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BMP West Africa
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance
Maritime Security off the Coast of West Africa including the
Gulf of Guinea
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SENEGAL
CABO VERDE
GAMBIA
GUINEA
BISSAU
BURKINA
FASO
GUINEA
SIERRA
LEONE
NIGERIA
TOGO
BENIN
LIB
COTE
D’IVOIRE
ER
IA
GHANA
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
GABON
GULF OF GUINEA
CONGO
BURUNDI
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
ANGOLA
Produced and supported by:
UNITY
FOR
SAFETY
AT SEA
IFSMA
International Parcel
Tankers Association
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BMP West Africa
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and
Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast of West
Africa including the Gulf of Guinea
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Version 1 published March 2020
Authors: ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF
Legal Notice
BMP WA has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the
Authors, their Members or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP WA
or any omission from BMP WA or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying
upon guidance contained in BMP WA even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Copyright Notice
The Authors of BMP WA have provided BMP WA free of charge. All information, data and text contained in BMP WA
whether in whole or in part may be reproduced or copied without any payment, individual application or written license
provided that:
•
•
It is used only for non-commercial purposes; and
The content is not modified Exceptions:
The permission granted above permits the photographs to be used within the whole or part of BMP WA. The permission
does not extend to using the photographs separately outside of BMP WA as these photographs belong to a third party.
Authorisation to use the photographs separately from BMP WA must first be obtained from the copyright holders, details
of whom may be obtained from the Authors.
Logos and trademarks are excluded from the general permission above other than when they are used as an integral part
of BMP WA.
BMP WA replaces any existing regional guidance issued by the supporting signatories.
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Contents
The fundamental requirements of BMP
Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 5
Section 6
Section 7
Introduction
The threat
Threat and risk assessment
Planning
Ship Protection Measures
Reporting
Ships under attack
4
5
7
9
11
15
29
31
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
Annex F
Annex G
Annex H
Annex I
Contact details
Maritime security charts
Common understanding
MDAT-GoG reporting forms
Other maritime security threats
Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing
Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts
Definitions and abbreviations
Supporting organisations
39
42
44
46
50
52
54
55
58
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The fundamental requirements of
BMP
Understand the threat
•
Maritime threats are dynamic.
•
Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.
Conduct risk assessments
•
Companies must conduct risk assessments.
•
Identify ship protection measures.
Implement ship protection measures
•
Harden the ship.
•
Brief and train the crew.
•
Enhanced lookout.
•
Follow Flag State, insurance and military guidance.
Report
•
Register and report to MDAT-GoG.
•
Report incidents and suspicious activity.
•
Send distress signal when attacked.
Cooperate
•
Cooperate with other shipping and military forces.
•
Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence.
•
Cooperate with welfare providers.
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Section 1
Introduction
The maritime security situation off the West Coast of Africa is complex and dynamic. BMP –
West Africa (WA) has been produced to help ships and seafarers avoid becoming the victims
of maritime security incidents in these waters.
This publication aims to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay
and report attacks. Experience has shown that application of the recommendations in this
publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.
The BMP contained in this publication mitigate the risk from piracy and armed robbery.
However, differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of
mitigation.
The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates
have subjected crew to violence and other ill treatment and extended periods of captivity.
Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships, seize the cargo and endanger
life.
Other maritime crime in the region, such as the trafficking of firearms, humans and narcotics,
migrant smuggling and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, can contribute to
insecurity.
The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG)
(https://gog-mdat.org/home) website should be consulted for advice. See annex A for
contact details.
Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s overriding authority
and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.
This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) Resolutions and Circulars (www.imo.org).
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Geographical area
This Guidance introduces recommended practices and procedures for vessels operating in
the Voluntary Reporting Area as depicted on UKHO Chart Q6114 and SHOM Chart 8801CSD.
Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region but most
predominantly in the eastern part of the Gulf of Guinea. Threats are dynamic; information
should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.
Voluntary Reporting Area
The MDAT-GoG Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such
as
UKHO Q6114
&
SHOM Chart 8801CSD.
Ships entering and operating within the VRA are
encouraged to register with the MDAT-GoG as registration establishes direct contact between
the reporting ship and MDAT-GoG.
Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community lists an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships
entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums
may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from
both Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of
those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the
JWC listed area can be found on their website:
www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar
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Section 2
The threat
The complex range of maritime security issues off the coast of West Africa creates direct and
indirect threats to the safety of seafarers. For this reason, it is important that all maritime
crime is addressed. This Guidance focuses on maritime crime that causes a direct threat
to seafarers, armed (and unarmed) robbery, including cargo theft, hijacking of vessels and
kidnapping.
The likelihood of attack further offshore is higher during the inter-monsoon season
(September-March). Attacks can take place at any time – day or night. However, more
seafarers have been kidnapped during the hours of darkness.
Attacks on Vessels
Attacks occur close to shore, in rivers and in ports; however, attacks have been reported over
200Nm from the coast.
Attacks on vessels vary significantly in their form. Attacks for theft may involve just a
few individuals. However, an attack on a vessel where the intention is the kidnapping of
seafarers and/or offloading cargo from tankers may involve a large number of heavily armed
individuals. Different types of vessels are used during attacks, these include fast small
craft, fishing vessels and small merchant vessels. Whilst most attacks on ships at anchor
off ports occur at night, many of the attacks further out to sea occur during the day or
night. Ships at anchor, drifting or conducting ship-to-ship (STS) operations are particularly
vulnerable. Attacks against vessels underway may occur when proceeding at slow speed and
occasionally involve some form of deception to force the vessel to stop. If a mother ship is
used it will carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable attackers to operate over a
much larger area.
Attackers may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) during attacks; the
bridge and accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons. Attackers may
use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb up the
side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take control
of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable others to
board.
The objective of an attack varies. Kidnap for ransom is widespread. These kidnappings
have ranged from one seafarer to the entire crew of a ship. Seafarers are held in distressful,
unsanitary conditions lacking adequate medical support, which has resulted in sickness and
sometimes death.
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Cases of armed robbery at sea
involve the theft of cargo, valuables and the destruction
of navigation and communication equipment; sometimes they are opportunistic but are
carefully planned. A hijack will typically last several days whilst the vessel is moved around
outside the jurisdiction of the coastal states. During this time the vessel may be moved to a
number of rendezvous points to enable STS transfers of cargo.
Experience has shown the crew of a vessel targeted for armed robbery at sea or cargo theft
are likely to be treated badly by perpetrators during an attack. Injuries are common and any
resistance shown to the attackers may lead to an escalation of violence.
The capability of military and law enforcement forces to respond to incidents of armed
robbery at sea, hijacking and kidnapping in the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is improving,
but remains limited. Only a few countries provide or allow Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA),
Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) for merchant
vessels within their EEZ and/or territorial waters.
Other maritime security concerns are outlined at annex E.
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Section 3
Threat and risk assessment
Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional maritime security threats.
As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the VRA the latest regional
threat advice can be obtained from the Interregional Coordination Centre, MDAT-GoG, the
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and commercial providers.
A
threat
is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.
Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is
demonstrated by continued attacks or by good intelligence. Opportunity is what is
mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described
in this Guidance. In addition to the information provided in this Guidance, supplementary
information about the characteristics of the specific threat or new tactics, and regional
background factors may be sought from regional reporting centres and organisations as
listed in annex A.
If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot
influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the
opportunity.
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Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system.
The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which
will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures.
Further guidance on risk assessments can be found at
www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org
The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to:
•
The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk.
•
Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers.
•
Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection
Detachments (VPDs).
•
The ship’s characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/
or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement, etc).
•
The ship’s and company’s procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision
making processes, etc).
•
Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic
patterns and local patterns of life,
including fishing vessel activity.
•
Cooperation with military.
All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available
information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed
threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.
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Section 4
Planning
Company planning
Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship’s
voyage plan:
•
Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary.
•
Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel
Hardening Plan (VHP).
•
Guidance to the Master about the recommended route and any rendezvous requirements.
•
Due diligence of companies providing security services.
•
Guidance on using a SAA, SEV and any transfer to terminal security.
•
Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM).
•
Companies should consider using hidden position transmitting devices as hijackers
will often attempt to disable all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials
straight away.
•
Review of company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non- essential crew
and families prior to sailing to areas of high security risk.
•
Crew training plans.
Information security
To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands, the following is advised:
•
Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention
paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions.
•
Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where
possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep voyage critical
information to a minimum.
•
Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and
information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually
required.
•
Reminding crew of the dangers of posting voyage related information on social media.
STS Operations
•
Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location of STS operations.
Offshore Terminals
•
Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location
of Offshore
Terminals.
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Ship Master’s planning
Security is a key part of any voyage plan.
Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area
•
Obtain the latest threat information.
•
Check the latest NAVAREA warnings, alerts and the Inmarsat SafetyNet broadcasts.
•
Implement VRA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in section 6
and annex D.
•
If security services are used, confirm arrangements with the Private Maritime Security
Companies (PMSC).
•
If used, rendezvous position and communication plan for Security Escort Vessels.
•
Contingency plans if security services do not arrive or cannot meet operational
requirements.
•
Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.
•
Implement security measures in accordance with the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
Brief crew and conduct drills
Crews should be made aware of the threat, risk and consequences along with available
resources to cope. Good practice guides can be found at
https://www.seafarerswelfare.
org/resources
The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with
the Ship Protection Measures (SPM) in place. The plan should be reviewed, and all crew
briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear
situation and the appropriate response to each. The drills should test:
•
The SPM, including testing the security of all access points.
•
Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
•
The bridge team’s security knowledge and crew awareness.
•
The crew’s understanding of required action in the event of an attack.
On entering the VRA
•
Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annex D.
•
Update and monitor latest threat information.
•
Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
•
Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where
possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep ship, crew, cargo
and voyage-critical information to a minimum.
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Other considerations
•
Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an
emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers
(see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed
near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel.
Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.
•
Define the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS
should remain switched on throughout passages in the VRA to ensure reporting centres
and militaries can track the ship but restrict the data to ship’s identity, position, course,
speed, navigational status and safety related information.
•
Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit through areas
identified in the risk assessment and have all equipment ready in the event of attack.
Location and Time at Anchor
•
Keep time at anchor to a minimum.
•
Anchor watch to be maintained.
•
Avoid setting patterns.
•
Consider use of “secure anchorage areas” operated by some countries in the region. More
information is contained in local Notice to Mariners or Admiralty Charts.
•
Vessels are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor or carrying out
STS transfer, Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) operations or slowing down for pilot transfer.
Coordinated Arrival
Many vessels wait
offshore and transit at high speed to arrive at any rendezvous point ‘Just
in Time’ including STS and/or Offshore Terminals. Some vessels tender a virtual Notice of
Readiness (NOR) whilst staying safely offshore, and both are accepted practice for many
vessels operating in the GoG.
Planning considerations for vessels permanently operating inside the VRA
Marine operations in the GoG region are diverse, covering many areas of activity including:
•
Offshore supply.
•
Diving & RoV Support.
•
MODU/MOU.
•
Pipe laying.
•
Fishing vessels.
•
Passenger vessels and ferries.
•
Recreation craft.
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In general, maritime security considerations for vessels permanently operating in the region
are not dissimilar to those for vessels visiting the region, its ports and harbours.
There is no set pattern to the location of attacks against vessels based and operating in the
region, but it should be assumed criminals are aware of the regular transit routes to
offshore
installations, STS and ship waiting areas, fishing grounds and scheduled ferry routes.
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Section 5
Ship Protection Measures
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on
regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.
When considering SPM it is important to recognise that ships may be subject to attack whilst
underway or stationary. Ships are especially vulnerable when at anchor or when carrying
out STS or SBM operations.
A Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) can ensure vessels are prepared for operations in areas of
increased threat and ought to be considered as part of voyage preparation. The requirement
for a VHP should be defined within the company management procedures for security. The
Company
Security Officer (CSO) should be responsible for the plan, with the Master and
Ship Security Officer (SSO) reviewing the contents before transit or operation within known
security risk areas.
The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process and
clearly marked on the VHP. Companies may wish to consider making further alterations
to the ship beyond the scope of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or
personnel as a means of further reducing the risk of attack.
Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance
Primary layer of defence
Good lookout/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
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The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board:
•
Provide additional, fully briefed lookouts.
•
Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position. During STS operations there is a
tendency for members of the crew to be looking “in” not “out”.
•
Enhanced vigilance may be required for exposed fender and mooring stations where SPM
have been removed.
•
Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts.
•
Maintain
sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
•
Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable
all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
•
Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational safety warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
•
Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give
the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
•
Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can
deter approaches from the stern.
•
Consider mounting anti-piracy mirrors on
the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.
•
The accommodation and pilot ladders, if
rigged, should be kept at main deck level
and lowered when required only.
•
When in port:
— Access to the vessel must be
controlled.
— Regular security rounds should be
conducted.
•
Ensure the crew, especially those assigned to Security Duties are well rested.
A proper lookout is the most effective method of ship protection.
It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, which
allows defences to be deployed.
Manoeuvring
The Master and Officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with
the ship’s handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres
while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can
defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as the effect of hydrostatic pressure between
vessels can have a better defensive impact than speed.
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Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker that
the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship’s whistle may
distract the attackers.
It is important that:
•
The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
•
Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack and
indicating ‘all clear’.
•
All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck PA
system, where fitted.
•
Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The drill will
confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.
Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make
it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access
to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb. When planning the placement of barriers,
special consideration should be given to ships with sunken poop decks.
Razor wire
Razor wire creates an effective barrier only if properly rigged and secured. The quality of
razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The following is
recommended:
•
Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is
difficult to cut with hand tools.
•
Use a double roll. If this is not possible,
place a single high-quality roll outboard of
the ship’s structure.
•
Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to
prevent attackers pulling the wire off. For
example, attach at least every third wire
ring to ship’s railings and rig a steel cable
through its core.
•
Use personal protective equipment and
wire hooks to move and install razor wire.
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•
Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g.
10m, so that it is easier and safer to move.
•
Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads
when at terminals so that it does not
interfere with mooring operations or chafe
mooring ropes.
Other physical barriers
Other barriers have proven
effective –
from hanging swinging obstacles over
the gunwales to specifically designed
overhanging protection that prevents
boarding by climbing over the ship’s rails.
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Water spray and foam monitors
•
The use of water spray and/or foam
monitors
is effective in deterring or
delaying any attempt to illegally board a
ship. The use of water can make it difficult
for an unauthorised boat to remain
alongside and makes it significantly more
difficult to climb aboard.
•
It is recommended hoses and foam
monitors (delivering water) are fixed in
position to cover likely access routes and
are remotely operated. Manual activation is
not recommended as this may place the
operator in an exposed position.
•
Improved water coverage may be
achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode
and using baffle plates fixed a short
distance in front of the nozzle.
•
Water cannons deliver water in a vertical
sweeping arc and protect a greater part of
the hull.
•
Water spray rails with spray nozzles
produce a water curtain covering larger
areas.
•
Foam can be used, but it must be in
addition to a ship’s standard firefighting
equipment stock. Foam is disorientating
and very slippery.
•
The use of all available fire and general
service pumps may be required to ensure all defences operate efficiently.
•
Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be
ready for immediate use.
•
Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective
coverage of vulnerable areas.
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Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an
attack. In some situations, attackers direct
their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate
the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If
pirates board the ship, they usually make for
the bridge to enable them to take control.
The following enhancements may be
considered:
•
Bridge windows are laminated but further
protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast
resistant film.
•
Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates
for the side and rear bridge windows and
the bridge wing door windows, which can
be quickly secured in place in the event
of an attack, can greatly reduce the risk of
injury from fragmentation.
•
Chain link fencing can be used to reduce
the effects of an RPG.
•
Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly
checked to ensure that they have not degraded.
•
The vulnerability of bridge doors should be
considered. Any physical barrier should not
impede access to life saving appliances.
Control of access to accommodation
and machinery spaces
It is important to control access routes to the
accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed
at denying access to these spaces.
•
Escape routes must remain accessible to
seafarers in the event of an emergency.
•
Where the door or hatch is located on an
escape route from a manned compartment,
it is essential that it can be opened from the
inside. Where the door or hatch is locked,
it is essential that a means of opening the
door from the inside is available.
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•
Doors and hatches providing access to the
bridge, accommodation and machinery
spaces should be properly secured to
prevent them being opened from the
outside.
•
Once doors and hatches are secured, a
designated and limited number are used
for security patrols and routine access. The
use of these doors or hatches should be
controlled
by the Officer of the Watch.
•
Block external stairs or remove ladders on
the accommodation block to prevent use and to restrict external access to the bridge.
•
Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged
down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as
wire strops, may be used.
•
Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not
need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
•
Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of
steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
•
Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and storerooms
should be briefed to the crew.
•
The attackers must be denied access to
ship propulsion.
Safe muster points and/or citadels
The company risk assessment and planning
process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.
Experience shows these safe areas are
effective.
Safe muster points
A safe muster point is:
•
A designated area chosen to provide
maximum physical protection to the crew and will be identified during the planning
process.
•
An area where crew not required on the bridge or the engine room control room will
muster if the ship is under threat.
•
A short-term safe haven, which will provide protection should the attackers commence
firing weapons.
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Citadels
A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek
protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel
cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.
Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF)
must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can
offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not
replace, all other SPM.
The use of the citadel must be drilled and include a lockdown plan and procedures should
define the conditions and supporting logistics for its use.
It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before
boarding a ship:
•
All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
•
Two-way communication with the citadel.
Citadel Management
The decision to send the crew to the citadel rests with the Master of the vessel. When
considering the use of a citadel in the Gulf of Guinea it is important to consider how and
when the crew exit the citadel and regain control of the vessel once the perpetrators have
left. Experience has shown rescue forces are unlikely to arrive before the perpetrators have
left the vessel or may not arrive at all.
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Planning Considerations
•
If military or law enforcement do not respond to an incident, is a plan in place for exiting
the citadel?
•
To aid situational awareness on the vessel:
— A CCTV feed in the citadel can provide awareness of activity on the vessel.
— Transmit the vessel’s CCTV feed to Company HQ who can monitor and advise when
safe to leave the citadel.
— Ensure contact details for company, Flag State and MDAT-GoG are available in the
citadel.
The Master should decide when to use the citadel.
Other measures
Closed circuit television
Once an attack is underway
it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have gained
access to the ship. The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage allows a degree of
monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies
can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore, which will be of value when provided to the
military. The following should be considered:
•
CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge.
•
CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
•
CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.
Lighting
•
Lighting is important. The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter
pirates from entering or disorientate those who may already have entered. The following
is recommended:
Underway
•
At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited and remain on at all times.
•
If fitted, search lights should be ready for immediate use.
•
Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted,
should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s crew to see them.
At anchor
•
At anchor, lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.
•
Over side lighting should be kept on at all times during hours of darkness.
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Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment
It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the
ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure
location.
Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck
•
Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or
containers of flammable liquids.
•
Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to
transit.
Ship-to-Ship operations
•
For vessels involved in STS operations, attackers have boarded via the Yokohama
fenders. When rigging or tending fenders, razor wire may well interfere with operational
requirements.
•
The use of a chain link fence, particularly if topped with razor wire, attached to the ship’s
side rails and supplemented by stanchions in the vicinity of the Yokohama fenders
provides
an effective deterrent to potential boarders. Care must be taken at the interface
between the chain link fence and razor wire to ensure that the best possible protection is
assured.
•
The use of gratings, (particularly Glass Reinforced Plastic gratings for ease of fitting) may
be secured in way of open panama or roller fairleads which will further deter any potential
boarding.
•
An additional deterrent in the vicinity of Yokohama fenders, and ship’s fairleads could be
the use of water spray.
•
The hawse pipe should be properly secured to prevent unauthorised access. Use of the
anchor wash may also provide a deterrent.
•
The main engines should be kept at immediate notice so the Master has the option of
getting underway in the event of an incident.
•
Crew engaged in security duties should not be given other responsibilities.
Floating (Production) Storage & Offloading
(F(P)SO) – Security Measures
F(P)SOs and vessels supporting offshore facilities are vulnerable.
F(P)SO Maritime Safety Zone
Procedures for establishing a vessel safety zone surrounding the F(P)SO that is monitored
and continuously controlled for unauthorised vessel entry should be in place. These
procedures should include communication checkpoints, means for vessel identification/
validation prior approval for entry. UNCLOS article 60.5 should be referenced. Preferably, all
vessels approaching within 2NM are monitored and then communicated with/challenged/
validated prior to entering in 1NM of the Safety Zone.
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There should be means to continuously
monitor and detect vessels approaching the
F(P)SO’s Safety Zone. These may include:
•
A proper radar watch.
•
360 degree CCTV coverage of F(P)SO
surroundings with thermal imaging
target detection/alarming for night time
surveillance.
•
Dedicated security vessel(s) for continuous
patrol and surveillance.
F(P)SO Security Plan
The Security Plan should include:
•
Management roles, responsibilities and clearly defined actions taken for threat level and
escalation.
•
Compliance with measures to enhance maritime security as detailed in the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 (as amended) and Parts A/B of the
ISPS Code.
F(P)SOs not required to comply with the SOLAS and ISPS Code requirements should still
consider them when developing security plans.
F(P)SO Access Control
Procedures for controlling access should be established and should consider:
•
Induction/familiarisation briefing.
•
Designation and marking of areas restricted to authorised personnel.
•
System for monitoring physical control and access barriers.
•
Identity verification of F(P)SO personnel, contractors, vessel staff
and visitors.
•
Personnel safety and security requirement briefings.
F(P)SO Perimeter Detection Systems
Perimeter and access points from the water such as boat landings and stair towers, as
well as vulnerable areas such as mooring chain fairleads, tanker hawser and marine hose
connections and riser porches should be equipped with threat detection and deterrent
equipment such as:
•
360 degree perimeter lighting.
•
CCTV coverage with thermal imaging target detection/alarming.
•
Electronic motion detection with visual and audible alarm.
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•
Depending on threat level – dedicated security person(s) posted to monitor and detect
threats by sight and or through threat detection equipment.
•
Search lighting (spotlights) capable of scanning 365 degrees of F(P)SO’s surrounding
waters. Spot light control can be locally but preferably controlled remotely.
F(P)SO Barriers
Perimeter
Vulnerable access points should be equipped
with physical hard barriers such as:
•
Security fencing and hard bars.
•
Razor or concertina wire.
Accommodation, Control Room and
Machinery Spaces
Hard barriers for access points including
port holes/window glass may include:
•
Doors without windows being internally
secured.
•
Personnel access points being limited to
single point of entry and secured during
night time operations.
•
All windows/port holes secured to prevent
access if glass can be broken.
•
All cargo and machinery hatches locked internally and easy to unlock in an emergency.
F(P)SO Citadel
F(P)SOs should have a centralised, hardened safe haven (citadel). The citadel should be:
•
A hardened room that prevents penetration by small firearms and forceful entry.
•
Big enough to safely accommodate all personnel on board.
•
Free of dangerous fire suppression systems (CO2).
•
Equipped with internal and external communications.
•
Supplied with water, medical and toilet facilities.
•
Able to access security CCTV and F(P)SO Emergency Shut Down and emergency systems
controls.
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Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
PMSCs may offer security services and the provision of Security Escort Vessels (SEVs).
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of a PMSC or the use of SEVs. This is
a decision taken by individual ship operators after carrying out a thorough risk assessment
and in conjunction with permissions from the ship’s Flag State, the hull and cargo insurance,
P&I club and any littoral states.
Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider:
•
Coastal state legislation and law enforcement practices.
•
The threat and risk environment.
•
The output of the company risk assessment.
•
Voyage plan requirements.
•
Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
•
Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.
Security Escort Vessels
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of SEVs to accompany merchant
ships; this is a decision taken by individual ship operators.
A contract for the provision of SEVs must:
•
Not prejudice the ship’s insurance cover arrangements.
•
Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the
requirements of the contract.
•
Ensure the PMSC can legally operate the SEV in accordance with coastal state law.
•
Ensure the SEV is fit for purpose.
Experience has shown some providers operate substandard SEVs. Therefore, any decision to
engage the services of SEVs should consider the guidance above for PMSC as well ensuring
the vessel operator:
•
Has a robust quality assurance programme;
•
A robust maintenance programme and;
•
A record of inspection.
Companies should check the credentials and licences/
permits of the PMSC.
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Operating with Security Escort Vessels
•
The escort plan, RV position and
communication arrangements should be
agreed in advance.
•
Planning should consider that SEVs may
have operating restrictions.
•
Regular communication should be
maintained.
•
The SEV will be positioned to defend
the vessel at all times and be reactive to
intercept any approaching suspicious
craft.
•
Authorisation to use force rests with the
military detachment onboard the SEV.
•
The Master/Bridge Crew can aid the SEV
with early detection and warning.
•
SEV should not enter any designated oil
terminal exclusion zone.
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Section 6
Reporting
All ships using the VRA are strongly encouraged to inform MDAT-GoG of their movement
as this is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond.
Once ships have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the
guidelines in this section and annex D are adopted to ensure common understanding.
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing
liaison with military forces in the region. MDAT-GoG administers the Voluntary Reporting
Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These
include:
1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
2. Daily reports (update on ship’s position, course and speed).
3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).
MDAT-GoG is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate
Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:
•
Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and
with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct MDAT-GoG to-ship telephone calls to
all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
•
Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/ reports that are
relevant within the region.
MDAT-GoG
offers regular information to ships on its website
https://gog-mdat.org/home
and in a weekly report summarising the previous week’s activity. MDAT-GoG can offer
Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage
planning in the region. Companies interested in this can make contact on a dedicated
exercise line; +33 298 221302.
Ships and their operators should submit vessel position
reporting forms to MDAT-GoG.
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The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the
region
Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger
seafarers, there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security.
Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law
enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help.
Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible.
If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot
data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is
any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.
Reporting suspicious activity to MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG and the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) can advise on the types of
activity of interest to the regional maritime community. A guide to help identify suspicious
activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular activity report is in annex D. Often,
seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may be concerned observations could
lead to further investigations by Port States and possible delay to the ship. Suspicious
activity/attack reports should be sent to MDAT-GoG at the earliest opportunity, to allow
assistance to be sought.
MDAT-GoG will forward information received in an anonymised form to the most appropriate
agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear inconsequential, when
added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.
Reporting specific vessel sightings and/or activity as requested to
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG may seek the assistance of vessels reporting to the centre to try to locate
specific ships. These are usually vessels that cannot be found on electronic systems
such as AIS. Sometimes the request for information will come directly from MDAT-GoG
when, for example, a vessel may have been hijacked and its whereabouts unknown. On
other occasions MDAT-GoG may be requested to assist in locating a vessel or seek further
information on a vessel by INTERPOL, when an INTERPOL “Purple Notice” has been issued.
When MDAT-GoG is seeking further information on a vessel it will contact vessels reporting to
it in the VRA for support.
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Section 7
Ships under attack
General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning.
Effective lookouts, both visual and
radar, will help to ensure early detection.
Mother ships
Mother ships have been used in the GoG acting as a base to launch and resupply pirate skiff
operations. Mother ships can vary in vessel type and have included offshore supply vessels,
fishing vessels or other smaller merchant vessels. Caution must be taken when detecting
merchant ships drifting in the area.
Piracy or armed robbery attacks
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g.
within two cables.
Use whatever time is available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective
measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the
ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.
In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt,
call MDAT-GoG without delay.
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Approach stage
Effective lookouts, using all available means,
will aid in the early identification of an
approaching threat. The nature and intention
of the suspicious vessel will only become
apparent as it approaches.
In all cases, the following steps should be
taken:
•
Sound the emergency alarm and make an
attack announcement, in accordance with
the ship’s emergency communication plan.
•
Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a
distress message via the Digital Selective
Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as
applicable.
•
Activate the SSAS.
•
If not already at full speed, increase to
maximum to open the distance.
•
Steer a straight course to achieve
maximum speed quickly.
•
Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.
•
Activate the emergency communication
plan.
Report the attack immediately to MDAT-GoG
by telephone +33 298 228888 and email
[email protected]
•
Ensure the AIS is switched on.
•
Activate water spray.
•
Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins are
fully secured.
•
All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine room should muster at the safe muster
point or citadel as instructed by the Master.
•
When sea and navigational conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an
approaching skiff’s exposure to wind/waves.
•
Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker
that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
•
Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording and the data saved.
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Attack stage
As the attackers get close to the ship, the
following steps should be taken:
•
Reconfirm all ship’s crew are in the safe
muster point or citadel as instructed by the
Master.
•
Report the attack immediately to
MDAT-GoG +33 298 228888
by telephone.
•
As the attackers close in on the ship,
Masters should commence small
alterations of helm whilst maintaining
speed to deter
skiffs from lying alongside
the ship in preparation for a boarding
attempt. These manoeuvres will create
additional wash to impede the operation
of the skiffs.
•
Large amounts of helm are not
recommended, as these are likely to
significantly reduce a ship’s speed.
•
SEV if present, will conduct themselves as
governed by their rules of engagement.
Actions on illegal boarding
If the ship is boarded, the following actions
should be taken:
•
Take all way off the ship and then stop the
engines.
•
Muster the crew in the citadel or safe
muster point.
•
Use all available means to establish
communications from the citadel with
MDAT-GoG and company to confirm all
crew are accounted for and in the citadel
or safe muster point.
•
Stay in the citadel until conditions force
you to leave or as advised by the military
or company.
•
If any member of the crew is captured it
should be considered that the attackers
have full control of the ship.
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If control of the ship is lost
All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their
hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.
Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
DO
be patient.
DO
keep mentally active/occupied.
DO
keep track of time.
DO
reduce stress where possible by remaining physically
active.
DO
remain calm and retain dignity.
DO
be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly
to release you).
DO
remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices
running.
DO
exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their
instruction.
DO
eat and drink when offered.
DO
take essential medical supplies if moved ashore.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
attempt to engage attackers.
DO NOT
make movements which could be misinterpreted as
being aggressive.
DO NOT
be confrontational.
DO NOT
resist.
Kidnap and ransom
One reason for attacking
a ship off West Africa is to remove the crew ashore for ransom.
Each company or organisation should have measures in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.
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If kidnapped
DO NOT
offer resistance.
DO NOT
argue with pirates or your colleagues.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
hide valuables.
DO NOT
react emotionally.
DO NOT
take drugs or alcohol.
DO NOT
bargain with pirates for personal privileges.
In the event of military intervention
On receipt of information involving an attack or attempted attack
on a vessel or offshore
platform, the MDAT-GoG/Regional reporting Centres/IMB PRC will immediately inform all
relevant regional and national Maritime Operation Centres who may respond if the incident
is within their area of jurisdiction and authority.
Reporting Centres do not have inherent response capability or the ability or mandate
to coordinate any response activity, especially inside a nation’s territorial waters. This
is the responsibility of the national authority with jurisdiction in the area. On the high
seas, activities may be coordinated by national authorities. For this reason, reporting any
suspicious/attempted or actual approach/attacks immediately to MDAT-GoG/Regional
reporting Centres/IMB PRC, using all available means, is important.
Advance warning of military or law enforcement intervention may be difficult without
detection and may add pressure on the crew. If the onset of military or law enforcement
action is suspected, the following should be considered:
Brief and prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and
instruct the crew as follows:
DO
keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
DO
keep hands visible.
DO
be prepared to be challenged on your identity.
DO
cooperate fully with military forces.
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DO NOT
make movements that could be interpreted as
aggressive.
DO NOT
take photographs.
DO NOT
get involved in activity with military forces unless
specifically instructed to.
Post incident actions and reporting
A difficult period may follow an attack, as companies, Master and crew recover from the
ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments and
care, both physical and mental, following an attack or hostage situation. Companies should
have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects of an attack from any
of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the management
of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the families of the
kidnapped crew.
To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is
important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew
should refer to IMO
Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence
A28/Res. 1091 and
other industry guidance.
Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital
that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company,
the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and
comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity.
Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the
incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Protection of evidence
The collection and protection of evidence is critical.
The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency
arrives by following these basic principles:
•
Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible.
•
Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch
and leave items in place.
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•
Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no
matter how unimportant it may seem.
•
Take initial statements from the crew.
•
Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints.
•
Protect VDR for future evidence.
•
Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers).
•
Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement
authorities.
•
Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
Investigation
The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will
significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.
Following any attack or incident, the investigating authority will be determined by external
factors including:
•
Flag State.
•
Ownership.
•
Crew nationality.
Thorough investigation using all available
evidence is critical.
The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the
sequence and circumstances of the event.
In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release
crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.
Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as
victims of crime.
Advice
INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their
ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps
to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a
Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188 member countries
faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of
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INTERPOL’s
official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours
a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL as soon as
possible and certainly within three days of a hijacking of their ship.
INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss recommended practices for the preservation of
evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. Contact
details are:
[email protected];
+33 472 44 7676.
Seafarer welfare
Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or even
recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The company
should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy and
other maritime security threats and, if necessary, provide independent support and other
assistance, as may be appropriate. There are a range of humanitarian programmes aimed
at assisting seafarers and their families affected by piracy or maritime crime, including the
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See
www.seafarerswelfare.org
and
www.missiontoseafarers.org
After care of seafarers suffering violent attack is important and
should not be neglected.
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Annex A
Contact details
Emergency contacts
MDAT-GoG
Email
Telephone (24hrs)
Website
[email protected]
+33 298 228888
https://gog-mdat.org/home
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Email
[email protected]
Telephone
Fax
Telex
Website
+60 3 2031 0014
+60 3 2078 5769
MA34199 IMBPC1
www.icc-ccs.org
Useful contacts
INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre
Email
[email protected]
Telephone (24hrs)
Website
+33 472 44 76 76
www.interpol.int
Yaoundé Principal Centres
ICC
Email
Telephone
[email protected]
+237 696281947
+237 222217529
(From Monday to Friday, 0830 hours to 1800 (local)
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ANGOLA
Luanda Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC)
Email
[email protected]
Telephone
+244 2 2239 1399
+ 244 2 2233 0430
LIBERIA
Monrovia Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination
Centre (RMRCC)
[email protected]
Email
IOR INMARSAT C Terminal One
AOR-E INMARSAT C Terminal Two
INMARSAT Satellite Phone (EXPLORER 710)
INMARSAT Satellite Phone (EXPLORER 700)
International Landline
International Cellular & SMS
Safety & Security Coordination
#463728971
#463728972
#+870772700138
#+870772700139
#(+231) 777 092229
#(+231) 777 290158
VHF/DSC CH 16 (Distress)
CH 09 (Ship/Shore)
CH 14
Maritime Security (RMRCC & Liberia CG)
Monrovia covers the territorial waters of Liberia and her neighbouring countries
– Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire
MOROCCO
Rabat Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC)
Email
[email protected]
Telephone Emergency
Other
+ 212 5 37 625877
+ 212 5 37 625897
Rabat covers the territorial waters of Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea
Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde
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NIGERIA
Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(RMRCC)/C4I Centre
Email
[email protected]
Telephone (24hrs)
+234 (1) 730 6618, +234 (1) 7053794383
The RMRCC Lagos covers nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São
Tomé & Príncipe and Togo). The RMRCC is collocated with the Nigerian Deep
Blue Project C4I Centre.
SOUTH AFRICA
Cape Town Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC)
[email protected]
Email
Telephone
+ 27 21 938 3300 / + 27 21 938 3309
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance
Network (ISWAN)
[email protected]
Email
Telephone
Website
+44(0) 300 012 4279
www.seafarerswelfare.org
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Annex B
Maritime security charts
Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the
planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the
UK Hydrographic
Office (UKHO) ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date and
verified information available.
The Security Chart for West Africa is the latest version of UKHO Chart Q6114 or SHOM Chart
8801CSD.
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Each maritime security chart includes:
•
Information about dangers to the security of navigation. This information, when used
alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew and
cargo.
•
General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional
contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or
security forces.
Yaoundé Code of Conduct (CoC)
The Yaoundé CoC is an agreement between nations from West and Central Africa with
an intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of transnational
organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal activities.
Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety & Security Space
The Economic Community, ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC agreed on a MoU to implement the
regional maritime strategy within the Central and African common maritime space. This
agreement created a number of Maritime Zones covering the overseen by an Interregional
Coordination Centre in Cameroon responsible for cooperation, coordination, pooling, and
interoperability of community assets.
Map courtesy of one earth FUTURE
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Annex C
Common understanding
It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious
activity.
The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes
suspicious activity:
Attacks
•
The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence.
•
Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates or other unauthorised persons.
•
If weapons are fired.
•
An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
•
Attempts to overcome the SPM using:
— Ladders
— Grappling hooks or other boarding equipment
Suspicious activity
•
The number of crew onboard an approaching
skiff relative to its size.
•
The Closest Point of Approach.
•
The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing
hooks or large amounts of fuel.
•
One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard.
•
The type of vessel is unusual for the current location.
•
Small boats operating at high speed.
•
If a vessel appears unmanned.
•
The vessel is not transmitting on AIS.
•
Skiffs operating far from the coast.
•
Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones.
•
Windows of vessel covered or blanked out.
•
Skiffs rafted up.
•
No lights during hours of darkness.
•
Skiffs with two or more outboard motors.
•
Skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing.
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•
Packages hanging outboard of a vessel.
•
Excessive communications antennas.
This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious
by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences
within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community.
If in doubt, contact MDAT-GoG & REPORT!
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Annex D
MDAT-GoG reporting forms
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting forms
Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, MDAT-GoG will request
daily reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port/anchorage or upon exiting the VRA,
MDAT-GoG will request a final report. The following forms are provided below and can be
requested by email to
[email protected]
•
Initial report.
•
Daily report.
•
Final report.
•
Suspicious/irregular activity report.
•
Follow Up Report.
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – initial report
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Ship Name
Flag
Call sign and IMO Number
INMARSAT Telephone Number
MMSI Number
Time
Position
Course
Speed
Maximum Speed
Freeboard
Cargo
Destination and estimated time of arrival
Name and contact details of the CSO
Nationality of Master and crew
Will Security Services be used?
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MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ship Name
Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Ship’s Position
Ship’s Course and Speed
Any other important information*
Date/time leaving VRA if applicable
*Preferred time for transmitting the daily report is 1200UTC.
*Other important information could be change of destination or ETA etc.
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – final report
1
2
3
4
Ship’s name
Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Port or anchorage position when leaving the voluntary reporting area
MDAT-GoG suspicious/irregular activity report
1
2
3
4
5
6
Own ship’s name
Own ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
Time of Report in UTC
Own ship’s Position
Own ship’s Course and Speed
Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and
activity witnessed
Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.
Threats to Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea are complex and often result in harm
to seafarers. Masters are encouraged to report any signs of suspicious activity.
Follow-up report to MDAT-GoG and IMB PRC
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to MDAT-GoG and the IMB. The appropriate and relevant information from an
incident will be used to support INTERPOL and regional law enforcement investigations.
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General Details
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Name of Ship:
IMO No:
Flag:
Call Sign:
Type of Ship:
Tonnages:
NRT:
Owner (Address & Contact Details):
Manager (Address & Contact Details):
Last Port/Next Port:
Cargo Details (Type/Quantity):
GRT:
DWT:
Details of Incident
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
48
Date & Time of Incident: LT
Position: Lat:
(N/S) Long:
Nearest Land Mark/Location:
Port/Town/Anchorage Area:
Country/Nearest Country:
Status (Berth/Anchored/Steaming):
Own Ship’s Speed:
Ship’s Freeboard During Attack:
UTC
(E/W)
Weather During Attack (Rain/Fog/Mist/Clear/etc, Wind (Speed and
Direction), Sea/Swell Height):
Types of Attack (Boarded/Attempted/Other):
Consequences for Crew, Ship and Cargo: Any Crew Injured/Killed:
Items/Cash Stolen:
Area of the Ship Attacked:
Last Observed Movements of Suspect Craft:
Type of Suspicious vessel (Fishing Vessel, Merchant Vessel):
Description of Suspicious vessel (Colour, Name, Distinguishing Features):
Course and Speed of Suspicious vessel when sighted:
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Details of Attackers (if applicable)
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Number of Attackers:
Dress/Physical Appearance:
Language Spoken:
Weapons Used:
Distinctive Details:
Craft Used:
Method of Approach:
Duration of Attack:
Aggressive/Violent:
Further Details
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Action Taken by Master and Crew
and its effectiveness:
Was Incident Reported to the Coastal Authority? If so to whom?
Preferred Communications with Reporting Ship: Appropriate Coast Radio
Station/HF/MF/VHF/INMARSAT IDS (Plus Ocean Region Code)/ MMSI
Action Taken by the Authorities:
Number of Crew/Nationality:
Please Attach with this Report – A Brief Description/Full Report/Master
– Crew Statement of the Attack/Photographs taken if any.
Details of Ship Protection Measures.
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Annex E
Other maritime security threats
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
IUU fishing is a significant problem in West Africa. Illegal catches have a detrimental
effect on
economic development and fish stocks. IUU threatens to contaminate the supply chain and
potentially prevent the legitimate export of products to the international market.
IUU fishing in the VRA involves extensive use of fraudulently issued licenses, as well as
blatant unlicensed fishing and illegal trans-shipping between purse seiners and reefers at
sea.
It is important for the mariner to understand how the fishing vessels that have been involved
in criminal activity directly affect seafarers on other vessels. Fishing vessels have, on a
number of occasions, been used to facilitate attacks on other vessels. It is also recognised
that fishing vessels are occasionally used in smuggling activities and have been involved in
the receipt of stolen bunker fuel by at sea STS.
For mariners to understand what suspicious fishing vessel activity is, it is important to be
familiar with normal fishing activity. More information on normal fishing activity is available
on the MDAT-GoG website.
Trafficking in narcotics
Trafficking of narcotics refers to the global illicit trade of illegal drugs. Maritime routes
through the waters off Africa’s western seaboard are used as a staging post to traffic cocaine
and heroin between the sites of production to the main consumer markets. West Africa is
regarded as an important waypoint for traffickers because of inconsistent law enforcement
and the increasing production of illegal drugs within the region itself.
Narcotics transiting the VRA are often transported without the knowledge of the ship’s
owner, operator or Master on internationally trading vessels, in sealed containers that are
supposed to be carrying legitimate cargo. Container vessels may unknowingly transport
cocaine from producers in South America to Western and Southern Africa, from there it is
transported to consumers in Europe. Recent seizures of heroin at port and at sea in West
Africa are indicative of the growing use of maritime trafficking routes between production
sites in Central and South-East Asia and markets in North America. While transshipment of
some narcotics has been reduced by successful intervention and legal action, the movement
of large quantities of cocaine gives authorities cause for concern with an increase in
quantities seized from shipping containers in West Africa.
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Illegal drugs are also moved by much smaller vessels for transshipment or cross decking to
other craft for onward conveyance.
The responsibility to disrupt drug trafficking
operations in West Africa rests with law
enforcement in the region. The shipping industry can support interdiction efforts by
remaining alert to and reporting suspicious activity to the MDAT-GoG who are able to inform
the appropriate authorities.
Human smuggling, trafficking and Stowaways
The smuggling and trafficking of persons are distinct crimes, but closely linked. Human or
migrant smuggling involves the illegal movement of willing and thus complicit persons over
an international border. Trafficking of persons does not necessarily involve the crossing
of an international border and, unlike human smuggling, involves an element of force,
coercion or fraud; people being trafficked are the victims, rather than complicit in the crime.
Should a person be smuggled into a country they can become a victim of trafficking through
subsequent exploitation.
The trafficking or smuggling of illegal migrants along maritime routes often involves the
use of unsafe and crowded vessels, which drastically increases the risk of an incident at
sea. Guidance from the IMO is that the shipping industry should be ready to provide all
possible assistance to persons in distress at sea, so that they can be rescued and receive fair
treatment once safely ashore. This principle is enshrined in international law.
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Annex F
Additional guidance for vessels
engaged in fishing
This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national
fishing industry associations:
• OPAGAC
– Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores.
• ANABAC
– Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.
Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones
•
Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified
boats.
•
If polyester
skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at
full speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.
•
Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine- room watch.
•
During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar
watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in
progress.
•
While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent
the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are
waiting.
•
If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the
engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights.
•
The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up.
•
Keep away from unidentified ships.
•
Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more
difficult.
•
Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate
identification and tracking.
Identification
•
Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MDAT-
GoG for the whole period of activity off the West Coast of Africa. This should include
communicating a full list of the crewmen on board and their vessels’ intentions, if
possible.
•
Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.
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•
Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their
manager should provide MDAT-GoG with access to VMS data.
•
Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from
any international or national anti-piracy operation.
•
Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification
request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make
escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).
In case of attack
•
In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (MDAT-GoG,
CRESMAC and CRESMAO) and the rest of the fleet.
•
Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land)
whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.
•
Recommendations
only for Purse Seiners:
— Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow’s nest.
— If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out,
encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine
is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the
gear to avoid misunderstanding.
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Annex G
Additional advice for leisure craft,
including yachts
Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to
determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on
both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close
contact should be maintained with MDAT-GoG throughout any voyage.
See the International Sailing Federation (www.sailing.org) for the most up-to-date
information.
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Annex H
Definitions
and abbreviations
Definitions
The following terms/definitions to categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that
are reported from shipping inside the VRA may be useful and ensures the consistent
identification of patterns and trends.
Armed robbery
The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:
•
Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other
than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic
waters and territorial sea.
•
Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
Hijack
A hijack is where attackers have boarded and taken control of a ship against the
crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same motive (armed robbery, cargo theft or
kidnapping).
Illegal boarding
An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT
taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the
citadel scenario.
Maritime Safety Zone
A safety zone is an area extending out from any part
of an offshore
oil and gas installation (typically 500m) and is established automatically around all
installations which project above the sea at any state of the tide. These safety zones are
500m radius from a central point.
Piracy
This is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide
clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent
assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.
The following may assist in assessing a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but is not
limited to:
•
The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
•
Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
•
An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
•
Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
— Ladders.
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— Grappling hooks.
— Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
Suspicious or aggressive approach
Action taken by another craft may be deemed
suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):
•
A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by
the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
•
Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance,
not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
•
Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
UNCLOS 60.5
The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account
applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they
are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or
structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each
point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international standards
or as recommended by the competent international organization. Due notice shall be given
of the extent of safety zones.
UNCLOS 101
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Abbreviations
AIS
CRESMAC
CRESMAO
CSO
DSC
DSV
Automatic Identification System
Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Central Africa
(Pointe Noire)
Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Western Africa (Abidjan)
Company
Security Officer
Digital Selective Calling
Diving Support Vessel
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EEZ
FPSO
FSO
GCC
GoG
ICC
IMB
IMO
JWC
MSC
MDAT-GoG
MODU
MOU
PAG
PCASP
PMSC
ROV
RUF
SPM
SAA
SEV
SSA
SSAS
SSO
SSP
UNCLOS
VDR
VHP
VMS
VPD
VRA
Exclusive Economic Zone
Floating Production Storage
& Offloading
Floating Storage & Offloading
Gulf of Guinea Commission
Gulf of Guinea
Interregional Coordination Centre
International Maritime Bureau
International Maritime Organization
Joint War Committee
Maritime Safety Committee
Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
Mobile Offshore Unit
Pirate Action Group
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
Private Maritime Security Company
Remotely operated underwater vehicle
Rules for the Use of Force
Ship Protection Measures
Secure Anchorage Area
Security Escort Vessel
Ship Security Assessment
Ship Security Alert System
Ship Security Officer
Ship Security Plan
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Vessel Data Recorder
Vessel Hardening Plan
Vessel Monitoring System
Vessel Protection Detachment
Voluntary Reporting Area
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Annex I
Supporting organisations
BMP WA Signatories
BIMCO
BIMCO
is the world’s largest international shipping association, with around 2,000
members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world’s tonnage. Its global
membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit
organisation, BIMCO’s mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping,
providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to its members’
businesses.
www.bimco.org
CDI
The Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI)
was established in 1994 as a not for profit
Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format
to its members. The main objectives of CDI are to continuously improve the safety and
quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation
with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice
in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and
advice on industry best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and
storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost
effective systems
for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of
Distribution Management Practice.
www.cdi.org.uk
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CLIA
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
is the world’s largest cruise industry trade
association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of the global cruise community.
CLIA supports policies and practices that foster a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable
cruise ship environment for the more than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and
is dedicated to promote the cruise travel experience. The organisation’s mission is to be the
unified global organisation that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and
promoting for the common interests of the cruise community.
www.cruising.org
ICS
The
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
is the international trade association for
merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry
from
different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners’
associations representing over 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS
activity is the IMO, the United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety of life at sea
and the protection of the marine environment. ICS is heavily involved in a wide variety of
areas including any technical, legal and operational matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is
unique in that it represents the global interests of all the different trades in the industry: bulk
carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship operators
www.ics-shipping.org
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IFSMA
The
International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA)
was formed in 1974
by Eight National Shipmasters’ Associations to unite the World’s serving Shipmasters into
a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation
dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of
around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations
or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non-
governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and
protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters.
www.ifsma.org
IGP&I Clubs
Thirteen principal underwriting associations “the Clubs” comprise the
International
Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I).
They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for
approximately 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance
associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the
use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances,
wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their
members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role
in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties.
www.igpandi.org
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IMCA
The
International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA)
is a leading trade association
representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated
supply chain in the offshore
marine construction industry worldwide. It has a membership of 800 companies including
contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies and
numerous non- governmental organisations (NGOs).
www.imca-int.com
INTERCARGO
The
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO)
is representing
the interests of quality dry cargo shipowners. INTERCARGO convened for the first time in
1980 in London and has been participating with consultative status at the IMO since 1993.
INTERCARGO provides the forum where dry bulk shipowners, managers and operators
are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory challenges,
especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence. The Association
takes forward its Members’ positions to the IMO, as well as to other shipping and
international industry fora, having free and fair competition as a principle.
INTERCARGO is committed to safety and quality in ship operations, with a focus on
operational efficiency and the protection of the marine environment.
www.intercargo.org
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InterManager
InterManager
is the international trade association for the ship management industry
established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated
to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today’s global
shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the
ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats.
InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change.
An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at
international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account
within the worldwide maritime industry.
www.intermanager.org
IMEC
The
International Maritime Employers’ Council Ltd (IMEC)
is the only international
employers’ organisation dedicated to maritime industrial relations.
With offices in the
UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235 shipowners and managers,
covering some 8,000 ships with CBAs, which IMEC negotiates on behalf of its members within
the International Bargaining Forum (IBF).
IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in
the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training.
www.imec.org.uk
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ITF
The
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)
is an international trade union
federation of transport workers’ unions. Any independent trade union with members in the
transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers
since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000
are members
of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers
of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the
interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the
flag of their ship.
www.itfseafarers.org
www.itfglobal.org
INTERTANKO
INTERTANKO
is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum
where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO
has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy
that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.
www.intertanko.com
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IPTA
The
International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA)
was formed in 1987 to represent
the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an
established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel
tankers, being recognised
as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade organisations may liaise with
such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non- Governmental Organisation
to the IMO in 1997 and is wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and
monitor compliance with international maritime legislation.
www.ipta.org.uk
ISWAN
The
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN)
is an
international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers
worldwide. It is a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare
organisation as members. ISWAN works with a range of bodies including PandI Clubs,
shipping companies, ports, and governments. Its focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million
seafarers around the world.
ISWAN supports seafarers and their families who are
affected by piracy and its 24 hour
multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world.
www.seafarerswelfare.org
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Joint Hull Committee and Joint War
Committee
The
Joint Hull and Joint War Committees
comprise elected underwriting representatives
from both the Lloyd’s and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who
write marine hull and war business in the London market.
Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the
exposures they face through the owners’ use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers
will inform underwriters’ approach to risk and coverage.
The Mission to Seafarers
The Mission to Seafarers
is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing
200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers’ centres across 50 countries. In addition to its services
of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling
and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with
relevant professional services in a seafarer’s home country. The Mission to Seafarers runs
family support networks in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine
and India offering access to
education, training and medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to
support the creation of BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all
maritime personnel.
www.missiontoseafarers.org
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OCIMF
The
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
is a voluntary association of
oil companies with an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude oil, oil products,
petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF focuses exclusively on preventing harm to people and
the environment by promoting best practice in the design, construction and operation of
tankers, barges
and offshore vessels and their interfaces with terminals.
www.ocimf.org
Sailors’ Society
Sailors’ Society
is the world’s oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and
their families across the globe.
The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres
to building boats to get children safely to school.
Its renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia,
Europe and Africa with plans to extend further.
Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural
disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial
help for as long as needed.
www.sailors-society.org
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SIGTTO
The
Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
is the
international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience,
between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas
tankers and terminals.
To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works of
reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships with
other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including the IMO, to
better promote the safety and integrity of gas transportation and storage schemes.
www.sigtto.org
WSC
The
World Shipping Council (WSC)
is the trade association that represents the
international liner shipping industry. WSC’s member lines operate containerships, roll-
on/roll-off
vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of
the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of
the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually.
WSC’s goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with
policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the
world’s most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non- governmental
organisation at the IMO.
www.worldshipping.org
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Naval/military/governmental organisations
CISMAR
CISMAR
is the Integrated Maritime Security Center of Brazil. It aims to contribute to the
safety of maritime traffic
of interest to Brazil, meet commitments related to Naval Control of
Maritime Traffic and the Naval Doctrine Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping assumed by
the country, in addition to increasing maritime situational awareness.
Contact:
Email:
[email protected]
Telephone: +55 21 2104 6353/6337
Website:
https://www.marinha.mil.br/cismar/
IFC
The
Information Fusion Centre (IFC),
based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime
Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub covering most of the Indo-Pacific region. With
an integrated team comprising International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from more than 19
navies and coast guard; and personnel from the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the
IFC facilitates MARSEC information sharing and collaboration between its partners to cue
operational responses. Its linkages with more than 90 Operational Centres (OPCENs) from
navies, enforcement and maritime agencies in more than 40 countries, as well as linkages
with the shipping industry, provide IFC with maritime situational awareness and enables
collaboration beyond its Area of Interest.
The IFC collates and analyses MARSEC information to produce accurate, timely and
actionable products, which enables its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good
time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best
practices to the shipping industry.
Contacts
Email:
[email protected]
Telephone: +65 9626 8965 (hotline), +65 6594 5728 (office)
Website:
https://www.ifc.org.sg
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IMB PRC
Established in 1992, the
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)
is an independent, non-
governmental and not-for-profit organisation which provides the shipping industry with a
free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery attack occurring anywhere in the
world.
As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters and ship owners, all reported attacks are
immediately relayed to the most relevant government response agency seeking their
support to render assistance to the ship in distress. Inmarsat Safetynet broadcasts to ships
and alerts to CSOs via email are also sent out which help alert other seafarers and save lives
at sea.
www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre
INTERPOL
INTERPOL
has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy
and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who
have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can
be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the
integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law
enforcement agents pursuing an investigation.
MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email [email protected]
during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00).
Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL’s Command and
Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed
24 hours a day, 365 days a year and supports
INTERPOL’s 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational
assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol’s official languages (English, French,
Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email [email protected].
It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three days of a hijacking of
their ship.
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MDAT-GoG
Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG)
is a cooperation
centre between the Royal Navy (UKMTO) and the French Navy (MICA-Center) in support of
the Yaoundé Process. This centre has been in operation since June 2016. The primary output
from the MDAT-GoG is to contribute by maintaining coherent maritime situational awareness
in the central and western African Maritime areas, with the ability to inform and support
industry. It contributes to the safety and security of the Mariner in the regional maritime
domain.
NIMASA
The
Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)
is committed to
the enthronement of global best practices in the provision of maritime services in Nigeria.
Our areas of focus
include effective Maritime Safety Administration, Maritime Labour
Regulation, Marine Pollution Prevention and Control, Search and Rescue, Cabotage
enforcement, Shipping Development and Ship Registration, Training and Certification
of Seafarers, and Maritime Capacity Development. Using modern tools that guarantee
efficiency and effectiveness, we are determined to develop indigenous capacity and
eliminate all hindrance.
ICC-Gulf of Guinea-Yaoundé
The
Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC)
is the coordination and information-
sharing structure which connects the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Central Africa
(CRESMAC) and the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Western Africa (CRESMAO).
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MDAT-GoG
+33 298 228888