Erhvervsudvalget 2020-21
ERU Alm.del Bilag 331
Offentligt
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CAPITAL
MARKETS UNION
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
TARGETED CONSULTATION
ON THE SUPERVISORY CONVERGENCE AND THE SINGLE RULE BOOK
Taking stock of the framework for supervising European capital markets, banks, insurers
and pension funds
Disclaimer
This document is a working document of the Commission services for consultation and
does not prejudge the final decision that the Commission may take.
The views reflected on this consultation paper provide an indication on the approach the
Commission services may take but do not constitute a final policy position or a formal
proposal by the European Commission.
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro_en
ERU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 331: EMs høringssvar vedr. finansiel tilsynsmæssig konvergens og Single Rule book, fra erhvervsministeren
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You are invited to reply
by 21 May 2021
at the latest to the
online questionnaire
available on the following webpage:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-esas-review_en
Please note that in order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process
only
responses received through the online questionnaire will be taken into account and
included in the report summarising the responses.
This consultation follows the normal rules of the European Commission for public
consultations. Responses will be published unless respondents indicate otherwise in the
online questionnaire.
Responses authorised for publication will be published on the following webpage:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-esas-review_en
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I
NTRODUCTION
There has been considerable progress on both supervisory convergence and the single
rulebook since the three
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)s
were created in 2011.
Nevertheless, both require continued and appropriately targeted efforts to make further
progress. In this context,
the Commission’s capital markets union (CMU)
1
action plan
published on 24 September 2020 includes the following action:
CMU action plan
- Action 16:
The Commission will work towards an enhanced single
rulebook for capital markets by assessing the need for further harmonisation of EU rules
and monitoring progress towards supervisory convergence. It will take stock of what has
been achieved in Q4 2021 and consider proposing measures for stronger supervisory
coordination or direct supervision by the European Supervisory Authorities.
The Commission will also carefully assess the implications of the Wirecard case for the
regulation and supervision of EU capital markets and act to address any shortcomings
that are identified in the EU legal framework.
The
CMU
is the EU's plan to create a truly single market for capital across the EU. It
aims to get investment and savings flowing to the companies and projects that need them
across all Member States, benefitting citizens, investors and companies, regardless of
where they are located. The CMU provides new sources of funding for businesses, helps
increase options for savers and makes the economy more resilient.
Without well-developed and integrated capital markets, there can be no economic
prosperity. And without supervision, capital markets could not contribute to economic
prosperity. Supervision is an essential condition for a well-functioning CMU. This will be
particularly relevant in a post-Brexit world with multiple financial centres across the EU.
Gradual progress towards more integrated capital markets supervision will be
indispensable.
It is essential for people and firms to have confidence in the financial system and also for
the providers of financial services to operate in a stable and fair environment. Supervision
should ensure that divergences in outcomes of supervisory practices in Member States do
not undermine confidence, stability, investor protection and fairness in the Single Market.
The three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) are mandated to ensure
the
convergence of supervisory practices among the national competent
authorities
2
. In addition, the
European Securities Markets Authority,
is responsible for
direct supervision of some market activities and market operators. However, supervisory
convergence reaches its limits where the national rules that supervisors have to apply and
enforce differ between Member States or where the common European rules leave room
for interpretation or too much discretion to Member States for its transposition, application
and enforcement. The ambition for a European single rulebook therefore seeks to reduce
differences between national laws and to provide more detailed rules where it is important
for stability and fairness in the single market. Taken together,
1
The EP adopted an own initiative report on further development of the CMU on 8 October and the Council
adopted its conclusions on the Commission’s CMU AP on 3 December
2020.
Within the
banking union,
the
single supervisory mechanism
ensures uniform supervision of banks. For
banking resolution, the
single resolution board
is directly responsible for resolution planning and decisions
for all significant banks and cross-border ones.
3
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supervisory convergence and the single rulebook provide the framework for effective and
efficient supervision.
The input to this consultation, which seeks to take stock of what has been achieved so far,
will feed into the preparation of the report required by the CMU action plan which will
cover the review
3
required under the ESAs founding Regulations as well. This consultation
seeks targeted views on certain aspects related to the 2019 ESAs review
4
and contributes
to a wider debate on supervisory convergence and the single rulebook.
Please note that not all questions are relevant for all stakeholders and that you are not
expected to reply to each question. Please indicate the ESA for which the reply is intended.
3
Article 81 of the
ESAs founding Regulations
requires the Commission to review the functioning of the
ESAs every 3 years, and next time by end 2021.
The ESAs founding Regulations were amended in 2019. These recent legislative changes entered into force
in January 2020 (Regulation
(EU) 2019/2175, which reviews the powers, governance and funding of the
ESAs.)
EBA Regulation consolidated version 01/01/2020
EIOPA Regulation consolidated version 01/01/2020
ESMA Regulation consolidated version 01/01/2020
4
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C
ONSULTATION QUESTIONS
A.
I.
Q
UESTIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
E
UROPEAN
S
UPERVISORY
A
UTHORITIES
(ESA
S
)
AND THE RECENT CHANGES IN THEIR FOUNDING
R
EGULATIONS
.
How do you assess the impact of each ESA’s activities on the aspects below? Please
rate the ESAs impact on each aspect from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant
impact” and 5 for "most significant impact”:
1
The financial system as a whole
2
3
x
4
5
No
opinion
Financial stability
The functioning of the internal market
The quality and consistency of supervision
The enforcement of EU rules on supervision
Strengthening
coordination
international
supervisory
X
X
X
X
X
Consumer and investor protection
Financial innovation
Sustainable finance
X
X
X
Please explain your answer
II.
In your view, do the ESA(s)’ mandate(s) cover all necessary
tasks and powers to
contribute to the stability and to the well-functioning of the financial system? If you
think that there are elements which should be added or removed from the mandate,
please provide a substantiated answer.
YES
NO
III.
In your view, do the ESAs face any obstacles in delivering on their mandates? If the
answer is yes, please explain what you consider to be the main obstacles.
YES
NO
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Firstly, the continuous amount of regulatory work stemming from reviews of existing
legislation as well as new regulation carrying new tasks puts a strain on the existing
resources as new resource allocation or funding seldom accompanies the tasks.
Moreover, it persistently requires reallocation of the existing resources from the essential
work on supervisory convergence while the call for greater focus of this latter work
steadily grows.
Secondly, unrealistic or overly ambitious timing of delivery of products (particularly
technical standards) set out in the Level 1 regulation combined with the amount of work
expected to be delivered strains the limited resources available at the ESAs and the
National Competent Authorities (NCAs). This will and does affect the quality of
material, as it results in a process with too short turnarounds for scrutiny of material as
well as difficulty in maintaining reasonable consultation periods with stakeholders.
Thirdly, the trend of inserting mandatory convergence activity within the level 1 texts
(such as mandatory peer reviews) or forced areas of focus potentially in isolation of
market developments, will increasingly take away the ability of the ESAs and in
particular the NCAs to plan their supervisory work taking into account relevant risk
based assessments with a view to acting where the highest risk would be or emerge and
without regard to the degree of added value. Planning of supervisory activity must be
done in view of the circumstances at hand, which is in the hands of the relevant
supervisors, not the legislators.
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1. The supervisory convergence tasks of the ESAs
1.1. Common supervisory culture/supervisory convergence:
1.1.1. To what extent the ESAs do contribute to promoting a common
supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices? Please rate
in a scale from 1 to 5 (“5” being the most significant contribution
and “1” the less significant contribution). Please explain your answer
and indicate if there are any areas for improvement.
Generally, we believe the ESAs actively contribute to this mandate and we also believe
it is one of the most important aspects of their work.
However, there is room for further improvement and we have focused on a few essential
issues that admittedly should and could not be tackled through legislation but rather the
nature of cooperation.
The fundamentals for reaching a common approach are that all parties of a process have
a good understanding of the premises for the results and decisions made during the legal
assessments and reports. This is only achieved by a strong culture of information
sharing also within the ESAs themselves. The role of coordination is key for the ESAs.
This requires the ESAs to facilitate constructive discussions with transparent feedback
on the different steps of developments of products, including how approaches have been
decided upon and provide legal clarifications on such where relevant and beneficial for
the understanding. This can still be improved upon. We also believe that this would
naturally carry over on further consistency in supervisory practices.
We believe the ESAs must act as honest brokers taking into account all relevant
information and views to evidence the work. This includes not only the views of ESA
staff but naturally also suggestions from NCAs all of which is based on experience and
expertise as well as their views on what may be of importance in an area to facilitate
better supervisory convergence.
An example for illustration purposes is that since 2013 NCA members have suggested
that the EBA develop and publish guidance on intraday liquidity management, just like
Basel published its guidance in 2013 on monitoring tools for intraday liquidity
management. However, this has not been undertaken primarily with the argument that
there is no mandate in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) to assess the topic of
intraday liquidity. However, the same argument has not been invoked when developing
the LCR implementation reports which have been carried out.
1
Promote a common supervisory culture and
consistent supervisory practices
2
3
x
4
5
No
opinion
1.1.2. To what extent the following tasks undertaken by the ESA(s) have
effectively contributed to building a common supervisory culture
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and consistent supervisory practices in the EU. Please rate each task
from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant contribution" and 5 for
"most significant
contribution”:
1
Providing opinions to competent authorities
Promoting
bilateral
and
multilateral
exchanges of information between competent
authorities
Contributing to developing high quality and
uniform supervisory standards
Contributing to developing high quality and
uniform reporting standards
Developing and reviewing the application of
technical standards
Contributing to the development of sectoral
legislation by providing advice to the
Commission
Establishing
(cross)sectoral
training
programmes
Producing reports relating to their field of
activities
Conducting peer reviews between competent
authorities
x
x
2
3
4
x
X
5
No
opinion
x
x
x
x
x
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Determining
new
supervisory priorities
Union
strategic
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
x
x
x
X
X
Establishing coordination groups
Developing Union supervisory handbooks
Monitoring and assessing environmental,
social and governance-related risks
Adopting measures using emergency powers
Investigating breaches of Union law
Coordinating actions of competent authorities
in emergency situations (e.g. Covid-19 crisis)
Mediating between competent authorities
Monitoring the work of supervisory and
resolution colleges
Publishing on their website information
relating to their field of activities
Monitoring market developments
(Only for the EBA) Monitoring liquidity risks
in financial institutions
(Only the EBA) Monitoring of own funds and
eligible liabilities instruments issued by
institutions
Initiating and coordinating Union-wide stress
tests of financial institutions
Developing guidelines and recommendations
Developing Q&As
Contributing to the establishment of a
common Union financial data strategy
Providing supervisory statements
Other instruments and tools to promote
supervisory convergence, please indicate
x
x
X
x
X
x
Please add any qualitative comments you may wish to explain your
reasoning.
Below we have included comments on elements that are not covered in other
areas of this document.
On the issue of
exchange of information,
we believe that promoting bilateral
and multilateral exchanges of information between NCAs can be improved and
should be encouraged by the ESAs at all working levels. To this effect a more
consistent and transparent approach in sharing comments received and providing
feedback on the handling thereof, whether from stakeholders or NCA members is
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required. We are aware that this may be time consuming but also believe it is the
backbone of high quality work, which will translate into constructive discussions,
multilateral exchanges of views and information and a fully evidenced product.
We wish to highlight that the ESAs have a large amount of IT-related tasks
stemming from primary and secondary legislation. However, the amount of tasks
allocated to them also results in there being too many projects to address within a
given period of time. This results in delays in establishing the relevant IT-basis
which in turn results in
non-compliance with reporting obligations,
as such
were dependant on the IT-basis being in place. This in turn results in reporting
challenges for the financial institutions whereby these entitites would be in
breach of legal reporting requirements. An example is LCR that came into force 1
October 2015. However, the institutions first reported LCR in relation to the
legislation in September 2016 due to lack of an IT-reporting tool, partly due to
large burdens in the IT-area overall, partly due to delay because of lack of
sufficient prioritisation in finalizing the IT setup for the new LCR reporting.
We find the ESAs play an important role of providing
advice to the Commission
in order to inform an area prior to legislative action. Early consultation of the
ESAs/NCAs in the legislative process contributes to legislation that can be more
easily be implemented in practice in a more harmonsied manner from the
beginning where there is less need of
“translation” of abstract concepts into
practically applicable provisions.
We note that the ESAs have received stronger mandates to develop
supervisory
handbooks
in their remits. This concept is not new, but is also not defined and
may comprise many elements, such as supervisory statements that in turn are also
not further clarified anywhere. While these tools are now explicitly mentioned we
do not believe there is need of any further inclusion of rigid definitions, nor on-
going inclusion and thus mention of all supervisory convergence tools in
legislation. This would be too cumbersome and counterproductive to on-going
development and adjustment to the needs of the NCAs and ESAs. We note that
the handbooks should reflect an actual and practical need stemming from the
supervisory activity, both from the level of the ESAs as well as the NCAs.
We do not have extensive firsthand experience with official
mediation processes
facilitated by the ESAs. However, a range of new requirements and deadlines
where introduced with the recent review of 2019 and changes to the internal rules
of procedures. In this context is it important to ensure that mediation processes
are applied when there is an actual important point of contention between the
NCAs. The focus of the ESA in a mediation process is that of facilitating fluid,
open communication and cooperation between the NCAs, not rigid compliance
with deadlines. We would therefore urge not to constrain these processes by
excessive formal requirements.
We have a couple of general comments with regard to
guidelines and Q&As.
Overall these two tools are useful in providing answers to challenges raised by
NCAs as well as stakeholders with regard to the common understanding and
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application of the rules as well as communication on such conclusions and
approaches.
However, the Danish FSA experiences that the ESAs have a tendency
particularly in this work to see the market only as one market and thus steer the
work towards a “one size fits all” approach. However,
the EU internal market
continues to comprise many different
Member States’ markets
at different levels
of maturity which is also acknowledged by the regulation, ESAs and the
Commission. We believe that the more explicit references to these aspects in
regulation as well as communication by the ESAs has yet to fully be integrated in
the development of the products. Time should be allowed for this to take effect as
well as support the ESAs in facilitation of open and constructive discussions.
1.1.3. One of the roles of the ESAs is to promote and facilitate the
functioning of supervisory colleges, where established by sector
legislation, and foster the consistency of the application of Union
law among them. Please rate the ESAs’ contribution to the objectives
below from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant contribution" and
5 for "most significant
contribution”.
Please explain your reasoning.
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1
Promote the effective and efficient
functioning of colleges of supervisors
Foster consistency in the application of
Union law among colleges
Promote converging supervisory practices
among colleges.
2
3
X
X
X
4
5
No
opinion
We believe the description of the role of the ESAs is correct and the ESAs do to a
certain extent meet the expectations of facilitation and coordination of the functioning of
the colleges and consistency across relevant colleges and sectoral areas. In this regard, it
is important that the colleges remain fora for open communication between supervisors
with respect for the participants’ experiences.
The Danish FSA notes that issues relating
to potential lack of application of Union law may surface during the work in colleges.
Often they will be addressed through the course of exchanges of views, experiences and
adaptation to the new knowledge in the college. However, if it is not resolved, the issue
of lack of application of Union law should be addressed through the specific remedies
designed for such purpose. If investigated and followed through in the college itself, it
could taint the goal of these fora regarding openness in communication and consistency
in cooperation and application.
1.1.4. In the framework of the 2019 ESAs review. How do you assess the
new process for questions and answers (Article 16b)?
Generally, the Danish FSA has not experienced major changes to the process in practice
aside from the delay in providing timely responses when questions are referred to and
dealt with by the Commission. We recognize the
Commission’s role of interpreting the
Union law. However, we do not believe it is possible to make this full split between the
application of law from the interpretation of Union law. They are intertwined with each
other. Furthermore, we note that the raison
d’etre of the ESAs is
exactly to ensure the
expertise in reading and applying rules in financial regulation is fully taken into account
when applying the EU rules.
1.1.5. In your view, does the new process for questions and answers allow
for an efficient process for answering questions and for promoting
supervisory convergence?
YES Please identify areas for improvement, please explain
NO Please give reasons.
We find the Q&A to be an efficient and useful tool to address issues as they arise
whether from regulators or stakeholders and facilitate convergent approaches as well as
making them public so the stakeholders can adapt their approaches accordingly. Several
of the new elements are positive. However, it is too early to have a full evaluation of all
the aspects, including the use of public consultation and the web-based tool. We do have
a couple of remarks based on experiences thus far by the Danish FSA.
Firstly, the Danish FSA has seen a prolongation of the response time when questions are
submitted to the Commission for a response. The turn-around time at the Commission
must be shortened in order for this tool to be effective.
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Secondly, we find that public consultation for selected Q&As could be relevant as
answers sometimes carry significant consequences for the market. However, initial
identification of the need to apply this tool is also dependent on the initial description of
the issue at hand provided by the submitter. This may on the one hand mean that some
issues are not identified as needing broader consultation until potentially at a much later
stage. On the other hand extensive public consultation of all Q&As is not desirable as
this would not be viable from a resource nor efficiency perspective and would
significantly change the nature of the tool towards other tools such as guidelines in art.
16 of the ESA regulations.
Thirdly, we believe it is important to have a transparent follow-up system after the
answers are provided, not only to also assess whether any further steps need to be taken
but also to ensure the content is up-to-date. We believe this could be accommodated
through a more firm obligation to review published Q&As.
Fourthly, the web-based tool is still under development also in light of the added general
obligation for the ESAs to have a rulebook available on the website following from
changes to article 8 in the 2019 ESA-revision. It is important to ensure that it is
sufficiently interactive with good search functions to allow for easy access and use by
the users.
1.2. No action letters
1.2.1. In the framework of the 2019 ESAs review. In your view, is the new
mechanism of no action letters (Article 9a of the ESMA/EIOPA
Regulations and Article 9c EBA Regulation) fit for its intended
purpose? Please justify your answer.
YES
NO
The intended purpose of the no-action letters mechanism was, according to the review,
to create an: “alert and convergence system" which will ensure that the ESAs in
exceptional circumstances and when there are significant issues raised by legal acts
(e.g., rules that conflict with each other; absence of a delegated or implementing act
that raises legitimate doubts about the legal con-sequences of the level 1 act; absence of
guidelines that makes application of the act difficult) alert the Commission and
Competent Authorities about what those issues are and where necessary issue an
opinion to ensure convergent enforcement practices in relation to the issues raised.
It is important that the ESAs and the NCAs have the necessary powers to express
themselves about severe challenges in complying with legislation. However, it is
unclear at this time whether this mechanism is fit for purpose.
The Danish FSA experiences that there seems to be an increase in use of the tool among
the ESAs with a view to resolving situations of implementation deadlines where the
Commission has not yet adopted delegated acts. However, we do not believe no-action
letters is the appropriate tool to address such issues as this is a challenge to be addressed
by the co-legislators and the Commission when setting and complying with deadlines.
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Considering the wording limits the use of no-action letters, we believe that this specific
tool should be used with the utmost restraint and only in significant situations.
1.2.2. In the framework of the 2019 ESAs review. How does the new
mechanism, in your view, compare with “no action letters” in other
jurisdictions?
We have not conducted a full analysis of this tool with other jurisdictions. As it is
formulated today it looks to ensure that the ESAs do not set aside implementation or
application dates of legislative acts by de facto delaying their application. This is not
within the competences of an authority or agency as their competences are strictly
limited by the delegation and the legal acts themselves. These are matters for the co-
legislators, not the ESAs.
1.2.3. In the framework of the 2019 ESAs review. Could you provide
examples where the use of no action letters would have been useful
or could be useful in the future?
No-action letters can be a useful mechanism for establishing a common approach to
legislation in instances where delegated acts are absent and there are doubts about
implementation of the level 1 text. However, we would not encourage the use of no
action letters to dis-apply legislation and only use them when absolutely necessary. The
Danish FSA experiences that the mechanism can also have a conflict-escalating effect
on the cooperation and relationship with the Commission. This should be avoided.
1.3. Peer reviews
1.3.1. Please specify to what extent peer reviews organised by the ESAs
have contributed to the convergence outcomes listed below.
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Please distinguish between the situation before the 2019 review and
afterwards. Please rate each outcome from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less
significant contribution” and 5 for "most significant contribution”:
Situation before the 2019 ESAs review
Convergence in the application of Union law
Convergence in supervisory practices
More wide spread application of best practices
developed by other competent authorities
Convergence in the enforcement of provisions
adopted in the implementation of Union law
Further harmonization of Union rules
Other, please indicate
X
x
X
1
2
3
X
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
Situation after the 2019 ESAs review
Convergence in the application of Union law
Convergence in supervisory practices
More wide spread application of best practices
developed by other competent authorities
Convergence in the enforcement of provisions
adopted in the implementation of Union law
Further harmonization of Union rules
Other, please indicate
1
2
3
X
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
X
X
x
Please explain your reasoning/give examples.
Overall, we believe it is premature to provide a full view of the extent of changes
following from the 2019 review and several aspects have yet to be put to use. Thus, the
full effect on the convergence outcomes will only be available in two years.
We believe it is also important to distinguish between the peer review and its outcomes
on the one hand and enforcement of Union law on the other hand.
Generally, peer reviews have since the beginning been an effective tool to facilitate
convergence in application of Union law and supervisory practices through the exercise
of comparing approaches across the EU and learning from the identified good practices.
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It has been used as a true convergence tool facilitating information and knowledge
sharing as well as increased cooperation at a high level. The tool has also evolved from
being more desk-based analysis of how rules are incorporated into national procedures
to include analyses of the actual processes, on-site visits, etc. This also means that peer
reviews have become quite resource-intensive for the ESAs and NCAs alike. Therefore,
it is not feasible nor useful to conduct a huge amount of peer reviews annually and it is
important that they are conducted in areas where there is benefit in identifying the level
of convergence and practices. We also note that the increasing amount of legislative
mandated peer reviews in level 1 legislation hamper the ability of the ESAs to conduct
such targeted and relevant peer reviews as resources will have to be allocated to ensure
compliance with the legislative mandates.
Secondly, peer reviews may provide insight as to the manner of use of provisions,
including enforcement provisions. If divergences in approaches are identified such can
be subject for follow-up action with the aim to seek convergent approaches. Follow-up
action is also catered for in the legal provision. However, we strongly believe that peer
reviews are not in and of themselves tools to enforce the Union rules. Other remedies
address such action. Ultimately, enforcement action of non-application of Union law is
for the Commission to act upon and the co-legislators to address through legislation if
and where appropriate.
1.3.2. How do you assess the impact of each of the changes below
introduced by 2019 ESAs review in the peer review process? Please
rate each
change from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less effective” and 5 for
"most
effective”
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1
Ad-hoc Peer Review Committees (PRC)
composed of ESAs’ and NCAs’ staff and
chaired by the ESA are responsible for
preparing peer review reports and follow-ups.
The peer review report is now adopted by
X
written procedure on non-objection basis by
the Board of Supervisors.
Transparency provisions: if the PRC main
findings differ from those published in the
report, dissenting views should be transmitted
to the three European Institutions.
PRC findings may result in recommendations
to NCAs under Article 16 of the ESAs
Regulations that are now distinguished from
guidelines, addressed to all NCAs. The use of
this type of individual recommendations
entails the application of the “comply or
explain” mechanism and allows a close
follow-up.
Mandatory follow-up to peer reviews within
two years after the adoption of the peer review
report.
The possibility to carry out additional peer
reviews in case of urgency or unforeseen
events (fast track peer reviews).
The Management Board is consulted in order
to maintain consistency with other peer
reviews reports and to ensure a level playing
field.
X
2
3
x
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
X
x
Please explain your reasoning
Generally, the structure and organisation of the Peer Review Committees seems to have
functioned well.
Below we have focused our comments on elements where we believe the 2019 ESA-
review has unnecessarily complicated the peer review tool.
We find the provision indicated as a
“transparency provision”
above
concerning
transmitting of dissenting views to the three European Institutions highly problematic
both form a political point of view but also in ensuring the ESAs are not unduely
influenced by institutions when acting in their supervisory capacity. Firstly, peer
reviews concern matters of hands-on supervisory convergence work, a task by nature
independent of political influence. This provision has the ability to directly impair or
give cause for concern of potential impropriety in the ESAs and their members’ ability
to comply with the obligations to act independently and without taking instructions from
iter alia the Union institutions or bodies.
Secondly, the presence of such reporting requirements is in stark contrast to the
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expectation that NCAs themselves act independently and thus is at odds with the
mandate for the ESAs to foster and monitor supervisory independence of NCAs.
Thirdly, the Peer Review Committee is established to conduct the peer review and
submit draft reports, conclusions etc. As such the PRC is in effect a preparatory body
for the BoS. The relevant outcome of a concrete peer review for the public and for the
three European Institutions is that which has been approved by the BoS and published.
We find it is critical that the BoS as the highest decision-making body of the ESAs is
effectively bypassed by this submission of dissenting views directly to the political
establishment.
In relation to the
adoption procedure
by written procedure on non-objection basis the
Danish FSA experiences that it does not facilitate and actually prevents a good exchange
of views and experiences at the BoS. Past experience shows that discussions at the BoS
level of peer review outcomes has been a core part of ensuring knowledge of the
outcomes, processes during a peer review and facilitate good follow-up activity. This
interaction is much less feasible in written procedures. Moreover, the reverse voting
requirement (simple majority to object) in a written procedure in effect makes it
impossible for Member States to achieve enough votes to object to the outcomes of the
review even where there may be good reason for doing so. This would not seem to be
conducive to good decision-making. In addition, it is a very different approach to
handling reports, etc. than in other similar institutions such as the ECB.
It is too early to assess the element of the
recommendations to NCAs
versus general
guidelines as none have been set out yet. It will be imperative that the “comply or
explain” mechanism under Article 16 of the ESAs Regulations actually is a dual
recourse with the opportunity to explain actions. We will monitor this to see the
approach taken by the ESAs.
The 2019 ESA review provided a strict regime for
follow-up
with set deadlines. We
recognize benefits of conducting follow-ups to ensure on-going evolvement among the
NCAs, particularly on topics of large or substantial reviews. However, the fixed timing
requirement on all conducted peer reviews introduced by the 2019-revision (together
with mandated topics in level 1) de facto significantly constrain the ESAs ability to plan
their activities. For example if a peer review is introduced too quickly after the launch of
the regulation or just as a substantial review has been undertaken it will have no added
value. Furthermore, even where peer reviews are scheduled and approved by the BoS, it
must be possible to re-address and adapt the planning to take into account resources
needed, new trends or supervisory areas requiring attention, even tasks set out by the
Commission with short deadlines as well ensuring that a peer review should be run for
the added value of the results and not because it is on a work programme.
Generally we believe that peer reviews in order to be an effective supervisory tool must
be well planned in order to create value. Moreover, it is in their nature to look at several
NCAs with a view to compare approaches and identify areas that are well functioning or
need improving. The
urgent cases or unforeseen events
would arise of specific issues
being assessed from the point of view of potentially flawed application of Union law.
Therefore, we do not consider the peer reviews as the right tool use to assess issues that
have arisen as a matter of urgency or without warning.
1.3.3. Do you think mandatory recurring peer reviews, covering also
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enforcement aspects, could be introduced in some sectoral
legislation? If the answer is yes, please specify the piece of
legislation and concrete provision under which mandatory peer
reviews could be introduced.
YES
NO
1.3.4. Are there improvements that could be made to the peer review
process? Please specify which ones.
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NO
As commented on in response to question 1.3.2 we believe the approval procedure
should revert to the regular procedure of discussion at the BoS preferably at a physical
meeting followed by majority approval requirement as in Article 44 of the ESAs
Regulations. Furthermore, the reporting of dissenting views to the political system
should be removed to ensure the independence and integrity of the supervisory role of
the ESAs and the NCAs.
The follow-up requirement could be maintained but the timing be removed or at
minimum extended to allow for efficient work programme planning. If the timing is
maintained it should be supplemented with an option to re-address the planning as a
whole or leave options for NCAs to opt out of a review based on reasonable grounds.
YES
1.4. Other tasks and powers
1.4.1. In your view, is the collection of information regime (Art 35 ESAs
Regulations) effective? If you identify areas for improvement, please
explain.
YES
NO
Generally, we believe the ESAs have the necessary competencies to collect information
required to fulfill their tasks. The Danish FSA experiences that increased use of IT-tools
to facilitate this information collection is beneficial. We believe focus should be on
ensuring user friendliness and efficient data extraction, also in existing systems. A
concrete example is that the Danish FSA experiences that the IT in relation to the eGate
setup is not ideal as it has limited or rigid user options and lacks follow up on requests
made.
1.4.2. In the framework of the 2019 ESAs review, in you view, are the new
Union strategic supervisory priorities an effective tool to ensure
more focused convergence priorities and more coherent coordination
(Article 29a ESAs Regulations)? If you identify any areas for
improvement, please explain.
NO
Overall, we support the added focus in the ESA work that the Union strategic
supervisory priorities provide. Furthermore, we believe it is relevant for NCAs to take
such priorities into account when considering their own strategies and activities. The
tool is still in the implementation phase and it is too early to assess the full effect.
However, we recall that the Union strategic supervisory priorities are not intended to be
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nor are they an effective supervisory tool for the detailed planning of NCA activity.
Planning must naturally allow also for national prioritisation based on their risk
assessments to ensure prudent supervision. We therefore consider it important to ensure
an inclusive approach with constructive discussions when setting the priorities and
similarly with regard to the approach to targeted and proportionate reporting on them.
1.4.3.
Do you think there is the need to amend or add a tool to the toolkit
of the ESAs for achieving supervisory convergence? If yes, which
ones.
YES
NO
1.4.4.
Please assess in a scale from 1 to 5 the significance of the new ESAs’
task of fostering and monitoring the supervisory independence of
national competent authorities (“5” being the highest rate and “1” the
lowest rate). Please explain.
1
fostering and
independence
monitoring
supervisory
2
x
3
4
5
No
opinion
1.4.5. What criteria would be the most relevant, in you view, for the
ESAs to perform effectively their new task of fostering and
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monitoring supervisory independence of national competent
authorities? Please rate the relevance of each criteria in a scale from
1 to 5 (“5” being the most relevant criteria rate and “1” less relevant
criteria).
1
operational independence
financial independence
appointment and dismissal of governing body
x
accountability and transparency
adequacy of powers and ability to apply them
other, please specify
x
x
x
X
2
3
4
X
5
No
opinion
1.4.6. What are, in your view, the main remaining obstacle(s) to allow for
a more effective supervisory convergence?
Firstly, when considering potential obstacles to effective supervisory
convergence, one of the main challenges is changing legislation even before new
acts are applied and the effects can be taken into account.
Secondly, while we aim for a common EU internal market it is still comprised of
national markets and even local markets which means that
“one size fits all”
is
not an automatic fit on all issues. Efficiency in supervisory convergence is
measured on the similar outcomes that must not come about at the expense of due
national assessments and adjustments to cater for their specificities.
Thirdly, efficiency is impeded where an act is passed without taking into account
the practicalities and experiences in an area. Efficiency therefore requires new
acts and changes to acts are evidence based, add value and take into account that
burdens and costs are proportionate.
1.4.7. Do you consider that the ESAs ensure that enough information on
their activities and on financial institutions is available? If not, what
changes should be made in this area?
YES
NO
We believe the ESAs publish a wide range of reports, analysis, etc. on their work and
there is adequate access to information.
Danish stakeholders continue to ask for more transparency on process and feedback
regarding the content. The 2019-ESA review introduced a number of such requirements.
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However, it is too soon to assess if this fulfills the wishes of the stakeholders.
1.4.8. Do you consider that the purpose and outcome of inquiries under
Article 22.4 is clear? If the answer is no, please indicate what role
such inquiries should play.
YES
NO
The provision was a flexible provision that allowed the ESAs to conduct either targeted
or broader inquiries into areas of particular interest with the aim of collecting evidence
of the current situation and thus also to contribute to impact assessments for coming
work or focus areas. Such work was often organized within the preparatory bodies to the
BoS but always with the consent of the BoS. However, the recent amendments to the
system has added more procedural steps that may make this more difficult to
operationalize and more resource intensive. At this time we are unsure of the added
value of the new structure.
1.4.9. In your view, is there the need to add any tools or tasks in order to
enhance supervisory convergence towards digital finance? If your
answer is yes, please explain.
YES
NO
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1.4.10. Please assess the effectiveness of supervisory convergence tools
developed by the ESAs (e.g. common supervisory actions, real case
discussions, etc.) for achieving supervisory convergence:
There is a wide scope for the ESAs to develop supervisory convergence tools to meet
their needs. Currently, we would urge to focus on refining existing tools and align
them across the ESAs in order to simplify the range of tools and increase transparency
and comparability of the tools. This would in turn also support increased convergence.
1.5. Breach of Union law and dispute settlement
1.5.1.
Do you think that the ESAs’ powers in relation to breaches of Union
law (Article 17 ESAs’ Regulations) and binding mediation (Article
19 ESAs’ Regulations) are effective? Please explain your answer.
NO
The tools in relation to breaches of Union law and binding mediation are effective,
however they shouldn’t be used lightly.
Particularly, we believe the Breach of Union
Law-tool should be applied in limited and concrete situations, not with regard to
general compliance assessments in an area as this is a matter for the Commission to
investigate. Use of the Breach of Union Law-tool should always be used as a last
resort. We wish to recall that the mere reputational impact of a pending Breach of
Union Law case as well as the outcome has a severe impact on the subject of such an
investigation merely due to the ESAs’ position as European Supervisory Authorities.
It is therefore imperative that the integrity of investigations or procedures are
safeguarded.
1.5.2. Do you think that the use of the breach of Union law procedure by
the ESAs is adequate? Please consider both before and after the 2019
ESAs’ review and explain your
answer.
YES
Before 2019 ESAs’ review
YES
NO
We refer to our response immediately above and elaborate that we believe the use of
breach of Union law procedure by the ESAs should not be used in historical cases
where no breach of Union law exists today. Rather we find that it should be used as a
final solution for continued, ongoing and present breaches of Union law in order to
achieve a future consistent application of Union law. We believe the Commission
should address issues of historical nature.
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We also believe that the information the ESAs use to inform of the process and results
of a Breach of Union law procedure should reflect the report adopted by the BoS as
the highest decision-making body.
After 2019 ESAs’ review
YES
NO
Please refer to our response above on the situation before 2019 as it has not
significantly changed with the review and it is too early to assess the specificities.
1.5.3. Should there be other instruments available to the ESAs to address
instances of non-application or incorrect application of Union law
amounting to a breach ex-post? If the answer is yes, what would be
those instruments?
YES
NO
1.5.4. Do you think that the new written non-objection procedure by the
BoS and the new independent panels for the decisions on
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breaches of Union law and dispute settlements introduced in the
2019 ESAs’ review have improved these decision
making
processes? Please explain your answer.
YES
NO
Generally, we believe that issues should be discussed at physical meetings with the
opportunity to respond to questions and statements made, particularly the subject being
assessed and ensure full information is tabled prior to a decision is made. The use of
written procedures is generally used following a discussion to confirm a position or to
take into account changes following the discussion. Without the prior discussion it is
very difficult to have secured full disclosure of the issues at hand. Finally, we find the
reverse no-objection criterion in effect removes the possibility of NCAs to question the
decision at hand or reject the adoption of an issue when warranted. This seems to be
unnecessarily constraining on the decision-making. However, the Danish FSA often
experiences that other issues are tabled several times for BoS discussion in order to
resolve an issue wherever possible. This fosters a cooperative basis for the work.
1.5.5. Do you think that the ESAs have always acted, where needed, under
Article 17 and Article 19 of the ESAs’ Regulations?
If the answer is
no, please give concrete examples where you consider that the ESAs
should have taken relevant action under these Articles.
YES
NO
We believe that the ESAs have opened cases where there were no added value for
achieving a consistent application of the Union law as it pertained to historic
circumstances. However we have not experienced that they have failed to open a BuL
investigation where needed.
1.5.6. Could you provide concrete examples where the introduction of
further binding mediation provisions in sectoral legislation would be
useful?
No. We do not believe binding mediation should be a specific sectoral tool allocated to
specific situations or cases. We find the competence of the relevant ESA to enter into
mediation when and where disputes arise is sufficient.
1.5.7.
Why do you think the use of these ESAs’ powers has been limited?
Please explain how these processes could be improved.
We do not believe the powers have been limited but reflect that the NCAs seek to
resolve issues and disputes between themselves or with the assistance of the ESAs
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without resorting to actual mediation. We do not believe this is a negative process but
evidence of the cooperative nature of relationships between NCAs.
1.6. Emergency situations and response to COVID-19 crisis
1.6.1.
Please rate the impact of the ESAs’ response in the context of the
COVID-19 crisis from 1 to 5, 1
standing for "less significant impact”
and 5 for "very significant impact”. Please explain your answer.
1
ESAs’ response to the Covid-19
crisis
2
3
4
x
5
No
opinion
The question is difficult to answer as an overall response for all three ESAs as they had
very difficult roles and responses. Generally, we believe that the ESAs successfully
facilitated coordinated responses on a range of issues also following from changes in
legislation.
For example in the market risk area, the EBA had a quick response on implementing
regulatory guidance and changes following form the challenges from the crisis and
addressed in the CRR quick fix.
However, there could be room for improvement. In some areas it is important that the
view of the ESA is published in sufficient time for the market to take them into account
in connection with their coming activities, e.g. a view on dividend payouts should be
made public prior to the financial entities making their decisions in lieu of finalizing
their accounts and preparing general assemblies. In other areas action must be taken
swiftly in order to adequately address the issues as the situation otherwise ends up
stabilizing itself without input from the ESA. Finally, it is important to ensure that a
course of action addresses an issue at hand. For example in the summer and autumn
2020, the EBA looked into why institutions did not use their liquidity buffer in spring
2020 during COVID-19. However, most of the countries in the EU experienced an
increase in liquidity and there was no a liquidity crisis nor a situation of stress.
Therefore, it did stood to reason that that the institutions had not used their liquidity
buffer and for instance breached the LCR in that situation.
1.6.2.
Please rate in a scale from 1 to 5, the effectiveness of the ESAs’
follow-up actions on the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
recommendations below in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.
Please explain.
1
2
3
4
5
No
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opinion
Market illiquidity and implications for asset
managers and insurers
Impact of large scale downgrades of corporate
bonds on markets and entities across the
financial system
System-wide
restraints
on
dividend
payments, share buybacks and other pay-outs
Liquidity risks arising from margin calls
Generally, the ESAs followed up in a reasonable manner.
On the issue of dividend payments etc. we believe that this was and still is a matter for
the NCAs in their jurisdictions to assess based on their current situation as this also
depends on the state of affairs influenced by many other aspects such as public recovery
initiatives, etc. in the respective jurisdictions. Thus we believe it was limited what the
ESA should have done.
x
X
X
X
1.6.3. Do you think the coordinating activities carried out by the ESAs have
successfully contributed to address the challenges posed by the
COVID-19 crisis? If the answer is yes, please explain. If the answer
is no, please give examples.
YES
NO
We believe activities were successful in the midst of the crisis.
1.6.4. Do you think that the ESAs have always acted effectively, where
needed, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis? If the answer is no,
please give concrete examples where you consider that the ESAs
should have taken relevant action.
YES
NO
1.6.5. Do you think Article 18.2 of the ESAs Regulation (declaration of an
emergency situation) is fit for its intended purpose? Please explain
your answer. If the answer is no please suggest potential changes.
YES
NO
1.6.6. In case you identified areas for improvement in the ESAs’
powers in
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emergency situations, do you have any suggestions on how to
address them?
N/A
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1.7.
Coordination function (Art 31 ESAs’
Regulations)
1.7.1. Do you think the coordination role of the ESAs is effective? If you
identify areas for improvement, please explain.
YES
NO
Overall, the ESAs are fulfilling their coordination role and continuously expand on the
means for coordination. When carrying out their work the ESAs should continue to
facilitate constructive dialogue and discussions between the NCAs and with the ESAs in
order to achieve high quality and transparent solutions catering for all relevant aspects
of an issues at hand.
We also note that the amount of reporting obligations on the industry has increased
significantly over the years in the sectoral legislation. Therefore, any requests for further
data or adjustments to reporting tools should be well founded taking into account the
costs and resources in producing the data or adjustments to systems compared to the
intended use of the data received.
1.7.2. Do you see a need for greater coordination between the ESAs and/or
with other EU and national authorities as regards developing data
requirements, data collection and data sharing? If yes, please explain
your answer and indicate what changes you propose.
YES
NO
In principle we believe that coordination efforts and between NCAs can always be
enhanced. However, we would urge that focus is dedicated to implementing changes
following the 2019 ESA review as well as in recent sectoral legislation. This includes
areas such as anti-money laundering in the EBA where there is a big task to coordinate
and establish the central AML/CFT database.
Given the amount of sectoral legislation we believe that greater coordination efforts
could be well spent in the work with the Commission ensuring consistency of upcoming
regulation with existing regulation.
1.7.3.
2019 ESAs’ review. Please rate the effectiveness, in your view, of
the tools below in order to fulfil the new coordination role of the
ESAs facilitating the entry into the market of actors or products
relying on technological innovation. (“5” being the most effective
and “1” the least effective
tool)
1
exchange of information and best practices
2
3
4
5
x
No
opinion
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adopt guidelines
adopt recommendations
x
x
2019 ESAs review. [specific for ESMA]. Do you think ESMA’s new
coordination function (Article 31b ESMA Regulation) in relation to
orders, transactions and activities that give rise to suspicions of
market abuses and have cross-border implications for the integrity of
financial markets or financial stability in the EU is an effective tool?
If the answer is yes, please provide examples where this new
function has been or could be useful. If the answer is no, please
explain the reasons.
YES
NO
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1.7.4. 2019 ESAs review. Do you think the new coordination groups
(Article 45b of the ESAs Regulations) are effective tools to
coordinate competent authorities regarding specific market
developments? If the answer is yes, please provide examples where
the new provision could be useful. If you identify room for
improvement in this new provision, please explain.
YES
NO
This provision is in practice a codification of the existing culture in the ESAs to
establish coordination groups where deemed necessary. Aside from this work is
coordinated through working groups. It is too early to provide an assessment as to where
this tool could be even more useful in this specific area.
1.7.5. In your view, does the coordination function of the ESAs, ensuring
that the competent authorities effectively supervise outsourcing,
delegation and risk transfer arrangements in third countries, work in
a satisfactory way? Please explain your answer. If your answer is no,
please indicate how the coordination function of the ESAs should be
adjusted.
YES
NO
In our view, it is not the coordinating function of the ESA’s that enables
effective
supervision of outsourcing, but rather the underlying legislation. The Danish FSA is of
the view that the coordination function does not in any way hinder the supervision of
outsourcing, and as such, works in a satisfactory way. From a broader perspective, the
coordination function of the ESA’s ensures
that all competent authorities correctly have
implemented relevant guidelines on outsourcing, making cooperation between national
authorities easier in regards to outsourcing arrangements between these Member States.
1.8. Tasks related to consumer protection and financial activities.
1.8.1.
What are, in your view, the ESAs’ main achievements in the
consumer and investor protection area?
The Danish FSA is of the view that the second EBA report on the application of the
guidelines on product oversight and governance (POG) arrangements,
(EBA/REP/2020/28) has been informative both with regard to the survey, that it
included and the examples of good practice that is included in the report.
Another good example is the guidelines on complaints handling for the securities and
banking sectors (JC 2018 35), that obliges financial institutions to try to solve disputes
in house and provide NCAs with valuable information on the number of complaints
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received by the financial institutions.
1.8.2. Please assess the impact of
the ESAs’ work on analysis of consumer
trends, reviewing market conduct, developing indicators,
contributing to level playing field, financial literacy and follow up to
work in this area. Please rate the ESAs impact on each item from 1
to 5, 1 standing for
"less significant impact” and 5 for "most
significant impact”. Please
explain:
1
analysis of consumer trends
reviewing market conduct
developing indicators
contributing to a level playing field
X
2
3
X
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
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financial literacy
follow up to work in this area
X
X
1.8.3. 2019 ESAs review. The ESAs can now, where sectoral legislation
enables them, use their product intervention powers for practices and
products that cause consumer harm and after two prolongations of
six months, an automatic one-year prolongation of the prohibition is
possible (Article 9.5). In your view, are these powers effective for
their intended purpose? Please explain your answer.
YES
NO
The idea behind the product intervention powers is that identified practices or products
can be taken out of circulation for a period where it can be assessed whether adjustments
can be made to ensure compliance with the rules or a permanent ban should be put in
place. The idea of potential on-going prolongation of a prohibition would be
counterintuitive from an investor- or consumer protection point of view and it is better
protection to make a decision within the scheduled timeframe. At this point the rules
with this extended ESA intervention has just come in and should only be assessed after
they have had time to be applied.
1.8.4. Would you consider it useful if the ESAs could adopt acts of general
application in cases other than those referred to in Article 9(5) of the
ESAs Regulations?
YES Please specify which ones
NO Please give reasons
The premise would result in a change the dynamics of legislative power in the EU
thereby fundamentally changing the inter-institutional balance of the EU. The
competence to adopt acts of general application in Article 9(5) of the ESAs Regulations
presupposes a clear delimitation of the scope of competence being set out in the level 1
legislation and that their actions is that of execution of the will of the co-legislator. Any
competence without such a delimitation would provide the ESAs with an arbitrary
competence unbefit the role of executive arm of Commission. Moreover, it is uncertain
that this would be in compliance with Danish regulatory tradition where we must
indicate with relatively great precision what a provision is to be used for.
1.8.5. Could you provide concrete examples where enabling the use of the
product intervention powers in sectoral legislation would be useful?
No.
2019 ESAs’ review. [specific for EBA]. Under the expanded scope
of the competences as regards the consumer credit directive and the
payment account directive, EBA will also be able to look at
consumer issues across a range of activities, for example lending
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practices. How do you assess this change?
We believe that further convergence work in the area of the Consumer Credit Directive
could be beneficial. The Danish FSA has in recent years had a special focus on
creditworthiness assessments in connection with consumer loans. In the future EBA
could e.g. carry out a cross-cutting study of how creditworthiness assessments are
carried out when granting consumer loans, e.g. when these are granted in connection
with the purchase of goods.
1.8.6. 2019 ESAs review.
Please rate the new ESAs’ task to coordinate
mystery shopping activities of competent authorities, if applicable,
according to its relevance to promote consumer protection at EU
level (1 standing for "less relevant” and 5 for "most relevant”).
Please explain your answer and indicate whether you consider
enhancing national competencies for conduct supervision may be
beneficial for the overall coordination of mystery shopping
activities.
1
2
3
4
5
No
opinion
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EU-level coordination of mystery shopping
x
Mystery shopping activities is an area that is not similarly regulated across the EU. For
example in Denmark we have no legal basis to enter into such activities. We also see
some challenges with regard to identification requirements of a mystery shopper when
entering into a purchase agreement such as applying a national identification number in
the process. Any enhanced activity in this area would still need to respect the presence
or not of national legal basis and therefore whether or not an NCA could participate.
1.8.7. What are, in your view, the main strengths and weaknesses of the
current framework on consumer protection (Article 9 ESAs
Regulations) and what would you suggest to address any possible
shortcomings?
The consumer protection area is extremely broad even if this is divided between the
three ESAs regarding the three financial sectors. It is therefore essential that the ESAs
have a thorough knowledge of trends in the market so that they can focus on
problematic areas with regard to consumer protection. In order to fulfill this purpose the
continued publication of a consumer trend report will serve as a tool for focusing its
work. However, it is important to take into account that products, markets as well as the
maturity of financial consumers can and do differ from Member State to Member State.
We believe that the ESAs should address consumer issues that have a significant cross-
border nature in a majority of Member States as other issues are adequately dealt with
by the Member State due to proximity to the challenges.
1.8.8. Are there areas for improvement in the toolkit of the ESAs when it
comes to coordinating supervisors in the area of consumer
protection? Please explain your answer.
YES
NO
1.9. International relations.
1.9.1. How do you assess the role and competences of each ESA in the field
of international relations? Are there additional international fora in
which the ESAs should be active? Please specify.
Generally, there is potential for the ESAs to add value by coordinating Member States’
participation in international fora. However, the specific participation in the fora should
be left at Member State level.
EBA coordination on Basel issues is very useful as it also provides non-Basel Member
States valuable insights in ongoing Basel work. ESMA coordination was very useful
when setting out “Draft
Administrative Arrangement for the transfer of personal data”
between securities regulators, where ESMA facilitated the contact, cooperation with and
decision of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) as well as the cooperation
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with IOSCO in establishing an Oversight Mechanism to monitor the application of the
signed arrangements.
1.9.2.
2019 ESAs’ review.
How do you
assess the new ESAs’ role in
monitoring the regulatory and supervisory developments,
enforcement practices and market developments in third countries
for which equivalence decisions have been adopted by the
Commission?
It is still too soon to
evaluate properly on how the ESA’s role in monitoring regulatory
and supervisory developments in third countries. The ESA work on this is still being
framed. We should allow the ESAs time to have concrete experience in this regard.
1.9.3. Are the powers and competences in the field of international
relations as set out in Article 33 of the ESAs’ Regulations adequate
in light of the tasks conferred on each of the ESAs? If you identify
areas for improvement, please specify.
YES
NO
As stated above, experience is still limited. We need more experience before suggesting
changes to the framework.
1.9.4. How do you assess the role of each ESA in the development of model
administrative arrangements between national competent authorities
and third-country authorities? Should this role be further specified?
Aside from the positive experience with ESMAs work in relation to GDPR requirements
in connection with the transfer of personal data to third countries as well as setting out
model draft memorandums of understanding under the AIMFD, there is not much
experience in ESAs developing model administrative arrangements between NCAs and
third country authorities.
The EEA and UK aside, we do not see a need for the ESAs to generally engage in
developing model agreements since there is great difference in the necessity and
operational requirements for NCAs and other third country authorities. However, if a
more general need should arise in accordance to a sectoral piece of regulation or on a
horizontal EU piece of regulation a role for the relevant ESA should be considered.
1.10.
The role of the ESAs as enforcement actors/enforcers.
1.10.1.
Under Articles 17 (breach
of Union law),
18 (action
in emergency
situations)
and 19 (settlement
of disagreements between
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NCAs in cross-border situations/binding mediation),
in case a
competent authority fails to ensure that a market participant or
financial institution complies with requirements directly applicable
to it, the ESAs have the power to investigate the alleged breach or
non-application of Union law and, following a specified procedure
and under certain conditions, adopt an individual decision towards
the market participant or financial institution requiring it to comply
with EU law. How do you assess the role of each ESA under these
articles of the founding Regulations?
We believe the ESA’s roles are adequate at this time.
1.10.2. Do you see room for improvement in the way each ESA could ensure
that competent authorities enforce more effectively EU rules towards
market participants/financial institutions? Please explain your
answer.
YES
NO
Generally, we believe the current actions are sufficient.
The basis for supervisory compliance in the financial regulation is that the NCA is
responsible for and ensures that EU rules towards market participants/financial
institutions are complied by. In addition to select, targeted theme reviews or similar,
compliance is mainly achieved and checked through the course of on-going
supervisory activity based on the activity planning in the specific jurisdiction and
taking into account the premises of risk-based activity. The notion of efficiency is
therefore always in development and dependent on the risk appetite in a sector.
1.10.3. In your view, are the powers of the ESAs to enforce EU rules
towards market participants/financial institutions under Articles 17,
18 and 19 ESAs Regulations well balanced, adequate and
effective? Please substantiate your answer.
YES
NO
We believe it is appropriate to retain the current system of the NCAs enforcing the
rules towards its market participants/financial institutions and only if the NCA fails
this obligation, the ESA may act.
1.10.4. Do you think the respective roles of the ESAs and of the Commission
are clearly defined in Article 17, 18 and 19 ESAs Regulations?
Please substantiate your answer.
YES
NO
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1.10.5. Do you think the use of sanctions laid down in the EU acquis by
competent authorities in case of non-compliance of market
participants/financial institutions with EU rules is, in practice,
sufficiently dissuasive or disproportionate? If not, what role could
sectoral legislation and each ESA play in improving the situation?
Please substantiate your answer and give examples.
Sufficiently dissuasive
Disproportionate
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Other, please explain
The general use of sanctions by the NCAs in case of non-compliance is a matter of
assessing adequacy of the sectoral legislation and as a first measure it is the
responsibility of the NCA and its Member State. Further assessment of an NCAs lack to
ensure compliance with EU-rules is a matter for the Commission in assessing the status
of adequate implementation of regulation and finally a matter for the European Court of
Justice to render an opinion on. We do not believe the ESA should have a further role in
this regard.
2. Governance of the ESAs.
2.1. General governance issues
2.1.1.
Does the ESAs’ governance allow them to ensure objectivity,
independence and efficiency in their work/decision making? Please
explain. If you consider that there should be differences in
governance between different types of tasks, please indicate.
YES
NO
We do not believe that the governance structure should be subject to vast differences
dependent on tasks. All tasks follow the same structure with regard to development, i.e.
through working groups with input from ESA and NCA staff with final BoS approval.
The overall structure ensures the elements of objectivity, independence an efficiency.
Moreover, in order to support and foster the necessary cooperative nature enshrined in
the ESAs the BoS should as far as possible aim to progress through consensus and
sharing of best practices among NCAs and with the ESAs.
2.1.2.
2019 ESAs’ review. In your view, has the new provision in Article
42 of the ESAs’ Regulations according to which the Board of
Supervisors members must abstain from participating in the
discussion and voting in relation to any items of the agenda for which
they have an interest that might be considered prejudicial to their
independence, improved the decision making process? Please
explain your answer.
YES
NO
It is necessary to ensure the decision making process is not influenced by undue
interests. However, this basic principle is neither new nor has it changed in content with
the addition to the provision However, we recall the fact that BoS and MB members are
also representatives of their respective NCAs. They are obliged to bring their national
experience both personal and from the NCA to the table which is also a fundamental
element of the ESFS-system. Similar is also true for the Chairman of the ESAs,
particularly with the new voting rights and roles in a number of areas. This does not
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constitute a conflict of interest in and of itself.
2.1.3.
2019 ESAs’ review. Do you think the requirements in Articles 3 and
43a of the ESAs’ Regulations are sufficient to ensure accountability
and transparency? If you identify areas for improvement, please
explain.
YES
NO
We believe that the provisions are sufficient. Considering the ESAs are supervisory
authorities we also believe that the 2019 ESA-review introduced certain undesirable
actions, including an unfortunate mix of roles for particularly the European Parliament
as it facilitates a deeper role in relation to the on-going supervisory work of the ESAs.
In this regard we refer to the reporting of dissenting views from the Peer Review
Committee in Article 30 without involving the BoS in such reporting and without
indicating why the European Parliament needs this information or how it should react to
it. There is also the introduction of confidential discussions between the ESA and the
European Parliament behind closed doors in Article 8(8). These provisions should not
lead to interference with the supervisory actions of the ESAs.
We believe transparency and accountability is important in the ESA system. Publication
of summaries of BoS meetings contributes to this. However, we find it odd that the
European Parliament should have further information than the Council or that available
to the public as Article 43a would facilitate.
2.1.4.
2019 ESAs’ review. To what extent the recent enhancements in the
role of Chairperson improve the decision making process? Please
rate each change from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant
improvement" and 5 for "most significant improvement”. Please
explain your answer.
1
2
3
4
5
No
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opinion
Request to the Board to establish internal
committees for specific tasks
Set the agenda to be adopted by the Board
and table items for decision
Call a vote at any time
Propose the composition of independent
panels for breach of Union law investigations
and dispute settlements.
Propose the composition of peer review
committees for peer reviews
Propose a decision to launch an inquiry and
X
convene an independent panel for the purposes
of Article 22 (4) ESAs Regulation
Vote in the Board of Supervisors (except on
matters that are decided on the basis of
qualified majority voting)
Other, please indicate
The Danish FSA is of the view that generally, the Chairmen have administered their
new competences in a professional and cooperative manner. The elements regarding the
preparation and conduct of the BoS are to a large extent codification of existing
processes.
It is still an adaptation phase to ensure full implementation of all the new processes with
regard to the proposal competences but the Danish FSA experiences that it seems to
function in a satisfactory manner. Generally, the Danish FSA sees little use in the
changes to the process for initiating the inquiry-function given the nature of these is to
investigate an issue on a more general capacity.
2.1.5. Should the role of the Chairperson be strengthened in other areas? If
so, in which areas (please substantiate).
YES
NO
x
X
X
X
x
x
2.2. Decision-making bodies and preparatory bodies
2.2.1. Does the current composition of the Board of Supervisors (BoS) and
of the Management Board (MB) ensure that decisions are taken
efficiently and independently? If you identify areas for
improvement, please explain.
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NO
We are of the view that the current composition and system does ensure independent
decision-making. It is also our impression from the Danish FSA that efficiency has not
significantly deteriorated with the increased role of the Management Board. However, it
is still early days as many of the processes with natural relevance for the Management
Board are being carried out in accordance with the full effect of the new procedures for
the first time in 2021.
2.2.2. Do the current voting modalities (e.g. simple majority, qualified
majority…) of the BoS ensure efficient decision making? Please
explain. If the answer is no please indicate how voting modalities
could be streamlined.
YES
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NO
As far as possible the BoS should aim to progress through consensus and sharing of best
practices among NCAs.
[Only for EBA]. Does the current voting system that, for some
decisions, requires additional simple majorities from competent
authorities participating and not participating in the Banking Union
ensure efficient and balanced decision making? Please explain.
YES
YES
NO
We believe this mechanism continues to be important to ensure protection of NCAs
from non-participating Member States of the Banking Union so they are not without
influence on the work of the EBA compared to that of the SSM. Moreover, the Danish
FSA has not experienced that the mechanism has negatively influenced decision-making
in the EBA.
2.2.3. Does the current allocation of tasks between the BoS and the MB
ensure that the ESAs are run effectively and perform the tasks
conferred on them? If you identify areas for improvement, please
explain.
YES
NO
2.2.4.
2019 ESAs’ review. To what extent the enhanced role of the
Management Board has improved the decision making process.
Please rate each change from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant
improvement" and 5 for "most significant improvement”. Please
explain your answer.
1
The MB can give opinions on all matters to be
decided by the Board of Supervisors.
The MB ensures the consistent use of a
methodology for all peer reviews conducted
The MB proposes a peer review work plan every
two years.
The MB can set up coordination groups on its
own initiative
2
3
X
X
X
x
4
5
No
opinion
The Danish FSA is of the view that this has not influenced the efficiency of the ESAs
and the work done. However, it is premature to assess the full effect as many processes
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are only fully implemented with processes in 2021.
2.2.5. Should the role of the Management Board be strengthened in other
areas? If so, in which areas (please substantiate).
YES
NO
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2.2.6.
2019 ESAs’ review. Do you think the written non-objection
procedure for core convergence tools (breaches of Union law,
dispute settlements and peer reviews) is effective for achieving its
objective? Please substantiate your answer. If your answer is yes,
please indicate if there should be more decisions taken under this
procedure and in which areas.
YES
More decisions in this manner
No further decisions in this manner
NO
The Danish FSA experiences that the extensive use of written procedures with reverse
non-objection procedures on issues that have not been discussed at the BoS does not
facilitate constructive and fruitful discussions. Moreover, the Danish FSA finds that the
reverse no-objection requirement may prevent relevant views to be included during the
decision-making process and would therefore advise against further expanding the use
of them.
2.2.7. Do you think ad hoc committees composed of staff of the ESAs and
members from the competent authorities (e.g. peer review
committees) are effective tools to improve the decision making
process? If your answer is yes, please indicate if there should be
more decisions taken under this procedure and in which areas.
YES
NO
The composition comprising a mix of ESA and NCA staff is not a new element as most
committees were also established in this manner prior to the 2019-ESA review,
particularly with a view to include their experience but also support the written
outcomes of the work conducted. While a mix is beneficial, the primary objective
should be to ensure transparent and constructive discussions with inclusion of all
relevant views on equal footing.
2.2.8. Do you think the functioning of preparatory/supporting bodies of the
ESAs (e.g. technical working groups, standing committees, task
forces etc.) is effective and efficient? If you identify any
shortcomings please specify how these could be addressed.
YES
NO
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Tekst:
How can shortcomings be addressed?
The information below is based on experiences from the Danish FSA as a member of
the ESAs and their bodies. Generally, we believe the supporting bodies are efficient
means for the work and we recognize the benefits of ESA staff forming an integral part
of the preparatory and supporting bodies as well as undertaking the majority of the
drafting. However, the Danish FSA experience some hick-ups in the working
procedures and approaches that we wish to mention.
Firstly, as the ESAs have matured the Danish FSA experience that ESA staff is taking
on a stronger role with a voice as a “supervisor of supervisors” which is not envisaged
as their role in the EFSF nor is it always conducive to being an honest broker in a
process.
Secondly, we appreciate the vast amount of documents
both final and draft
documents- underpinning the high quality work being undertaken. However, the Danish
FSA find it increasingly challenging to review all the material as it is often distributed to
the NCA members very close to the actual meeting, allowing very little time for
preparation. It also influences on the approval processes and optimal results as NCA
members will be pressed to secure mandates for the work where needed. We would wish
that this was to a higher degree factored into preparations and timetables.
Thirdly, given the amount of issues to be addressed not all issues can be dealt with
extensively at physical meetings. This makes it even more important with due inclusion
of all relevant arguments in a process and transparency in how comments are handled.
This is equally relevant for the internal process with NCAs as it is towards stakeholders
where the 2019 ESA-review provided increased transparency to the latter.
Finally, the Danish FSA wishes to continue the good and important work in the ESAs in
a constructive and inclusive manner for all parties based on cooperation and exchange of
views to achieve the highest quality possible on the outcomes.
2.2.9. Please assess the impact of the work undertaken by
preparatory/supporting bodies of the ESAs (e.g. technical working
groups, standing committees, task forces etc.) on the ESAs’ overall
work and achievements. Please rate the impact from 1 to 5, 1
standing for "less significant impact” and 5 for "most significant
impact”: If you identify
any shortcomings please specify how these
could be addressed.
1
Standing committees and other permanent
committees
Other preparatory bodies (e.g. technical working
groups
Committee on consumer protection and financial
innovation
Proportionality Committee
47
2
3
X
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
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The included information is based on experiences from the Danish FSA as a member of
the ESAs and their bodies.
Generally, the Danish FSA believe the work undertaken in these fora is of vital
importance to ensure material has undergone thorough analyses and discussions prior to
submission for approval by the BoS (or other decision-making forum) in order to
provide high quality information for an informed decision.
Therefore, it is important that processes allow for thorough discussions and preparation
of documents facilitated by ESA staff as honest brokers in the process.
It is too early to fully assess the impact of the new Proportionality Committees in the
ESAs.
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(only for ESMA) Should there be a different governance in case of direct
supervisory decisions in ESMA (for example, similar to the new
governance for CCPs)? If the answer is yes, please indicate your
suggestions for improvements and the expected benefits.
YES
NO
2.3. Financing and resources.
2.3.1. Do you consider the provisions on financing and resources for the
general activities of the ESAs appropriate to ensure sufficiently
funded and well-staffed ESAs taking into account budgetary
constraints at both EU level and the level of Member States? Please
explain your answer. If the answer is no, please indicate what other
sources of finance could be considered.
YES
NO
2.3.2. Do you think that the ESAs have sufficient resources to perform their
tasks? Please explain.
YES
NO
Generally, we believe that the increase in tasks from recent legislation has not
sufficiently been accompanied by funding. We do acknowledge the difficulties in
delivering a large contribution to the single rulebook, extensive supervisory
convergence work, IT projects combined with a wide range of other tasks in the ESA
Regulations. However, given these conditions and the necessity of adequate
preparation of material we believe that it may be more an issue of the ESAs focusing
even more on a tougher prioritisation according the budget available and the tasks at
hand and lower expectations of deliverables.
We see a significant challenge in the continuously growing IT-costs due to a
multitude of IT-projects at the ESAs, some of which have been set out as level 1
demands but without funding to accompany it.
2.3.3. Do you think there are enough checks and balances for how the
ESAs spend their budget? Please explain.
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YES
NO
2.4. Involvement and role of relevant stakeholders
2.4.1. In your view, are stakeholders sufficiently consulted or, on the
contrary, are there too many consultations? Please explain your
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answer.
YES
Too many consultations
It is important to involve stakeholders in order to ensure fully informed basis for
decision-making. While there may be cause for targeted roundtables on narrow or very
specific issues, it is necessary to ensure that all relevant parties are invited to such to
ensure relevant expertise on the issues on the table is present. However, the Danish FSA
have experienced that particularly the EBA could in some instances have invited all
impacted stakeholders. An example is the EBA's guidance on article 26 in the LCR
Delegated Regulation in the second EBA report on LCR implementation. The guidance
has a considerable impact on the LCR requirement for the specialized mortgage credit
institutions. However, EBA did not include specialized mortgage credit institutions in
the consultation, despite suggestions to do so..
2.4.2. Please assess in a scale from 1 to 5 the quality, in your view, of the
consultations launched by the ESAs (5 standing for the highest
quality). Please explain your answer.
1
General consultations launched by the ESAs
Specific consultations when developing data
collection requirements
NO
2
3
X
x
4
5
No
opinion
2.4.3. Are the ESAs sufficiently transparent and accessible for stakeholders
to ensure effective and efficient interaction? Please explain your
answer.
YES
NO
The new requirement of providing feedback on the handling of responses to
consultations has not yet fully reached its potential. Aside from this Danish stakeholders
still ask for better information on how the ESA deals with crossborder issues, subject of
course to what information may be divulged taking into account obligations of
professional secrecy.
2.4.4. Please rate in a scale from 1 to 5 the impact of stakeholders groups
within the ESAs on the overall work and achievements of the ESAs
(1 standing for "less
significant impact” and 5 for "very significant
impact”). Please explain your
answer.
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1
EIOPA Insurance & Reinsurance Stakeholder
Group
EIOPA Occupational Pensions Stakeholder
Group
ESMA Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group
EBA Banking Stakeholder Group
2
3
4
5
No
opinion
x
x
x
x
2019
ESAs’ review. Please assess the significance of the recent
changes in the composition, selection, term of office and advice of
the stakeholders groups (Article 37 ESAs Regulations)? Please rate
each change from 1 to 5, 1 standing for "less significant" and 5 for
"most significant”. Please explain your answer.
1
Composition of stakeholders groups
Selection of members
Term of office
A third of its members can issue a separate advice
X
X
X
2
3
4
5
No
opinion
x
It is too early to effectively assess the changes as the terms of current members have not
completed full cycles yet. However, the main challenge is to attract candidates to cover
all segments as well as attracting sufficiently high level candidates that are available and
willing to contribute to the work.
2.4.5. Does the composition of stakeholders groups ensure a sufficiently
balanced representation of stakeholders in the relevant sectors?
Please explain your answer.
YES
NO
2.4.6.
In your experience, are the ESAs’ stakeholders groups sufficiently
accessible and transparent in their work? If the answer is no, please
indicate the areas where the transparency could be improved.
YES
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NO
2.5. Joint bodies of the ESAs
2.5.1. Please assess the aspects described below regarding the Board of
Appeal (BoA) of the ESAs. Please rate the effectiveness of each
aspect from 1 to 5 (1 least effective, 5 most effective). If you identify
areas for improvement, please explain.
1
Organisation
Functioning and time limits
2
3
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
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One joint Board of Appeal for the 3 ESAs
The composition of the BoA
X
X
2.5.2. Please assess the aspects described below regarding the Joint
Committee of the ESAs. Please rate the effectiveness of each aspect
from 1 to 5 (1 least effective, 5 most effective). If you identify areas
for improvement, please explain.
1
Functioning
Working methods
Ensuring cross-sectoral cooperation
Ensuring consistent approaches
Decision making process
The legal structure (no legal personality)
X
x
2
3
X
X
4
5
No
opinion
X
X
2.5.3. Please assess the work of the Joint Committee of the ESAs in the
areas below. Please rate each area from 1 to 5 (1 least significant
contribution, 5 most significant contribution). If you identify areas
for improvement, please explain.
1
Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation
Coordination and cooperation for bi-annual Joint
Risk Reports, published in spring and autumn
Financial Conglomerates
Securitisation
European Forum of Financial Innovators
x
x
x
x
2
3
4
x
5
No
opinion
3. Direct supervisory powers.
3.1.
How do you assess ESMA’s direct supervisory powers in the field
of:
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Credit Rating Agencies
Trade Repositories under EMIR
Trade Repositories under SFTR
Securitisation Repositories (STS)
Satisfactory.
3.2.
Please assess ESMA’s performance as a direct supervisor of the entities
referred to in question 3.1 in a scale of 1 to 5 (1 lowest rate, 5 highest
rate). If you identify areas for improvement please explain.
1
Credit Rating Agencies
Trade Repositories under EMIR
Trade Repositories under SFTR
Securitisation Repositories
2
3
X
X
X
X
4
5
No
opinion
3.3. How do you envisage the future scope of direct supervisory powers of
ESMA or any other ESA? What principles should govern the decision to
grant direct supervision to the ESAs? If you see room for improvement,
please provide evidence where you see weaknesses of the current set-up.
The ESAs have been established with the primary focus of promoting and facilitating
supervisory convergence in their remit and contributing to the single rulebook, also
within their remit. From an organisational point of view, direct supervisory powers were
not envisaged and put a strain on not only relevant governance structures but also on
funding structures. Moreover, the EU financial regulation is based on national
competences and national supervisory responsibility with international cooperation
which should remain the basis also in the future.
Any consideration of further allocation of direct supervisory competencies with the
ESAs should be based on a clear, evidence-based rationale. Relevant criteria would be a
thorough analysis, including evidence of significant cross-border activity that cannot be
adequately addressed by National Competent Authorities, existence of significant
divergent approaches among NCAs and consideration of the ESA's resources to
undertake the task.
We do not support creating a “supervisor of supervisors” regime.
The Danish FSA notes that with regard to EIOPA there has been reference to a criteria
based on the systemic importance of insurance and pension companies. However, there
does not seem to be sufficient evidence to support such a criterion at this time. The
reasons being
there is no common definition of “systemic importance”
It is not possible
to equate banking and insurance businesses to facilitate this classification due to the
diversity in business forms, lack of indication of which companies would be subject to
this classification and lack of data on the effect of bankruptcies of the relevant entities.
3.4. Have you identified any areas where supervision at EU level should be
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considered? If your answer is yes, please explain.
YES
NO
4. The role of the ESAs as regards systemic risk.
4.1. Please assess the aspects described below regarding the role of each ESA
as regards systemic risk in a scale of 1 to 5 (1 lowest rate, 5 highest rate).
If you identify room for improvement, please specify how this could be
addressed.
1
The quality of the analysis of market
developments
The quality of the stress test and transparency
exercises that were initiated and coordinated by the
ESAs
2
3
4
5
x
No
opinion
x
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The interaction between the ESRB and ESAs on
the development of a common set of quantitative
and qualitative indicators to identify and measure
systemic risk
The cooperation within the European System of
Financial Supervision (ESFS) to monitor the
interconnectedness of the various subsectors of
the financial system they are overseeing
The broader cooperation between the ESRB and
the ESAs within the ESFS
The contribution of the ESAs to facilitating the
dialogue between micro- and macro-supervisors
x
x
x
x
The main objective for the ESAs is to ensure that the EU financial sectors are
significantly better at withstanding a financial crisis than it was during the last financial
crisis. To the extent that it does not conflict with financial stability, the ESAs should
also aim to enhance efficiency, e.g. through harmonising rules and practices and thereby
ease cross border financial activity. However, when the two goals conflict promoting
financial stability should be the main objective of the ESA.
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B.
QUESTIONS ON THE SINGLE RULEBOOK
5. The ESAs work towards achieving a rulebook
5.1. Do
you
consider
that
the
technical
standards
and
guidelines/recommendations developed by each ESA have contributed
sufficiently to further harmonise a core set of standards (the single
rulebook)?
YES If you have identified areas for improvement, please explain
Other
We believe the ESA's work have contributed to further harmonise the Single Rulebook.
In general, it is important to ensure sufficient time for preparation and review of the
documents accompanying the processes throughout the development phase thus
facilitating harmonized approaches and consistent application. This is particularly
important when addressing highly technical issues or issues of a significant horizontal
nature.
We also see an increased level of detail in these products leaving less room for
supervisory discretion and national optional discretions. In general, standards and
guidelines should respect of such elements.
The Danish FSA experiences that
the ESA’s expect full compliance with
general
application guidelines or recommendations. However, considering the level of
granularity of such instruments and the
“comply or explain” function,
we believe it is
important to recognize that partial or non-compliance may be appropriate in some
circumstances and legally possible.
NO Please give reasons.
5.2. Do you assess the procedure for the development of draft technical
standards as foreseen in the ESAs Regulations effective and efficient in
view of the objective to ensure high quality and timely deliverables?
Please explain your answer. If you identify areas for improvement, please
indicate.
YES
NO
Other
There is still an on-going and crucial challenge in delivering the draft technical
standards within the specified legal timeframe in level 1. This is of course not
something to be addressed by the ESA’s Regulations, but does have a severe impact on
the ability to achieve the goal of high quality and timely deliverables at the level of the
ESAs. We therefore strongly urge the Commission to consider this from the beginning
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in the Commission proposals but also as an honest broker during the political
negotiations. Also, we as co-legislators should ensure that timeliness is reviewed during
the negotiation process following changes to the tasks and the period of negotiations.
While there are variations across the ESAs, we generally are of the view that the draft
technical standards being delivered are of high quality and are for the vast majority
delivered within the set timeframe. However, it is always possible to improve. Firstly,
more feasible deadlines for delivering in the level 1 text as mentioned. Secondly, on
grounds of the huge number of mandates to be fulfilled combined with ever growing
granularity of content, it is a very large task for the ESAs to fulfill all the mandates
within the set deadlines while still fulfilling their other objectives on e.g. coordination
and supervisory convergence at an equally high standard and maintaining high quality
deliverables
The changes in the procedures in Articles 10-15
of the ESA’s Regulation
from the 2019-
ESA review have had little time to show their true merit due to the short time of
application. We particularly appreciated the obligation for the Commission to provide
explanations on proposed amendments when resubmitting a draft technical standard to
the ESA for re-evaluation.
5.3. When several ESAs need to amend joint technical standards (e.g. PRIIPs
RTS) and there is a blocking minority at the Board of Supervisors of one
of the ESAs, what would you propose as solution to ensure that the
amendment process runs smoothly?
The question presupposes that there should not be differences in opinion between the
BoS of the three ESAs. We believe that is a flawed assumption. The reason for requiring
the approval of two or three of the BoS of the ESAs would be to ensure that the product
reflects the interests of all parties concerned. Should that not be the case thus resulting
in a blocking minority, it is the task of the ESAs to re-examine the issues and find
solutions agreeable to all parties.
5.4. In particular, are stakeholders sufficiently consulted and any potential
impacts sufficiently assessed? Please explain your answer. If you identify
areas for improvement, please indicate.
YES X
by organizing round tables and consultation procedures.
Other
The processes vary between the ESAs. Generally, the ESAs consult where mandatory
and on select issues they supplement stakeholder inclusion through round tables and
additional consultation procedures.
However, we do believe that there is room for improvement for broader inclusion of
stakeholders, particularly at the EBA, but also more generally, on the assessments of
impacts in relation to proposals. This ever so more on areas where a high level of
granularity will result in burdens for the stakeholders when they must comply with the
rules. However, this also presumes contributions from the stakeholders without which
the ESAs cannot adjust the content.
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5.5. Can you provide examples where guidelines and recommendations
issued by the ESAs have particularly contributed to the establishment of
consistent, converging, efficient and effective supervisory practices and
to ensuring the common, uniform and consistent application of Union
law?
The included information is based experiences from the Danish FSA.
Given the vast amount of issued guidelines and recommendations by the ESAs, the Danish
FSA stress that the below mentioned are merely a small sample of examples and there are
many more of equally good value contributing to the common understanding and
convergence in the on-going supervisory work.
The first example is ESMA guidelines on enforcement of financial and non-financial
information in annual and interim financial reports (ref. ESMA32-50-218). The Danish
FSA experience that these guidelines have together with the ongoing coordination from
ESMA to a high degree ensured consistent, converging, efficient and effective
supervisory practices on this financial information. The enforcement has contributed to
common, uniform and consistent application of the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) in Europe.
The second and third examples are the guidelines on AML/CFT colleges (ref. JC 2019
81) and the guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (ref. EBA/BL/2021/02). The Danish FSA
find they are useful tools that contribute to the establishment of consistent supervisory
practices. However, in some instance the Danish FSA would wish more convergence
with similar workstreams under the FATF, as to ensure that those different tools
complement each other, and that we keep some added value.
A fourth example is the EBA Guidelines on the treatment of structural FX under Article
352(2) of the CRR (ref. EBA/GL/2020/09).
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5.6. Would you consider it useful if the ESAs could adopt guidelines in areas
that do not fall under the scope of legislation listed in Article 1 (2) of the
ESAs founding Regulations and are not necessary to ensure the effective
and consistent application of that legislation?
YES Please specify which ones
NO Please give reasons.
We would not consider this useful nor legal. Firstly and generally, we do not believe it
is feasible on legal grounds to issue guidelines in areas where the ESA has not been
allocated competence, i.e. the legal act is not included in Article 1(2) of the ESAs
Regulations. The ESA would be exceeding its competences.
Secondly, guidelines are often considered as a tool to supplement the single rulebook
and have an authoritative effect once published. However, they remain a non-binding,
convergence tool with a “comply-or-explain” function attached to them and thus
do not
have any status as legislative acts.
Thirdly, issuance of guidelines must satisfy the test of establishing consistent, efficient
and effective supervisory practices and ensure common, uniform and consistent
application of the Union law as stated in Article 16(1) of the ESAs Regulations. The
reference to Union law is a reference to the legal acts as stated in Article 1(2) of the
ESAs Regulations.
Moreover, according to the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality the ESAs can
only issue guidelines where it is necessary to ensure an effective and consistent
application of the legislation. Therefore, issuance without the necessity to ensure
effective and consistent application of that legislation makes the guideline nul and void.
Fourthly, we are aware that the issuance of guidelines in areas (such as accounting in
ESMA) that affect undertakings which are not within the scope of the ESA competence
is a continuous subject of debate. However, this poses many challenges of ensuring that
all of the relevant goals and interests of the rules the guidelines are supplementing are
catered for and all the relevant authorities are include in the process. Below we provide
you with an example of this based on the accounting area. Listed entities must focus on
significant transparency, as they have issued securities that are traded by investors with
no direct involvement in the undertakings under the listing rules. This transparency has
a direct cost when preparing information. However, the undertakings competitors etc.
may also take advantage of this information. For undertakings that are not listed, there
is also a vital focus on the costs relating to requiring undertakings to disclose
information, and in particular whether these costs are reasonable compared to the
benefits.
The NCAs represented in ESMA have a strong focus on investor protection. However,
in the Member States different authorities will often regulate and supervise non-listed
entities, with a different focus including
on the undertaking’s
general situations. These
other authorities are today not represented in ESMA, but must be in the process of
issuing regulation and guidelines covering non-listed undertakings.
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[exclusively for ESMA] If you think of the Wirecard case as an example,
how could supervision be improved in the field of auditing and financial
reporting? Yes, supervision could be improved further by ESMA having
a mandate to draft RTS on enforcement of financial reporting.
Including Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 [IAS Regulation] and
Directive 2013/34/EU [Accounting Directive] in Article 1(2) of the
ESMA Regulation
Other, please explain
We believe that regulation and the procedures for supervision should not be based on
singular cases in individual Member States. The experience from recent cases is useful
but should be used together with other factors when developing or adjusting regulation
and procedures for supervision.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate individual cases, compare it with similar cases and
then consider whether the weaknesses in the regulation and supervision that are detected
are general or related to the specific cases. If any changes are to be made, it should be
carefully evaluated whether the benefits will outweigh the costs and other burdens that
will follow from a change.
Audit Committees are playing an important role in the PIE entities corporate reporting
and the audit of the financial report. Consequently, it could be considered whether the
supervision of audit committees needs to be improved.
We also believe that it has merit to consider whether supervision could be improved
further by further rules on the enforcement of financial reporting.
5.7. Do you think that the role of ESMA with regard to Directive
2004/109/EC (Transparency Directive) could be strengthened? For
example, by including a mandate for ESMA to draft RTS in order to
further harmonize enforcement of financial (and non-financial)
information.
YES Please explain and specify how.
We believe it could be relevant and useful to change the nature of the current
guidelines on enforcement of financial and non-financial information in annual
and interim financial reports. Taking into account the non-binding nature of
guidelines as is set out in the legislative acts these could be transferred into a
mandate for a draft RTS thus requiring full compliance in all Member States and
strengthening as well as facilitating direct enforceability.
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NO Please give reasons.
5.8. Do you think that Directive 2004/109/EC (Transparency Directive)
should require ESMA to annually report on the supervision and
enforcement of financial and non-financial information in the EU on the
basis of data provided by the national competent authorities regarding
their supervisory and enforcement activities? Please explain your answer.
YES
Transparency is key in ensuring a well-functioning supervision and
enforcement of financial and non-financial information. We therefore support
continued and enhanced transparency of reporting of data provided by the
NCAs regarding their supervisory and enforcement activities.
Moreover, we believe that such reporting from ESMA not only with regard
to the enforcement activities on European level but also on national level may
be necessary in order to ensure transparency of the enforcement activity in
Europe and focus on one single marked with harmonized enforcement both
on regulation and in practice.
NO
5.9. Do you think that ESMA could have a role with regard to Directive
2006/43/EC (Audit Directive) and Regulation 537/2014/EU (Audit
Regulation)?
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YES Please explain and specify how.
NO Please give reasons.
Recent cases have highlighted that high-quality financial reporting is essential for
maintaining investor trust in capital markets, and the need to have consistent and effective
enforcement of that reporting across the European Union. Continuous focus on ESMAs
contribution to the Audit regulation would enhance quality and uniformity of practice in
the European audit and assurance profession, enhancing investor protection and
improving listed entities’ auditors’ report.
However, the Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB) has been
established in accordance with Article 30 of Regulation 537/2014/EU and comprises the
National Supervisory Authorities for auditors and audit firms. The members of CEAOB
are experts in the audit area, including audit of non-PIE entities, and thereby ensure the
necessary expertise in this area. Accordingly, CEAOB should continue have the main
role with regard to the Audit Directive and the Audit Regulation. Furthermore, ESMA
already appoints a member of CEAOB and both EBA and EIOPA are invited to attend
meetings of CEAOB as observers. Therefore, we do not see a need to extend the role of
ESMA with regard to the Audit Directive and the Audit Regulation.
5.10.
What is your assessment of the work undertaken by each ESA
regarding opinions and technical advice?
No comment.
6. General questions on the single rulebook
6.1. Which are the areas where you would consider maximum harmonisation
desirable or a higher degree of harmonisation than presently (rather than
minimum harmonisation)?
Please give your reasons for each
As a matter of principle, we believe that maximum harmonisation is not a goal in itself
and can be of lesser importance faced with other important objectives such as financial
stability. The quest for harmonisation cannot lead to a lower level or less strict
regulation in Member States, and it should not remove flexibility where this is needed to
address specific circumstances and ensure financial stability or other substantive
objectives.
Any consideration of further or maximum harmonisation in any field must take into
account the reasons for establishing minimum harmonization, the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality as well as the main objectives of the rules in question.
Thereafter, it will be the consistent application across the jurisdictions that will be the
real proof of whether the harmonisation has been a success or not.
As an example the main objective for the EBA is to ensure that the EU banking sector is
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significantly better at withstanding a financial crisis than it was during the last financial
crisis. The EBA should also aim to enhance efficiency, e.g. through harmonising rules
by contributing to the single rulebook and practices and thereby ease cross border
financial activity. However, should these two goals conflict, we are of the view that
promoting financial stability should be the main objective of the EBA.
Considering all of the above we do not believe that an assessment of the level of
harmonisation of specific sectoral legislation is appropriate within the context of this
public hearing.
6.2. Which are the areas where you consider that national rules going beyond
the minimum requirements of a Directive (known as “gold- plating”) are
particularly detrimental to a Single Market? Please identify the relevant
sectoral legislation, examples of gold plating and give reasons for each.
Sector:
Specific
piece of
legislation
N/A
N/A
N/A
Example
of gold-
plating
Please
explain
Banking
Insurance
Asset
management
Market
infrastructure
(CCPs,
CSDs)
Market
organisation
(MiFID,
MIFIR,
MAR)
Other
N/A
N/A
N/A
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6.3. Do you consider that the single rulebook needs to be further enhanced to
reach the uniform application of Union law or rules implementing Union
law and efficient convergent supervisory outcomes? Please explain your
choice. Where appropriate, please support your response with examples.
YES
NO
The single rulebook is vast and comprises many different aspects and contributions
from many sources. We find it challenging to assess it as one product. We will
consider all the forthcoming proposals from the Commission in light of strategies,
action plans, etc. and assess them on their own merits.
6.4. Questions regarding the appropriate level of regulation.
6.4.1. In your view, are there circumstances in existing EU legislation
where level 1 is too granular, or for other reasons, would rather be
preferable to have a mandate for level 2, or guidance at level 3?
Please specify the area (and if possible, specific piece of legislation)
and explain why (e.g. in order to have appropriate flexibility to adapt
the specifics of the regulation in case of change of circumstances)?
YES
NO
In general, it is preferable to have as much certainty in the level 1 text as possible,
including setting out granular content where necessary to ensure the politically
important issues are adequately addressed. Unfortunately, there are many examples of
politically important issues that are delegated to regulators in level 2, thereby pushing
the responsibility of the legislators is displaced to the regulators in the EU. We
strongly favor clear rules in level 1 and when delegating to level 2 and 3, there should
be a clear and well-framed mandate for the ESAs and/or Commission.
It is also important to stress that highly detailed level 1 text can also present
challenges as this high degree of granularity is not the same as ensuringcommon
understanding or actually conveying precise rules for application. This is true for all
levels of EU rules.
An example is the in the area of consumer protection where directives generally
contain very detailed rules on consumer protection requirements. In combination with
the Commission’s
approach of national implementation being an almost word by
word implementation, this leaves no room for adaptions to national practices in the
market. It also leads to national legislation being difficult to understand and apply. We
would therefore prefer a solution, where directives are to a larger extent than today
based on more general or principal based rules that can be supplemented with level 3
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guidance. This would leave room for national adaptations without waiving the
objective of a more uniform legislation.
Moreover, the consumer area is subject to a combination of directives and regulations
regulating the same issue, which is far from appropriate and creates an overly
complex regime without providing a clear picture of rights and obligations with
respect to a specific area. As an example the suitability test in MiFID is regulated in
MIFID directive as well as in a delegated regulation. It would have been more
appropriate if these rules were place in only one piece of legislation.
A second example is it would be useful for the EBA to develop and publish a
guidance on intraday liquidity management in EU, similar to Basel’s published
guidance in 2013 on monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management.
6.4.2. On the other hand, in your view, could
reducing divergences in
rules
at level 1 (legislation agreed by the co-legislators), as well as
rules regarding delegated acts (regulatory technical standards) or
implementation at level 2, (implementing acts and implementing
technical standards) and/or level 3 (‘comply or explain guidance’ by
ESAs) further enhance the single rulebook?
YES
NO
A successful single rulebook is that which regulates where it is necessary and leaves
discretion to the relevant authorities to conduct its activity with respect of the
circumstances at hand as well as maintaining a holistic view of regulation in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication and divergences between different sources of rules,
thus mitigating the risk of inconsistencies in dealing with the same issue. Therefore,
the answer to this question
is “yes”.
6.4.3. Which of the three levels and/or a combination thereof are more
effective in building the single rulebook? (multiple choices allowed)
In our view it is an effective combination of all levels that will ensure an
effective and consistent single rulebook.
6.5. Generally speaking, which level of regulation should be
enhanced/tightened in order to ensure
uniform application
of the single
rulebook? (multiple choices allowed). Please explain and substantiate
with examples, where possible.
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Level 1(legislation agreed by the co-legislators)
Level 3 (‘comply or explain guidance’ by
ESAs)
In our view it is an effective combination of all levels that will ensure an effective and
consistent and uniform application starting with as clear rules and principles at level 1.
6.6. In your view, what, if anything and considering legal limitations, should
be improved in terms of determining application dates and sequencing of
level 1, level 2 and level 3?
Please explain
We have been faced with a number of situations where application dates in the level 1
text have been misaligned with dates for mandates in the level 2 and level 3 resulting in
periods where the principle based level 1 text would apply without the necessary content
to ensure the right information is available to ensure compliance. This creates confusion
and adds to the costs of regulators and the stakeholders as they will have to frequently
adapt their methods of compliance without necessarily knowing if they are doing it
correctly.
We believe it should be one of the primary tasks of the co-legislators as a final element
of the negotiation phase combined with checks by the lawyer-linguists to have final
checks ensuring there is consistency in the application dates and sequencing of the
coming rules.
6.7. Please indicate whether the following factors should be considered when
deciding on the need for further harmonisation in rules (attribute 1 to 5
to each factor, 1 being the least important and 5 being the most
important):
1
Strong interlinkages with areas of law which x
remain non-harmonised (e.g. CRIM-MAD and
national criminal law)
Level 2 (e.g. delegated acts and technical standards)
2
3
4
5
No
opinion
Broad discretion left to national authorities
and frequent use of that discretion by these
national authorities
High level of gold plating by national rules
High degree to which supervision of the same
type of actors and/or activities render
divergent outcomes across Member States
All of the above
None of the above
X
x
x
x
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Other aspects, if so which ones:
provide concrete examples
Please
x
Regarding AML/CFT, we would also mention the cooperation with regard to
information sharing, as well as the level of supervisory cooperation. However, this
could also be a more general aspect to take into consideration.
6.8.
As part of the Commission’s work on enhancing the single rulebook
under the Capital Markets Union project, do you consider that certain EU
legislative acts (level 1) should, in the course of a review, become more
detailed and contain a higher degree of harmonisation? Would any of
those legal frameworks currently contained in Directives, or any part
therein, benefit from being directly applicable in Member States instead
of requiring national transposition?
YES Please specify which one
Sector:
Specific
piece of
legislation
Example
Please
explain
Banking
Insurance
Asset
management
Market
infrastructure
(CCPs,
CSDs)
Market
organisation
(MiFID,
MIFIR,
MAR)
Other
NO Please specify which Directives you have in mind and explain
your answers
Sector:
Specific
piece of
legislation
N/A
N/A
69
Example
Please
explain
Banking
Insurance
ERU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 331: EMs høringssvar vedr. finansiel tilsynsmæssig konvergens og Single Rule book, fra erhvervsministeren
2399729_0070.png
Asset
management
Market
infrastructure
(CCPs,
CSDs)
Market
organisation
(MiFID,
MIFIR,
MAR)
Other
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
70
ERU, Alm.del - 2020-21 - Bilag 331: EMs høringssvar vedr. finansiel tilsynsmæssig konvergens og Single Rule book, fra erhvervsministeren
2399729_0071.png
6.9. Do you consider that on the basis of existing mandates, additional/more
detailed rules at level 2 should be introduced to provide the supervised
entities and their supervisors with more detailed and clearer guidance?
YES Please specify legislation and what these rules at level 2 should
regulate
NO
6.10.
Against the objective of establishing the single rulebook for
financial services, how would you increase the degree of harmonisation
of EU financial legislation?
Across the board (e.g., via an Omnibus act which amends multiple
sectoral acts at the same time)
Sector:
Specific
piece of
legislatio
n
Legislativ
e
approach
(omnibus
vs
targeted
reviews)
Please
explai
n
Banking
Insurance
Asset
management
Market
infrastructur
e
(CCPs,
CSDs)
Market
organisation
(MiFID,
MIFIR,
MAR)
Other
In a targeted manner through individual sectoral reviews
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