NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

NATO 2021 BRUSSELS SUMMIT: KEY OUTCOMES

14 June 2021

Information Document

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I.   NATO'S SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES & DEFENDING THE RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

1.   The Summit communiqué reaffirms, in its second paragraph, the importance of NATO's shared democratic values and principles as the "bedrock of unity, solidarity and cohesion". Allied leaders lay out two new concrete ways to bolster their commitment to shared values.

2.   First, they pledge to increase consultation "when fundamental values and principles are at risk" and add to their reaffirmation of the Alliance's democratic principles, a commitment to "the spirit and the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty".

3.   Second, the communiqué signals NATO's intention to play a greater role in addressing the increasing challenge that state and non-state actors pose to the rules-based international order and to democracy. Allied leaders highlight, in particular, Russia's multiple violations of its international commitments [see Russia section], but also China's "coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty" [see China section].

4.   Increased consultation and NATO's enhanced role in preserving and shaping the international rules-based order are two of the eight NATO 2030 priorities. They will likely feature as key issues in the next Strategic Concept. The NATO Secretary General specifically cited the reaffirmation of Allied values as one of the two reasons – together with changes in the security environment – why NATO needs a new Strategic Concept.

5.   As is the case in past communiqués, the importance of shared democratic values also features heavily in sections related to partnerships and the Open Door policy. A new emphasis is placed on the need to work with existing partners and new ones, including key global actors and other new interlocutors from Africa, Asia and Latin America, in addressing threats to the rules-based international order. Interestingly, this is the first time Latin America features in a recent Summit communiqué.

Additional notes:

6.   The NATO 2030 process is a result of concern related to the ongoing cohesion and unity of the Alliance in a context of serious tensions among Allies throughout 2019 in particular. At the London Summit in December 2019, Allied leaders tasked the NATO Secretary General to lead a reflection process on ways to strengthen NATO's political dimension, including consultation. This issue of consultation among Allies features first in the list of priorities for NATO 2030 with a "pledge to strengthen and broaden our consultations" and a "commitment to reinforc[e] consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk". These statements send a fairly clear and strong signal that Allies are prepared to discuss potential internal differences and tensions in the future – including issues related to fundamental values and principles.

The Assembly's position:

7.   The Assembly has made rededicating NATO to its democratic foundations a top priority for the NATO Summit, NATO 2030 and the future Strategic Concept. It has called for NATO to affirm its commitment to shared democratic values in words as well as in deeds. Specifically, it has urged Allies to establish a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters – a centre which would serve as a resource to monitor threats to democracy and assist Allies upon request. The Assembly's Working Group on a NATO Democratic Resilience Centre is tasked with refining the concept for this centre and building support.

8.   The Summit communiqué has little detail about how NATO intends to implement its renewed commitment to democratic values and principles and to defending the rules-based international order. However, it does include important new statements and commitments which open the way for further work and recommendations on these issues.

9.   The Assembly had also offered several recommendations on how to strengthen political consultation at NATO as well as NATO's role in defending the rules-based international order as part of its contribution on NATO 2030.

II.   THE EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

10.   Summit communiqués routinely include a short description of the threats and challenges which Allies consider relevant to Euro-Atlantic security. The Brussels Summit communiqué reaffirms a number of key threats and challenges highlighted in previous communiqués. Significantly, it also highlights a number of new challenges, which are likely to feature in NATO's next Strategic Concept.

Previously identified threats include:

-       Russia's aggressive actions
-       Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations

Other previously identified threats and challenges undermining Euro-Atlantic security include:

-       Cyber, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns
-       Instability beyond NATO's borders and its impact in terms of irregular migration and human trafficking
-       Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The list of new challenges includes:

-       A new reference to the "systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers"
-       The challenge that state and non-state actors pose not only to the rules-based international order but also to democracy across the globe
-       China's first inclusion in the list of challenges – following its first inclusion in a Summit communiqué in 2019
-       A new reference to the impact of growing advances in the space domain
-       A reference to the erosion of the arms control architecture
-       A new reference to the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies
-       Acknowledgment of climate change as a threat multiplier

The Assembly's position:

11.   The Assembly has recognised that these recent major shifts in the strategic environment require a revision of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. It has made this point in particular in the report and resolution presented by then General Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Gerald E. Connolly (United States) on the occasion of NATO's 70th anniversary in 2019. The same point is made in Declaration 460 on NATO 2030.

III.   THE THREAT FROM RUSSIA AND NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

12.   Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea by military force required a profound redefinition of NATO's relations with Russia. Whereas the 2010 Strategic Concept set the goal of a "true strategic partnership", since 2014, NATO has scaled down political cooperation and suspended practical cooperation and implemented a dual--track policy, which combines strong deterrence and defence with openness to meaningful dialogue. As part of the first pillar, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of NATO's deterrence and defence posture since the end of the Cold War. NATO has conditioned dialogue with Russia to Ukraine being the first topic of any discussion. As a result, Russia has been unwilling to hold meetings of the NATO-Russia Council since July 2019.

13.   Repeating language first used at the 2019 London Summit, the Brussels Summit communiqué clearly identifies "Russia's aggressive actions" as the top "threat to Euro-Atlantic security" and includes strong

language on Russia's multiple violations and aggressive actions. The Secretary General stated that the relationship with Russia is "at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War".

14.   The Summit reaffirms NATO's dual-track approach, while putting renewed emphasis on collective defence [see defence and deterrence section] and reaffirming NATO's response to Russia's military modernisation, build-up and violations of arms control commitments. The communiqué nonetheless holds out openness to dialogue as well as the goal of re-establishing a constructive relationship when Russia's actions make that possible. The Secretary General specifically signalled support for new strategic talks on future arms control [see arms control section].

15.   The communiqué also reiterates NATO's support for the territorial integrity of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and reaffirms the Alliance's Open Door policy [see Open Door section].

16.   Among the challenges posed by Russia, the communiqué lists:

- growing multi-domain military build-up
- more assertive and aggressive posture
- novel military capabilities
- provocative activities, including near NATO borders
- intensified hybrid actions against Allies and partners, including through disinformation, cyber activities and attempted interference in democratic processes
- strategic intimidation, including through extensive nuclear modernisation and diversification, aggressive and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and increasing focus on exercises involving dual--capable systems
- a growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, which poses significant risks from all strategic directions to security and stability – including Russia's development of missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty [see collective defence and deterrence section].

17.   While the communiqué specifically refers to China's challenge to the rules-based international order, the text leaves no doubt that NATO considers Russia as well as one of the "state actors" which "challenge the rules-based international order and seek to undermine democracy across the globe".

Leaders' messages about / to Russia:

- NATO does not seek confrontation and does not pose a threat to Russia.
- There will be no return to business as usual until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.
- Allies aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia when its actions make that possible.
- Allies have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.
- NATO Ballistic Missile Defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine its strategic deterrence.

Leaders' appeal to Russia:

- **Relations with the Czech Republic and the United States**: rescind designation as 'unfriendly countries'
- **Ukraine**: withdraw all forces; reverse the military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the Black Sea as well as stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports; stop fuelling the conflict in eastern Ukraine by providing financial and military support to the armed formations it backs
- **Georgia**: withdraw all forces; reverse the recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent states; implement the EU-mediated 2008 ceasefire agreement; end militarisation of these regions and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the continued construction of border-like obstacles; cease the human rights violations, arbitrary detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens
- **Moldova**: withdraw all forces; engage constructively in the Transnistria Settlement Process

- **International obligations and commitments**: return to full implementation of and compliance with the letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region

The Assembly's position:

18. The Assembly supports NATO's dual-track approach to Russia, and its statements on the threat posed by Russia and NATO's response are well in line with the communiqué language. One of the Committee's reports for 2021 deals with Russia's multifaceted challenge.

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S RISE

19. The 2019 London Leaders' Declaration marked the first time NATO acknowledged the implications of China's rise. However, it referenced China only once: "We recognise that China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance."

20. Over the last few years and months, views among Allies on the implications of China's rise in a strategic environment characterised by systemic competition have converged. Leaders note that "China's growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance". They commit to engaging China "with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance." The communiqué outlines the first pillars of an Allied policy on China based on these principles. Fleshing out Allied consensus on China will no doubt be one of the main issues for discussion as Allies prepare the next Strategic Concept.

21. China is referenced for the first time in the communiqué's section on threats and challenges and the text later mentions the "systemic challenges" posed by China's ambitions and behaviour. However, the text makes a clear difference between the actions of Russia and of China. While Russia's aggressive actions constitute a threat, China's growing influence and international policies can present challenges.

Specific challenges identified:

- systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and areas relevant to Alliance security, demonstrated by China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour
- coercive policies in contrast to NATO's fundamental values
- a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal (including more warheads and larger number of sophisticated delivery systems)
- opaqueness of military modernisation and military-civil fusion strategy
- certain cooperation activities with Russia, including in the Euro-Atlantic area
- lack of transparency
- use of disinformation

Leaders' appeals to China:

- uphold international commitments
- act responsibly in the international system
- engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building and transparency measures on nuclear capabilities and doctrine

On dialogue with China:

- maintain a constructive dialogue where possible
- seek opportunities to engage where relevant to Allied or common challenges (e.g. climate change)
- potentially seek information exchange, reciprocal transparency and understanding to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements

The Assembly's position:

22.   The Assembly has long acknowledged the growing impact of China's rise. More recently, in 2020, three comprehensive reports and one resolution dealt with the issue, and one of the 2021 reports examines China's military modernisation. The key takeaway was the Assembly's call to address the challenges posed by China collectively – without ever compromising the core values on which both the global liberal order and NATO were founded.

23.   The 2021 communiqué language is generally in line with the Assembly position. However, the Assembly has gone further in outlining a transatlantic strategy on China, notably in then General Rapporteur Gerald E. Connolly's report on *The Rise of China: Implications for Global and Euro-Atlantic Security* and the accompanying Resolution 464. Moreover, the Assembly more forcefully argues that exchanges on China with relevant NATO partners, the EU and like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific region should be pursued on the implications of China's rise, including in Declaration 460.

V.   DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

24.   The Summit reaffirms NATO's three core tasks of deterrence and collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. However, it puts a renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence, which is also the second of the eight priorities for NATO 2030. The communiqué makes clear that deterrence and defence are "at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond".

25.   This renewed focus is a response to what Allied leaders characterise as "the increasingly challenging security environment with risks arising from changes in the posture, doctrine, and behaviour of potential adversaries and their significant investments to develop, modernise, and expand capabilities".

26.   As a result, Allied leaders reiterate NATO's 360° approach, defining NATO's stated level of ambition as follows: "to respond to any threats, from state and non-state actors, from wherever they arise, and potentially from multiple directions in more than one region simultaneously". The communiqué reaffirms NATO's commitment to maintain its forward presence in the Alliance's East and the Black Sea, assurance measures across several regions, including in Turkey, and readiness to respond to potential threats from the South. The High North is also referenced for the first time in recent NATO communiqués, as an area where NATO will maintain "necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the Alliance's security interests".

27.   The Summit also reaffirmed that NATO's deterrence and collective defence will continue to be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities.

28.   Allied leaders agreed the following measures to further strengthen deterrence and collective defence:

- **a new deterrence and defence military concept** to guide enhanced advance planning for potential crisis and conflict, further improve the use and organisation of Allied forces and capabilities and ensure more effective command and control;
- **a new warfighting military concept** to ensure continued development of NATO's military and technological advantage;
- **further strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure**, i.e. the pool of Allied national and multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance's disposal;
- **continue to enhance the NATO Command Structure**, i.e. NATO's permanent multinational headquarters;
- maintain an ongoing focus on **readiness**, **ability to deploy forces in contested theatres** and **sustainment and reinforcement of deployed forces**;

- **improve NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities**, including sensors, interceptors and command and control; and
- **strengthen cooperation with relevant and like-minded partners**.

Deterrence and collective defence in space and cyber space and against hybrid threats:

29.   The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that malicious cyber or hybrid activities could, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

30.   Allies remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. Leaders endorsed a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which spans the three core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture but also enhances Alliance resilience. The communiqué makes clear, once again, that NATO's mandate remains defensive, but that Allies remain determined to employ the full range of capabilities against cyber threats. In this respect, leaders agreed to effectively integrate sovereign cyber effects – including offensive cyber capabilities – which are provided on a voluntary, national basis, into collective defence and Alliance operations and missions, stressing strong political oversight.

31.   Significantly, Allies, for the first time, "recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack." In other words, *persistent* malicious cyber *campaigns* could trigger Article 5.

32.   Similarly, Allied leaders agreed that "attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance" and "could lead to the invocation of Article 5" [see also resilience section].

Nuclear deterrence:

33.   The communiqué reaffirms NATO's previously agreed language on nuclear deterrence, notably:

- the core principle that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance;
- the role of the Alliance's strategic forces as the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies;
- the importance of nuclear burden-sharing arrangements – whereby European Allies provide capabilities and infrastructure to host US forward-deployed nuclear weapons.

34.   The Brussels Summit communiqué includes a new mention of NATO's support for efforts towards strategic risk reduction – an issue highlighted as well in sections of the communiqué relating to dialogue with Russia and with China.

Missile defence:

35.   The communiqué reiterates the contribution of missile defence to NATO's collective defence posture and recommits Allies to continue to deliver a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability. NATO's BMD has so far only reached initial operational capability, with only limited geographical coverage (southern NATO Europe only) and limited command and control. As already signalled in previous Summit's communiqués, reaching full operational capability would require more national assets (mostly radars and interceptors) and expanding the command and control capability. The latter is the only part of NATO's BMD resourced through NATO's common funding. The Brussels communiqué language suggests that future discussions on NATO's common funding [see funding section] could include consideration of currently unfulfilled requirements for NATO's BMD command and control, allowing NATO to reach the next milestone in developing its BMD capability.

36.   The communiqué also reiterates language meant to counter Russia's disinformation suggesting that the system is directed against it and restates NATO's openness in principle to discussing BMD with Russia.

Response to Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and development of new missiles:

37.   Leaders reiterated NATO's earlier statement that NATO has no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and development and deployment of new missiles. Instead, NATO will implement "a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures", including "strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO's nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; intelligence; and exercises."

The Assembly's position:

38.   The Summit's decisions are well in line with the Assembly's recommendations on deterrence and collective defence. In particular, in its declaration on NATO 2030, the Assembly had called on Allies to:

-    "reaffirm that NATO's greatest responsibility is to protect and defend collectively its territory and populations against attacks";
-    "continue to affirm the crucial role of a safe and resilient nuclear deterrent for the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture";
-    "continue to strengthen NATO's enhanced deterrence and defence posture in the East and the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and to continue to adapt collective defence and deterrence to new threats, including hybrid actions, and new domains of conflict, including cyber and space;"
-    "maintain NATO's policy towards Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence as well as openness for meaningful dialogue, while holding Russia accountable for its unacceptable violations of international laws and norms and adopting necessary responses";
-    "reaffirm NATO's readiness to address any threats and challenges which have the potential to affect Euro-Atlantic security at 360 degrees".

39.   Notably, on cyber threats, the communiqué's language on "significant malicious cumulative cyber activities" lives up to Assembly calls on persistent cyber campaigns, laid out in Resolution 459 (2019).

VI.   RESILIENCE

40.   Enhancing resilience is one of the eight planks in the NATO 2030 agenda as "essential for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks." The renewed focus on resilience is both a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as of the growing number of hybrid and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation activities and interference in democratic processes in recent years. Resilience clearly remains a national responsibility, including in terms of goals and implementation, and must be compatible with national competences, structures, processes and obligations as well as those of the EU, where applicable.

41.   Leaders agreed on a Strengthened Resilience Commitment as a follow-up to a commitment made at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Based upon a whole-of-government approach, Allies strive to achieve the seven NATO Baseline Requirements (see below) through:

-    enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness;
-    closer engagement with Allied populations, the private sector and non-governmental actors; and
-    the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies, including the new Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience in Romania.

NATO's seven baseline requirements on resilience
1) assured continuity of government and critical government services;
2) resilient energy supplies;
3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people;
4) resilient food and water resources;
5) ability to deal with mass casualties;
6) resilient communications systems; and finally
7) resilient transportation systems.

As part of the NATO 2030 agenda, a more integrated and better coordinated approach to resilience will be developed "to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict". As a next step, Allies will now develop "a proposal to establish, assess,

review and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation plans".

42.   Continued or enhanced resilience efforts in NATO partnerships is emphasised throughout the communiqué, in particular with the EU, Finland, Georgia, Sweden and Ukraine.

Key areas for enhancing resilience:

-     the seven areas covered by the NATO Baseline Requirements, with a notable emphasis on critical infrastructure, key industries, supply chains, and communication information networks, including 5G
-     cyber threats
-     hybrid activities
-     implications of climate change
-     the fight against terrorism
-     resilience of NATO structures and installations
-     energy security
-     space

Hybrid activities and resilience:

43.   The communiqué stresses the threats and challenges from actors using hybrid activities to target political institutions, public opinion and the security of our citizens.

44.   The primary responsibility lies nationally, but "NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team". NATO is also enhancing hybrid situational awareness and developing comprehensive preventive and response options.

45.   The communiqué notes that "Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative."

46.   The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that a malicious hybrid activity could, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [see deterrence and collective defence section].

Cyber threats and resilience:

47.   Cyber threats are "complex, destructive, coercive, and becoming ever more frequent", and cyber resilience is therefore critical, leaders note. Notably, activities targeting critical infrastructure and democratic institutions "might have systemic effects and cause significant harm", they state.

48.   Allies remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. Leaders endorsed a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which spans the three core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture but also enhances Alliance resilience.

49.   The communiqué reiterates earlier statements that malicious cyber or hybrid activities could, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack which could trigger the collective defence clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

50.   Leaders also commit to increase political consultation on cyber activities and to further development of cyber partnerships.

The Assembly's position:

51.   The steps taken on resilience are generally in line with recent recommendations by the Assembly on resilience, especially on hybrid and cyber threats as well as increasing cooperation with NATO partners and aspirants. However, the communiqué does not specifically mention enhanced resilience efforts when it comes to future pandemics and the defence industrial capacity within the Alliance, which were key themes across the Assembly's 2020 recommendations. Nor does it take a broad view of resilience encompassing democratic resilience and a whole of society approach. Resilience is the topic of one of the Committees' reports in 2021.

VII.   THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

52.   Allied leaders reiterated that "terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat" to the security of populations in the Alliance as well as international stability and prosperity. They vowed to "continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity".

53.   NATO will stay the course in the fight against terrorism, which is by now well established and notably comprises awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships as well as operations. This includes NATO's continued contributions in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh. NATO will also maintain some support for Afghanistan following the termination of its military presence. Although the communiqué does not outline specific counterterrorism tasks going forward, this could be one of the areas covered in future training of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces [see Afghanistan section].

Recent and next steps:

-       NATO is stepping up support to partner countries, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region [see Middle East and Africa section]. For example, NATO has recently upgraded defence capacity building assistance to Jordan.
-       NATO places more emphasis on the need to protect Allied forces against terrorist misuse of technology and the importance of capitalising on emerging technologies in counter-terrorism efforts.
-       By the end of 2021, NATO will update the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan.

The Assembly's position:

54.   The communiqué is broadly in line with the Assembly's policy recommendations in 2020 and in previous years. Declaration 460 urged the Alliance "to further enhance NATO and Allies' counterterrorism efforts, and continue to share assessments about the future evolutions of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations". Resolution 465 noted the Assembly's alarm "that the easy availability of commercial and dual-use technologies allows malignant nonstate actors, including terrorist and extremist militant groups, to weaponize them". In its statements on the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, the Assembly also stressed the importance of holding the Taliban and other Afghan actors to their pledge to cut ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

VIII.   MAINTAINING NATO'S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE

55.   Allied leaders agreed to broaden and deepen Allied and NATO's work on maintaining NATO's technological edge. The communiqué makes clear the Alliance must "exploit the opportunities and to address the challenges posed by emerging and disruptive technologies" – the misuse of which is mentioned for the first time in the list of threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security. One of the eight planks of the NATO 2030 initiative is to foster technological cooperation, promote interoperability and encourage the development and adoption of technological solutions to address Allied military needs. Research and development and innovation are thus vitally important, leaders note. In all of this, Allies will be "guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora".

56.   The communiqué specifically points to contributions technologies will continue to make in the fight against terrorism, NATO's new warfighting concept, force and capability development and NATO-EU cooperation.

Concrete decisions:

- set-up of a civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic
- establishment of a NATO Innovation Fund to support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies
- adoption of a strategy to foster and protect Emerging and Disruptive Technologies focused on:
  o identifying, developing, and adopting emerging and disruptive technologies
  o preserving interoperability
  o safeguarding sensitive technologies
  o actively addressing the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by other actors
  o further leveraging partnerships, including with the private sector and academia

The Assembly's position:

57.   The communiqué is in keeping with Assembly long-standing warnings about the growing speed of technological change and the need for the Alliance to retain its military edge. In 2020, Declaration 460 urged the Alliance "to step up investment and Allied collaboration in defence science, technology, research and development to maintain NATO's scientific and technological edge, especially in emerging and disruptive technologies and new domains of warfare, consistent with Allies' international obligations". Resolution 465 deals specifically with defence innovation. In this context, the Summit's concrete decisions bode well if fully and swiftly implemented.

IX.   BURDEN SHARING

58.   Allied leaders recommitted to the Defence Investment Pledge, agreed upon at the 2014 Wales Summit and reaffirmed ever since. They did so "in its entirety" and with "unwavering commitment". Leaders reaffirmed their "commitment to continue our efforts as a matter of priority across the three pillars of cash, capabilities, and contributions."

59.   They stressed that "Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance's cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5 commitments." Further improvements on burden sharing remains an individual and collective responsibility.

60.   Leaders noted that the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities by the European Union (EU), avoiding unnecessary duplication, contributes to transatlantic burden sharing.

Progress since 2014:

- considerable progress with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure
- by end of 2021, European Allies and Canada will have added USD 260 billion
- 10 Allies expected to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence in 2021 (expectation by 2024: about 20)
- 24 Allies spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment (expectation by 2024: about 27)

The Assembly's position:

61.   The communiqué is very well in line with well-established Assembly recommendations. In Declaration 460 in 2020, the NATO PA urged the Alliance "to continue and reinforce efforts to implement the Defence Investment Pledge and parallel efforts in terms of capabilities and contributions to operations, as fair sharing between the Allies of the burdens and responsibilities for defence is crucial for Alliance cohesion

and necessary to maintain and, where necessary, rebuild the military capabilities to deter and defend against potential adversaries; initiatives aimed at reinforcing European defence must be conducted in complementarity with the strengthening of NATO". One of the 2021 Committee reports deals with Allied defence spending and one with the broader issue of burden sharing and the transatlantic bond.

2014 Defence Investment Pledge

Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the following considerations:
o   Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.
o   Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:
▪   halt any decline in defence expenditure;
▪   aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
▪   aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.
o   Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.
o   All Allies will:
▪   ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed output metrics;
▪   ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines.

X.   FUNDING A HIGHER LEVEL OF AMBITION

62.   "The NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO", leaders stressed at the 2021 Summit. Delivering on the eight-point NATO 2030 agenda as well as living up to the three core tasks and the requirements of the next Strategic Concept necessitates adequate resourcing at the national level and through NATO common funding.

63.   Allied leaders therefore agreed to set out, at the 2022 Summit, "the specific requirements for additional funding up to 2030 and the resource implications across the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Security Investment Programme and the Civil Budget, as well as identify potential efficiency measures." This could pave the way to increase NATO common funding starting in 2023. Indeed, the NATO Secretary General noted during his press conference that "to do more together, Allies agreed that we also need to invest more together in NATO" and that "this will require increased resources across all three NATO budgets: military, civil, and infrastructure." He highlighted areas such as joint training and exercises, command and control, cyber defences, pre-positioned equipment, infrastructure, and capacity-building for partners.

64.   Future common funding and its use is likely to be one of the main issues for discussion as Allies prepare the next Strategic Concept and next NATO Summit.

The Assembly's position:

65.   The NATO PA has no recently established position on the level of NATO common funding.

XI.   IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SECURITY

66.   The Brussels Summit marks a milestone in the Alliance's approach to climate change. For the first time in a Summit communiqué, Allied leaders agreed climate change is a "threat multiplier that impacts Alliance security", calling it "one of the defining challenges of our times". Climate change is one of the eight NATO 2030 topics.

NATO set three goals for itself in connection to climate change:

-   become the leading international organisation on understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security
-   set target for the reduction of emissions by NATO structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by 2050
-   hold regular high-level climate and security dialogue

Next steps:

-   implementation of Action Plan on NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security
-   annual assessments of the impact of climate change on NATO's strategic environment, missions and operations
-   incorporation of climate change considerations into the full spectrum of work
-   develop a mapping methodology to help Allies measure emissions from military activities and installations
-   strengthen exchanges with partner countries, international and regional organisations as well as the EU

Additional notes:

67.   The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept identified climate change as a key environmental and resource constraint, alongside health risks, water scarcity and increasing energy needs. The 2012 and 2014 NATO Summits reiterated this language, but it dropped out of Summit communiqués since then.

The Assembly's position

68.   The communiqué brings NATO broadly in line with long-standing Assembly recommendations. Since the 1980s, the Assembly has been a pioneer in identifying and discussing the security impact of climate change. Since Resolution 427 in 2015, the Assembly has called upon the Alliance to fully recognize climate change-related risks as significant threat multipliers.

XII.   NATO'S OPEN DOOR POLICY

69.   The Summit communiqué includes a general reaffirmation that NATO's door remains open to new members, but no new steps are taken in relations with the three current aspirants: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine.

70.   The Summit reaffirms the decision taken by Allied leaders in Bucharest in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine "will become" NATO members, with the Membership Action Plan an integral part of the process. The emphasis, in the communiqué and in the NATO Secretary General's remarks, is on the importance for aspirants to continue with necessary reforms.

Additional notes:

71.   Expectations were high, particularly in Ukraine, that the Brussels Summit might endorse a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities had actively campaigned for MAP in the aftermath of Russia's military build-up on their borders and in occupied Crimea.

The Assembly's position:

72.   The Assembly has traditionally been a champion of NATO's Open Door policy, and its declaration 460 on NATO 2030 called on Allies to reaffirm that NATO remains open. It has not called for MAP for Ukraine and Georgia in its recent recommendations, but the Assembly continues to actively support Ukraine and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration through the Ukraine-NATO and Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary Council. The NATO PA also keeps an active ongoing focus on the Western Balkans.

XIII.   NATO'S CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

73.   The Summit communiqué reaffirms the key principles of NATO's long-standing policies on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, while taking into account recent positive and negative developments.

74.   Allied leaders thus reaffirmed:

-    NATO's readiness to further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation taking into account the prevailing security environment;
-    NATO's commitment to the full implementation of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects;
-    NATO's support for the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;
-    NATO's opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW);
-    NATO's concern about the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among state and non-state actors, and commitment to defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats;
-    NATO's commitment to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and support work on a fissile material cut-off treaty;
-    NATO's commitment to preserve, strengthen and modernise conventional arms control in Europe as well as call for Russia to return to compliance with all its obligations and commitments.

Relations with Russia:

75.   Allied leaders condemned Russia's direct violation and non-compliance with an increasing range of arms control commitments, including the INF Treaty, the CWC and Open Skies Treaty.

76.   They welcomed the extension by the United States and Russia of the New START Treaty and expressed their support for new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures, "taking into account all Allies' security".

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK):

77.   Allied leaders reaffirmed their "full support to the goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs [United Nations Security Council Resolutions]".

<u>Iran</u>:

78.   Allied leaders restated their support for ongoing discussions to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), including as a pathway to addressing further regional and security concerns. They condemned Iran's support to proxies and ballistic missile activities in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and urged Iran to stop its destabilising activities.

<u>Syria</u>:

79.   Allied leaders condemned Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons and welcomed the suspension of Syria's rights and privileges under the CWC. NATO will also continue to monitor the ballistic missile threat from Syria, particularly to Turkey.

<u>The Assembly's position</u>:

80.   The Summit's language on arms control is well in line with the Assembly's statements. The Assembly has been supportive of arms control conditional upon the prevailing security environment. It has welcomed the extension of New START, while condemning Russia's ongoing violation of the INF and other arms control treaties and commitments. It has also welcomed the resumption of talks on the JCPoA as a first step towards addressing a range of other arms control challenges, including Russia's violations of its international obligations, the need to engage China in new arms control agreements addressing its modern and growing nuclear arsenal, and North Korea's ongoing development of a nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile programme. One of the Assembly's reports in 2021 deals with the current challenges to nuclear arms control and strategic stability.

XIV.   NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS

81.   The importance of training and building the capacity of partners is one of the eight priorities under NATO 2030 and the Summit makes reference to specific partnerships, but without providing an overall vision for the future of NATO's partnerships. This might be addressed instead as part of the elaboration of NATO's next Strategic Concept.

82.   The communiqué does, however, signal an interest in developing existing partnerships and exploring new partnerships beyond the Euro-Atlantic area to jointly address challenges to the rules-based international order. Africa, Asia and – for the first time – Latin America are specifically mentioned [see also values and international order section].

<u>NATO-EU relations</u>:

83.   The communiqué reiterates NATO's position on the NATO-EU strategic partnership as well as including some new language [see NATO-EU relations section].

<u>Finland and Sweden</u>:

84.   Once again, Finland and Sweden receive a specific reference in a NATO communiqué, highlighting their specific contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and extensive cooperation with NATO. The communiqué signals NATO's intention to further deepen these partnerships.

<u>Georgia and Ukraine</u>:

85.   The communiqué reaffirms the bases of NATO's close partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine as well as support for both countries' Euro-Atlantic aspiration [see Open Door section].

Western Balkans:

86.   The communiqué reaffirms NATO's strong commitment to the security and stability of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region. It also signals NATO's intention to enhance capacity building support in the region.

87.   Allied leaders also reaffirm their support to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an aspirant country and encourage further progress on necessary reform, without prejudice to a final decision on membership – which is currently tied up in internal political differences.

88.   NATO leaders also reaffirm their ongoing support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, for the NATO-Serbia partnership and for KFOR.

Middle East and Africa:

89.   The communiqué largely reiterates previous NATO statements on the importance of close cooperation with partners in the South [see Middle East and Africa section].

Belarus:

90.   The communiqué includes a specific paragraph expressing concern about ongoing developments in Belarus, which is a NATO partner, albeit with very limited cooperation. This includes the unacceptable diversion of a civilian aircraft, and domestic repression. It also urges transparency in connection with the Zapad-21 exercise conducted together with Russia.

Asia-Pacific

91.   The communiqué signals that work is ongoing to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners in the region – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea in response to global security challenges, including to the rules-based international order.

Afghanistan and Central Asia:

92.   The communiqué signals that with the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, the Alliance opens a new chapter in relations with Afghanistan [see Afghanistan section]. It also indicates NATO's willingness to explore further cooperation with Central Asia.

The Assembly's position:

93.   Partnerships with lawmakers from countries seeking a closer association with NATO are an essential dimension of the Assembly's work. Today, the Assembly's partnerships are wide and deep. The Assembly complements and reinforces NATO's own programme of partnership and cooperation.

94.   The NATO PA regularly calls upon NATO to develop its partnership programmes, including with the above partners. Such calls are mainstreamed throughout the Assembly's work, reports and resolutions. In 2020, NATO PA lawmakers put specific emphasis on partnerships in the Western Balkans, the Gulf and the Black Sea regions, on defence capacity building and on the NATO-EU partnership. Declaration 460 also underlined the importance of partners, with one of the three suggested priorities for NATO 2030 being "An Alliance with a Global Voice and Broad Network of Partners". In 2021, the Assembly put a special emphasis on NATO partners in Asia in a report on science and technology cooperation and in the Middle East and North Africa through reports on the Mediterranean security agenda, the ten-year anniversary of the Arab

Spring and Iraq. One report also deals with the situation in Belarus.[1] Moreover, the 2021 Spring Session was hosted by Sweden, albeit online.

XV. NATO-EU RELATIONS

95.   The Summit communiqué reaffirmed the <u>main pillars of NATO's policy towards the EU</u>, namely:

-   Recognition of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and the EU's role as a unique and essential partner for NATO;
-   Reaffirmation that NATO remains "the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies";
-   Recognition of "the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence", and support for "the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication";
-   NATO's call for non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in European defence efforts;
-   NATO's readiness to "further strengthen [the] strategic partnership [with the EU] in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations' different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations", including by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals; and
-   NATO's support for the ongoing political dialogue with the EU.

96.   At the same time, the communiqué includes several new statements on NATO-EU relations.

97.   First, Allied leaders specifically cite the EU as a key partner in efforts to defend the rules-based international order – one of the key priorities for NATO 2030 – as well as in relations with China and in promoting stability in Iraq.

98.   Second, the Summit communiqué lists a number of new developments and priority areas in the strategic environment which provide opportunities for closer NATO-EU cooperation, namely: resilience, emerging and disruptive technologies, security implications of climate change, disinformation and growing geostrategic competition.

99.   Third, the communiqué makes an indirect reference to the concomitant processes of NATO updating its Strategic Concept and the EU developing its Strategic Compass as an opportunity for further consultation and cooperation.

<u>The Assembly's position</u>:

100.   In line with the Summit communiqué, the Assembly has generally welcomed the strengthening of the NATO--EU strategic partnership. In its recommendations on NATO 2030, it has also identified the EU as a key partner in addressing the challenges posed by China's rise. At the same time, the Assembly has consistently stressed the importance of coherence and complementarity and reaffirmed NATO's unique role as the principal forum for transatlantic consultation and guarantor of collective defence. The Assembly also insists on the need to fully involve non-EU Allied countries.

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[1]   The Parliament of Belarus was granted Associate membership in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1992 but its status remains suspended since 1997.

XVI. AFGHANISTAN

101.   The Summit confirmed the end of NATO's military operations in Afghanistan, while restating the pillars of NATO's new relationship with, and support for, Afghanistan, namely:

- ongoing training and financial support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, including through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund
- ongoing diplomatic engagement, including through the office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul
- transitional funding to ensure continued functioning of the Kabul airport
- dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners
- support for the ongoing peace process.

The Assembly's position:

102.   The Assembly has welcomed Allies' decision to end NATO's military presence in Afghanistan, while stressing the need to hold all actors in Afghanistan, particularly the Taliban, to their commitments to guarantee that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan can never again threaten Allied security, and to protect the significant political, economic, and social gains made by Afghan citizens, especially women and girls, since 2001.

XVII. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

103.   The 2021 Summit made clear that Allied leaders remain committed to enhancing NATO's long-standing engagement in the Middle East and Africa, working with partner nations and relevant international organisations.

104.   While staying the course on its established policies and efforts, one of the eight NATO 2030 planks is the substantial strengthening of NATO's ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners. Such training and capacity building is particularly relevant in the Middle East and Africa.

105.   Leaders also committed to strengthening political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners.

106.   In Iraq, the Alliance will strengthen its support through the NATO Mission Iraq.

107.   Concerning the crisis in Libya, Allied leaders welcome recent progress achieved and "remain committed to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area of defence and security institution building, taking into account political and security conditions."

108.   While NATO has no involvement in Syria, the communiqué notes that the conflict "continues to have significant consequences on the stability of the region and the security of NATO's south-eastern border". NATO stands ready to defend NATO territory and borders.

109.   Leaders reaffirmed their earlier statements that the deteriorating situation in the Sahel region matters to NATO's collective security and that the Alliance "remains open, upon request, to consider further engagements in the region." NATO currently focuses on the long-standing partnership with Mauritania and dialogue with relevant institutional actors in the region. Going forward, NATO will enhance its engagement with the G5 Sahel structures.

The Assembly's position:

110.   The NATO PA maintains a strong emphasis on political, economic, and strategic developments in the Middle East and Africa, as the Euro-Atlantic community's security, prosperity, and stability are directly linked to developments in these regions. The communiqué is very well aligned with the Assembly positions, for

example Declaration 460's call "to strengthen support to stability and defence and related security capacity building in the partner countries […] and to support selected partners upon request". The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group's report for 2021 focuses specifically on Iraq, while two other Committee reports deal with political and security developments in the region.

XVIII. WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

111.   Allied leaders recommitted to fully implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda set out by the UN Security Council in all aspects of NATO's own work and with partners. They underscored "the critical importance of women's full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability, as well as the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls".

112.   Addressing the peace process in Afghanistan, Allied leaders also stressed that a lasting inclusive political settlement should protect "the human rights of Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities".

113.   Leaders also endorsed NATO's new Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence to address such violence, which has devastating consequences on individuals, families, and entire communities, can prolong conflict, trigger displacement, foster instability and is an impediment to sustainable peace.

114.   In Jordan, NATO also contributed to the establishment of a Military Women's Training Centre.

The Assembly's position:

115.   The Assembly has long been a steadfast champion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In 2020 again, Assembly members demonstrated their continuous commitment. The policy recommendations outlined in Declaration 460 and Resolution 461 are in line with the communiqué language. The new Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, in particular, is a welcome new step in line with a specific Assembly recommendation. However, more efforts are needed, and Resolution 461 outlines efforts Allies and NATO should pursue.

XIX.   NATO'S NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT

116.   NATO leaders tasked the Secretary General to lead the development of NATO's next Strategic Concept – the Alliance's main strategic guidance document – until the next NATO Summit in 2022 (which would also be the current Secretary General's last Summit). The current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010. In presenting this decision, the Secretary General highlighted two main drivers of this revision: to reaffirm NATO's values and to reflect the significant changes in the security environment.

117.   No information has yet been made public about the process of revision of the Strategic Concept. However, the language in the communiqué suggests it will likely be a much less elaborate process than in 2010, which involved extensive consultations, including through an independent group of experts led by Madeleine Albright.

The Assembly's position:

118.   The Assembly has been urging NATO to adopt a new Strategic Concept since 2018 and made clear its readiness to contribute actively to the process – just as it did in 2010.

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