UUI, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 219: Spm. om ministeren har kendskab til denne sag og/eller rapporten? I bekræftende fald bedes ministeren redegøre for sit kendskab til hændelsen og forelægge rapporten for udvalget. Ministeren bedes ligeledes afklare, hvem der repræsenterer Danmark i Frontex’ bestyrelse, til udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2020-21
UUI Alm.del
Offentligt

Warsaw, 16/12/2020

Serious incident report no. 11860/2020

Report date and time (UTC)

Reporting person

Last modification date and time (UTC)

Last modification done by

SIR Status

FSC SIR Category

Type of SIR

Subject

Joint operation

JORA incident number

Original source of information

Frontex SIR Coordinator

Frontex resources involved

Incident dates (UTC)

Detection date (UTC)

Location of the incident

Latitude

Longitude

Reference to the operational area

Type of resources / involvement

Dead persons

Injured persons

Missing persons

Text removed (reference to operational area)

Yes

Danish HELO deployed to JO Poseidon 2020

DNK HELO CO/NO

HoS.OIS

Yes

2020-07-27 04:21

2020-07-29 09:36

Text removed (personal data)

2020-08-03 14:19

Text removed (personal data)

Ongoing

4 - Situations of alleged violations of Fundamental Rights or

international protection obligations

2 Formal SIR

Migrants detected in Greek territorial waters returned to Turkey

Poseidon 2020

Details

Fact of the case

• On 27.07.2020 at 06:21LT a Danish helicopter detected a

rubber boat with approx. 25 migrants south of Chios in Greek

territorial waters.

• Once the Hellenic Coast Guard arrived at the scene and took

over the incident, the Danish asset left the area.

• JRCC Piraeus informed MRCC Ankara.

• According to information provided by Greek Authorities, a

Turkish patrol boat took over the responsibility of the incident

inside Turkish territorial waters.

• The event has been registered as a “Prevention of Departure”

by ICC Piraeus.

Measures

On 27th of July, National Official (NO) of the Danish HELO

deployed to JO Poseidon 2020 informed the FOC in ICC by phone

on a possible serious incident, where ICC would have requested

to change the reported location of a detected migrant boat that

was initially spotted by the HELO in the operational area. FOC

advised DNK NO and the HELO CO to get in contact with ICC

Coordinator in order to clarify the necessary details.

On 28th of July, Frontex and the Greek authorities received a SIR

from the Danish HELO.

On 28th of July the incident has been discussed (FCO/FOC, HCG,

DNK NO) in the ICC Piraeus (JCB). ICC has referred to a

misunderstanding and that the request to change the location

was only applicable for the initial detection in the Turkish TWs.

The respective incident was presented by HCG as a prevention of

departure.

SIR procedure shall be launched by Frontex. There is information

provided that indicate a possible location of the migrant boat in

the Greek TW and within the operational area of the JO

Poseidon. For unknown reasons, the incident has been reportedly

concluded in the Turkish side as a prevention of departure.

Assessment

Final outcome

Documents

Serious incident document

No.

Title

Name

Date

SV Serious Incident Report RELEASABLE TO INTERNET TRANSMISSION

.msg

SV Serious Incident Report RELEASABLE TO INTERNET TRANSMISSION

.msg

2020-07-29

Serious incident document

No.

Title

Name

Date

11859 2020 Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020 Migrants detected in Greek

territorial waters returned to Turkey.msg

11859 2020 Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020 Migrants detected in Greek

territorial waters returned to Turkey.msg

2020-07-29

Serious incident document

No.

Title

Name

Date

SIR - DNK FENNEC 281100LJUL20.pdf

2020-07-29

UUI, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 219: Spm. om ministeren har kendskab til denne sag og/eller rapporten? I bekræftende fald bedes ministeren redegøre for sit kendskab til hændelsen og forelægge rapporten for udvalget. Ministeren bedes ligeledes afklare, hvem der repræsenterer Danmark i Frontex’ bestyrelse, til udlændinge- og integrationsministeren UUI, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 219: Spm. om ministeren har kendskab til denne sag og/eller rapporten? I bekræftende fald bedes ministeren redegøre for sit kendskab til hændelsen og forelægge rapporten for udvalget. Ministeren bedes ligeledes afklare, hvem der repræsenterer Danmark i Frontex’ bestyrelse, til udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Warsaw, 19/01/2021

Serious incident report no. 11859/2020

Report date and time (UTC)

Reporting person

Last modification date and time (UTC)

Last modification done by

SIR Status

FSC SIR Category

Type of SIR

Subject

Joint operation

JORA incident number

Original source of information

Frontex SIR Coordinator

Frontex resources involved

Incident dates (UTC)

Detection date (UTC)

Location of the incident

Latitude

Longitude

Reference to the operational area

Type of resources / involvement

Dead persons

Injured persons

Missing persons

11.1863888888

111.1863888888

2020-07-27 07:42

2020-07-29 07:43

Text removed- personal data

2020-11-09 15:15

Text removed – personal data

Closed

4 - Situations of alleged violations of Fundamental Rights or

international protection obligations

1 Initial SIR

Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020: Migrants detected in Greek

territorial waters returned to Turkey

Details

Fact of the case

Measures

FOR DETAILS SEE SIR 11860/2020 SIR ID 1265

Assessment

Final outcome

FOR DETAILS SEE SIR 11860/2020 SIR ID 1265

Documents

Subject:

FW: 11859/2020: Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020: Migrants detected in Greek territorial waters returned to Turkey

From:

Text Removed – Reporting Tools

Sent:

29 July, 2020 09:54

To:

Text Removed – Reporting Tools

Subject:

11859/2020: Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020: Migrants detected in Greek territorial waters returned to Turkey

11859/2020: Initial SIR - JO Poseidon 2020: Migrants detected in Greek territorial waters returned to Turkey:



On 27.07.2020 at 06:21LT a Danish helicopter detected a rubber boat with approx. 25 migrants south of Chios in Greek territorial waters.

Once the Hellenic Coast Guard arrived at the scene and took over the incident, the Danish asset left the area.

JRCC Piraeus informed MRCC Ankara.

According to information provided by Greek Authorities, a Turkish patrol boat took over the responsibility of the incident inside Turkish territorial

waters.

The event has been registered as a “Prevention of Departure” by ICC Piraeus.

FSC proposes HoS.OIS to act as the Serious Incident Coordinator for this case.

Text Removed – Reporting Tools

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT

Serious Incident Report no.

Reporting date:

28 1100L JUL 2020

Reporting person:

Last modification date:

Text removed

(personal data)

Last modification done

by:

FSC SIR Category

Subject

Type of SIR

JORA Incident number (if any)

Frontex activity

Frontex SI Coordinator

Incident date/time

Detection date/time

Location of the incident

Is latitude unknown

Latitude

Is longitude unknown

Longitude

Reference to the operational area (for

operational activities)

27 JULY 2020 / 1000 LOCAL

Chios, Greece

Potential non-access to the asylum procedure by removal

Category 4

text removed (reference to operational area)

Operational Area J

Frontex resources involved (Human resources

DNK Helicopter

/ co-financed technical equipment)

Type of resources / involvement

Dead persons

Injured persons

Missing persons

Likely or possible effects, reactions,

Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency

www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT

consequences

Source of information

Historical information and background of the SI (why/how it happened)

27 0621L JUL 2020: During patrol in Area J near Chios a rubberboat with migrants is detected and identified

inside Greek Territorial Waters by the crew onboard the Danish Fennec Helicopter. Shortly after detection the

boat is intercepted by Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG), whom passes the rubberboat at relative high speed in regards

to the rubberboat laying still. These actions are recorded with FLIR by the Danish Helicopter. After HCG has

arrived at the scene and taken over the incident, the Danish helicopter leaves the area to continue mission.

27 1000L JUL 2020: The Danish helicopter detachment is contacted via telephone by the

text removed (personal data)

from the HCG, and is asked whether it is possible to change the reported

coordinates of the above mentioned incident in order to indicate that the incident took place outside Greek

Territorial Waters.

The request is denied by the Danish detachment.

Measures/Actions taken (own/MS/others)

27 1345L JUL 2020: The Danish detachment verbally informed Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) at ICC

Piraeus of the request to change coordinates in the report pushed forward by the HCG.

27 1721L JUL 2020: The Danish detachment verbally informed Frontex ICC Piraeus, that pending national

decision, a possibly SIR would be sent.

Assessment / Comments

The Danish detachment assesses that the request from HCG to change the reported coordinates of the incident

was not a case of misunderstanding.

2/2

Legend

Personal Data

Number and profile of

Human Resources

Reporting tools and

methods used by law

enforcement officials

and

Sensitive operational

information

The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in

particular, the name of an individual. Its disclosure

would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual

and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception

laid down in Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No

1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding

the number and profiles of officers deployed in the

operational area. Disclosing such information would be

tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths

of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness.

As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar

operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating

their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border

crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently,

the disclosure of such information would undermine the

protection of the public interest as regards public security

as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC)

1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information

related to reporting tools and methods used by law

enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks

and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would

jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future

operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and

trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law

enforcement measures would be significantly reduced.

As disclosing this information would undermine the

protection of the public interest as regards public

security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article

4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed text cannot be released as it refers to

details crucial for situational awareness at the external

borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex

to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk

analyses. The disclosure of this information would

hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and

jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union

and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the

external borders. It would thus benefit criminal

networks especially those involved in people smuggling

and trafficking in human beings, which would put the

life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the

information pertaining to this variable would undermine

the protection of the public interest as regards public

security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a)

first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The information related to this non-disclosed text is

also used for the development of risk analyses, which

Number and type of

technical equipment

constitute a specific form of internal decision-making

processes based on the intelligence derived from

previous and presently ongoing activities and have a

bearing on the conduct of current and future

operations. Being an important base for determining

the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility

to conduct such analyses without interference is

crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate.

Consequently, releasing this information would enable

third parties to gain insights into this decision making

process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in

depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such

analyses wholly independently, free from any external

pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this

information would seriously undermine Frontex

internal decision making-processes. As no overriding

public interest that is objective and general in nature

and not indistinguishable from individual or private

interests for the release of this information is

ascertainable in the present case, information

pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on

Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding

the technical equipment deployed in each operational

area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount

to disclosing the exact type, capabilities and weaknesses

of the equipment, as well as their usual position, opening

way for abuse. The result of this would only be to hamper

the course of ongoing and future similar operations,

ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and

prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized

border

crossings.

this

light,

the disclosure of such

information would undermine the protection of the public

interest as regards public security in the sense of Article

4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency

www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01