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BMP5
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime
Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
Produced and supported by:
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BMP5
Best Management Practices to Deter
Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea
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Version 5 published June 2018
Authors: BIMCO, ICS, IGP&I Clubs, INTERTANKO and OCIMF
Legal Notice
BMP5 has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the
Authors, their Members or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP5 or
any omission from BMP5 or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying upon
guidance contained in BMP5 even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Copyright notice
The Authors of BMP5 have provided BMP5 free of charge. All information, data and text contained in BMP5 whether in
whole or in part may be reproduced or copied without any payment, individual application or written license provided
that:
•
•
It is used only for non-commercial purposes; and
The content is not modified
Exceptions:
The permission granted above permits the photographs to be used within the whole or part of BMP5. The permission
does not extend to using the photographs separately outside of BMP5 as these photographs belong to a third party.
Authorisation to use the photographs separately from BMP5 must first be obtained from the copyright holders, details of
whom may be obtained from the Authors.
Logos and trademarks are excluded from the general permission above other than when they are used as an integral part
of BMP5.
Published by
Witherby Publishing Group Ltd
4 Dunlop Square
Livingston, Edinburgh, EH54 8SB
Scotland, UK
Tel No: +44 (0) 1506 463 227
Fax No: +44 (0) 1506 468 999
Email: [email protected]
Web: www.witherbys.com
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Contents
The fundamental requirements of BMP
Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 5
Section 6
Section 7
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
Annex F
Annex G
Annex H
Annex I
Annex J
Introduction
The threat
Threat and risk assessment
Planning
Ship Protection Measures
Reporting
Ships under attack
Contact details
Maritime security charts
Common understanding
UKMTO reporting forms
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms
Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing
Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts
Definitions and abbreviations
Supporting organisations
Voyage reference card
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The fundamental requirements of
BMP
Understand the threat
•
Maritime threats are dynamic.
•
Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.
Conduct risk assessments
•
Companies must conduct risk assessments.
•
Identify ship protection measures.
Implement ship protection measures
•
Harden the ship.
•
Brief and train the crew.
•
Enhanced lookout.
•
Follow Flag State and military guidance.
Report
•
Report to UKMTO and register with MSCHOA.
•
Report incidents and suspicious activity.
•
Send distress signal when attacked.
Cooperate
•
Cooperate with other shipping and military forces.
•
Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence.
•
Cooperate with welfare providers.
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Section 1
Introduction
Seafarers have encountered different security threats when operating ships in the Red Sea,
the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
The purpose of this publication is to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter,
delay and report attacks. Experience has shown application of the recommendations in this
publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.
Piracy-specific Best Management Practice (BMP), international navies and capacity building
ashore have helped to suppress piracy. However, Somali piracy has not been eradicated and
remains a threat.
The BMP contained in this publication mitigates the risk from piracy and other maritime
security threats.
Regional instability has introduced other maritime security threats, which include:
•
Deliberate targeting of ships by extremist groups.
•
Collateral damage arising from regional conflict.
BMP piracy measures are effective, but differences in attack methods from other threats may
require other forms of mitigation. For example, attacks carried out by extremists may be
more determined, as they may be willing to risk their lives.
The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates
have subjected hostages to violence and other ill treatment and periods of captivity for
some hijacked seafarers have lasted for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an
intent to damage ships and endanger life.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (www.ukmto.org) and Maritime Security
Centre – Horn of Africa (www.mschoa.org) websites should be consulted for advice.
See annex A for contact details.
This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organization
(IMO) MSC Circulars (see
www.imo.org)
and advice on the Maritime Security Transit
Corridor.
Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s overriding authority
and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.
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Geographical area
The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the
Bab el Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali
basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary.
Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region. Threats are dynamic;
information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.
Voluntary Reporting Area
The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as
UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with
the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO.
MSCHOA vessel registration area
The MSCHOA vessel registration area is designed to inform military counter piracy forces of
the transit of merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The MSCHOA vessel
registration area is defined on maritime security chart Q6099.
High Risk Area
A High Risk Area (HRA) is an industry defined area within the VRA where it is considered that
a higher risk of attack exists, and additional security requirements may be necessary. The
HRA is outlined on maritime security chart Q6099. It is important the latest information on
current threats is used when planning routes through the HRA. Ships should be prepared to
deviate from their planned route at short notice to avoid threats highlighted by navigation
warnings or by military forces.
Maritime Security Transit Corridor
The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which
naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on maritime
security chart Q6099 and the figure below and consists of:
•
The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
-
The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) but an established transit corridor
in the Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their counter piracy patrols. Within the
IRTC, group transits and national convoys may be offered.
•
The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands.
•
A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS.
It is recommended that ships use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and
surveillance.
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Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community may list an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships
entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums
may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from
both Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of
those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the
JWC listed area can be found on their website:
www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.
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Section 2
The threat
As well as piracy, regional instability has introduced new security threats including the use
of:
•
Anti-ship missiles.
•
Sea mines.
•
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED).
Piracy
Pirates operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) who operate several different boat
configurations, typically using small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or skiffs.
PAG boat configurations include:
•
Skiffs only.
•
Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel and often towing one or more attack
skiffs.
•
Motherships, which include merchant ships and fishing vessels but, more commonly,
dhows.
Where motherships are used the crew are often held onboard as hostages. Motherships are
used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much
larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed
behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows, skiffs may be carried onboard
and camouflaged.
Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate Masters
of ships to reduce speed or stop to allow them to board. The bridge and accommodation
tend to be the main targets for these weapons.
Pirates use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb
up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take
control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable
other pirates to board.
Attacks can take place at any time – day or night – however experience shows attacks at
dawn and dusk are more likely.
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The intent of Somali pirates is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. The usual
practice is to keep the crew onboard as negotiations progress, keeping both the crew and
the ship together. Seafarers have occasionally been separated by nationality and taken
ashore. It is in the interests of the pirates to keep their captives alive, although cases of
intimidation and torture have occurred.
Anti-ship missiles
Anti-ship missiles are long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used
against military ships in the region. Their use against merchant ships associated with
regional conflict cannot be discounted. Other ships may be hit if the missile controller
targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target.
Sea mines
Sea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports in Yemen. These mines
are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into shipping
lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not a target and it is recommended ships use the MSTC
when passing through the area.
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
WBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red
Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.
Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:
•
WBIED used in the regional conflict have been aimed at harming those associated with
the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.
•
WBIED used by extremists have been aimed at merchant ships. These boats have been
manned.
An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a
number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should
recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board the
ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship’s hull are
limited.
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Section 3
Threat and risk assessment
Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional security threats.
As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the HRA the latest military
threat advice must be obtained from UKMTO
www.ukmto.org
and threat assessments
from MSCHOA
www.mschoa.org
(see annex A).
A
threat
is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.
Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is
demonstrated by continued attacks. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship
and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance. In addition to the
information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics
of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional background factors may be sought from
regional reporting centres and organisations as listed in annex A.
If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot
influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the
opportunity.
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Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system.
The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery,
which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures. Companies
should also take account of these measures for ships transiting the VRA even if they do not
enter the HRA.
Further guidance on risk assessments can be found in the
Global Counter Piracy Guidance
at
www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org.
The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to:
•
Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers.
•
The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk.
•
Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic patterns and local patterns of life,
including fishing vessel activity.
•
Cooperation with military. An understanding of presence should be obtained from
UKMTO.
•
The embarkation of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).
•
The ship’s characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/
or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement,
etc.).
•
The ship’s and company’s procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision
making processes, etc.).
All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available
information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed
threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.
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Section 4
Planning
Company planning
Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship’s
voyage plan:
•
Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary.
•
Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel
Hardening Plan (VHP).
•
Guidance to the Master about the recommended route, updated plans and requirements
for group transits and national convoys.
•
Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM).
•
Due diligence of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) for the possible use of
PCASP.
•
Companies should consider the placement of hidden position transmitting devices as one
of the first actions of hijackers is to disable all visible communication and tracking devices
and aerials.
•
Review of
company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non-essential crew.
•
Crew training plans.
Information security
To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands the following is advised:
•
Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention
paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions.
•
Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and
information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually
required.
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Ship Master’s Planning
Security is a key part of any voyage plan.
Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area
•
Obtain the latest threat information.
•
Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
•
Implement VRA/MSCHOA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in
section 6 and annexes D and E.
•
If used, confirm PCASP embarkation plan.
•
Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.
Prior to entering the High Risk Area
•
Implement security measures in accordance with the SSP.
Brief crew and conduct drills
The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with
the SPM in place. The plan should be reviewed and all crew briefed on their duties, including
familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear situation and the appropriate
response to each. The drills should test:
•
The SPM, including testing the security of all access points.
•
Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
•
The bridge team’s security knowledge.
•
The crew’s understanding of any different actions required in the event of a pirate attack
compared to other types of attack.
Other considerations
•
Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an
emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers
(see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed
near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel.
Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.
•
Define the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS
should remain switched on throughout passages through passages through the VRA and
HRA, to ensure militaries can track the ship, but restrict data to ship’s identity, position,
course, speed, navigational status and safety related information.
•
Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit of an HRA.
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On entering the High Risk Area
•
Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annexes D and E.
•
Monitor latest threat information.
•
Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
•
Avoid drifting, waiting, anchoring and slow steaming, particularly in the MSTC.
•
Minimise use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible
only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF, bearing in mind that imposters are
possible.
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Section 5
Ship Protection Measures
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on
regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.
The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process.
Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope
of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of further
reducing the risk of attack.
Primary layer of defence
Good look out/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance
The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board.
•
Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.
•
Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.
•
Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts.
•
Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
•
Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable
all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
•
Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
•
Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give
the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
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•
Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can
deter approaches from the stern.
•
Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.
An effective lookout is the most effective method of ship
protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack
early on, which allows defences to be deployed.
Manoeuvring
The Master and officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with
the ship’s handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres
while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can
defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as creation of hydrostatic pressure can have a
better defensive impact than speed.
Avoidance manoeuvres should only be practiced when it is
safe to do so.
Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the ship’s crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker
that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship’s whistle
may distract the attackers.
It is important that:
•
The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
•
Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially
those warning of an attack and indicating ‘all clear’.
•
All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the
accommodation and deck PA system, where fitted.
•
Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard
throughout the ship. The drill will confirm the time
necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.
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Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access
to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb for those trying to illegally board. When
planning the placement of barriers special consideration should be given to ships with
sunken poop decks.
Razor wire
Also known as barbed tape. It creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured. The
quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The
following is recommended:
•
Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil
diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is difficult to
cut with hand tools.
•
Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place
a single high-quality roll outboard of the ship’s
structure.
•
Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent
attackers pulling the wire off. For example, attach
at least every third wire ring to ship’s railings and
rig a steel cable through its core.
•
Use personal protective equipment and wire
hooks to move and install razor wire.
•
Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10m, so
that it is easier and safer to move.
•
Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when
at terminals so that it does not interfere with
mooring operations.
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Other physical barriers
Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging
swinging obstacles over the gunnels to specifically
designed overhanging protection that prevents illegal
boarding by climbing over the ship’s rails.
Water spray and foam monitors
•
The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is
effective in deterring or delaying any attempt to
illegally board a ship. The use of water can make
it difficult for an unauthorised boat to remain
alongside and makes it significantly more difficult
to climb aboard.
•
It is recommended hoses and foam monitors
(delivering water) are fixed in position to cover likely
access routes and are remotely operated. Manual
activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an exposed position.
•
Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and using baffle
plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
•
Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part of the
hull.
•
Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger areas.
•
Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship’s standard fire fighting equipment
stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery.
•
The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure all
defences operate efficiently.
•
Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be
ready for immediate use.
•
Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective
coverage of vulnerable areas.
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Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct their
weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If pirates
board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control.
The following enhancements may be
considered:
•
Bridge windows are laminated but further
protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast
resistant film.
•
Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates
for the side and rear bridge windows and
the bridge wing door windows, which can
be quickly secured in place in the event of
an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
•
Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
•
Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly
checked to ensure that they have not degraded.
Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces
It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces.
•
Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the
event of an emergency.
•
Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route
from a manned compartment, it is essential it can be
opened from the inside. Where the door or hatch is locked
it is essential a means of opening the door from the inside
is available.
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•
Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation
and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them
being opened from the outside.
•
Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited
number are used for security patrols and routine access. The use
of these doors or hatches should be controlled by the Officer of the
Watch.
•
Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent use and
to restrict external access to the bridge.
•
Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged
down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as
wire strops, may be used.
•
Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not
need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
•
Pirates
have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of
steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
•
Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms
should be briefed to the crew.
•
The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.
Safe muster points and/or citadels
The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.
Safe muster points
A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to
the crew and will be identified during the planning process.
If the threat assessment identifies risks that may result in a breach of hull on or below the
waterline then a safe muster point above the waterline must be identified. In many ships, the
central stairway may provide a safe location as it is protected by the accommodation block
and is above the waterline.
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To minimise the effect of an explosion, consideration should be given to the likely path of
the blast. The safe muster point should be selected with this in mind.
Citadels
A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek
protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel
cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.
Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF)
must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can
offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not
replace, all other SPM.
The use of the citadel must be drilled and the SSP should define the conditions and
supporting logistics for its use.
It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before
boarding a ship:
•
All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
•
Two-way communication with the citadel.
The Master should decide when to use the citadel.
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Other measures
Closed circuit television
Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to
assess whether the attackers have gained access
to the ship. The use of CCTV coverage allows a
degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack
from a less exposed position. Some companies
can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore,
which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered:
•
CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge.
•
CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
•
CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.
Lighting
Lighting is important and the following is recommended:
•
Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the
poop deck to demonstrate awareness.
•
If fitted, search lights ready for immediate use.
•
Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted,
should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s crew to see them.
•
At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited.
•
Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of
international regulations and the risk of collision is higher than that of being attacked.
•
At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.
•
The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from entering or
disorientate those who may already have entered.
Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment
It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the ship.
Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck
•
Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or
containers of flammable liquids.
•
Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to
transit.
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Private Maritime Security Companies
This section provides guidance on the employment of PMSCs. PMSCs may offer armed or
unarmed services. Further guidance on the use of armed services (PCASP) is given below.
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PMSCs onboard merchant ships;
this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag State
and any littoral states. However, the use of experienced and competent unarmed PMSCs
can be a valuable protective measure, particularly where there may be the requirement
to interface and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast
guards.
Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider:
•
The current threat and risk environment.
•
The output of the company risk assessment.
•
Voyage plan requirements.
•
Ship speed.
•
Freeboard.
•
Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
•
Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.
Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PMSC.
It is recommended that shipping companies only employ PMSCs who are accredited to
the current ISO 28007-1:2015
Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships.
A PMSC contract must:
•
Be between the technical manager and the PMSC.
•
Not prejudice the ship’s insurance cover arrangements.
•
Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the
requirements of the contract.
•
Clearly identify the procedure for the use of force.
•
Confirm the Master’s overriding authority.
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
Any decision to engage the services of PCASP should consider the guidance above for PMSC as
well as the following.
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PCASP onboard merchant ships; this
is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag State and
any littoral states.
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Companies must check the credentials and licenses/permits of
the PMSC, and where appropriate the PCASP, to ensure they have
been issued by an appropriate authority and are operating legally
against identified threats.
Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PCASP. Some Flag States provide military
Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) instead of PCASP. A VPD may be provided by another
State, subject to Flag State approval. In some cases, the deployment of either PCASP or VPDs
must be reported and acknowledged by the Flag State and reported when entering the VRA
(see section 6 and annexes D and E).
Master’s overriding authority
If private security contractors are embarked, there must be a clear understanding of the
overriding authority of the Master.
The Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the PCASP operate must be acceptable to
the Flag State and the company.
The Master and PCASP should:
•
Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF as outlined in the contract.
•
Have documentation authorising the carriage of weapons and ammunition.
•
Ensure all incidents involving the use of weapons and armed force are reported at the
earliest instance to the Flag State and the Chief Security Officer (CSO).
The PCASP must:
•
Act in accordance with the agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated, reasonable,
proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of force in
defence of crew on the ship.
PCASP should only be used as an additional layer of mitigation
and protections and not as an alternative to other measures.
The decision to carry PCASP is an output of the company risk
assessment and a ship that traverses the HRA without PCASP
on board can be considered in full compliance with the BMP. The
ship’s crew must not handle or use firearms.
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Section 6
Reporting
All ships are strongly encouraged to inform military organisations of their movement as this
is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond. Once ships
have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the guidelines in
this section and annexes C, D and E are adopted to ensure common understanding. The two
principal military organisations to contact are the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).
UKMTO
UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing
liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO administers the Voluntary Reporting
Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These
include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
Daily reports (update on ship’s position, course and speed).
Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).
UKMTO is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate
Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:
•
Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and
with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct UKMTO-to-ship telephone calls to all
ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
•
Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/reports that are
relevant within the region.
UKMTO offers regular information to ships on its website
www.ukmto.org
and in a weekly
report summarising the previous week’s activity. UKMTO is also able to offer Masters and
CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage planning
in the region. Companies that are interested can contact UKMTO +44(0)2392 222060 or
[email protected].
Ships and their operators should complete both UKMTO vessel
position reporting forms and register with MSCHOA.
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MSCHOA
The MSCHOA is the planning and coordination centre for the EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR).
MSCHOA encourages companies to register their ships’ movements before entering the HRA
and if participating in the group transit system via their website
www.mschoa.org.
When departing the VRA, ships should be aware of adjacent regional reporting requirements,
e.g.: NATO Shipping Centre (Mediterranean – Chart Q6010) and ReCAAP Information Sharing
Center/Singapore Information Fusion Center (SE Asia – Chart Q6012).
EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) produce Industry Releasable Threat
Assessments (IRTAs) to aid risk management for companies. The threat assessments use
military knowledge and intelligence to present a common understanding of the threats and
trends in the region. The IRTAs are complimented by Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins
(IRTBs), which cover specific events. These documents are an important resource and
should be considered as part of the threat and risk assessment process.
The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the
region
Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger
seafarers there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security.
Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law
enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help. This
is more important in the seas off the coast of Somalia and Yemen where navies, coastguards
and law enforcement agencies have limited resources.
Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible.
If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot
data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is
any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.
Reporting suspicious activity to UKMTO
UKMTO can advise on the types of activity of interest to the regional maritime community.
A guide to help identify suspicious activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular
activity report is in annex D. Often, seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may
be concerned observations could lead to further investigations by Port States and possible
delay to the ship. UKMTO will forward information received in an anonymised form to
the most appropriate agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear
inconsequential, when added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.
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Section 7
Ships under attack
General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual and
radar, will help to ensure early detection.
Piracy attack
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g.
within two cables.
Use whatever time available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective
measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the
ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.
In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt, call
UKMTO without delay.
Approach stage
Effective lookouts may aid in identifying the nature of the attack, the threat profile of a piracy
or other attack may initially look similar and it will not be until the attackers are close that
the nature of the attack becomes apparent. In all cases, the following steps should be taken:
•
If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance.
•
Steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed.
•
Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.
•
Activate the emergency communication plan.
•
Sound the emergency alarm and make an attack announcement, in accordance with the
ship’s emergency communication plan.
•
Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a distress message via the Digital Selective
Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
•
Activate the SSAS.
•
Report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by telephone.
•
Ensure the AIS is switched on.
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•
Activate water spray.
•
Ensure that all external doors and, where possible,
internal public rooms and cabins are fully secured.
•
All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine
room should muster at the safe muster point or
citadel as instructed by the Master.
•
When sea conditions allow, consider altering course
to increase an approaching skiff’s exposure to wind/
waves.
•
Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to
demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship
is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
•
Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording.
•
PCASP, if present, will take agreed actions to warn off attackers.
Attack stage
As the attackers get close the following steps should be taken:
•
Reconfirm all ship’s crew are in the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the
Master.
•
Ensure the SSAS has been activated.
•
If not actioned, report the attack immediately to
UKMTO (+44 2392 222060)
by
telephone.
•
As the attackers close in on the ship, Masters should commence small alterations of helm
whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the ship in preparation for a
boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation
of the skiffs.
•
Large amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a
ship’s speed.
•
Check VDR data is being saved.
•
PCASP, if present, will conduct themselves as governed by the RUF.
Actions on illegal boarding
If the ship is illegally boarded the following actions should be taken:
•
Take all way off the ship and then stop the engines.
•
All remaining crew members to proceed to the citadel or safe muster point locking all
internal doors on route.
•
PCASP, if present, will follow procedures agreed with company and Master.
•
Ensure all crew are present in the citadel or safe muster point. This includes the Master,
bridge team and PCASP.
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•
Establish communications from the citadel with UKMTO and your company and confirm
all crew are accounted for and in the citadel or safe muster point.
•
Stay in the citadel until conditions force you to leave or advised by the military.
•
If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates have full
control of the ship.
If control of the ship is lost
•
All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their
hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.
Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
DO
be patient.
DO
keep mentally active/occupied.
DO
keep track of time.
DO
reduce stress where possible by remaining physically active.
DO
remain calm and retain dignity.
DO
be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly to release you).
DO
remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices running.
DO
exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their instruction.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
attempt to engage attackers.
DO NOT
make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive.
DO NOT
be confrontational.
DO NOT
resist.
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Hijack – hostage situation
The model of pirate action off Somalia is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. It
should be remembered it is in the interests of the pirates to keep the ship and crew safe.
Each company or organisation should have a policy in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap and ransom. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.
DO
remain calm and maintain self-control.
DO
be humble and respectful to the pirates.
DO
look out for your colleagues’ well-being.
DO
stay together as a team, where possible.
DO
accept the new pirate leadership.
DO
maintain the hierarchy of rank.
DO
try to establish normal communication with the pirates.
DO
maintain personal hygiene.
DO
save water and essentials.
DO
be positive – many people are working to release you.
DO
be patient and maintain routines (including your spiritual needs, as permitted by
pirates).
DO
try to keep your breathing regular.
DO
meditate and keep mentally active.
DO
respect religion: yours, your colleagues’ and the pirates’.
DO NOT
offer resistance.
DO NOT
argue with pirates or your colleagues.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
hide valuables.
DO NOT
react emotionally.
DO NOT
take drugs or alcohol.
DO NOT
bargain with pirates for personal privileges.
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In the event of military intervention
Brief and prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and
instruct crew as follows.
DO
keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
DO
keep hands visible.
DO
be prepared to be challenged on your identity.
DO
cooperate fully with military forces.
DO NOT
make movements that could be interpreted as aggressive.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
get involved in activity with military forces unless specifically instructed to.
Attack from other threats
•
Anti-ship missiles
In the event or warning of a missile attack military advice should be
followed. If no warning is received there will be no time to take any mitigations beyond
a PA warning to the crew if a missile is spotted. It is unlikely merchant ships will be the
intended target; Masters should be aware of the ship plot in their immediate vicinity and, if
sea room allows, keep clear of naval and associated ships.
•
Sea mines
Ships should avoid all published or identified mine danger areas and maintain
close liaison with military authorities. If operating close to mine danger areas, Masters
should be aware tethered mines may break free and drift into shipping lanes. Ships should
manoeuvre clear of floating objects and the forward area of the ship should be kept clear
of crew. Effective lookouts are essential. Specific advice on self protective measures when
operating in mine danger areas can be obtained from UKMTO.
•
WBIED attack
In the early stages of the attack it may not be possible to differentiate
between a piracy or WBIED attack. Initial actions as highlighted in this guidance for the
approach stage of a piracy attack should be
followed. Military threat assessments may
indicate areas where one type of attack is more
likely than another. A speed boat with multiple
people onboard is unlikely to be a WBIED as
these are usually unmanned or have a solitary
occupant.
WBIED attacks may result in a breach of the
ship’s hull. The use of the safe muster point is
recommended before entering a citadel located
below the waterline.
Courtesy of the US Naval Institute
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If a WBIED is anticipated, the time to react is very short. The figure below gives an example
of possible reaction times.
The threat and risk assessment will identify areas where these threats occur which, if
successful, may result in an explosion (commonly referred to as a blast). The Master
should communicate to the crew prior to entering a threat area what position to take if a
blast threat is detected. The Master may consider telling the crew to:
•
Lie flat on the deck, as this may minimise exposure and may reduce the impact on the
body from the blast.
•
Adopt a brace position (arms/legs bent, hands holding onto something solid and feet
firmly planted on the deck) to protect personnel from shock waves.
•
Move away from a particular area, such as the port side, starboard side, poop deck or
engine room.
Post a WBIED attack
•
Ensure all crew and PCASP are accounted for.
•
Send distress signal.
•
Survey area where the blast occurred.
•
Implement damage control.
•
Call CSO and UKMTO.
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Post incident actions and reporting
The period following an attack will be difficult as companies, Master and crew recover from
the ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments,
both physical and mental, and care following an attack or hostage situation. Companies
should have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects from an attack
from any of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the
management of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the
families of the kidnapped crew.
To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is
important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew
should refer to IMO
Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence
A28/ Res. 1091
and other industry guidance.
Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital
that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company,
the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and
comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity.
Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the
incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Protection of evidence
The collection and protection of evidence is critical.
The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency
arrives by following these basic principles:
•
Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible.
•
Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch
and leave items in place.
•
Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no
matter how unimportant it may seem.
•
Take initial statements from the crew.
•
Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints.
•
Protect VDR for future evidence.
•
Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers).
•
Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement
authorities.
•
Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
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Investigation
Thorough investigation using all available evidence is critical.
The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will
significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.
Following any attack or incident the investigating authority will be determined by external
factors including:
•
Flag State.
•
Ownership.
•
Crew nationality.
Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as victims of
crime.
The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the
sequence and circumstances of the event.
In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release
crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.
Advice
INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their
ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps
to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a
Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188-member countries
faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of
INTERPOL’s official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three
days of a hijacking of their ship.
INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss the recommended practices for the
preservation of evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an
investigation. Contact details are: email [email protected]; telephone +33 472 44 7676.
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Seafarer welfare
Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or
even recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The
company should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy
and other maritime security threats and if necessary provide independent support and other
assistance, as may be appropriate. There is a range of humanitarian programmes aimed
at assisting seafarers and their families effected by piracy or maritime crime, including the
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See
www.seafarerswelfare.org
and
www.missiontoseafarers.org.
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Annex A
Contact details
Emergency contacts
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
Email
[email protected]
Telephone (24hrs)
Website
+44 2392 222060
www.ukmto.org
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
[email protected]
Email
Telephone
Fax
Website
+44 1923 958545
+44 1923 958700
+44 1923 958520
www.mschoa.org
US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping
[email protected]
Email
Telephone (24hrs)
Telephone (office)
+973 3904 9583
+973 1785 1023
Useful contacts
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Email
[email protected]
Telephone
Fax
Telex
Website
INTERPOL
Email
Telephone (24hrs)
Website
+60 3 2031 0014
+60 3 2078 5769
MA34199 IMBPC1
www.icc-ccs.org
[email protected]
+33 472 44 76 76
www.interpol.int
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Adjacent regional reporting centres
Mediterranean
NATO Shipping Centre
Email
[email protected]
Telephone (24hrs)
Fax
Website
+44 1923 956574
+44 1923 956575
www.shipping.nato.int
South East Asia
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre
[email protected]
Email
Telephone
Fax No
+65 6376 3063
+65 6376 3066
Singapore Information Fusion Centre
[email protected]
Email
Telephone
Fax No
+65 9626 8965 (24/7)
+65 6594 5728
+65 6594 5734
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Annex B
Maritime security charts
Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the
planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the
UKHO through work with NATO and other government organisations, ensuring each chart has
the most accurate, up-to-date and verified information available.
Each maritime security chart includes:
•
Information about dangers to the security of navigation including piracy, terrorism,
embargoes, mine warfare, exclusion zones, blockades and illegal fishing. This information,
when used alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships,
crew and cargo.
•
General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional
contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or
security forces.
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Annex C
Common understanding
It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious
activity.
The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes
suspicious activity.
Attacks
•
The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence.
•
Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates or other unauthorised persons.
•
If weapons or RPGs are fired.
•
Attempts to place a WBIED against the hull.
•
Sighting of missile firing.
•
An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
•
Attempts to overcome the SPM using:
-
Ladders.
-
Grappling hooks.
-
Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
Suspicious activity
•
The number of crew onboard relative to its size.
•
The Closest Point of Approach.
•
The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing
hooks or large amounts of fuel.
•
One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard.
•
The type of vessel is unusual for the current location.
•
Small boats operating at high speed.
•
If a vessel appears unmanned.
•
The vessel is not transmitting on AIS.
•
The vessel is not flying a Flag.
•
Vessel is flying two or more flags simultaneously.
•
Skiffs operating far from the coast.
•
Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones.
•
Windows of vessel covered or blanked out.
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•
Dhows/skiffs rafted up.
•
No lights during hours of darkness.
•
Skiffs with two or more outboard motors.
•
Dhows/skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing.
•
Vessels loitering East of Socotra, South of the Makran Coast or in the vicinity of Zanzibar,
Dar es Salaam, Pemba, Salalah, Ras Fartek or the IRTC.
•
Packages hanging outboard of a vessel.
•
Excessive communications antennas.
This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious
by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences
within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community.
If in doubt, report and contact UKMTO.
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Annex D
UKMTO reporting forms
UKMTO vessel position reporting forms
Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, UKMTO will request daily
reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port or upon exiting the VRA, UKMTO will request a
final report. The following forms are provided below and are available at
www.ukmto.org:
•
Initial report.
•
Daily report.
•
Final report.
•
Suspicious/irregular activity report.
UKMTO vessel position reporting form - initial report
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Ship Name
Flag
IMO Number
INMARSAT Telephone Number
Time and Position
Course
Passage Speed
Freeboard
Cargo
Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival
Name and contact details of Company Security Officer
Nationality of Master and Crew
Armed/unarmed security team embarked
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UKMTO vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ship Name
Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Ship’s Position
Ship’s Course and Speed
Any other important information*
ETA point A/B IRTC (if applicable)
*Other important information could be change of destination or ETA, number of UK crew on
board, etc.
UKMTO vessel position reporting form - final report
1
2
3
4
Ship’s name
Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Port or position when leaving the voluntary reporting area
UKMTO suspicious/irregular activity report
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ship’s name
Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Ship’s Position
Ship’s Course and Speed
Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and
activity witnessed
Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.
Follow-up report to UKMTO and MSCHOA
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.
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Annex E
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of
Africa reporting forms
MSCHOA vessel registration and incident reporting
Registration with MSCHOA ensures a ship is monitored by military counter piracy forces
during its transit of the HRA. In addition, regular threat assessment updates, warnings and
the latest self-protection information are made available to shipping companies and Masters
who register.
Registration is required within the MSCHOA Vessel Registration Area as highlighted on UKHO
Chart Q6099.
The form to ‘Register a Vessel’s Movements’ is available on the MSCHOA website and UKHO
Chart Q6099. The following should be noted:
•
There are two principal methods to register your ship’s movement with MSCHOA.
-
Online
at
www.mschoa.org
(note you will need to register with MSCHOA for access,
this can be done following the register tab on the website).
-
Offline.
A downloadable form is available from
www.mschoa.org
or it can be
requested from
[email protected].
This form was updated in March 2018
to make offline registration simpler for ships with sporadic internet connectivity to
register.
If the above options are not possible a ship can be registered by sending an email with
the subject heading
MSCHOA Vessel Registration
to [email protected] with the
information in the table below. Items marked with an * are mandatory.
Vessel Details
Ship Name *
IMO Number *
Call Sign *
Primary Email *
Ship contact number *
Owner name
Operator address
DPA telephone
Flag State *
MMSI Number *
Ship’s Master
Secondary Email
Ship contact email *
Operator name
DPA name
DPA email
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Movement Details
Entry Point to MSCHOA vessel registration
area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Entry Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel
registration area *
(DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Exit Point from MSCHOA vessel registration
area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Exit Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel
registration area *
(DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Do you intend to transit the IRTC?
ETA to IRTC (times are in UTC/ Zulu time) *
Direction * (East/West)
Do you intend to join a group transit?
Do you intend to join a National Convoy?
Which National Convoy are you joining? *
Crew numbers and nationalities
Freeboard of lowest accessible deck in
Metres(M) *
Vessel’s Maximum Speed *
Draught
Planned Transit Speed *
Cargo (Crude Oil/Clean Oil/Arms/
Chemicals/ Gas/Passengers/Bulk Cargo/
Containers/Fishing/Ballast/ Others …
Please Specify)
Hazardous cargo
Last Port of Call
Nationality of armed security team?
Next Port of Call
Number of Armed Security personnel on
board?
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Follow-up report to MSCHOA and UKMTO
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is also helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.
Incident report; vessel particulars/details
It is recognised that during an incident time may be short and crew will be under a number
of pressures and stresses. Those lines marked with an * are those that, in extremis, are the
key requirements that must be reported. Without this data responses cannot be planned or
mounted and assessments will be incomplete and may be inaccurate.
INCIDENT REPORTING PART ONE – VESSEL DETAILS
Line
(a)
(b)
A*
SHIP NAME
B*
IMO NUMBER
C
IDENTITY
1.1
D
E
F
A
B
CREW / CARGO
1.2
C
D
E
A
B
ROUTE /
SCHEDULE
1.3
C
D
E
FLAG
CALL SIGN
OWNER NAME & CONTACT DETAILS
Company Security Officer / Designated
Person Assure CONTACT DETAILS
CREW NUMBER
CREW NATIONALITIES
CAPTAIN / MASTER NATIONALITY
CARGO
CARGO SIZE / QUANTITY
LAST PORT OF CALL (LPOC)
LAST PORT OF CALL DATE
NEXT PORT OF CALL (NPOC)
NEXT PORT OF CALL DATE
SEA DAYS SINCE LAST PORT
Responses / Inclusions
Format
(d)
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
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INCIDENT REPORTING PART TWO – INCIDENT DETAILS
Line
(a)
(b)
2.1*
TIME OF REPORT
A*
INCIDENT LOCATION
2.2
B*
DETAILS
SPEED AND HEADING AT TIME OF
INCIDENT
DTG
LAT / LONG
PLAIN TEXT
DTG
DTG
PLAIN TEXT
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
NUMBER
NUMBER
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
SELECT
SELECT
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
Responses / Inclusions
Format
(d)
A*
INCIDENT START TIME
2.3
B*
INCIDENT END TIME
C
A*
INCIDENT
2.4
B
WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING EVENT
SIGHTING / APPROACH /
COMMUNICATION / ATTACK / BOARDING
AREA(S) OF VESSEL TARGETED
A*
NUMBER OF SUSPECT CRAFT
B
SUSPECTS
2.5
C
D
NUMBER OF SUSPECT INDIVIDUALS
NOT KNOWN / CIVILIAN DRESS /
UNIFORMS / MIX
ETHNICITY / LANGUAGES
A*
NONE SEEN / SIGHTED / SHOTS FIRED
WEAPONS
2.6
B
A
LADDERS
2.7
B
A*
CRAFT
2.8
B
DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL (COLOUR,
NAME, FEATURES)
PISTOLS / RIFLES / MACHINE GUNS /
GRENADE LAUNCHERS
NONE SEEN / SUSPECTED / SIGHTED /
USED
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
TYPE: WHALER / DHOW / FISHING VESSEL
SELECT
/ MERCHANT VESSEL
PLAIN TEXT
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A*
CITADEL / SECURE AREA
B*
C
2.9
D
E
F
NO SECURITY TEAM / UNARMED TEAM /
ARMED TEAM
HEIGHT OF FREEBOARD AT THE TIME OF
INCIDENT
SELF PROTECTION MEASURES IN PLACE
BEFORE INCIDENT
DEFENCE MEASURES EMPLOYED
OTHER
YES / NO
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
YES / NO
PLAIN TEXT
YES / NO
YES / NO
SELECT
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
SELECT
YES / NO
YES / NO
YOUR
VESSEL
A*
ALARM SOUNDED
B*
CREW MUSTERED IN CITADEL
C*
YOUR
RESPONSE
2.10
INCREASED SPEED / EVASIVE
MANOEUVRES
D*
DESCRIPTION
E
F
PAST SHOWED WEAPONS / WARNING
SHOTS / AIMED SHOTS / NO PAST
WAS INCIDENT REPORTED TO
AUTHORITIES? IF SO TO WHOM?
A*
INCIDENT FINISHED / ONGOING
STATUS
2.11
B
C
INCIDENT ENDED BY SUSPECTS / OWN
VESSEL
DETAIL
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INCIDENT REPORTING PART THREE – STATUS AND SUPPORT REQUESTS
Line
(a)
(b)
A*
B
STATUS
3.1
C*
D
VESSEL SAFE / UNSAFE / UNDER ATTACK
/ BOARDED
VESSEL UNDERWAY / VESSEL STATIC
UNDER OWN POWER / SUPPORTED /
WITHOUT POWER
NO DAMAGE / MINOR DAMAGE / MAJOR
DAMAGE
Responses / Inclusions
Format
(d)
SELECT
SELECT
SELECT
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
SELECT
NUMBER
PLAIN TEXT
NUMBER
PLAIN TEXT
SELECT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
A*
DAMAGE DETAILS
B
C
3.2
D
E
F
INJURY DETAILS
CREW FATALITIES
FATALITY DETAILS
CREW AT STATIONS / CREW IN CITADEL /
CREW OFF SHIP
CREW INJURIES
DAMAGE /
MEDICAL
A*
CONTINUE AS PLANNED / RE-ROUTING
B*
INTENTIONS
3.3
C
D
E
REPAIR DAMAGE / ABANDON SHIP /
SURRENDER CONTROL
CURRENT SPEED
CURRENT HEADING
OTHER
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A
IMAGERY
3.4
B
C
A
ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
3.5
B
WAS THE INCIDENT RECORDED?
CCTV FOOTAGE / PHOTOGRAPHS
IMAGERY ATTACHED (IF AVAILABLE
PLEASE ATTACH)
ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY
ASSIST?
PLEASE ATTACH WITH THIS REPORT – A
BRIEF DESCRIPTION / FULL REPORT /
MASTER – CREW STATEMENT OF THE
ATTACK
YES / NO
SELECT
YES / NO
PLAIN TEXT
PLAIN TEXT
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Annex F
Additional guidance for vessels
engaged in fishing
This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national
fishing industry associations:
•
OPAGAC
– Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores.
•
ANABAC
– Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.
Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones
•
Non-Somali fishing vessels should avoid operating or transiting within 200nm of the coast of
Somalia, irrespective of whether they have been issued with licenses to do so.
•
Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified
boats.
•
If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at full
speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.
•
Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine-room watch.
•
During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar
watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in
progress.
•
While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent
the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are
waiting.
•
If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the
engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights.
•
The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up.
•
Keep away from unidentified ships.
•
Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more
difficult.
•
Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate
identification and tracking.
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Identification
•
Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MSCHOA for the
whole period of activity off the coast of Somalia. This should include communicating a full
list of the crewmen on board and their vessels’ intentions, if possible.
•
Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.
•
Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their
manager should provide MSCHOA with access to VMS data.
•
Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from
any international or national anti-piracy operation.
•
Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification
request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make
escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).
In case of attack
•
In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (UKMTO and
MSCHOA) and the rest of the fleet.
•
Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land)
whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.
•
Recommendations
only for Purse Seiners:
-
Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow’s nest.
-
If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out,
encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine
is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the
gear to avoid misunderstanding.
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Annex G
Additional advice for leisure craft,
including yachts
Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to
determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on
both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close
contact should be maintained with UKMTO throughout any voyage.
See the MSCHOA (www.mschoa.org) and the International Sailing Federation
(www.sailing.org) for the most up-to-date information.
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Annex H
Definitions and abbreviations
Definitions
The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are
reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent identification of
patterns and trends.
Armed robbery
The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:
•
Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other
than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic
waters and territorial sea.
•
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
Attack
An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an
aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.
Hijack
A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship against
the crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed robbery, cargo theft
or kidnapping).
Illegal boarding
An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT
taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the
citadel scenario.
Piracy
Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide
clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent
assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.
The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but
is not limited to:
•
The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
•
Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
•
An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
•
Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
-
Ladders.
-
Grappling hooks.
-
Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
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Suspicious or aggressive approach
Action taken by another craft may be deemed
suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):
•
A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by
the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
•
Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance,
not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
•
Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
Abbreviations
AIS
BAM
CMF
CSO
DSC
EU NAVFOR
HRA
IMB
IMO
IRTA
IRTB
IRTC
JWC
MSC
MSCHOA
MSTC
NATO
PAG
PCASP
PMSC
RECAAP
RPG
Automatic Identification System
Bab el Mandeb
Combined Maritime Forces
Chief Security Officer
Digital Selective Calling
European Union Naval Force
High Risk Area
International Maritime Bureau
International Maritime Organization
Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
Joint War Committee
Maritime Safety Committee
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
Maritime Security Transit Corridor
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Pirate Action Group
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
Private Maritime Security Company
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia
Rocket Propelled Grenade
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RUF
SPM
SSA
SSAS
SSP
TSS
UKMTO
VDR
VHP
VMS
VPD
VRA
WBIED
Rules for the Use of Force
Ship Protection Measures
Ship Security Assessment
Ship Security Alert System
Ship Security Plan
Traffic Separation Scheme
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
Vessel Data Recorder
Vessel Hardening Plan
Vessel Monitoring System
Vessel Protection Detachment
Voluntary Reporting Area
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
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Annex I
Supporting organisations
I.1
BMP5 Signatories
BIMCO
BIMCO
is the world’s largest international shipping association, with around 2,000
members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world’s tonnage. Our global
membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit
organisation, BIMCO’s mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping,
providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to members’
businesses.
www.bimco.org
CDI
The Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI)
was established in 1994 as a not for profit
Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format
to its members. The main objectives of CDI is to continuously improve the safety and
quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation
with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice
in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and
advice on industy best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and
storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost effective systems
for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of
Distribution Management Practice.
www.cdi.org.uk
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CLIA
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
is the world’s largest cruise
industry trade association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of
the global cruise community. CLIA supports policies and practices that foster
a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship environment for the more
than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and is dedicated to promote the
cruise travel experience. The organization’s mission is to be the unified global
organization that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and
promoting for the common interests of the cruise community.
www.cruising.org
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
The
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
is the international trade association for
merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry
from different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners’
associations representing over 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS
activity is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency with
responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. ICS
is heavily involved in a wide variety of areas including any technical, legal and operational
matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is unique in that it represents the global interests of
all the different trades in the industry: bulk carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship
operators
www.ics-shipping.org
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IFSMA
The
International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA)
was formed in 1974
by Eight National Shipmasters’ Associations to unite the World’s serving Shipmasters into
a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation
dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of
around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations
or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non
governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and
protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters.
www.ifsma.org
IGP&I Clubs
Thirteen principal underwriting associations “the Clubs” comprise the
International
Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I).
They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for
approximately 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance
associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the
use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances,
wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their
members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role
in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties.
www.igpandi.org
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IMCA
The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is a leading trade association
representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated supply chain in the
offshore marine construction industry worldwide. We have a membership of 800 companies
including contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies
and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
www.imca-int.com
INTERCARGO
The
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO),
established in
1980 in London and granted IMO NGO consultative status since 1993, is a voluntary non-
profit association representing the interests of dry cargo vessel owners.
INTERCARGO provides the forum where quality dry bulk shipowners, managers and
operators are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory
challenges, especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence.
INTERCARGO promotes best practices and represents dry cargo shipping interests at IMO,
other industry fora and the broader business context, basing its strategies on the principle of
free and fair competition.
www.intercargo.org
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InterManager
InterManager
is the international trade association for the ship management industry
established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated
to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today’s global
shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the
ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats.
InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change.
An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at
international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account
within the worldwide maritime industry.
www.intermanager.org
International Maritime Employers’
Council Ltd (IMEC)
IMEC
is the only international employers’ organisation dedicated to maritime industrial
relations. With offices in the UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235
shipowners and managers, covering some 8,000 ships with CBA’s, which IMEC negotiates on
behalf of its members within the International Bargaining Forum (IBF).
IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in
the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training.
www.imec.org.uk
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International Transport Workers’
Federation
The
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)
is an international trade union
federation of transport workers’ unions. Any independent trade union with members in the
transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers
since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000
are members of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers
of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the
interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the
flag of their ship.
www.itfseafarers.org
www.itfglobal.org
INTERTANKO
INTERTANKO
is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum
where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO
has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy
that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.
www.intertanko.com
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IPTA
The
International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA)
was formed in 1987 to represent
the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an
established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel
tankers, being recognised as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade
organisations may liaise with such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non-
Governmental Organisation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997 and is
wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and monitor compliance with
international maritime legislation.
www.ipta.org.uk
ISWAN
The
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN)
is an
international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers
worldwide. We are a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare
organisation as members. We work with a range of bodies including PandI Clubs, shipping
companies, ports, and governments. Our focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million seafarers
around the world.
We support seafarers and their families who are affected by piracy and our 24 hour
multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world.
www.seafarerswelfare.org
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Joint Hull Committee and Joint War
Committee
The
Joint Hull and Joint War Committees
comprise elected underwriting representatives
from both the Lloyd’s and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who
write marine hull and war business in the London market.
Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the
exposures they face through the owners’ use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers
will inform underwriters’ approach to risk and coverage.
The Mission to Seafarers
The Mission to Seafarers
is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing
200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers’ centres across 50 countries. In addition to our services
of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling
and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with
relevant professional services in a seafarer’s home country. We run family support networks
in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine and India offering access to education, training and
medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to support the creation of
BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all maritime personnel.
www.missiontoseafarers.org
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OCIMF
The
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
is a voluntary association of oil
companies (the ‘members’) who have an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude
oil, oil products, petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF’s mission is to be the foremost authority on
the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore
support vessels, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation.
www.ocimf.org
Sailors’ Society
Sailors’ Society
is the world’s oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and
their families across the globe.
The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres
to building boats to get children safely to school.
Our renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia,
Europe and Africa with plans to extend further.
Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural
disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial
help for as long as needed.
www.sailors-society.org
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SIGTTO
The
Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
is the
international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience,
between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas
tankers and terminals.
To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works
of reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships
with other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including
the International Maritime Organization, to better promote the safety and integrity of gas
transportation and storage schemes.
www.sigtto.org
World Shipping Council
The
World Shipping Council (WSC)
is the trade association that represents the
international liner shipping industry. WSC’s member lines operate containerships, roll-
on/roll-off vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of
the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of
the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually.
WSC’s goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with
policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the
world’s most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non-governmental
organization at the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
www.worldshipping.org
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I.1
Naval/military/governmental organisations
CGPCS
The
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)
was established on
14 January 2009, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1851. This ad hoc
international forum brings together more than 60 countries, regional and international
organisations, all working together towards the prevention of piracy off the coast of Somalia.
The CGPCS coordinates political, military and non-governmental efforts to combat piracy,
ensures that pirates are brought to justice and support local governments to develop
sustainable maritime security capabilities. The group’s approach focuses on informality,
inclusion and multi-stakeholder representation and is an attempt to find innovative
solutions outside of formal international organisations.
Combined Maritime Forces
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
is an enduring global maritime partnership of 32 willing
nations aligned in common purpose to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in order
to provide security and stability in the maritime environment. CMF operates three Combined
Task Forces (CTF) across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf
of Oman, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. CTF150 is responsible for maritime security and
counter-terrorism, CTF151 is responsible for deterring, disrupting and suppressing piracy
and CTF152 is responsible for maritime security and counter-terrorism specifically in the
Arabian Gulf. Visit
www.combinedmaritimeforces.com
or e-mail us at
[email protected].
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EU NAVFOR
MSCHOA
Piracy and other maritime security issues have continued to be a threat to mariners who
transit the Southern Rea Sea, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. The mission of
the
European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR)
is (1) to PROTECT World Food Programme
and other vulnerable shipping and (2) to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea. This requires (3) the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with
an increasingly wide range of maritime actors to uphold freedom of navigation across a
broad maritime security architecture. EU NAVFOR is also tasked with (4) monitoring fishing
activities off the coast of Somalia. Thus, acting as a catalyst for action, EU NAVFOR continues
to promote solutions to regional maritime security issues, thereby contributing to the EU’s
much wider security, capacity-building and capability-building work in this strategically
important location.
The
Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
is an integral part of EU
NAVFOR, sitting functionally within the Operational Headquarters and staffed by military
and civilian EU NAVFOR personnel. The MSCHOA provides a service to mariners in the Gulf
of Aden, the Somali Basin and off the Horn of Africa. It is a Coordination Centre dedicated to
safeguarding legitimate freedom of navigation in light of the risk of attack against merchant
shipping in the region, in support of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions (UNSCR) 1816 and
subsequent reviews. EU NAVFOR and CMF are committed to ensuring that mariners have
the most up to date regular threat assessments and incident specific bulletins, published by
the MSCHOA. Through close dialogue with shipping companies, ships’ masters and other
interested parties, MSCHOA builds up a picture of vulnerable shipping in these waters and
their approaches. The MSCHOA can then act as a focal point sharing information to provide
support and protection to maritime traffic. There is a clear need to protect ships and their
crews from illegitimate and dangerous attacks, safeguarding a key global trade route.
http://eunavfor.eu
www.mschoa.org
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IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
Established in 1992,
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)
provides the shipping
industry with a free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery incidents
occurring anywhere in the world.
The IMB PRC is an independent and non-governmental agency aimed at raising awareness
of areas at risk of these attacks. As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters reporting
incidents to the IMB PRC from anywhere in the world, the IMB PRC immediately relays
all incidents to the local law enforcement requesting assistance. Information is also
immediately broadcast to all vessels via Inmarsat Safety Net to provide and increase
awareness.
www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre
Information Fusion Centre
The
Information Fusion Centre (IFC),
based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime
Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub. It has linkages with more than 70 regional and
extra-regional Operational Centres (OPCENs) from navies and law enforcement agencies in
39 countries, as well as linkages with the shipping industry. It is also the only centre in the
Asia-Pacific with International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from 16 countries.
The IFC collates and analyses relevant information to produce accurate, timely and
actionable products, which enable its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good
time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best
practices to the shipping industry. IFC also administers the Voluntary Community Reporting
(VCR) for merchant vessels to report anomalies and incidents, enabling community
contribution to Safe and Secure Seas for All.
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INTERPOL
INTERPOL
has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy
and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who
have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can
be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the
integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law
enforcement agents pursuing an investigation.
MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email [email protected]
during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00).
Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL’s Command
and Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and
supports INTERPOL’s 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent
operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol’s official languages (English,
French, Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email os-ccc@
interpol.int.
It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within 3 days of a hijacking of their
ship.
NCAGS
The
Naval Cooperation & Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)
mission is to facilitate the
exchange of information between the United States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and
the commercial maritime community in the United States Central Command’s (CENTCOM)
Area of Responsibility. NCAGS operates as a conduit for information focused on the safety
and security of shipping and is committed to assisting all members of the commercial
maritime community. To help combat piracy, NCAGS serves as a secondary emergency point
of contact for mariners in distress (after UKMTO) and also disseminates transit guidance to
the maritime industry. NCAGS disseminates guidance to merchant shippers via briefings,
website, email, and duty phone concerning Naval Exercises, Boardings, Aids to Navigation,
Environmental Issues, MEDEVAC Assistance, Security and Augments, Regional Search and
Rescue Centres.
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UKMTO
UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKTMO)
capability acts as the primary point of contact
for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces within the region. UKTMO also
administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant vessels are encouraged
to send regular reports, providing their position/speed and ETA at the next port of call, in
accordance with the Maritime Security Chart Q6099.
Emerging and time relevant information impacting commercial traffic can then be passed
directly to vessels at sea, and responding assets accordingly, therefore improving the
collective responsiveness to an incident. For further information on UKMTO please contact:
Emergency Telephone Numbers: +44 (0)2392 222060 or +971 5055 23215
e-mail: [email protected]
Web:
www.ukmto.org
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Annex J
Voyage reference card
Understand the threat
„
Get threat information.
„
Review guidance.
„
Review Rules for the Use of Force.
Assess the risk
„
Conduct risk assessment.
„
Identify ship protection measures.
Protect the ship and crew
„
Harden the ship.
„
Test critical equipment.
„
Brief/train the crew.
„
Extra lookout/radar watch.
„
Control access.
„
Follow military advice.
Do NOT be alone
„
„
„
„
„
Report to UKMTO.
Register with MSCHOA.
Report suspicious activity.
Report incidents.
Send DISTRESS if attacked.
UKMTO
+44 (0) 2392 222060
[email protected]
MSCHOA
+44 1923 958545
www.mschoa.org
Cooperate with:
„
Other shipping and military forces.
„
Local law enforcement.
„
Welfare providers.
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70
Primary layer of defence
Good lookout/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
BMP5
Detect, Deter,
Delay
Do Not Be
BOARDED
Do Not Be
VULNERABLE
Do Not Be
SURPRISED
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DRAFT