NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 7: Policy Brief: Key recommendations and NATO PA references

NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2020-21
NPA Alm.del Bilag 7
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NATO 2030 REPORT OF

THE NATO GROUP OF

EXPERTS:

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS,

AND NATO PA

REFERENCES

Policy Brief

xxx SPE 20 E | Original: English | December 2020

This Policy Brief is presented for information only and does not

represent the official view of the Assembly.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 7: Policy Brief: Key recommendations and NATO PA references

169 SPE 20 E

INTRODUCTION

The Group of Experts, appointed by the NATO Secretary General in April 2020 to assist him with the reflection

process labelled

NATO 2030,

published their report on 1 December. The 66-page report, entitled

NATO

2030: United for A New Era,

includes an

analysis of the threat environment

in the coming decade and

138 recommendations in three areas:

Strengthening NATO’s political role and tools with regards to

emerging threats and challenges from

every direction;

Strengthening NATO’s political cohesion and unity; and

Strengthening NATO’s political consultation and decision-making.

While the main focus of recommendations is NATO’s political role, their report takes a much broader look at

the state of the Alliance and ways to adapt it for the coming decade. As such, it offers interesting

groundwork

for the upcoming revision of NATO’s

Strategic Concept,

which NATO Heads of State and Government

are likely to initiate at their Summit meeting in 2021.

The experts’ report highlights the

significant shifts in the international environment

characterised by a

new great-power competition and the simultaneity of complex challenges. It also describes the

increased

internal strains among Allies,

which risk weakening Allied unity, solidarity, and cohesion and benefiting

Russia and China, which

the report calls NATO’s “systemic

rivals”.

In light of these external and internal challenges, the report calls on Allies to

rededicate themselves to the

Alliance’s enduring values and purpose

as the bedrock of Europe and North America’s unity and security.

The report makes clear

much relies on Allies’

political will

to a) continuously and actively use NATO as

the essential transatlantic forum for consultation on all challenges which Allies feel affect their security and

b) align national policies with the positions taken within NATO and refrain from politically motivated blockage.

The

report’s

core vision is

a more proactive and agile political Alliance

which stands as a bulwark against

the competing visions of systemic rivals, actively anticipates challenges, routinely consults formally and

informally on all perceived threats and challenges, does not shy away from discussing issues beyond its

traditional agenda, exercises speedy political decision-making in crisis response, and proactively chooses

the partnerships which will help it achieve its security goals.

The sections below include the experts’ vision statement and excerpts of the recommendations.

Specific

reference is made when recommendations are inspired by, or align with, the Assembly’s own.

The NATO PA and the Expert Report

•

The Assembly’s Standing Committee met with the Group on 7 October.

The Assembly’s then

President Attila Mesterhazy (Hungary) submitted a report to the Group on 2

November which summarised the main recommendations

contained in delegations’

answers to the

NATO PA survey on NATO 2030 conducted between July and October 2020.

Some of the survey recommendations and proposals contained in Assembly reports and

resolutions were incorporated into the Group of Experts’ report.

The report’s other

recommendations are

well in line with the Assembly’s agreed positions.

The report

includes one explicit reference to the NATO PA’s role

in the section on Strategic

Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Tackling Disinformation (pp. 48-49):

“While NATO accelerates

digitalisation of its public communications functions, Allies should amplify

face-to-face

engagements with broader audiences while partnering with stakeholders in NATO’s rich network

of force multipliers like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Atlantic Treaty

Association.”

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VISION STATEMENT

(Group of Experts’ report, p.11)

The Reflection Group’s vision

for NATO in 2030 is one of

an Alliance defined by vitality, utility, relevance, and

endurance. By the end of the decade, no matter the

strategic environment, NATO will:

•

Uphold its role as the bedrock of peace, stability, and the

rule of law in the Euro-Atlantic area;

•

Remain the strategic centre of gravity for collective defence

of all its members on the basis of an up-to-date Strategic

Concept;

•

Strengthen its role as the unique and essential forum to

which Allies turn on all major national security challenges,

proactively seeking to forge consensus and build common

strategies for dealing with common threats;

•

Play a larger part in an international order in which open

societies can flourish and be secure and prosperous; a world

in which a plurality of worldviews and fundamental

differences of opinion are no obstacle to dialogue and

cooperation;

•

Enjoy deeper strategic and mutually reinforcing

connections with partners that share these principles and

aspirations, affirming the Helsinki Final Act principle that all

states have the right to choose their security arrangements;

and, where partnership is not possible, a commitment to

work towards shared security on the basis of mutual respect;

•

Possess a stronger relationship and intensify consultation on

issues of common concern with the European Union built on

the foundations of cooperation, with a view to taking

advantage of different capabilities and toolkits.

To achieve this, Allies should redouble their commitment

to:

•

Adhere to the democratic principles enshrined in the North

Atlantic Treaty, with all Allies free to shape their own

destinies within these bounds;

•

Share the burden that comes with collective security,

maintaining equitable responsibilities for the common

defence;

•

Ensure their actions do not undermine the utility and

cohesion of the Alliance for unrelated ends or narrow

national goals without prejudice to their sovereign rights and

core national security interests;

•

Put collective defence, from conventional to nuclear and

hybrid, at the forefront of consultation and decision-making

on security in the Euro-Atlantic area;

•

Enable swift decision-making and policy implementation—

preserving the principle of consensus but ensuring the

Alliance is equipped to deal with a changing strategic

environment.

MAIN FINDINGS: Moving Towards NATO 2030

[Below find abstracts from the

Group of Experts’ Report, pp. 12-15.

Text boxes highlight when

recommendations

are inspired by, or align with, the Assembly’s own]

1. The starting point must be to

update the 2010 Strategic Concept

[…]. [I]t should update content related

to the principles undergirding the NATO Alliance, changes to the geostrategic environment (including both

Russia and China), and the need to incorporate terrorism more fully into NATO’s core tasks.

Recommendation included in the NATO PA’s

Resolution 457

of 2019 on

NATO @ 70

and

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030

2. NATO should continue the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with

Russia.

[…] NATO should

[…] ensure its continued effectiveness by raising the costs for Russian aggression and develop a more

comprehensive response to hybrid forms of Russian aggression, while at the same time supporting increased

political outreach to negotiate arms control and risk reduction measures.

3. NATO […] needs to develop a political strategy for approaching a world in which

China

will be of growing

importance through to 2030. The Alliance should […] consider establishing a consultative body to discuss all

aspects of Allies’

security interests vis-à-vis

China. It must expand efforts to assess the implications of

China’s technological development and monitor and defend against any Chinese activities that could impact

collective defence, military readiness or resilience in

the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR)

Area of Responsibility.

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Recommendations in line with 2020 NATO PA Reports on China for the

CDS, PC

and

ESC; Resolution

464

of 2020 on

A Transatlantic Strategy on China;

and then President

Mesterhazy’s

report to the Group

of Experts, particularly the need for a comprehensive China strategy and the proposal to create a Centre

of Excellence on the Indo-Pacific

Emerging and disruptive technologies

are a challenge but also opportunity for NATO. Competing with

the efforts underway by large authoritarian states to achieve dominance in key [emerging and disruptive

technologies] must be a strategic priority for the Alliance and its members. NATO should serve as a crucial

coordinating institution […]. NATO should hold a digital summit of governments and private sector […] [on]

security-related AI strategies, norms, and research and development (R&D) […].

Recommendations in line with reports in the

STC

between 2017 and 2020 and Resolutions

465

of 2020

Defence Innovation,

453

of 2018 on

Maintaining the Science & Technology Edge and Enhancing

Alliance Agility,

443

Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge.

5. […] NATO should more explicitly integrate the fight against

terrorism

into its core tasks. […] NATO

should enhance the fight against terrorism as part of the hybrid and cyber conversation and ensure that the

threat from terrorism figures in exercises and lessons learned. NATO should strive to improve current

practices of intelligence-sharing […].

6. NATO must articulate a consistent, clear, and coherent approach to the

South,

addressing both traditional

threats like terrorism, and the growing presence of Russia and to a lesser extent China. NATO must maintain

political focus on building up military preparedness and response for the southern/ Mediterranean flank […].

NATO should strengthen ties and cooperation, especially with the EU, in the framework of a coordinated

approach. It should increase the frequency of political consultations […] on the South. [...].

Recommendations in line with

Declaration 460

of 2020 on NATO 2030.

7. NATO should reaffirm its support for

arms control

while maintaining an effective

nuclear deterrence.

should play an enhanced role as a forum to debate challenges to existing arms control mechanisms and

consult on any future arrangements. […] It should develop an agenda for international arms control in key

areas of [emerging and disruptive technologies] with military application. NATO should further adapt its

defence and deterrence posture in the post Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty setting to take

into account the threat posed by Russia’s existing and new military capabilities. It should continue and

revitalise the nuclear-sharing arrangements

that constitute a critical element of NATO’s deterrence policy.

Recommendations on deterrence in line with

Resolution 455

of 2019 on Supporting NATO’s Post-INF

Treaty Defence and Deterrence Posture.

Climate change

[…] NATO has a role to play in increasing situational awareness, early warning, and

information sharing, including by considering the establishment of Centre of Excellence on Climate and

Security. It should build on efforts to include climate change and other non-military threats such as pandemics

in NATO planning on resilience and crisis management [...]. NATO should […] develop and implement better

green military technology.

The report makes specific reference to the impact of climate change on the High North / Arctic and calls

on NATO to “enhance its situational

awareness across the High North and the Arctic and, for the High

North that falls within SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, should develop a strategy that takes into

account broader deterrence and defence

plans.” This recommendation is included in

Declaration 460

2020 on

NATO 2030,

building on the 2017 report by the PC on

NATO and Security in the Arctic.

9. Maintaining

political cohesion and unity

must be an unambiguous priority for all Allies. Allies on both

sides of the Atlantic must reaffirm their commitment to NATO as the principal institution for the defence of the

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Euro-Atlantic area. Allies should pledge themselves to a code of good conduct to abide by the spirit as well

as the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty. Allies should maintain and meet agreed burden-sharing

requirements. NATO should reassert its core identity as an Alliance rooted in the principles of democracy,

and Allies should consider establishing a Centre of Excellence for Democratic Resilience dedicated to

providing support to individual Allies, upon their request, for strengthening societal resilience to resist

interference from hostile external actors in the functioning of their democratic institutions and

processes. When disputes between Allies arise, the Secretary General should continue to provide his good

offices and consider more closely involving other Allies as informal mediators.

Recommendation for the creation of a Centre of Excellence for Democratic Resilience included in

Resolution 457

of 2019 on

NATO @ 70

and referenced in

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030

and

then President Mesterhazy’s report to the Group of Experts. Recommendations regarding dispute

resolution mechanisms in line with

Declaration 460

of 2020 on NATO 2030 and then President

Mesterhazy’s

report to the Group of Experts.

10. The Group calls for transatlantic

consultation

to be strengthened in a systematic, credible, and powerful

manner. Allies must reaffirm the role of the North Atlantic Council as a genuine forum for consultation on

major strategic and political issues. Allies should strive to hold national policies to the line of policy developed

at NATO. The Alliance should institute a practice whereby Allied Foreign Ministers make a periodic appraisal

of the Alliance’s political health and development. NATO should hold more frequent Ministerials and, when

appropriate, expand their format. It should resume the practice whereby the number of annual Foreign

Ministerials matches the number of Defence Ministerials, with meetings alternating between NATO HQ and

Allied capitals. It should hold more informal meetings and institute regular consultations on issues beyond

the traditional agenda […].

Recommendation for more frequent and more informal consultations with the North Atlantic Council,

including in new formats, included

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030

and then President

Mesterhazy’s

report to the Group of Experts.

11.

NATO and the EU

should seek to reinvigorate trust and understanding at the highest levels.

[…I]t

would

be useful for NATO and EU Heads of State and Government to meet in a special formal session […]. The

two organisations should create an institutionalised staff link […] NATO should welcome EU efforts towards

a stronger and more capable European defence capacity insofar as these strengthen NATO, contribute to a

fair transatlantic burden-sharing, and fully involve non-EU Allies. Ongoing European efforts should be better

used to increase the share of European Allies in support of NATO capability targets.

Recommendations in line with

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030.

12. NATO should outline a global blueprint for better utilising its

partnerships

to advance NATO strategic

interests. It should shift from the current demand-driven approach to an interest-driven approach and consider

providing more stable and predictable resource

streams for partnership activities. NATO’s Open Door Policy

should be upheld and reinvigorated. NATO should expand and strengthen partnerships with Ukraine and

Georgia, seek to heighten engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and counter destabilisation across the

Western Balkans. NATO should energise the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative (ICI) through strengthened political engagement, capacity building, and resilience enhancement. It

should deepen cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners, including by strengthening information-sharing and

creating regularised dialogues on technological cooperation and pooling of R&D in select fields.

Recommendations regarding the Open Door Policy, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, MD

and ICI in line with

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030.

Recommendation on cooperation with Indo-

Pacific partners in line with

Declaration 460

of 2020 on

NATO 2030,

Resolution 464

of 2020 on

Transatlantic Strategy on China,

and

then President Mesterhazy’s report

to the Group of Experts.

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13. The principle of consensus is a cornerstone of the Alliance, but NATO must be diligent in ensuring that

it remains capable of

reaching and implementing decisions

in a timely fashion.

(…)

It should consider

bolstering the Secretary General’s chief executive role in order to make decisions on routine matters

and to

bring difficult issues into the open at an early stage. NATO should create a more structured mechanism to

support the establishment of coalitions inside existing Alliance structures and should examine ways to time-

limit decision making in crisis. To deal with the growing frequency of single-country blockages involving

external bilateral disputes, it should consider raising the threshold for such blockages to the Ministerial level.

Recommendation regarding the consensus principle and the need for faster decision-making in line with

then President Mesterhazy’s report to the Group of Experts.

14. With regard to

political structure, staffing, and resources,

[…] NATO should consider increasing

the delegated authorities of the Secretary General to make meaningful decisions on personnel and certain

budgetary matters. It should institute a practice of outside-in audits of the administrative functioning of the

organisation and require a functional review process once every five years. Allies that make up a low

proportional share of the civil budget should raise their national contributions. NATO should establish a centre

of higher learning to cultivate future talent outside of NATO and launch a scholarship program, tentatively

called the Harmel Fellowship Programme, under which each Ally would fund a scholarship programme for at

least one individual every year from another NATO Ally to undertake postgraduate study at one of its leading

universities.

Recommendation for a NATO scholarship programme included in then President Mesterhazy’s

report to

the Group of Experts.