Indfødsretsudvalget 2021-22
IFU Alm.del Bilag 99
Offentligt
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SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 26781/19
Anis LARABA
against Denmark
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on
22 March 2022 as a Chamber composed of:
Carlo Ranzoni,
President,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Egidijus
Kūris,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Jovan Ilievski,
Saadet Yüksel,
Diana Sârcu,
judges,
and Stanley Naismith,
Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 May 2019,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
A. The circumstances of the case
1. The applicant, Mr Anis Laraba, has dual nationality, Danish and
Algerian. He was born in Denmark in 1995 and lives in Horsens. He was
represented before the Court by Mr Michael Juul Eriksen, a lawyer practising
in Aarhus.
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised
as follows.
3. In spring 2016 the Danish Security and Intelligence Service received a
list from Interpol with the names of persons believed to have been recruited
by the terrorist organisation Islamic State and to have operated in Syria. The
applicant’s name was on the list.
4. On 7 April 2016 the applicant was arrested and provisionally charged
on the basis of information that he had allegedly entered Syria and had
IFU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 99: Orientering om afgørelser fra Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol i klagesager vedrørende frakendelse af dansk statsborgerskab og udvisning
LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION
accepted his recruitment by the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). The following day the applicant was remanded in custody.
5. By a District Court (Retten
i Glostrup)
judgment of 13 December 2017,
the applicant was convicted of a violation of Article 114c(3) and
Article 114d(3) of the Penal Code for having joined Islamic State from July
2013 to April 2014 with the purpose of committing terrorist crimes. He was
sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, he was deprived of his Danish
citizenship and his expulsion from Denmark was ordered with a permanent
re-entry ban.
6. On appeal, on 22 November 2018 the judgment was upheld by the High
Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre
Landsret).
7. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) was refused on
7 March 2019 by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet).
8. The Danish courts noted from the outset that, according to the
preparatory work on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality, the
assessment of whether to withdraw a person’s citizenship should be based on
a weighing up of the severity of the offence and the impact on the person
concerned of the withdrawal of his or her citizenship.
9. As to the severity of the offence, the courts noted that the applicant had
been convicted of very serious terrorist crimes under the Penal Code.
10. As to the impact on the applicant of the withdrawal of his citizenship,
they took into account that the applicant had been born and raised in Denmark
to a Danish mother and an Algerian father who had later also acquired Danish
nationality. The applicant’s parents and siblings lived in Denmark. He did not
have a family of his own. He had family in Algeria, where he had been on
holiday with his father around 2011. He spoke Danish and, by his own
account, some Arabic. The District Court noted, however, that the applicant
had corrected the Prosecutor, when the latter was referring to an Arabic
translation during the criminal proceedings. Moreover, in 2016 the applicant
had been admitted to the University in Medina to study Sharia in Arabic, but
he had been detained in this case before he could go.
11. After having weighed the severity of the offence against the impact of
withdrawal of the applicant’s citizenship based on an assessment of his
situation, including his ties with Denmark and Algeria, his family situation
and his language skills, the courts found that his Danish citizenship should be
withdrawn. It also found that the conditions in the Danish Aliens Act for
expelling the accused had been met. It found that none of these measures
would be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
B. Relevant domestic law and Council of Europe documents
12. The relevant domestic law and Council of Europe documents were
recently set out in
Adam Johansen v. Denmark
(dec.), no. 27801/19, §§ 21-28,
1 February 2022.
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IFU, Alm.del - 2021-22 - Bilag 99: Orientering om afgørelser fra Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol i klagesager vedrørende frakendelse af dansk statsborgerskab og udvisning
LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION
COMPLAINT
13. The applicant complained that the order to withdraw his Danish
citizenship and to expel him from Denmark was in violation of Article 8 of
the Convention.
THE LAW
14. The applicant relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Deprivation of citizenship
15. The Court notes that the general principles applicable to cases
involving deprivation of nationality are well-established in the Court’s
case-law (see, for example
K2 v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), no. 42387/13,
§§ 49-50, 7 February 2017,
Mansour Said Abdul Salam Mubarak v. Denmark
(dec.), no. 74411/16, §§ 62-63, 22 January 2019,
Ghoumid and Others
v. France,
no. 52273/16, §§ 43-44, 25 June 2020,
Usmanov v. Russia,
no. 43936/18, §§ 52-54, 22 December 2020, and
Adam Johansen v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above, §§ 44-45 and 52-55).
1. Arbitrariness
16. The decision to deprive the applicant of his Danish citizenship was
based on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality. The Court is satisfied
by the clarity of the domestic law and can therefore conclude that the decision
was “in accordance with the law” (see also,
Mansour Said Abdul Salam
Mubarak v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above, § 64, and
Adam Johansen
v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above, § 47).
17. The applicant had an opportunity to contest the prosecuting
authorities’ request to strip him of his Danish citizenship before the domestic
courts at two levels of jurisdiction, and he has not alleged any procedural
shortcomings in this regard. Accordingly, the applicant was afforded the
procedural safeguards required by Article 8 of the Convention (see,
a
contrario, Usmanov,
cited above § 66).
18. The Court is also satisfied that the authorities acted diligently and
swiftly. It observes that in spring 2016 the Danish Security and Intelligence
Service received information from Interpol, leading to the applicant’s arrest
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LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION
on 7 April 2016. On 13 December 2017 the applicant was convicted by the
District Court. The judgment was upheld by the High Court on 22 November
2018 and became final on 7 March 2019, when leave to appeal was refused
by the Appeals Permission Board.
19. Finally, the revocation of the applicant’s Danish citizenship was the
consequence of his conviction for a very serious terrorist crime under articles
114c(3) and 114d(3) of the Penal Code. The deprivation of his Danish
nationality complained of was thus to a large extent a result of the applicant’s
own choices and actions (see,
inter alia, Ramadan v. Malta,
no. 76136/12,
§ 89, 21 June 2016). Moreover, as the Court has underlined on numerous
occasions, terrorist violence, in itself, constitutes a grave threat to human
rights. Accordingly, the Court considers it legitimate for Contracting States
to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it
cannot condone in any circumstances (see, for example,
Ghoumid,
cited
above, § 50, and the references mentioned therein).
20. The Court therefore concludes that the decision of the Danish courts
to deprive the applicant of his Danish citizenship was not arbitrary.
2. Consequences of the revocation
21. It is not in dispute that the applicant was not rendered stateless by the
decision to deprive him of his Danish citizenship (see also, among others,
K2
v. United Kingdom,
cited above, § 62).
22. The preparatory work on section 8b of the Act on Danish Nationality
set out that the assessment of whether to withdraw a person’s citizenship
should be based on a weighing of the seriousness of the offence and the
impact on the person concerned. Accordingly, the domestic courts carefully
assessed the consequences for the applicant of a revocation of his Danish
citizenship in the light of his ties with Denmark and Algeria.
23. The courts took account of the fact that the applicant was born in
Denmark, to a Danish mother and an Algerian father who had later also
acquired Danish nationality. The applicant had therefore acquired dual
nationality by birth. He had strong ties with Denmark, where his parents and
siblings lived. He did not have a family of his own. He spoke Danish. They
also found that the applicant had some ties with Algeria. He had been there
on holiday with his father around 2011. Although he claimed to speak only
some Arabic, it was noted that he had corrected the Prosecutor, when the latter
was referring to an Arabic translation during the criminal proceedings.
Moreover, in 2016 he had been admitted to the University in Medina to study
Sharia in Arabic (see paragraph 10 above). In conclusion, based on an overall
balancing test, the Danish courts found that the deprivation of the applicant’s
Danish nationality would not be a disproportionate sanction.
24. The Court finds reason to emphasise that, as opposed to section 8b of
the Act on Danish Nationality and, for example, the compatibility of an
expulsion order with Article 8 of the Convention, the compatibility of
withdrawal of a person’s citizenship is not based on a balancing test of
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LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION
specific criteria, but on the requirement that two separate issues have been
addressed: whether the revocation was arbitrary and what the consequences
of revocation were for the applicant (see, for example,
Adam Johansen
v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above, § 68).
25. In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts
diligently addressed the consequences of depriving the applicant of his
Danish citizenship.
26. Moreover, in the Court’s view, taking into account that the applicant
was convicted for having joined Islamic State with the purpose of committing
terrorist crimes, which themselves constitute a serious threat to human rights
and which to a large extent showed his lack of attachment to Denmark and its
values (see,
mutatis mutandis, Ghoumid and Others v. France,
cited above,
§ 50), the fact that the applicant in the present case had obtained Danish
nationality by birth does not significantly alter or add to the consequences for
him (see also
Adam Johansen v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above, § 70).
3. Conclusion
27. In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that the domestic courts’
assessment of the decision to revoke the applicant’s nationality was adequate
and sufficient, and does not disclose any appearance of arbitrariness or
omission with regard to the applicant’s arguments. Consequently, this part of
the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to
Article 35 § 3(a) and 4 of the Convention (see also
Ghoumid and Others
v. France,
cited above, §§ 51-52,
K2 v. United Kingdom
(dec.), cited above,
§ 67,
Mansour Said Abdul Salam Mubarak v. Denmark
(dec.), cited above,
§ 71, and
Adam Johansen v. Denmark,
cited above, § 71).
B. The order to expel the applicant from Denmark
28. It is not in dispute that there was an interference with the applicant’s
right to respect for his private life within the meaning of Article 8, that the
expulsion order was “in accordance with the law” and that it pursued the
legitimate aim of preventing disorder and crime.
29. The relevant criteria to be applied in determining whether an
interference is necessary in a democratic society are well established and set
out in,
inter alia, Üner v. the Netherlands
[GC] (no. 46410/99, §§ 54-55 and
57-58, ECHR 2006-XII) and
Maslov v. Austria
[GC] (no. 1638/03, §§ 68-76,
ECHR 2008).
30. In respect of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, the
domestic courts took the same factors into account as when assessing the
impact on the applicant of revocation of his Danish citizenship.
31. These factors included the nature and seriousness of the offence
committed by the applicant, the length of the applicant’s stay in the country
from which he was going to be expelled, the nationalities of the various
persons concerned and the solidity of his social, cultural and family ties with
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LARABA v. DENMARK DECISION
the host country and with the country of destination. Thus, the Danish courts
took into account, among other things, that the applicant was born in
Denmark and had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for serious
offences committed as an adult (see, also for example,
Levakovic v. Denmark,
no. 7841/14, 23 October 2018,
Balogun v. the United Kingdom,
no. 60286/09,
10 April 2012, and
Mutlag v. Germany,
no. 40601/05, 25 March 2010).
32. The expulsion order in the present case was issued together with a
lifelong ban on re-entry. The Court notes in this context that the duration of
a ban on re-entry is an element to which it has attached importance in its case-
law. In the present case, the Court is convinced that the applicant’s crime
leading to the expulsion order was of such a nature that he posed a serious
threat to public order (see also,
inter alia, Mutlag v Germany,
cited above,
§§ 61-62, and
Balogun v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, § 53).
33. In conclusion, the domestic courts found that there were compelling
reasons to expel the applicant, and that respect for the applicant’s private life
in Denmark did not make the deprivation of his Danish nationality and
expulsion conclusively inappropriate.
34. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court is satisfied
that the Danish courts made a thorough assessment of the applicant’s personal
circumstances, carefully balanced the competing interests, took into account
the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law and explicitly assessed whether the
expulsion order could be deemed contrary to Denmark’s international
obligations. “Very serious reasons” were adequately adduced by the national
authorities when assessing his case, and the expulsion order cannot be said to
be disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely, the protection of
the public from the threat of terrorism (see,
inter alia, K2 v. United Kingdom,
cited above, § 66, and
Adam Johansen v. Denmark,
cited above, § 84; see
also, among many others,
Ndidi v. the United Kingdom,
no. 41215/14, § 76,
14 September 2017, and
Levakovic v. Denmark,
cited above, § 45).
35. Consequently, this part of the application must also be rejected as
manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 § 3(a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares
the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 14 April 2022.
Stanley Naismith
Registrar
Carlo Ranzoni
President
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