REU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 101: Opfølgningsrapport af 22. september 2021 fra Europarådets antikorruptionsorgan GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) om Danmarks forebyggelse af korruption blandt offentlige nøglepersoner og politiet, fra justitsministeren

Retsudvalget 2021-22
REU Alm.del Bilag 101
Offentligt

22 September 2021

Confidential

GrecoRC5(2021)9

Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in

central governments (top executive functions) and

law enforcement agencies

FIFTH EVALUATION ROUND

COMPLIANCE REPORT

DENMARK

For adoption by GRECO

at its 88

Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 20-22 September 2021)

Adopted by GRECO

at its 88

Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 20-22 September 2021)

REU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 101: Opfølgningsrapport af 22. september 2021 fra Europarådets antikorruptionsorgan GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) om Danmarks forebyggelse af korruption blandt offentlige nøglepersoner og politiet, fra justitsministeren

INTRODUCTION

GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round deals with "Preventing corruption and promoting

integrity in central governments (persons entrusted with top executive functions, PTEF)

and law enforcement agencies (LEA)".

This Compliance Report assesses the measures taken by the authorities of Denmark to

implement the recommendations issued in the Fifth Round Evaluation Report on

Denmark which was adopted at GRECO's 83

Plenary Meeting (17-21 June 2019) and

made public on 4 September 2019, following authorisation by Denmark

(GrecoEval5Rep(2018)8).

As required by GRECO's Rules of Procedure

, the authorities of Denmark submitted a

Situation Report on measures taken to implement the recommendations. This report

was received on 27 May 2021 and served, together with additional information, as a

basis for the Compliance Report.

GRECO selected the Slovak Republic (with respect to top executive functions in central

governments) and Iceland (with respect to law enforcement agencies) to appoint

Rapporteurs for the compliance procedure. The Rapporteurs appointed were Ms Lívia

TYMKOVÁ, on behalf of the Slovak Republic, and Mr Björn THORVALDSSON, on behalf

of Iceland. They were assisted by GRECO’s Secretariat in drawing up the Compliance

Report.

The Compliance Report examines the implementation of each individual

recommendation contained in the Evaluation Report and establishes an overall

appraisal of the level of the member’s compliance with these recommendations. The

implementation of any pending recommendation (partially or not implemented) will be

assessed on the basis of a further Situation Report to be submitted by the authorities 18

months after the adoption of the present Compliance Report.

ANALYSIS

GRECO addressed 14 recommendations to Denmark in its Evaluation Report.

Compliance with these recommendations is dealt with below.

II.

Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive

functions)

Recommendation i.

GRECO recommended that an analysis of integrity-related risks involving members of the

government and special advisers be carried out and that on this basis a strategy for the

integrity of persons with top executive functions be developed and implemented.

The Compliance procedure of GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round is governed by its Rules of Procedure, as

amended: Rule 31 revised bis and Rule 32 revised.

The Danish authorities report that a number of rules and guidelines on integrity-related

matters apply to ministers. In the Danish experience all integrity-related rules

concerning ministers are generally adhered to. There are therefore no immediate plans

to develop and implement a strategy for the integrity of members of the government.

When it comes to special advisers, the Danish authorities point out that several inquiries

have already been carried out. Based on the most recent recommendations from a

special expert committee in 2011, special advisers undergo an introduction course upon

their appointment, in which their attention is drawn to the Code VII

and the Code of

Conduct for the Public Sector. In addition, Denmark has a number of enforceable

integrity-related rules both for special advisers and ministers. Lack of compliance with

the rules on conflicts of interest, confidentiality or gifts can entail a violation of the

Criminal Code and can therefore lead to sanctions.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. The existence of rules and guidelines on

integrity-related matters applying to ministers and special advisers, as already described

in the Evaluation Report, does not correspond to the expectations of a more holistic

approach underlying this recommendation. Against the background of what has been

described in the Evaluation Report about the need for a greater sensitivity to certain

integrity risks and for more importance to be attached to promoting integrity among

persons with top executive functions (hereafter: PTEFs), GRECO regrets that no analysis

of integrity-related risks involving members of the government has been carried out as

a basis for a future strategy on these matters.

GRECO concludes that recommendation i has not been implemented.

Recommendation ii.

10.

11.

GRECO recommended (i) that a code of conduct for persons with top executive functions

be adopted, complemented with appropriate guidance regarding conflicts of interest

and other integrity-related matters (e.g. gifts, outside activities, third party contacts,

handling of confidential information etc.) and (ii) that such a code be coupled with a

mechanism of supervision and enforcement.

The Danish authorities report as regards the first part of the recommendation that all

new ministers receive a ministerial handbook, which is updated regularly and contains

relevant regulations regarding governmental work. This handbook contains all

applicable rules and guidelines on integrity-related matters, including the Ministerial

Accountability Act, the Public Administration Act (as regards conflicts of interest), the

rules and guidelines on gifts, ministers’ occupations and financial interests (including the

12.

It is recalled, as outlined in paragraph 39 of the Evaluation, Code VII refers to the publication “Code VII – 7 key

duties”, which saw the light in 2015 and focuses specifically on seven key duties of civil servants which are

considered most essential to the work of civil servants in the central government in their interactions with

ministers, with a brief explanation of what each duty means and implies. The seven key duties are legality,

truthfulness, professionalism, development and co-operation, responsibility and management, openness about

errors and party-political neutrality.

Act on Remuneration and Pensions for Ministers) and ministers’ expenses (including the

transparency scheme for ministers’ expenses and activities). Following the general

election in June 2019, the handbook also features a memorandum on conflicts of

interest. As such the handbook provides guidance on many of the same topics addressed

by the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector (e.g. rules on conflicts of interest, secondary

employment, gifts and other benefits), as well as a number of issues that are not

relevant for civil servants (e.g. ministers’ legal and political responsibility, rules and

guidelines on representation and official journeys). It does however not contain any

rules on lobbyists or employment following termination of their ministerial position, as

Denmark does not have such rules.

13.

Like the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector, one of the main purposes of the

handbook is to help ministers be aware of integrity-related issues and provide guidance

thereon. As such it is as indicative and complete as the Code of Conduct for the Public

Sector and on some matters even contains stricter rules (e.g. on conflicts of interest,

where it follows from the guidelines on conflicts of interest that ministers are obliged to

have a matter officially transferred to another minister in all cases where questions can

be raised about the integrity of the minister in question).

In respect of special advisers, the Danish authorities emphasise that the Code of Conduct

for the Public Sector is fully applicable and serves as a guideline on the interpretation

and use of existing rules on the same level as it is used by all other civil servants.

As regards the second part of the recommendation, the Danish authorities point out

that the primary integrity-related rules are in fact sanctionable both for ministers and

special advisers. Lack of compliance with the rules on conflicts of interest, confidentiality

and gifts can entail a violation of the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, for special advisers

the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector outlines that sanctions in the form of a

warning, a reprimand or dismissal can be imposed for violations of this code. In turn, for

ministers, a violation of the rules can in some cases be sanctioned in accordance with

section 5 of the Ministerial Accountability Act (e.g. when it comes to violating the rules

on conflicts of interest in the Public Administration Act).

It is Denmark’s experience that all integrity-related rules, including those who are only

subject to “political” sanctions, are in general adhered to. Therefore, for ministers it is

not considered necessary to take further measures to implement this recommendation.

14.

15.

16.

For example, for conflicts of interest, section 155 of the Criminal Code provides that any persons exercising a

public office or function abuses his/her position to procure him- or herself or others an unfair advantage can be

sentenced to a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment; for confidentiality, section 152 of the Criminal Code

provides that any person who exercises or has exercised a public office or function and who unlawfully forwards

or exploits confidential information, which s/he has obtained in connection with his/her office or function can

be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment of up to six months; for gifts, section 144 of the Criminal Code provides

that any person who exercises a public office or function and who unlawfully receives, demands or accepts the

promise of a gift or another favour can be sentenced to a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment.

Section 5 of the Ministerial Accountability Act provides that ministers can be sanctioned to a fine or up to two

years’ imprisonment for “intentionally or by gross negligence” disregarding “duties which are imposed upon

him/her by the Constitution or legislation in general or the nature of the post”.

For special advisers a code of conduct complemented with appropriate guidance and

coupled with a mechanism of supervision and sanctions already exists.

17.

GRECO takes note of the information provided, which – apart from the new

memorandum on conflicts of interest – describes the information already outlined in

the Evaluation Report. It is recalled that, GRECO saw much benefit in establishing a code

of conduct for members of the government consolidating the rules on integrity and

providing additional guidance, as a complement to the existing handbook for ministers

(of which the main focus is not on integrity issues), rather in a similar way as Denmark

has found it valuable to establish the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector and the

abovementioned Code VII as a complement to the general rules that already exist for

civil servants. A code of conduct for PTEFs would also need to address areas not

currently regulated, such as contacts with lobbyists and other third parties seeking to

influence government decision-making, or matters which at the time of adoption of the

Evaluation Report were not included in the ministerial handbook and/or on which

insufficient guidance was being provided, such as conflicts of interest. On this latter

issue, GRECO welcomes that a new memorandum on conflicts of interest has been

added to the ministerial handbook, but finds that this memorandum for the most part

reiterates the situations outlined in the Public Administration Act and as such does not

provide much further guidance. It notes that the memorandum makes a reference to

special guidelines applying to ministers (as contained in a 2004 letter by the Prime

Minister’s Office), but as the content of these guidelines have not been shared with

GRECO (and also does not seem to be included in the ministerial handbook), GRECO

cannot draw further conclusions from this.

Furthermore, when it comes to enforcement, it is exactly because not all integrity-

related misconduct rises to the level of crime, GRECO found that non-criminal

enforceability of the code would have obvious merits, providing for additional

proportionality to the accountability of ministers who have little or none for official

misconduct other than political oversight. Finally, as regards special advisers, while in

the Evaluation Report GRECO considered the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector a

comprehensive document which provided clear guidance, it also concluded that it would

not in all situations be pertinent for special advisers (inter

alia

given the political

neutrality expected of civil servants and the differences in status and recruitment

between civil servants and special advisers). It was therefore considered more

appropriate to have special advisers covered by a special code of conduct for PTEFs.

What is clear however is that the above reasoning has not been followed by Denmark

and that unfortunately no tangible steps have been taken to implement this

recommendation.

GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has not been implemented.

18.

19.

Recommendation iii.

20.

GRECO recommended that i) systematic briefing on integrity issues be imparted to

members of the government upon taking up their positions and at certain intervals

thereafter and ii) confidential counselling on integrity issues be established for them.

The Danish authorities report, as regards the first part of the recommendation, as also

mentioned in the paragraph 47 in the Evaluation Report, that following the general

election of June 2015, ministers were briefed on the most important issues in the

aforementioned handbook. A similar briefing was conducted by the Head of the Law

Division in the Prime Minister’s Office following the general election in 2019. It is the

intention that similar briefings will be conducted following future government

formations. Moreover, ministers are always able contact the Prime Minister’s Office to

receive advice on any integrity-related issue.

As regards the second part of the recommendation, the Danish authorities stress that

ministers are counselled on a daily basis on integrity-related issues by their permanent

secretary, their secretariat and their Law Divisions. This counselling is confidential.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. As regards the first part of the

recommendation, it notes that briefings on integrity issues have been imparted to

members of the government upon taking up their position in recent governments. This

is a good practice. However, for this part of the recommendation to be fully

implemented these briefings would need to be repeated at certain intervals thereafter

(notwithstanding the fact that ministers can always contact the Prime-Minister’s Office

at their own initiative). This part of the recommendation is therefore partly

implemented. As regards the second part of the recommendation, GRECO notes that

ministers are reportedly counselled on a daily basis by their permanent secretary, their

secretariat and Law Divisions. However, in the Evaluation Report, it found that these

channels to communicate on possible ethical dilemmas should be “more clearly defined,

harmonising practices and consolidating institutional memory”. As this has not been

done, GRECO can only say that this part of the recommendation has not been

implemented, not even partly.

GRECO concludes that recommendation iii has been partly implemented.

Recommendation iv.

25.

GRECO recommended that, in order to improve public access to information under the

Access to Public Administration Files Act, the scope of the exceptions under the Act be

restricted or further measures be taken to ensure that the exceptions under the act are

applied less frequently in practice.

The Danish authorities report that, in April 2021, it was decided to start political

negotiations regarding a possible revision of the Access to Public Administration Files

Act, to see if a political agreement can be reached on restricting the use of certain

exceptions under the act. These negotiations are currently on-going.

21.

22.

23.

24.

26.

27.

GRECO welcomes the intention to revise the Access to Public Administration Files Act.

As this process is still at a very early stage and since the adoption of the Evaluation

Report no other measures have been taken to ensure that the exceptions under the act

are applied less frequently in practice, it can only conclude that the recommendation

has not been implemented.

GRECO concludes that recommendation iv has not been implemented.

Recommendation v.

GRECO recommended i) introducing rules and guidance on how persons entrusted with

top executive functions engage in contacts with lobbyists and other third parties seeking

to influence governmental processes and decisions; and (ii) increasing the transparency

of contacts and subject matters concerning lobbying of persons entrusted with top

executive functions.

The Danish authorities report that Denmark does not have rules or guidance in place

regarding contacts with lobbyists and other third parties seeking to influence

governmental processes and decisions. However, the general rules on confidentiality,

conflicts of interest

, bribery and rules regarding acceptance of gifts apply. For persons

with top executive functions who are also civil servants the Code of Conduct for the

Public Sector also applies to interactions with lobbyists and other third parties seeking

to influence governmental decision-making.

As outlined under recommendation ii

above (paragraph 15), violations of these rules are subject to sanctions, primarily

pursuant to the Criminal Code or in case of lack of compliance of ministers with the rules

on conflicts of interest pursuant to the section 5 of the Ministerial Accountability Act or

for civil servants pursuant to the Code of Conduct for the public sector.

In 2016, the Danish Parliament considered a proposal for a motion for a resolution

regarding the introduction of a public register of ministers’ meetings with lobbyists and

other third parties. However, a majority in Parliament considered it inexpedient to

introduce such a register. There are currently no plans to introduce specific rules

regarding contacts with lobbyists.

GRECO takes note of the information. It already noted in the Evaluation Report that

there are “no rules in place to regulate contacts of ministers (or special advisers for that

matter) with lobbyists/other third parties, other than the general rules on lawful

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

On this the Public Administration Act for example provides that any person working for a public administration

shall be disqualified from being involved in a particular matter if amongst other things s/he has financial interests

in the outcome in the matter or if there are other circumstances which are likely to raise doubts as the

impartiality of the person in question. The rules in the Public Administration Act are supplemented by the general

legal principle of impartiality, which covers areas where the Public Administration Act does not apply, which

provides that in order to hold a position in the public administration a person shall not be in a position in which

s/he would frequently be disqualified from performing administrative functions due to “personal particular

impartiality” (i.e. those situations regulated by the Public Administration Act).

Pursuant to this code, civil servants for example have a duty to report potential conflicts of interest to the

permanent secretary at their ministry or their manager.

administration, including the rules on conflicts of interest and misuse of confidential

information”. GRECO

inter alia

found that these general rules on lawful administration

did not provide sufficient transparency in respect of the impact of lobbyists and other

third parties (including special interest groups) on government policies and considered

it crucially important to address this issue to uphold public trust in democratic decision-

making processes. This would appear especially important in countries where there are

close interactions between politicians and industries and other interest groups. GRECO

urges the Danish authorities to reconsider their position on this and establish pertinent

rules to provide a more transparent framework for contributions to public decision-

making.

33.

GRECO concludes that recommendation v has not been implemented.

Recommendation vi.

34.

GRECO recommended introducing rules to deal with the employment of persons

entrusted with top executive functions following the termination of their service in the

public sector.

The Danish authorities report that, in 2016, Parliament considered a proposal for a

motion to establish a working group with a view to preparing possible models for rules

regarding “revolving doors”. However, a majority of Parliament voted against the

proposal. There are currently no plans to introduce specific rules regarding “revolving

doors”.

As regards the risks associated with “revolving doors”, the Danish authorities point to

the legal provisions on conflicts of interest in the Public Administration Act (see footnote

5 above) and on confidentiality and bribery in the Criminal Code, as well as the rules on

gifts and the fact that ministers are as a main rule required to resign from any

occupations in private or public companies, undertakings or institutions upon taking

office (pursuant to Article 8 of the Act on Remuneration and Pensions for Ministers).

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It recalls that in the Evaluation Report,

adopted in 2019, it already referred to the 2016 discussion in the

Folketing

on “waiting

periods” for former ministers, in particular when taking up employment in the private

sector as lobbyists. In the Evaluation Report, GRECO concluded that the legal framework

was not sufficient and did not adequately take into account the integrity risks associated

with PTEFs moving to the private sector. In this context, it considers that it would be

rare for such moves to rise to the level of crime and the Public Administration Act would

lose its relevance in this context once someone is no longer a minister.

GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has not been implemented.

Recommendation vii.

39.

GRECO recommended (i) enshrining in regulation or legislation an obligation for

members of the government to publicly declare their assets, income and financial

35.

36.

37.

38.

interests; (ii) that quantitative data on income as well as data on assets and significant

liabilities is included in the financial declarations; and (iii) that it be considered to oblige

special advisers to declare their financial interests publicly on a regular basis as well.

40.

The Danish authorities recall, as regards the first and second part of the

recommendation, as was also noted by GRECO in its Evaluation Report, that since 2005

all ministers have been required to file their financial interests on the basis of a standard,

which is published. Even if the scheme is not based on legislation, successive

governments have complied with the regime as a mandatory measure. The system

prescribes the disclosure of information on occupations held currently and in the past

five years, self-employment with an annual turn-over of more than 50 000 Danish Kroner

(DKK, approximately EUR 6 700 EUR), financial agreements with former and/or future

employers, membership of associations, remunerated positions, revenue-making

activities and corporate interests of a spouse or partner. The present scope of what is

being declared expresses the desire to strike a fair balance between the need to inform

the general public and the reasonable expectation of a minister to keep part of his/her

financial situation private. In this regard, successive governments regularly assess which

financial interests should be declared. Thus, Denmark does not find it necessary to take

further measures to implement these two parts of the recommendation as regards

members of the government.

As regards the third part of the recommendation, the authorities emphasise that special

advisers have a duty to report potential conflicts of interest to the permanent secretary

of their ministry or their manager. Therefore, it is not considered necessary to introduce

new rules regarding special advisers’ financial interests.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It is clear that no measures have been

taken to implement this recommendation, not even to give due consideration to

obliging special advisers to declare their financial interests on a regular basis.

GRECO concludes that recommendation vii has not been implemented.

Recommendation viii.

44.

45.

GRECO recommended that declarations submitted by persons entrusted with top

executive functions be subject to substantive control.

The Danish authorities report that even though ministers are not legally obliged to

declare their financial interests and there is no formal review mechanism regarding the

accuracy of information provided by ministers, the declarations are published on the

41.

42.

43.

GRECO recalls that Bureau 75 established four criteria to be fulfilled to conclude that a “consider-

recommendation” has been implemented, namely 1) pertinence (Has the reflection process carried out in the

country concerned really taken into account GRECO’s underlying concerns?); 2) extent (Were these concerns

examined/discussed in depth, possibly with the involvement of appropriate (expert) institutions/individuals?);

3) legitimacy (Has the decision to act/not to act been taken by an appropriate authority, ideally at political level?);

4) documentation (Has the reflection process and/or its results been properly documented?).

website of the Prime Minister’s Office. Consequently, this information (and any

inaccuracies therein) will be subject to scrutiny by Parliament, the press and the public

at large, and ministers bear political responsibility for this information.

46.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister has the discretion to dismiss a minister, if s/he for

example does not submit his/her financial declaration or if it appears that the

information contained therein is inaccurate, in accordance with Section 14 of the

Constitution. Similarly, not submitting a financial declaration or providing incorrect

information in this declaration could lead the Parliament to adopt a vote of no-

confidence in a minister, thereby dismissing him/her. In addition, it should be noted that

ministers are generally subject to a duty of truthfulness, which has its basis in Section 5,

paragraph 2 of the Ministerial Accountability Act, regarding the provision of incorrect or

misleading information to Parliament.

In some cases, the provision of incorrect or

misleading information in financial declarations to the general public can also be

regarded as a disregard of duties imposed upon him/her by the nature of the post under

paragraph 1 of that same section. It is Denmark’s experience that the rules are in general

adhered to. Thus, Denmark does not find it necessary to take further measures to

implement the recommendation as regards ministers.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. As it already stated in the Evaluation

Report, it would find some kind of review of financial declarations by the authorities

logical, in that it would provide for additional safeguards and ensure that the public can

trust the information provided. In this context. GRECO regrets that Denmark has not

found it necessary to ensure that the declarations are subject to substantive control.

GRECO concludes that recommendation viii has not been implemented.

Regarding law enforcement agencies

Recommendation ix.

49.

GRECO recommended further developing training particularly focusing on the special

integrity requirements relevant for the police and to make such training mandatory for

managers in the Danish police.

The Danish authorities report that in 2018 and 2019, the Danish National Police carried

out a national campaign concerning good conduct in the entire police force. The

campaign targeted both managers and ordinary staff in the Danish National Police and

the police districts. It comprised a tailored e-learning programme (with a special focus

on elements of the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector and the publication “Good

behaviour in the police and prosecution service” on the intranet of the police, which all

47.

48.

50.

Section 5 of the Ministerial Accountability Act (see also footnote 4 above) provides: “A minister is punished if

s/he intentionally or by gross negligence disregards the duties which are imposed on him/her by the Constitution

or the legislation in general or the nature of the post. 2) The provision in subsection 1 applies if a minister

provides incorrect or misleading information to the Parliament or under the Parliament’s reading of a case is

silent about information, which is substantial to the Parliament’s assessment of the case.”

staff (including managers) were required to complete. Newly hired staff is required to

complete this e-learning programme as well.

51.

Furthermore, in 2018 and 2019, a number of targeted courses were held on Code VII

for executive secretariats and leaders of the Danish police districts involved in

ministerial services.

In addition, a module on good conduct and ministerial services

(including an introduction to Code VII) was included in the curriculum for leaders of the

police, to ensure that future leaders of the Danish police are well acquainted with these

rules and mandatory training is being provided specifically to what is called “leaders in

transition”. Persons being promoted to police chief have to complete a specific 12-18

months’ training course for leaders in transition. Combining teaching and practice, this

training focuses on the framework and conditions for management, including such

issues as responsible management, ethics and Code VII.

The Danish authorities finally emphasise that the Danish National Police is generally

attentive to good conduct with regard to supplementary education and regularly adapts

its curriculum in this respect.

Code VII and the principles regarding good conduct of

public authorities form part of the core elements and values which drive change

management in the Danish police.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It recalls its main preoccupation was that

oversight regarding integrity matters was first and foremost the responsibility of the

supervisor of the staff member concerned and that s/he would also be the point of

contact in case of ethical dilemmas. In this respect, while GRECO would have welcomed

more information on the content and frequency of trainings on integrity (beyond Code

VII, which is more relevant for interactions between civil servants and ministers), it

accepts that training on integrity is provided in the Danish police and is mandatory for

managers, as required by the recommendation.

GRECO concludes that recommendation ix has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation x.

55.

56.

GRECO recommended that further measures be taken to strengthen the representation

of women and other underrepresented groups at all levels in the Danish police.

The Danish authorities report that in the past few years the Danish National Police has

intensified its efforts to expand the base of qualified applicants to the policy academy,

in response to political demands for more police officers. Part of this recruitment drive

has also focused on boosting the number of female applicants and applicants from

52.

53.

54.

See footnote 2 above as regards Code VII.

Ministerial services include contributions of the Danish National Police to replies to parliamentary questions,

consultations, hearings and specific inquiries from the Ministry of Justice (etc.).

For example, due to the so-called Tibet-case (concerning the actions of the Danish Police in relation to two

demonstrations held in Copenhagen in 2012-2014) national guidelines are being implemented to ensure the

legality of the police’s actions. Further initiatives were also taken in relation to meetings between the police and

citizens and regarding purchasing.

57.

ethnic minority backgrounds to the police academy. In doing so, particular attention has

been paid to ensuring that the overall message of the material, be it as part of campaigns

in printed or digital media, is such that different targets groups (such as women and

ethnic minorities) can identify themselves with a career in the police. Female police

cadets and police officers with a non-Danish background are used to target potential

applicants from underrepresented groups. The Danish National Police also works with

employer branding, analysing data gathered about what motivates potential candidates

to select or deselect an education in the police, in order to adapt recruitment campaigns

where needed, and uses micro segmentation for its campaigns.

The Danish authorities furthermore report that the campaigns of the Danish National

Police have been effective, resulting in an increase in the number of applicants, including

female applicants and applicants from ethnic minority backgrounds. The number of

female applicants to the police academy increased to 26.1 percent of all applicants in

2020 (compared to 20.2 percent in 2015), with the number of admitted female students

increased to 27.7 percent of admitted candidates in 2020 (compared to 22 percent in

2015). The number female employees in the Danish police totalled 1.942 in September

2020, representing 17.3 percent of the total police force. The number of applicants with

a non-Danish background increased to 2.1 percent of all applicants in 2020 (compared

to 1.5 percent in 2015), with the number of admitted candidates with a non-Danish

background increasing to 5.2 percent of all admitted candidates in 2020 (compared to

2.7 percent in 2015).

Finally, the Danish authorities emphasise that the Danish National Police always hires

the best-qualified applicants and does not discriminate as regards the gender or ethnic

background of the applicant.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It welcomes the increase in the

representation of women and other underrepresented groups among applicants and

admitted candidates to the police academy. It trusts that in time this will be positively

reflected in the number of police officers also at higher levels.

GRECO concludes that recommendation x has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation xi.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

GRECO recommended developing a streamlined system for authorisation of secondary

activities within the police, which is coupled with effective follow-up.

The Danish authorities report that secondary activities within the police are seen as a

positive element in the relationship between the community and the police.

Consequently, it is the opinion of the Danish police that secondary activities are in most

cases of value for both the staff members and the workplace, as the staff members

through their secondary activities enhance their knowledge and improve their links with

With micro segmentation target groups are divided into even smaller more precise segments, based on various

factors, recognising for example that women of different ages and in different family situations find different

matters relevant and appealing in the work and education the police force can provide.

the community. If the possibility of secondary activities were to be restricted, there is a

risk that these positive effects would be lost.

63.

The Danish authorities furthermore state that a generalised system of reporting

secondary activities would be incompatible with the Civil Servants Act, which does not

provide for a system for employees to report their secondary activities. Employees are

already nevertheless already obligated to provide information to their managers on

their secondary activities, if so requested, and, if in doubt whether the secondary

employment is compatible with employment within the police, must report their

secondary employment. Employees with the security level “secret” or “top secret” are

always required to report their intention to take up secondary activities.

It is the experience of the Danish National Police that secondary activities in the vast

majority of cases are unproblematic and that staff members of the police have a great

understanding of when a secondary activity is incompatible with their profession. If in

doubt, employees ask their managers for advice.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It wishes to emphasise that the

recommendation is not about restricting the possibility of secondary activities, but

rather about being able to filter those secondary activities that adversely impact the

exercise of the staff member’s functions or could entail a real, potential or perceived

conflict of interests. GRECO finds the fact that the Civil Servants Act does not provide for

a reporting system not a convincing argument, as it should be possible to envisage

further procedural requirements in police-specific regulations. It is similarly not

convinced that sufficient information is available to allow for the drawing of conclusions

on the potential for problems or the understanding of the incompatibility of secondary

activities on the part of police staff.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xi has not been implemented.

Recommendation xii.

67.

GRECO recommended that a study be conducted concerning employment of staff of the

police after they leave the police and that, in the light of the findings, a policy be adopted

to minimise the risk of possible conflicts of interest in this respect.

The Danish authorities report that it is not considered an issue that (former) staff of the

police are hired elsewhere. Staff members are furthermore well-acquainted with the

legal provisions, including the rules on confidentiality in the Criminal Code and the fact

that this legal obligation continues to apply after leaving the police. In light of this and

the small number of cases, it would be considered very radical to require former

employees to report offers of employment and await approval. Such an obligation would

require a clear legal provision, including the possibility of imposing sanctions in case of

violation of this legal provision. Currently, such a provision does not exist.

A new survey, as suggested by GRECO, would not serve any purpose in the Danish

context, as the survey would depend on the willingness of former employees to

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65.

66.

68.

69.

participate. Considering all of the above, the Danish authorities take the view that the

initiatives already in place, such as the implementation of the whistleblower regulations,

are more suited to deal with cases where there are doubts about the impartiality of

staff.

70.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It recalls that, in the absence of any data,

it could not be assessed how often persons leave the police for other functions in the

private sector, in which areas and what risks were associated with this. It therefore

recommended that a study be conducted to get a better understanding of the scale and

the specifics of the risks associated with police staff taking up other employment

following their departure from the police force. This study would not necessarily have

to be a survey but would clearly have to involve substantive research. GRECO regrets

that the matter is dismissed outright, without this being supported by available data,

and is again framed with reference to the Criminal Code, demonstrating a lack of

sensitivity to integrity-related risks which do not rise to the level of crime.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xii has not been implemented.

Recommendation xiii.

72.

GRECO recommended that the authorities analyse the need for introducing a

requirement for certain officials within the police to declare financial interests on a

regular basis.

The Danish authorities report that, since 2017, there has been an increased focus on

public procurement in the Police, which has resulted in a number of initiatives to

enhance the management of risks associated with procurement.

Besides the demand

upon procurement officers to register close personal relationships with people

employed by companies that could supply goods or services to the Danish police, there

is also an obligation for such officers to also register their directorships, ownerships,

joint ownerships (etc.) of companies that could be potential suppliers to the police.

Denmark does not believe that there is a need to analyse whether a further requirement

to declare financial interests would be necessary.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It recalls that the abovementioned

registration was only introduced in response to a scandal involving the procurement of

IT equipment in the police, following an internal police report. It would welcome if a

more profound reflection of this issue is undertaken, to proactively assess the benefits

of a requirement for certain officials in top management or particularly vulnerable

positions in the police to declare their financial interests on a regular basis. As such,

GRECO cannot say that the need for introducing this requirement has now been properly

analysed.

71.

73.

74.

As described in paragraph 111 of the Evaluation Report, this for example includes the establishment of a

relationships with people employed by companies where the police may purchase goods and/or services.

75.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xiii has not been implemented.

Recommendation xiv.

76.

77.

78.

GRECO recommended that measures be taken to raise awareness of staff of the police

of their duty to report corruption-related misconduct within the police service.

The Danish authorities report that it will be considered if further initiatives are to be

taken to extend the employees’ knowledge of the whistleblower regulation.

GRECO takes note of the information provided. It emphasises that this recommendation

does not refer to the awareness of staff of the whistleblowing regulations, but rather to

the awareness of staff of their duty to report misconduct, as a complement to the

abovementioned whistleblowing regulations (which had only just become operational

at the time of adoption of the Evaluation). In this regard, GRECO had for example noted

that the guidelines on “good behaviour in the police and the prosecution service” and

the Code of Conduct for the Public Sector were silent on how to act when witnessing

misconduct by colleagues and what the available reporting channels were. GRECO

regrets that more than two years after the Evaluation Report has been adopted (and

two and a half years since the new whistleblowing regulations have entered into force),

the implementation of this recommendation is still being considered.

GRECO concludes that recommendation xiv has not been implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the foregoing, GRECO concludes that Denmark has dealt with in a

satisfactory manner only two of the 14 recommendations contained in the Fifth Round

Evaluation Report.

Of the remaining recommendations, one has been partly

implemented and 11 have not been implemented.

More specifically, recommendations ix and x have been dealt with in a satisfactory

manner, recommendation iii has been partly implemented and recommendations i, ii,

iv, v, vi, vii, viii, xi, xii, xiii and xiv have not been implemented.

When it comes to persons with top executive functions (PTEFs), almost no progress has

been made on any of the recommendations. The only positive steps that can be

mentioned in this context is that again, after the 2019 elections, ministers were briefed

on the integrity rules applicable to them and that a memorandum on conflicts of interest

has been added to the ministerial handbook. In general, the arguments used by the

Danish authorities do not bode well for the future implementation of the outstanding

recommendations. The frequent references to the provisions of the Criminal Code

(e.g.on bribery and confidentiality) confirm what has been already described in the

Evaluation Report about a lack of sensitivity to integrity issues which do not rise to the

level of crime. The trust placed in PTEFs as is demonstrated by the Danish authorities in

this report prevents the current rules being looked at with an open mind and having

gaps therein proactively addressed. GRECO had hoped that an analysis of integrity-

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III.

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82.

related risks involving members of the government and special advisers as a basis for a

future integrity strategy would have made a difference in this respect. It thus particularly

regrets that no progress on this fundamental recommendation has been made, with

equally no or very little progress being reported on almost all other recommendations,

covering issues such as a code of conduct for PTEFs, improving access to information

under the Access to Public Administration Files Act, increasing the transparency of

lobbying, introducing rules to deal with the employment of PTEFs following the

termination of their public service, including more data in the financial declarations of

ministers and ensuring that these declarations are subject to substantive control. In light

of the above, GRECO can only urge the Danish authorities to address the concerns

underlying the abovementioned recommendations, with a view to taking more resolute

action to have these recommendations implemented in the near future.

83.

With respect to law enforcement agencies (police), progress has been made in

strengthening the representation of women and other underrepresented groups in the

Danish police (which in due time will hopefully also be positively reflected at higher

levels in the police) and as regards the training on integrity requirements relevant for

the police. However, regrettably very little progress has been reported as regards any

of the other recommendations, covering matters such as improving the system of

authorising secondary activities in the police, conducting a study on the employment of

staff of the police once they leave the police, analysing the need for introducing a

requirement for certain officials within the police to declare financial interests on a

regular basis and raising the awareness of staff of the police on their duty to report

corruption-related misconduct. GRECO encourages the authorities to step up their

efforts in this regard.

In view of the above, GRECO notes that further progress is necessary to demonstrate an

acceptable level of compliance with the recommendations within the next 18 months.

Pursuant to Rule 31 revised bis, paragraph 8.2 of its Rules of Procedure, GRECO invites

the Head of delegation of Denmark to submit additional information regarding the

implementation of the outstanding recommendations (i-viii and xi-xiv) by

31 March 2023.

GRECO invites the authorities of Denmark to authorise as soon as possible the

publication of this report, to translate it into the national language and to make the

translation public.

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