uddannelses- og forskningsministeren

Uddannelses- og Forskningsudvalget 2021-22
UFU Alm.del Bilag 124
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EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Analysis of current and publicly available

documents on securing international

science cooperation

Part I: Annotated collection of checklists and

guidelines for the international science and

technology cooperation

Part II: Meta-Guidelines supporting the safe and

successful international science and technology

cooperation

EU Research and Innovation Knowledge Network on China

Edited by

Laura Klueting, Ena Skorzinski, Nicola Dierkes, Gerold Heinrichs

[email protected]

March 2021, DLR-PT Bonn, Germany

ISBN

978-3-949245-06-0

Disclaimer:

This work was carried out under a mandate from the European Commission. The

information and views set out in this document do not necessarily reflect the official

opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies

nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which

may be made of the information contained therein.

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

UFU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 124: Orientering om offentliggørelse af Udvalg om retningslinjer for internationalt forsknings- og innovationssamarbejdes afrapportering og retningslinjer, fra uddannelses- og forskningsministeren

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Analysis of current and publicly available

documents on securing international

science cooperation

Part I: Annotated collection of checklists and

guidelines for the international science and

technology cooperation

EU Research and Innovation Knowledge Network on China

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Preface

In the past years, various guidelines have been published with the aim of improving

international research and innovation cooperation. These guidelines have been produced

by very different groups and individuals, address different target groups, focus on different

topics, and some have specific political intentions. Some of these guidelines give rather

general advice, others are very detailed. Some of them are state agnostic, others address

the cooperation with specific countries. They are addressed to individuals but sometimes

also to institutions or policy makers; most are addressed specifically to members of higher

education institutions or individual researchers.

It is not easy for the European user from a university or research organization to find and

classify the appropriate recommendations. To facilitate this, an analysis of recently

published and publicly accessible documents has been carried out. The results of the

analysis are presented in 2 parts:

Part I: Annotated collection of checklists and guidelines for the international science and

technology cooperation

Part II: Meta-Guidelines supporting the safe and successful international science and

technology cooperation

Part I: Annotated collection of checklists and guidelines for the international

science and technology cooperation

In the analysis provided here, both country specific as well as country neutral guidelines,

checklists and other relevant documents are presented with a short profile and summary.

26 documents have been analysed. The collection uses the English language, although

some documents were written in other languages as indicated in the profile. The brief

categorisation of the documents in the profiles is not based on a structured standard, but

is the result of a rough assessment of the editors by comparing the documents. It is

intended to give some initial pointers during a quick perusal.

The analysis makes no claim to completeness but is instead intended to give an overview

on the current situation.

Readers of this analysis are invited to inform the editors about other publicly available

relevant and recently published documents.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Content:

Australia

University Foreign Interference Taskforce

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian University Sector (2019)

.... 6

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

Hunting the phoenix

– The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology

and talent (2020)

......................................................................................................................................... 7

Picking flowers, making honey - the Chinese military's collaboration with foreign

universities (2018)

...................................................................................................................................... 8

Belgium

Flemish Interuniversity Council

Recommendations for implementing a human rights assessment at the Flemish

universities (2019)

...................................................................................................................................... 9

European Union

EU-Commission

Basic Principles for effective International Science, Technology and Innovation

Agreements (2014)

................................................................................................................................... 10

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items (2020)

............................... 11

Germany

Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation

Report on Research, Innovation and Technological Performance in Germany 2020

(2020)

............................................................................................................................................................ 12

Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA)

Export Control in Academia Manual (2019)

..................................................................................... 13

German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

No red lines - science cooperation under complex framework conditions (2020)

............ 14

German Association of Chinese Studies (DVCS)

Guidance by the German Association for Chinese Studies on the Interaction of German

Academic Institutions with the People's Republic of China (2018)

......................................... 15

German Rectors’ Conference (HRK)

Guidelines and standards in international university cooperation (2020)

........................... 16

Guiding Questions on University Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China

(2020)

............................................................................................................................................................ 17

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Risky Business: Rethinking Research Cooperation with Non-Democracies. Strategies for

Foundations, Universities, Civil Society Organizations, and Think Tanks (2020)

............. 18

Industrial espionage and spying on competitors in Germany and Europe

(WISKOS)

Risks for the German research location - Guidelines for dealing with scientific

espionage and spying on competitors in the scientific context

................................................ 19

Working Group China Research

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Pathways to Research with China - Knowledge, Approaches, Recommendations (2020)

.......................................................................................................................................................................... 20

Japan

Director General for Science, Technology and Innovation

Guidelines for Collaboration of Universities and National Research and Development

Agencies with Foreign Companies (2019)

........................................................................................ 21

Netherlands

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions

(2019)

............................................................................................................................................................ 22

Leiden Asia Centre (LAC)

Towards Sustainable Europe-China Collaboration in Higher Education in Research

(2020)

............................................................................................................................................................ 23

Sweden

The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher

Education (STINT)

Responsible Internationalisation: Guidelines for reflection on international academic

collaboration (2020)

................................................................................................................................. 24

United Kingdom

Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group (AFIWG)

DRAFT MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT: Protection of Academic Freedom and the Academic

Community in the context of the internationalisation of the UK HE Sector (2020)

......... 25

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

Trusted Research Guidance for Academia

........................................................................................ 26

Universities UK (UUK)

Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues (2020)

............................. 27

USA

Association of American Universities (AAU); Association of Public and Land-

grant Universities (APLU)

University Actions to Address Concerns about Security Threats and Undue Foreign

Government Influence on Campus (2020)

....................................................................................... 28

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A

Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide

(2019)

............................................................................................................................................................ 29

National Science and Technology Council

Recommended Practices for Strengthening the Security and Integrity

of America’s

Science and Technology Research Enterprise (2021)

.................................................................. 30

University of Rochester

International Research & Global Collaboration (2019)

................................................................ 31

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Australia

University Foreign Interference Taskforce

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian University Sector

(2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Australian universities

no specific focus

governance and risk frameworks, due diligence, communication,

knowledge sharing, and cyber security to counteract foreign

interference

key themes and objectives supported by guiding questions; best

practice considerations; links to additional resources; case

studies and scenarios

detailed, practical guidance

English

44 pages

p. 10-32, 38-40

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The University Foreign Interference Taskforce was specifically established for the purpose

of publishing these guidelines in 2019 and includes representatives from relevant

government agencies as well as universities. The document is split into two parts: key

themes and objectives that are supported by guiding questions to provide guidance for

universities to address the specific foreign interference risks they face, and more detailed

best practice considerations to support decision-making processes. The guidelines are

intended to support Australian universities in mitigating the risk of undue foreign

interference without missing out on the benefits of international research collaboration,

and should be used as a tool for risk assessment as well as examination of existing policies

and protocols.

The total of 87 guiding questions include recommendations such as:

•

Develop new and reevaluate/amend existing policies, procedures, risk assessments and

internal reporting mechanisms to safeguard against foreign interference, clearly define

responsibilities

Apply appropriate due diligence proportionate to the combined sensitivity of research

topics and research partners

Ensure compliance with export control regulations, especially where dual use

technologies are concerned, consider and monitor the potential end use of research

throughout the research cycle

Improve training as well as communication and reporting protocols, raise awareness

and provide information on foreign interference activities

Improve knowledge sharing and collaboration, especially where information about

foreign interference activities and potential or past partners is concerned, across the

sector

Develop, invest in and implement strong cyber security strategies

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

Author: Alex Joske (International Cyber Policy Centre)

Hunting the phoenix

– The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology

and talent (2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

governments, universities worldwide

China-specific

Chinese talent-recruitment programs

information on talent programs and associated risks; case

studies; recommendations

relatively detailed

English

64 pages

p. 27-28

ASPI is an Australian defense, national security and strategic policy think tank.

“Hunting

the phoenix” points out that greater awareness of potential “brain drain” through Chinese

overseas talent-recruitment programs, greater transparency where these programs are

concerned, and increased funding to support the retention of talent and technology are

necessary. Several case studies and a list of recommendations for governments and

universities are included. These recommendations should be introduced alongside existing

regulations to promote transparency and accountability, as well as help manage conflicts

of interest. The need for increased compliance and enforcement of existing regulations, as

well as implementation of these new recommendations, is strongly emphasized.

Some of the proposed recommendations for governments:

•

Carry out studies on talent-recruitment programs, brief universities and research

institutions

Ensure that cases of theft, fraud, espionage, and non-compliance are investigated

Prohibit government employees from joining talent programs

Include disclosure requirements for any type of funding, as well as staff participation

in foreign talent programs

Establish a public online database of foreign funding received by universities and their

employees

Establish a national research integrity office

Some of the proposed recommendations for universities:

•

Carry out audits of participation in talent-recruitment programs by staff

Update relevant policies and brief staff, especially where disclosure of contracts and

foreign renumeration is concerned

Investigate cases of fraud, misconduct, and nondisclosure, examine why existing

regulations and systems failed to prevent them

Strengthen existing staff travel databases to flag conflicts

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Picking flowers, making honey - the Chinese military's collaboration with foreign

universities (2018)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

governments, universities worldwide

China-specific

research collaboration with People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

information on PLA strategies and associated risks;

recommendations

relatively detailed

English

25 pages

p. 18-20

Also published by ASPI,

“Picking flowers, making honey”

seeks to inform governments and

universities about the risks involved in research collaboration with Chinese universities,

research institutes and individual researchers that have ties to

China’s People’s Liberation

Army (PLA). It provides in-depth information about ways in which PLA-affiliated scientists

have attempted to conceal their ties to the Chinese military in the past and offers a list of

37 recommendations in total that governments and universities should implement to

protect themselves against the inadvertent transfer of knowledge and technology,

especially in cases where it could be used to advance a non-allied

military’s capabilities.

Some of the proposed recommendations for governments:

•

Deepen national as well as international discussion on PLA collaboration, increase

awareness, develop interagency responses, and share relevant information globally

Improve the visa application screening process to detect deception by PLA scientists

Re-examine and amend existing export control policies, continuously train and provide

resources for university staff that is tasked with export control compliance

Introduce policies to regulate the scientific training that foreign military personnel can

receive

Regulate or prohibit the use of government funding in collaboration with the Chinese

military and other non-allied militaries

Increase funding for research in strategically relevant research fields, limit or prohibit

certain forms of foreign investment in the same fields

Some of the proposed recommendations for universities:

•

Build an awareness of the extent of PLA collaboration on campus and develop

processes, internal policies and security precautions accordingly

Increase oversight over visiting scholar and student application

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Belgium

Flemish Interuniversity Council

Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad

Recommendations for implementing a human rights assessment at the Flemish

universities (2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

Flemish universities

no specific focus

human rights

information on human rights; guidance on assessment;

examples; additional resources; indicator checklist

detailed, practical guidance

English

24 pages

p. 9-23

The Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) is an autonomous consultative body that

advises the Belgian government on higher education policies and established an ad hoc

Working Group on Human Rights in 2018. The working group determined that respecting

human rights is fundamental to universities’ social responsibility, and that while it is

important to raise awareness, this is not sufficient in itself. Therefore, the working group

developed a human rights assessment as a practical self-regulation tool to aid universities

in implementing new and strengthening existing human rights policies.

The working group also provided an indicator checklist to simplify the screening of potential

and existing partners and research activities (p. 19-20) and identified some additional

steps that can be taken should the indicator diagram reveal a potential risk for human

rights violations within a given research collaboration (p. 21-23).

Some of the proposed recommendations to universities are as follows:

•

Establish a contact point for questions regarding the human rights assessment, the

university’s human rights policies and

possible human rights violations in new or

ongoing collaborations

Carry out systematic human rights assessments of both new and ongoing

collaborations, partners and research activities

Include human rights clauses in contracts where relevant

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

European Union

EU-Commission

Basic Principles for effective International Science, Technology and Innovation

Agreements (2014)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

EU, EU member states

non-EU countries

international STI agreements

information on existing bilateral STI agreements used by the

EU, its member states, and the USA; information on the impact

of existing STI agreements; potential alternatives;

recommendations

general

English

62 pages

p. 43-48

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The European Commission tasked a consortium with developing a study about existing

bilateral Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) agreements, their impact, and potential

alternatives such as umbrella agreements between the EU and non-member states. This

was preceded by reports that pointed out the strategic disadvantages of a lack of

coordination and the lack of a common framework at the EU level, as well as calls that

“Europe should act as one to achieve a global playing field for research and innovation”

(p.

6).

The study concludes that a coordinated approach to STI agreements with non-EU countries

at the European level would result in increased efficiency and effectiveness of international

cooperation activities. STI umbrella agreements, meaning agreements that result out of

joint action by the EU and member states, are presented as a potential coordinated

approach. While the implementation of joint consent umbrellas (legally binding multilateral

agreements that present overarching framework conditions for STI cooperation) may be

difficult, basic principles umbrellas (not legally binding guidelines to be used at the

European level as a basis for STI agreements) are considered a feasible strategy.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items (2020)

(EU Dual Use Research guidance-draft version for Targeted Consultation)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

individual researchers; research organizations

no specific focus

dual-use export controls

information on export control regulations and how they affect

research organizations; guidelines; information research areas

and scenarios where export control regulations might be

relevant;

detailed guidance

English

64 pages

p. 21-40

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The document was drafted to support individual researchers and research organizations in

identifying, managing and mitigating the specific risks related to the export of dual use

technologies, as well as complying with the appropriate export control regulations. The

document will be updated periodically.

Among a total of 60 guidelines that address aspects that organizations should consider

when setting up or reevaluating their internal export control compliance policies, the

compliance guidance recommends to:

•

Establish and communicate clear responsibilities and processes where export control

compliance is concerned

Make relevant training for staff that could potentially take part in research concerning

dual use compulsory

Develop and implement regular risk assessments of partners as well as projects. These

could include traditional risk assessment methods as well as data mining or other

software solutions

Consider potential end uses of research

Perform export screening procedures throughout the research cycle on high risk

projects

Encourage staff to report non-compliance incidents or suspicions thereof

Protect dual-use items from unauthorized removal, consider access restrictions

Develop cyber security mechanisms including antivirus checks, firewalls, encryption,

audit trails and logs, as well as access controls. Ensure that international partners make

use of similar protections where relevant

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Germany

Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation

Report on Research, Innovation and Technological Performance in Germany 2020

(2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

German Federal Government

no overall focus; partly China specific

cyber security; knowledge exchange; equal competition;

mutually beneficial cooperation; dual-use

Information about current developments/challenges;

recommendations on measures

general guidance

English (German

version)

147 pages

p. 14-15; p. 53-54; p. 71-72

The Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (EFI) publishes yearly reports on

Germany’s

research, innovation and technological performance. The annual report for 2020

includes cybersecurity and knowledge exchange between Germany and China among its

main topics.

Recommended measures applicable or specifically related to China include:

•

Build cybersecurity expertise that covers technical, ethical and legal aspects

Make information on cybersecurity topics and advisory services easily accessible

Create a level playing field for direct investment in German and Chinese companies

Establish a central competence center to offer legal advice and specific expertise

relating to the cooperation with Chinese partners

Expand expertise on China

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA)

Export Control in Academia Manual (2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

academic and research sector; individual scientists

no specific focus

export control, foreign trade law

information about export control regulations and their impact on

the academic sector; case studies; recommendations for

universities

detailed guidance

English

108 pages

p. 84-95

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The manual was set up by the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export

Control (BAFA) in collaboration with several German research institutes and the Technical

University of Berlin to raise awareness among higher education institutions on export

control, and to provide support on the application of foreign trade law if needed.

BAFA’s recommendations

include suggestions such as:

•

Ensure compliance with export control regulations and foreign trade law through

personal responsibility and frameworks defined by the institution

Consider setting up an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) to facilitate compliance with

relevant regulations, provide risk analyses, keep records, and perform audits

Identify and clearly assign responsibilities within the research organization, consider

appointing an export control officer and provide relevant training

Include export control compliance regulations in relevant manuals and codes of conduct

Tailor due diligence on export regulation compliance to the specific fields of research

that the organization is involved in

Keep detailed records of activities that fall under export control regulations

Ensure that all members of the organization are aware of their duty to comply with

export control regulations and know whom to contact

Implement control mechanisms such as the 4-eyes principle

Regularly review internal export control compliance policies to ensure that they are up

to date and effective

Develop an anonymous reporting procedure for suspected or actual violations of foreign

trade laws and export control regulations

Protect listed items from theft by use of access controls, authorization concepts,

password protection, encryption, firewalls, storage and email policies etc.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

No red lines - science cooperation under complex framework conditions (2020)

(German original title: Keine roten Linien

–

Wissenschaftskooperationen unter komplexen

Rahmenbedingungen)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

German higher education institutions

no specific focus

framework conditions in the partnering country, opportunities

and risks of international collaboration, overall performance and

fit of the partner institution, embedding the partnership into the

institutional strategy

criteria catalog, guiding questions, additional resources

detailed guidance

German

57 pages

p. 9-54

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The DAAD’s Competence Center for International Science Cooperation (KIWi)

published

these guidelines to support higher education institutions in independently weighing up risks

and opportunities in their research cooperation with international partners. The guidelines

are supplemented by selected references and represent an experience-based foundation,

on the basis of which different actors in higher education institutions can decide which

aspects should be considered in their own risk and opportunity assessments. The document

has been prepared in collaboration with universities and experts and is to be continuously

developed and updated.

The guiding questions provided by the DAAD are arranged along six broad criteria. The

first four provide an overview over opportunities, potentials, challenges and risks of

international science cooperation projects and cover political, sociopolitical and legal

aspects. The fifth and sixth criteria refer more specifically to the evaluation process of the

participating partner institutions.

The corresponding guiding questions cover a broad range of topics, such as:

•

general aspects to consider when visiting the partnering country (who to contact in

case of emergency while abroad, whether cell phones and computers have been

adequately secured to make transfer of confidential data possible, etc.)

•

status of bilateral relationships/relationships with the EU

•

potential sanctions against the partner country and their impact on the science sector

•

potential for instrumentalization or political, strategic or ideological goals

•

potential for misuse of research results, compliance with export control laws

•

legal framework and independence of courts of laws in the partner country

•

science policy framework (is there a legal framework to regulate export/regulations for

joint publications etc., is academic freedom guaranteed, are certain research fields

prioritized, etc.)

•

potential civil-military links at the partner institution

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

German Association of Chinese Studies (DVCS)

Guidance by the German Association for Chinese Studies on the Interaction of

German Academic Institutions with the People's Republic of China (2018)

(German original title:

Chinastudien e.V. zum

Volksrepublik China)

Handlungsempfehlungen der Deutschen Vereinigung für

Umgang deutscher akademischer Institutionen mit der

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

German universities and research institutions

China-specific

agenda-setting, legal context, academic integrity

guidelines/suggestions

somewhat detailed guidance

German

4 pages

p. 1-4

The German Association for Chinese Studies (DVCS) is a non-profit association for China

scholars from German-speaking countries. The DVCS published 16 guidelines in total with

the intention of facilitating successful and mutually beneficial German-Chinese research

cooperation while accounting for the challenges constituted by different political systems.

Some of the suggestions to universities and research institutions are as follows:

•

Add a clause to cooperation agreements with Chinese partners that states that any

legal disputes shall be carried out before a German court of law

Include China experts in the discussions before cooperation agreements are finalized

or extended,

Make the content of cooperation agreements, especially where funding is concerned,

transparent and openly accessible

Include an exit clause in cooperation agreements

Avoid long-term financial dependencies

Perform rigorous background checks on Chinese partners

Protect the academic freedom of Chinese partners

Inform the head of the institute or an ethics council if lobbying efforts become apparent

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

German Rectors’

Conference

(HRK)

Guidelines and standards in international university cooperation (2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

German higher education institutions, individual university

members

no specific focus

strategy and governance; joint teaching and learning; joint

research; universities as transnational spaces

guidelines within four broad categories

general guidance

English (German

version)

6 pages

p. 3-6

The German Rectors’ Conference (HRK)

is a voluntary association of state and state-

recognized universities in Germany. HRK considers international cooperation to be of great

value to German higher education institutions and believes that “it is important to

proactively identify realms of possibility, without jeopardizing one’s own values and

standards in the process” (p.2).

The guidelines were developed with the intention of providing German universities and

research institutions with a means for critical evaluation of and orientation for setting up

and maintaining new and existing cooperation projects and international partnerships. The

document will be reviewed and updated at regular intervals.

Some of the proposed guidelines and standards are as follows:

•

Equal partnerships with transparent communication

Balanced funding models that avoid dependencies

Knowledge of the partner including cultural differences, values and principles

Robust and transparent due diligence processes, clear allocation of responsibilities

Adherence to institutional rules as well as scientific, ethical and legal standards

Academic integrity and freedom

Intercultural dialogue

The document, which does not have a specific regional focus, was supplemented by the

“Guiding Questions on University Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China”, which

go into more detail on how to implement the proposed guidelines specifically in the

cooperation with China.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Guiding Questions on University Cooperation with the People’s Republic of China

(2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

German higher education institutions

China-specific

strategy and governance; academic integrity; knowledge

security; quality in cooperation; intercultural aspects

objectives, guidelines/guiding questions, further reading

detailed, practical guidance

English (German

version)

18 pages

p. 6-17

HRK developed a total of 59 guiding questions that address specific concerns in the

cooperation with Chinese partners together with a number of experts on China. Although

the majority of German-Chinese research collaboration is considered to be mutually

beneficial in most cases, and even essential in some fields, CCP influence on the curricula

and bureaucratic processes at Chinese universities as well as negative impacts on academic

freedom have become a growing concern in recent years. However, rather than cutting

ties with China, the HRK proposes to strengthen dialogue and cooperation while being

mindful of one’s own values as well as the potential challenges involved.

In this context, the guiding questions are intended to map out both necessary and optional

courses of action in the establishment and further development of partnerships with China.

The guiding questions include suggestions such as:

•

Clearly define responsibilities within the university as well as within partnerships

Develop and implement control mechanisms and review procedures

Make funding decisions and concepts transparent, avoid one-sided or long-term

dependencies

Write exit clauses into contracts

Establish a contact point or person for advice regarding cooperation with China, as well

as a person who Chinese students and scholars can approach with questions

Implement clear reporting mechanisms for incidents relating to foreign interference

etc.

Ascertain whether the objectives of the participating institutions are compatible

Invest in and make use of expertise on China, individual actors on the Chinese side,

and risk-prone areas of research

Ensure that all partners observe research, ethical, and legal standards

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Authors: Asena Baykal, Thorsten Benner

Risky Business: Rethinking Research Cooperation with Non-Democracies.

Strategies for Foundations, Universities, Civil Society Organizations, and Think

Tanks (2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

foundations, universities, research organizations, civil society

organizations, think tanks in democratic countries

non-democracies (China, Russia, Turkey)

agenda-setting; academic integrity; knowledge security;

intelligence-sharing

information on democratic values and red lines; information

regarding potential risks of cooperation with non-democracies;

strategies to counteract risk; guidelines

very detailed, practical guidance

English

58 pages

p. 35-52

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) is an independent non-profit think tank that

published this study to support actors in democratic countries in the process of rethinking

scientific cooperation with non-democracies and provide strategies that can aid risk

management.

The document states that neither cutting all ties with non-democratic partners nor

conducting business as before should be the way forward; rather, the GPPi urges

universities and research organizations in democratic countries to reaffirm and clearly state

their values and red lines while being aware of the potential challenges and risks before

engaging in research cooperation or exchange with non-democracies such as China.

Among 74 guidelines in total, the GPPi suggests to:

•

Invest in and make use of country-specific expertise

Offer preparatory and follow-up seminars for participants in international cooperation

projects

Conduct background checks on potential partners and organizations

Foster topic-specific expertise, especially on dual use technology, to better assess risk

Develop a categorization system of risk-prone areas of research

Make use of tools such as the Academic Freedom Index, the Australian Strategic Policy

Institute’s China Defence Universities Tracker, and the German BAFA’s list of sensitive

research areas

Implement access restrictions where dual use or other sensitive technologies are

concerned

Maintain incident trackers and share these among organizations in democratic countries

Include exit strategies in cooperation agreements

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Industrial espionage and spying on competitors in Germany and Europe

(WISKOS)

Risks for the German research location - Guidelines for dealing with scientific

espionage and spying on competitors in the scientific context

(German original title: Risiken für den deutschen Forschungsstandort - Leitfaden zum

Umgang mit Wissenschaftsspionage und Konkurrenzausspähung im

Wissenschaftskontext)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

German universities and research institutions

no specific focus

scientific espionage

information on espionage activities; recommendations;

additional resources

somewhat detailed

German

28 pages

p. 19-23

WISKOS is a project funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) that

focused on a threat analysis of economic and scientific espionage.

WISKOS suggests that higher education institutions should

•

Perform a risk analysis of different research areas to determine their individual risk

profile and adjust policies and processes accordingly

Train staff and researchers according to their individual risk

Appoint a member of staff as security officer or consider involving external security

advisors

Exercise greater oversight over visiting scholars

Track researchers’ career paths after they leave the institution

Make use of confidentiality agreements

Enforce both physical and digital access controls where necessary

Ensure compliance with security protocols, especially where sensitive data is concerned

Contact the police or the state or federal criminal investigation offices when suspicions

of espionage arise

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Working Group China Research

(AG China-Forschung)

Pathways to Research with China - Knowledge, Approaches, Recommendations

(2020)

(German original title: Wege in die Forschung mit China

–

Wissen, Zugänge,

Empfehlungen)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

German universities and research institutions

China-specific

existing successful cooperation with China; background

information

information about the Chinese higher education system and

relevant preconditions; information about Chinese economic

interests; potential steps towards building cooperation

agreements; best practice examples

detailed background information on Chinese context

German

78 pages

p. 7-9, 48-74

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The Working Group China Research was appointed by Lower Saxony’s Ministry for Science

and Culture. The white paper advocates for a knowledge-based approach to cooperation

with China. To that effect, it offers detailed background information on the Chinese higher

education sector as well as economic areas of interest, and presents a number of examples

to illustrate how and on which topics joint research between Germany and China has been

conducted. It gives an overview of different projects and the partners involved and makes

recommendations based on the respective experiences. Two examples of preparatory

activities for research cooperation projects are also included. Each example had its own

characteristics, but within the included case studies, the following overarching observations

about prerequisites and conditions for the successful research cooperation with China were

made:

•

Mutual trust is key for joint projects as well as for being able to conduct on-site research

Balanced funding increases efficiency and effectiveness of projects

An on-site presence is recommended for continuous implementation of projects

Symposia and joint publications are important activities for both sides

Involvement of young scientists enhances positive effects

Long term strategic research partnerships often include other aspects such as teaching

and industry cooperation

The White Paper offers the following recommendations:

•

Establish relevant advisory bodies at the federal level

Develop matching processes to support the establishment of contacts and

collaborations

Develop a monitoring system to support the systematic setup of research cooperation

projects and STI cooperation strategies based on China expertise

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Japan

Director General for Science, Technology and Innovation

Guidelines for Collaboration of Universities and National

Development Agencies with Foreign Companies (2019)

Research

and

(Japanese original title:

大学・�½立研究開発法人の外�½企業との連携に係るガイドライン)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

Japanese universities and National Research and Development

Agencies

no specific focus

objectives; risk management; technology transfer; export

control

information on relevant laws/regulations; examples of existing

initiatives; recommendations

general; partly practical

Japanese

32 pages

p. 1; p. 5- 22; p. 23-31

The guidelines were put together by the Japanese government to address collaboration

between Japanese universities and research institutes with foreign companies. The

document delivers information on relevant laws, risk management, and administrative

considerations, clarifies appropriate approaches to collaboration, and assesses benefits of

collaboration. It concludes that to lead in global competition, Japanese universities and

research institutions have to intensify their collaboration with foreign companies.

The following measures should be taken to create mutually beneficial relationships and

prevent unintended technology transfer or reputational risk: high-level risk management

system, compliance with laws and regulations (e.g. Security Export Control, Unfair

Competition Prevention Act, Japanese Bayh-Dole Act), systematic mechanisms and

organizational structure for process management and development, monitoring, follow-up.

The guidelines include specific examples of initiatives taken by Japanese and foreign

(German, American, French, British) universities and public research institutions.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Netherlands

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)

Authors: Frank Bekkers, Willem Oosterveld, Paul Verhagen

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research

Institutions (2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

Dutch universities and research institutions

China-specific

academic freedom; knowledge transfer; agenda-setting

guiding questions

general guidance

English

18 pages

p. 3-15

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is an independent think tank that published

these guidelines with the aim of ensuring academic freedom as well as mutually beneficial

partnerships, and counteracting against the inadvertent transfer of science and technology

to China. Previously, HCSS and the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) worked on a mapping of risks

and challenges of the collaboration with China. HCSS hopes to enhance the benefits of

research cooperation for the Netherlands rather than discourage cooperation entirely.

Among the outcomes of the HCSS/LAC joint study is a list of 10 guiding questions that

were designed to provide support to universities and research institutions by helping them

to assess the challenges and risks involved in collaboration with China. Some of the

suggestions are as follows:

•

Determine the objectives of the research project and how the collaboration with a

Chinese partner will help to achieve them

Determine how the project will be funded and how this affects partners on both sides

Ensure a balanced partnership that allows access to research results for all those

involved

Ensure that all those involved are aware of potential challenges and risks

Consider potential restrictions on academic freedom

Ensure appropriate data management policies

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Leiden Asia Centre (LAC)

Authors: Dr. Ingrid d'Hooghe, Jonas Lammertink

Towards Sustainable Europe-China Collaboration in Higher Education in Research

(2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

European higher education and research institutions

China-specific

sustainable, mutually beneficial cooperation

information on current research climate in China; information

on the current state of European-Chinese collaboration; analysis

of 5 existing guideline documents; list of 17 recommendations

general guidance

English

82 pages

p. 55-57

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) is an independent research center for knowledge on modern

East Asia. “Towards Sustainable Europe-China

Collaboration in Higher Education and

Research”

aims to provide a framework to aid European universities and research

institutions in the establishment and further development of beneficial and sustainable

research collaboration with Chinese partners. Collaboration with China is considered to

have become essential for research and innovation in Europe, but some of the challenges

and risks need to be met with better coordination on the European side, as well as strong

measures that safeguard academic integrity and freedom, keep knowledge secure, and

ensure mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of reciprocity.

Some of the suggestions LAC offers are as follows:

•

Invest in expertise on China, especially in knowledge about Chinese higher education

institutions, their political ties, developments in higher education in China, and

developments in science and technology

Develop and implement safeguards for academic integrity, academic freedom, and

knowledge security

Establish a joint coordinating entity at the national level to facilitate a cooperative

approach to the challenges and risks involved in collaboration with Chinese partners

Develop appropriate guidelines that are proportionate to the specific risk and tailored

to scholars in specific research fields

Engage and share knowledge with other EU member states

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Sweden

The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and

Higher Education (STINT)

Responsible Internationalisation:

academic collaboration (2020)

Guidelines

for

reflection

international

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Swedish universities and research institutions

no specific focus

political, social, cultural and legal context of the partner

country; motivation for collaborating; strategic design of

collaborations

information highlighting benefits and risks; guiding questions

general guidance

English

12 pages

p. 6-10

Design:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education

(STINT) was set up by the Swedish government. These guidelines, which were developed

in cooperation with several Swedish universities, are intended to aid members of Swedish

higher education institutions in assessing and approaching international collaboration.

STINT views internationalization of research as generally positive, as it generates value

and aims to enhance research quality.

Among a total of 30 guiding questions, STINT suggests to:

•

Clearly define the objectives, forms and outcomes of the collaboration

Ensure that funding is transparent and balanced

Assess whether the type of funding poses risks regarding academic integrity and

freedom

Offer support to help all those involved understand the political, social, and cultural

context of the partner country

Closely assess risks for dual use of research results

Research intellectual property rights and data protection regulations in the partner

country

Consider ethical aspects and the potential for infringements on academic freedom

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

United Kingdom

Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group (AFIWG)

DRAFT MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT: Protection of Academic Freedom and the

Academic Community in the context of the internationalisation of the UK HE Sector

(2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

UK higher education institutions

no specific focus

academic freedom

information on benefits and risks of internationalization; list of

responsibilities

general guidance

English

7 pages

p. 3-6

The Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group (AFIWG) is an initiative to

strengthen academic freedom in the context of increasing internationalization. AFIWG

regards the internationalization of the academic sector as overwhelmingly positive, but

intends to raise awareness to the challenges and risks involved, including those associated

with violations of academic freedom.

To protect against threats to academic freedom, AFIWG calls for increased transparency

and accountability across the higher education sector. Among a total of 28

recommendations, AFIWG suggests to:

•

Implement thorough risk assessments and due diligence of both potential research

collaboration partners as well as topics before entering into cooperation agreements

Reference publicly available data such as the Academic Freedom Index

Agree on, implement, monitor and regularly reevaluate/adapt measures to safeguard

academic freedom

Develop confidential reporting mechanisms for incidents relating to threats to academic

freedom

Support members of higher education student whose academic freedom is at risk

Incorporate measures to protect academic freedom into Memoranda of Understanding

(MOUs)

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

Trusted Research Guidance for Academia

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

UK higher education institutions, particularly researchers in

STEM fields

no specific focus

research security; intellectual property and data protection;

compliance with legal frameworks

information on potential risks of international collaboration;

recommendations

somewhat detailed

English

21 pages

p. 3-20

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) provides security advice to

businesses and organizations across the UK. The Trusted Research Guidance was

developed to ensure and maintain mutually beneficial international cooperation while

protecting intellectual property and sensitive research.

CPNI suggests to:

•

Ensure that due diligence processes include ethical, financial, legal and national security

considerations to inform decision-making

Ensure maximum transparency to avoid conflicts of interest

Enforce access controls where necessary in order to protect intellectual property and

data

Implement effective cyber security mechanisms

Perform background checks on potential partners and affiliated institutions

Ensure compliance with export control and technology transfer regulations

Consider end uses and the potential for patenting throughout the research cycle

Exercise oversight over visiting scholars and visitors to campus

Ensure that intellectual property and research data is protected while traveling overseas

Take steps to protect IT devices from phishing attacks etc.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Universities UK (UUK)

Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues (2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

UK higher education institutions

no specific focus

academic integrity; knowledge security; protecting values,

reputation, people, campuses, research, and transnational

education; establishing reporting infrastructures; individual

responsibility

guidelines underpinned by several case studies and scenarios;

links to additional resources; guiding questions

very detailed and practical guidance

English

61 pages

p. 14-47, p. 55-57

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

Universities UK (UUK) is special interest group for universities in the United Kingdom. These

guidelines were published with the intention of enabling universities to protect themselves,

their staff and students as well as managing specific risks associated with

internationalization while actively pursuing international cooperation and dialogue. UUK

provides several case studies and suggests a number of additional resources.

Most importantly, UUK suggests that universities and research institutions should:

•

Identify their institution’s individual risk profile,

regularly review as risks change over

time, and develop/adapt policies and processes accordingly

Provide annual risk reports to governing bodies

Encourage staff to raise concerns about partnerships

Establish clear codes of conduct, policies, and legal agreements along with relevant

training, especially where sensitive areas of research are concerned

Develop a reporting infrastructure through which both staff and students can report

any concerns and receive support, regularly update this infrastructure as threats evolve

over time

Develop and implement cybersecurity strategies and contractual agreements to protect

intellectual property

Comply with export control legislation

Include appropriate exit strategies along with a mutual understanding of what could

trigger an exit with any cooperation agreement

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

USA

Association of American Universities (AAU); Association of Public and

Land-grant Universities (APLU)

University Actions to Address Concerns about Security Threats and Undue Foreign

Government Influence on Campus (2020)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

US universities

no specific focus

risk assessments; export controls; cybersecurity; intellectual

property; technology control; travel safeguards; academic

freedom

recommendations; example measures

general

English

7 pages

p. 1-7

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

According to the findings of a 2019 survey of American universities by the AAU and the

APLU, the document presents a summary of methods that some universities have already

implemented to address risks related to foreign interference. Universities are encouraged

to implement similar measures to ensure the security of their research and protect

academic integrity on their own campuses.

AAU and APLU recommend to:

•

Build awareness, especially about export control regulations and other disclosure

requirements

Provide relevant training to staff and students

Strengthen cyber security and data protection measures

Continuously update conflict of interest and conflict of commitment policies

Develop international travel policies including security briefings, review of travel plans,

and ensure that electronic equipment is protected from potential cyber security threats

before, after, and during international travel

Exercise oversight over visitors to campus

Strengthen existing policies and employ staff with relevant experience to ensure

compliance with export control regulations

Form task forces that can coordinate risk assessments

Assign clear responsibilities and points of contact

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A

Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide

(2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

higher education institutions worldwide

China-specific

academic freedom

code of conduct with 12 recommendations

partly specific recommendations

English

3 pages

p. 1-3

Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international human rights-focused NGO. HRW created

this code of conduct based on more than 100 interviews that were conducted between

2015 and 2018 in Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain and the United States with

academics, graduate and undergraduate students and administrators from a range of

different institutions. It is designed to support higher education institutions in ensuring

their academic integrity and protecting the academic freedom of their students, particularly

those who work on or are from China.

Some of the proposed recommendations to worldwide institutions of higher education are

as follows:

•

Recognize threats to academic freedom and academic integrity

Strengthen commitment to and policies for academic freedom on campus

Develop and implement reporting mechanisms and incident trackers

Offer support and flexibility to students and scholars whose progress or careers are

under threat due to Chinese curtailment of academic freedom

Monitor activities of all organizations on campus that receive Chinese funding

Publicly disclose sources of Chinese funding as well as projects and collaborations with

Chinese counterparts

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

National Science and Technology Council

Recommended Practices for Strengthening the Security and Integrity of

America’s Science and Technology

Research Enterprise (2021)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

US higher education institutions

no specific focus

research security

information on benefits and risks of international cooperation;

recommended practices

detailed

English

22 pages

p. 6-15

The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established to coordinate the US

government’s science and technology policies. The document emphasizes the benefits of

an open research environment, but stresses that this openness must be supported by

appropriate safeguards. These guidelines were developed to aid higher education

institutions in protecting their academic integrity and the security of their research.

Among a total of 21 recommendations, NSTC suggests to:

•

Include all members of a given institution in the establishment of an organizational

approach to research security

Assess the institution’s specific risk profile

and develop policies and processes

accordingly

Centralize review and approval processes for international research cooperation

Develop strict conflict of interest, conflict of commitment and disclosure policies

Consider digital persistent identifier policies

Develop appropriate training and guidance for staff, scholars and students

Ensure compliance with all relevant policies and regulations

Establish policies for securely hosting visiting scholars and other foreign visitors to

campus

Develop and maintain data security protections

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

University of Rochester

International Research & Global Collaboration (2019)

Target audience:

Regional focus:

Thematic focus:

Structure:

Level of guidance:

Language:

Page total:

Most relevant:

University of Rochester community

no specific focus

disclosure policies; hosting visitors; travel; publications

overview over relevant policies; guidelines

general

English

13 pages

p. 5-12

The University of Rochester published these guidelines to ensure mutually beneficial

cooperation with international partners and compliance with relevant policies and

regulations in an environment that increasingly raises concerns about the risks and

challenges involved in international academic collaboration.

The university recommends to:

•

Disclose all types of collaborative activities that involve foreign entities; all types of

foreign or domestic funding, grants, and gifts; and participation in foreign talent

programs

Exercise greater oversight over visiting scholars and short-term visitors

Ensure data and intellectual property protection, particularly where sensitive research

is concerned

Ensure that publications are affiliated with the university

destination, consider using a sanitized laptop

•

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Analysis of current and publicly available

documents on securing international

science cooperation

Part II: Meta-Guidelines supporting the safe and

successful international science and technology

cooperation

EU Research and Innovation Knowledge Network on China

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Preface

In the past years, various guidelines have been published with the aim of improving

international research and innovation cooperation. These guidelines have been produced

by very different groups and individuals, address different target groups, focus on different

topics, and some have specific political intentions. Some of these guidelines give rather

general advice, others are very detailed. Some of them are state agnostic, others address

the cooperation with specific countries. They are addressed to individuals but sometimes

also to institutions or policy makers; most are addressed specifically to members of higher

education institutions or individual researchers.

It is not easy for the European user from a university or research organization to find and

classify the appropriate recommendations. To facilitate this, an analysis of recently

published and publicly accessible documents has been carried out. The results of the

analysis are presented in 2 parts:

Part I: Annotated collection of checklists and guidelines for the international science and

technology cooperation

Part II: Meta-Guidelines supporting the safe and successful international science and

technology cooperation

Part II: Meta-Guidelines supporting the safe and successful international

science and technology cooperation

These meta guidelines are intended to support universities and research institutions in

setting up international collaborations as well as in managing the specific risks that have

been identified in the scientific cooperation and other types of academic exchange with

non-democracies.

As a result of the collection of guidelines in part I, this document compiles guidelines and

guiding questions from the following documents, which each cover different aspects that

are relevant for the cooperation with specific countries or non-democracies in general:

•

Checklist for collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions

(The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2019. Authors: Frank Bekkers, Willem

Oosterveld, Paul Verhagen)

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items

(EU Commission, 2020)

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector

(University

Foreign Interference Task Force, 2019)

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People's Republic of China

(German Rectors’ Conference, 2020)

Hunting the phoenix

– The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and

talent

(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020. Author: Alex Joske)

Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues

(Universities UK, 2020)

Picking flowers, making honey

– The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign

universities

(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018. Author: Alex Joske)

Resisting Chinese government efforts to undermine academic freedom abroad

(Human

Rights Watch, 2019)

Risky Business: Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies

(Global Public Policy Institute, 2020. Authors: Asena Baykal, Thorsten Benner)

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

The documents were chosen for their level of detail in covering aspects or partial aspects

that have to be considered by stakeholders of the European science and technology

landscape when building and maintaining cooperation projects or undergoing other types

of exchange with partners from non-democracies.

By pooling the information provided in these documents and thus combining expertise from

several different countries and institutions, these meta-guidelines hope to cover all

relevant aspects for safe and mutually beneficial cooperation.

The categorization of the options for action or recommendations for action of the guidelines

used is not based on a structured, scientifically backed standard, but is the result of the

evaluation of the editors through the step-by-step compilation of the recommendations for

action. Of course, other forms of compilation and grouping are also possible.

The analysis makes no claim to completeness but is instead intended to make the access

to guidelines and checklists easier for users.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Content:

1 Due

diligence

on new and existing international cooperation .......................... 5

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

5.1

5.2

Agenda-setting ............................................................................... 6

Contracts and legal frameworks ........................................................ 7

Funding ......................................................................................... 9

Transparency and accountability ..................................................... 10

Informal collaboration .................................................................... 11

Reviews of ongoing partnerships ..................................................... 12

Background checks ........................................................................ 13

Prep and follow-up activities ........................................................... 14

Incident trackers ........................................................................... 14

People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) collaboration .................................... 15

Roles and responsibilities ............................................................... 15

Existing policies ............................................................................ 16

Internal reporting mechanisms ....................................................... 17

Conflict of Interest (CoI) policies ..................................................... 17

Travel policies ............................................................................... 18

Joint teaching and researching ........................................................ 19

Training and educating staff and students ........................................ 19

Student groups and other campus organizations ............................... 21

Talent-recruitment programs .......................................................... 22

Visiting scholars and exchange students........................................... 22

Country-specific and topic-specific expertise ..................................... 24

Organizational values .................................................................... 25

Risk assessment and management........................................................ 11

Strategy and governance on campus ..................................................... 15

Due diligence on campus ..................................................................... 19

Communication and education .............................................................. 24

Academic integrity and freedom ........................................................... 25

Research security ............................................................................... 28

7.1

7.2

Dual Use technology ...................................................................... 30

Export control compliance .............................................................. 31

Knowledge sharing .............................................................................. 36

Additional resources ............................................................................ 37

Other points from the quoted guidelines for further discussion ............... 37

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

1. Due diligence on new and existing international

cooperation

•

“What minimum level of due diligence is applied to foreign investments and

partnerships?”

“Investments

in due diligence should put organizations in a position to make informed

decisions about the entities from non-democracies with which they want to

–

or do not

want to

–

associate themselves. At the same time, identifying low-risk cooperation

areas upfront allows organizations to approach every new cooperation project with only

the degree of caution that is warranted.”

“Due

diligence to mitigate security-related risks should be undertaken regularly, with

regular reviews in relation to international partnerships and projects, including research

partnerships, as well as sources of income, such as investments, donations,

philanthropy, commercialisation, capital investment, tuition fee income and staff

honorary and consultancy appointments. Full consideration should be given to the

potential for security breaches in every engagement, from the most informal

collaboration to the most formal partnership.”

“What

level of internal reporting applies to foreign investments and partnerships and

how does this aid accountability and risk management?”

“Does

the university have internal guidelines that provide a framework for the

cooperation with China? Was or is there an internal discussion at the university that

involves all relevant actors and achieves an institutional consensus on the key issues

for the university?”

“Ensure

that due diligence processes consider reputational, ethical and security risks.”

“Does

the university have review procedures for the handling of problematic incidents?

How is it decided which grounds militate for or against continuation of the cooperation

if no agreement can conceivably be reached with Chinese partners? Who should be

involved in this decision? What steps are taken to deal with recurring problems? Have

potential exit strategies been defined for the cooperation?”

“Has

it been ensured that the research cooperation is compliant with the principles of

the university and that research data will not be collected under ethically problematic

conditions? Has an internal ethics committee been established at the university that

addresses ethical issues in the context of the projects in question where needed?”

“Institutions

should consider the implications of laws with extraterritorial application for

their students, staff and visitors. In response legislation with extraterritorial

implications, some academic institutions have introduced protections for students. This

has included, for example, identifying without modifying course material to students

that might be considered politically sensitive in certain states. Institutions could also

take steps to protect students by introducing the Chatham House rule to seminars or

other oral discussions, and otherwise introducing measures that allow students to

submit coursework anonymously.”

“Ensure that there’s sufficient

resourcing to implement and ensure compliance with

policies on conflicts of interest, commercialisation, integrity and intellectual property.”

•

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 37.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 7.

Guiding

questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 14.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 25.

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Fully

investigate cases of fraud, misconduct or nondisclosure. These investigations

should determine why existing systems failed to prevent misconduct and then discuss

the findings with relevant government agencies.”

“How

do staff understand what risks should be shared with government agencies?”

“How

do staff know who their university contact is for liaison with government

agencies?”

“Is

there an internal monitoring system at the university for recurring questions and

problems? What steps are taken to deal with recurring problems?”

“What

level of visibility do senior administrators and officials in universities have of staff

appointments?”

“What

level of oversight exists for staff appointments, including secondary

appointments (e.g. honorary and adjunct roles)?”

“How

could research integrity offices and security offices in universities assist

researchers in due diligence activities?”

1.1 Agenda-setting

•

“What is the partnership’s aim? It is wise to formulate your own goals for the

partnership and then consider whether they can be achieved in practice. Which factors

determine success or failure? Is there a risk that certain activities could be blocked by

the Chinese partner for political or strategic reasons, or might have to be designed

differently? Are your aims and objectives in line with national or regional policy

guidelines? Is there a reasonable chance that the envisaged aims will still be intact at

the end of the project? Are the aims on the Chinese side known and understood and

can they be reconciled with your own?”

“What

form will the partnership take? What parties are directly or indirectly involved in

the partnership? Will any third parties be joining at a later stage who could demand a

particular role or a stake? What contribution could they make to the factors that

determine success or failure in achieving the objectives? What are the options for

monitoring this?”

“Why

work with a partner from China rather than another country? In view of the

potentially serious limitations and risks that collaboration with Chinese parties can

involve, it is useful to examine whether the desired results can be more easily achieved

elsewhere. There are substantive considerations: is the integrity of the shared data at

stake and can researchers operate freely? There are also possible procedural issues: is

it easy to get visas? Is screening required? Are financial transactions guaranteed? Such

considerations may lead to the conclusion that collaboration with European partners

will ultimately prove more worthwhile.”

“Be

selective when choosing cooperation projects.”

“What

institutional return or added value will be created for the university? Has an

appropriate balance been struck between expenditure and return?”

•

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 23.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 10.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 4.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 5.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 3.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 6.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Was

an agreement reached on the objectives of the partnership at the start of the

cooperation? Are the objectives of the participating institutions compatible?”

“Abandon the idea and practice of “dialogue for dialogue’s sake.” Organizations should

ask themselves whether attending a dialogue event or participating in a cooperation

project will add any concrete value for them. The benefits of networking should be

weighed against the risks of being instrumentalized for authoritarian PR.”

“How

does the partnership fit into the university's long-term strategic planning? Can

any conflicting objectives be identified in view of other cooperation projects or general

objectives of the university?”

“Are

there commercial interests at stake? Commercial interests may be at stake,

especially in partnerships in areas of research with major technological added value.

From the Chinese viewpoint, these interests are never hard to find. This makes it

important to identify the commercial risks beforehand, not only in joint projects but

also in working with third parties.”

“What

mechanisms does your university have to identify and protect commercially

valuable research?”

“Do

researchers consider the potential for their research to be used for purposes that

are inconsistent with promoting economic, social and security benefits

(…)?”

“Have

the interests of economic actors participating in the cooperation been

documented transparently? Has it been ensured that these interests do not obstruct

the actual research interests (e. g. prohibition of publication)?”

“Is

the teaching or research cooperation expected to result in scientific or economic

added value for the participating

(…)

actors? What other types of added value are hoped

for?”

“What

elements of the activity need to be scoped differently as a result of the

partnership and if so, do the benefits outweigh the risks?”

“How

does the partnership consider potential internal and external risks to the

university where it may be appropriate to obtain executive advice and approval?”

“Researchers

should consider the intentional and unintentional potential consequences

if foreign interference occurs. Key questions include: Who might be affected by this

research

–

positive and negative consequences? How might they be affected? What

might be affected by this research

–

positive and negative consequences? University

guidelines and advice could adapt existing security and personal safety protections as

required.”

1.2 Contracts and legal frameworks

•

“Formulate

clear rules (such as codes of conducts) for properly approaching interactions

with entities from non-democracies before entering into any type of cooperation

contract.”

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 6.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 6.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 13.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 19.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 14.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 11.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 15.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 21.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 41.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Specific

legal advice should be sought in relation to contract design and ensuring the

appropriate protections are in place.”

“Do

not allow for foreign jurisdiction over any partnership contracts that govern

activities in liberal democracies.”

.36

“How

are contracts drafted to give the university clear authority to withdraw from the

agreement should the partnership impinge on academic freedom and research ethics

or be found to be subject to export controls?”

“Make

sure to always have the legal option and be ready to terminate a contract if

necessary.”

“The (…) institution should have in place an appropriate exit strategy with provisions

in place, along with an understanding of what would trigger an exit. Ultimately, this

could include the right to withdraw from the agreement or terminate it early without

incurring any liabilities if the ongoing due diligence exercise reveals that the overseas

organization or researcher is no longer an appropriate partner. An example would be

where the ongoing due diligence exercise reveals

that the university’s legal obligation

to maintain academic freedom is under threat.”

“For

all formal interactions with partner organisations or individuals, use best practice

contracting mechanisms and policies to manage security-related risks. Terms and

conditions of agreements or memoranda of understanding should include clauses that

protect the integrity of academic activity.”

“Can

all partners access and use the findings of the joint research? Research findings

may represent different stakes for the various parties involved. It is therefore vital to

know what can be done with the findings in terms of publication or sharing with third

parties, so that none of the partners can unexpectedly veto a decision.”

“Has

access to the cooperation activities been adequately guaranteed for academically

relevant partners (or partner institutions)? What measures will the university take if it

becomes apparent that individual persons or institutions have been excluded on the

basis of their background, political orientation, religion, gender or geographical

location?”

“Has

a legal framework been agreed in writing that guarantees that the research

cooperation and its results benefit both sides (e. g. access to and use of research data

with a transfer plan for cross-border data communication)?”

“How

is it decided which grounds militate for or against continuation of the cooperation

if access to jointly generated research data is expected to be restricted? Who should

be involved in this decision?”

“Has

a coordinated approach been agreed upon with regard to the application of

internationally accepted procedures in publication practice?”

“Are

the legal bases of the joint use of research infrastructures and research data clear

in both [the EU country] and China and have aspects been addressed that could prove

to be problematic?”

“Have you taken steps to ensure that any translated versions of contractual agreements

include identical terms and conditions?”

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 42.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 17.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 42.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 7.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 7.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 12.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of

China, p. 12.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Check

whether the proposed contractual conditions align

with the organization’s

overarching values. To make this process easier and guide potential internal discussions

on the proposed conditions for cooperation, it can be helpful to have a standardized,

comprehensive set of questions to ask when reviewing a contract. These should be

rooted in an organization’s core values.”

“Protect

core values and wider interests by integrating control and sanctions

mechanisms in contracts with cooperation partners from nondemocracies.”

“As (…) universities increase their operations

overseas, they may find that the legal

and social frameworks of other countries do not necessarily match (…) in respect of,

for example, to anti-discrimination policies and the protection of individual rights. These

should be assessed within the normal risk management framework.”

“While recognizing that (…) norms of academic freedom and freedom of speech may

not be legally upheld in other countries, universities can still take measures to ensure

that core values such as equality and diversity are

respected within the university’s

own scope and working environment. For example, a university might publish a charter

of values for staff working internationally, clearly stating the implications of the

university’s commitment to values of equality, diversity

and respect, while recognizing

the laws and cultural norms of the country.”

1.3 Funding

•

“Are

the funding concept and agreements governing the cooperation transparent and

comprehensible for all participants?”

“Who

will fund the partnership, and how

will this affect the partners’ rights, obligations

and responsibilities? It is important to know who will fund the project

–

directly or

indirectly. This is particularly true when working with a country like China, where the

government plays a major role not only as the financier but also in directly or (more

often) indirectly shaping the partnership’s content and form. Between the lines of the

formulated and agreed objectives, there may also be other, implicit objectives. An

agreement that leaves room for interpretation can cause friction at a later stage.”

“Partner

organisations or individuals may seek to access or influence particular areas

of activity through various forms of funding arrangements and other inducements

targeted at individuals. To mitigate this, individuals and institutions should be

transparent about their sources of funding. Due diligence should establish which

processes exist to manage security-related risks when considering sources of potential

income.”

“Is

the funding concept balanced and does it involve all partners to an appropriate

degree? Have the medium- and long-term financial implications of the cooperation been

considered? Will long-term financial dependencies be avoided?”

“Define

and enforce consequences for cooperation partners from nondemocracies that

withhold information about government or military ties or funding.”

“Can

it be determined whether individual university members benefit (financially or

otherwise) from the cooperation?”

•

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 25.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 8.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 8.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

p. 41.

p. 42.

p. 43.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Is

there a consensus within the university as to which types of Chinese funding are

compatible with its principles as an institution and which framework conditions the

funding should be based on?”

“If

necessary, has the question of charging tuition fees been discussed and settled

amicably in both countries?”

“Make

sure that cooperation projects do not depend on funding from nondemocratic

governments or businesses or foundations that are close to such governments. Instead,

organizations should prioritize independent project funding by looking for domestic

funders or funders in other liberal democracies. This effectively means that the total

amount of funding for research and civil society organizations will have to increase. The

bulk of this increase should eventually come from public bodies to lessen the

attractiveness of funds from non-democracies. Of course, international cooperation

projects can be co-funded by counterparts from non-democracies. But such funding

should be limited to providing for partner organizations’ own staff costs and on-the-

ground activities in non-democratic settings. Under no circumstances should staff costs

of organizations in liberal democracies be covered by funds from autocracies.”

“Use

funding guidelines to incentivize a culture of integrity by making funding

conditional on corresponding good practices. A positive example from the sphere of

research are the Guidelines for Safeguarding Good Research Practice by the German

Research Foundation (DFG), which were published in August 2019. Following these

guidelines, the DFG only provides funding to organizations that establish those same

guidelines in a legally binding manner, granting them an adjustment period until July

2021.”

1.4 Transparency and accountability

•

“Disclose

contracts with partners in non-democracies to ensure transparency and

accountability, and to demonstrate that normative and security questions have been

appropriately considered.”

“Make

information about cooperation arrangements with partners from non-

democracies more accessible by explicitly stating who gets funding from whom and for

which purposes, who the cooperation partners are, and which joint activities the

cooperation entails.”

“Does

the university document its cooperation activities with China, the objectives and

the foundations of the cooperation in a manner that can be understood by the general

public?”

“Disclose

all Chinese government funding. Publicly disclose, on an annual basis, all

sources and amounts of funding that come directly or indirectly from the Chinese

government. Publish lists of all projects and exchanges with Chinese government

counterparts.”

“Demand

full transparency from cooperation partners concerning their sources of

funding, potential government ties, and the relevant staff’s backgrounds. This includes

paying attention to any potential links with businesspeople who might have close ties

•

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 8-9.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 3.

46.

47.

42.

Conduct for

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

to the respective non-democratic governments or who are part of inner circles of

government elites.”

“Have

responsibilities been defined at the domestic university and the Chinese partner

university? Have resilient control mechanisms been established for the partnership?

Have transparent procedures been defined for the selection of persons or admission of

students as well as funding criteria and funding decisions?”

“Are

the interests of both sides involved in a partnership transparent for all

participants? Is there sufficient knowledge of the institutions sending Chinese visiting

academics?”

1.5 Informal collaboration

•

“Although

informal collaborations are unlikely to be covered by the

institution’s formal

policies or procedures, risks remain. Your institution should consider how it supports

staff to make informed decisions outside your formal policies and procedures, including

requiring staff to disclose partnerships and collaborations wherever possible. This will

ensure that your institution has visibility of any conflicts of interest and other legal,

reputational or financial risks associated with informal collaborations.”

2 Risk assessment and management

•

“How

clear are requirements to undertake proportionate risk assessments at the start

of international collaborative research projects?”

“Who

has responsibility for conducting risk assessments on overseas research

projects?”

“How

is the level of risk in a particular research project, and the nature of the

governance and oversight that could be applied to mitigate this risk considered?”

“What

documentation and templates capture these considerations, and can be referred

to, should a retrospective assessment of the research activity be undertaken?”

“What

mechanisms assist staff to identify and mitigate possible risks?”

“The

governing body and executive leadership of the institution are responsible and

accountable for protecting the institution against the threats and risks set out in these

guidelines. To support them in performing this role, the governing body of the

institution should receive an annual report describing the risks the institution faces and

how the risks are being mitigated.”

“A

shared understanding of the policies and processes in place to manage these risks,

including individual responsibilities to proactively report and escalate security-related

risks, is crucial to fostering a culture of awareness and security

(…).”

“Identify

and manage exposure to security-related risks.

Your institution’s risk

exposure is unique and depends on a range of factors, including the nature and scope

•

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 7.

Guiding questions on university cooperation

with the People’s Republic of China, p. 13.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 19.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 6.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 16.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

of your activity, and the risk awareness and management culture you have fostered.

Your risk exposure will change over time.”

“Policies

and

processes must align with your institution’s risk profile. A higher risk

profile may necessitate more robust due diligence processes and oversight and subject

your institution to additional scrutiny. Assessment of your risk profile must be informed

by a robust understanding of your legal obligations.”

“Establish

security-related risk management as a key, ongoing priority. Your institution

will have a range of risk-management, governance and reporting frameworks and

capabilities in place to manage risk. Risks, including those related to academic freedom

and freedom of speech, should be covered in these processes and publicised widely

across your institution.”

“How

robust are your risk framework mitigation strategies that deal with foreign

interference in research?”

“Who

is responsible for maintaining, promoting and applying these arrangements?”

“How

are these arrangements informed by the range of research undertaken in the

university and the associated level of risks?”

“Are

periodic risk assessments performed to evaluate risk in each building, taking into

consideration multiple factors such as the type of research activities taking place,

including non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), the range of visitors and shipping to and

from the building?”

“Are the

risk assessments undertaken by personnel with expertise and responsibilities

in the various areas of interest, including the protection of digital systems, physical

property and visitor procedures and protocols?”

“These

risks are dynamic. As the threats evolve, so too should the systems and

processes in place to manage them. Risk frameworks should be regularly reviewed to

ensure they are fit for purpose and in line with best practice. In certain circumstances,

independent organisations may need to provide assurance of the controls in place.”

“What

ability and capacity does the university have to analyse and respond to the

information gathered from internal reporting arrangements?”

2.1 Reviews of ongoing partnerships

•

“Have collaborators’ behaviours,

interests and external relationships changed over

time into something with which the university or individual is not comfortable?”

“Has the government’s advice or assessments changed over time?”

“In

view of existing partnerships, how are decisions reached in cases where

developments suggest that academic freedom can no longer be adequately

guaranteed? Who should be involved in this decision? What steps are taken to deal

with recurring problems?”

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 15.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 16.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12, 17.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 55.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 16.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 16.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 10.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

2.2 Background checks

•

“Conduct

rigorous background checks on potential cooperation partners from non-

democracies before entering into a cooperation agreement. Explicitly check for contacts

to the military, government affiliations and potential complicity in human rights

violations.”

“Draw

on a diverse array of resources and experts to conduct background checks.

Potential resources include information-sharing services and incident trackers. Country

and regional expertise should be combined with topic expertise, for instance, from the

defense and emerging technologies sectors.”

“When

vetting seemingly independent organizations in non-democracies, pay close

attention to links between their leadership and broader governmental elites from non-

democracies.”

“To

the extent that it is reasonable for a university to determine, do partners or their

associates have relevant research backgrounds, is their organisation reputable, and are

reasonable background checks conducted for new people working on a project?”

“What

information or advice is available from government to assist?”

“What background is known about the university’s partner and is there anything

dubious about their interests being reported?”

“How

upfront and transparent is the partner being about affiliations, parent partners

and intent, that it is reasonable for the university to be able to identify? These may

include existing vendor relationships, sourcing partners and alliances with interest in

the primary partner.”

“Due

diligence on prospective international partners should be proportionate and

reference relevant legal and regulatory provisions. It should include consideration of all

security-related risks, including any risks to academic freedom that are associated with

international partnerships. Be clear about monitoring data, and who is responsible for

reporting what to whom.”

“Is

the partnership or the project embedded in a political context on the Chinese side?

Does the university have knowledge of how this political framework is assessed by the

relevant

(…)

actors? Is there a consensus within the university on the assessment of

this framework?”

“Is

there sufficient knowledge of the Chinese partner university and its environs? Is

there sufficient knowledge of the institutions sending Chinese students and visiting

academics?”

“What

are the partner entity’s

relationships with foreign governments, political parties

and related entities and individuals? Are these appropriately disclosed, for example is

the information available to the public through a website or register

(…)?”

100

•

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 38.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 15.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 17.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 19.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 7.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic

of China, p. 6.

100

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 15.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

2.3 Prep and follow-up activities

•

“Develop

and implement preparatory and follow-up seminars for individuals who are

engaged in cooperation projects. Such seminars should offer room for participants to

reflect on the specific risks and challenges that come with working in non-democratic

contexts. Moreover, they should raise awareness for the logic and methods of

authoritarian propaganda narratives and foster an understanding of the constraints

faced by program partners and participants from non-democracies. Participants should

also learn about the types of human rights violations that occur in their respective fields

of cooperation as well as the privileges they might enjoy because they are from

democratic countries. When preparing youth or student exchange programs, this could

include contextualizing experiences that former students have made.”

101

“Schedule

trainings and refresher sessions before new cooperation projects start to

ensure that staff members remain alert and sensitive to risks.”

102

“Do

the participants understand the potential risks and know about precautions that

have been taken or need to be taken? Are staff fully aware of the specific risks of

working with Chinese parties? Are there any regulations or protocols they need to know

about?”

103

“Scientists,

researchers and students going to China should be briefed beforehand

about the ways in which they could be approached or influenced. If possible, a

debriefing session should also be held after their return, to check whether any potential

risks actually materialised and to identify possible patterns.”

104

“Collect

information on fundamental rights infringements that occurred in cooperation

projects with entities from non-democracies. Such incidents should be documented

meticulously.”

105

“Does

the university have an exchange platform or a procedure that facilitates internal

communication between teaching staff and researchers involved in partnerships and

projects with China, establishes a consensus at the university on the opportunities and

limitations of the partnership and thus stabilises existing partnerships in a sustained

manner?”

106

•

2.4 Incident trackers

•

“Establish,

support and/or use incident trackers that document problems or challenges

encountered by organizations from liberal democracies when cooperating with

counterparts from non-democracies. Such incident trackers would provide shared,

collectively maintained data bases that would make it easier for organizations to

strategize for and mitigate the potential risks involved in cooperation with non-

democracies. Specific types of incidents captured by incident tracks could, for instance,

be efforts by partners to conceal military affiliations or visa harassment, to name just

two. Such incident trackers should be complemented by corresponding reports that

would be published at least on an annual basis. Especially organizations involved in

dialogue programs should enhance their efforts to document, systematically assess and

publicize risks and incidents as research in this area is currently almost completely

lacking.”

107

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 7-8.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

p. 36.

p. 40.

14.

p. 51.

p. 52.

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Create

and maintain a list that documents entities from non-democracies with which

collaboration is not advisable due to their continued involvement in fundamental rights

infringements.”

108

2.5

People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) collaboration

•

“Produce

credible and thorough assessments of the extent of PLA collaboration on

campuses.”

109

“Develop

processes for managing PLA collaboration so that security risks can be

identified and resolved.”

110

“Ensure

that those interacting with members of non-allied militaries take appropriate

security precautions.”

111

“Require

employees to receive approval before collaborating with or training members

of non-allied militaries.”

112

3 Strategy and governance on campus

3.1 Roles and responsibilities

•

“Who

in your university has operational responsibility for foreign interference and

safeguards?”

113

“Who

in your university has senior executive responsibility for foreign interference and

safeguards?”

114

“Who has responsibility for signing off and monitoring contractual agreements on

research collaborations?”

115

“Do

staff know when and where to seek advice when they have concerns?”

116

“What

guidance exists on when researchers should seek further advice internally or

external to the university?”

117

“How

clear are roles and responsibilities across the university about when to engage

with [relevant] agencies to ensure compliance with

(…)

Export Controls

(…)?”

118

“Is

there sufficient join-up between those responsible for the oversight and discharge

of strategies relating to the protection of campuses and infrastructure, whether through

the protection of digital systems, physical property or visitor procedures and protocols?

What mechanisms are in place to support this join-up?”

119

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 52.

Picking flowers, making honey. The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities, p.

Picking flowers, making honey. The Chinese military’s collaboration

with foreign universities, p.

Picking flowers, making honey. The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities, p.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 10.

20.

115

116

117

118

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 22.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

119

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 55.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

3.2 Existing policies

•

“Enhance

efforts to enforce existing policies. This includes taking stock of the different

(types of) disclosure policies that are already in place as well as of how their

enforcement and implementation were handled before.”

120

“What

policies does your university have that trigger engagement with relevant

(…)

agencies on legislative compliance and foreign interference?”

121

“How

do policies and procedures acknowledge foreign interference as a risk?”

122

“How

do policies and procedures enable staff and students to understand who is

affected by specific security risks?”

123

“How

have all stakeholders been considered in security policies and procedures?”

124

“What

policies manage responses to security incidents?”

125

“What policies, tools and frameworks does your institution use to protect intellectual

property (IP)?”

126

“What

is the escalation pathway and how is the appropriate response to these risks

clearly articulated?”

127

“What

mechanisms support staff to identify foreign interference risks from collaborative

partners who are undertaking extended stays, do not have the appropriate background,

or engage in unusual activity?”

128

“What

policies exist in the university to identify research contracts that may require

additional oversight due to the nature of the research and/or the type of

partnership?”

129

“What is the process for

contracts and agreements put in place for non-funded research

projects, such as one-to-one research collaborations between academics in the UK and

overseas?”

130

“What processes are in place to deal with breaches of, or changes to contractual

research agreements?”

131

•

“Are

security-related risks and overseas threats sufficiently embedded in cybersecurity strategies,

estates policies and visitor procedures and protocols?”

132

“How

can current university policies, for example pertaining to human ethics, safe

travel arrangements, facility access and event management, continue to be enhanced

to identify potential risks and support researchers in high risk or sensitive research

areas to proactively manage their risks?”

133

“Update policies on intellectual property, commercialisation,

research integrity,

conflicts of interest and external appointments where necessary.”

134

•

120

121

122

123

124

125

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 10.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

126

127

128

129

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 16.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

130

131

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

132

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 55.

133

134

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 20.

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

3.3 Internal reporting mechanisms

•

“Institutions

should develop confidential mechanisms and spaces to allow both staff

and students to raise any concerns that they may have relating to interference in the

same way as they can for academic freedom and freedom of speech. This could involve

adapting institutional ethics processes. There should be clear and transparent lines of

reporting in place to ensure that these cases are brought to the attention of senior

leaders in a timely fashion and escalated where necessary.”

135

“Build and sustain a culture that enables staff to raise concerns, coupled with processes

that enable the institution to consider whether activities raise reputational, ethical

and/or security risks.”

136

“Introduce

a confidential complaint procedure that staff and students can use if they

find that a peer or anyone else with access to the organization engages in intimidation

or espionage activities, or if they themselves feel pressured to self-censor or have

experienced discrimination.”

137

“What

communications and protocols support staff and students to follow reporting

requirements on foreign interference?”

138

“How

consistent are internal reporting mechanisms to support internal evaluation and

communication with external stakeholders?”

139

“Conduct

regular anonymous surveys of all staff involved in cooperation with non-

democracies to identify areas for improvement.”

140

“Is

there an internal routine at the university and a communication strategy for

problematic and crisis situations, such as an attempt to exert external influence? Have

responsibilities been clearly defined within the university?”

141

“Have

review procedures been established at the university for the handling of

problematic incidents (e. g. attempts to exert influence, recording or monitoring of

virtual or face-to-face lectures or seminars, approval procedures for research

results)?”

142

“What level of internal reporting applies to foreign investments

and partnerships and

how does this aid accountability and risk management?”

143

“What

ability and capacity does the university have to analyse and respond to the

information gathered from internal reporting arrangements?”

144

•

3.4 Conflict of Interest (CoI) policies

•

“Are researchers –

both those based in the [EU] and those based overseas

–

asked to

disclose external work obligations and conflicts of interest on a regular basis?”

145

“How do the university’s

CoI policies include international financial and other

interests?”

146

“How do the university’s

CoI policies include secondary staff employment, such as

honorary and adjunct staff?”

147

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 25.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

137

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 49.

138

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 20.

139

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 13.

140

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 45.

141

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

142

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 10.

143

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

144

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 12.

145

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

146

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 13.

147

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 13.

135

136

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“What

processes monitor how conflicts are treated and reported? These may include

prompts to mitigate potential risks, protect academic freedom and free speech, and

ensure compliance with export control laws and other regulations.”

148

“What

processes exist to manage risk when considering the acceptance of donations

and gifts?”

149

“Make

sure researchers and staff members comply with disclosure rules.”

150

3.5 Travel policies

•

“Many

university staff and students regularly travel overseas in the course of their

employment or study. In most cases, this short-term travel, irrespective of the

purpose, will involve a similar degree of risk exposure as similar activity in the [EU].

However, in certain cases, individuals or universities may be exposed to significantly

higher and unfamiliar risks. For example, students and academics involved in advanced

or emerging technologies are likely to be of greater interest to local and national

authorities.”

151

“Coherent

safe travel policies must outline the steps needed for safely managing

overseas travel and related activities, and outline clear approval processes, including

processes for escalating high or unusual risks for institutional approval. Travel policies

should also consider how export controls and other [EU] laws apply in each

circumstance, and the implications of local and extraterritorial legislation on the person

travelling overseas.”

152

“It

is crucial that the processes in place are proportionate and applied to all international

travel. Institutions should maintain records of overseas travel and draw on internal and

external knowledge of the specific risks associated with travel to certain countries or

regions. In addition, institutions should establish a formal method for monitoring and

reviewing processes and procedures regularly, not just following an incident.”

153

“Travel

to certain countries requires special consideration and preparation. Processes

should be in place to educate students and staff about specific security-related risks.

This should include adequate training for students and staff to ensure that they

understand the relevant policies and codes of conduct, as well as what is required of

them and other obligations before travelling overseas.”

154

“Electronic

devices such as laptops and smartphones for use in China should be kept

strictly separate from other equipment. You should also assume that all information

stored on equipment or servers in China can be viewed by the Chinese government and

intelligence services. Good cyber hygiene and customised security by design for your

own IT infrastructure can reduce the impact and repercussions of incidents, for instance

by compartmentalising access to information.”

155

“Strengthen

existing staff travel databases to automatically flag conflicts with grant

commitments and contracts.”

156

•

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 13.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 17.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 31.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 14.

Hunting

the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

3.6 Joint teaching and researching

•

“Is

the curriculum appropriate in terms of subject matter and does it meet the needs

of all participating students? Can the academic added value of the joint programme be

clearly identified for graduates?”

157

“What

intercultural added value can be expected for graduates? Are teaching materials

included in the curriculum that reflect the international or global dimension of the

subject matter, with a view to internationalising the curricula?”

158

“Have

the legal requirements of both countries in terms of quality assurance been met

and the formal approval procedures for the joint study programme been initiated both

in [the EU country] and in China?”

159

“Is

there a comprehensive quality assurance concept for the joint study programme

and is there a joint body that is responsible for matters related to quality assurance?

Are both the students and external participants adequately involved in the quality

assurance process?”

160

“Are

the mechanisms for selecting students adequately transparent and do they satisfy

the principles of all participating institutions?”

161

“Will

the possibilities of digital teaching be included in the joint study programme in

order to make it more widely accessible at participating universities and to complement

face-to-face teaching in a manner that is appropriate to the subject matter? Are data

protection requirements met in the use of digital teaching and learning platforms?”

162

•

4 Due diligence on campus

4.1 Training and educating staff and students

•

“Train

and inform your staff and students on their rights and educate them about how

they can protect themselves through legal measures. Help them exercise their

rights.”

163

“Are

all students and researchers involved in a partnership or exchange informed of

their rights and obligations in an appropriate manner?”

164

“What

processes ensure staff are aware of their rights and obligations at the university

and under [the relevant] law?”

165

“What

processes ensure staff are aware of foreign interference risks, even in informal

collaboration and communication?”

166

“What kind

of training is available to support researchers to take measures to protect

against IP theft or leveraged transfer through cybersecurity infringements or the theft

of personal property?”

167

•

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 11.

159

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 11.

160

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China,

p. 11.

161

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 12.

162

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 12.

163

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 49.

164

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

165

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

166

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 14.

167

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

157

158

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“What

guidelines support staff and student understanding of these policies where

appropriate?”

168

“How

are academic staff, professional staff and research students required to undertake

training to recognise foreign interference risks in everyday work, communications and

international travel?”

169

“Implement

regular trainings on best practices in protecting and handling sensible

information, especially in the realm of dual-use technology, to increase awareness of

the importance of information security. Using concrete case studies to train staff could

be an option to ensure that staff members know how to react in certain situations.”

170

“Educate

staff who participate in dialogue activities with non-democracies about the

fine line between cultural sensitivity and self-censorship. Regular discussions,

workshops and briefings on such matters can equip individuals with the necessary

knowledge and tools to navigate international dialogue events without falling back onto

polite platitudes. Organizations need to empower their staff to clearly name the

elephant in the room while still respecting the rules of intercultural engagement.”

171

“Educate

staff, clients or students on

‘safe

behavior online’ as well as the corresponding

threat environment.”

172

“Develop

a risk-literate, risk-aware culture. Senior leaders improve institutional

resilience to security-related issues by prioritizing the development of a positive, risk-

literate, risk-aware culture and implementing clear governance, reporting and risk-

management structures that promote the strengths

and values of (…) higher

education.”

173

“What

training does your university provide to promote awareness of foreign

interference risks?”

174

“What

training does the university offer to staff to build capacity in identifying potential

instances of foreign interference? What training is offered for researchers and

(…)

students to understand the need to comply with the university’s risk mitigation

strategies?”

175

“What

training and awareness strategies are needed to ensure researchers understand

the need to comply

with the university’s risk mitigation strategies?”

176

“Deepen

information and intelligence sharing to educate partners on high risk areas

and new technologies to support them in adapting restrictions where this might be

necessary.

177

In conjunction with the government, brief staff on relevant policies on and precautions

against CCP talent-recruitment programs.”

178

“Are

you aware that the Chinese government can take advantage of partnerships (and

actually does so in practice) to ‘recruit’ and/or ‘use’ students,

scientists and

researchers, consciously or not, and that this is often done in a seemingly routine and

straightforward way, such as through LinkedIn? A contact made in this way may lead

to a request

–

in some cases a blatantly candid one

–

for information, sometimes with

the excuse that this cannot be obtained via Chinese internet.”

179

“Prepare

a checklist of potential red flags to serve as guidance for junior (and senior)

staff. While the overarching goal should be to foster a critical view on organizational

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 14.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 40.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 43-44.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 40.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 14.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 20.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 37.

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 15.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

and individual behavior, simple and practical lists can make it easier for staff to get a

sense of what constitutes red flags and help address initial insecurities

–

especially if

staff are still at the beginning of their time at the organization. More senior staff can

use checklists as reminders or back-up. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and

the Leiden Asia Centre provide a model checklist that organizations can use as a

blueprint.”

180

“To

what extent can employees or others involved in the partnership be exposed to

risks of a political nature? Researchers and/or students involved in a partnership may

be exposed to political risks against their will or without specific intentions. For instance,

Chinese researchers may (unintentionally) incur sanctions if they are careless with

sensitive information, or conversely be deployed to obtain sensitive information. (…)

students may be put at risk through contact with sensitive information, or be monitored

by their fellow students. Equally, political pressure can lead to people being excluded

from participation in conferences, or invitations to conferences in China can be used as

a means of spreading a political message more widely.”

181

“What

university policies and practices and processes promote awareness of safety and

security to safeguard against foreign interference?”

182

“To

what degree are researchers, and their international partners, aware of their legal

obligations, in some types of research, including conflicts of interests and complying

with legislative requirements.”

183

“What

training and awareness strategies are there to ensure researchers understand

the need to comply with the university’s risk mitigation strategies?”

184

“Are

researchers, and their foreign partners, aware of their legal obligations in some

types of research, including conflicts of interests?”

185

“What

additional or targeted training is provided to researchers involved in

commercially valuable research to minimise the risk of foreign interference?”

186

“What

training currently exists? How is training appropriately targeted to provide

information about the more subtle forms of foreign interference?”

187

4.2 Student groups and other campus organizations

•

“Is

there a communication channel with Chinese student associations? Is there

adequate knowledge of the activities that these student associations are engaged

in?”

188

“Monitor

Chinese government-linked organizations. Require that all campus

organizations, including the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA), that

receive funding or support from Chinese diplomatic missions and other Chinese

government-linked entities, report such information.”

189

“Prohibit

any direct financial links between student groups and nondemocratic

governments. Student groups at universities in democracies should be forbidden to

receive any funding from foreign governments without explicit approval from the

respective university. As part of the approval process, university administrators can

•

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 44.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 12.

182

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 10.

183

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 11.

184

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 16.

185

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 16.

186

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 19.

187

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 21.

188

Guiding

questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 15.

189

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of Conduct

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

180

181

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

then check for potential links to non-democratic governments. Of course, this implies

that student groups are required to disclose information about their funders.”

190

4.3 Talent-recruitment programs

•

“Carry

out a comprehensive and independent audit of participation in CCP talent-

recruitment programs by staff.”

191

“Participants

in CCP talent-recruitment programs should be required to submit their

contracts with the foreign institution (both English and Chinese versions) and fully

disclose any remuneration.”

192

4.4 Visiting scholars and exchange students

•

“Exercise

greater oversight of visiting scholar and student application.”

193

“You

should embed awareness of security-related issues into your existing estates and

visitor policies. There needs to be robust policies and procedures for visitors to your

institution, covering both staff and students. In relation to campus visitors, these

policies might include:

frameworks, policies and risk assessments that clearly distinguish between

different types of visitor (for example, between professional and academic staff,

undergraduate and postgraduate students, and short- and long-stay visitors)

adequate checks on visitors before, on arrival and during their stay to restricted

areas of the campus, including identity checks and checks on compliance with

visa requirements, and checks to ensure their access is limited to the approved

duration of their visit

senior oversight and accountability for any visitor and visa agreements

restrictions on access for visitors to courses or projects not cleared via their visa

(…) application and clear processes for oversight

and accountability for changing

these during their visit

clear advice, information and guidance for visitors and staff to inform them of

the need to adhere to appropriate protocols during their time on campus.”

194

“Is

the information provided about study programmes as well as research and work

opportunities at the domestic university adequate, easy to comprehend and easily

accessible for Chinese partners?”

195

“Are

there venues for formal and informal interaction and dialogue with Chinese

students? Have programmes been established that promote student engagement with

regards to the integration of and intercultural interaction with Chinese students,

whether curricular or extracurricular (e. g. buddy programmes)?”

196

“Have

contact persons been appointed for the academic and social concerns of students

and researchers entering the country as well as those leaving or returning?”

197

•

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 47.

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search for technology and talent, p. 28.

Hunting the phoenix. The Chinese Communist Party’s global search

for technology and talent, p. 28.

Picking flowers, making honey. The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities, p. 20.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 36.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 14.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 15.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China,

p. 14.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Are

there sufficient offerings at the university for the social integration of Chinese

students and academics? Is there an ombudsperson whom Chinese students or

researchers can contact in case of discriminatory incidents?”

198

“Are

students and academics who return from a stay in China systematically contacted?

Important contact persons for Chinese students and researchers on site could emerge

from this group.”

199

“Have

programmes and formats been established that encourage Chinese students and

academics to share their experiences with university members and support them in

doing so?”

200

“Are

there sufficient capacities for the academic supervision of Chinese students and

academics? Are there fixed contact persons for both target groups?”

201

“Is

there an alumni concept for Chinese graduates and former visiting academics from

China?”

202

“Is

there a sufficient amount of linguistic and intercultural programmes for incoming

and outgoing or returning students and researchers?”

203

“What

means are used to evaluate the linguistic skills of applicants and students? Has

a corresponding review process been established?”

204

“Has

a language concept been developed to support and guide the cooperation? Is

there an adequate number of offerings for acquiring or improving [relevant language]

or Chinese language skills?”

205

“Are

there sufficient opportunities for academic and nonacademic staff participating in

a partnership to further develop their language skills?”

206

“Are

there offerings for academic and cultural engagement with China and for learning

the Chinese language? Is there a central point of contact with China expertise at the

university or in its environs?”

207

“Is

the success of all students monitored? How is the feedback of Chinese students and

visiting academics regarding their academic and social experience at the university

collected? Have routines and processes been established to ensure that the acquired

findings lead to the adaptation of day-to-day university life?”

208

“Is

an emergency plan in place for crisis situations that also includes arrangements for

the return of students and researchers of the domestic university? Have arrangements

been made in this regard with the Chinese partner institution as well as, where

applicable, other local actors? Are outgoing students and researchers provided with

essential information about everyday life at the Chinese partner institution as well as

about the potential risks and appropriate precautionary measures and the necessary

conduct and procedures in case of a crisis?”

209

“Protect

and support foreign staff and students who are critical of their government.

This could include supporting them with visa or immigration procedures, or providing

or recommending counselling or legal support.”

210

“How

are Chinese students and visiting academics supported on campus? Are there

contact persons whom they can approach with questions relating to professional

matters? Is there an ombudsperson whom they can send complaints to and who can

be consulted in the event of disagreements within the Chinese student body or the

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 16.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s

Republic of China, p. 15.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 16.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with

the People’s Republic of China, p. 14.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 16.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 17.

Guiding questions on university cooperation

with the People’s Republic of China, p. 17.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 16.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 14-15.

Guiding questions

on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 15.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 49.

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

Chinese academic community on campus? Are there any services for persons

accompanying academics who are entering the country (e.g. dual career advice)?”

211

5 Communication and education

5.1 Country-specific and topic-specific expertise

•

“Foster

and use country-specific and regional expertise and make it available to others.

This expertise should

combine a thorough understanding of a country’s or region’s

context with corresponding language skills. Integrating country or regional expertise is

a necessary prerequisite for planning any cooperation project with counterparts from

non-democracies. The focus should not only be on utilizing this expertise to enhance

cooperation by simply ‘understanding the other side’; the goal should rather be to

gather necessary specific information to feed into a comprehensive assessment of the

potential risks of the planned cooperation project.”

212

“Use

regional expertise to formulate strategies for dealing with restrictions and

constraints imposed on cooperation projects by authoritarian governments. Experts on

a specific region or local partners (especially in less consolidated authoritarian systems)

know how to circumvent the rules of their governments as well as how to tweak projects

in such a way that they get approved without being too heavily scrutinized by the

respective authorities. They can also help organizations in democracies develop a better

understanding of how to best frame critical thoughts or ideas in, for instance, research

cooperation, which is particularly helpful for scholars who work on contentious issues.

Finding the right tone without capitulating to illiberal restrictions is a constant balancing

act that requires extensive contextual knowledge.”

213

“Continue

to draw on country and regional expertise throughout the cooperation

process, including for regular strategy reviews.”

214

“Promote

independent country and regional expertise by establishing new and

supporting existing research centers on non-democracies. Not only will this ensure

adequate regional expertise in the future, but such centers could also serve as safe

havens for scholars from non-democratic contexts who are at risk.”

215

“Is

there a contact point with China expertise at the university or in its environs that

can advise university members participating in the cooperation where needed and

provide educational and training offerings?”

216

“Has

a China representative been appointed at the university and is this responsibility

backed with the necessary financial and personnel resources?”

217

“Establish

a central point of contact to channel and direct requests for assistance and

expertise on cooperating with partners in non-democracies. This central point of contact

would facilitate information sharing between government agencies, NGOs, research

institutes, and foundations. On the one hand, this will help the bigger institutions build

up the necessary in-house capacities for tackling the risks associated with cooperation

activities. The smaller ones, on the other hand, can rely on the pooled expertise in case

their own capacities are not enough. In addition, such a hub could maintain up-to-date

incident databases of regional and country experts, and connect organizations that aim

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 8.

•

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

35.

36.

50.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

to cooperate with non-democracies in similar fields to share their strategies and

experiences. Ideally, such a central point of contact could also draw on relevant

information from intelligence agencies where necessary.”

218

“Establish

an ombudsperson for cases of infringement, for instance, on academic

freedom or in the form of undisclosed financial links. Inform staff (and, in the case of

universities, students) about their rights and how to recognize common infringement

patterns so they know when to approach the ombudsperson.”

219

5.2 Organizational values

•

“Draft

and publish codes of conduct or value statements that show the bigger picture

of what the organization stands for and how it plans to protect and enact those values

in its day-to-day activities.”

220

“Establish

strong, transparent internal control and accountability mechanisms to ensure

that the organization acts in accordance with its own stated values.”

221

“Incorporate

core organizational values into the education and training of junior staff.

Such efforts need to go beyond abstract or purely theoretical discussions about values

(which should still take place). Organizations need to construct a framework of rules

that supports their values. That should include clear communication about and guidance

on what is desirable and appropriate (and what is not).”

222

“Maintain

an open discussion about the validity of the rules that the organization

derives from its key values. This will help generate greater buy-in for these values and

rules among staff members.”

223

“Promote

open and transparent communication, debate, research and enquiry about

our shared values, and support staff and students to take responsibility for protecting

against attempts to undermine them.”

224

•

6 Academic integrity and freedom

•

“Promote

open and transparent communication, debate, research and enquiry about

what interference in academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional autonomy

might look like, and support staff and students to take responsibility for protecting

against these infringements throughout their engagements and activities.”

225

“Develop

and promote clear codes of conduct, policies and legal agreements that

enshrine the avoidance of interference alongside the core values of academic freedom

and freedom of speech.”

226

“Develop

processes and mechanisms through which staff and students can report, raise

concerns and receive support in relation to issues connected to academic freedom and

freedom of speech, including issues arising from interference.”

227

•

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 24.

Non-Democracies,

52.

45.

44.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Use

tools such as the Academic Freedom Index (AFi) to assess risks to academic

freedom. Funders could make such risk assessments mandatory for cooperation

projects that concern all countries with a low AFi score.”

228

“Emphasize

academic freedom and integrity, including non-discriminatory hiring

practices and balanced curricula and especially in university and research

cooperation.”

229

“To

encourage open and transparent discussion about the importance of academic

freedom and freedom of speech to the integrity and identity of (…) higher education

institutions, senior staff should promote debate, research and enquiry about these

issues across their institutions. They should also raise awareness about the range of

ways in which academic freedom and freedom of speech can be undermined by foreign

interference.”

230

“Doing research with Chinese partners may place certain restrictions on academic

freedom. These may relate to content, for instance not mentioning the 3 Ts (Tibet,

Tiananmen and Taiwan). Or accepting that Chinese partners may want to actively

control certain ‘narratives’ (giving rise to a tension between intellectual integrity and

indoctrination) for instance by wanting to foreground the role played by the Communist

Party of China (CPC) in historical research.”

231

“Speak

out for academic freedom. Publicly commit to supporting academic freedom and

freedom of expression through public statements at the highest institutional levels,

institutional policies, and internal guidelines. Explicitly recognize threats posed to

academic freedom and freedom of expression by the Chinese government seeking to

shape discussions, teaching, and scholarship on campus. Reaffirm a commitment to

freedom of inquiry, enabling scholars and students to freely conduct research, and

make clear that opposing direct and indirect censorship pressures or retaliation by third

parties, including national and foreign governments, is integral to academic

freedom.”

232

“Strengthen

academic freedom on campus. Emphasize the commitments and policies

in support of academic freedom in student orientation, faculty hiring, handbooks and

honor codes, and public gatherings. To avoid self-censorship or retaliation for stating

opinions, academic institutions should publicize a policy that classroom discussions are

meant to stay on campus, and never to be reported to foreign missions.”

233

“Counter

threats to academic freedom. Encourage students and faculty members to

recognize that direct and indirect censorship pressures, threats, or acts of retaliation

by Chinese government authorities or their agents against students or scholars for what

they write or say threaten academic freedom. Develop and implement effective

mechanisms, such as an ombudsperson, to whom such pressures, threats, or acts of

retaliation can be privately or anonymously reported.”

234

“Record

incidents of Chinese government infringement of academic freedom. Actively

track instances of direct or indirect Chinese government harassment, surveillance, or

threats on campuses. Where warranted, they should be reported to law enforcement.

Report annually the number and nature of these kinds of incidents.”

235

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

230

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 24.

231

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 8.

232

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 1.

233

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 1.

234

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

235

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

228

229

36.

42.

Conduct

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Monitor

impact of Chinese government interference in academic freedom. Work with

academic institutions, professional associations, and funders to systematically study

and regularly publicly report on: a) areas of research that have received less attention

because of fears about access; b) decline of on-campus discussions of topics deemed

sensitive by the Chinese government, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre;

c) efforts by academic institutions to curtail Chinese government threats to academic

freedom; and 4) strategies collectively pursued by institutions to defend and promote

academic freedom.”

236

“Join

with other academic institutions to promote research in China. Academic

institutions should work in concert, including by making public statements and

complaints where appropriate, in the event of unwarranted visa denials or prolonged

delays for research in China. Academic institutions should consider joint actions against

Chinese government entities in response to visa denials or other obstacles to academic

research.”

237

“Offer flexibility for scholars and students working on China. Ensure that a scholar’s

career advancement

or a student’s progress will not be compromised if their research

has to change direction due to Chinese government restrictions on research or access

to source material in China. Institutions should consider steps, such as granting the

scholar or student extra time to finish their research, supporting alternative research

strategies, or publishing using pseudonyms, in the face of Chinese government

obstacles, harassment, or reprisals. Academic institutions should be open to alternative

research strategies when funding or receiving funds for academic work that has been

rejected by a Chinese entity. Funders and review boards should provide comparable

flexibility.”

238

“Promote

academic freedom of students and scholars from China. Inform students and

scholars from China that they are not required to join any organizations, and help

mentor and support them to ensure they can enjoy full academic freedom.”

239

“Ensure

academic freedom in exchange programs and on satellite campuses. Exchange

programs and satellite campuses in China should only be undertaken after the

completion of a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese counterpart that has

been transparently discussed by relevant faculty members and ensures the protection

of academic freedom, including control over hiring and firing, and the curriculum.”

240

“Ensure that partners understand the UK institution’s commitment to academic freedom

and freedom of speech and any potential implications this might have for the

collaboration or partnership.”

241

“In

view of existing partnerships, how are decisions reached in cases where

developments suggest that academic freedom can no longer be adequately

guaranteed? Who should be involved in this decision? What steps are taken to deal with

recurring problems?”

242

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad.

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 3.

237

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad.

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

238

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad.

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

239

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad.

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

240

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad.

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 3.

241

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 20.

242

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China,

236

A Code of Conduct

p. 10.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

7 Research security

•

“Build

a categorization system for research areas based on how prone they are to risks

like espionage or theft. Based on that system, different policies (e.g., on access or

confidentiality) should apply. Identifying potential areas for dual use is already a

common practice in most organizations and governments.”

243

“Restrict cooperation partners’ access to information in areas where information is

prone to misuse (such as for dual use). Within research organizations in democracies,

nationality should only be a criterion for access restrictions in areas that concern highly

sensitive national security interests to protect against citizens of non-democracies

being subjected to pressure from their governments to engage in spying activities. In

other

areas, it should not be individuals’ nationality but their previous and present

affiliations that determine whether or not they will be granted access to information.”

244

“Formulate

clear criteria for when access restrictions should apply so as to not endanger

open science and data initiatives.”

245

“Prepare guidelines that are easy to use, such as “cheat sheets” and Q&As, to help

cooperation practitioners internalize appropriate procedures and risk preparedness

measures. One example is the German BAFA’s cheat

sheet on risks related to dual use,

but there is certainly room to provide even more user-friendly resources (e.g., in the

form of interactive support and information websites). Limit additional regulations to

the bare minimum and take into account that each new layer of provisions will add

more red tape for those who have to implement them. Overly complicated or

cumbersome rules and processes can quickly backfire.”

246

“Senior

leaders should take measures to ensure that research staff and students

understand and adhere to processes that safeguard IP during international

partnerships, comply with export control legislation and promote the ethics and

integrity of research and data management.”

247

“Can

information on the applicable provisions pertaining to security-related research

and relevant internal and external contact persons (…) be easily accessed by all those

involved in research or research support? Are the actors participating in the cooperation

aware of the applicable regulations in China in this context? Is information and training

available for questions of security-related research?”

248

“Are there effective procedures in place to review regularly access to sensitive data and

facilities by those who have access?”

249

“Does

data management meet the required standards? Data collection, storage and

access can entail a range of risks. This may be because the information is politically

sensitive, because it has a certain strategic value, or because sharing information can

be an issue for third parties. Unauthorised parties may attempt to gain access to such

information via any number of entry points. Even sectors that do not seem terribly

relevant in terms of content may still be targeted, not least because they often provide

indirect access (‘a foot in the door’) to other, more relevant sectors. Besides these

substantive matters, technical safeguards (e.g. for data encryption and access

protocols) are also important in this connection.”

250

•

243

244

245

246

247

248

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 41.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 13.

37.

39.

40.

249

250

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 55.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 11.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Invest in IT security to protect data, individuals’ or institutions’ research, and other

sensible information from theft. Pay special attention to data and research activities in

dual-use areas. Smaller organizations should receive support from their funders to

increase their data security capabilities.”

251

“Senior

leaders should ensure that cybersecurity strategies are developed and

implemented. In parallel, institutions should develop effective oversight and reporting

protocols for cybersecurity risks, including threat modelling and intelligence-sharing

with government and the sector

(…).”

252

“Your

institution will have a range of cybersecurity policies and procedures to manage

access to software and hardware. However, as partnerships and collaborations come

under greater scrutiny, it is likely that the frequency and sophistication of cyber-attacks

will increase. You should ensure that your institution uses published threat assessments

to anticipate likely cyber-threats

(…).”

253

“You

should pay particular attention to protecting information of specific value, which

is likely to be subject to greater risk. This might include, for example, research with

potential economic value, politically and commercially sensitive material, sensitive

enterprise data or data on your staff and students.”

254

“Appropriate

training is particularly important for researchers working on high-security

issues, controlled technologies or other areas of research that are subject to export

control legislation. Institutions should develop policies and training packages that

highlight the need to segregate research materials and limit and monitor access to

sensitive data and information. Such policies include:

segregation of sensitive research

–

separate out different areas of research so

that data and information is not all held in one place, both physically and online

access control

–

only users and partners with a valid requirement have access

to this data and networks, with two-step identity verification where possible

security of IT platforms

–

institutions should develop policies to ensure that staff

and students understand the security of any collaborative IT platforms,

especially those used by third parties

protection from extraterritorial jurisdiction issues

–

consider carefully the risks

faced by academics and students participating in online discussions about issues

that some nation states might regard as sensitive and take steps to inform these

individuals.”

255

“You

should regularly review your cybersecurity risk response processes and, if

possible, share your findings with other institutions and the government where this

would support the sector to better respond to future incidents. In addition to developing

an evidence-base, this exchange of information will increase the collective capacity of

institutions, the sector and government to respond.”

256

“Have

internal university regulations and structures been established for handling

questions of security-related research and export control, which exclude military use of

civil research results and the transfer of sensitive, protected research technologies?”

257

“Electronic

devices such as laptops and smartphones for use in China should be kept

strictly separate from other equipment. You should also assume that all information

stored on equipment or servers in China can be viewed by the Chinese government and

intelligence services. Good cyber hygiene and customised security by design for your

own IT infrastructure can reduce the impact and repercussions of incidents, for instance

by compartmentalising access to information.”

258

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 39-40.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 35.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 36.

Guiding questions on university cooperation

with the People’s Republic of China, p. 13.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p. 14.

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“Do

not share personal information. This could be information collected during

interviews (e.g., for studies or other research outputs) or information about staff.

Personal information includes data such as ID, tax or passport numbers, bank account

numbers, personal addresses, or information on family members.”

259

“Have

principles and procedures been established for issues related to intellectual

property protection? Can information on the applicable provisions and relevant internal

and external contact persons be easily accessed by all those involved in research or

research support? Is information and training available for corresponding questions?”

260

7.1 Dual Use technology

•

“While

considering whether and to what extent it is concerned by dual-use export

controls, a research organisation needs to conduct an initial risk assessment by

examining

the

following

parameters:

1. The subjects of its activities (e.g., disciplines and research areas where it is active).

2. The type and scope of these activities (e.g., field research, online and distance

learning and amount of international collaborations and foreign participation involved

in its activities).

3. The current status of institutional policies and standardised procedures (e.g. type of

organisation structure, existing mitigating measures for security risks and predominant

attitudes of the staff).

These parameters have to be assessed against legal obligations set in the EU and

national export control laws. At the end of this initial risk assessment, a research

organisation will be able to determine its specific dual-use risk profile. This will help the

organisation to become aware of the parts of its research activities that need to be

covered by the ICP (scope of its internal export compliance system) and target the ICP

to the

organisation’s specific circumstances (e.g., structure, institutional procedures

and available resources).”

261

“Develop

in-house expertise on dual-use applications at large research funders, both

public and private, to advise researchers and institutions.”

262

“Institutionalize

risk assessments, security strategizing and internal compliance

procedures by setting up ‘compliance desks’. (…)

Depending on the organization and

the corresponding risks involved in cooperating with counterparts from non-

democracies, compliance desks need to be staffed with the right experts. For instance,

research institutions working in the STEM fields should definitely have in-house experts

on dual-use technologies. These compliance desks could also be responsible for

updating security provisions and organizing staff trainings.”

263

“What

strategies monitor the development of research in areas of potential high

risk?”

264

“Identify

research areas that are sensitive based on an analysis of the economic or

security interests of the respective non-democratic government.”

265

“Limit

restrictions on collaboration to those areas that pose an identified threat to

national security. Any restrictions should be clearly articulated and targeted.”

266

“Consult

others who were previously involved in similar cooperation projects and refer

to incident trackers for information on potential problems that came up during

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 13.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 21.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 19.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

p. 39.

p. 37.

p. 41.

p. 37.

p. 38.

•

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

cooperation. This should include looking into the leadership of individual organizations

as well as screening different types of organizations from specific countries rather than

only screening specific organizations.”

267

“How

do researchers reasonably consider the potential for their research to become

dual-use?”

268

7.2 Export control compliance

•

“Develop

a commitment statement stating that the scientific and administrative staff

shall comply with all EU and national dual-use export control laws and regulations by

applying the mitigating measures foreseen in the organisation’s policies and

procedures.”

269

“Clearly

and regularly communicate the commitment statement to all potentially

concerned staff (also staff with no role in dual-use export control) in order to raise

awareness and promote a culture of compliance with the dual-use export control laws

and regulations.”

270

“Consider

using all available means (either electronic or print-outs) to publicise the

statement and sources of information about the internal compliance procedures of the

organization.”

271

“Determine

which parts of your organisation are relevant for export control compliance.

Identify and appoint the person(s) with the overall responsibility and attribute at least

one person to the export compliance function. Depending on the organisation’s needs

this person may only have to handle tasks relating to dual-use export control on a part-

time basis.”

272

“What

strategies are in place to ensure compliance with

(…)

relevant legislative

frameworks?”

273

“Consider

all different types of responsibility and compliance related functions. Define

clear processes and responsibilities for both administrative and scientific staff. Start by

the departments conducting research in a critical area and expand to address other

less sensitive departments as your compliance system evolves. Do not overlook to

define the delegation of powers (e.g. in case of sickness or holidays) and back-up

functions whenever possible.”

274

“Ensure

that appropriate resources are allocated to the ICP [internal compliance

programme] and consider the knowledge and skillset needed in terms of both legal and

technical expertise. Written job descriptions are recommended.”

275

“Be

ready to fully exploit expertise and experience already available in different parts

of the organisation. Consult with colleagues of different departments (e.g.,

procurement, security and legal department) on the ways that available policies and

procedures could accommodate export compliance requirements. Consider setting up -

along with your IT support - online tools and procedures to facilitate the implementation

of internal compliance measures.”

276

“Codify the organisation’s export compliance policies and procedures including the main

chain of responsibility in manuals/handbooks and make them available to the

organisation online or in hard copy. Try to use language that is as precise and clear as

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 38.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 23.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 25.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 18.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 25.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 26.

•

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

possible. Consider including examples and practical cases such as the ones offered in

this guidance or in national sources.”

277

“Make

sure that the scientific and administrative staff knows what procedure to follow

and who is the contact point whenever an export control question arises.”

278

“To

maximise compliance with export control legislation, individuals should:

consider potential end-use possibilities of technology: it is the duty of

researchers and their institutions to monitor potential end-uses of research,

throughout the research life cycle. In some cases, research will have end-use

applications that are unidentifiable in the early stages of development and

continued monitoring is required

inform researchers about the implications of intangible technology transfer:

researchers must be aware that controlled sensitive information transmitted

electronically (eg via social media, fax and email, videoconferencing, sharing

screens remotely) and verbally (eg in telephone and face-to-face discussions)

may still be subject to export controls.”

279

“Provide

compulsory, periodic training for all staff potentially involved in export

controlled dual-use activities in order to raise awareness of export control issues and

infuse a culture of responsibility throughout the organisation.”

280

“When

possible, use existing training initiatives such as introductory courses for newly

recruited staff to incorporate references to export compliance measures and

requirements. Follow the same approach with staff regulations and didactic material

being already in use.”

281

“Ensure

via awareness raising tools (e.g., decision trees, intranet webpages,

information and acknowledgement notes in export control relevant procedures) that all

concerned staffs are aware of all internal policies and measures on export controls.

Make use of material containing information on relevant EU dual-use export control

laws and control lists and restrictive measures, as well as national measures and

embargoes. Consider making user-friendly tools (developed in-house or provided by

external resources) available to all concerned staff to facilitate easy navigation through

these legal documents and their updates. If possible, consider customised trainings for

both administrative and scientific staff.”

282

“Consider,

whenever appropriate, to make use of opportunities to receive national or

EU training for dual-use export controls.”

283

“Incorporate

lessons learnt from performance reviews, audits, reporting and corrective

actions, whenever possible, in your training or export awareness programmes.

Conversely, take note of any findings alluding to an insufficient functioning of the

compliance measures in place.”

284

“Try

to determine whether an envisaged project will use controlled items and examine

whether its contributions will meet the thresholds specified in the control list. For

projects identified as of high risk, provide for export screening checks throughout the

life cycle of the project.”

285

“Pay

particular attention to the classification of dual-use components and spare parts,

and to the classification of dual-use software and technology that can be transferred

by e-mail

or made available via a ‘cloud’ service abroad.”

286

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 26.

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 42.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 27.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 28.

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 32.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

“As

a precautionary measure, consider verifying whether dual-use items falling within

the scope of the control lists exist in the laboratories and repositories of the

organisation. Their presence can be an indicator of export control sensitivities. Examine

the possibility to register in your inventories whether an item (either new, used or

spare) is of dual-use relevance, and thus requires special handling in case of export.”

287

“Consult

with the project leaders and available experts in order to collect information

about the possible misuse of your dual-use items in the context of conventional military

weapons or WMDs.”

288

“While

collaborating with companies or other research organisations, it is a good

practice to request additional information about the technical parameters and the

control status and classification of materials, components, subsystems that are to be

used by your organisation from them.”

289

“As

required by Article 22(10) of the EU dual-use regulation concerning intra-EU

transfers, mention in the relevant documents (contract, order confirmation, invoice or

dispatch note) that the transaction involves listed dual-use items and are subject to

controls if exported from the EU.”

290

“Set

up export screening procedures allowing your organisation to perform a risk

assessment that addresses all different potentially sensitive activities and sources of

risk. These procedures shall enable individual researchers, students, project leaders

and administrative staff to contribute to the assessment of the export control risks

relating to the organisation’s activities.”

291

“Where

possible, adjust your institutional policies and procedures to accommodate

export control checks for potentially sensitive activities (shipping, contracting,

publishing, sharing online etc.) and, allow for mitigating measures concerning projects

flagged as sensitive.”

292

“Consider

using generic risk assessment tools (e.g. flow charts) as well as data mining

technics and other software for screening items, projects and linked activities against

export control lists and lists of restricted entities and destinations.”

293

“The

result of the item classification and risk assessment of the activity might be that

a licence requirement is relevant. Gather and disseminate information about the range

of license types (including individual, global and general licenses) and controlled

operations (export, brokering, transfer and transit), and about the license application

procedures relating to the applicable EU and national dual-use export controls. Be

aware of national dual-use export control measures for other activities, such as

technical assistance.”

294

“Consider

to make use of simplified licence procedures (general licenses) for

destinations mentioned in the EU dual-use Regulation or national measures.”

295

“Ensure

that all concerned staff knows about the different types of licences and

procedures to be followed internally and for submission to the authority (who will be

able to apply and what steps to follow).”

296

“Ensure, according to the research organisation’s risk assessment, that controlled dual-

use items are secured against unauthorised removal, access or use by all staff including

students, visiting scientific staff and external collaborators. Measures to be considered

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

compliance

guidance

for

research

involving

dual-use

items,

32-33.

33.

31.

32.

35.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

include, for example, physically safeguarding the items, the establishment of restricted

access areas and personnel access or exit controls.”

297

“Establish

internal policies and procedures for secured storage of and access to

controlled dual-use software or technology in electronic form, including antivirus

checks, file encryption, audit trails and logs, user access control and firewall.”

298

“In

the case of handling export controlled information in the context of an international

collaboration make sure that the necessary precautions are applied also by the

organisation’s partners. Such a requirement could be specifically included in the

agreement/contract setting up the collaboration.”

299

“Consider

using classification schemes (e.g. markings) when transmitting software and

technology containing sensitive or export controlled information.”

300

“If

applicable to your organisation, consider protective measures such as end to end

encryption for uploading software or technology to the ‘cloud’, storing it in the ‘cloud’

or transmitting it via the ‘cloud’.”

301

“Ensure

that none of the parties involved in a project or sensitive activity are subject

to restrictive measures (including sanctions) by consulting the EU consolidated list of

sanctions or national list.”

302

“Know

your partner(s) and consider how they intend to use your research involving

dual-use items.”

303

“Be

aware of the existence of research organisations acting as cover for military

research or having strong ties with state-owned entities.”

304

“Ask

for an end-use statement if the activity involves listed dual-use items and when

there are end-use(r) concerns in case of non-listed dual-use items. Consult the

information provided by your competent authority for national rules and requirements

concerning end-use statements. Please be aware that end-use statements can be

requested also for sharing controlled software and technology.”

305

“Be

vigilant for diversion risk indicators and signs about suspicious enquiries or

orders.”

306

“Be

vigilant for diversion risk indicators and signs about suspicious enquiries for

cooperation. There might be indications suggesting that a partner will use dual-use

items shared or delivered by your organisation in the context of unauthorised military

research or, in relation to WMDs and their means of delivery or, other unlawful

purposes.”

307

“Please

take into account that also non-listed dual-use items might require an export

authorisation, if the stated end-use and involved parties screening or the diversion risk

screening raises some concern in the sense of the catch-all provisions, in Article 4 of

Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Usually, this situation may concern items having

technical parameters close to the controlled ones.”

308

“The

export screening process should assess the possibility for a non-listed dual-use

item to be used in connection to sensitive end-uses specified under Article 4 of the EU

dual-use Regulation. If the researcher or research organisation is aware or suspects

that an activity or project entails such a risk, it must abstain from engaging further to

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

compliance

guidance

for

research

involving

dual-use

items,

39.

39-40.

40.

33.

34.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

this research and immediately inform the competent authorities who will conclude

whether a license application is necessary.”

309

“Before

the actual shipment or transmission of a controlled item, there should be a final

check if all steps regarding compliance were taken. This is a good moment to double

check if items are correctly classified, if red flags have been checked, if the screening

of entities was done and whether there is a valid licence for the shipment. Be aware

that a change of relevant legislation could have taken place in the meantime. For

example: the item is now a listed dual-use item or the end-user is now sanctioned.”

310

“Ensure

that the terms and conditions of the licence have been complied with (including

reporting). Please be aware that a licence may restrict the transfer of technology and

software to only certain recipients and consider how partners involved in a sensitive

research observe such requirements.”

311

“Be aware that any changes to the organisation’s details (such as name, address and

legal status), to the details of the end-user and/or intermediaries and to the details of

the authorised items may affect the validity of your license.”

312

“Provide

for control mechanisms as part of the regular operations to monitor the

workflow within the organisation to ensure that any wrong doings are detected in an

early stage. For example, one approach is to use the four eyes principle for a technical

classification or export screening result. Consider the roles of both administrative staff

and researchers in the process of monitoring.”

313

“Develop

and perform audits to check the design, adequacy and efficiency of the ICP.

Make sure to include all elements of the ICP into the audit.”

314

“Ensure

that all staff, including students, feel confident and reassured when they raise

questions or report concerns about compliance in good faith.”

315

“Establish

whistleblowing and escalation procedures to govern the actions of staff when

a suspected or known incident of non-compliance has occurred.”

316

“Document

any suspected breaches of national and EU dual-use export control

legislation and the associated corrective measures in writing.”

317

“Take

corrective actions to adapt the export control operations or the ICP according to

the findings of the performance review, the ICP system audit or the reporting. It is

recommended to share these findings, including the revision to procedures and

corrective actions with all staff concerned and the top-management. Once the

corrective actions have been implemented, it is recommended to adapt the policies and

procedures of the ICP as necessary and communicate the changes within the

organisation.”

318

“A

dialogue with your competent authority can contribute to damage control and

possible ways to strengthen the research organisation’s export control system.”

319

“Verify

the legal requirements for recordkeeping (period of safekeeping, scope of

documents, etc.) in the national legislation of the EU Member State where the

organisation is established. In order to make sure that all relevant documentation is at

hand, consider determining the record retention requirements in the contracts with

collaborators. Create an adequate filing and retrieval system for the dual-use export

control. Electronic systems with performant indexing and search functionalities are

essential. Ensure that export control related documents are maintained in a consistent

compliance

guidance

for

research

involving

dual-use

items,

34.

35.

36.

37.

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

manner and can be made available promptly to your government or other external

parties for inspections or audits. It is recommended to keep a record of past contacts

with the competent authority, also in relation with end-use(r) controls for non-listed

dual-use items and in case of technical classification advices.”

320

8 Knowledge sharing

•

“How

does your university collaborate and share information across the sector?”

321

“Establish

and/or strengthen multilateral and international platforms for dialogue and

exchange through financial and/or political support. These institutions facilitate the

development of new cooperation regimes, but they can also set norms by establishing

codes of conduct, treatises, memoranda of understanding, and other contractual

formats that eventually shape what constitutes good practice in the respective realms

of collaboration. In addition, they facilitate knowledge sharing and dissemination

activities. These platforms should include (semi-)permanent formats that allow (non-

)governmental security experts, university leaders and other stakeholders affected by

the risks of cooperation to come together to exchange experiences.”

322

“Create,

support and/or participate in permanent exchange fora where organizations

involved in cooperation activities can share and discuss experiences. This could, for

example, include experiences with authoritarian influence tactics and propaganda

activities.”

323

“Share,

standardize, codify, and disseminate best practices. Different countries,

business sectors and research institutes should engage in frequent discussions and

share information as well as experiences. Moreover, they should jointly raise awareness

about non-democratic practices such as disinformation campaigns.”

324

“Make

guidelines, best practices and results of internal reflection processes publicly

available. Internal resources that are only circulated in the respective organizational

circles may be a first step, but they do not enable public oversight of the organizations

in question, nor do they allow for scrutiny of the extent to which organizations have

learned from previous misjudgments. Not only is public access to information a way to

showcase integrity by demonstrating openness to public scrutiny, but it promotes the

overall endeavor to aggregate best practices.”

325

“Regularly

review and adjust guidelines and security procedures to ensure that they

remain up to date. Ideally, organizations should do so every time they enter into a new

and/or bigger international cooperation project with a partner or partners from non-

democratic contexts.”

326

“Do

staff have ready access to information on potential partners that have engaged

with the university in the past?”

327

“How

are experiences shared to help others and what opportunities are there to provide

feedback and share lessons learned?”

328

“How

does your university collaborate and share information with government?”

329

“Commission

regular external reviews of the organization. These can either be

conducted by specialized evaluators or by other organizations with similar value

EU compliance guidance for research involving dual-use items, p. 38.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 22.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 22.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 23.

•

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

51.

40.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

statements through peer review networks. When handled on the basis of reciprocity

between participating organizations (and thus free of charge), the latter could be

especially fitting for smaller organizations with limited budgets.”

330

9 Additional resources

•

“What

information or advice is available from Government?”

331

“What additional resources and support are available to provide ongoing due diligence

on high-risk international research partnerships?”

332

10 Other points from the quoted guidelines for further

discussion

•

“Support

a pro-democratic,

‘watchdog’ civil society in liberal democracies to build the

structures that are necessary for a functioning domestic culture of scrutiny and

monitoring of institutions that are too close to or too dependent on authoritarian

funding (or other forms of influence).”

333

“Reject

Confucius Institutes. Refrain from having Confucius Institutes on campuses, as

they are fundamentally incompatible with a robust commitment to academic freedom.

Confucius Institutes are extensions of the Chinese government that censor certain

topics and perspectives in course materials on political grounds, and use hiring

practices that take political loyalty into consideration.”

334

“Provide

flexible project guidelines that enable organizations to spend money more

creatively, try out new formats and better react to unforeseen circumstances.”

335

“Form

alliances between funders who are committed to the principles of liberal

democracy. When clearly fostering integrity, such alliances can act as a more visible

source of potential funding for value-based cooperation projects. At the same time,

stronger cooperation between funding organizations and a pooling of resources could

enable funding for bigger, more ambitious projects. Such projects could aim at, for

instance, building certain research infrastructures that are currently lacking in certain

democratic countries. This way, organizations involved in research cooperation do not

depend as much on access to infrastructures in non-democratic contexts.”

336

“Publicly

stand in for and pursue your values, including freedoms and rights for

research, dialogue and civil society. This should include promoting counternarratives to

those propagated by non-democratic governments.”

337

“Publicly

commit to core values such as academic freedom or freedom of expression

and do so starting at the highest institutional levels. Provide high-level visible support

for like-minded individuals and organizations when they are under pressure.”

338

“Directly

and publicly name and condemn authoritarian practices where they affect your

staff or your organization as a whole and stand in solidarity with peers. Organizations

in liberal democracies should not only recognize but also publicly name threats to their

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p. 45.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 19.

•

330

331

332

333

334

Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues, p. 56.

45.

Conduct

46.

47.

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad. A Code of

for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide, p. 2.

335

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

336

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

337

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

338

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies, p.

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

values and do so at the highest institutional levels. Organizations that aim to be

diplomatic often fall back onto euphemisms when talking about serious human rights

violations and atrocities. But anything short of clearly seeing and naming such abuses

for what they are comes close to complicity. It also aids authoritarian governments in

their efforts to reframe narratives about their repressive actions or blame the victims

of their oppression.”

339

“Formulate

clear rules (such as codes of conducts) for properly approaching interactions

with entities from non-democracies before entering into any type of cooperation

contract.”

340

“Provide

moral and, if possible, financial support to monitoring bodies or organizations

that work to expose and counter human rights violations and atrocities. Such

organizations play an important role in public naming and shaming and are often

involved in efforts to document violations for when national or international prosecution

becomes possible.”

341

“Design

mandatory introductory courses aimed at fostering critical and independent

thinking, especially for study programs with typically high numbers of students from

non-democracies. Universities in liberal democracies with students from non-

democracies should help these students (and their other students) develop their critical

thinking skills and teach the value of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech

and academic freedom

–

ideally not only as abstract concepts, but as lived experiences.

Such courses should be a mix of philosophy of science and applicable knowledge about

research integrity practices. Every student, but especially those in the STEM fields that

often lack these types of courses, would benefit from such dedicated spaces for critical

reflection on the nature and conditions of independent science. Such courses promise

to be particularly rich if students come from a variety of different political systems. This

would force students to engage with each other and work through their differences in

an orderly, constructive manner. It would also provide for an intellectual as well as an

intercultural exchange. While many universities offer courses in that direction, these

are often optional. Making them a mandatory

part of students’ education would not

only ensure that all students have this experience at least once, but it would also signal

that universities and schools regard those topics and questions as a fundamental part

of their respective academic discipline.”

342

“Draft

targeted policies by focusing on specific, egregious forms of behavior or

affiliations rather than on identity markers such as ethnicity or nationality.”

343

“Support

like-minded CSOs in non-democracies through long-term financial

engagement. Funding organizations should keep in mind that independent CSOs in non-

democracies are often targets of government-sponsored harassment and debilitating

legislation that usually results in higher costs, for instance for legal fees. In addition,

independent CSOs in non-democratic contexts are often dependent on funds from

liberal democratic countries. In the Turkish academic sphere, for example, many

projects are financed through the EU’s Horizon 2020 scheme, including the Future of

EU-Turkey Relations (FEUTURE) project, or through Erasmus+ schemes such as

VIADUCT. However, many donors only provide short-term funds on a project basis

while it is actually the more long-term and flexible funding commitments that would

help CSOs in non-democracies adapt to and cope with the volatility of corrupted legal

systems and repression.”

344

“Expand

engagement with like-minded partners that contest the status quo and

confront strategic narratives of their non-democratic governments. Just as engagement

Risky

Business.

Rethinking

Research

Cooperation

and

Exchange

with

Non-Democracies,

48.

41.

48.

48-49.

49.

49-50.

339

340

341

342

343

344

EU R&I Knowledge Network on China

•

with organizations that are close to or even associated with non-democratic

governments provides legitimacy for the institutional networks of autocracies,

engagement with alternative actors that work against such narratives provides them

with legitimacy.”

345

“Maintain

established channels and exercise caution when establishing new ones if the

situation on the ground deteriorates. Long-standing cooperation channels should be

maintained and kept alive even when the situation in a nondemocratic country

deteriorates, as was the case in Turkey. These networks already come with a history

and strong interpersonal relationships make it easier to strike the right balance between

amicable and constructive cooperation on the one hand and maintaining one’s integrity

by clearly speaking up and pushing back against repression and authoritarian practices

on the other hand. At the same time, rapidly deteriorating political situations and

especially a rise in infringements of human rights and fundamental freedoms warrant

special caution when it comes to engaging in any new cooperation projects.”

346

“Are

there concerns that the scientific independence of university members

participating in a partnership has been restricted?”

347

“Has

the academic freedom of the

(…)

students, teaching staff and researchers

participating in the cooperation been predictably guaranteed?”

348

“Does

the partner or the backing entity appear on any public registers

(…)

and

–

to the

extent that it is reasonable for the university to be able to determine

–

is the partner

being upfront and transparent about their affiliations, parent partners and intent?”

349

“Does

the research activity proposed involve items or goods listed on the Defence

Strategic Goods List? Are the proposed research activities captured by the DTCA?”

350

“Does

the activity or partnership proposed need to be registered under the Foreign

Influence Transparency Scheme?”

351

“Are

you aware that there is a specific/heightened risk:

o in using particular IT applications in China and social media of Chinese origin (e.g.

WeChat) when communicating with Chinese people?

o in allowing Chinese students and researchers to access

(…)

university networks?

o inherent in Dutch society, with its openness, freedom of communication and relatively

limited degree of compartmentalisation, which makes it relatively easy for outsiders to

gain access to a critically important sector by an indirect route

–

in other words via a

different, seemingly less related sector?”

352

“Are you aware that long-term

relations and financial dependence on Chinese funding

sources increase vulnerability?”

353

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

Risky Business. Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies,

Guiding

questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 10.

Guiding questions on university cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, p. 10.

Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, p. 15.

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions, p.

p. 50.

15.