FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2020-21, Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2020-21, Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21, Udenrigsudvalget 2020-21
NPA Alm.del Bilag 23, UPN Alm.del Bilag 296, FOU Alm.del Bilag 87, URU Alm.del Bilag 251
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Brussels Summit Communiqué

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the

meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021

14 Jun. 2021 -

Press Release (2021) 086

Issued on 14 Jun. 2021

Last updated: 15 Jun. 2021 10:30

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have gathered in Brussels

to rea�½rm our unity, solidarity, and cohesion, and to open a new chapter in transatlantic

relations, at a time when the security environment we face is increasingly complex. NATO

remains the foundation of our collective defence and the essential forum for security

consultations and decisions among Allies. NATO is a defensive Alliance and will continue to

strive for peace, security, and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain �½rmly

committed to NATO’s founding Washington Treaty, including that an attack against one Ally shall

be considered an attack against us all, as enshrined in Article 5. We will continue to pursue a

360-degree approach to protect and defend our indivisible security and to ful�½l NATO’s three

core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

2. NATO is the strongest and most successful Alliance in history. It guarantees the security

of our territory and our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including

individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. We are bound together by our

common values, enshrined in the Washington Treaty, the bedrock of our unity, solidarity, and

cohesion. We commit to ful�½ling our responsibilities as Allies accordingly. We rea�½rm our

adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. We are

committed to the rules-based international order. We commit to reinforce consultations when

the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles

are at risk.

3. We face multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian

powers, as well as growing security challenges to our countries and our citizens from all strategic

directions. Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in

all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all. State and non-state actors

challenge the rules-based international order and seek to undermine democracy across the

globe. Instability beyond our borders is also contributing to irregular migration and human

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tra�½cking. China’s growing in�½uence and international policies can present challenges that we

need to address together as an Alliance. We will engage China with a view to defending the

security interests of the Alliance. We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other

asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more

sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid advances in the space domain are

a�½ecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the

arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is a threat

multiplier that impacts Alliance security. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect

and defend our territories and our populations against attack, and we will address all threats

and challenges which a�½ect Euro-Atlantic security.

4. We gather at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic continues to test our nations and our

resilience. NATO and Allied militaries have supported the civilian response to the pandemic,

while ensuring our collective defence and the e�½ectiveness of our operations. We have also

provided critical assistance to a number of partners through the delivery of vital medical

supplies. We pay tribute to all those who combat this pandemic in our countries and around the

world.

5. At our December 2019 meeting in London, we asked the Secretary General to carry out a

forward-looking re�½ection process to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension, including

consultations. We recognise the important contribution of the independent group appointed by

the Secretary General to support NATO 2030. As a result, today we agree NATO 2030 – a

transatlantic agenda for the future. Throughout its history, NATO has continuously adapted to a

changing security environment. The NATO 2030 agenda complements and builds on our

ongoing political and military adaptation, strengthens our ability to deliver on the three core

tasks and contributes to making our strong Alliance even stronger and ready for the future.

6. To that end we agree to:

Rea�½rm that NATO is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for

consultations and joint action on all matters related to our individual and collective

security. We pledge to strengthen and broaden our consultations and to ensure that NATO

remains �½exible and e�½ective to conduct military operations in support of our common

security. We rea�½rm the Alliance’s shared democratic principles as well as our

commitment to the spirit and the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty. We commit to

reinforcing consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our

fundamental values and principles are at risk.

Strengthen NATO as the organising framework for the collective defence of the Euro-

Atlantic area, against all threats, from all directions. We reiterate our commitment to

maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities

for deterrence and defence, and to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge, in its entirety. We

commit to the full and speedy implementation of ongoing work to further strengthen our

deterrence and defence posture, and we pledge to continue to improve the readiness of

our forces and to strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure to meet current and

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

future defence needs.

Enhance our resilience. Noting that resilience remains a national responsibility, we will

adopt a more integrated and better coordinated approach, consistent with our collective

commitment under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce vulnerabilities and

ensure our militaries can e�½ectively operate in peace, crisis and con�½ict. Allies will develop

a proposal to establish, assess, review and monitor resilience objectives to guide

nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation plans. It will be up to each

individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience goals and

implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is compatible with

respective national competences, structures, processes and obligations, and where

applicable those of the EU.

Foster technological cooperation among Allies in NATO, promote interoperability and

encourage the development and adoption of technological solutions to address our

military needs. For this purpose we will launch a civil-military Defence Innovation

Accelerator for the North Atlantic. We also agree to establish a NATO Innovation Fund,

where Allies who so wish can support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and

disruptive technologies in areas key to Allied security.

Enhance NATO’s ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international

order in areas that are important to Allied security. We will increase our dialogue and

practical cooperation with existing partners, including with the European Union, aspirant

countries and our partners in the Asia Paci�½c, and strengthen our engagement with key

global actors and other new interlocutors beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, including from

Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Substantially strengthen NATO’s ability to provide training and capacity building support to

partners, recognising that con�½ict, other security developments and pervasive instability in

NATO’s neighbourhood directly impact Allied security.

Aim for NATO to become the leading international organisation when it comes to

understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. We agree to

signi�½cantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations

without impairing personnel safety, operational e�½ectiveness and our deterrence and

defence posture. We invite the Secretary General to formulate a realistic, ambitious and

concrete target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and

military structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by

2050. We will also initiate a regular high-level climate and security dialogue to exchange

views and coordinate further action.

Invite the Secretary General to lead the process to develop the next Strategic Concept. The

Concept will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed

by NATO Leaders at the next Summit.

7. The NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO. It provides clear

guidelines for further adaptation to address existing, new and future threats and challenges,

building on the ongoing political and military adaptation of the Alliance. Delivering on the NATO

2030 agenda, the three core tasks and the next Strategic Concept requires adequate resourcing

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through national defence expenditure and common funding. Based on requirements, we agree

to increase such resourcing, including as necessary NATO common funding starting in 2023,

taking into account sustainability, a�½ordability and accountability. When we meet in 2022, we

will agree, alongside the Strategic Concept, the speci�½c requirements for additional funding up

to 2030 and the resource implications across the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Security

Investment Programme and the Civil Budget, as well as identify potential e�½ciency measures.

8. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of

all its members by political and military means. The evolving security environment increasingly

requires us to address threats and challenges through the use of military and non-military tools

in a deliberate, coherent, and sustained manner. NATO will take a tailored and structured

approach. NATO uses a variety of non-military tools which support the Alliance’s three core

tasks. It also serves as a platform for enhancing the coherent use of these tools by Allies, under

their own authority and control, and alongside other international actors. We will continue to

strengthen e�½ective, clear, and convincing strategic communication as an essential element to

support all three of NATO’s core tasks.

9. For more than twenty-�½ve years, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia,

including through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). While NATO stands by its international

commitments, Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments

outlined in agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship. We rea�½rm our

decisions towards Russia agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit and all our subsequent NATO

meetings. We have suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while

remaining open to political dialogue. Until Russia demonstrates compliance with international

law and its international obligations and responsibilities, there can be no return to “business as

usual”. We will continue to respond to the deteriorating security environment by enhancing our

deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the

Alliance. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. Decisions we have

taken are fully consistent with our international commitments, and therefore cannot be

regarded by anyone as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

10. We call on Russia to rescind the designation of the Czech Republic and the United States

as “unfriendly countries” and to refrain from taking any other steps inconsistent with the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

11. Russia’s growing multi-domain military build-up, more assertive posture, novel military

capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-

notice and snap exercises, the continued military build-up in Crimea, the deployment of modern

dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, military integration with Belarus, and repeated violations of

NATO Allied airspace, increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and contribute

to instability along NATO borders and beyond.

12. In addition to its military activities, Russia has also intensi�½ed its hybrid actions against

NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes attempted interference in

Allied elections and democratic processes; political and economic pressure and intimidation;

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

widespread disinformation campaigns; malicious cyber activities; and turning a blind eye to

cyber criminals operating from its territory, including those who target and disrupt critical

infrastructure in NATO countries. It also includes illegal and destructive activities by Russian

Intelligence Services on Allied territory, some of which have claimed lives of citizens and caused

widespread material damage. We stand in full solidarity with the Czech Republic and other Allies

that have been a�½ected in this way.

13. Russia has continued to diversify its nuclear arsenal, including by deploying a suite of

short- and intermediate-range missile systems that are intended to coerce NATO. Russia has

recapitalised roughly 80 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, and it is expanding its nuclear

capabilities by pursuing novel and destabilising weapons and a diverse array of dual-capable

systems. Russia continues to use aggressive and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and has

increased its ongoing emphasis on destabilising conventional exercises that include dual-

capable systems. Russia’s nuclear strategy and comprehensive nuclear weapon systems

modernisation, diversi�½cation, and expansion, including the qualitative and quantitative increase

of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, increasingly support a more aggressive posture of

strategic intimidation. We will continue to work closely together to address all the threats and

challenges posed by Russia.

14. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia,

and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders. In accordance with

its international commitments, we call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in all

three countries without their consent. We strongly condemn and will not recognise Russia’s

illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, and denounce its temporary occupation. The

human rights abuses and violations against the Crimean Tatars and members of other local

communities must end. Russia’s recent massive military build-up and destabilising activities in

and around Ukraine have further escalated tensions and undermined security. We call on

Russia to reverse its military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the Black Sea.

We also call on Russia to stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports. We

commend Ukraine’s posture of restraint and diplomatic approach in this context. We seek to

contribute to de-escalation. We are also stepping up our support to Ukraine. We call for the full

implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides, and support the e�½orts of the Normandy

format and the Trilateral Contact Group. Russia, as a signatory of the Minsk Agreements, bears

signi�½cant responsibility in this regard. We call on Russia to stop fuelling the con�½ict by

providing �½nancial and military support to the armed formations it backs in eastern Ukraine. We

reiterate our full support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. We stress the importance of ensuring its safety and full

and unhindered access throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the

Russia-Ukraine border, in accordance with its mandate. We further call on Russia to reverse its

recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent states; to

implement the EU-mediated 2008 cease�½re agreement; to end its militarisation of these regions

and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the continued

construction of border-like obstacles; and to cease the human rights violations, arbitrary

detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens. We reiterate our �½rm support to the Geneva

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International Discussions. We also call on Russia to engage constructively in the Transnistria

Settlement Process. We are committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova’s democratic

reforms and providing assistance through our Defence and Related Security Capacity Building

Initiative.

15. We remain open to a periodic, focused, and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to

engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding,

miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. NRC

meetings have helped us communicate clearly our positions, and we are ready for the next

meeting of the NRC. We will continue to focus our dialogue with Russia on the critical issues we

face. The con�½ict in and around Ukraine is, in current circumstances, the �½rst topic on our

agenda. NATO remains committed to making good use of the existing military lines of

communication between both sides to promote predictability and transparency, and to reduce

risks, and calls on Russia to do so as well. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship

with Russia when its actions make that possible.

16. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the

security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity. We categorically reject

and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms. Allies will continue to �½ght this threat

with determination, resolve, and in solidarity. While nations retain the primary responsibility for

their domestic security and their own resilience, the �½ght against terrorism demands a coherent,

long-term e�½ort by the international community as a whole, involving a wide range of

instruments and actors. NATO’s role in the �½ght against terrorism contributes to all three core

tasks of the Alliance, and is an integral part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence

and defence. Cooperation in NATO adds value to Allies’ national e�½orts and capacity to prevent,

mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism. We condemn all �½nancial

support of terrorism. We also recognise the need to address the conditions conducive to the

spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with

international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant

United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on the �½ght against terrorism.

17. We remain fully committed to NATO’s enhanced role in the international community’s

�½ght against terrorism, including through awareness and analysis, preparedness and

responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships, and operations. We continue to

implement our 2019 Action Plan and will update it by the end of this year, to take account of the

evolving terrorist threats. We are determined to meet our commitments under UNSCR 2396,

including through NATO’s new Battle�½eld Evidence Policy, supported by improved information

and data collection, preservation, sharing, and analysis, within NATO’s mandate. We will

continue our work to defend against improvised explosive devices and chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We are developing capabilities to protect our forces

against terrorist misuse of technology, while capitalising on emerging technologies to help us in

the �½ght against terrorism. We are also stepping up support to partner countries to �½ght

terrorism themselves and deny terrorists safe haven, which in turn strengthens NATO’s own

security. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with partner countries and other

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international actors to ensure added value and complementarity. NATO continues to play its

part in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, including through our Airborne Warning &

Control System (AWACS) surveillance �½ights and sta�½-to-sta�½ support.

18. After almost 20 years, NATO's military operations in Afghanistan are coming to an end.

We have denied terrorists a safe haven from which to plot attacks against us, helped

Afghanistan to build its security institutions, and trained, advised, and assisted the Afghan

National Defence and Security Forces; they are now taking on full responsibility for security in

their country. We pay tribute to those who have lost their lives or have been wounded, and

express our deep appreciation to all the men and women who have served under the NATO �½ag,

and to their families.

19. Withdrawing our troops does not mean ending our relationship with Afghanistan. We

will now open a new chapter. We a�½rm our commitment to continue to stand with Afghanistan,

its people, and its institutions in promoting security and upholding the

hard-won gains of the last 20 years. Recalling our previous commitments, NATO will continue to

provide training and �½nancial support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces,

including through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. NATO will retain a Senior Civilian

Representative's O�½ce in Kabul to continue diplomatic engagement and enhance our

partnership with Afghanistan. Recognising its importance to an enduring diplomatic and

international presence, as well as to Afghanistan's connectivity with the world, NATO will provide

transitional funding to ensure continued functioning of Hamid Karzai International Airport. We

will also step up dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We

continue to support the ongoing Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process, and call on all

stakeholders to help Afghanistan foster a lasting inclusive political settlement that puts an end

to violence; safeguards the human rights of Afghans, particularly women, children, and

minorities; upholds the rule of law; and ensures that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe

haven for terrorists.

20. NATO remains a leading and active contributor to international security through

operations, missions, and activities. We are grateful to our partners for their substantial

contributions to these e�½orts. NATO and Allies support Iraq in its �½ght against ISIS/Da’esh and

terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commend the Government of Iraq and the

Iraqi Security Forces for their continued e�½orts to combat ISIS/Da’esh. Based on a request from

the Iraqi Government, we will strengthen our support to Iraq through our NATO Mission Iraq.

We will broaden our non-combat advisory, training, and capacity building mission to support

Iraq in building more e�½ective, sustainable, accountable, and inclusive security institutions and

forces. This expansion of NATO Mission Iraq, including additional support to the Iraqi security

institutions, will be demand-driven, incremental, scalable, and based on conditions on the

ground. It will be carried out with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, in full respect of Iraq’s

sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in close coordination with relevant partners and

international actors, including the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, the United Nations, and

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the European Union.

21. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the

Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond. We are united and resolute in our

ability and commitment to defend one another. We will maintain and further develop the full

range of ready forces and capabilities necessary to ensure credible deterrence and defence and

provide the Alliance with a wide range of options to tailor our response to speci�½c circumstances

and to respond to any threats, from state and non-state actors, from wherever they arise, and

potentially from multiple directions in more than one region simultaneously. While rea�½rming

our commitment to the three core tasks, we have placed a renewed emphasis on collective

defence, and have also ensured that NATO retains the ability to project stability and �½ght against

terrorism.

22. We welcome the signi�½cant progress already made to implement our previous decisions

to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and rea�½rm our commitment to their full

and speedy implementation. We have accelerated our military adaptation with increased

defence spending, modern capabilities, enhanced political and military responsiveness, and

higher readiness of our forces. NATO is taking forward a new military strategy through the

implementation of two signi�½cant military concepts that will further strengthen our ability to

deter and defend against any potential adversary and to maintain and develop our military

advantage now and in the future. The deterrence and defence concept provides a single,

coherent framework to contest and deter and defend against the Alliance’s main threats in a

multi-domain environment, and will strengthen our preparedness to address challenges,

particularly pervasive instability and strategic shocks. The war�½ghting concept provides a long-

term vision for maintaining and developing NATO’s decisive military edge. The implementation

of the deterrence and defence concept will guide enhanced advance planning to respond to

potential crisis and con�½ict, as well as further improve the use and organisation of Allied forces

and capabilities in all operational domains and ensure more e�½ective command and control.

We are developing strategic, domain-speci�½c and regional military plans to improve our ability to

respond to any contingencies and ensure timely reinforcement. We will emphasise persistent

activities in peacetime to support deterrence, including through the presence and dynamic

posture of our military forces and exercises, based on enhanced coordination amongst Allies

and NATO. Through the implementation of the war�½ghting concept, we will ensure that the

Alliance continuously develops its military and technological advantage, as the character of

con�½ict evolves. We commit to the full implementation of these new concepts, and to taking the

necessary steps to enhance the coherence between relevant national and NATO activities and

plans and the concepts.

23. We commit to further strengthening and modernising the NATO Force Structure to meet

current and future deterrence and defence needs. We will ensure a �½exible, agile, and resilient

multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right place at the right time. We will

strengthen modern command and control tailored to support our 360-degree posture, dynamic

force management, improved response system, and plans. In doing so, we will place increased

emphasis on the interdependence of geography, domains, and readiness. As part of these

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overall e�½orts, we are committed to continue increasing the readiness of our forces and the

Alliance’s rapid response capability, including through the ongoing implementation of the NATO

Readiness Initiative, which is designed to strengthen the culture of readiness and help to provide

forces at 30 days readiness or less. We have sourced all the combat forces of the NATO

Readiness Initiative with 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions,

and 30 kinetic air squadrons. They are being organised and trained as larger combat formations

for reinforcement and high-intensity war�½ghting, or for rapid military crisis intervention.

24. We will ensure that the NATO Command Structure is robust, resilient, and able to

undertake all elements of e�½ective command and control for simultaneous challenges across all

domains and the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale operations for collective

defence. Our two new commands, Joint Force Command Norfolk headquarters and Joint

Support and Enabling Command, as well as the Cyberspace Operations Centre, have achieved

Initial Operational Capability. Allied contributions to command and control through the NATO

Force Structure and national headquarters as well as their strengthened relationship with the

NATO Command Structure, including by providing host nation support, remain essential to

improve the Alliance’s regional understanding, vigilance, and ability to rapidly respond to any

threat from any direction.

25. We will not be constrained by any potential adversary as regards the freedom of

movement of Allied forces by land, air, or sea to and within any part of Alliance territory. Our

deterrence and defence posture is underpinned by credible forces, both in-place and ready for

reinforcement within Europe and from across the Atlantic. We will continue to strengthen and

regularly exercise the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We

will continue to give high priority, both nationally and in the Alliance, to ensuring enablement of

SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility to improve our ability to support the deployment and

sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory. These e�½orts

include taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements. We reiterate that

NATO’s e�½orts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies with the EU in the area of military

mobility should be pursued, including with regard to military mobility related procedures that

should apply to all Allies equally. We continue to reinforce our maritime posture and to protect

our sea lines of communication. We welcome the establishment of the NATO Maritime Security

Centre of Excellence in Turkey. We will maintain awareness of any potential threats to our

critical undersea infrastructure and will continue to address them nationally and, where needed,

collectively. We welcome the Full Operational Capability of NATO’s Rapid Air Mobility which was

activated and utilised by Allies for relief �½ights carrying critical supplies to Allies and partners in

response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

26. We rea�½rm our commitment to respond in a measured, balanced, coordinated, and

timely way to Russia’s growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles,

which is increasing in scale and complexity and which poses signi�½cant risks from all strategic

directions to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area. We will continue to implement

a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures to achieve Alliance

objectives, including strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and

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o�½ensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and

e�½ective; e�½orts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation;

intelligence; and exercises. We have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in

Europe.

27. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is an essential and continuous mission

in peacetime, crisis, and times of con�½ict, which contributes to deterrence and defence and the

indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to

reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. NATO IAMD incorporates all measures to

contribute to deter any air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce their e�½ectiveness. This

mission is conducted in a 360-degree approach and tailored to address all air and missile threats

emanating from all strategic directions.

28. NATO has enhanced its IAMD mission and we have taken steps to improve our IAMD

forces’ readiness and responsiveness in peacetime, crisis, and times of con�½ict, strengthening

our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are implemented for the security of the

Alliance. We are taking into account the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile

threats from state and non-state actors ranging from simple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to

sophisticated hypersonic missiles.

29. Allies will continue to work on NATO IAMD to ensure that it remains �½exible and

adaptive. Allies will also continue to e�½ectively train and exercise their IAMD forces. Allies have

committed to improving NATO IAMD capabilities, including sensors, interceptors, and command

and control, in particular through the NATO Defence Planning Process. We welcome the

establishment of NATO’s new IAMD Centre of Excellence in Greece.

30. Resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defence and the e�½ective ful�½lment of

the Alliance’s core tasks. It is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, anchored in

Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Recognising the signi�½cant progress achieved since our

Resilience Commitment at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, we have agreed today a Strengthened

Resilience Commitment that sets out further steps we intend to take in the coming years. We

will continue to take a whole-of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of our

societies, and achieving the seven NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through

enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagement with our

populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and the centres of expertise on

resilience established by Allies. We welcome the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for

Resilience in Romania. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, will maintain and

enhance the security of our critical infrastructure, key industries, supply chains, and

communication information networks, including 5G. NATO will further strengthen its own

resilience, ensuring our ability to consult, decide, and act together. We will continue to work

closely with our partners and other international organisations engaged in similar e�½orts in

order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure.

31. Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state

actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the

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security of our citizens. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests

with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a

hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support

Team. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack. NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter,

and defend against hybrid threats. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing

hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign

national prerogative. We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at

our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing

comprehensive preventive and response options. We will also continue to support our partners

as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

32. Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive, coercive, and

becoming ever more frequent. This has been recently illustrated by ransomware incidents and

other malicious cyber activity targeting our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions,

which might have systemic e�½ects and cause signi�½cant harm. To face this evolving challenge,

we have today endorsed NATO’s Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which will support

NATO’s three core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture, and further enhance our

resilience. Rea�½rming NATO’s defensive mandate, the Alliance is determined to employ the full

range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum

of cyber threats, including those conducted as part of hybrid campaigns, in accordance with

international law. We rea�½rm that a decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the

invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.

Allies recognise that the impact of signi�½cant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in

certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack. We remain committed

to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian

law, and international human rights law as applicable. We will promote a free, open, peaceful,

and secure cyberspace, and further pursue e�½orts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of

con�½ict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in

cyberspace. We will make greater use of NATO as a platform for political consultation among

Allies, sharing concerns about malicious cyber activities, and exchanging national approaches

and responses, as well as considering possible collective responses. If necessary, we will impose

costs on those who harm us. Our response need not be restricted to the cyber domain. We will

enhance our situational awareness to support NATO’s decision-making. Resilience and the

ability to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to vulnerabilities and intrusions is critical, as

demonstrated by malicious cyber actors’ exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic. NATO as an

organisation will therefore continue to adapt and improve its cyber defences. Five years since

the adoption of our Cyber Defence Pledge, we remain committed to uphold strong national

cyber defences as a matter of priority. We continue to implement cyberspace as a domain of

operations. We will enhance the e�½ective integration of sovereign cyber e�½ects, provided

voluntarily by Allies, into collective defence and Alliance operations and missions, in the

framework of strong political oversight. We will further seek to develop mutually bene�½cial and

e�½ective partnerships as appropriate, including with partner countries, international

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organisations, industry, and academia, furthering our e�½orts to enhance international stability in

cyberspace. We welcome the recent opening of the NATO Communications and Information

Academy in Portugal.

33. We recognise the growing importance of space for the security and prosperity of our

nations and for NATO’s deterrence and defence. Secure access to space services, products, and

capabilities is essential for the conduct of the Alliance’s operations, missions and activities. We

will accelerate our work to deepen and expand our use of space as an operational domain,

including through the NATO Space Centre in Germany and the upcoming establishment of the

Space Centre of Excellence in France, which we welcome. We will strengthen NATO’s space

domain awareness and better integrate space in our activities, including training and exercises,

resilience, and innovation e�½orts. Consistent with the Overarching Space Policy, NATO's

approach to space will remain fully in line with international law. We support the international

e�½orts to promote responsible behaviour in space. We consider that attacks to, from, or within

space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, the impact of which could

threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to

modern societies as a conventional attack. Such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article 5.

A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by

the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.

34. We continue to stand and act together in response to the challenging security

environment. As it continues to evolve, the Alliance will continue to respond and adapt as

necessary. Since the Warsaw Summit, we have established a forward presence in the eastern

part of the Alliance. We continue to improve our enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, and Poland through alignment with plans and by ensuring the ability of the four

combat-ready battlegroups to operate with national home defence forces in an integrated

manner. We have increased our contributions to our tailored Forward Presence on land, at sea,

and in the air in the Black Sea region, and we remain committed to its full implementation. Our

assurance measures, including exercises and various other air, land, and maritime activities,

remain in place and continue to provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance

and deterrence. We have increased our contributions to our tailored assurance measures for

Turkey, and we remain committed to their full implementation. We have a range of forces,

including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, which are ready to deploy on short notice to

respond to any contingencies and reinforce Allies. The full implementation of NATO’s

Framework for the South, as an enduring component of NATO’s deterrence and defence

posture, is ongoing. Building on the progress achieved since 2016, including the establishment

of the Hub for the South, we will continue to strengthen our capacity to deal with the threats and

challenges emanating from the South, including in the Mediterranean Sea region and its

approaches, by enhancing our strategic awareness, our plans, and the readiness of our forces.

In the High North, we will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities

in support of the Alliance’s security interests. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with

relevant and like-minded partners in the interests of NATO’s agreed deterrence and defence

objectives, in line with NATO’s decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate, and with

consideration of political implications.

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

35. We rea�½rm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment

Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance’s

cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to ful�½l our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5

commitments. We are, individually and collectively, committed to further improving the balance

of sharing the costs and responsibilities of Alliance membership. We have made considerable

progress since the Wales Summit with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence

expenditure, which reinforces our shared responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance.

All Allies have increased the amount they spend on defence in real terms and this trend is set to

continue. Since 2014, European Allies and Canada will have added 260 billion US dollars by the

end of this year. Furthermore, ten Allies are expected to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence

this year. About two-thirds of Allies plan to reach or exceed the 2% guideline by 2024.

Additionally, 24 Allies are spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major

equipment, including related research and development, and, according to their national plans,

27 Allies will meet the 20% guideline by 2024. Our overall security and defence depend both on

how much we spend and how we spend it. Allies continue to make valuable force and capability

contributions that bene�½t the security of the Euro-Atlantic area through NATO’s operations,

missions, and other activities, as well as through the operations and missions conducted under

national authority and the authority of other organisations. Allies invest considerable resources

in preparing their forces, capabilities, and infrastructure for Alliance activities and Allies’

operations. In the years ahead, in line with the Defence Investment Pledge and building on the

good progress to date, we a�½rm our commitment to continue our e�½orts as a matter of priority

across the three pillars of cash, capabilities, and contributions. We must and will do more.

36. We are investing in our military capabilities in order to meet new and enduring

challenges across all operational domains. We continue to deliver an array of robust and

sophisticated capabilities across all domains, including heavier, more high-end, technologically

advanced, better-supported forces and capabilities at the required readiness. We will continue

to improve and adapt the sustainability, deployability, and interoperability of our capabilities for

a demanding strategic environment, as well as high-end operations. Our national capability

development plans will support the full and timely implementation of the capabilities, in

particular those required by the Alliance in line with the NATO Defence Planning Process. In light

of the pace, breadth, and scale of technological developments, as we further develop our forces

and capabilities, we recognise the vital importance of research and development and innovation

to exploit the opportunities and to address the challenges posed by emerging and disruptive

technologies. This will help to ensure, individually and collectively, our technological edge now

and in the future. We continue working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on

Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national e�½orts and multinational

cooperation. We welcome the modernisation of the NATO AWACS �½eet and the progress of the

Alliance Future Surveillance and Control programme, as well as the initial operations of the new

Alliance Ground Surveillance Force. Through NATO-supported multinational cooperation

projects, Allies are committed to working together to develop or acquire new capabilities in key

areas such as air-to-air refuelling, training, precision strike, munitions, air defence, CBRN

defence, autonomous systems, and next-generation rotorcraft capability.

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37. The speed of technological change has never been higher, creating both new

opportunities and risks in the security environment and to the way NATO operates. We are

determined to preserve our technological edge, and ensure Alliance interoperability, in order to

maintain the credibility of our deterrence and defence posture. We have recently taken

important steps to that end, building on the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs)

Roadmap we agreed in 2019, and have now adopted our strategy to foster and protect EDTs.

This strategy outlines a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the

speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international

law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora. Moreover, this strategy

seeks to preserve our interoperability; safeguard our sensitive technologies; and actively

address the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by others, both now

and in the future. Drawing on the extensive innovation expertise of all 30 Allies, we will further

leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our

technological edge.

38. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our

populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should

doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. Faced with a

highly diverse, complex, and demanding international security environment, NATO is

determined to maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any

threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

39. Credible deterrence and defence is essential as a means to prevent con�½ict and war and

will continue to be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence

capabilities. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion and

provides an essential political and military transatlantic link, through an equitable and

sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens. We acknowledge the increasingly

challenging security environment with risks arising from changes in the posture, doctrine, and

behaviour of potential adversaries and their signi�½cant investments to develop, modernise, and

expand capabilities. NATO continues to adapt and remains steadfast in its resolve to take all

necessary steps to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent,

resilient, and adaptable to the security environment.

40. Allies’ goal is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective

defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons

exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. In response to the more challenging security

environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe,

secure, and e�½ective. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States,

are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of

the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute signi�½cantly to

the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute

to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear

deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe

and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this e�½ort. The

Alliance rea�½rms the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by Allies

concerned in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity

and resolve. Allies concerned will continue to drive forward progress on sustaining leadership

focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission. Allies will also continue to

ensure greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence

and defence posture, strengthen e�½ective strategic communications and enhance the

e�½ectiveness of NATO exercises to maintain and demonstrate a credible deterrence and reduce

strategic risk. NATO supports e�½orts towards strategic risk reduction which constitute

important contributions to regional and international security. In particular, transparency and

dialogue can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.

41. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent

coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a

credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The

circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO

reiterates that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter

the nature of a con�½ict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be

threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary

that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the bene�½ts that any adversary could hope to

achieve.

42. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot

substitute them. We rea�½rm our commitment to continue to deliver a NATO Ballistic Missile

Defence (BMD) capability, to pursue the Alliance's core task of collective defence and to provide

full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the

increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. NATO BMD is purely defensive.

The aim and political principles of NATO BMD remain unchanged from the 2010 Lisbon Summit.

These principles are the indivisibility of Allies’ security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of

risks and burdens as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat,

a�½ordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat

assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international e�½orts reduce the threats posed by

ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.

43. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including the US European

Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Turkey, Spain, and Poland, as well as the NATO

BMD command and control, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional

voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to completing

additional essential components of NATO BMD command and control, which is necessary for

achieving the next major milestone before reaching the Full Operational Capability. Full Allied

political control and oversight are essential, and full implementation will be ensured and

monitored. We will continue to engage with third states on a case-by-case basis to enhance

transparency, build mutual con�½dence, and increase ballistic missile defence e�½ectiveness.

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

44. NATO BMD is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic

deterrence. NATO BMD is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside

the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD system is not

capable against Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign this

system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, Russian statements threatening to target

Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready

to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject to Alliance agreement, NATO remains open to the

discussion.

45. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to

make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance’s security objectives and for ensuring

strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on

disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced

the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in

NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not been realised

since the 2018 Brussels NATO Summit. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold and

support existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and

commitments. We will further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as

a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment.

We welcome and fully support the agreement between the United States and the Russian

Federation to extend the New START Treaty for �½ve years. NATO Allies believe the New START

Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies again express their strong support for its

continued implementation and for early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic

stability. Allies will welcome new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future

arms control measures, taking into account all Allies’ security. Allies will support further arms

control negotiations, with the aim of improving the security of the Alliance, taking into account

the prevailing international security environment.

46. NATO remains clear-eyed about the challenges Russia poses, including the qualitative

and quantitative increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Alliance will be guided

by experience, not least Russia’s material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty, which ultimately led to the termination of that agreement. NATO will continue to

respond in a measured and responsible way to the signi�½cant risks posed by the Russian 9M729

missile, and other short- and intermediate-range missiles, to Allied security. We have agreed a

balanced, coordinated, and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO's deterrence and

defence posture remains credible and e�½ective, including through potential arms control,

disarmament, and non-proliferation contributions. Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on the

deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe is inconsistent with Russia’s unilateral and

ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from

building up such missiles outside of its European territory; this proposal is therefore not credible

and not acceptable. At the same time, NATO Allies remain open to meaningful arms control

discussions and dialogue on reciprocal transparency and con�½dence-building measures that

would take into account security interests of all Allies and increase security across the Alliance.

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

47. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the essential

bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-

proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the framework for international cooperation in

sharing the bene�½ts of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. Allies

remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, as an

irreplaceable platform, and the strengthening of the NPT across its mutually reinforcing three

pillars. We are committed to working towards a meaningful outcome at the upcoming Tenth

Review Conference, which presents a major opportunity to contribute to the preservation,

universalisation, and full implementation of the NPT. The Alliance rea�½rms its resolve to seek a

safer world for all and to take further practical steps and e�½ective measures to create the

conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations. NATO Allies support the ultimate goal

of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including

Article VI, in an ever more e�½ective and veri�½able way that promotes international stability, and

is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear arrangements have

always been fully consistent with the NPT, which remains the only credible path to nuclear

disarmament. The enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires

sustained e�½ort to further its achievements. In this spirit, we call on all NPT States Parties to

work together towards a successful Tenth Review Conference. We reiterate our opposition to

the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which is inconsistent with the

Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and

disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the

current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries

with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW re�½ects or in

any way contributes to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners

and all other countries to re�½ect realistically on the ban treaty’s impact on international peace

and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through

tangible and veri�½able measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on

nuclear disarmament.

48. While NATO is not itself party to any arms control agreement, Allies will make best use of

NATO as an important platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control

e�½orts that will support Alliance unity, political cohesion, and solidarity. We continue actively to

address the collapse of the INF Treaty due to Russian actions, and we are committed to maintain

appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

49. We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by

states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and

forces. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the repeated use of chemical weapons in

Syria, as well as use in Iraq, Russia, Malaysia, and, for the �½rst time since NATO’s foundation on

Allied territory, the United Kingdom. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by

anyone, for any reason is unacceptable. There can be no impunity for those who use chemical

weapons. We therefore welcome, as an important step towards accountability, the decision by

the April 2021 Conference of the State Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to

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suspend Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC. We are determined to uphold the CWC and

the global norm against the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons,

and to hold those who use chemical weapons accountable for their actions, including through

our joint commitment within the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of

Chemical Weapons. We support the full implementation of the CWC and the work of the

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in addressing WMD threats and

condemn those who seek to impede its work. NATO remains committed to ensuring that Allies

can protect their populations, forces, and territories against CBRN threats, including through

reviewing NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against CBRN Threats. We are united in our

resolve to promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We

underline the need to bring the treaty into force and we support the Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, including the International Data Centre

and International Monitoring System. We call for the immediate commencement and early

conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the

production of �½ssile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in

accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained

therein. In the meantime, the Alliance calls on all states to declare and maintain voluntary

moratoria on the production of �½ssile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices.

50.

We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic

security. We are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control

in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and

host nation consent. Russia’s continuing aggressive military posture, its refusal to fully comply

with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, its ongoing selective implementation of the

Vienna Document, and its long-standing failure to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe, continue to undermine security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies

call on Russia to return to full implementation of, and compliance with the letter and spirit of all

of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding trust and

con�½dence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We

speci�½cally call on Russia to be open and transparent about its no-notice snap exercises, large-

scale exercises and large-scale troop movements, in accordance with its Vienna Document

commitments, particularly in light of its recent unprovoked and unjusti�½ed military build-up in

and around Ukraine. Allies underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document,

and welcome the broad support for its comprehensive modernisation package. We look

forward to intensi�½ed discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation leading to consensus

on an updated Vienna Document at the 2021 OSCE Ministerial. To maintain the contributions of

the Treaty on Open Skies to the security of all State Parties, it is essential that all State Parties

fully implement its provisions. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions at the

OSCE, including the Structured Dialogue. We call on Russia to engage constructively on all these

e�½orts.

51. We reiterate the Alliance’s full support to the goal of the complete, veri�½able, and

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We call on

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage in meaningful negotiations with the

United States towards achieving this goal. We urge the DPRK to fully implement its international

obligations; to eliminate its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities and ballistic

missiles; to return to the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and to abandon all related programmes. We call on

nations to fully implement existing UN sanctions.

52. We are committed to ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon. We

welcome the substantive discussions between Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA)

participants, and separately with the United States, to accomplish a mutual return to compliance

with the JCPoA by the United States and Iran. We support the goal of restoring the non-

proliferation bene�½ts of the JCPoA and of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s

nuclear programme. It is vital that Iran preserves the space for these discussions by avoiding

any further escalation. We strongly support the IAEA in its crucial monitoring and veri�½cation

work to help ensure Iran’s compliance with the NPT-related safeguards obligations, as well as its

other commitments. A restored and fully implemented JCPoA could also pave the way to further

address regional and security concerns, including in support of the non-proliferation regime.

We condemn Iran’s support to proxy forces and non-state armed actors, including through

�½nancing, training, and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to

stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231, refrain from destabilising

actions, and play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.

Syria retains an inventory of short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers parts of NATO’s

territory and some of our partners’ territories. Syria has used these missiles extensively against

its own population. We remain vigilant over missile launches from Syria which could again hit or

target Turkey. We continue to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat from Syria.

The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-

eastern border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO’s development and

deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is con�½gured to counter threats from

outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

53. The con�½ict in Syria has entered its eleventh year and continues to have signi�½cant

consequences on the stability of the region and the security of NATO’s south-eastern border.

We remain concerned and vigilant over its rami�½cations. We reiterate our determination to

defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and to address challenges emanating

from Syria. The presidential elections held on 26 May 2021 by the Syrian regime cannot be

considered as free and fair and do not contribute to the e�½orts to achieve a political solution.

We underline that stability and security cannot be reinstated in Syria without a genuine political

process in line with UNSCR 2254. We call for a nationwide cease�½re and the reauthorisation and

expansion of the UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for a period of at least 12 months in

order to meet the needs of the Syrian people. We reiterate our appreciation to our Ally Turkey

for hosting millions of Syrian refugees.

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

54. Allies remain deeply concerned about developments in Belarus since August 2020. The

policies and actions of Belarus have implications for regional stability and have violated the

principles which underpin our partnership. NATO will remain vigilant of and monitor the

implications for the security of the Alliance. The unacceptable diversion of a civilian aircraft in

May 2021 and the subsequent arrest of a journalist and his partner travelling on board

endangered the safety of civilians and was a grave a�½ront to political dissent and freedom of the

press. We support the independent investigations, including by the International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO). We support measures taken by Allies individually and collectively in

response to this incident. We call on Belarus to abide by international law, respect human rights

and fundamental freedoms, and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners,

including those belonging to the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign, and stable

Belarus is in all of our interests. Allies stand ready for a mutually bene�½cial NATO-Belarus

partnership, taking into account political and security conditions. We will follow the scale, scope,

and aftermath of the Zapad-2021 exercise, and continue to call on Russia and Belarus to act in a

predictable, transparent way in compliance with their international obligations and OSCE

commitments.

55. China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the

rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by

those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the

Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a

larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in

implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It

is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in

the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use

of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act

responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in

keeping with its role as a major power.

56. NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible. Based on our

interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance

and on common challenges such as climate change. There is value in information exchange on

respective policies and activities, to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements.

Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, con�½dence-building, and transparency

measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and

understanding would bene�½t both NATO and China.

57. We are working together as an Alliance and with like-minded partners, in particular with

the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our

technological edge, and address these challenges to the rules-based international order.

58. Climate change is one of the de�½ning challenges of our times. It is a threat multiplier

that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance’s broader

neighbourhood. Climate change puts our resilience and civil preparedness to the test, a�½ects

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our planning and the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, and may

create harsher conditions for our operations. Today we have endorsed an Action Plan to

implement our NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security, which increases our awareness,

adaptation, mitigation, and outreach e�½orts, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence

posture and upholding the priorities of the safety of military personnel and operational and cost

e�½ectiveness. To increase awareness, NATO will conduct annual assessments of the impact of

climate change on its strategic environment as well as on missions and operations. To adapt to

climate change, NATO will incorporate climate change considerations into its full spectrum of

work, ranging from defence planning and capability development to civil preparedness and

exercises. To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, drawing on best practices of Allies,

and taking into account their di�½erent national circumstances, NATO will develop a mapping

methodology to help Allies measure greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and

installations, which could contribute to formulating voluntary goals to reduce such emissions.

NATO will also strengthen exchanges with partner countries as well as with international and

regional organisations that are active on climate change and security issues.

59. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. A stable and reliable

energy supply, the diversi�½cation of routes, suppliers, and energy resources, including the

integration of sustainable energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, are all

of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and economic pressure. It is

essential to ensure that the members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or coercive

manipulation of energy, which constitutes a potential threat. Allies will therefore continue to

seek further diversi�½cation of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions.

While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national authorities, energy developments

can have signi�½cant political and security implications for Allies and also a�½ect our partners.

Consequently, we will continue to enhance our strategic awareness, including through regular

Allied consultations and intelligence sharing, and will strengthen our links with relevant

international organisations. We will further develop NATO’s capacity to support national

authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber

activity. We will ensure reliable energy supplies to our military forces.

60. NATO has long recognised the importance of Human Security, which focuses on risks

and threats to populations in con�½ict or crisis areas and how to mitigate and respond to them.

Taking a Human Security approach is a re�½ection of our values and makes us more operationally

e�½ective. We are committed to ensuring that all e�½orts are made to avoid, minimise, and

mitigate any potential negative e�½ects on civilians arising from our missions or activities, as

underscored in our Policy for the Protection of Civilians. Today, we endorse NATO’s new Policy

on Preventing and Responding to Con�½ict-Related Sexual Violence, a landmark demonstration of

our commitment to addressing such violence, which in�½icts long-term stigma and trauma on

individuals and families, contributes to their marginalisation, destroys the social fabric of

communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors’ activities, fosters prolonged con�½ict and

instability, and is an impediment to sustainable peace and reconciliation. We are updating our

policy on combating tra�½cking in human beings. Our ongoing work on Human Security also

includes Children and Armed Con�½ict and Cultural Property Protection. NATO will continue to

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

work with its partners, international organisations, and civil society to further our Human

Security agenda, which includes robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in support of

lasting peace and security and our populations’ common defence.

61. Recognising the critical importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation

in all aspects of peace and stability, as well as the disproportionate impact that con�½ict has on

women and girls, including con�½ict-related sexual violence, we are committed to fully

implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out by the UN Security Council.

NATO’s Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security better prepare the Alliance to

address the challenges of today and tomorrow. NATO’s Policy on Preventing and Responding to

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, agreed in 2019, reinforces our commitment to hold ourselves to

the highest standards of behaviour, in keeping with our values. Working together with partners,

international organisations, and civil society, we will consistently continue to implement our

policy on Women, Peace and Security, and, in this context, we will advance gender equality and

integrate gender perspectives and foster the principles of the Women, Peace and Security

agenda in all that we do, including in NATO operations, missions, and activities.

62. We remain committed to NATO’s Building Integrity Policy and Programme. Corruption

and poor governance undermine democracy, the rule of law, and economic development, thus

constituting challenges to our security. Implementing measures to improve integrity building, to

�½ght against corruption, and to foster good governance is of continued importance for NATO,

Allies, and partners alike.

63. NATO’s partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. The

success of NATO’s partnerships is demonstrated by their strategic contribution to Alliance and

international security. They play an important role in supporting NATO’s three core tasks and

our 360-degree security approach. They are central to advancing NATO’s cooperative security

agenda, helping to shape our security environment, and contributing to stability in the Euro-

Atlantic area, and to the pursuit of NATO’s political and military objectives. We remain

committed to the principles underpinning our relations with our partners, and have taken steps

to make our partnerships more strategic, more coherent, and more e�½ective. The Alliance’s

partner relationships are also based on reciprocity, mutual bene�½t and mutual respect. We will

strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. We are grateful to our

partners for their signi�½cant contributions to NATO’s situational awareness, operations,

missions, and activities, including Trust Fund projects. We recognise their sacri�½ces for Euro-

Atlantic and international security over the years. We will continue to improve interoperability,

in particular with our Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Recognising that con�½ict and instability

in NATO’s neighbourhood directly undermine Allied security, we will continue to intensify NATO’s

assistance and capacity building support to our partners. We rea�½rm our commitment to

expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation that shares the Alliance’s

values and interest in international peace and security and will further develop our partnerships

so that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners. In line with our

Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own

tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.

64. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The NATO-EU

strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-

Atlantic area. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European

defence. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities,

avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint e�½orts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer.

Such e�½orts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our

common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities,

and support an overall increase in defence spending. Non-EU Allies continue to make signi�½cant

contributions to the EU's e�½orts to strengthen its capacities to address common security

challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest

involvement in these e�½orts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible

progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. We rea�½rm in their

entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU

cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full

mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ di�½erent

mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two

organisations.

65. NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels, with tangible results in

countering hybrid and cyber threats, strategic communication, operational cooperation

including maritime issues, military mobility, defence capabilities, defence industry and research,

exercises, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building. Political dialogue

between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance this cooperation. We will continue to

develop and deepen our cooperation by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals,

which contribute to the coherence and complementarity of our e�½orts. The current strategic

environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in

the face of current and evolving security challenges, in particular in addressing resilience issues,

emerging and disruptive technologies, the security implications of climate change,

disinformation, and the growing geostrategic competition. The ongoing distinct strategic

processes within NATO and the EU o�½er a unique opportunity to intensify further our

consultations and cooperation to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and

stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, while rea�½rming that NATO remains the

transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security

consultations and decisions among Allies. We value the Secretary General’s continued close

cooperation with the President of the European Council, the President of the European

Commission, and the High Representative, on all aspects of the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

66. We rea�½rm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the

Washington Treaty, which has been a historic success. North Macedonia’s accession last year is

yet another tangible demonstration of this commitment. Successive rounds of enlargement

have strengthened Euro-Atlantic security by helping to spread and consolidate the rule of law

and democratic institutions and practices across the European continent, and have respected

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

the right of all states to seek their own security arrangements, as enshrined in the 1990 Charter

of Paris for a New Europe. NATO’s door remains open to all European democracies which share

the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and

obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and

whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Decisions on

enlargement are for NATO itself; no third party has a say in that process. We remain committed

to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own

merits. We encourage them to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to

prepare for membership. We will continue to o�½er support to their e�½orts and look to them to

take the steps necessary to advance their aspirations.

67. Allies strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure

Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in

Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements, encourage domestic

reconciliation, and urge political leaders to avoid divisive rhetoric. We commend Bosnia and

Herzegovina, an aspirant country, for its contributions to NATO-led operations. We are

committed to maintaining strong political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and o�½er our

continued support to the implementation of all reform e�½orts, including through NATO HQ

Sarajevo. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take full advantage of the

breadth of NATO cooperative security and partnership tools. Allies welcome the work of the

Commission for Cooperation with NATO. Allies urge political leaders to work constructively and

to demonstrate political will for the bene�½t of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing Euro-

Atlantic aspirations by implementing the much-needed political, electoral, rule of law, economic,

and defence reforms, including through the country’s Reform Programme with NATO, without

prejudice to a �½nal decision on NATO membership.

68. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become

a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the

process; we rea�½rm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including

that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand �½rm in our support for Georgia’s

right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. As an

Enhanced Opportunities Partner, Georgia is cooperating closely with the Alliance across a wide

range of issues. We highly appreciate Georgia’s substantial contributions to NATO operations,

which demonstrate its commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We

welcome the recent political agreement on the Way Ahead for Georgia and encourage its full

implementation by all sides. This agreement paves the way for the important reforms which will

help Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership. We

remain committed to making full use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National

Programme in deepening political dialogue and cooperation. We commend the signi�½cant

progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue to make, and which have

helped Georgia strengthen its defence capabilities and interoperability with the Alliance.

Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual

membership. We are working closely with Georgia on security in the Black Sea region, in

response to Russia’s increasingly destabilising activities, and welcome the steps taken to

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

implement the refreshed Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. We stand ready to enhance our

support to Georgia, including in building resilience against hybrid threats, in training and

exercises, and in secure communications. We look forward to the next NATO-Georgia exercise

in 2022.

69. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become

a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the

process; we rea�½rm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including

that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand �½rm in our support for Ukraine’s

right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. The

Annual National Programmes under the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) remain the

mechanism by which Ukraine takes forward the reforms pertaining to its aspiration for NATO

membership. Ukraine should make full use of all instruments available under the NUC to reach

its objective of implementing NATO principles and standards. The success of wide-ranging,

sustainable, and irreversible reforms, including combating corruption, promoting an inclusive

political process, and decentralisation reform, based on democratic values, respect for human

rights, minorities, and the rule of law, will be crucial in laying the groundwork for a prosperous

and peaceful Ukraine. Further reforms in the security sector, including the reform of the

Security Services of Ukraine, are particularly important. We welcome signi�½cant reforms already

made by Ukraine and strongly encourage further progress in line with Ukraine’s international

obligations and commitments. We will continue to provide practical support to reform in the

security and defence sector, including through the Comprehensive Assistance Package. We will

also continue to support Ukraine’s e�½orts to strengthen its resilience against hybrid threats,

including through intensifying activities under the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid

Warfare. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine with regard to security in

the Black Sea region. The Enhanced Opportunities Partner status granted last year provides

further impetus to our already ambitious cooperation and will promote greater interoperability,

with the option of more joint exercises, training, and enhanced situational awareness. Military

cooperation and capacity building initiatives between Allies and Ukraine, including the

Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, further reinforce this e�½ort. We highly value Ukraine’s

signi�½cant contributions to Allied operations, the NATO Response Force, and NATO exercises.

70. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO, as highlighted by our

long history of cooperation and operations. NATO remains strongly committed to the security

and stability of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the

countries in the region. We will intensify our e�½orts in the region and enhance our political

dialogue and practical cooperation in order to support reform e�½orts, promote regional peace

and security, and counter the malign in�½uence of outside actors. Democratic values, the rule of

law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and

Euro-Atlantic integration, and we look to continued progress in this regard. We value the NATO-

Serbia partnership. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations would be of bene�½t to the Alliance, to

Serbia, and to the whole region. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and other e�½orts aimed

at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the sides to seize the

moment and engage in good faith towards reaching a lasting political solution.

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

71. We remain committed to NATO’s continued engagement in Kosovo, including through

the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) which contributes to a safe and secure environment and to

wider stability in the Western Balkans, and through ongoing capacity building e�½orts with the

Kosovo security organisations. Any changes to our force posture in KFOR remain conditions-

based and not calendar-driven.

72. The Alliance’s close and mutually bene�½cial security cooperation with our Enhanced

Opportunities Partners Finland and Sweden, which share our values and contribute to NATO-led

operations and missions, has grown across a wide range of areas. We will continue to

strengthen our ability to respond rapidly and e�½ectively to any common challenges and to work

together on enhancing our resilience and civil preparedness. We will bolster our regular and

open political dialogue and cooperation in support of our common security, including by crisis

management preparation, exercises, and exchanging information and analysis, notably on the

security situation in the Baltic Sea region.

73. We will work more closely with all our Western European partners to share expertise,

address emerging security challenges, and continue our cooperation on operations, missions,

and other initiatives. We will also seek to further develop relations with our partners across the

globe. We are enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our long-standing

Asia-Paci�½c partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to promote

cooperative security and support the rules-based international order. We will discuss common

approaches to global security challenges where NATO’s interests are a�½ected, share

perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to

address shared concerns. We are intensifying our interaction with Colombia, NATO’s partner in

Latin America, on good governance, military training, interoperability, demining, and maritime

security. We remain open to deepening our political dialogue and intensifying our practical

cooperation with our partners in Central Asia, taking into account the regional situation. We

welcome the interest of other global actors to work with NATO in addressing our shared security

concerns and stand ready to explore further engagement on a case-by-case basis.

74. We are committed to enhancing our long-standing engagement in the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) region. We will strengthen our political dialogue and practical cooperation

with our Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. This

will build stronger security and defence institutions and capacities, promote interoperability, and

help to counter terrorism. We have upgraded our defence capacity building assistance to

Jordan, our Enhanced Opportunities Partner, to include additional counter-terrorism support,

and have contributed to the establishment of the new Military Women’s Training Centre. We will

continue our engagement with Tunisia on defence capacity building. We will leverage the NATO-

ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait as an important hub for education, training, and public diplomacy

activities, and we remain open to the potential establishment of other education and training

centres with interested MENA countries. Our Regional Hub for the South, in Naples, is making

tangible progress in implementing its four functions and contributing to our situational

awareness and understanding. We will continue to engage with the African Union and further

develop our relations with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council in order

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

to enhance our ability to better address mutual security concerns.

75. The deteriorating situation in the Sahel region matters to NATO’s collective security. This

region is a theatre of complex and interconnected challenges. NATO’s approach to the Sahel is

currently focused on our long-standing partnership with Mauritania, and we are looking into

providing additional advice and training support. We will also continue to engage in dialogue

with relevant NATO partners, representatives from the Sahel region, international and regional

organisations and entities such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel structures, the UN, and the

EU, as well as with the Coalition for the Sahel. NATO will enhance its engagement with the G5

Sahel structures and remains open, upon request, to consider further engagements in the

region.

76. The crisis in Libya has direct implications for regional stability and the security of all

Allies. We welcome the progress achieved in Libya, including the recent endorsement of the

interim Government of National Unity (GNU) and Presidency Council. We commend the UN

e�½orts in support of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, aimed at promoting

national reconciliation as well as unifying and strengthening state institutions. We call on all the

relevant Libyan authorities and institutions, including the GNU and the House of

Representatives, to take actions set out in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap and to

make the necessary preparations for free, fair, and inclusive national Presidential and

Parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. We fully support the implementation of UNSCRs

2570 and 2571 and the 23 October 2020 cease�½re agreement. In accordance with our Summit

decisions, we remain committed to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area of

defence and security institution building, taking into account political and security conditions.

77. NATO is an Alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and

challenges. NATO is also adapting as an institution. To enhance our political-military coherence

and situational awareness, we have restructured the activities of the NATO Headquarters, and

established a Chief Information O�½cer function. We welcome and will continue progress

towards an optimised NATO intelligence enterprise, better postured to provide timely and

relevant support to Alliance operations and decision-making on contemporary and future

challenges. We will also further strengthen the security of our cyber and communications

systems and continue to protect the Alliance against espionage attempts. We will continuously

pursue greater coherence, improved e�½ectiveness, and new e�½ciencies, in support of the

�½exibility and responsiveness we need as an Alliance.

78. We express our deep appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to NATO by the

Government and the people of Belgium for over �½ve decades, and to us today on the occasion of

our Summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. We pay tribute to all the men and women in

uniform who continue to work daily for our collective security. And we extend a special word of

thanks to all those who made it possible for us to have a safe and productive Summit meeting

despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including the NATO medical personnel and the Polish

Medical Emergency Detachment.

79. With our decisions today, we have opened a new chapter in the transatlantic

FOU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 87: NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué 14 June 2021

relationship and set the direction for the Alliance’s continued adaptation towards 2030 and

beyond. We look forward to meeting again in Spain in 2022, followed by our next meeting in

Lithuania.