NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2021-22
NPA Alm.del Bilag 31
Offentligt
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NATO MADRID SUMMIT
29-30 JUNE 2022
Policy Brief
136 SPE 22 E | Original: English | July 2022
This Policy Brief is presented for information only and does not
represent the official view of the Assembly.
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136 SPE 22 E
1.
The recent NATO Summit in Madrid was a “transformative”
event
for the
Alliance in the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The Summit
demonstrated Allied unity and resolve in meeting the key security challenges of today
and tomorrow. It took place against the background of the greatest security threat to
the Euro-Atlantic area since the Cold War and set the stage for
a
number of
important decisions
on the future trajectory of the Alliance:
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the adoption of a new Strategic Concept for NATO;
inviting Sweden and Finland to join NATO;
a new concept for NATO deterrence and defence;
a recommitment to increase defence spending and an agreement to
increase NATO common funding;
enhanced support for Ukraine;
deepened cooperation with key partners;
enhanced resilience
new initiatives in support of defence innovation; and
reaffirming NATO’s role in addressing the security impact of climate
change.
2.
The NATO PA President, Gerald E. Connolly, addressed Allied leaders on
the final day of the Summit
(Allies-only format), stressing the importance of
recommitting NATO to its democratic foundations (read
the full speech).
3.
Ahead of the Madrid Summit, the Assembly adopted its own
recommendations
for NATO’s next Strategic Concept
as well declarations on Standing
with Ukraine and
on Confronting
Russia’s Threat
which included further recommendations for how the
Alliance should demonstrate its support for Ukraine and address the threat from
Russia at the Madrid Summit. Many of the Summit’s decisions are well in line with the
priorities identified by the Assembly.  
I.
PROGRAMME
4.
The two-day
programme
of the Summit covered three individual working
sessions as well as a transatlantic working dinner for Heads of State and Government
and separate dinners for Foreign and Defence Ministers. A roundtable discussion of
Women Foreign and Defence Ministers from Allied Countries was held for the first
time.
5.
During the first session on 29 June, Allied leaders welcomed
President
Zelensky’s participation
via VTC and received from him a sobering assessment of
the current situation in Ukraine. Leaders firmly reiterated that NATO stands in full
solidarity with the government and the people of Ukraine in the defence of their
country.
6.
During the second session, also on 29 June, Allied leaders welcomed for the first
time
Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New
Zealand, along with Finland, Georgia and Sweden, and the Presidents of the
European Council and European Commission.
The meeting aimed to demonstrate
the shared commitment by NATO and its partners to shared values and to the rules-
based international order. NATO and the European Union have also responded in
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136 SPE 22 E
unison to Russia’s war against Ukraine, thereby strengthening their strategic
partnership.
7.
Following the various working dinners the previous evening, the final session was
held on 30 June, among Allied leaders, to address the issue of countering terrorism
and addressing threats and challenges from the South.
NATO PA President Gerald
E. Connolly
addressed leaders at the beginning of this session.
KEY MESSAGES IN THE NATO PA PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS
II.
8.
In his
address,
the NATO PA President urged Allied leaders, as they implement
the new Strategic Concept and the Summit’s important decisions, to
reaffirm and
operationalise NATO’s commitment to shared democratic values.
9.
Welcoming the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept – the Alliance’s top
strategic guidance – President Connolly stated: “This Alliance will not allow
authoritarianism to extinguish the flame of democracy. This Alliance will not allow
President Putin to stamp out the embers of democratic ambition, wherever they burn”.
10. Russia’s war against Ukraine, he stressed, was a tragic illustration of the global
contest of values: “People are dying in Ukraine as we speak for daring to embrace the
democratic ideal. For daring to associate themselves with us – an Alliance that through
solidarity, sense of purpose, and courage won the Cold War.”
11. To gird itself against “the march of authoritarianism”, NATO needed to “move
beyond the rhetorical in our commitment to democratic institutions”, Mr Connolly
argued. Specifically,
the Assembly has recommended that NATO should establish
a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters
to serve as a resource and
clearinghouse on democratic benchmarks – a proposal which currently has the
backing of 29 out of 30 Allies. “To reject this proposal is to turn a blind eye to what
Putin is doing in Ukraine and let a cancer that threatens our future continue to grow.”
12. President Connolly also
welcomed the invitation extended by Allied leaders
to Finland and Sweden to join NATO.
As it has in the past, the Assembly will play
its part in speeding up ratification in the Alliance’s 30 parliaments.
13.
Mr Connolly further urged prompt and full implementation of NATO’s
strengthened deterrence and defence posture,
particularly in the East of the
Alliance, and welcomed the new Strategic Concept’s recognition of the challenges
posed by China’s ambitions and coercive policies.
He also highlighted the need for
the Alliance to address simultaneously other threats and challenges,
including
the persistent, direct threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, instability in the South and other neighbouring regions of the Alliance and
the impact of climate change.
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136 SPE 22 E
III.
KEY OUTCOMES OF THE SUMMIT
14. The key decisions taken at the Summit are laid out in the
Madrid declaration
issued on 29 June 2022.
a.
A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT
15. NATO’s last Strategic Concept was dating back to 2010, when partnership
cooperation with Russia still appeared possible. Now, peace in the Euro-Atlantic area
has been shattered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Madrid, NATO leaders
therefore adopted a new Concept that provides a blueprint setting out how NATO will
tackle the entire range of security threats it currently faces.
16. The
new Strategic Concept
is a public document. It makes clear that Allies
consider
Russia the most significant and direct threat to security
at this point in
time.
Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the other, most direct
asymmetric threat,
as terrorist organisations threaten the security of Allied
populations, forces and territory. The Strategic Concept also
addresses China for
the first time
and the challenges that Beijing poses to the security, interests and
values of the Alliance.
17. Beyond that, the Strategic Concept covers the
evolving approach to a number
of other threats and challenges, including energy security, cyber threats,
climate change, technological innovation and hybrid warfare.
18. Importantly, as the Assembly has recommended,
the new Strategic Concept
places the Alliance’s shared democratic values at the heart of NATO’s response
to today’s threats and challenges.
The text of the new Concept includes references
to these values throughout.
19. Paragraph 2 of the Strategic Concept affirms: “We are bound together by
common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” The
second paragraph of the section on the threat environment highlights the growing
threat of authoritarianism, stating: “Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values
and democratic way of life.” The Concept concludes with the following commitment:
“As Allies, we will continue to stand together to defend our security, values, and
democratic way of life”.
20. The Madrid Strategic Concept
reiterates the three core tasks
identified in the
2010 Concept – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management and
cooperative security. However, in light of Russia’s war, it puts significant emphasis on
the need to strengthen collective defence.
21. See the
full text
of the Madrid Strategic Concept here and a factsheet
here.
22. The Assembly was closely engaged throughout the consultation phase of the
development of the new Strategic Concept. Its own recommendations for the new
Concept – adopted in late February 2022 - are available
here.
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136 SPE 22 E
b.
FINLAND AND SWEDEN
23. In an historic development, NATO leaders clearly reaffirmed the Alliance’s
commitment to the Open Door Policy, by deciding to
invite Finland and Sweden to
become members of NATO.
Leaders welcomed the conclusion of the
trilateral
memorandum
between Türkiye, Finland and Sweden that set the stage for this
important phase of Alliance enlargement.
Accession Protocols were signed at
NATO HQ on 5 July.
The membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO (and the
NATO PA) will be completed once individual parliaments of NATO nations will ratify
the Accession Protocols. Allied leaders stated that the security of Finland and Sweden
is of direct importance to the Alliance, including during the accession process.
c.
DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE
24. In the face of the strategic shock of Russia’s aggression, leaders agreed a
fundamental shift in NATO’s defence posture,
labelled by NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg as the biggest overhaul of Allied collective defence since the Cold War.
25. First and foremost, NATO will
strengthen the battlegroups
already positioned
in the eastern part of the Alliance up to brigade-level.
26. Beyond that,
NATO’s force structure will be transformed to
increase the
number of high readiness forces
up from 40,000 to well over 300,000.
NATO will
also boost its ability to reinforce during crisis and conflict
by securing:
more pre-positioned equipment and stockpiles of military supplies;
more forward-deployed capabilities, like air defence;
strengthened command and control; and
upgraded defence plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies.
27. These additional contributions will significantly enhance the ability of NATO
forces to exercise together with home defence forces and to become familiar with local
terrain, facilities and the new pre-positioned stocks. All of this will ensure NATO
remains ready to protect and defend Allies against any threat, at any time.
d.
DEFENCE SPENDING AND NATO COMMON FUNDING
28. Another important Summit decision, linked to this enhanced defence posture, is
a
commitment to provide necessary resources to fund this new effort.
29. 2022 will be the eighth consecutive year of increases across European Allies and
Canada. By the end of the year, these will have invested well over 350 billion
US dollars since Allies agreed a Defence Investment Pledge at their Wales Summit in
2014. The US defence budget continues to be robust.
30.
NATO leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 2014 pledge and to build
on it. They will decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024.
31. This decision also includes a commitment to
ensure that increased national
defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with
the challenges of a more contested security order.
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32. The agreement on
common funding
foresees an
upward trajectory
– “a
considerable significant increase” in the words of Secretary General Stoltenberg –
up
to 2030.
The Secretary General further explained: “The specific figures will be decided
in the yearly or annual budgets. What I can say is that the agreement we have reached
today [...] will enable us to invest more together in prepositioned equipment, in
hardened shelters, in infrastructure, and to ensure that we can plug and play
capabilities together in NATO. Also with more command and control and also to
provide more support to our partners and also to have more exercises.”
e.
SUPPORT TO UKRAINE
33. The Madrid Summit’s fifth important decision was to
upgrade a comprehensive
support package for Ukraine.
Allies already spend billions of Euros’ worth of military,
financial and humanitarian assistance to support Ukraine. The strengthened
Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine includes substantial deliveries of
non-lethal support in areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems and fuel.
In addition, over the longer term,
NATO will help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era
military equipment to modern NATO equipment, boost interoperability and
further strengthen Ukrainian defence and security institutions.
f.
COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS
34. Leaders also agreed to
deepen cooperation with partners.
NATO will step up
cooperation with
Indo-Pacific partners
including on cyber defence, new
technologies, maritime security, climate change and countering disinformation. The
Alliance will also continue to deepen the strategic partnership with the
EU.
35. Defence capability-building measures were agreed to step up tailored political
and practical support to partners, including
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and
the Republic of Moldova.
These measures will help those partners build their
integrity and resilience, develop capabilities and uphold their political independence.
Leaders also endorsed capacity-building support to partners from the South,
Mauritania
– for the first time –
and Tunisia.
g.
ENHANCING RESILIENCE
36. The new Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring national and collective
resilience is critical to NATO’s three core tasks
and underpins efforts to safeguard
Allied nations, societies and shared values. In line with this guidance, leaders decided
to
further enhance Allied resilience across all domains,
which is a national
responsibility and a collective commitment.
Nationally-developed goals and
implementation plans, guided by objectives developed collectively,
continue to
play a key role.
37. Allies also endorsed
a new chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
defence policy.
Other resilience areas singled out by lLeaders in the Declaration are
energy security
and
resilience against cyber and hybrid threats.
Notably, they
decided to build and exercise
a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond
to significant malicious cyber activities.
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136 SPE 22 E
h.
BOOSTING DEFENCE INNOVATION
38. The Madrid Summit also
launched the
NATO Innovation Fund,
which will invest
1 billion Euros over the next 15 years in start-ups developing dual-use emerging
technologies, such as artificial intelligence. Together with NATO’s Defence Innovation
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the new fund will harness the best new
technology for transatlantic security. Allies also endorsed a strategy to ensure the
seamless delivery of the next generation Airborne Warning & Control System
(AWACS) and related capabilities.
i.
ADDRESSING THE SECURITY IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
39. To help mitigate the impact of climate change on Allied security, NATO leaders
agreed to
cut greenhouse gas emissions by NATO bodies and commands
by at
least 45 per cent by 2030, down to net zero by 2050. They also agreed a new
methodology to map military greenhouse gas emissions.
The
first High-Level
Dialogue on Climate Change and Security
was held on the margins of the NATO
Summit and the Secretary General released his first
Climate Change and Security
Impact Assessment
report.
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40. Taken together, these Madrid Summit decisions firmly set the direction for the
Alliance’s continued adaptation to the new security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic
area. Allies agreed to
hold another Summit meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2023.
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www.nato-pa.int
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