NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2020-21
NPA Alm.del Bilag 24
Offentligt

NATO 2021 BRUSSELS

SUMMIT: KEY OUTCOMES

14 June 2021

Information Document

106 SPE 21 E | Original: English | June 2021

This Information Document is presented for information only and does

not represent the official view of the Assembly.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

III.

IV.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

XVII.

XVIII.

XIX.

NATO’S SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES & DEFENDING THE

RULES-BASED

INTERNATIONAL ORDER ............................................................................................... 1

THE EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................... 2

THE THREAT FROM RUSSIA AND NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS ................................... 2

THE IMPLICATIONS

OF CHINA’S RISE

.......................................................................... 4

DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ................................................................ 5

RESILIENCE .................................................................................................................... 7

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ................................................................................ 9

MAINTAINING NATO’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE

.......................................................... 9

BURDEN SHARING ....................................................................................................... 10

FUNDING A HIGHER LEVEL OF AMBITION ................................................................. 11

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SECURITY ........................................................... 12

NATO’S OPEN DOOR POLICY

...................................................................................... 12

NATO’S CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION

AND

DISARMAMENT ............................................................................................................. 13

NATO’S PARTNERSHIPS

.............................................................................................. 14

NATO-EU RELATIONS .................................................................................................. 16

AFGHANISTAN .............................................................................................................. 17

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA ................................................................................. 17

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY ................................................................................ 18

NATO’S NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT

......................................................................... 18

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

NATO’S SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES

& DEFENDING THE RULES-BASED

INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The Summit communiqué reaffirms, in its second paragraph,

the importance of NATO’s shared

democratic values and principles as the “bedrock of unity, solidarity and cohesion”. Allied leaders lay out two

new concrete ways to bolster their commitment to shared values.

First, they pledge to increase consultation “when fundamental values and principles are at risk” and

add to their reaffirmation of the Alliance’s democratic principles, a commitment to “the spirit and the letter of

the North Atlantic Treaty”.

Second, the communiqué signals NATO’s intention to play

a greater role in addressing the increasing

challenge that state and non-state actors pose to the rules-based international order and to democracy. Allied

leaders highlight, in particular,

Russia’s multiple violations of its international commitments [see

Russia

section],

but also China’s “coercive

policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in

the Washington Treaty”

[see

China section].

Increased consultation

and NATO’s enhanced role in preserving and shaping the international rules-

based order are two of the eight NATO 2030 priorities. They will likely feature as key issues in the next

Strategic Concept. The NATO Secretary General specifically cited the reaffirmation of Allied values as one

of the two reasons

–

together with changes in the security environment

–

why NATO needs a new Strategic

Concept.

As is the case in past communiqués, the importance of shared democratic values also features heavily

in sections related to partnerships and the Open Door policy. A new emphasis is placed on the need to work

with existing partners and new ones, including key global actors and other new interlocutors from Africa, Asia

and Latin America, in addressing threats to the rules-based international order. Interestingly, this is the first

time Latin America features in a recent Summit communiqué.

Additional notes:

The NATO 2030 process is a result of concern related to the ongoing cohesion and unity of the Alliance

in a context of serious tensions among Allies throughout 2019 in particular. At the London Summit in

December 2019, Allied leaders tasked the NATO Secretary General to lead a reflection process on ways to

strengthen NATO’s political dimension, including consultation. This issue of consultation among Allies

features first in the list of priorities for NATO 2030 with a “pledge to strengthen and broaden our consultations”

and a “commitment to

reinforc[e] consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when

our fundamental values and principles are at risk”. These statements send a fairly clear and strong signal

that Allies are prepared to discuss potential internal differences and tensions in the future

–

including issues

related to fundamental values and principles.

The Assembly’s position:

The Assembly has made rededicating NATO to its democratic foundations a top priority for the NATO

Summit, NATO 2030 and the future Strategic Concept. It has called for NATO to affirm its commitment to

shared democratic values in words as well as in deeds. Specifically, it has urged Allies to establish a

Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters

–

a centre which would serve as a resource to monitor

threats to democracy and assist Allies upon request. The Assembly’s Working Group on a NATO Democratic

Resilience Centre is tasked with refining the concept for this centre and building support.

The Summit communiqué has little detail about how NATO intends to implement its renewed

commitment to democratic values and principles and to defending the rules-based international order.

However, it does include important new statements and commitments which open the way for further work

and recommendations on these issues.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

The Assembly had also offered several recommendations on how to strengthen political consultation

at NATO as well as NATO’s role in defending the rules-based

international order as part of its contribution

NATO 2030.

II.

THE EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

10. Summit communiqués routinely include a short description of the threats and challenges which Allies

consider relevant to Euro-Atlantic security. The Brussels Summit communiqué reaffirms a number of key

threats and challenges highlighted in previous communiqués. Significantly, it also highlights a number of new

challenges, which are likely to

feature in NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

Previously identified threats include:

Russia’s

aggressive actions

Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations

Other previously identified threats and challenges undermining Euro-Atlantic security include:

Cyber, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns

Instability beyond NATO’s borders and

its impact in terms of irregular migration and human trafficking

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The list of new challenges includes:

A new reference to the “systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers”

The challenge that state and non-state actors pose not only to the rules-based international order but

also to democracy across the globe

China’s first inclusion in the list of challenges –

following its first inclusion in a Summit communiqué in

2019

A new reference to the impact of growing advances in the space domain

A reference to the erosion of the arms control architecture

A new reference to the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies

Acknowledgment of climate change as a threat multiplier

The Assembly’s

position:

11. The Assembly has recognised that these recent major shifts in the strategic environment require a

revision

of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. It has made this point in particular in

the

report

and

resolution

presented by then General Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Gerald E. Connolly (United States) on the

occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary in 2019.

The same point is made in

Declaration 460

on NATO 2030.

III.

THE THREAT FROM RUSSIA AND NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

12.

Russia’s

illegal annexation of Crimea by military force required

a profound redefinition of NATO’s

relations with

Russia. Whereas the 2010 Strategic Concept set the goal of a “true strategic partnership”, since

2014, NATO has scaled down political cooperation and suspended practical cooperation and implemented a

dual--track policy, which combines strong deterrence and defence with openness to meaningful dialogue. As

part of the first pillar, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of NATO’s deterrence and defence

posture since the end of the Cold War. NATO has conditioned dialogue with Russia to Ukraine being the first

topic of any discussion. As a result, Russia has been unwilling to hold meetings of the NATO-Russia Council

since July 2019.

13. Repeating language first used at the 2019 London Summit, the Brussels Summit communiqué clearly

identifies “Russia’s aggressive actions” as the top “threat to Euro-Atlantic security” and includes strong

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

language on Russia’s multiple violations and aggressive actions. The Secretary General stated that the

relationship with Russia

is “at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War”.

14.

The Summit reaffirms NATO’s dual-track

approach, while putting renewed emphasis on collective

defence [see

defence and deterrence section]

and reaffirming

NATO’s response to Russia’s military

modernisation, build-up and violations of arms control commitments. The communiqué nonetheless holds

out openness to dialogue as well as the goal of re-establishing a constructive relationship

when Russia’s

actions make that possible. The Secretary General specifically signalled support for new strategic talks on

future arms control [see

arms control section].

15. The communiqué

also reiterates NATO’s support

for the territorial integrity of Georgia, the Republic of

Moldova and Ukraine and reaffirms the Alliance’s Open Door policy [see

Open Door section].

16.

Among the challenges posed by Russia, the communiqué lists:

growing multi-domain military build-up

more assertive and aggressive posture

novel military capabilities

provocative activities, including near NATO borders

intensified hybrid actions against Allies and partners, including through disinformation, cyber activities

and attempted interference in democratic processes

strategic intimidation, including through extensive nuclear modernisation and diversification,

aggressive and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and increasing focus on exercises involving

dual--capable systems

a growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, which poses significant

risks from all strategic directions to security and stability

– including Russia’s development of missiles

in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty [see

collective defence and

deterrence section].

17. While the communiqué

specifically refers to China’s challenge to the rules-based

international order,

the text leaves no doubt that NATO considers Russia as well as one of the “state actors” which “challenge

the rules-based international order and seek to undermine

democracy across the globe”.

Leaders’ messages about / to Russia:

NATO does not seek confrontation and does not pose a threat to Russia.

There will be no return to business as usual until Russia demonstrates compliance with international

law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

Allies aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia when its actions make that possible.

Allies have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine its strategic

deterrence.

Leaders’ appeal to Russia:

Relations with the Czech Republic and the United States:

rescind designation as

‘unfriendly

countries’

Ukraine:

withdraw all forces; reverse the military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the

Black Sea as well as stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports; stop fuelling the

conflict in eastern Ukraine by providing financial and military support to the armed formations it backs

Georgia:

withdraw all forces; reverse the recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of

Georgia as independent states; implement the EU-mediated 2008 ceasefire agreement; end

militarisation of these regions and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through

the continued construction of border-like obstacles; cease the human rights violations, arbitrary

detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens

Moldova:

withdraw all forces; engage constructively in the Transnistria Settlement Process

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

International obligations and commitments:

return to full implementation of and compliance with the

letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding

trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region

The Assembly’s position:

18.

The Assembly supports NATO’s dual-track

approach to Russia, and its statements on the threat posed

by Russia and NATO’s response are well in line with the

communiqué language.

One

of the Committee’s

reports for 2021 deals

with Russia’s multifaceted challenge.

IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S RISE

19.

The 2019 London Leaders’ Declaration marked the first time NATO acknowledged

the implications of

China’s rise. However, it referenced China only once: “We recognise that China’s growing influence and

international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an

Alliance.”

20.

Over the last few years and months, views among Allies on the implications of China’s rise

in a strategic

environment characterised by systemic competition

have converged. Leaders note that “China’s growing

influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”.

They commit to engaging China “with

a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance.’’ The

communiqué outlines the first pillars of an Allied policy on China based on these principles. Fleshing out

Allied consensus on China will no doubt be one of the main issues for discussion as Allies prepare the next

Strategic Concept.

21. China is referenced for the

first time in the communiqué’s section on threats and challenges

and the

text later mentions

the “systemic challenges” posed by China’s ambitions and behaviour.

However, the text

makes a clear difference between the actions of Russia and of

China. While Russia’s aggressive actions

constitute a threat, China’s growing influence

and international policies can present challenges.

Specific challenges identified:

systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and areas relevant to Alliance security,

demonstrated by China’s stated ambitions and assertive

behaviour

coercive policies in contrast to NATO’s fundamental values

a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal (including more warheads and larger number of sophisticated

delivery systems)

opaqueness of military modernisation and military-civil fusion strategy

certain cooperation activities with Russia, including in the Euro-Atlantic area

lack of transparency

use of disinformation

Leaders’ appeals to China:

uphold international commitments

act responsibly in the international system

engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building and transparency measures on nuclear

capabilities and doctrine

On dialogue with China:

maintain a constructive dialogue where possible

seek opportunities to engage where relevant to Allied or common challenges (e.g. climate change)

potentially seek information exchange, reciprocal transparency and understanding to enhance

awareness and discuss potential disagreements

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

The Assembly’s position:

22.

The Assembly has long acknowledged the growing impact of China’s rise.

More recently,

in 2020,

three

comprehensive reports and one resolution dealt with the issue, and

one

of the 2021 reports examines China’s

military modernisation.

The key takeaway was the Assembly’s call

to address the challenges posed by China

collectively

–

without ever compromising the core values on which both the global liberal order and NATO

were founded.

23. The 2021 communiqué language is generally in line with the Assembly position. However, the Assembly

has gone further in outlining a transatlantic strategy on China, notably in then General Rapporteur Gerald E.

Connolly’s report on

The Rise of China: Implications for Global and Euro-Atlantic Security

and the

accompanying

Resolution 464.

Moreover, the Assembly more forcefully argues that exchanges on China

with relevant NATO partners, the EU and like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific region should be pursued

on the implications of China’s rise,

including in

Declaration 460.

DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

24.

The Summit reaffirms NATO’s three core tasks of

deterrence and collective defence, crisis

management and cooperative security. However, it puts a renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective

defence, which is also the second of the eight priorities for NATO 2030. The communiqué makes clear that

deterrence and defence are “at

the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty

and an enduring transatlantic bond”.

25. This renewed focus is a response to what Allied leaders characterise

as “the increasingly challenging

security environment with risks arising from changes in the posture, doctrine, and behaviour of potential

adversaries and their significant investments to develop, modernise, and expand capabilities”.

26.

As a result, Allied leaders reiterate NATO’s 360° approach, defining NATO’s stated level of ambition

as follows:

“to respond to any threats, from state and non-state

actors, from wherever they arise, and

potentially from multiple directions in more than one region simultaneously”. The communiqué reaffirms

NATO’s commitment to maintain its forward presence in the Alliance’s East and the Black Sea, assurance

measures across several regions, including in Turkey, and readiness to respond to potential threats from the

South. The High North is also referenced for the first time in recent NATO communiqués, as an area where

NATO will maintain “necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the Alliance’s security

interests”.

27.

The Summit also reaffirmed that NATO’s

deterrence and collective defence will continue to be based

on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities.

28.

Allied leaders agreed the following measures to further strengthen deterrence and collective defence:

a new deterrence and defence military concept

to guide enhanced advance planning for potential

crisis and conflict, further improve the use and organisation of Allied forces and capabilities and ensure

more effective command and control;

a new warfighting military concept

to ensure continued development

of NATO’s

military and

technological advantage;

further strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure,

i.e. the pool of Allied national and

multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance’s disposal;

continue to enhance the NATO Command Structure,

i.e.

NATO’s permanent multinational

headquarters;

maintain an ongoing focus on

readiness, ability to deploy forces in contested theatres

and

sustainment and reinforcement of deployed forces;

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

improve NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities,

including sensors, interceptors and

command and control; and

strengthen cooperation with relevant and like-minded partners.

Deterrence and collective defence in space and cyber space and against hybrid threats:

29. The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that malicious cyber or hybrid activities could, in certain

circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article

5 of the Washington Treaty.

30. Allies remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. Leaders

endorsed a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which spans the three core tasks and overall deterrence

and defence posture but also enhances Alliance resilience. The communiqué makes clear, once again, that

NATO’s mandate remains defensive, but that Allies remain determined to employ the full range of capabilities

against cyber threats. In this respect, leaders agreed to effectively integrate sovereign cyber effects

–

including offensive cyber capabilities

–

which are provided on a voluntary, national basis, into collective

defence and Alliance operations and missions, stressing strong political oversight.

31. Significantly, Allies, for the first time,

“recognise

that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber

activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In other words,

persistent

malicious cyber

campaigns

could trigger Article 5.

32. Similarly, Allied leaders agreed

that “attacks

to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the

security of the Alliance” and “could lead to the invocation of Article 5” [see

also

resilience section].

Nuclear deterrence:

33.

The communiqué reaffirms NATO’s previously agreed language on nuclear deterrence, notably:

the core principle that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance;

the role of the Alliance’s strategic forces as the supreme guarantee

of the security of Allies;

the importance of nuclear burden-sharing arrangements

–

whereby European Allies provide capabilities

and infrastructure to host US forward-deployed nuclear weapons.

34. The Brussels Summit communiqué includes a new mention of NATO’s

support for efforts towards

strategic risk reduction

–

an issue highlighted as well in sections of the communiqué relating to dialogue with

Russia and with China.

Missile defence:

35.

The communiqué reiterates the contribution of missile defence to NATO’s collective defence posture

and recommits Allies to continue to deliver a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability.

NATO’s BMD

has so far only reached initial operational capability, with only limited geographical coverage (southern NATO

Europe only) and limited command and control. As already signalled in previous Summit’s communiqués,

reaching full operational capability would require more national assets (mostly radars and interceptors) and

expanding the command and control capability. The latter is the only part of NATO’s BMD

resourced through

NATO’s common funding. The Brussels communiqué language suggests that future discussions on NATO’s

common funding [see

funding section]

could include consideration of currently unfulfilled requirements for

NATO’s BMD command and control, allowing NATO to reach the next milestone in developing its BMD

capability.

36. The communiqué also reiterates language

meant to counter Russia’s disinformation suggesting that

the system is directed against it and restates

NATO’s openness in principle to discussing BMD with Russia.

Response to Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and development of

new missiles:

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

37. Leaders reiterated

NATO’s earlier statement that NATO has no intention to deploy land-based

nuclear

missiles in Europe in response to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and development and deployment of

new missiles. Instead, NATO will implement “a coherent and balanced package

of political and military

measures”, including “strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive

conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to

support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation;

intelligence; and exercises.”

The Assembly’s position:

38.

The Summit’s decisions are well in line with the Assembly’s recommendations on

deterrence and

collective defence. In particular, in its

declaration

on NATO 2030, the Assembly had called on Allies to:

“reaffirm that NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend collectively its territory and

populations against attacks”;

“continue to affirm the crucial role of a safe and resilient nuclear deterrent for the Alliance’s deterrence

and defence posture”;

“continue to strengthen NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture in the East and the Baltic

and Black Sea regions, and to continue to adapt collective defence and deterrence to new threats,

including hybrid actions, and new domains of conflict, including cyber and space;”

“maintain NATO’s policy towards Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence as well as openness

for meaningful dialogue, while holding Russia accountable for its unacceptable violations of

international laws and norms and adopting necessary responses”;

“reaffirm NATO’s readiness to address any threats and challenges which have the potential to affect

Euro-Atlantic security at 360

degrees”.

39. Notably, on cyber threats,

the communiqué’s language on “significant malicious cumulative cyber

activities”

lives up to Assembly calls on persistent cyber campaigns, laid out in

Resolution 459

(2019).

VI.

RESILIENCE

40.

Enhancing resilience is one of the eight planks in the NATO 2030 agenda as “essential for credible

deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”

The renewed focus on

resilience is both a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as of the growing number of hybrid and cyber

attacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation activities and interference in democratic processes in recent

years. Resilience clearly remains a national responsibility, including in terms of goals and implementation,

and must be compatible with national competences, structures, processes and obligations as well as those

of the EU, where applicable.

41. Leaders agreed on a Strengthened Resilience Commitment as a follow-up to a commitment made at

the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Based upon a whole-of-government approach, Allies strive to achieve the seven

NATO Baseline Requirements (see below) through:

enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness;

closer engagement with Allied populations, the private sector and non-governmental actors; and

the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies, including the new Euro-Atlantic Centre for

Resilience in Romania.

NATO’s

seven baseline requirements on resilience

1) assured continuity of government and critical government services;

2) resilient energy supplies;

3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people;

4) resilient food and water resources;

5) ability to deal with mass casualties;

6) resilient communications systems; and finally

7) resilient transportation systems.

As part of the NATO 2030 agenda, a more

integrated and better coordinated approach

to resilience will be developed “to reduce

vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can

effectively operate in peace, crisis and

conflict”. As a next step, Allies will now

develop “a proposal to establish, assess,

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

review and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation

plans”.

42. Continued or enhanced resilience efforts in NATO partnerships is emphasised throughout the

communiqué, in particular with the EU, Finland, Georgia, Sweden and Ukraine.

Key areas for enhancing resilience:

the seven areas covered by the NATO Baseline Requirements, with a notable emphasis on critical

infrastructure, key industries, supply chains, and communication information networks, including 5G

cyber threats

hybrid activities

implications of climate change

the fight against terrorism

resilience of NATO structures and installations

energy security

space

Hybrid activities and resilience:

43. The communiqué stresses the threats and challenges from actors using hybrid activities to target

political institutions, public opinion and the security of our citizens.

44. The primary

responsibility lies nationally, but “NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally

at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid

Support Team”. NATO is also enhancing hybrid

situational awareness and developing comprehensive

preventive and response options.

45. The communiqué

notes that “Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid

activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national

prerogative.”

46. The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that a malicious hybrid activity could, in certain

circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article

5 of the Washington Treaty [see

deterrence and collective defence section].

Cyber threats and resilience:

47.

Cyber threats are “complex, destructive, coercive, and becoming ever more frequent”,

and cyber

resilience is therefore critical, leaders note. Notably, activities targeting critical infrastructure and democratic

institutions “might have systemic effects and cause significant harm”, they state.

48. Allies remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. Leaders

endorsed a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which spans the three core tasks and overall deterrence

and defence posture but also enhances Alliance resilience.

49. The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that malicious cyber or hybrid activities could, in certain

circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article

5 of the Washington Treaty.

50. Leaders also commit to increase political consultation on cyber activities and to further development of

cyber partnerships.

The Assembly’s position:

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

51. The steps taken on resilience are generally in line with recent recommendations by the Assembly on

resilience, especially on hybrid and cyber threats as well as increasing cooperation with NATO partners and

aspirants. However, the communiqué does not specifically mention enhanced resilience efforts when it comes

to future

pandemics

and the defence industrial capacity within the Alliance, which were key themes across

the Assembly’s 2020 recommendations.

Nor does it take a broad view of resilience encompassing democratic

resilience and a whole of society approach. Resilience is the topic of

one

of the Committees’ reports in 2021.

VII. THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

52.

Allied leaders reiterated that “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat”

to the security of populations in the Alliance as well as international stability and prosperity. They vowed to

“continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity”.

53. NATO will stay the course in the fight against terrorism, which is by now well established and notably

comprises awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and

partnerships as well as operations. This includes NATO’s continued contributions

in the Global Coalition to

Defeat ISIS/Da’esh.

NATO will also maintain some support for Afghanistan following the termination of its

military presence. Although the communiqué does not outline specific counterterrorism tasks going forward,

this could be one of the areas covered in future training of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces

[see

Afghanistan section].

Recent and next steps:

NATO is stepping up support to partner countries, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) region [see

Middle East and Africa section].

For example, NATO has recently upgraded

defence capacity building assistance to Jordan.

NATO places more emphasis on the need to protect Allied forces against terrorist misuse of technology

and the importance of capitalising on emerging technologies in counter-terrorism efforts.

By the end of 2021, NATO will update the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan.

The Assembly’s position:

54. The communiqué

is broadly in line with the Assembly’s policy recommendations in 2020 and in previous

years.

Declaration 460

urged the Alliance “to further enhance NATO and Allies’ counterterrorism efforts, and

continue to share assessments about the future evolutions

of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.

Resolution 465

noted the Assembly’s alarm “that the easy availability of commercial and dual-use

technologies allows malignant nonstate actors, including terrorist and extremist militant groups, to weaponize

them”.

In its statements on the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, the Assembly also stressed the

importance of holding the Taliban and other Afghan actors to their pledge to cut ties with Al Qaeda and other

terrorist groups.

VIII.

MAINTAINING NATO’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE

55.

Allied leaders agreed to broaden and deepen Allied and NATO’s work on maintaining NATO’s

technological edge. The communiqué

makes clear the Alliance must “exploit the opportunities and to address

the challenges posed by emerging and disruptive technologies” –

the misuse of which is mentioned for the

first time in the list of threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security. One of the eight planks of the

NATO 2030 initiative is to foster technological cooperation, promote interoperability and encourage the

development and adoption of technological solutions to address Allied military needs. Research and

development and innovation are thus vitally important, leaders note.

In all of this, Allies will be “guided by

principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in

relevant international fora”.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

56. The communiqué specifically points to contributions technologies will continue to make in the fight

against terrorism, NATO’s new warfighting concept, force and capability development and NATO-EU

cooperation.

Concrete decisions:

set-up of a civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic

establishment of a NATO Innovation Fund to support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and

disruptive technologies

adoption of a strategy to foster and protect Emerging and Disruptive Technologies focused on:

identifying, developing, and adopting emerging and disruptive technologies

preserving interoperability

safeguarding sensitive technologies

actively addressing the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by other

actors

further leveraging partnerships, including with the private sector and academia

The Assembly’s position:

57. The communiqué is in keeping with Assembly long-standing warnings about the growing speed of

technological change and the need for the Alliance to retain its military edge. In 2020,

Declaration 460

urged

the Alliance “to step up investment and

Allied collaboration in defence science, technology, research and

development to maintain NATO’s scientific and technological edge, especially in emerging and disruptive

technologies and new domains of warfare, consistent with Allies’ international obligations”.

Resolution 465

deals specifically with defence innovation. In this context, the Summit’s concrete decisions bode well if fully

and swiftly implemented.

IX.

BURDEN SHARING

58. Allied leaders recommitted to the Defence Investment Pledge, agreed upon at the 2014 Wales Summit

and

reaffirmed ever since. They did so “in its entirety” and with “unwavering commitment”.

Leaders reaffirmed

their “commitment to continue our efforts as a matter of priority across the three pillars of cash, capabilities,

and contributions.”

59. They stressed

that “Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance’s cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and

ability to fulfil our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5 commitments.”

Further improvements on burden sharing

remains an individual and collective responsibility.

60. Leaders noted that the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence

capabilities by the European Union (EU), avoiding unnecessary duplication, contributes to transatlantic

burden sharing.

Progress since 2014:

considerable progress with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure

by end of 2021, European Allies and Canada will have added USD 260 billion

10 Allies expected to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence in 2021 (expectation by 2024: about 20)

24 Allies spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment (expectation by

2024: about 27)

The Assembly’s

position:

61. The communiqué is very well in line with well-established Assembly recommendations. In

Declaration 460

in 2020, the NATO PA urged the Alliance “to

continue and reinforce efforts to implement the

Defence Investment Pledge and parallel efforts in terms of capabilities and contributions to operations, as

fair sharing between the Allies of the burdens and responsibilities for defence is crucial for Alliance cohesion

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

and necessary to maintain and, where necessary, rebuild the military capabilities to deter and defend against

potential adversaries; initiatives aimed at reinforcing European defence must be conducted in

complementarity with the strengthening

of NATO”.

One

of the 2021 Committee reports deals with Allied

defence spending and

one

with the broader issue of burden sharing and the transatlantic bond.

2014 Defence Investment Pledge

Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the following considerations:

Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence

will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment,

including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.

Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:

▪

halt any decline in defence expenditure;

▪

aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;

▪

aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling

NATO's capability shortfalls.

Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related

Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence

expenditures.

All Allies will:

▪

ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and

other agreed output metrics;

▪

ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO

standards and doctrines.

FUNDING A HIGHER LEVEL OF AMBITION

62.

“The NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO”, leaders stressed at the 2021

Summit. Delivering on the eight-point NATO 2030 agenda as well as living up to the three core tasks and the

requirements of the next Strategic Concept necessitates adequate resourcing at the national level and

through NATO common funding.

63.

Allied leaders therefore agreed to set out, at the 2022 Summit, “the specific requirements for additional

funding up to 2030 and the resource implications across the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Security

Investment Programme and the Civil Budget, as well as identify potential efficiency measures.” This could

pave the way to increase NATO common funding starting in 2023. Indeed, the NATO Secretary General

noted during his

press conference that “to do more together, Allies agreed that we also need to invest more

together in NATO” and that “this will require increased resources across all three NATO budgets: military,

civil, and infrastructure.” He highlighted areas such as joint

training and exercises, command and control,

cyber defences, pre-positioned equipment, infrastructure, and capacity-building for partners.

64. Future common funding and its use is likely to be one of the main issues for discussion as Allies prepare

the next Strategic Concept and next NATO Summit.

The Assembly’s position:

65.

The NATO PA has no recently established position on the level of NATO common funding.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

XI.

IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SECURITY

66.

The Brussels Summit marks a milestone in the Alliance’s approach to climate change.

For the first time

in a Summit communiqué,

Allied leaders agreed climate change is a “threat multiplier that impacts Alliance

security”, calling it “one of the defining challenges of our times”. Climate change is one of the eight NATO

2030 topics.

NATO set three goals for itself in connection to climate change:

become the leading international organisation on understanding and adapting to the impact of climate

change on security

set target for the reduction of emissions by NATO structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of

reaching net zero emissions by 2050

hold regular high-level climate and security dialogue

Next steps:

implementation of Action Plan on NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security

annual assessments of the impact of climate change on NATO’s strategic environment, missions and

operations

incorporation of climate change considerations into the full spectrum of work

develop a mapping methodology to help Allies measure emissions from military activities and

installations

strengthen exchanges with partner countries, international and regional organisations as well as the

Additional notes:

67. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept identified climate change as a key environmental and resource

constraint, alongside health risks, water scarcity and increasing energy needs. The 2012 and 2014 NATO

Summits reiterated this language, but it dropped out of Summit communiqués since then.

The Assembly’s

position

68. The communiqué brings NATO broadly in line with long-standing Assembly recommendations. Since

the 1980s, the Assembly has been a pioneer in identifying and discussing the security impact of climate

change. Since

Resolution 427

in 2015, the Assembly has called upon the Alliance to fully recognize climate

change-related risks as significant threat multipliers.

XII.

NATO’S OPEN DOOR POLICY

69.

The Summit communiqué includes a general reaffirmation that NATO’s door remains open to new

members, but no new steps are taken in relations with the three current aspirants: Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Georgia and Ukraine.

70. The Summit reaffirms the decision taken by Allied leaders in Bucharest in 2008 that Georgia and

Ukraine “will become” NATO members, with the Membership Action Plan an integral part of the process.

The emphasis, in the communiqué

and in the NATO Secretary General’s remarks, is on the importance for

aspirants to continue with necessary reforms.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

Additional notes:

71. Expectations were high, particularly in Ukraine, that the Brussels Summit might endorse a Membership

Action Plan for Ukraine.

Ukrainian authorities had actively campaigned for MAP in the aftermath of Russia’s

military build-up on their borders and in occupied Crimea.

The Assembly’s position:

72.

The Assembly has traditionally been a champion of NATO’s Open Door policy, and

its

declaration 460

on NATO 2030 called on Allies to reaffirm that NATO remains open. It has not called for MAP for Ukraine

and Georgia in its recent recommendations, but the Assembly continues to actively support Ukraine and

Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic

integration through the Ukraine-NATO and Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary

Council. The NATO PA also keeps an active ongoing focus on the Western Balkans.

XIII.

NATO’S CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION

AND DISARMAMENT

73.

The Summit communiqué reaffirms the key principles of NATO’s long-standing

policies on arms control,

non-proliferation and disarmament, while taking into account recent positive and negative developments.

74.

Allied leaders thus reaffirmed:

NATO’s

readiness to further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation taking into

account the prevailing security environment;

NATO’s commitment to the full implementation of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects;

NATO’s

support for the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all

provisions of the NPT and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

NATO’s opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW);

NATO’s concern

about the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) among state and non-state actors, and commitment to defend against chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats;

NATO’s commitment to uphold the

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), promote the goals and

objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and support work on a fissile material cut-

off treaty;

NATO’s commitment to preserve, strengthen and modernise conventional arms control in Europe

well as call for Russia to return to compliance with all its obligations and commitments.

Relations with Russia:

75.

Allied leaders condemned Russia’s direct violation and non-compliance

with an increasing range of

arms control commitments, including the INF Treaty, the CWC and Open Skies Treaty.

76. They welcomed the extension by the United States and Russia of the New START Treaty and

expressed their support for new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control

measures, “taking into account all Allies’ security”.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK):

77.

Allied leaders reaffirmed their “full support to the goal of the complete, verifiable, and

irreversible

denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs [United Nations Security Council

Resolutions]”.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

Iran:

78. Allied leaders restated their support for ongoing discussions to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPoA), including as a pathway to addressing further regional and security concerns. They

condemned Iran’s support to proxies and ballistic missile activities in violation of UN Security Council

resolutions and urged Iran to stop its destabilising activities.

Syria:

79.

Allied leaders condemned Syria’s repeated use of chemical weapons and welcomed the suspension of

Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC. NATO will also continue to monitor the ballistic missile threat

from Syria, particularly to Turkey.

The Assembly’s position:

80. The

Summit’s language on arms control is well in line with the Assembly’s statements. The Assembly

has been supportive of arms control conditional upon the prevailing security environment. It has

welcomed

the extension of New START, while condemning Russia’s ongoing violation of the INF and other arms control

treaties and commitments. It has also

welcomed

the resumption of talks on the JCPoA as a first step towards

addressing a range of other arms control challenges, including Russia’s violations of its international

obligations, the need to engage China in new arms control agreements addressing its modern and growing

nuclear arsenal, and North Korea’s ongoing development of a nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile

programme.

One

of the Assembly’s reports in 2021 deals with the current challenges to nuclear arms control

and strategic stability.

XIV.

NATO’S PARTNERSHIPS

81. The importance of training and building the capacity of partners is one of the eight priorities under

NATO 2030 and the Summit makes reference to specific partnerships, but without providing an overall vision

for the future of

NATO’s partnerships. This might be addressed instead as part of the elaboration of NATO’s

next Strategic Concept.

82. The communiqué does, however, signal an interest in developing existing partnerships and exploring

new partnerships beyond the Euro-Atlantic area to jointly address challenges to the rules-based international

order. Africa, Asia and

–

for the first time

–

Latin America are specifically mentioned [see also

values and

international order section].

NATO-EU relations:

83. The communiqué

reiterates NATO’s position on the NATO-EU

strategic partnership as well as including

some new language [see

NATO-EU relations section].

Finland and Sweden:

84. Once again, Finland and Sweden receive a specific reference in a NATO communiqué, highlighting

their specific contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and extensive cooperation with NATO. The communiqué

signals NATO’s intention to further deepen these partnerships.

Georgia and Ukraine:

85. The communiqué reaffirms

the bases of NATO’s close partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine as well

as support for both countries’ Euro-Atlantic

aspiration [see

Open Door section].

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

Western Balkans:

86.

The communiqué reaffirms NATO’s strong commitment

to the security and stability of the Western

Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region.

It also signals NATO’s

intention to enhance capacity building support in the region.

87. Allied leaders also reaffirm their support to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an aspirant country and

encourage further progress on necessary reform, without prejudice to a final decision on membership

–

which

is currently tied up in internal political differences.

88. NATO leaders also reaffirm their ongoing support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, for

the NATO-Serbia partnership and for KFOR.

Middle East and Africa:

89. The communiqué largely reiterates previous NATO statements on the importance of close cooperation

with partners in the South [see

Middle East and Africa section].

Belarus:

90. The communiqué includes a specific paragraph expressing concern about ongoing developments in

Belarus, which is a NATO partner, albeit with very limited cooperation. This includes the unacceptable

diversion of a civilian aircraft, and domestic repression. It also urges transparency in connection with the

Zapad-21 exercise conducted together with Russia.

Asia-Pacific

91. The communiqué signals that work is ongoing to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation

with partners in the region

–

Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea in response to global

security challenges, including to the rules-based international order.

Afghanistan and Central Asia:

92. The communiqué signals that with the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, the Alliance opens

a new chapter in relations with Afghanistan [see

Afghanistan section].

It also indicates NATO’s willingness to

explore further cooperation with Central Asia.

The Assembly’s position:

93. Partnerships with lawmakers from countries seeking a closer association with NATO are an essential

dimension of the Assembly’s work. Today, the

Assembly’s partnerships

are wide and deep. The Assembly

complements

and reinforces NATO’s own programme of partnership and cooperation.

94. The NATO PA regularly calls upon NATO to develop its partnership programmes, including with the

above partners.

Such calls are mainstreamed throughout the Assembly’s work, reports and

resolutions. In

2020, NATO PA lawmakers put specific emphasis on partnerships in the

Western Balkans, the Gulf

and the

Black Sea

regions, on

defence capacity building

and on the

NATO-EU partnership. Declaration 460

also

underlined the importance of partners, with one of the three suggested priorities for NATO 2030 being “An

Alliance with a Global Voice and Broad Network of Partners”.

In 2021, the Assembly

put a special emphasis

on NATO partners in

Asia

in a report on science and technology cooperation and in the Middle East and

North Africa through reports on the

Mediterranean security agenda,

the

ten-year anniversary of the Arab

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

Spring

and

Iraq.

One report also deals with the situation in

Belarus.

Moreover, the 2021 Spring Session was

hosted by

Sweden,

albeit online.

XV. NATO-EU RELATIONS

95.

The Summit communiqué reaffirmed the

main pillars of NATO’s policy towards the

EU, namely:

Recognition of the NATO-EU

strategic partnership and the EU’s role as a unique and essential partner

for NATO;

Reaffirmation that NATO remains “the transatlantic framework for strong

collective defence and the

essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies”;

Recognition of “the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence”, and support for

“the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable

defence capabilities, avoiding

unnecessary duplication”;

NATO’s call for non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in European defence efforts;

NATO’s readiness to “further strengthen [the] strategic partnership [with the EU] in a spirit of full mutual

openness,

transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ different mandates,

decision-making

autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations”, including

by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals; and

NATO’s

support for the ongoing political dialogue with the EU.

At the same time, the communiqué includes several new statements on NATO-EU relations.

96.

97. First, Allied leaders specifically cite the EU as a key partner in efforts to defend the rules-based

international order

–

one of the key priorities for NATO 2030

–

as well as in relations with China and in

promoting stability in Iraq.

98. Second, the Summit communiqué lists a number of new developments and priority areas in the strategic

environment which provide opportunities for closer NATO-EU cooperation, namely: resilience, emerging and

disruptive technologies, security implications of climate change, disinformation and growing geostrategic

competition.

99. Third, the communiqué makes an indirect reference to the concomitant processes of NATO updating

its Strategic Concept and the EU developing its Strategic Compass as an opportunity for further consultation

and cooperation.

The Assembly’s position:

100. In line with the Summit communiqué, the Assembly has generally welcomed the strengthening of the

NATO--EU strategic partnership. In its recommendations on NATO 2030, it has also identified the EU as a

key partner in addressing the challenges posed by China’s rise. At the same time, the Assembly has

consistently

stressed the importance of coherence and complementarity and reaffirmed NATO’s unique role

as the principal forum for transatlantic consultation and guarantor of collective defence. The Assembly also

insists on the need to fully involve non-EU Allied countries.

The Parliament of Belarus was granted Associate membership in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1992 but

its status remains suspended since 1997.

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

XVI. AFGHANISTAN

101.

The Summit confirmed the end of NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan, while restating the pillars

of NATO’s new relationship with, and support for, Afghanistan, namely:

ongoing training and financial support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, including

through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund

ongoing diplomatic engagement, including through the office of the NATO Senior Civilian

Representative in Kabul

transitional funding to ensure continued functioning of the Kabul airport

dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners

support for the ongoing peace process.

The Assembly’s position:

102. The Assembly has

welcomed

Allies’ decision to end NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan, while

stressing the need to hold all actors in Afghanistan, particularly the Taliban, to their commitments to

guarantee that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan can never again threaten Allied security,

and to protect the significant political, economic, and social gains made by Afghan citizens, especially women

and girls, since 2001.

XVII. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

103.

The 2021 Summit made clear that Allied leaders remain committed to enhancing NATO’s long-standing

engagement in the Middle East and Africa, working with partner nations and relevant international

organisations.

104. While staying the course on its established policies and efforts, one of the eight NATO 2030 planks is

the substantial strengthening of NATO’s ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners.

Such training and capacity building is particularly relevant in the Middle East and Africa.

105. Leaders also committed to strengthening political dialogue and practical cooperation with

NATO’s

Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners.

106. In Iraq, the Alliance will strengthen its support through the NATO Mission Iraq.

107. Concerning the crisis in Libya, Allied leaders

welcome recent progress achieved and “remain committed

to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area of defence and security institution building, taking

into account political and security conditions.”

108. While NATO has no involvement in Syria, the communiqué notes that the conflict

“continues to have

significant consequences on the stability of the region and the

security of NATO’s south-eastern border”.

NATO stands ready to defend NATO territory and borders.

109. Leaders reaffirmed their earlier statements that the deteriorating situation in the Sahel region matters

to NATO’s collective security and that the Alliance “remains open, upon request, to consider further

engagements in the region.”

NATO currently focuses on the long-standing partnership with Mauritania and

dialogue with relevant institutional actors in the region. Going forward, NATO will enhance its engagement

with the G5 Sahel structures.

The Assembly’s position:

110. The NATO PA maintains a strong emphasis on political, economic, and strategic

developments in the

Middle East and Africa,

as the Euro-Atlantic

community’s security, prosperity, and stability are directly linked

to developments in these regions. The communiqué is very well aligned with the Assembly positions, for

NPA, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 24: NATO PA Post Summit conference + info document on Summit communiqué

106 SPE 21 E

example

Declaration 460’s

call “to strengthen support to stability and defence and related security capacity

building in the partner countries

[…] and to support selected partners upon request”.

The

Mediterranean and

Middle East Special Group’s

report for 2021 focuses specifically on

Iraq, while two other Committee reports

deal with

political

and

security

developments in the region.

XVIII. WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

111. Allied leaders recommitted to fully implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda set

out by the UN Security Council in all aspects of NATO’s own work and with partners. They underscored “the

critical importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability,

as well as the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls”.

112. Addressing the peace process in Afghanistan, Allied leaders also stressed that a lasting inclusive

political settlement should protect “the human rights of Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities”.

113.

Leaders also endorsed NATO’s new Policy on Preventing and

Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual

Violence to address such violence, which has devastating consequences on individuals, families, and entire

communities, can prolong conflict, trigger displacement, foster instability and is an impediment to sustainable

peace.

114.

In Jordan, NATO also contributed to the establishment of a Military Women’s Training Centre.

The Assembly’s position:

115. The Assembly has long been

a steadfast champion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

2020 again, Assembly members demonstrated their continuous commitment. The policy recommendations

outlined in

Declaration 460

and

Resolution 461

are in line with the communiqué language. The new Policy

on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, in particular, is a welcome new step in

line with a specific Assembly recommendation. However, more efforts are needed, and Resolution 461

outlines efforts Allies and NATO should pursue.

XIX.

NATO’S NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT

116.

NATO leaders tasked the Secretary General to lead the development of NATO’s next Strategic Concept

– the Alliance’s main strategic guidance

document

–

until the next NATO Summit in 2022 (which would also

be the current Secretary General’s last

Summit). The current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010. In

presenting this decision, the Secretary General highlighted two main drivers of this revision: to reaffirm

NATO’s values and to reflect the significant changes in the security environment.

117. No information has yet been made public about the process of revision of the Strategic Concept.

However, the language in the communiqué suggests it will likely be a much less elaborate process than in

2010, which involved extensive consultations, including through an independent group of experts led by

Madeleine Albright.

The Assembly’s position:

118. The Assembly has been urging NATO to adopt a new Strategic Concept since 2018 and made clear

its readiness to contribute actively to the process

–

just as it did in 2010.

________________