Erhvervsudvalget 2019-20
ERU Alm.del Bilag 412
Offentligt
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
FINANSTILSYNET
Århusgade 110
2100 København K
(Sendt via e-mail til
[email protected]
og
[email protected])
Danske Bank A/S
Holmens Kanal 2-12
DK-1092 København K
Tel. 33 44 00 00
danskebank.dk
10. september 2020
Svar på Fi a stilsy ets brev: A
J.nr. 6252-0349
od i g o
redegørelse o
Da ske Ba k A/S’ gældsi ddrivelsessyste
INDLEDNING
Danske Bank A/S (herefter Danske Bank eller banken) henviser til Finanstilsynets brev af 31. august 2020. I
dette brev anføres, at Finanstilsynet i lyset af de oplysninger, der på det seneste er kommet frem i medierne
om fejl i bankens inkassosystem, har besluttet at undersøge bankens håndtering af de konstaterede fejl i
bankens inkassosystem set i forhold til bankens forpligtelse til at handle redeligt og loyalt over for sine kunder
(jf. § 43 i lov om finansiel virksomhed og bekendtgørelsen om god skik for finansielle virksomheder).
Indledningsvis vil vi gerne understrege, at vi dybt beklager situationen og den usikkerhed, som vores fejl og
de fejlbehæftede data i bankens inkassosystem har skabt
–
ikke mindst for vores kunder. Kunderne såvel som
alle andre interessenter skal naturligvis kunne stole på de oplysninger, de får fra banken og som vores
rådgivning og aftaler er baseret på. Vi beklager meget, at dette ikke har været tilfældet i denne sag. Det er
udelukkende vores ansvar, og vi forpligter os til så hurtigt som muligt at gennemgå og korrigere alle de sager,
der er påvirket af datafejlene, samt sikre, at vores kunder modtager fuld kompensation for de beløb, de har
betalt for meget, eller andre relaterede tab som følge af vores fejl.
Ligeledes kan vi kun beklage over for både kunder, medarbejdere og alle andre interessenter, at disse
problemer ikke på et tidligere tidspunkt er blevet håndteret ordentligt. Der er tale om en kompleks sag, men
det står klart for os, at problemstillingen igennem årene delvist har været kendt i forskellige dele og på
forskellige niveauer af organisationen, herunder blandt ledere. På trods af forsøg på at afhjælpe
problemerne, blev der aldrig taget hånd om de underliggende datafejl, og desværre fik problemerne i denne
sag derfor fik lov til at eksistere gennem mange år.
Vi tager de forhold, der er nævnt i Tilsynets brev, meget alvorligt, og vi forpligter os til fortsat at have en åben
og transparent dialog med Finanstilsynet i forhold til de historiske og aktuelle forhold, der vedrører eller
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
påvirker bankens inkassosystemer. Ledelsen har altid ansvaret for at vide, hvad der foregår i virksomheden,
for at rette op på fejl, der er opstået tidligere, samt for at sikre, at vi har en ledelseskultur, hvor fejl og
problemer bringes frem i lyset og løses.
Hensynet til bankens kunder kommer i første række, og vi vil fortsat arbejde på at sikre holdbare løsninger.
Hvis vi i forbindelse med vores forsatte analysearbejde identificerer forhold, der påvirker oplysningerne i
denne redegørelse, vil vi naturligvis omgående orientere Finanstilsynet herom.
Vi vil gerne understrege, at vi vil kompensere alle de kunder, der er økonomisk påvirket af de fire
hovedårsager
”root auses”
, som vi beskriver i denne redegørelse. Sagen skyldes de beklagelige systemiske
fejl i bankens inkassoproces, der er konstateret i forbindelse med en grundig analyse af bankens
inkassosystemer. Den 10. september 2020 besluttede vi endvidere at tilbyde alle potentielt berørte kunder
at sætte tilbagebetalingen af deres gæld i bero uden omkostninger for dem.
Vi har allokeret og vil fortsat allokere betydelige ressourcer til arbejdet med at rette op på fejlene og
kompensere alle berørte kunder så hurtigt som muligt. De konstaterede systemiske datafejl beskrives mere
detaljeret i denne redegørelse. Vi har i forbindelse med vores analyser af inkassosagen og de fire
hovedårsager indtil videre identificeret en række yderligere faktiske eller potentielle problemstillinger. Disse
er anført i bilag 2.5. Vi vil arbejde videre med disse problemstillingerne, for at opnå en fuld forståelse af dem
og håndtere dem på en passende måde. Nogle af problemstillinger vedrører renter på rykkergebyrer,
fejlbehæftede oplysninger til brug i retssager, mæglersalærer og ukorrekt registrering af skattemæssige
oplysninger. Disse yderligere problemstillinger kan potentielt påvirke et større antal kunder, end dem, der er
påvirket af de fire hovedårsager, som er beskrevet i denne redegørelse.
Bankens direktion blev i maj 2019 orienteret om de systemiske datafejl, der påvirker bankens
inkassosystemer, og iværksatte som følge heraf foranstaltninger, for at afhjælpe konsekvenserne af
systemfejlene, som beskrevet nærmere i denne redegørelse.
BAGGRUND
Banken har i dag to inkassosystemer: i) Debt Collection System (DCS) og ii) Personlige Fordringer (PF).
•
•
I DCS registreres misligholdt gæld på almindelige bankprodukter som f.eks. kassekreditter, stående
lån, kautioner osv.
I PF-systemet registreres misligholdt gæld, der er opstået i forbindelse med kundens manglende
betalinger på realkreditlån ydet af Realkredit Danmark A/S, hvor pantet i ejendommen ikke har været
tilstrækkeligt til at indfri realkreditlånet.
DCS blev implementeret i 2004 med det formål at centralisere inkassoprocesserne på tværs af banken.
PF-systemet blev implementeret i banken i 1979.
Tidligere foregik inddrivelsesprocessen i de enkelte filialer, der havde et overblik over de lokale kunders
gældsforpligtelser og håndterede eventuelle misligholdte gældsforpligtelser via manuelle processer for at
sikre korrekt tilbagebetaling af gæld. Opkrævningen af inkassogæld før 2004 blev understøttet af PF-
systemet og flere ældre systemer (f.eks. papirarkiver, regneark og Lotus Notes) med individuelt tilpassede
processer og kontrolforanstaltninger. Inkassosystemerne før 2004 havde nogle iboende systemiske
svagheder, men en række manuelle processer for at afbøde effekten af sådanne svagheder var i langt de
fleste sager etableret.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
I 2004 blev data vedrørende al udestående misligholdt gæld til banken centraliseret og migreret til DCS. Efter
denne migrering af data blev alle nye inkassosager åbnet direkte i DCS (undtagen de sager, der havde deres
oprindelse i PF-systemet som anført ovenfor).
Da data blev migreret til DCS blev de fejl, der eksisterede i relation til visse kunders gæld, ligeledes overført.
Med tiden har man i banken i større og større omfang handlet i tillid til oplysningerne i DCS, de medarbejdere,
der har været involveret i inkassoprocessen, har haft mindre erfaring og der har i et mindre omfang været
anvendt fysiske kundefiler som referencepunkt. Alt dette har bidraget til, at der fortsat skete fejl i
håndteringen af visse kunders gæld. Som beskrevet nærmere i svaret på spørgsmål 1 har der historisk været
viden om visse problemer i banken, og banken har implementeret forskellige processer for at afhjælpe eller
afbøde konsekvenserne af fejlene. Til trods for eskalering af problemstillingen har banken ikke gjort nok for
rettidigt at håndtere problemet i sin helhed. En større ændring af forældelsesloven i 2008 besværliggjorde
endvidere bankens inkassoprocesser. Vi har i svaret på spørgsmål 2 nedenfor beskrevet de hovedårsager, der
har påvirket inkassosystemernes funktioner negativt og dermed også vores kunder.
I maj 2019 iværksatte banken en proces, der skulle sikre, at der blev foretaget en grundig undersøgelse af
alle aspekter af systemfejlene, herunder især med det formål at identificere alle kunder, der er blevet
påvirket økonomisk med henblik på at disse snarest muligt kan blive fuldt kompenseret.
Som nærmere beskrevet i svarene på spørgsmål 3 og 4 har banken fra og med juni 2019 taget en række tiltag
for at afbøde de negative virkninger af de systemiske fejl. Som anført i svaret på spørgsmål 5 nedenfor viser
bankens analyse, at i en gruppe på 106.000 kunder kan potentielt 10.000-15.000 kunder være økonomisk
påvirket. Systemfejlene er komplekse. På grund af kompleksiteten og de individuelle og skiftende forhold
skal alle potentielt berørte kunders gæld genberegnes manuelt. De første grupper af berørte kunder er blevet
kompenseret, og banken har lagt en plan for at sikre fuld kompensation af alle berørte kunder inden den 1.
juli 2021 som anført i svaret på spørgsmål 7.
Der henvises nedenfor til bankens svar på de enkelte spørgsmål, som Finanstilsynet har stillet:
I.
FINANSTILSYNETS ANMODNING OM BANKENS REDEGØRELSE FOR FORLØBET
MED FEJLENE I GÆLDSINDDRIVELSESSYSTEMET
SPØRGSMÅL 1: HVORNÅR KONSTATEREDE BANKEN FEJLENE FØRSTE GANG?
Medarbejdere på forskellige niveauer i organisationen, herunder ledere, har på forskellige tidspunkter haft
et større eller mindre kendskab til problemerne i inkassosystemerne.
Som nævnt ovenfor blev bankens direktion i maj 2019 informeret om de systemiske fejl, der påvirker bankens
inkassosystem. Nedenfor gives et overblik over kendskabet til de systemiske datafejl i banken.
Inkassosystemet (Debt Collection System - DCS)
Den planlagte implementering af DCS foregik i perioden frem til 2004. Det er bankens opfattelse, at der i et
vist omfang var kendskab til, at der var nogle iboende fejl i de data, der blev migreret til DCS. Derfor var
banken allerede fra implementeringen af DCS i 2004 opmærksom på, at der kunne være datafejl i DCS.
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Det er bankens opfattelse, at der i flere år efter implementeringen af DCS i september 2004 var et relativt
højt niveau af manuel håndtering af kundefilerne. Den manuelle håndtering betød, at data i DCS, f.eks. data
om hovedstolen på en kundes gæld, i praksis normalt blev kontrolleret ved at sammenholde med
oplysningerne om gælden i den fysiske kundefil. Dette betød, at data normalt blev tilrettet, før fejlene
påvirkede kunderne. Det er foreløbigt ikke klart for banken, hvor effektiv denne manuelle håndtering var.
Det er imidlertid bankens opfattelse, at der blev gjort en indsats for at sikre, at de fejlbehæftede data i DCS
normalt blev kontrolleret ved at sammenholde med kundefilerne, da man var opmærksom på de systemiske
datafejl i DCS.
I 2007 blev der etableret et "korrektionsteam" med det formål løbende at korrigere eventuelt fejlbehæftede
sager manuelt i DCS.
Bankens interne revision havde en række bemærkninger i årene 2005-2016, hvoraf nogle var relateret til de
problemer, som banken nu står overfor. Vi anerkender, at vi ikke gjorde nok for at håndtere hovedårsagerne
til revisionens bemærkninger fuldt ud eller fulgte op på handlingsplanerne, som opsummeret nedenfor:
I de første to år efter implementeringen af DCS blev der udarbejdet to interne revisionsrapporter (fremsendt
i januar 2005 samt i januar og marts 2006), hvoraf det fremgik, at der var problemer med datakvaliteten i
DCS og behov for væsentlige korrektioner, og det blev anbefalet, at inkassoafdelingen (Debt Collection
Service) foretog en gennemgang af samtlige sager med forkerte registreringer, og at der udførtes periodiske
kontroller for at sikre, at problemerne ikke var vedvarende.
Revisionsrapporter fra 2010 (fire udførte revisioner) og 2011 (to udførte revisioner) identificerede en række
problemstillinger i Group Recovery Debt Management (GRDM) i form af manglende eller utilstrækkelige
kontroller og processer, forskelle i de registrerede forældelsesfrister for krav samt ufuldstændige eller ikke-
behandlede sager om misligholdt gæld. I 2012 konstaterede revisionen, at GDRM ikke behandlede
udestående gæld korrekt, at datagennemgange og beregninger af nedskrivninger på udlån var
utilstrækkelige, og at renteberegninger var ukorrekte.
Der blev ved revisionen af området i 2015 og 2016 ikke konstateret problemer i det omfang, som nu er
konstateret.
En planlagt revision af området i 2019 blev ikke gennemført på grund af den nu igangværende interne
undersøgelse.
I perioden 2006-2016 overvejede man at gennemføre visse gældskampagner, hvor visse debitorer blev
tilbudt et betydeligt nedslag i deres gæld. Fire kampagner blev sendt til godkendelse i banken i 2007, 2009,
2014 og 2016, og selv om det er bankens opfattelse, at det ikke var alle kampagnerne, som blev gennemført,
var der, i det mindste i forbindelse med nogle af kampagnerne, en opfattelse i banken af, at kampagnerne
ville reducere omfanget af det manuelle arbejde med at genberegne de pågældende kunders gæld og
reducere risikoen for at kravene blev forældet.
I 2008 blev forældelsesloven ændret i Danmark, hvilket betød, at hovedstolen på lån generelt havde en
forældelsesfrist på 10 år, og at renter og omkostninger havde en forældelsesfrist på 3 år (med undtagelse af
omkostninger tilkendt af retten). Tidligere var forældelsesfristen henholdsvis 20 år og 5 år. Desuden gjorde
de nye regler det mere vanskeligt at suspendere forældelsesfristen. Disse nye forældelsesregler forværrede
problemerne med de fejlbehæftede data i DCS.
I 2009 lanceredes et initiativ kaldet LEAN. LEAN havde til formål at strømline eksisterende
forretningsprocesser i et forsøg på at blive mere effektiv i sagsbehandlingen. Bankens øgede fokus på LEAN
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betød, at medarbejderne i inkassoområdet var under et stigende pres for at handle i tillid til data i DCS i
forbindelse med gældsinddrivelse, frem for at bruge tid på at sammenholde data med fysiske kundefiler.
Overgangen til i højere grad at forlade sig på data i DCS betød, at den tidligere foretagne manuelle kontrol af
de fejlbehæftede data i DCS, der (i det mindste til en vis grad) reducerede risikoen for, at datafejlene i sidste
ende påvirkede kunderne, nu blev foretaget i langt mindre udstrækning.
Ved udgangen af 2016 nedlagde banken korrektionsteamet, idet banken på det tidspunkt var af den
opfattelse, at korrektionsteamet havde gennemført korrektionen af de gamle sager. Der var en opfattelse af,
at "nye sager", dvs. sager oprettet efter den 27. september 2004, hvor DCS blev implementeret, var korrekte.
På trods af denne opfattelse blev der over tid identificeret sager med fejl. I interne eskaleringer i 2016 og
2017 blev det oplyst, at også "nye sager" kunne være fejlbehæftede. Det blev i den forbindelse foreslået at
oprette e task for e til hå dteri g af pro le er ed " ye sager” ed
ukorrekte data, da banken
–
efter
egen opfattelse
–
havde korrigeret de gamle sager i 2016. Uanset dette forslag blev der ikke tildelt nye
ressourcer til en nyt task force (et nyt korrektionsteam).
I perioden fra marts 2018 til september 2018 nåede den nye ledelse i inkassoafdelingens juridiske funktion
en forståelse for, at der var sager, som fortsat krævede manuel korrektion. I september 2018 blev den øverste
ledelse i GRDM gjort opmærksom på problematikken med de fortsatte fejl i DCS. GRDM undersøgte sagen
og så på mulige it-løsninger. Ledelsen i GRDM anerkendte også, at datafejlene i DCS kunne påvirke bankens
planer om yderligere outsourcing af inkassoprocessen. Det er bankens opfattelse, at potentielle bekymringer
måske (i december 2018) blev videregivet til en Sponsor Komite i banken, der havde ansvaret for arbejdet
med at forbedre bankens processer for udenretlig inkasso. Det ser ikke ud til, at arten af de underliggende
datafejl blev drøftet på mødet.
I januar 2019 blev der udarbejdet et notat, der beskrev problemerne med datakvaliteten i DCS. I marts 2019
konkluderede ledelsen i GRDM, at problematikken med fejlene i DCS krævede eskalering, og man
informerede den øverste ledelse i COO-organisationen i marts 2019. Banken gennemførte herefter en
risikovurdering, der førte til indberetning af problemer med datakvaliteten i DCS via bankens operationelle
risikoinformationssystem (Operational Risk Information System - ORIS) den 24. maj 2019. I indberetningen
blev det anført, at man havde identificeret, at DCS havde visse problemer med datakvaliteten, og at de
iboende fejl i inkassoprocessen ikke blot relaterede sig til manuelle fejl. ORIS er et værktøj til den formelle
registrering og håndtering af operationelle risikohændelser, og alt efter den enkelte sags omfang og alvor
udløser det en eskaleringsproces internt i banken, herunder krav om at involvere Finanstilsynet i mere
alvorlige tilfælde. Hændelsens omfang og alvor blev vurderet som værende tilstrækkelig til at udløse både
intern eskalering til direktionen og bestyrelsen og orientering af Finanstilsynet. Finanstilsynet blev skriftligt
underrettet herom den 6. juni 2019. Direktionen og bestyrelsen blev ligeledes informeret den 6. juni 2019.
I ORIS-indberetningen til Finanstilsynet blev det oplyst, at banken havde oprettet et projekt, der skulle
fokusere på:
•
•
•
•
Årsagsanalyser
”root ause a alyses”
, der skulle foretages for at sikre, at fejlene ikke opstod i alle
nye inkassosager;
Oprydning i data i porteføljen (inkl. en gennemgang af alle sager og tilbagebetaling af inddrevne
beløb, som vi ikke var berettiget til)
Implementering af et nyt system og nye procedurer og
Kommunikation til kunderne og tilbagebetaling til dem hurtigst muligt
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Det oprettede projekt blev kaldt "Data Quality Project". I Data Quality Project blev der truffet forskellige
foranstaltninger for at analysere og håndtere konstaterede problemstillinger. Eksterne advokater og
konsulenter blev hyret for at bistå med at identificere, forstå og afhjælpe problemerne. Data Quality Project
blev efterfølgende, mere præcist den 4. november 2019, omdannet til "Programme Athens" efter en
præsentation fra Plesner Advokatpartnerselskab (herefter Plesner) den 29. oktober 2019, hvor det blev klart
for direktionen, at problemerne med datafejlene var mere systemiske og havde større konsekvenser end
tidligere antaget. Vi henviser til svarene på spørgsmål 3 og 4 vedrørende de forskellige foranstaltninger og
tiltag, der blev taget i regi af Data Quality Project og Programme Athens.
Personlige Fordringer (PF)
GRDM konstaterede den 4. juli 2019, at der var indtruffet en ikke-finansiel hændelse og foretog derefter
registrering i ORIS. Det blev opdaget, at de kendte problemer med datakvaliteten i et vist omfang var
systembaserede snarere end at der var tale om menneskelige og manuelle fejl. PF-systemet havde
utilstrækkelig funktionalitet, der resulterede i dårlig datakvalitet.
PF-systemet har eksisteret siden 1979. Der har været problemer med systemet over en lang periode.
Fejlene og de systemiske mangler i data blev opdaget den 4. juli 2019.
Siden den 4. juli er de risici, der er forbundet med PF-systemet, blevet varetaget af Danske Banks såkaldte
Data Quality Programme, der blev etableret for at håndtere og afhjælpe de identificerede risici i DCS-
systemet.
SPØRGSMÅL 2: HVAD BESTÅR FEJLENE KONKRET I, OG HVORDAN HAR DET PÅVIRKET KUNDERNE?
De konstaterede systemiske fejl i data skyldes fejlbehæftet migrering af data, manglende afstemning af data
og forkert brug af bankens inkassosystemer.
Som følge af et utilstrækkelig governance-setup i GRDM har de systemiske fejl i data resulteret i et stort antal
fejl i inkassosager samt utilstrækkelig dokumentation til brug for revisionen af området. GRDM havde en
utilstrækkelig governance og kontroller til i alle tilfælde at kunne identificere fejlene i gældsopkrævning og
korrigere dem.
De systemiske datafejl er inddelt i fire kategorier
–
eller
”root auses”.
Disse hovedårsager danner
udgangspunktet for bankens arbejde med at analysere data og korrigere fejl. Vedhæftet dette svar er:
•
Draft System and Process Flaw Document (udkast til dokument om system- og procesfejl af 28.
november 2019), bilag 2.1, som giver en mere detaljeret beskrivelse af de systemiske datafejl, der er
konstateret i DCS.
•
•
•
En intern præsentation af 26. november 2019, bilag 2.2, som giver en oversigt over de systemiske
datafejl i DCS
Et notat om hovedårsagerne og Danske Banks forpligtelse til at yde kunderne erstatning, bilag 2.3.
og
Dataanalyse og overvejelser i forbindelse med inkasso, bilag 2.4
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2.1 Hovedårsag 1: Hovedstol, renter og gebyrer slået sammen
Berørte systemer: DCS & PF
Generelt består kundens gæld af en række forskellige fordringer, herunder hovedstol, renter, omkostninger
og gebyrer.
De systemiske datafejl beskrevet under hovedårsag 1 opstår som følge af, at påløbne renter, gebyrer og
omkostninger fejlagtigt er lagt sammen til ét beløb, der er registreret som hovedstolen. Konsekvensen af de
problemer, der er kategoriseret under hovedårsag 1 er, at systemerne ikke kan skelne mellem de forskellige
typer af fordringer, selvom der gælder forskellige forældelsesfrister for disse krav. Dertil kommer, at der blev
pålagt rente på rykkergebyrer forud for en domstolsafgørelse.
Den potentielle effekt af at pålægge renter på rykkergebyrer er ikke medtaget i beregningerne vedrørende
hovedårsag 1. En separat arbejdsgruppe er i gang med at undersøge forholdene yderligere.
Hvordan har problemerne kategoriseret under hovedårsag 1 påvirket kunderne?
Hovedårsag 1 gør det vanskeligt at identificere de forskellige forældelsesfrister for henholdsvis hovedstol,
renter, gebyrer og omkostninger og kan resultere i en unøjagtig beregning af restgælden, renter osv.
Hovedårsag 1 kan resultere i
•
•
•
inddrivelse af forældede krav
fejlbehæftet indberetning til skattemyndighederne i relation til rentefradrag og
opkrævning af mere gæld end det faktisk skyldte beløb.
2.2 Hovedårsag 2: Forkert registrering af forfaldsdatoen
Berørte systemer: DCS
Forældelsesfristen regnes fra den dato gælden forfalder til betaling. Ved overførslen af en fordring til DCS
registreres forældelsesfristen imidlertid til datoen for overførslen til systemet i stedet for den faktiske
forfaldsdato. Registreringen medfører, at forældelsesfristen fremstår længere, end den faktisk er.
Dette betyder, at det var vanskeligt ved brug af DCS at identificere og kontrollere, på hvilket tidspunkt
forældelsesfristen skulle afbrydes for at forhindre, at en fordring blev forældet.
Hvordan har problemerne kategoriseret under hovedårsag 2 påvirket kunderne?
Banken kan have opkrævet gæld, der på tidspunktet for inddrivelsen var forældet,
•
•
•
Kunder kan have indgået aftaler om at afvikle gæld, der helt eller delvist var forældet,
Banken kan have indledt uretmæssig retsforfølgelse af kunder og
Banken kan have inkasseret gæld, der var forældet.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Der er en øget risiko for, at frivillige forlig eller retsafgørelser, der er indgået eller afsagt på eller omkring det
tidspunkt, hvor forældelsesfristen udløb som registreret i DCS, rent faktisk allerede var forældet på
tidspunktet og derfor ikke burde være blevet opkrævet af banken.
2.3 Hovedårsag 3: Kautionister og meddebitorer behandlet ens
Berørte systemer: DCS
Hovedårsag 3 er en konsekvens af en fejlagtig og forkert migrering af data tilbage i 2004.
Forud for implementeringen af DCS i 2004 havde Danske Bank en række decentrale inkassoafdelinger og -
systemer.
I 2001 overtog Danske Bank BG Bank, og dermed også BG Banks gældsportefølje. I BG Bank var der visse
iboende svagheder i det gamle inkassosystem. I det gamle system kunne man ikke ved registreringen af
kautionister og meddebitorer i systemet teknisk set skelne mellem en kautionist og en meddebitor. BG Bank
havde imidlertid og før overtagelsen etableret manuelle procedurer til håndtering af langt de fleste af de
iboende svagheder i det gamle system.
Set ud fra et dataperspektiv medførte disse systemiske fejl en række udfordringer med datakvaliteten i
systemerne, og fejlene kunne i sidste ende resultere i en ukorrekt beregning af gælden. Disse interne
problemer blev migreret med over i DCS, da eksisterende kundesager blev overført til DCS i 2004. Disse
systemiske datafejl påvirker kun BG Bank-sager fra før 2004 som følge af migreringen. De sager, der stammer
fra denne migrering, kan dog stadig være påvirket af de problemer med datakvaliteten, som man tidligere
via manuelle processer havde forsøgt at imødekomme.
Da oplysningerne fra BG Bank blev overført til DCS, blev alle debitorer, meddebitorer og kautionister
behandlet ens, og det var ikke muligt i DCS at knytte meddebitorer eller kautionister til den gæld, der var
kautioneret for.
Hvordan har problemerne kategoriseret under hovedårsag 3 påvirket kunderne?
Banken kan have opkrævet den fulde gæld fra alle debitorer, meddebitorer og kautionister. Banken kan
derfor have opkrævet den samme gæld mere end en gang.
•
Hvis der f.eks. ikke blev foretaget en manuel justering i DCS ville banken, på trods af at der var indgået
et frivilligt forlig med debitor, fortsat forsøge at inddrive det fulde beløb fra en kautionist og/eller en
meddebitor.
2.4 Hovedårsag 4: Den fulde hovedstol blev opkrævet hos meddebitorer
Berørte systemer: DCS
Hovedårsag 4 er tilsvarende en konsekvens af en ukorrekt migrering af data i 2004.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Forud for implementeringen af DCS var det grundet de begrænsninger, der var i det gamle system,
nødvendigt at åbne separate konti for hovedskyldneren og eventuelt den eller de tilknyttede kautionist(er),
hvor hver enkelt konto viste det fulde beløb som gæld.
Den fulde gæld blev derfor registreret på mere end en konto.
I henhold til bankens forretningsgange skulle debitorkonti justeres manuelt efter, at en kunde havde betalt
et afdrag, eller at der var tilskrevet renter, påløbet omkostninger eller lignende. Der skulle foretages en
tilsvarende justering på konti tilhørende meddebitorer eller kautionister.
Da de eksisterende konti blev overført til DCS, kunne kautionisterne og meddebitorer ikke længere
identificeres i systemerne. Det betød, at hvis en debitor betalte en gæld eller indgik et frivilligt forlig med en
afviklingsordning, så ville der ikke blive foretaget en tilsvarende justering på den pågældende kautionists
og/eller meddebitors konto.
Hvordan har problemerne kategoriseret under hovedårsag 4 påvirket kunderne?
Banken kan have opkrævet den samme gæld mere end en gang fra hver kautionist, meddebitor og
hovedskyldneren.
•
F.eks. kan en kunde have indfriet sin gæld, men gælden er stadig registreret hos meddebitor og/eller
kautionist.
Yderligere problemstillinger
Desuden har banken i løbet af Data Quality Project og Programme Athens identificeret en række yderligere
faktiske eller potentielle problemstillinger. Oplysninger om disse forhold fremgår af bilag 2.5. Det skal
bemærkes, at disse problemstillinger og antallet af berørte kunder fortsat undersøges, og der er behov for
yderligere analyser. Der kan derfor være kunder, der er berørt af de faktiske eller potentielle
problemstillinger, der er anført i bilag 2.5, men som ikke indgår i beregningerne i denne redegørelse. Vi er i
gang med at undersøge problemstillingerne og vil tage de nødvendige tiltag for at rette op på problemerne.
SPØRGSMÅL 3: HVORDAN HÅNDTEREDE BANKEN INFORMATIONEN OM DE KONSTATEREDE FEJL,
HERUNDER HVILKE TILTAG, BLEV DER IVÆRKSAT OG HVORNÅR SAMT HVORDAN MAN VIL UNDGÅ NYE FEJL
FREMADRETTET?
Der er et vist overlap mellem spørgsmål 3 og 4 med hensyn til de tiltag, vi har iværksat, da vi blev
opmærksomme på systemfejlene.
Vi har i besvarelsen af dette spørgsmål 3 fokuseret på det projekt, der i perioden efter ORIS-indberetningen
blev etableret for at afhjælpe problemerne, og de governance-rammer, der blev etableret i forbindelse med
Programme Athens.
Vi henviser til vores svar på spørgsmål 4, der indeholder en liste over de forskellige foranstaltninger og tiltag,
der blev iværksat, da det stod klart for direktionen, at problemerne med datafejlene var mere systemiske og
havde mere alvorlige konsekvenser end det tidligere havde været opfattelsen.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
3.1 Iværksatte foranstaltninger og tiltag
Efter ORIS-indberetningen den 24. maj 2019 blev der oprettet en operational task force bestående af
teamleads og lokale specialister og projektet gik under navnet "Data Quality Project" som nævnt ovenfor.
Parallelt hermed har Group Risk Management og Compliance gennemført en række workshops med henblik
på at afdække og analysere problemerne nærmere og for bedre at forstå kompleksiteten i sagen.
Resultaterne blev overdraget til advokatfirmaet Plesner, der blev engageret for at gennemføre en ekstern
advokatundersøgelse med det formål at identificere de væsentligste årsager til, at Danske Bank inddrev gæld
på et uberettiget grundlag.
Desuden blev der omkring dette tidspunkt iværksat en række forebyggende foranstaltninger for at mindske
risikoen for uretmæssig inddrivelse af gæld. Der henvises til spørgsmål 4 for yderligere oplysninger.
Den 27. september 2019 instruerede banken Plesner om at indlede en undersøgelse af datafejlene og de
potentielle problemer og konsekvenser, der opstod som følge af datafejlene, samt om at bistå med det
projektet, der var etableret for at afhjælpe problemerne.
Den 24. oktober 2019 fremlagde Plesner sine foreløbige resultater og redegjorde for visse potentielle
problemer over for Data Quality Project. Præsentationen fra telefonmødet er vedlagt som bilag 3.3. På
grundlag af de foreløbige resultater og de konstaterede mulige problemer anbefalede Plesner, at der blev
foretaget yderligere analyser, og det blev aftalt, at de konstaterede potentielle systemfejl skulle undersøges
nærmere og især, at det skulle verificeres, om konkrete kundesager i DCS rent faktisk var berørt af de
potentielle problemer og i hvilket omfang. Plesners efterfølgende arbejde har især resulteret i de to notater,
der forklarer de konstaterede systemfejl og som er vedhæftet som bilag 2.1 og 2.3.
Som et resultat af de konklusioner Plesner fremlagde den 29. oktober 2019 stod det klart for direktionen, at
problemerne med datafejlene var mere systemiske og havde mere alvorlige konsekvenser, end det tidligere
havde været opfattelsen. På grund af den nye opfattelse af problemets alvor blev der to dage senere, den
31. oktober 2019, foretaget en ny indberetning til Finanstilsynet.
Som en konsekvens af, at der var konstateret et alvorligt problem, oprettede Danske Bank den 4. november
2019 Programme Athens for at skabe en formel governance-struktur. Der henvises til bilag 3.4, som
indeholder en oversigt over den etablerede governance-struktur.
Den 11. november 2019 bad banken revisions- og konsulentvirksomheden Ernst & Young (EY)om at hjælpe
med Programme Athens og med at analysere og verificere de systemfejl, der var konstateret af Plesner.
Desuden har EY hjulpet med at kvantificere effekten af de potentielle fejl - både med hensyn til antallet af
berørte kunder, men også med hensyn til de økonomiske konsekvenser.
SPØRGSMÅL 4: HVORDAN SIKREDE BANKEN SIG FRA DET TIDSPUNKT, FEJLENE BLEV KONSTATERET, AT
TILSVARENDE FEJLAGTIGE INDDRIVELSER FRA DETTE TIDSPUNKT IKKE LÆNGERE KUNNE FINDE STED?
Ud over det projekt, der blev oprettet efter ORIS-indberetningen for at afhjælpe problemerne, har banken
implementeret følgende foranstaltninger og tiltag:
4.1 Indførelse af nye manuelle kontroller vedrørende genberegning
Den 17. juni 2019 blev det besluttet at iværksætte en række yderligere forebyggende foranstaltninger i form
af følgende nye manuelle kontroller:
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
1) ingen nye inkassosager må oprettes fra den dato, uden at der først er foretaget en manuel beregning.
Derfor skulle alle nye sager efter denne dato behandles i henhold til den opdaterede forretningsgang,
der dækker afhjælpningen af de væsentligste problemer;
2) ingen nye sager kan indbringes for retten, uden at der først er foretaget genberegning, og
3) banken vil ikke afslutte igangværende sager (dvs. sager, der allerede er oprettet i DCS inden den 17.
juni 2019), f.eks. i tilfælde af ønske om ekstraordinær tilbagebetaling, uden at der først foretages en
manuel genberegning for at sikre, at kunden ikke har betalt banken mere, end banken har krav på.
4.2 Korrektionsteam oprettet
Det nye krav om manuel kontrol resulterede i en øget arbejdsbyrde. Der blev derfor oprettet et
korrektionsteam den 17. juni 2019 til at korrigere data i alle nye sager. Det oprindelige team på 4
medarbejdere blev efterfølgende udvidet med 21 medarbejdere for yderligere at fremskynde
genberegningsprocessen. EY blev også hyret til at bistå med genberegningen af sagerne.
Pr. 9. september 2020 er i alt 6.250 sager blevet genberegnet af korrektionsteamet.
4.3 Udbedring af DCS
I juli 2019 blev der foretaget en ændring i kodningen af DCS for at sikre, at rykkergebyrer ikke længere bliver
indsat i et datafelt i DCS, uden at forældelsesfristen er korrekt. Dette blev gjort for at forhindre, at denne
systemfejl resulterede i uretmæssig inddrivelse af gæld i nye sager.
4.4 Ophør af igangværende retssager
Ud over den nye manuelle kontrol, der foretages med henblik på at forhindre, at nye sager bliver indbragt
for retten, før der er foretaget en ny beregning, blev det den 17. december 2019 besluttet at trække alle
igangværende retssager tilbage eller genberegne/korrigere dem, herunder sager vedrørende gældssanering
og konkursboer. Korrektionsteamet har genberegnet de fleste af de igangværende sager, og alle
igangværende sager, hvor domstolen endnu ikke havde truffet afgørelse, blev trukket tilbage fra domstolene
i februar 2020.
4.5 Beslutning om at betale kompensation til kunderne
Styregruppen har besluttet at kompensere alle kunder for deres tab som følge af de konstaterede årsager.
Der henvises til vores svar på spørgsmål 7 for yderligere oplysninger om det antal af kunder, der på
nuværende tidspunkt har modtaget kompensation, og den aktuelle plan for yderligere udbetaling af
kompensation.
4.6. Beslutning om at tilbyde alle kunder at sætte deres tilbagebetaling af gæld i bero
For yderligere at reducere risikoen for overopkrævning sætter Danske Bank omkring 17.000 kunders
inkassosager i bero, indtil de er blevet genberegnet. Det sker i forlængelse af den igangværende indsats for
at rette op på de fejl, der er konstateret i vores gældsinddrivelsessystem.
Der er tale om de sager, hvor der er afdraget 60 pct. eller mere af hovedstolen, og hvor der derfor er en
højere risiko for, at kunderne bliver opkrævet for meget, inden sagerne når at blive genberegnet. Inddrivelsen
genoptages, når den enkelte sag er gennemgået, og eventuelle fejl er rettet. Herudover vil der desuden ikke
blive tilskrevet renter i den periode, hvor sagen er sat i bero.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Inddrivelsen vil fortsætte for de 35.000 kunder, som har påbegyndt tilbagebetaling, men har tilbagebetalt
mindre end 60 pct. af den oprindelige hovedstol, og hvor risikoen for overopkrævning dermed er meget lille.
Selvom inddrivelsen opretholdes, vil der heller ikke i disse sager blive tilskrevet renter, før en genberegning
har fundet sted.
For at sikre størst mulig valgfrihed kan kunder, hvis inkassosager sættes i bero, vælge at fortsætte betalingen.
Ligeledes kan kunder, hvor inddrivelsen som hovedregel opretholdes, vælge at sætte betalingerne i bero,
indtil sagen er genberegnet.
Ændringerne vil træde i kraft med udgangen af denne måned.
4.7. Plan for indførelse af yderligere tekniske sikkerhedsforanstaltninger og forbedringer
Banken er i øjeblikket i gang med en plan for it-implementering, som omfatter en række tekniske
sikkerhedsforanstaltninger og forbedringer af de pågældende it-systemer med henblik på at styrke de
eksisterende kontroller samt implementere yderligere kontroller.
4.8 Vurdering af beregninger i DCS og PF
Efter implementeringen af systemforbedringerne blev de to systemer, DCS og PF, vurderet af EY, og det
blev bekræftet, at beregningerne sker korrekt baseret på korrekt datainput og korrekt anvendelse af
funktionaliteten.
4.9 Fremadrettede tiltag - nyt it-system indkøbt
Banken havde allerede inden Programme Athens taget skridt til at købe et nyt it-system til erstatning af DCS.
Banken har nu købt et nyt system, der er planlagt til at erstatte DCS.
SPØRGSMÅL 5: HVOR MANGE KUNDER ER BERØRT AF FEJLENE?
Som anført ovenfor er der to særskilte inkassosystemer, som er blevet påvirket af de fire konstaterede
hovedårsager, nemlig DCS- og PF-systemerne. For de fleste af de berørte kunder er deres sag behandlet enten
i DCS eller PF-systemet, mens et mindre antal kunder er behandlet af begge systemer. Dette svar beskriver
vores aktuelle estimat af det samlede antal kunder, der er påvirket på tværs af begge systemer.
Det skal bemærkes, at svarene i denne redegørelse omhandler det antal kunder, der er påvirket af en eller
flere af de hovedårsagerne. Redegørelsen vedrører ikke antallet af kunder, der kan være påvirket af de
yderligere problemstillinger, som banken blev opmærksom på i forbindelse med årsagsanalysen (beskrevet i
bilag 2.5).
Der henvises i øvrigt til EY rapporten i bilag 2.4.
5.1 Det samlede antal potentielt berørte kunder
Det samlede antal potentielt berørte kunder på tværs af både DCS- og PF-systemet, som kan have betalt for
meget tilbage på deres gæld, er 106.000. Der henvises til
figur 1
nedenfor.
402.000 kunder (ca. 600.000 konti) er behandlet i DCS- og PF-systemerne, og der er talt om både privat- og
erhvervskunder. Det samlede antal potentielt berørte kunder omfatter både sager, der stadig er aktive DCS,
samt sager, der er afsluttet (fordi gælden er tilbagebetalt, eller sagen på anden måde er lukket af Danske
Bank) i perioden mellem 2004 og nu.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Af de i alt 402.000 kunder blev 333.000 behandlet i DCS, 49.000 i PF-systemet, og de resterende 20.000 i
begge systemer.
Ifølge nedenstående kategorisering er der i alt 106.000 kunder, som muligvis er berørt af fejlene, og som
risikerer at skulle betale eller have betalt for meget tilbage til banken. Af hensyn til overskueligheden skal det
bemærkes, at dette omfatter både kunder, der vil modtage en økonomisk kompensation efter
gennemgangen af deres sag, og kunder, hvor godtgørelsen vil blive modregnet i anden gæld til Danske Bank.
5.2 Kategorisering
Kunder i andre jurisdiktioner
Af de 333.000 kunder, der udelukkende blev behandlet i DCS, var 152.000 kunder en del af gældsporteføljer
i andre jurisdiktioner (herunder Norge, Sverige, Finland og Storbritannien). Da DCS også anvendes i andre
lande end Danmark blev der foretaget en intern undersøgelse for at få bekræftet, om de identificerede
hovedårsager også berørte inkassokunder i de andre lande. En kombination af afbødende foranstaltninger,
herunder manuel afstemning, software-løsninger og nationale forældelsesfrister har betydet, at de
konstaterede systemfejl kun har berørt kunder i Danmark.
PF-systemet blev ikke anvendt til behandling af kunder i lande uden for Danmark.
Kunder, der ikke har foretaget betalinger
105.000 kunder af de resterende kunder havde ikke betalt af på deres gæld, da de blev overført til DCS/PF,
dvs. de havde hverken betalt hovedstol, gebyrer eller rente forud for overførslen til DCS eller PF. Disse kunder
er således ikke genstand for økonomisk godtgørelse.
Kunder, der har været aktive i mindre end 3 år.
I alt har 24.000 kunder kun været aktive i mindre end 2,5 år i relation til DCS-systemet og 3 år i relation til PF-
systemet, og de er ikke overflyttet til DCS- eller PF-systemet fra et ældre inkassosystem. Disse kunder kan
ikke kategorises under hovedårsag 1 og risikerer ikke at have betalt renter, omkostninger eller hovedstol, der
er forældet, idet forældelsesfristen er tre år for renter og omkostninger og 10 år for hovedstol samt
omkostninger tilkendt af retten.
Kunder, der ikke er ramt af hovedårsagerme
Endelig er der i alt 15.000 kundesager, som ved stikprøvekontrol er blevet bekræftet som værende behandlet
korrekt i både DCS- og PF-systemet. I nogle sager, der registreres i DCS, er renterne korrekt adskilt fra
hovedstolen i modsætning til dem, der ellers er observeret som et resultat af hovedårsag 1, hvor renterne er
forkert aggregeret med hovedstolen.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Figur1 Kategorisering af de kunder, der er omfattet af potentielle beløbskorrektioner. Kunderne er inddelt i følgende kategorier:
Kunder i alt; Kunder uden for Danmark; Kunder i Danmark; Kunder, der ikke har betalt; Kunder, der har betalt; Kunder aktive i >3 år
og registreret i DCS/PF efter 2004; Tilbagebetalt hovedstol med evt. forældede gebyrer og renter; Kunder registreret korrekt i DCS/PF;
og Kunder med behov for beløbskorrigering.
5.3 Estimeret antal kunder, hvis sager potentielt skal korrigeres
Vi har gennemgået 17.000 kunder og identificeret 900 kunder, som har krav på kompensation. Ud fra disse
resultater har vi modelleret den resterende gruppe af kunder, og vores aktuelle skøn er, at det betyder, at
mellem 10.000 og 15.000 kunder kan være økonomisk påvirket.
5.4 Typiske godtgørelser
Den typiske kompensation
–
enten ved modregning i anden gæld eller ved kontant udbetaling
–
ligger på
1.000-2.000 kr. Beløbet kan dog i nogle sager være meget højere. Banken erkender, at der er kunder (især i
PF-systemet), der er berettiget til en relativt højere kompensation, og der vil også være kunder, der kun er
berettiget til et mindre beløb.
5.5 Yderligere sager, der skal korrigeres
Herudover vil en række kunder, som ikke har lidt noget økonomisk tab (dvs. kunder, der ikke har betalt af på
deres gæld og kunder, der har haft aktive inkassosager i mindre end 3 år) få deres sager genberegnet.
SPØRGSMÅL 6: HVORDAN HAR BANKEN HÅNDTERET DE BERØRTE KUNDER, HERUNDER HVORDAN
OPGØRES OG BEREGNES KOMPENSATIONEN FOR DEN ENKELTE KUNDE, OG HVILKE OPLYSNINGER GIVES
KUNDERNE OM FEJL OG BEREGNINGER?
6.1 Hvordan har banken håndteret de berørte kunder?
De systemiske datafejl, der potentielt har ramt kunderne, er opdelt i tre hovedkundegrupper:
i.
ii.
Kunder med forkert registreret gæld i systemerne, men som har ikke betalt af på deres gæld.
Kunder, hvor der er foretaget forkert opkrævning; der kan dog foretages modregning i kundens
udestående gæld.
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
iii.
Kunder, hvor der er foretaget forkert opkrævning, og som er berettiget til at modtage kompensation.
For så vidt angår ii) og iii) følger banken følgende principper for afhjælpning og kompensation af kunder:
Banken vil
•
•
•
•
•
Sættekunden i en økonomisk situation
1
, som om fejlene aldrig var sket.
Godtgøre kunderne baseret på alle tilgængelige data.
Baseres kompensationen på en model for direkte tab.
Etablere en proces for behandling af kundesager, der involverer indirekte tab.
Kompensere kunderne for eventuelle skattemæssige tab.
Ud af de 106.000 kunder, der potentielt er berørt, og som derfor har mulighed for at få kompensation, har
banken til dato undersøgt 17.000 kundesager ved at genberegne den enkelte kundes gæld og sammenligne
det genberegnede beløb med data, der er registreret i DCS (se svaret til spørgsmål 7 nedenfor for yderligere
oplysninger). Genberegningen af de 17.000 kundesager har vist, at der er opkrævet for meget i 930 tilfælde,
og disse kunder vil modtage godtgørelse, og/eller der vil ske modregning i kundens eventuelle udestående
gæld.
6.2 Hvordan fastsættes og beregnes kompensationen for den enkelte kunde?
Kundens gæld genberegnes ved hjælp af en datamodel, der er udviklet af EY for Danske Bank. Modellen
opdeler den samlede gæld i renter, gebyrer og hovedstol og anvender korrekte forældelsesfrister for hver
postering, der går tilbage til datoen for den første tilbagebetaling på kundens lån.
Modellen er baseret på bankens principper for kompensation ved, at der laves et skøn, der er til kundens
fordel, når den underliggende datakvalitet ikke giver mulighed for et mere præcist skøn (et konservativt skøn
over opkrævningen af for store beløb).
Formålet med modellen er at beregne godtgørelsen til kunder, der er ramt af hovedårsag 1 og 2, ved 1) at
genskabe de saldi, der oprindeligt blev registreret i DCS, men samtidig justere for renter og gebyrer, der ikke
er korrekt sammenlagt med hovedstolen (afhjælpning af hovedårsag 1) og ved 2) at rette de anvendte
forældelsesfrister (afhjælpning af hovedårsag 2). Når saldiene i DCS er korrigeret, genberegner datamodellen
de beløb, som kunden skylder i dag, på baggrund af alle de tilbagebetalinger, som kunden har foretaget; de
renter, der er påløbet korrekt på de forskellige dele af den samlede gæld; alle gældende forældelsesfrister,
der kan være udløst i lånets løbetid; den anerkendte gæld og/eller potentielle korrektioner, der er foretaget
i lånets løbetid (f.eks. når en debitor får gældssanering). Til sidst vil det output, der genereres af
datamodellen, være forskellen mellem, hvad saldiene er i DCS, og hvad saldiene burde have været i DCS, hvis
de ikke var påvirket af de fire hovedårsager. Forskellen mellem de faktiske saldi i DCS og de saldi, der
genberegnes af datamodellen, anses for at være det beløb, som Danske Bank har opkrævet for meget over
for kunden.
Kunder, der har betalt for meget, vil modtage kompensation svarende til forskellen mellem, hvad de skulle
have betalt tilbage på deres udestående gæld, og hvad de faktisk har betalt med tillæg af rente for den
periode, hvor pengene skulle have været til kundens rådighed.
Rentekompensationen beregnes fra datoen for kundens første overbetaling af lånet og indtil datoen for
bankens godtgørelse af kunden. Datoen for første overbetaling er sat som startdato for beregningen af
Kunder, som har lidt et økonomisk tab som følge af en af de fire hovedårsager, vil få mulighed for at indsende
dokumentation for yderligere potentielle følgetab.
1
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
rentekompensationen, idet dette er den første dato for, hvornår banken har opkrævet for meget, og dermed
det tidspunkt, hvor kundens krav mod Danske Bank opstår.
Rentekompensationen beregnes på baggrund af det samlede beløb for, hvad kunden har betalt for meget. I
henhold til rentelovens § 5 er renten for rentekompensationen den officielle udlånsrente (offentliggjort to
gange årligt af Nationalbanken) plus et tillæg på enten 7 % eller 8 % p.a. (i overensstemmelse med
definitionen af morarente). Valget mellem 7 % og 8 % er afhængig af, hvornår kundens krav mod banken er
opstået, og er her defineret som, hvornår den første tilbagebetaling af gælden har fundet sted. For kunder,
der har foretaget deres første tilbagebetaling før den 1. marts 2013, er der et tillæg på 7 %, mens der for
kunder, der har foretaget deres første tilbagebetaling efter den 1. marts 2013, er et tillæg på 8 %.
I den aktuelle version er datamodellen ikke i stand til at registrere kunder, der potentielt har været ramt af
for store tilbagebetalinger som følge af hovedårsag 3 og 4. Grunden til, at hovedårsag 3 og 4 endnu ikke er
indarbejdet i modellen er kompleksiteten af beregningen af kundernes godtgørelse, idet dette kræver brug
af fysiske kundefiler. Der arbejdes fortsat på både at identificere og løse problemerne i forbindelse med
genberegning af gæld for kunder, som også er ramt af hovedårsag 3 og 4. Kunder, der risikerer at have betalt
for meget som følge af hovedårsag 3 og 4, undersøges og gennemgås i øjeblikket manuelt, og denne proces
vil om nødvendigt finde sted sammen med kunden.
6.3 Hvilke oplysninger modtager kunderne om fejl og beregninger?
Alle kunder, der er konstateret som værende ramt af hovedårsagerne, vil blive kontaktet direkte af Danske
Bank, så vi kan oplyse, hvad der er gået galt, hvad Danske Bank gør for at sikre, at kunden får den rette
kompensation, og hvad kunden kan forvente, at der dernæst sker.
SPØRGSMÅL 7: HVOR MANGE KUNDER HAR PR. 1. SEPTEMBER 2020 MODTAGET KOMPENSATION, OG
HVOR MANGE KUNDER FORVENTER BANKEN AT UDBETALE KOMPENSATION TIL, OG HVORNÅR
FORVENTES ALLE KUNDER AT VÆRE BLEVET KOMPENSERET?
7.1 Hvor mange kunder har pr. 1. september 2020 modtaget kompensation?
Pr. 1. september 2020 havde 326 kunder modtaget kompensation. Kompensationsbeløbene til disse kunder
udgør samlet 395.638 kr. Disse kunder er blevet gennemgået i et segment på 17.000 sager (som alle er
oprettet i DCS efter 2009). Vi er nu i gang med at korrigere sagerne, og arbejdet vil skride hurtigere frem i
resten af 2020.
Kompensationsbeløbene fordeler sig således:
•
•
•
25 kunder har modtaget mere end 2.000 kr. i kompensation
70 kunder har modtaget mere end 1.000 kr. (de 25 kunder indgår i dette antal) i kompensation
256 kunder har modtaget mindre end 1.000 kr. i kompensation
7.2 Hvor mange kunder forventer banken at skulle betale kompensation til?
På nuværende tidspunkt vurderer banken, at 10.000-15.000 kunder er berettiget til kompensation i form af
en godtgørelse eller en reduktion af deres restgæld.
7.3 Hvornår forventes det, at alle kunder har fået kompensation?
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Danske Banks svar på Finanstilsynets brev med ref.nr. 6252-0349
Banken har udarbejdet en plan for kompensation af alle berørte kunder. Danske Bank forpligter sig til at rette
alle kundesager og kompensere alle kunder senest den 1. juli 2021.
SPØRGSMÅL 8: FINANSTILSYNET ANMODER ENDVIDERE OM AT MODTAGE RELEVANTE DELE AF BANKENS
INTERNE UNDERSØGELSER OG DEN UNDERSØGELSE, SOM BANKENS COMPLIANCE-FUNKTION OG
EKSTERNE ADVOKATER UDFØRER.
Finanstilsynet henviser i anmodningen til "relevante" dele af de forskellige undersøgelser, der er udført.
Banken har fortolket dette således, at Finanstilsynet gerne vil modtage de dele af undersøgelsesrapporterne,
der
(i) er relevante for Finanstilsynets undersøgelse af banken som anført i brev af 31. august: bankens
håndtering af de konstaterede fejl i bankens inkassosystem set i relation til bankens forpligtelse til at handle
redeligt og loyalt over for sine kunder (jf. § 43 i lov om finansiel virksomhed og bekendtgørelsen om god skik
for finansielle virksomheder), og
(ii) redegør for fakta og juridiske vurderinger vedrørende de forhold, som Finanstilsynet har spørgsmål til
ovenfor,
8.1 Interne undersøgelser
Banken har bedt EY om at vurdere og varetage kompensationen af kunderne, der er ramt af de konstaterede
systemiske datafejl i GRDM.
Vedlagt dette brev er følgende dokument:
•
Draft
–
EY report: Data analysis and considerations within debt collection of 1 July 2020 (bilag 2.4)
8.2 Eksterne advokatundersøgelser
Som nævnt ovenfor har banken bedt advokatfirmaet Plesner om at analysere systemfejlene, identificere
relevante risici og bistå med at afhjælpe systemfejlene.
Vedlagt dette brev er følgende dokumenter:
•
•
•
•
Draft System and Process Flaw Document of 28 November 2019 (bilag 2.1)
Workshop presentation of 26 November 2019 (bilag 2.2)
Draft e ora du o
ai root auses a d Da ske Ba k’s o ligatio to o pe sate usto ers
(bilag
2.3)
Presentation from conference call on 24 October 2019 (bilag 2.4)
--oo0oo--
Frans Woelders
Chief Operating Officer
Rob de Ridder
Head of Customer Service Delivery
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BILAG
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
3.3
3.4
Draft System and Process Flaws Document of 28 November 2019
Workshop presentation of 26 November 2019
Draft memorandum on main root causes and
Da ske Ba k’s o ligatio to o pe sate
customers of 13 December 2019
EY report: Data analysis and considerations within debt collection of 1 July 2020
List of potential derived or correlated issues
Presentation from conference call on 24 October 2019
Overview of the governance structure of Programme Athens
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Early draft of 28 November 2019
The descriptions in this document are not finally verified
Certain parts are currently in Danish to speed up the verification process
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
–
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
PROJECT COLLECTION
DESCRIPTION OF THE KEY SYSTEM AND PROCESS FLAWS IN DCS AND CERTAIN OTHER SYSTEMS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 4
TIMELINE OF MAIN EVENTS ................................................................................................... 5
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
3
Pre-2004: Legacy Danske Bank systems
..................................................................... 5
2004: Introducing DCS
.............................................................................................. 5
2008: Change in statute of limitations
........................................................................ 6
2009: Correction team
............................................................................................... 6
2009: LEAN focus
...................................................................................................... 6
Lithuania outsourcing
................................................................................................ 6
2019: Operational Risk Event
..................................................................................... 6
2019: Correction Team
.............................................................................................. 7
GENERAL DESCRIPTION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ................................................................ 7
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.2
Statute of limitation ................................................................................................... 7
Loans
Interest and fees
Transitional period
7
7
8
Overview of relevant limitation periods ....................................................................... 8
4
DESCRIPTION OF KEY SYSTEM AND PROCESS FLAWS WITHIN DCS ......................................... 8
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Introduktion til DCS-systemet .................................................................................... 8
Hvordan DCS formentlig var tiltænkt at fungere .......................................................... 9
Hvad der faktisk sker i DCS ...................................................................................... 10
Praktisk eksempel ................................................................................................... 11
5
HISTORIC ISSUES PRE-DATING DCS ..................................................................................... 14
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
Legacy Danske Bank systems ................................................................................... 14
Generel introduktion
Fejlregistrering af advokatomkostninger
Migrationsfejl
14
16
17
Legacy BG Bank systems ......................................................................................... 17
Generel introduktion
Registrering af debitorer og kautionister
Skift af kontonumre
Regionale forskelle i håndteringen af kontotype 3
17
19
20
20
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5.2.5
5.2.6
Eksempel på et hændelsesforløb
Tilgodehavender til ekstern inddrivelse
21
22
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PROJECT COLLECTION
DESCRIPTION OF THE KEY SYSTEM AND PROCESS FLAWS IN DCS AND CERTAIN OTHER SYSTEMS
1
INTRODUCTION
We have been instructed by Danske Bank A/S ("Danske Bank") to assist with certain data quality
issues identified within the debt collection systems in Group Recovery & Debt Management
("GRDM"), which have resulted in cases of collection of time-barred debt.
The main scope of our work has been:
•
•
•
to understand and describe the key system and process flaws that were identified in the
systems and associated processes;
to assess and describe the key legal and regulatory risks resulting from the identified
system and process flaws; and
to assist Danske Bank in identifying possible ways of solving the issues resulting from the
system and process flaws.
In order to deliver on these tasks, we have performed a detailed fact-finding exercise involving a
number of interviews of relevant members of staff, participated in meetings held by GRDM's 'Cor-
rection Team', and observed how case officers navigate and use the debt collection systems. We
have not made an analysis of how the relevant IT systems are coded. The descriptions contained
in this document are therefore based on the information we have received about how the relevant
debt collection systems work and examples from actual cases in the systems.
[Comment: Section about the verification of the description that has been carried out by GRDM to
be inserted here. We are also working on including examples for all the system flaws to make it
possible to see an actual case from DCS in which the specific flaw has occurred.]
The purpose of this document is to describe the key system and data flaws in the Debt Collection
System ("DCS") and in the historic debt collection systems from which data in the DCS is based.
We note that some of the flaws described in this document remain unresolved or have only recently
been resolved, whilst some of the historic flaws only transpired in connection with the migration of
data into the DCS in 2004 or occurred in the systems that preceded the DCS. The end result,
therefore, is that a high number of customers in GRMD - both current and historic - may therefore
be impacted by the flaws.
We have also included a section setting out a high-level timeline of certain events that are relevant
either for the purposes of understanding some of the system and processing flaws or to understand
the scope or impact of the flaws.
Furthermore, we have also included a high-level summary of the applicable rules on limitation
periods that have applied during the relevant period. As most of the data flaws relate to incorrect
handling of the statutory limitation periods applicable to the various elements that make up the
outstanding debt (interest, collection costs and the principal amount of the loan) it is relevant to
have an understanding of these rules and how they changed in 2008.
The varying elements (interest, costs, and principal amount) that make up an outstanding debt
need to be tracked separately within debt collection systems in order for the systems to be able to
apply the applicable varying time-barring periods. Accordingly, the debt collection systems are
meant to break up an outstanding debt into different data fields, each representing an element of
the outstanding debt, and each with their own varying periods of limitation.
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For the purposes of understanding some of the system and process flaws described below, it is
necessary to understand that when a debt is 'written-off', from an accounting perspective, it is still
tracked and considered to be owed by the customer, and attempts are made by Danske Bank to
collect such outstanding debt.
This document is structured as follows: In Part 2 immediately below we have set out the timeline
of main events that have occurred in the relevant time period. In Part 3 we have set out the high-
level summary of the relevant statute of limitation rules. Part 4 contains our description of the
system and process flaws within DCS and Part 5 contains our description of the system and process
flaws pre-dating DCS.
2
TIMELINE OF MAIN EVENTS
This section contains a chronological timeline of what we understand to be the key events in the
process leading up to the issues Danske Bank is facing today in respect of the system and process
flaws. The list does not include events that may be relevant from an accountability perspective.
2.1
Pre-2004: Legacy Danske Bank systems
BG Bank was formed in a merger in 1996 between Bikuben and Girobank. During 1999 the debt
collection portfolio of Girobank was transferred / converted to the recovery system in Bikuben.
To our knowledge the collection system in Bikuben can be accessed back to approx. 1984. The
recovery system from Girobanken's 'Jurix' cannot be accessed.
In 2001 Danske Bank acquired BG Bank, including BG Banks debt collection portfolio and depart-
ment.
Initially BG Bank's debt collection department operated independently from a number of other
decentralised Danske Bank debt collection departments.
It can be assumed that the majority of the older collection cases originating in BG-Bank and the
Danske Bank legacy collection system were incorrectly registered. These issues were further exac-
erbated, through the compounding of issues, when the cases were subsequently integrated into
DCS, cf. below.
2.2
2004: Introducing DCS
In 2004 a new debt collection system (DCS) was implemented in an effort to centralise debt col-
lection processes across Danske Bank. Data on all outstanding defaulted debt was therefore mi-
grated into DCS.
There appears to have been some knowledge of the existing issues within the earlier decentralised
systems, which in part led to the introduction of DCS, which in turn was meant to be a new and
improved system. Attempts to implement the new system spanned over a period of time, and we
understand that this is due to the fact that already at this stage it was known that DCS had some
inherent issues that needed to be fixed prior to "go-live". We have been informed that the "go-live"
date was pushed back once, but that the management decided to implement the DCS despite
awareness of at least some of the system and process flaws because it was not considered an
option to push the "go-live" date a second time. It remains unclear to us, what efforts were made
to rectify the issues within DCS before implementing, or whether the full extent of the issues known
today, were also known then.
All existing cases, irrespective of where they originated, were transferred to DCS on 27 September
2004. All new cases following this date were opened directly within DCS (except from cases origi-
nating in the PF-system).
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It is relevant to note already now, that rather than flaws in how DCS treats and calculates out-
standing debt, the key problems relate to the point of data entry into DCS. In other words, when
an existing, or a new case, was or is transferred to, or created, in DCS.
2.3
2008: Change in statute of limitations
In 2008, new rules on the statute of limitations were implemented in Denmark and going forward
principal amounts on loans have in general a time-barring period of 10 years and interest and costs
carry a time-barring period of 3 years. Prior to this, the time-barring periods were 20 years and 5
years, respectively. Moreover, the new rules made it much more difficult to suspend the time-
barring period. In order to suspend the time-barring period a large portion of the claims was sent
to external debt collection agencies.
2.4
2009: Correction team
Perhaps in the knowledge that DCS contained some inherent data quality issues, and in conjunction
with the new statute of limitations, a Correction Team was established in 2009 to manually correct
the cases in DCS on a continuous basis. However, in many instances this was done without the
case handler being able to reconcile the most recent calculation of debt owed against an original
account statement. By inference, therefore, some but not all cases that underwent correction, were
not corrected to the accurate amount. The Correction Team managed to review some, but far from
all cases in DCS, before it was disbanded in around 2011. Plesner does not know how many cases
were corrected at this stage, or the extent to which these cases were corrected accurately.
2.5
2009: LEAN focus
In 2009 Danske Bank launched an initiative known as LEAN, which aimed to streamline existing
business processes in an attempt to become more efficient in case handling. It is not currently clear
to us exactly when the focus on LEAN ended but it is our understanding that the strong focus on
LEAN lasted for a longer period. In the case of DCS, the focus on LEAN meant that GRDM was
instructed to only rely on the data as presented by DCS when performing debt collection (such as
when entering into settlement agreements, seeking court orders etc.) and not to spend time looking
at physical files. Previously greater efforts were made to ensure that amounts reflected in DCS
were reconciled against a previous account statement or other evidence on file for that customer,
e.g. by reviewing the physical customer file that contained information on the correct principal
amount owed by the customer etc. It is our impression that the focus on LEAN further exacerbated
some of the issues present today, as presumably some of the case errors would have been caught
earlier.
2.6
Lithuania outsourcing
Danske Bank operates an off-shore office in Lithuania that mainly performs operations and other
administrative tasks. For a period of time since 2004, staff in Lithuania conducted case handling on
behalf of GRDM using DCS. The focus on LEAN meant that staff in Lithuania were incentivised to
produce results over quality in their case handling. Further to LEAN, this may have meant collection
of debt has occurred without any controls or reconciliation to ensure that the data produced by
DCS was correct.
2.7
2019: Operational Risk Event
On 24 May 2019 an ORIS was escalated internally at Danske Bank confirming that it had discovered
that DCS suffered from underlying data quality issues, and that the inherent issues with the debt
collection processes were not merely manual errors, as apparently previously thought. The Danish
FSA was notified on 6 June 2019.
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2.8
2019: Correction Team
The Correction Team was re-established in August 2019, following the ORIS, with a view to man-
ually review and correct all cases in DCS that had been mishandled. We have been informed by
members of the Correction Team that some cases can be dealt with relatively quickly, whilst other
cases can take days to recalculate and complete - and in some cases it might not even be possible
to perform a recalculation due to the lack of a physical customer file.
3
GENERAL DESCRIPTION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
When describing the applicable statute of limitation rules, it is relevant to distinguish between the
following three time periods:
1) The period before 1 January 2008. In this period the time-barring rules were governed by
two limitation acts covering loans, fees and interest (a) Danske Lov 5-14-4 ("DL"), and (b)
the 1908 Act of Limitation (Act No. 274 of 22 December 1908) (the "1908 Act").
2) The period from 1 January 2008. In this period the Act of Limitation (Act No. 522 of 6 June
2007) (the "2008 Act") governed, and continues to govern, the time-barring rules in re-
spect of loans, fees and interest.
3) The transitional period for obligations incurred before 1 January 2008 that were unresolved
on 1 January 2008 and therefore became subject to the specific transitional rules in the
2008 Act.
The purpose of the 2008 Act was to replace DL and the 1908 Act and the 2008 Act remains the
applicable legal framework.
3.1
3.1.1
Statute of limitation
Loans
Before 1 January 2008
Prior to the 2008 act, the limitation period on loans was regulated by DL. Under the DL, the limita-
tion period was twenty (20) years from the
establishment of the claim
, e.g. the establishment of a
loan. Such limitation could be interrupted by either (i) the debtor's perception of the claim, ii) by
the creditor reminding the debtor about the obligation, (iii) a notice to an estate or iv) request of
appropriation (
anmodning om udlæg
). If the limitation period was interrupted before the loan be-
came time-barred, a new limitation period would begin.
From (and including) 1 January 2008
Under the 2008 Act, the limitation period for loans is ten (10) years
from the due date of the loan
.
The statute of limitations was thereby changed from twenty (20) years to ten (10) years. The new
legal requirements for interrupting the statute of limitation period, under the 2008 Act, are to either
(i) obtain the acknowledgment of the obligation by the debtor or (ii) by taking legal action against
the debtor.
3.1.2
Interest and fees
Before 1 January 2008
Prior to the 2008 act, the limitation period on interest and fees were regulated by the 1908 Act.
Claims on interest, which was due at specified intervals but not considered as repayment of a debt
owed, carried a statute of limitation period of five (5) years
from the due date
. Claims on interest
become time-barred either independently or if the principal amount became time-barred.
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From (and including) 1 January 2008
Under the 2008 Act, interest and fees will as a general rule become time-barred after three (3)
years
from the due date
.
However, it should be noted if claims on interest and/or fees are attributed within the maximum of
an overdraft facility (
kassekredit
), the limitation period is ten (10) years
from the due date
.
Moreover, if a debtor acknowledges the debt on interest and fees, wholly or partially, the limitation
period will be 10 years
from the due date
.
3.1.3
Transitional period
When the 2008 Act entered into force on 1 January 2008, the general transitional rule was that the
new 2008 Act applied to previously established obligations, which were not timed-barred under the
DL or the 1908 Act before the date of entry into force.
The transitional rules were relevant if:
•
•
the applicable rules led too time-barring after 1 January 2008; and
the 2008 Act led to time-barring before 1 January 2011.
In order to avoid unintended consequences, a transitional period was introduced in the 3-year
period, after which time-barring only occurred if it followed from the previous as well as the newly
applicable rules - and if so the latest limitation date of the two possible limitation dates should
apply as the limitation date in this transitional period.
The transitional rules imply that if a reminder was sent to the debtor prior to 1 January 2008 the
interruption will have effect under the 2008 Act (even though such an interruption cannot be made
under the 2008 Act). A reminder sent before 1 January 2008 in relation to a claim, which according
to the 2008 Act is subject to a limitation period of ten (10) or tree (3) years, triggers a limitation
period of respectively ten (10) or tree (3) years for the claims (and not the twenty (20) and five
(5) years known under DL and the 1908 Act.)
For claims established on 1 January 2008, or later, the transitional rules will not be relevant.
3.2
Overview of relevant limitation periods
We have in annex 1 to this document set out an overview of the various limitation periods relevant
to the debt portfolio. Any reference to Danske Bank shall be read as a reference to any previous
lender having taken such action or has been unknown to the relevant fact.
4
4.1
DESCRIPTION OF KEY SYSTEM AND PROCESS FLAWS WITHIN DCS
Introduktion til DCS-systemet
DCS er det centrale gældsinddrivelsessystem i Danske Bank.
Når et udestående gældsforhold overdrages fra en filial til GRDM, flyttes kontoen samt ansvaret
for at inddrive gælden samtidigt til DCS og GRDM.
De identificerede system- og procesfejl er i al væsentlighed resultat af flere forskellige "data-entry"
flaws. Som konsekvens af disse data-entry flaws vil alle senere løbende beregninger forudsæt-
ningsvist være forkerte i et eller andet omfang. En fejl på registreringstidspunktet vil således på-
virke restgældens størrelse, hvis ikke sådanne entry-flaws manuelt over tid korrigeres.
De identificerede fejl er proces/systembundne, og den følgende beskrivelse skal dels illustrere da-
tastrømmene, når en sag oprettes i DCS, og dels illustrere hvor og hvorfor fejlene opstår.
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I DCS opdeles den udestående gæld i seks forskellige datafelter. Differentieringen mellem disse
datafelter er nødvendig bl.a. af hensyn til fremtidig beregning af renter, overvågning, kontrol og
afbrydelse af forskellige forældelsestidspunkter, samt for indberetning af relevante rentefradrag
over for Skattestyrelsen.
Figur 1: Datafelter i DCS
Felt nr.
Beskrivelse
Omkostninger
1
Forældelsesregel
i DCS
F.eks. tilkendte sagsomkostninger. Datafeltet er typisk tomt,
når sagen oprettes i DCS.
Beregnet ikke betalte renter
10 år
2
Renter påløbet i filialen - der ikke er betalt og før sagen op-
rettes i DCS.
Hovedstol
3 år
3
Resthovedstol
Anerkendte renter
10 år
4
Renter påløbet efter sagens oprettelse i DCS, og som kunden
har anerkendt ved f.eks. indgåelse af frivilligt forlig. Ren-
terne fra datafelterne 5 og 6 overføres til dette datafelt efter
en 'anerkendelse'.
Løbende renter
10 år
5
Totale renter påløbet efter sagens oprettelse i DCS.
Løbende renter i år
3 år
6
Renter påløbet i indeværende år.
3 år
Når en debitor foretager et afdrag på et udestående gældsbeløb er der etableret følgende dæk-
ningsrækkefølge i DCS (i forhold til datafelterne): 1, 2, 5, 4 og 3.
Omvendt hvis der foretages modregning er dækningsrækkefølgen: 1, 2, 3, 4 og 5.
[Beskrivende tekst om felt 6.]
4.2
Hvordan DCS formentlig var tiltænkt at fungere
Følgende afsnit viser alene, hvordan DCS formentlig var tiltænkt at fungere med blik på at eksem-
plificere de fejl, som opstår i DCS. I afsnit 4.3 nedenfor angives således, hvad der rent faktisk sker
i DCS.
Når en sag oprettes i DCS registreres hovedstolen som værende resthovedstolen og eventuelle
anerkendte renter. Det samlede beløb registreres i datafelt 3.
Datafelterne 5 og 6 anvender beløbene som angivet i datafelterne 2, 3 og 4 til at beregne løbende
renter. Renterne i datefelterne 5 og 6 holdes adskilt fra datafelterne 3 og 4, idet forældelsesfristen
for disse fordringer er 3 år, hvorimod forældelsesfristen for hovedstolen og anerkendte renter er
10 år.
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Opnås en ny dom eller indgås et nyt frivilligt forlig, akkumuleres renterne (datafelterne 5 og 6) og
overføres til datafelt 4. Samtidig overføres ethvert beløb i datafelt 2 til datafelt 3, hvorved beløbet
betragtes som en del af hovedstolen. Beløbet i datafelt 2 overføres til datafelt 3 - og ikke datafelt
4 - da der allerede er søgt om skattefradrag for renterne i datafelt 2. Danske Bank søger herved at
undgå registrering af dobbelt rentefradrag for kunden.
Datafelt 1 indeholder tilkendte omkostninger, der f.eks. tilkendes som led i Danske Banks retslige
inddrivelse af et tilgodehavende. Beløbet forbliver i datafelt 1, og rykkes ved en dom eller en for-
ligsaftale ikke til datafelt 3.
4.3
Hvad der faktisk sker i DCS
Bemærk, at følgende beskrivelse og illustrationer er eksempler på de hyppigste fejl, der er identi-
ficeret i forbindelse med tilretningsprocessen. Det skal understreges, at vi ikke er bekendt med,
hvorvidt sagerne er repræsentative. Der opstår fortsat nye "problemer", hvor der ikke umiddelbart
findes en logisk forklaring. F.eks. har vi fået forklaret, at inddrivelsen af krav over for danske kau-
tionister systemmæssigt er oversendt til Norge.
Der er ikke i Danske Bank et fuldstændigt overblik over alle fejl i DCS. Hertil kommer, at der fortsat
identificeres fejl, hvis oprindelse ikke umiddelbart lader sig forklare.
Figur 2: Sekvens af begivenheder for et nyt lån i en filial og før sagens oprettelse i DCS
Reminder
notice sent:
DKK 100
1 May
Transfer
into DCS
1 Jan
1 Feb
1 Mar
1 Apr
1 Jun
1 Jul
1 Aug
1 Sep
1 Oct
1 Nov
DCS
Key:
Interests
DKK 2,500
Interests
DKK 2,500
Interests
DKK 2,500
=
DKK 1,000 Monthly Contribution Paid
=
DKK 1,000 Monthly Contribution Unpaid
Debitors sidste rettidige betaling blev i ovennævnte eksempel foretaget i august.
Almindeligvis fremsendes 3 rykkere, før en sag overføres til DCS.
4.3.1
Delvist betalte renter
Tilskrevne renter dækkes forud for hovedstolen. Ovennævnte scenarie beskriver den fejl i DCS, der
opstår, når et afdrag delvist dækker allerede tilskrevne renter. I eksemplet bliver der foretaget to
afdrag på DKK 1.000 i hhv. juli og august, der tilsammen dækker DKK 2.000 af en rentetilskrivning
på DKK 2.500.
De resterende DKK 500 er fortsat "ubetalte renter" i andet kvartal. De DKK 500 (og eventuelt
senere ubetalte renter) burde overføres til datafelt 2 i DCS. Resthovedstolen skal overføres til da-
tafelt 3. Imidlertid overføres de DKK 500 fejlagtigt til datafelt 3 i DCS, og beløbet registreres derved
som en del af resthovedstolen. Med andre ord registreres der i dette eksempel DKK 500 for meget
i datefelt 3. Eventuelle senere ubetalte renter (f.eks. de renter, der tilskrives i september) overføres
korrekt til datafelt 2 i DCS.
DCS-systemet synes ikke at kunne skelne mellem delvist betalte renter og delvist betalte ydelser,
hvorfor de behandles på samme måde, hvilket ikke er korrekt.
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Ved oprettelsen af sagen i DCS indeholder datafelt 3 således fejlagtigt delvist ubetalte renter, der
er påløbet før gælden blev overført til DCS. Sammenlægning af delvist betalte renter og hovedsto-
len i datafelt 3 indebærer, at DCS anvender forældelsesreglerne for resthovedstolen (10 år) på
delvist betalte renter (i vores tilfælde DKK 500). Derfor bliver DKK 500 "markeret" som forældet
efter 10 år. Reelt burde renterne forældes efter 3 år.
Denne iboende fejl i DCS-systemet medfører i yderste konsekvens, at Danske Bank ultimativt op-
kræver et større beløb end den faktiske gæld.
4.3.2
Behandling af rykkergebyrer
Forældelsesfristen for rykkergebyrer er i udgangspunktet 3 år.
Rykkergebyrer, der er tilskrevet før sagens oprettelse i DCS, er - siden implementeringen af syste-
met i 2004 - blevet overført direkte til datafelt 3. Rykkergebyrerne er derfor blevet inkluderet som
en del af hovedstolen til beregning af de løbende renter. Rykkergebyrer burde ikke registreres i
datafelt 3, men snarere i et selvstændigt datafelt.
Systemopsætningen har på dette punkt i praksis betydet, at sagsbehandlerne skulle foretage en
manuel korrektion af hovedstolen, når de relevante gebyrer blev forældet. Denne korrektion skulle
foretages 3 gange (én gang for hvert rykkergebyr), idet rykkerne blev sendt på forskellige tids-
punkter (typisk med en måneds mellemrum) og derfor også forældes på forskellige tidspunkter.
Denne manuelle sagsbehandling er ikke i alle tilfælde blevet foretaget, og den manuelle korrektion
har tillige været fejlbehæftet.
I juli 2019 blev denne fejl systemmæssigt korrigeret, således at ubetalte rykkergebyrer blev adskilt
fra hovedstolen. Ubetalte rykkergebyrer overføres på nye sager til datafelt 2. Ændringen i juli 2019
har alene virkning for fremtidige sager, og der er ikke foretaget en automatisk korrektion af de
allerede eksisterende sager i DCS. [Det er for nuværende uklart, hvorvidt registreringen i relation
til forældelse og indberetning af rentefradrag for kunderne foretages korrekt.]
4.3.3
Beregning af forældelsesperioden
Forældelsesfristen for hovedstol, påløbne renter og gebyrer regnes fra forfaldstidspunktet. Imid-
lertid beregner DCS forældelsesfristen ud fra oprettelsestidspunktet i DCS. Som konsekvens inde-
bærer dette, at man i DCS nødvendigvis ikke kan identificere og kontrollere det korrekte tidspunkt
for afbrydelse af forældelse.
Det indebærer, at frivillige forlig eller retsafgørelser i praksis kan indeholde allerede forælde renter,
gebyrer og eventuelt hovedstole. Dette gælder navnlig, hvis et frivilligt forlig indgås omkring tids-
punktet for forældelsesfristens udløb registreret i DCS. Hertil kommer, at ikke-betalte ydelser under
(i hvert fald) gældsbreve selvstændigt forældes. Ikke-betalte ydelser forældes således før den
samlede restgælds forældelse.
Såfremt hovedstolen allerede er forældet på tidspunktet forud for indgåelsen af et frivilligt forlig,
har Danske Bank fortabt retten til at kræve hovedstol og renter betalt til sig.
4.4
Praktisk eksempel
De i punkt 4.3 beskrevne problemstillinger er de primære systemfejl i DCS (foruden de beskrevne
data-entry flaws fra BG Bank og "Legacy Danske Bank" i punkt 5).
Correction-teamet gennemgår fortsat nye og gamle sager, og der fremkommer forskellige typer af
systemmæssige problemstillinger, hvis nærmere oprindelse ikke umiddelbart kan forklares. Dette
illustreres via følgende eksempel, som viser fejl i DCS-systemet, der pt. ikke præcist kan beskrives.
Figur 3: Kontooversigt
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Date
08.11.2007
11.12.2007
31.12.2007
31.12.2007
03.01.2008
14.02.2008
04.03.2008
31.03.2008
31.03.2008
07.04.2008
22.04.2008
10.06.2008
10.06.2008
Text
Transport
Credit
Interest
Overdraft Interest
Credit
Credit
Credit
Interest
Overdraft Interest
Reminder Notice
Reminder Notice
Overdraft Interest
Overdraft Interest
Debit
Credit
2.500,00
2.151,96
6,16
2.500,00
2.500,00
2.500,00
2.177,78
8,61
100
100
50
1.738,22
Balance
-91.697,27
-89.197,27
-91.349,23
-91.355,39
-88.855,90
-86.355,39
-83.855,39
-86.033,17
-86.041,78
-86.141,78
-86.241,78
-86.291,78
-88.030,00
*Overtræksrenter er renter tilskrevet efter ubetalte månedlige ydelser.
Den 4. marts 2008 foretog kunden i eksemplet det sidste rettidige afdrag på gælden. På tidspunktet
udgjorde gælden samlet DKK 83.855,39. Dette beløb burde rettelig overføres til datafelt 3 i DCS
(hvor DKK 200 i rykkergebyrer - fejlagtigt - også blev overført, da sagen er fra før juli 2019, hvor
denne fejl blev rettet).
Efter den 4. marts 2008 er der 4 gange tilskrevet renter for samlet DKK 3.974,61. Dette beløb
burde være overført til DCS-systemets datafelt 2. I alt udgør det samlede krav DKK 88.030,00.
Uanset ovenstående er alle tilskrevne renter frem til den 22. april 2008 fejlagtigt overført til datafelt
3, og kun renterne tilskrevet den 10. juni 2008 er overført til datafelt 2. Dermed henstår der en
urigtig hovedstol på DKK 86.241,78, der er DKK 2.186,39 for højt (ekskl. rykkergebyrer på DKK
200) (beløbet er markeret med gult i både figur 3 og 4).
Renterne registreret i datafelt 3 registreres som konsekvens fejlagtig og ikke som forældet efter 3
år.
Figur 4: Screenshot af sag i DCS
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Figur 4 illustrerer tilretningen af sagen. I datafelt 3 burde der have stået DKK 83.855,39 svarende
til udeståendet pr. 4. marts 2008.
Figur 5: Screenshot af sag i DCS
Figur 5 illustrerer den korrekte registrering af renterne tilskrevet den 10. juni 2008 i datafelt 2.
Fejlens opståen kan ikke umiddelbart forklares.
Uanset ovenstående medfører denne iboende fejl i DCS-systemet i yderste konsekvens, at Danske
Bank via DCS-systemet ultimativt opkræver et større beløb end den faktiske gæld.
Figur 6
: Illustration DCS-systemets behandling af sagen anvist i figur 3
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Datafelt 1
DKK 0,00
Datafelt 2
DKK 1.788,22 (which includes the two sets of interests
incurred on the 10
th
of June)
Datafelt 3
DKK 86.241,78 (which includes the correct amount of
DKK 83.855,39, but also the interest incurred on the
31
st
of March as well as the two reminder notice costs)
Datafelt 4
N/A
Datafelt 5
N/A
Datafelt 6
N/A
5
5.1
5.1.1
HISTORIC ISSUES PRE-DATING DCS
Legacy Danske Bank systems
Generel introduktion
Forud for DCS-systemet var inddrivelsessystemet internt i Danske Bank decentralt og baseret på
følgende tre overordnede konti:
1. Almindelig konto
f.eks. indlån, udlån og kreditter
2. Inkassokonto
Overgang fra filial til inkassoafdelingen
3. Afskrevet fordringer
Uerholdelige fordringer
I Danske Banks decentrale gældsinddrivelsesenheder var der ikke etableret en systemmæssig be-
talingsrækkefølge.
Når en given debitor misligholdte sin betalingsforpligtelse overførtes den misligholdte fordring fra
kontotype 1 til kontotype 2, dvs. til "inkassokontoen". Medmindre der med kunden blev indgået et
frivilligt forlig eller man i Danske Bank opnåede dom blev fordringen afskrevet, og fordringen blev
overført til kontotype 3. Hvis en betalingsforpligtelse efter et frivilligt forlig eller en dom fortsat blev
misligholdt blev tilgodehavendet tilsvarende afskrevet og overført til kontotype 3. Kontoen beva-
rede det samme kontonummer indtil afskrivelsen, hvorefter der blev udfyldt et E-blad, og følgende
informationer blev registreret i den fysiske kundemappe:
•
•
•
Oplysning om gammelt og nyt kontonummer,
Navn på debitor og meddebitorer,
Navn på kautionister og deponenter,
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•
•
Retsbehandling, og
Dato for afskrivning
Registreringsmæssigt var det den samlede saldo på kontotype 2, der blev overført til kontotype 3.
Det vil sige, at når en misligholdt fordring blev afskrevet anførtes den samlede saldo som et enkelt
beløb i kontotype 3 (inkl. renter, omkostninger, gebyrer m.v.). Illustreres simplificeret nedenfor:
Kontotype 2
Lån (inkl. renter og om-
kostninger/gebyrer):
DKK 155.000 (hovedstol)
+ DKK 10.000 (renter)
+ DKK 5.000 (omk./geby-
rer)
Kontotype 3
DKK
170.000
DCS
DKK
170.000
(registreret i kontotype 3
i DCS)
Danske Bank opererede ikke med én kontotype 3 pr. gældspost. I stedet havde man i Danske Bank
en "samlekonto" for en debitors samlede afskrevne gæld. Denne integrationsmodel har bl.a. med-
ført, at de forskellige forældelsesfrister og starttidspunkter for fordringernes respektive forældel-
sestidspunkter blev umulig at identificere. Problemet videreførtes ved indførelsen af DCS. Hvis
denne registrering manuelt ikke var blevet tilrettet ville den samlede saldo fra kontotype 3 blive
overført til DCS-systemet.
Figur 7: En sag med en debitor med flere gældsposter til inddrivelse
Kontotype 1
(f.eks. gældsbreve)
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 2
(f.eks. kassekredit)
DKK 50.000
Kontotype 2
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 2
DKK 50.000
Kontotype 3
DKK 150.000
5.1.1.2
Dobbeltregistrering
Såfremt en fordring registreret i kontotype 3 havde to eller flere debitorer eller kautionister, blev
der oprettet en konto for hver debitor med hver sit kontonummer. Gælden blev herved registreret
dobbelt.
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Som anført ovenfor opererede Danske Bank ikke med én kontotype 3 pr. gældspost - men derimod
en kontotype 3 pr. debitor. Registreringen medførte som konsekvens, at bankens tilgodehavende
fremstod forkert, og hvis der ikke internt i Danske Bank blev foretaget en manuel korrektion, risi-
kerede man herved, at Danske Bank opkrævede et større beløb end det faktiske skyldte.
Kontotype 1
Debitor 1 - egen gæld
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 1
Fællesgæld
DKK 150.000
Kontotype 1
Debitor 2 - egen gæld
DKK 20.000
Kontotype 2
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 2
DKK 150.000
Kontotype 2
DKK 20.000
Kontotype 3
Debitor 1
DKK 250.000
Kontotype 3
Debitor 2
DKK 170.000
Figur 8: En sag med 2 debitorer, hvor hver især har en egen gæld samt en fællesgæld
Når en konto blev afskrevet og overført til saldotype 3, blev der for hver skyldner oprettet et E-
blad. På dette E-bland skulle løbende indbetalinger registreres - hvis de fandt sted.
Disse E-blade foreligger kun i fysisk form (ringbind), og blev ikke registreret i et elektronisk system.
Alene ud fra E-bladet kunne man konstatere, hvorvidt der var andre skyldnere (meddebitorer), der
hæftede for fordringen. En meddebitor skulle registreres med et grønt kryds på forsiden. Dette var
metoden, hvorved man søgte ikke at inddrive det samme beløb to (eller flere) gange.
5.1.2
Fejlregistrering af advokatomkostninger
Registrerede tilkendte sagsomkostninger er ikke i overensstemmelse med de faktisk tilkendte sags-
omkostninger fra f.eks. en inkassosag.
De danske domstole fastsætter standardiserede sagsomkostninger i inkassosager, der sjældent
modsvarer de faktiske advokatomkostninger. Tilkendte sagsomkostninger kan tilskrives restgæl-
den. Omkostninger herudover er kunden uvedkommende, og er en omkostning Danske Bank som
kreditor må bære.
Det er konstateret, at Danske Bank har registreret de faktiske advokatomkostninger frem for de
tilkendte sagsomkostninger. Hvorvidt denne praksis er fastholdt også efter indførelsen af DCS er
uvist.
Dette må dog beskrives som en manuel fejl. Hvorvidt det dog skyldtes en forkert intern procedure
eller blot en forkert praksis i p.t. uvist.
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5.1.3
Migrationsfejl
Ved konvertering til DCS i 2004, blev saldoen for hver kontohaver (kontotype 3) overført til datafelt
3 i DCS.
Integrationen skete uagtet, at saldoen kunne indeholde forskellige hovedstole, renter og omkost-
ninger, der potentielt kunne være forældede.
Renter og omkostninger burde ikke registreres i datafelt 3 i DCS - (medmindre renterne er aner-
kendt).
Alene den totale saldo overgik til DCS-systemet.
Oplysninger om tidligere kontonumre eller navne på meddebitorer/kautionister blev ikke registreret
i DCS. Det var ikke muligt løbende at registrere indbetalinger parallelt mellem flere meddebitorer.
Eksempel (se figur 8)
Hvis debitor 1 indbetalte DKK 150.000 (et beløb der dækker egen gæld samt DKK 50.000 af
fællesgælden) ville DKK 170.000 fortsat stå til inddrivelse ved debitor 2. Såfremt der ikke blev
foretaget en manuel korrektion, ville der som konsekvens fortsat blive gjort forsøg på at inddrive
det fulde beløb ved debitor 2 - selvom gælden allerede delvist var blevet betalt.
5.2
5.2.1
Legacy BG Bank systems
Generel introduktion
Inddrivelsessystemet i BG Bank var baseret på følgende tre overordnede konti (idet der for kasse-
kreditter dog ikke var behov for oprettelse af en kontotype 2):
1. Almindelig konto
f.eks. indlån, udlån og kreditter
2. Inkassokonto
Overgang fra filial til inkassoafdelingen
3. Afskrevet fordringer
Uerholdelige fordringer
I BG Bank var der etableret en systemmæssig betalingsrækkefølge, hvor afdrag først anvendtes til
at inddække allerede påløbne renter forud for hovedstolen. Påløbne renter blev først dækket på
kontotype 1 og derefter kontotype 2. Påløbne renter blev kun dækket på kontotype 3, idet omfang
at renterne var anerkendt af debitor.
Når en debitor misligholdte sin betalingsforpligtelse, overførtes den misligholdte fordring fra kon-
totype 1 til kontotype 2, dvs. til "inkassokontoen". Filialen oprettede kontotype 2 udfyldte samtidig
et stamblad, hvor følgende informationer blev registreret i den fysiske kundemappe:
•
•
•
•
•
Navn på debitorer,
Navn pa kautionister og deponenter,
Kontonummer på konti der skulle til inkasso,
Kontotype - gældsbrev, kassekredit eller almindeligt overtræk,
Oprindelig lånebeløb på hver enkelt konto,
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•
•
•
•
Saldo ved overførsel til inkasso på hver enkelt konto (samlede saldo),
Oplysning om eventuel sikkerhedsstillelse,
Beskrivelse af sagsforløb i filialen samt oplysninger om debitors situation, og
Dato for overførsel til inkasso.
Systemmæssigt kan man ikke tilgå disse informationer.
Når inkassosagen var blevet behandlet og skulle afskrives, blev fordringen overført til kontotype 3,
dvs. til kontoen med afskrevne fordringer.
Inkassoafdelingen udarbejdede forud for afskrivningen et stamblad kaldet
’’Indstilling til afskriv-
ning”,
hvilket stamblad indeholdte informationer om:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Oplysning om gammelt og nyt konto nr.
Saldo på krav på hver enkelt konto (det samlede udestående),
Hvad der var sket i sagen,
Retsbehandling,
Dato for afskrivningen, og
Oplysning om sagsforløb.
Registreringsmæssigt var det den samlede saldo på kontotype 2, der blev registreret på kontotype
3. Det vil sige, at når en misligholdt fordring blev afskrevet anførtes den samlede saldo som et
enkelt beløb i kontotype 3.
Ved overførslen fra kontotype 2 til kontotype 3 blev der således ikke sondret mellem hhv. hovedstol,
renter og omkostninger. Illustreres simplificeret nedenfor:
Kontotype 2
Lån (inkl. renter og om-
kostninger/gebyrer):
DKK 155.000 (hovedstol)
+ DKK 10.000 (renter)
+ DKK 5.000 (omk./geby-
rer)
Kontotype 3
DKK
170.000
DCS
DKK
170.000
(registreret i kontotype 3
i DCS)
Før 1992:
Tilgodehavender der blev afskrevet (overført til kontotype 3) blev overført til en såkaldt "hoved-
bogskonto". Denne "hovedbogskonto" var en samlekonto for samtlige af de i BG Bank værende
"afskrevne fordringer". Rentetilskrivning kunne således ikke foretages ligesom eventuelle afdrag
ikke direkte kunne registreres.
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En kunde i BG Bank modtog årligt en oversigt over de løbende mellemværende. Imidlertid kunne
gæld, der var blevet tilskrevet kontotype 3, ikke indeholdes i disse årlige oversigter. Gælden til-
skrevet kontotype 3 blev således skrevet ud af årsoversigten - og kunden kunne således ikke iden-
tificere den pågældende gæld til banken. Kunden modtog således ikke systematisk en årlig oversigt
over gældsforholdets udvikling. Udarbejdelsen af en årsoversigt vedr. gæld tilskrevet kontotype 3
krævede manuel sagsbehandling og blev ikke konsekvent generet.
Efter 1992:
Medio 1992 blev det EDB-mæssigt muligt at håndtere de afskrevne fordringer på kontotype 3 på
separate konti, hvorfor gælden kunne registreres med en samlet saldo på enkeltstående konti.
Kunderne modtog herefter også årsoversigter vedr. gæld tilskrevet kontotype 3.
I de tilfælde hvor en konto havde flere end to interessenter (meddebitorer), var det ikke muligt at
sende årsoversigter til alle øvrige interessenter. Det var kun muligt at sende årsoversigt til én
person, hvis der var mere end to interessenter tilknyttet en konto.
Perioden 1999-2004
I perioden 1999-2004 var der i BG Bank etableret et note-baseret system. I dette system var der
oprettet en række underrubrikker på kontotype 3, hvor man sondrede mellem renter, anerkendte
renter, omkostninger, gebyrer og resthovedstol. Ved overgangen til DCS blev disse underrubrikker
i al væsentlighed ikke registreret i DCS. I BG Bank havde man mange forskellige registreringsmu-
ligheder i disse underrubrikker, hvilke mange registreringsmuligheder migrationen ikke tog højde
for.
Den endelige migration til DCS var mangelfuld, og alene dele af de registrerede anerkendte renter
blev overført til DCS's datafelt 4. Efter 2004 er underrubrikkerne i BG Banks system ikke ajourført.
5.2.2
Registrering af debitorer og kautionister
På de afskrevne engagementer på kontotype 3, hvor en eller flere kautionister helt eller delvist
hæftede for engagementet, blev sådanne kautionister systemmæssigt (urigtigt) registreret som en
meddebitor. Denne systemmæssige registrering var nødvendig for, at der kunne generes årsover-
sigter. Årsoversigten anvendtes bl.a. til at afbryde forældelse efter Danske Lov 5-14-4.
Hvis der systemmæssigt blev registreret mere end to meddebitorer, kunne der imidlertid ikke ge-
nereres årsoversigter for alle interessenter. Det var kun muligt at genere én årsoversigt, hvis der
var mere end to interessenter. Der blev således kun udsendt årsoversigt til én interessent (den der
var registreret med skattekode 1) med den risiko, at forældelse ikke blev afbrudt over for kautio-
nister.
Registreringen indebærer, at man ikke systemmæssigt kan se, at meddebitoren rent faktisk er en
kautionist - en sådan information fremgår alene af den fysiske kundemappe. Som konsekvens
medfører dette, at kautionisten - hvis datagrundlaget i systemet lægges til grund - kunne/kan blive
opkrævet uberettigede beløb, f.eks. hvis der bliver indgået en akkordordning med hovedmanden.
Et sådant restkrav kan i udgangspunktet ikke gøres gældende over for en kautionist. Danske Bank
har konstateret, at sådanne krav er inddrevet.
5.2.2.1
Et krav pr. konto - flere debitorer
Såfremt en fordring registreret i kontotype 3, havde to eller flere debitorer, og kravene over for de
respektive debitorer blev behandlet forskelligt, og der derfor var forskellige pengemæssige krav
overfor debitorerne, blev sagen ikke registreret korrekt. I BG Bank kunne der kun registreres et
krav pr. konto.
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Hvis debitor 1 eksempelvis anerkendte en resthovedstol + renter, og debitor 2 tilsvarende aner-
kendte kravet, kan der potentielt rejses forskellige krav over for de respektive debitorer - i hvert
fald over tid i takt med forældelsen.
Eksempel: Debitor 1 underskriver et frivilligt forlig
Resthovedstol
Renter
TOTAL
DKK
DKK
DKK
100.000,00
15.000,00
115.000,00
Såfremt debitor 2 ikke tilsvarende anerkendte rentebeløbet forældes rentekravet efter den almin-
delige forældelsesfrist.
Systemet kunne alene håndtere ét krav. Systemmæssigt blev det højeste af de mulige krav regi-
streret. Dvs. i ovenstående tilfælde registreres kravet med DKK 115.000,00 - og dette krav ville -
hvis der ikke blev foretaget en manuel korrekt - også blive gjort gældende over for debitor 2.
Samme systemfejl gør sig gældende for kautioner. Dette er navnlig relevant i forhold til beløbsbe-
grænsede kautioner. Hvis der eksempelvis var vedtaget en beløbsbegrænset kaution på DKK
50.000 i ovenstående tilfælde, ville kravet overfor kautionisten blive registreret som værende DKK
115.000,00.
5.2.3
Skift af kontonumre
Frem til ca. år 1999/2000 var det ikke muligt at opretholde et oprindeligt kontonummer, når gælden
blev sendt til hhv. kontotype 2 og kontotype 3. Systemmæssigt oprettedes et nyt kontonummer,
og der var registreret en transport. Dette indebærer, at den historiske udvikling i engagementet
blev vanskeligt at spore.
5.2.4
Regionale forskelle i håndteringen af kontotype 3
En debitor med flere gældsposter til inddrivelse blev håndteret på forskelligvis regionalt i Danmark.
Overordnet kan det siges, at man på Sjælland opererede med en kontotype 3 pr. gældspost, mens
man i Jylland anvendte kontotype 3 som en "samlekonto" for en debitors samlede afskrevne gæld.
Se illustration nedenfor:
Kontotype 1
(f.eks. gældsbreve)
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 2
(f.eks. kassekredit)
DKK 50.000
Nyt kontonummer
Kontotype 2
DKK 100.000
Kontotype 3
DKK 150.000
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Denne integrationsmodel har bl.a. medført, at de forskellige forældelsesfrister og starttidspunkter
for fordringernes respektive forældelsestidspunkter blev umulig at identificere. Problemet videre-
førtes ved indførelsen af DCS.
Hvis denne registrering manuelt ikke var blevet tilrettet ville den samlede saldo fra kontotype 3
blive overført til DCS-systemet.
5.2.5
Eksempel på et hændelsesforløb
Kontotype 1
Kontotype 2
Kontoen blev således "afskrevet" den 17. december 1996 med en saldo på DKK 117.536,24. Den
samlede saldo på DKK 117.536,24 blev overført til kontotype 3. Det konstateres, at der allerede
inden overførslen til kontotype 3 ikke var korrigeret for tilskrevne forældede renter (den gældende
forældelsesfrist for renter på daværende tidspunkt var 5 år regnet fra forfaldsdagen, og allerede
den 17. december 1996 var der tilskrevet DKK 14.170,15 i forældede renter.
Saldoen på kr. 117.536,24 har været registreret på kontotype 3 frem til konverteringen til DCS i
2004, og blev registreret som hovedstol i DCS.
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Med virkning pr. 31. december 2018 blev sagen korrigeret, og hovedstolen blev nedskrevet til kr.
59.179,39, svarende til den sidste foretagne indbetaling den 1. august 1989. De kr. 59.179,39 kan
i dag tillægges 3 års rente (forudsat at forældelsen af hovedstolen er behørigt afbrudt).
Hvis debitor i dette scenarie eksempelvis den 31.12.2017 havde underskrevet et frivilligt forlig på
baggrund af kontotype 3, ville de 117.536,24 blive tillagt yderligere 3 års renter af en allerede
forkert opgjort restgæld.
I denne sag er der forudsætningsvist indgået enten (i) et frivilligt forlig eller (ii) opnået dom på
baggrund af en urigtigt opgjort restgæld.
Hvis der ikke var foretaget en manuel korrekt af denne sag, kunne der potentielt være fejlagtigt
inddrevet en beløb, der oversteg den reelle restgæld med mere end 100 %.
Resthovedstolen på alle tilgodehavender er forudsætningsvist - hvis sagen ikke er blevet manuelt
korrigeret - systemmæssigt registreret forkert. Det indebærer bl.a., at Danske Bank undertiden har
opkrævet mere end det skyldte beløb. Den forkerte opgørelse af resthovedstolen ses derfor også
reflekteret i f.eks.:
•
•
•
•
•
•
5.2.6
Indfriede fordringer,
Frivillige forlig,
Fogedopgørelser,
Domsfundamenter,
Advokatopgørelser, og
Gældssaneringssager, konkursboer, rekonstruktion, dødsboer etc.
Tilgodehavender til ekstern inddrivelse
Såfremt en fordring har været til inddrivelse ved ekstern advokat er det konstateret, at når kravet
tilbagesendes fra advokaten - f.eks. fordi der er opnået skylderklæring - registreredes fordringen
på ny i systemet. I kontotype 3 registreredes den samlede resthovedstol inkl. renter i 5 år og
fogedomkostninger. Den eksterne advokat havde typisk tilskrevet yderligere renter frem til over-
sendelsestidspunktet, hvilket tilsvarende blev registreret i kontotype 3 - dog som anerkendte om-
kostninger. Efterfølgende sagsbehandlingsskridt i tillid til systemet vil være forkerte.
5.2.7
Migrationsfejl
Ved konverteringen til DCS-systemet i 2004 blev det besluttet, at fastholde registreringen af kauti-
onister som meddebitorer som anført i punkt 5.2.2.
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Ved konverteringen til DCS-systemet blev kun saldoen fra kontotype 3 konverteret til DCS. Elektro-
niske oplysninger vedr. kontotype 1 og kontotype 2 fremgår således ikke af DCS-systemet, og
sådanne oplysninger kan kun tilgås via den fysiske kundemappe. Tilsvarende fremgår der ikke
informationer om, at saldoen på kontotype 3 også udgøres af eksempelvis renter, gebyrer og om-
kostninger. I enkelte tilfælde er anerkendte renter blevet overført til DCS. Anerkendte renter kunne
i BG Bank registreres på flere forskellige måder. Selve migrationen til DCS inkluderede ikke alle
registreringsmetoder.
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ANNEX 1 - OVERVIEW OF TIME-BARRING RULES
This is a high-level non-exhaustive overview of the key rules on statute of limitation.
CLAIM
LIMITA-
TION
PERIOD
SUSPENSION
CAUSE
SUSPEN-
SION RE-
SULT
INTERRUP-
TION CAUSE
INTERRUP-
TION RE-
SULT
PRIOR to 1 JANUARY 2008
Loans, over-draft ac-
counts, document of
indebtedness, settle-
ment out of court
and guarantees of
these obligations
20 years from
establishment
N/A
N/A
i) Debtor's Per-
ception
(
anerkendelse
)
of the claim
ii) Notification
to debtor
iii) Notice to an
estate
iv) Request of
appropriation
(
anmodning
om udlæg
)
Interest, fees, costs
and guarantee obli-
gations of these
5 years from
the due date
i) Unaccounta-
ble knowledge
of the claim or
the debtor's
residence.
ii) Substantive
negotiations
POST 1 JANUARY 2008
Loans, over-draft ac-
counts, document of
indebtedness, settle-
ment out of court
and guarantees of
these obligations
10 years from
the due date
i) DB's lack of
knowledge or
ought to know
of the claim or
of the debtor
Postponement
of limitation
period
i) Debtor's Per-
ception of the
claim
ii) DB's legal
actions to-
wards the
debtor.
Postponement
of limitation
period
i) Debtor's Per-
ception of the
claim
ii) DB's legal
actions to-
wards the
debtor.
New 3 years
limitation pe-
riod
New 10
years limita-
tion period
Postponement
of limitation
period
i) Debtor's Per-
ception of the
claim
ii) DB's legal
actions to-
wards the
debtor
New 5 years
limitation pe-
riod
New 20
years limita-
tion period
Interest, fees, costs
and guarantee obli-
gations of these
3 years from
the due date
i) DB's lack of
knowledge or
ought-
knowledge of
the claim or of
the debtor
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Project Collection
Workshop 26 November 2019
Strictly confidential
–
legal privilege
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Introduction
Key impact of system and process failures
Systems impacted
•
•
•
•
The Debt Collection System
("DCS")
Legacy Danske Bank system
(pre 2004)
BG Bank (pre 2004)
(PF and Pantebreve
–
to be
verified)
•
Affected areas
All customers within GRDM
•
•
•
•
•
•
General debt collection
Debt relief
Bankruptcy
Foreclosure sale
Decedent estate
Etc.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Risks
Regulatory sanctions and
liability
Prudent practice and conduct
FSA
TAX
GDPR
Reputation
•
•
•
Remediation
Reimbursement of suffered
losses
Developing a compliant debt
collection framework
Maintaining the reputation of
Danske Bank
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High impact flaws
Examples of high impact flaws (pre and post 2004)
•
The field in the DCS that uses the statute of limitation for the principal amount may contain interest and/or fees although the timing barring period for these
types of obligations is shorter than the time barring period for the principal amount. This is an ongoing flaw, but with a particularly high impact in connection
with the migration of data into the DCS in 2004.
•
The time limitation for the principal and interest is generally counted from the time the debt is entered into DCS rather than from the time the debt was due.
•
Time-barred interest, costs and fee payments have incorrectly been included in settlement agreements entered with customers, and also in successful claims
made against customers in courts, estates etc.
The key impact of the system and process flaws
•
Customers in risk of overpaying
•
Customers have overpaid
•
Customers have paid debt that was time-barred
•
Danske Bank has collected debt that was not owed
•
Danske Bank has submitted inaccurate tax reports to the Tax Agency
•
Inability to accept payments from debtors who want to make total repayment on their outstanding debt
➢
It is not possible generally to "auto-correct" the incorrect debt calculations
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DCS
Main flaws within DCS (irrespectively of the various migration flaws between DCS and legacy Danske Bank systems)
➢
Principal amount containing interest; ongoing issue
–
–
FLAW:
The data field in respect of the principal amount may incorrectly contain unpaid interest that have accrued prior to the debt being transferred to the DCS.
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
Different types of amounts have been aggregated into a single amount that is then reflected as the 'principal amount' in the DCS, and subsequently treated as
such for time-barring purposes.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
➢
Principal amount containing costs; (fixed on cases entered into DCS post July 2019)
–
–
FLAW:
When creating a new case in DCS, related costs (collection fees) that remain unpaid are added to the principal amount.
CONSEQUENCES:
•
Incorrect handling af time-barring.
•
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
•
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
➢
Time-barring counting period; ongoing issue
–
–
FLAW:
DCS starts to count the time-barring periods from the date a case is opened in the DCS
CONSEQUENCES:
•
The exact time for time-barring is untraceable.
•
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
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BG Bank
Improper and incorrect migration of data into DCS (applicable to historic BG Bank cases)
➢
Single amount migration
–
–
FLAW:
At the migration between BG Bank and DCS the total debt registered in BG Bank was registered as a principal amount (field number 3 in DCS).
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
Different types of amounts merged into a single amount registered as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
➢
Guarantors and co-debtors - Settlement agreements
–
FLAW:
In BG Bank it was not possible to distinguish between guarantors and co-debtors. This limitation has been transferred into DCS.
–
•
CONSEQUENCES:
Unjustifiable collection of debt.
•
•
•
For example where a settlement agreement (for a lower amount than the initial debt) has been agreed with a debtor, attempts to collect the full amount
would still be made against co-debtors.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
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BG Bank
Improper and incorrect migration of data into DCS (applicable to historic BG Bank cases)
➢
Regional differences
–
FLAW:
Debt collection processes differed across regions of Denmark. The integration in DCS may be affected.
–
–
In Jutland it was primarily decided that once a debt was written-off it would be combined with other written-off debt (even where the types of debt may have
varied) belonging to the same customer
Impossible to track differing periods of limitation.
Different types of amounts merged into a single amount registered as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
•
➢
Double registration of debt
–
FLAW:
Joint liability debtors were registered on one single account. It was not possible to take into account any differences that might arise between the debtors in
respect of the outstanding debt.
–
–
By example, if one co-debtor entered into a settlement agreement, the system would also apply the new principal amount (which includes earlier interest and
collection costs) to the remaining co-debtor(s) and the guarantor, both of whom are not bound by the settlement agreement
Unjustifiable collection of debt.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
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Legacy Danske Bank
Improper and incorrect migration of data into DCS (applicable to historic Danske Bank cases)
➢
Single amount migration
–
–
FLAW:
At the migration between Danske Bank and DCS the total debt registered in Danske Bank was registered as a principal amount (field number 3 in DCS).
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
Different types of amounts merged into a single amount registered as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
➢
Double registration of debt
–
–
FLAW:
Where a debt was assigned to multiple debtors and/or a guarantor it was necessary, due to system limitations, to open an account for each debtor and
guarantor (where applicable) each reflecting the debt owed.
CONSEQUENCES:
•
•
•
•
•
Unjustifiable collection of debt - the relevant debt was recorded more than once.
Different types of amounts merged into a single amount registered as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
Inaccurate calculation and reporting of interest.
Potential collection of time-barred claims, and subsequently in risk of over-payment.
The link ('green X') connecting co-debtors and/or guarantors was not incorporated into the transfer and therefore co-debtors and guarantors became untraceable.
•
Potential double collection.
7
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Key financial risks
Key financial risks
Comments
Repayments to the customers
Depreciation of debt that is actually time
barred
Tax related liabilities
Sanctions from Tax Agency/SØIK
Sanctions from DFSA/SØIK
•
The obligation to repay customers will result in a net loss
•
Debt registered in DCS as 'owed', but which is actually time-barred will need to be depreciated
•
There is a risk that re-opening customers' annual tax assessments will result in "late payments" of the relevant
taxes. Such a cost will likely be borne by Danske Bank
•
Risk of being fined for having reported incorrect data to the Tax Agency (Skattestyrelsen)
•
Breach of conduct of business rules (god skik) for collecting debt that was statute-barred, or otherwise not owed
by the customer
•
Governance failures for not resolving the issues despite escalation efforts made by employees and the
continuation of debt collection whilst knowing that the calculations might not be correct
•
Governance failures for not having sufficient systems in place
Damages for losses suffered by
customers and other third parties
Fine for GDPR-non compliance
Work to fix issues may be costly
•
Customers and other third parties may claim against Danske Bank for damages for the consequences of
incorrect debt collection
•
The DCS contains incorrect data on customers' debt and other personal data in breach of GDPR.
•
Due to the number of customers impacted by the issue, the costs in fixing the issue will likely be sizeable. Work
on re-calculating debt correctly will take a lot of effort and resource. The need to resolve the impact on
customers' tax returns may be costly. Finding a new solution for debt collection will naturally also be costly (we
understand this aspect is already ongoing)
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Q&A
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Plesner draft - 13 December 2019
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
–
LEGAL PRIVILEGE
MEMORANDUM
ON MAIN ROOT CAUSES AND DANSKE BANK'S LEGAL OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE CUSTOMERS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
3
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 3
DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................ 4
MAIN ROOT CAUSES .............................................................................................................. 4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4
Root cause 1: Interest, fees and costs incorrectly added to principal amount field .......... 4
Root cause 2: Incorrect information of Due Date ......................................................... 5
Root cause 3: Guarantors from BG Bank have been treated like co-debtors ................... 6
Root cause 4: Missing link between principal debtor, co-debtors and guarantors ............ 6
OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE CUSTOMERS ........................................................................... 7
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Right of restitution .................................................................................................... 7
Time-barring............................................................................................................. 8
Set-off right or obligation to pay out debt collected on an unjustified basis? .................. 9
Interest on Compensation amounts ............................................................................ 9
Regulatory conduct of business requirements ............................................................ 10
Specific situations assessed ..................................................................................... 10
5
ISSUES NOT CONSIDERED ................................................................................................... 11
Annex 1 - List of agreed terms
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MEMORANDUM
ON MAIN ROOT CAUSES AND DANSKE BANK'S LEGAL OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE CUSTOMERS
1
INTRODUCTION
We have been instructed by Danske Bank A/S ("Danske Bank") to prepare this memorandum set-
ting out:
1) the main root causes that in our view have caused Danske Bank to collect debt on an
unjustified basis from customers within the Group Recovery & Debt Management
("GRDM") business area; and
2) our assessment of to which extent Danske Bank is legally obliged to Compensate the cus-
tomers from which Danske Bank has collected debt on an unjustified basis due to the root
causes.
The purpose of this memorandum is to serve as the basis for a data analysis to be carried out by
Ernst & Young ("EY") that will enable EY to make a rough estimate (subject to certain assumptions
and qualifications) of:
1) the total amount of debt Danske Bank on an unjustified basis has collected as a result of
the root causes; and
2) the total amount Danske Bank will need to Compensate the customers due to an unjusti-
fied collection of debt.
The exact scope of the estimate to be made by EY will of course be agreed between EY and Danske
Bank and the above just reflects our preliminary understanding of the scope of the estimate.
Together with EY we have identified four main root causes, which in our view are those with the
highest impact in terms of volume. These are the root causes described in this memorandum. We
note that we have also identified a number of other root causes in connection with our work on
this project. These other root causes are described in our separate draft memorandum entitled
"Description of key system and process flaws" dated 28 November 2019 (the "System and Process
Flaw Document").
The descriptions of the root causes set out in this memorandum have been simplified in order to
make it more operational and easier for EY to use the descriptions as the basis for their data
analysis work. We refer to the System and Process Flaw Document for more detailed and accurate
description of the root causes identified.
We have together with this memorandum also provided a separate memorandum on the relevant
Danish statute of limitation rules that are relevant to this mater.
This memorandum has been prepared under time constraints as we have just had a few days from
the initial instruction and only one day from final agreement on the exact scope of our work. We
have therefore not had sufficient time to assess and consider all the aspects that it, in our view, is
relevant to assess and consider before taking any decisions regarding remediation actions. How-
ever, we believe that our assessments and descriptions set out in this memorandum should be
sufficient for the purposes of EY's data analysis described above.
This memorandum is structured as follows: Part 2 sets out the definitions used in this memorandum
by reference to Annex 1. In Part 3 we have set out our descriptions of the four main root causes
identified. Part 4 contains our assessment of the extent of Danske Bank's obligation to Compensate
the customers and guarantors. Finally, we have in Part 5 listed the issues that we have not consid-
ered or taken into account in relation to this memorandum but which it, in our view, is relevant to
take into account or consider at a later point in time.
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2
DEFINITIONS
Capitalised terms used but not defined in this memorandum have the meaning set out in Annex 1.
3
3.1
3.1.1
MAIN ROOT CAUSES
Root cause 1: Interest, fees and costs incorrectly added to principal amount field
Description of root cause
Interest, fees and costs have incorrectly been added to the principal amount field in the DCS (field
3). This root cause has been triggered by various events.
This root cause can be divided into:
(i) two ongoing flaws in DCS that have continued to occur for a longer period of time; and
(ii) a one-off migration event that occurred in 2004 when data was transferred into the DCS.
3.1.2
3.1.2.1
Ongoing flaws in the DCS
Interest incorrectly added to principal amount field in the DCS
When a debt collection case is created in the DCS, the data field in respect of the principal amount
may incorrectly contain unpaid interest that have accrued prior to the debt data being transferred
to the DCS. This means that the interest amount and the principal amount have been aggregated
into a single amount that is then reflected as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
It is our understanding that this flaw mainly occurs in cases of partial repayments of interest.
However, there continues to be some uncertainties exactly when this flaw is triggered and what its
exact impact is in respect of the unpaid interest. Further, we also understand that EY has identified
some cases where debt data has been transferred to the DCS and where interest have been added
directly to the principal amount even though no partial repayments of interest has occurred.
Period of time
This flaw has to our understanding occurred on an ongoing basis since 2004 and continues to
occur.
3.1.2.2
Fees and costs incorrectly added to principal amount field in the DCS
When a debt collection case is created in the DCS, the standard collection fees (in Danish:
rykker-
gebyrer
), which is typically 3 x DKK 100, are generally incorrectly added to the principal amount
field in the DCS. This means that the collection fees and the principal amount have been aggregated
into a single amount that is then reflected as the 'principal amount' in the DCS.
It is also our understanding that certain other costs in some cases may incorrectly be added to the
principal amount field, e.g. certain lawyers' fees.
Period of time
The flaw has to our understanding occurred on an ongoing basis since 2004 and until July 2019.
3.1.3
3.1.3.1
One-off migration event in 2004
Interest, fees and costs added to principal amount field in the DCS
When data in 2004 was migrated into the DCS, the total debt (the principal amount, interest, fees
and costs) registered in each of Danske Bank's and BG Bank's systems was incorrectly transferred
as single field integration into the principal amount field in the DCS.
Period of time
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This flaw originates from the migration of data in 2004, and this flaw should therefore only occur
on migrated cases. However, it likely impacted a high percentage of the cases being transferred to
the DCS.
3.1.4
Consequences of root cause
The key consequences of this root cause are:
•
Since the DCS is programmed to apply a 10-year time-barring period to the principal
amount field, the incorrectly added interest, fees and costs - in respect of which only a 3-
year time-barring period apply - will not be treated as time-barred by the DCS before 10
years.
Danske Bank will unjustified have collected time-barred interest, fees and costs.
The DCS will unjustified have calculated additional interest based on too high an amount
since interest is calculated on the basis of the principal amount stated in field 3.
Danske Bank may have reported incorrect data on customers' principal amount of debt
and interest payments to the Tax Agency (in Danish:
Skattestyrelsen
).
Danske Bank's data on the total amount owed by the customers in the DCS will reflect a
higher amount than actually owed by the customers.
•
•
•
•
3.2
Root cause 2: Incorrect information of Due Date
Pursuant to the Limitation Act, the time-barring period in respect of a principal amount, accrued
interest, fees and costs should be counted from the Due Date of the relevant debt.
In order to correctly keep track of when a debt becomes time-barred, it is as a starting point
necessary to know:
(i) the time-barring period that applies to the relevant type of debt; and
(ii) when the Due Date of the relevant debt occurred.
However, information on the correct Due Date is not necessarily transferred to the DCS. Rather,
the due date registered in the DCS, and which therefore is used to calculate when the debt is time-
barred, is the date on which the debt data is transferred into the DCS.
This means that the DCS starts to calculate the relevant time-barring period from an incorrect date
later in time than the due date, and consequently the debt is registered time-barred at a later point
in time than it actually should be under the Limitation Act. This is mainly a risk in respect of time-
barring of the principal amount where Danske Bank (or a debt collection agency) may have to
interrupt the time-barring of the principal amount. If Danske Bank takes such action close to the
expiration time of the time-barring period, the principal may in reality already be time-barred even
though the DCS shows that there still is some time before the principal is time-barred.
Period of time
This flaw has to our understanding occurred on an ongoing basis since 2004 and continues to
occur.
3.2.1
Consequences of root cause
The key consequences of this root cause are:
•
The debt shown in the DCS may actually be time-barred because the Due Date used to
calculate the beginning of the time-barring period is a later date than what is actually the
case.
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•
•
Danske Bank will unjustified have collected time-barred debt.
Danske Bank's data on the total amount owed by the customers in the DCS will reflect a
higher amount than actually owed by the customers.
3.3
3.3.1
Root cause 3: Guarantors from BG Bank have been treated like co-debtors
One-off migration event in 2004
In BG Bank's system it was not possible to distinguish between guarantors and co-debtors. BG
Bank therefore manually kept track of whether an individual or entity was a guarantor (in Danish:
kautionist
or
garant
) by stating this in the relevant physical files.
Since there was no electronic information in BG Bank's system to identify whether a specific indi-
vidual or entity was a guarantor, no information about this was migrated into the DCS system in
2004. Therefore, after the migration to DCS, guarantors in BG Bank has incorrectly been reflected
and treated like co-debtors in the DCS system. Further, since the information in the DCS to an
increasing extent over the years has been relied upon rather than the physical files, the risk of this
data flaw materialising has increased over time.
The flaw means in practice that Danske Bank may not have observed the special requirements that
follow from an individual or entity being a guarantor. For example, Sections 47-48 of the Danish
Financial Business Act set out a number of notification obligations that must be observed by Danske
Bank in respect of guarantors in order for Danske Bank to maintain a claim against the guarantors.
The requirements apply both to commercial relationships and to non-commercial relationships,
although the rules are stricter in respect of the requirements vis-à-vis non-commercial relationships.
Period of time
This flaw only occurs on cases migrated into DCS in 2004.
3.3.2
Potential ongoing issue
We understand that EY has received information that this root cause may also have occurred after
2004 in the DCS. It is not currently clear to us if any such subsequent occurrences are limited to
manual errors only (i.e. non-systemic or processing errors). We have not received information
about this root cause being an "ongoing" issue so this is something that should be investigated
further.
3.3.3
Consequences of root cause
The key consequences of this root cause are:
•
•
•
Danske Bank may fully or partially have lost its rights against guarantors due to not having
observed the legal requirements applicable in respect of guarantors.
Danske Bank may incorrectly have reported data to the Tax Agency in respect of the guar-
antors as if they were co-debtors.
Danske Bank may have collected debt from guarantors which in fact was not covered by the
guarantee, e.g. if the guarantee was limited, or if debt-arrangements have been agreed with
the principal debtor.
3.4
3.4.1
Root cause 4: Missing link between principal debtor, co-debtors and guarantors
One-off migration event in 2004
In Danske Bank's pre-DCS system it was not possible to distinguish between guarantors and co-
debtors. Where a debt was assigned to multiple debtors and/or a guarantor the procedure was to
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open an account for each debtor and the guarantor (where applicable) each reflecting the debt
owed. The relevant debt was accordingly recorded more than once.
Prior to DCS, these types of accounts were managed manually by making amendments to physical
ledgers associated with an account following account activity such as a payment, newly accrued
interest, costs etc. When Danske Bank received a payment from a debtor, the principal amount
would be reduced in line with the payment received on his/her ledger. Where a co-debtor or guar-
antor was attached to the same debt, the physical ledger would be marked with a green X, and
the payment received would also need to be registered, and the principal amount reduced, on the
corresponding physical ledger of that co-debtor or guarantor.
When the DCS was implemented and existing accounts were transferred into the DCS, the link (the
green X) connecting co-debtors and/or guarantors was not migrated into the DCS and therefore
the link between co-debtors and guarantors was lost. In other words, if a debtor made a payment
against a debt, a corresponding reduction that would be required on the account of a co-debtor
and/or a guarantor would not be made.
Period of time
This flaw only occurred when the migration of data took place in 2004.
3.4.2
Potential ongoing issue
We understand that EY has received information that this root cause may also have occurred after
2004 in the DCS. It is not currently clear to us if any such subsequent occurrences are limited to
manual errors only (i.e. non-systemic or processing errors). We have not received information
about this root cause being an "ongoing" issue so this is something that should be investigated
further.
3.4.3
Consequences of root cause
The key consequences of this root cause are:
•
•
•
Danske Bank may have collected debt that was not owed because the debt was recorded
more than once (potentially double payment).
Danske Bank have reported incorrect data on customers' principal amount of debt and in-
terest payments to the Tax Agency.
Danske Bank's data on the total amount owed by the customers in the DCS may reflect a
higher amount than actually owed by the customers (because repayments e.g. by co-debtors
may not be registered in respect of the other co-debtors).
4
4.1
OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE CUSTOMERS
Right of restitution
Under Danish law, if a person (or entity) has paid an amount due to a mistake, misunderstanding
or as a result of an error, the starting point is that the person has a right of restitution (
condictio
indebiti
) against the other person (or entity) to which the payment has been made.
Based on case law from the Danish courts, the starting point with the payer's right of restitution
may in some cases change to the effect that the payer losses the right of restitution. The typical
examples of cases where the payer has lost the right of restitution, regardless of the starting point,
is where the payment (i) is made due to a mistake attributable to the payer; and (ii) the receiver
of the payment was in good faith.
In situations where the fault of the mistaken payment lies with the receiver of the payment (as it
will be the case in the situation at hand in respect of Danske Bank), it is clear from case law from
the Danish Supreme Court that the payer will be entitled to restitution.
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Based on this, it is generally our view that the customers (or guarantors) that have paid amounts
that were time-barred or that were not actually owed to Danske Bank have a right of restitution.
The fact that the customers (or guarantors) have actually paid the amounts without any objections
does not alter this.
In cases where it due to the specific circumstances would be unreasonable or very burdensome for
Danske Bank to Compensate a customer, Danske Bank may have an argument to avoid having to
Compensate the customer. However, we generally do not believe Danske Bank will be able to avoid
Compensations based on this argument. Accordingly, at least for the purposes of EY's data analysis,
we suggest that this possible exemption is disregarded.
4.2
4.2.1
Time-barring
General background to the applicable time-barring rules
Currently, the Danish time-barring rules are set out in the Limitation Act, which came into force on
1 January 2008. Before the Limitation Act entered into force, the Danish time-barring rules were
set out in the two acts DL 5-14-4 and the 1908 Act. Both of these two acts were replaced by the
Limitation Act on 1 January 2008.
The transitional rules applied during the period from 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2011. All claims
established before 1 January 2008 will be time-barred by now, unless Suspension or Interruption
have continuously been and are duly constituted. All relevant claims are now regulated by the
Limitation Act exclusively.
For further details on the time-barring rules, please refer to our separate memorandum on this.
4.2.2
The time-barring rules applicable to the customers restitution claims against Danske Bank
Under the Limitation Act, the general rule on time barring of debt provides that debt will be time-
barred after three (3) years, pursuant to the 3(1) of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, this will be the
time-barring period unless a different time-barring period is specified in the Limitation Act. The
period begins from the Due Date pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act.
The principal amount of a loan is subject to a time-barring period of ten (10) years.
In the examples where a customer has paid a debt to Danske Bank that was actually time-barred
or was not actually owed, and the customer therefore gets a restitution claim against Danske Bank,
as stated in Part 4.1 above, the time-barring will as a starting point be three (3) years as no special
time-barring period is specified in respect of such claim. This will also be the case in situations
where the payment is not made by the customer but by way of distribution of a divided from a
bankruptcy estate, an estate of a deceased person or from a customer in debt relief on the basis
of an unjustified claim for the debt submitted by Danske Bank.
Regardless that the time-barring period is three (3) years in respect of the customers' restitution
claims, the time-barring period is suspended if the customer (or the bankruptcy estate or the estate
of deceased person etc.) is not and ought not to be aware of the restitution claim. However, the
absolute limitation period - regardless of whether the time-barring period is suspended - is ten (10)
years, pursuant to Section 3(2), no. 4.
In our view, customers' or guarantors' restitution claims against Danske Bank will be subject to the
general time-barring period of three (3) years, but the time-barring period will be suspended for a
maximum of ten (10) years until the customer becomes or ought to become aware of its restitution
claim.
There may be special cases where Danske Bank perhaps would be able to argue that the customer
ought to have been aware that the payment(s) made to Danske Bank were not correct as they
were time-barred or not actually owed. However, we only expect this to be relevant in very few
cases.
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Therefore, for the purposes of EY's data analysis, we recommend that it is assumed that the time-
barring period of customers' restitution claims against Danske Bank will be suspended which means
that the model should consider all restitution claims that have a Due Date less than 10 years back
will not be time-barred.
We note that there may be special cases where Danske Bank from a legal perspective would be
legally obliged to go a bit further back in time than 10 years, but this will most likely only be a in a
limited number of cases. We do therefore not believe this is something that is relevant for EY to
take into account in their data analysis at this point in time.
4.2.3
Special rules on time limitation in respect of certain claims under criminal cases
As described above, claims in respect of restitution (
condictio indebiti
) and liability for damages
against Danske Bank will be time-barred at the latest after 10 years of the unjustified collection.
In that connection we note that it may be possible for customers to file an already time-barred
claim against Danske Bank according to the rules on Ancillary Proceedings.
In these Ancillary Proceedings, time-barring of claims does not prevent a defendant from being
liable to pay damages or Compensation to the injured in connection with the criminal case where
the accused is found guilty. Such a claim can also be asserted under a separate lawsuit within 1
year of final decision in a criminal case where the defendant is found guilty, or within 1 year of the
defendant adoption of a fine or other criminal sanction.
The decisive point is that a criminal case is actually carried out, and by implication that the specific
injured can be identified - however, it is unclear whether a more general decision will be sufficient
to initiate such a process. The rules on time-barring is regulated in respect of the time-barring
period for criminal charges. For the identified potential criminal offence there is a limitation period
of 10 years.
Claims that have been time-barred before the time-barring of the criminal charges cannot by im-
plication be involved in such Ancillary Proceedings. At this moment initiation of Ancillary Proceed-
ings seems unlikely.
4.3
Set-off right or obligation to pay out debt collected on an unjustified basis?
If (i) the customer has a valid claim (for restitution or liability for damages) against Danske Bank,
and (ii) Danske Bank has a valid claim against the customer, it is our preliminary assessment that
Danske Bank will be entitled to set-off the customers claim against Danske Bank in Danske Bank's
claim towards the customer.
Due to the limited time for our input, we have not been able to analyse whether such a set-off
would be permitted under the applicable regulatory conduct of business requirements, including
prudent debt collection practice, good business practice etc. Further, we have also not conducted
an analysis of any tax-related impact.
4.4
Interest on Compensation amounts
In the situations where Danske Bank is obliged to Compensate the customer for a loss, interest will
as a starting point accrue from the date the customer paid the debt Danske Bank was not entitled
to collect.
The rate of interest is determined pursuant to Section 5 of the Danish Interest Act (at present
8.05%).
It is possible it will be relevant to distinguish between situations where Danske Bank is able to set-
off the customer's claim against other debt owed by the customer and situations where Danske
Bank will actually need to pay out an amount to the customer. We have not had time to analyse
this in detail yet.
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4.5
Regulatory conduct of business requirements
Section 43 of the Financial Business Act provides that Danske Banks must be operated in accord-
ance with honest business principles and good practice within the field of activity. This obligation
is fleshed out in Executive Order on Good Business Conduct.
We have considered whether this requirement entails a requirement for Danske Bank to Compen-
sate customers in respect of those of the customers' claims against Danske Bank that have become
time-barred. Our preliminary view is that that no such Compensation requirement will apply in that
case as we would expect the time-barring rules of the Limitation Act to prevail over any obligation
to compensate customers pursuant to the conduct of business requirements.
We have also considered whether Danske Bank will have an obligation to notify those of the cus-
tomers that have been impacted by the root causes and in respect of which Danske Bank has
collected debt Danske Bank was not entitled to. Our preliminary view is in that respect that Danske
Bank will be obliged to make such notification unless it would unreasonably cumbersome. We
recommend that this is analysed in further details and any decision in this respect should probably
be discussed with the Danish FSA.
4.6
4.6.1
Specific situations assessed
Introduction
We have below set out our assessment in respect of Danske Bank's obligation to Compensate
customers (or guarantors) in the following four situations:
1) if Danske Bank has collected debt that was time-barred;
2) if Danske Bank has collected debt that was not owed;
3) if a customer has suffered a loss due to a claim from the Tax Agency resulting from an
incorrect reporting of data by Danske Bank; and
4) if Danske Bank is not able to evidence with a customer's debt has become time-barred.
4.6.2
Situation 1 - Collection of debt that was time-barred
The customer will have a restitution claim against Danske Bank in a situation where Danske Bank
has collected debt that was time-barred.
The customer's claim is subject to the general three (3) years' time-barring period, but the period
will be suspended for ten (10) years because the customer will typically not be aware of the resti-
tution claim.
4.6.3
Situation 2 - Danske Bank has collected debt that was not owed
The customer will have a restitution claim against Danske Bank in a situation where Danske Bank
has collected debt that was not actually owed.
The customer's claim is subject to the general three (3) years' time-barring period, but the period
will be suspended for ten (10) years because the customer will typically not be aware of the resti-
tution claim.
4.6.4
Situation 3 - Loss due to claim from the Tax Agency resulting from incorrect data reporting
Since Danske Bank has reported incorrect data in respect of the customers' debt owed to Danske
Bank and the interest payments made, the Tax Agency may claim damages from customers that
have received too high a tax deduction as a result of the incorrect data reported by Danske Bank.
The customers will in turn get a recourse claim against Danske Bank for the same amount as the
amount claimed by the Tax Agency.
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In our view, the Tax Agency will most likely be able to resume the tax assessment of customers 10
years. In the cases where the Tax Agency has a claim going up to 10 years back, the Tax Agency
will also have a right to claim interest on the amount up to 10 years back. Detailed rules apply in
respect of determining the restitution level, see Section 62a of kildeskatteloven.
[@EY, in respect of the impact assessment, please note that Section 5(8) of Ligningsloven provides
that: "
Renteudgifter mv., jf. stk. 1, kan først fradrages ved opgørelsen af den skattepligtige ind-
komst i det indkomstår, hvori betaling sker, hvis renteudgifter mv. for tidligere indkomstår i samme
gældsforhold ikke er betalt inden udgangen af indkomståret
".]
4.6.5
Situation 4 - Unable to evidence if debt is time-barred or not
In situations where Danske Bank is not able to evidence whether a customer's debt is time-barred
or not, e.g. because Danske Bank cannot prove when the Due Date of the debt is, Danske Bank
will in our view have to waive the claim for the debt.
5
ISSUES NOT CONSIDERED
We have considered the following issues out of the scope of this memorandum:
•
Any claims for indirect or consequential damages, e.g. customers that have suffered an
indirect loss as a result of Danske Bank having collected an amount Danske Bank was not
entitled to;
Any compensation that Danske Bank may be obliged to pay as a result of Danske Bank
having entered into a settlement agreement or repayment agreement with a customer on
the basis of Danske Bank stating that the customer's debt was X amount while it actually
was a lower amount, e.g. if it has appeared to the customer that the customer received a
discount of 25% while the customer actually - due to the incorrect debt information - only
received a discount of 10%. The customer may in such situation - depending on the spe-
cific facts - be able to claim to be put in a situation as if a 25% discount had actually been
granted. This may be relevant to analyse further at a later point in time;
Issues arising out of or in connection with PF or the "Home issue"; and
Any questions of foreign law.
•
•
•
11
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ANNEX 1 - LIST OF AGREED TERMS
Below we have prepared a non-exhaustive list of defined terms relevant to this project. The list should be
updated on an ongoing basis based on the agreement between Danske Bank, EY and Plesner regarding which
terminology to use in connection with the project.
"Ancillary Proceeding"
"Barring of Claim"
"Co-debtor"
"Compensation"
"Debt Relief"
"Document of Indebt-
edness"
"Due Date"
"Dunning notice"
means a judicial enforcement of a civil claim filed and growing out of the prose-
cution of a criminal offence. In Danish "
adhæsionsproces
".
means preclusion of a claim. In Danish "
præklusion
"
means one of two or more debtors who are joint and separate liable to the same
debt.
means set-off, refund or repayment.
means in court debt-restructuring. In Danish "
gældssanering
".
means an instrument of debt and serves as a legally enforceable evidence of a
debt and the promise of its timely repayment. In Danish "
Gældsbrev
".
means the last day for payment without unpaid amounts being subject to a late
payment charge or additional collection efforts. In Danish "
forfaldsdag
".
means a notification sent to a customer, stating that it is overdue in paying an
account receivable and where a fee off DKK 100 is attributed to the debt. In
Danish "
Rykkerbrev
".
means executive order no. 330 of 7 April 2016, as amended.
"Executive Order on
Good Business Con-
duct"
"Guarantor"
"Interruption"
"Limitation Period"
"Liquidator"
"Overdraft
Account"
and "Overdraft Facil-
ity"
"Perception"
"Proff of Claim"
"Root cause"
"Suspension"
"Time-barred"
means a person who guarantees to pay a borrower's debt in the event the bor-
rower defaults on a loan obligation (totally or partially).
means a break in the continuity of the limitation period.
means a certain period limited by the applicable rules on statute of limitation
after which debt collection cannot be enforced.
means either (i) a person appointed by the shareholders to liquidate a company,
(ii) a person appointed by the probate court to liquidate a company.
means a credit agreement made with a financial institution that permits an ac-
count holder to use or withdraw more than they have in their account, without
exceeding a specified maximum negative balance. In Danish "
Kassekredit
".
means the debtor's admission of the existence of the debt. In Danish "erkendelse
af gæld".
means a notice of claim in an estate (bankruptcy, decedent estate, debt relief,
etc).
means the actual reason for the occurrence of a problem.
means postponement of the limitation period.
means barred by the passage of time under a statute of limitations. In Danish
"
forældet
".
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DRAFT
Phase 2:
Data analysis and considerations within debt collection
Project Athens
–
01-July-2020
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Project Athens
Introduction
•
The following analysis has been performed in accordance with instructions from Danske Bank A/S (Danske Bank) and founded upon the description of main root causes
prepared by Plesner Advokatpartnerselskab (Plesner
set out in their memorandum of
December
9 the Main Root Cause Memorandum
•
Ernst & Young (EY) have been tasked by Danske Bank to estimate and execute the redress of customers affected by the flaws identified within Group Recovery & Debt
Management (GRDM), specifically relating to data quality issues in the two centralized debt collection systems; Debt Collection System (DCS) and Personlig Fordring (PF)
•
The flaws have affected the customers registered in the two systems which can be segmented into three main customer groups;
i.
ii.
iii.
Customers with debt incorrectly registered in the systems, but have not made any repayments
Customers subject to incorrect collection of debt, however the over-collection
can be offset in the customers outstanding debt
Customers subject to incorrect collection of debt that are eligible to receive compensation
•
The scope of the data analysis and the focus of this report has been to identify affected customers that are likely to be eligible to receive compensation as a direct
consequence of the main root causes (customer group (iii)), as well as estimate the total financial impact of such remediation. Further, EY has been tasked to assist
Danske Bank in executing the outpayment to affected customers
•
The reasoning behind the approach outlined abo e relies on Danske Bank s ambition to compensate customers, that ha e suffered
a direct financial loss due to root
causes, as soon as possible while being mindful of the important task at hand of rectifying every customer that have been impacted by root causes, although it has not led
to a direct net financial loss (i.e. customer groups (i) and (ii))
•
The remediation of customer groups (i) and (ii) will focus on correction of cases while notifying affected customers respectively that their debt has been corrected or that
their claim against Danske Bank have been offset in their outstanding debt
•
The programme governance structure has been revised in June 2020 to ensure a clearer remediation focus and speed of execution with a programme timeline for
completion set to end of Q3 2021, subject to changes pending dialogue with authorities and further calculations. See pp. 23 and 24 respectively
•
The remediation of customer groups (i) and (ii) will be executed by a dedicated workstream
Portfolio trimming and Clean up that ill identif , rectif and inform the
selected customers impacted by root causes (i.e. debt incorrectly registered)
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Project Athens
Key terminology and definitions
•
Compensation
‒
Means either set-off, refund, redress, restitution or repayment (dependent on context)
•
Due date
‒
The last day for payment without unpaid amounts being subject to a late payment charge or additional collection efforts
•
Over-collection
‒
Amount of the collected debt that Danske Bank did not have a legal justification to claim (due to i.e. wrongfully calculated outstanding debt and partial (or total) time-
barring of debt)
•
Overpayment
‒
Identical definition to over-collection, taking the customer's perspective
•
Redress
‒
Total compensation that Danske Bank is obliged to pay affected customers (adhering to remediation principles approved by Project Athens Steering Committee) that
have suffered a direct financial loss (over-collection). Total redress amount can include compensation due to direct financial loss, indirect loss and a time-value
component.
•
Offset
‒
If the customer's existing debt exceeds the prescribed redress amount, then Danske Bank will be entitled to offset the customer's claim against Danske Bank as
outlined in Plesner draft memos (13. December 2019 and 8. April 2020). However, this assessment relies on the assumption that the opposing claims are originating
from the same legal relationship (i.e. connexity)
•
Time-barred
‒
Means barred by the passage of time under a statute of limitations
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Project Athens
Agenda
Page
Executive summary
Evaluation of correction process
Scope of the remediation
Customer segmentation
Financial impact
Remediation plan
Appendix
05
08
09
12
15
21
25
Question
1-5
1
2
3
4
5
1,2,3 & 5
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Project Athens
Executive Summary
•
Project Athens analysed the identified data quality related issues in
Group Recovery and Debt Management (GRDM) that led to two ORIS
filings in the summer 2019
•
•
402,000 customers had been through the two systems
152,000 of these could safely be removed as they belonged to other
legal entities, where manual processes had mitigated the impact
Further 105,000 customers could be removed as they never paid
anything on their debt, and hence could not have overpaid
•
Calculation of the potential redress to the remaining customers in scope
(86,000) requires manual review. To reduce manual workload a
repayment ratio of at least 80% is implemented leaving 43,150
customers for manual handling. The repayment ratio is set based on
empirical data on overpayment ratios, including uncertainty factor and
will exclude customers extremely unlikely to be in scope for redress
•
A project team from EY have led the data analysis and delivered
conclusions in two previous reports in end December 2019 and in end
•
January 2020
The external law firm, Plesner, has performed legal assessments under
•
instruction of the Bank and the analysis in this report builds on the legal
basis provided by them
•
•
•
See complete breakdown of customer redress actions and non-actions
Additional 24,000 customers could safely be removed as they entered
illustrated in decision tree on p. 14
the systems and paid their debt before any interest could have time
barred (within 3 years)
This report answers the following five questions:
Finally 15,000 customers had entered the two systems through
validated channels and confirmed to be correct
This leaves 106,000 customers at risk of over-collection and hence a
redress for direct loss
1.
Can the project assure that the root causes currently are
sufficiently prevented from causing additional and refundable losses
for customers?
What is the scope of the redress the Bank is going to pay back to
the impacted customers?
How can the project segment the customers into cohorts?
What is the estimate of the financial impact of the redress?
How does EY suggest to execute the remediation?
In these previous reports, EY concluded the following:
•
Four root causes had affected about 106,000 customers, of which
estimated 24,000 could be entitled to a redress as the impact of the
root causes could be offset in the remaining debt for the rest. Examples
•
of the four root causes can be found in appendix pp. 27-30
The root causes relate to improper and incorrect integration of existing
loans into the IT systems supporting the debt collection process and
dating back to when the systems were introduced (1979 and 2004)
2.
3.
4.
5.
•
•
It is from this group of customers that EY estimates that 24,000 (23%)
customers have suffered direct losses that exceed their remaining debt,
and hence need to be redressed
The redress should also include indirect, consequential and tort related
losses that both the four root causes, but also a series of other practices
in GRDM had caused for the customer (e.g. wrongful reporting to the
RKI, customers having to take out expensive loans to pay their debt or
settlements made on incorrect data)
•
Because of the root causes, the Bank has potentially (i) collected debt
(fees, interest and principal) that potentially was time-barred at the time
of collection (ii) collected debt based on wrongly calculated principals
and/or (iii) treated guarantors and co-debtors as primary debtors,
leading to potential over-collection. The data analysis considers all three
types of over-collection (i,ii,iii)
•
•
•
•
The root causes has been isolated to two systems,
Debt Collection
System
(DCS) and
Personlig Fordring
(PF), and impacted Denmark only
Redress approach is dependent on data availability:
as manual processes mitigated the impact in other countries (pending
2
nd
line approval)
•
EY will apply a data model approach to identify customers in scope for
redress only where sufficient electronic transaction data exists (i.e. after
Insufficient governance set-up within GRDM and controls in the
2010). The model is applicable for 20,000 customers in DCS.
internally developed systems had failed to catch incorrect input entered
Calculation of the potential redress to the remaining customers in scope
into the systems at the time of implementation as well as in the following
(86,000) requires manual review
years
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5
These indirect losses cannot be calculated, but should be treated in a
new claims handling process.
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Project Athens
Executive Summary (cont.)
Question 1: Root causes sufficiently mitigated?
•
EY s assessment of the red-
/ green mitigation process introduced in
July 2019, has shown there are at least three instances where the
customer still can be over-collected from. These are:
‒
‒
‒
•
The customer is following a payment plan settled prior to July 2019
The customer is making an unscheduled /un-agreed
payment
An estate handling or a bankruptcy is completed before the Bank
resubmits the correct claim
•
in the systems. Pending 2
nd
line review
•
home
fees:
In facilitating voluntary deficit property deals (DK:
underskudshandler
on behalf of customers, established process
within GRDM has been to not negotiate the fee proposal from real-estate
agent
home,
while fee proposals from other real-estate agents should be
negotiated. This may have led to customers paying too high a fee to
home,
eventually leading to a higher remaining debt after the property
was sold off. Although investigations into the matter has shown, that a
basis for comparison of hat the right fee should ha e been is a er
difficult process, it is assessed that this issue should lead to a redress
for the customers in relevant cases. However, as the issue is unrelated
•
to the root causes, the exercise of potentially redressing these
customers should be separated from the main redress execution in
Project Athens
•
Debt collection agencies:
On the outsourcing to DCAs, the four largest
providers (19k out of 40k cases) have been contacted and a
reconciliation of their data been undertaken. Conclusion is that the
outsourced customers are included among the 160,000 customers
mentioned on previous page. Data flows have however been flawed
flowing back from the DCAs, leading to potential mis-matches in the
active- / passive status. Up to 950 customers could potentially have
paid on their debt, without it being properly registered in DCS and hence
appearing as non-payers in DCS. These are recommended to be added
to the redress portfolio
An overview of the investigated five side issues stated above is included
on p. 9
Further risks and issues, e.g. incorrect charged court fees, potential
conduct related issues and incorrect settlements are currently being
investigated. See pp. 10-11 for an overview of remaining items and
concerns
The assessment has however shown that enforcement of the mitigation
process has been strict and that cases are being manually reviewed
prior to e.g. court proceedings/foreclosures to ensure proper mitigation
of the known data quality issues
EY has reviewed 100 new cases and not been able to identify any
among these that have led to over-collection, but EY concludes that the
process lacks controls and 2
nd
line review. An internal risk assessment
has been initiated on 3
rd
March 2020, and conclusions are pending
EY recommends independent review from 2
nd
and 3
rd
line and tight
process control going forward, but do not recommend that this should
stall the redress execution as no evidence of over-collection have been
found
•
•
•
Question 2: Scoping
•
Plesner
1
concludes that the four root causes have led to the majority of
•
the issues identified; however, five additional significant side issues have
been identified and assessed. These are: Impact on other countries,
broker fees from
home,
GDPR concerns, outsourcing to debt collection
agencies (DCAs) and credit rating (RKI) reporting. Additional (10) issues
and concerns exist and is currently being analysed and qualified
GDPR concerns:
Processing of incorrect data is not adherent to the
GDPR regulation. This in turn may lead to indirect losses for the
customers. It is the conclusion, that from a legal perspective the
processing of the incorrect data is not a data breach as defined b
Question 3
–
Customer cohorts
GDPR, and hence the Bank is not required under the GDPR to
proactively communicate to affected customers. Potential direct losses
•
402,000 customers (private and commercial) have been handled in the
for customers, stemming from the
Bank s
processing of flawed data, is
two systems. Of these the Bank can safely exclude:
already covered by the redress approach. Customers substantiating an
additional indirect loss (e.g. tort, cf. the GDPR, sec. 82 ) could be entitled
‒
Non-DK portfolio (152,000)
–
pending 2
nd
line review
to an additional redress. Estimated size of potential fine (if any) is in the
‒
Customers ho ha en t paid an thing –
non-payers (105,000)
range of 7.5 mDKK, based on the very limited precedent available
‒
Customers who have been active less than 3 years in DCS after
RKI reporting:
The Bank is under no regulatory requirement to report
2004 and customers who entered PF less than 3 years ago– i.e. less
customers that are sent for debt collection to credit reference agencies,
than the limitation period for fees and interest. An conservative cut-
such as RKI. Customers, who are unrightfully (or with incorrect data)
off period of 2.5 years is applied for DCS (24,000)
reported to RKI, can claim a loss and should be entitled to a redress. As
the likelihood of the entire principal being time-barred is limited, EY
concludes that the majority of the customers have been reported
correctly to RKI, and only interest might be time-barred leading to
additional redress, provided that the customer can substantiate a loss
‒
Customers correctly calculated and entered into DCS and PF
(15,000)
(continued on next page)
EY concludes that:
•
Country dimension:
The four root causes have not had an impact
beyond Denmark as manual processes have mitigated the incorrect data
1
Memorandum on root causes and obligation to compensate customers - 13.12.2019.docx
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Project Athens
Executive Summary (cont.)
•
•
•
•
This leaves 106,000 customers in scope for potential over-collection
These can be split into 80,000 customers in DCS and 26,000
customers in PF
20,000 of the customers in DCS can be re-calculated as original loan
data exists electronically.
The remaining 86,000 (60,000 in DCS and 26,000 in PF) have to be
manually reviewed in order to determine whether the Bank has over-
collected from them
through a claims process built for the redress. These claims can come
from beyond the customer group at risk of over-collection, as customers
could have suffered losses aside from direct over-collection
–
e.g. by
agreeing to settlements on time-barred debt, by keeping customers in
•
debt beyond the time-barring or by paying legal and default fees that
should have been covered by the Bank
•
Based on experience from previous remediation project, EY assesses
that the risk of a large number of customers filing claims for indirect
losses is low
•
approval (and binding ruling) on taxation of redress and adjustments in
tax filings
It should be noted that re-assessment of the tax assessments will
involve substantial burdens and challenges for the customers, the
Danish Tax Authorities and for Danske Bank
EY recommends to align the redress methodology with the BAU
correction approach to insure consistent treatment of customers
independently of whether they need redress or not (e.g. during offset)
•
•
As the majority of these customers have not fully paid their debt and
since the corrections performed by the BAU team stay below 20% of the
principal, it is safe to assume that repayment rates below 80% of the
principal would allow over-collection to be offset in the remaining debt
1
•
Hence manual handling can be reduced to 43,150 customers
Customers with repayment ratio below 80% would be treated as a part
•
of the BAU, but would not be entitled to a redress
The cohorts for redress are therefore 20.000 customers that can be re-
calculated and 43,150 customers which cases have to be manually
•
reviewed
24,000 customers are estimated to be entitled to redress. 7,500 of
these are identified
2
and the remaining customers are expected to be
identified by manual handling
•
•
•
•
Question 4
–
Financial impact
•
•
The distribution of the over-collection is a skewed normal distribution
3
. Across both systems the total
with an average of 1,600 DKK
estimated over-collection (excl. interest compensation) sums up to 49.6
mDKK
–
see p. 18 for an overview of redress composition
•
To this should be added an unknown amount of indirect, consequential
and tort related losses that customers have suffered and reported
Plesner concludes in their memorandum Set-off right in relation to debt
collection on an unjustified basis , that
Danske Bank is legally obliged to
Question 5: Remediation plan
compensate customers according to the Danish Interest Act section 5
•
As the customer cohorts have been identified and the analysis signed off
by the Steering Committee, EY propose to initiate the execution of the
Customers that are eligible to receive interest compensation as part of
remediation
their redress either have no current debt, or no outstanding debt after
offset is performed. See p. 17
•
Due to the limited scope of customers (24,000 est.) and size of over-
collection (DKK 1,600 on average) a direct communication to the
The Tax impact of the redress paid to the customer has to be agreed
impacted customers is recommended
with the Tax Authority (probably in a binding ruling). Current assessment
is however that if the Bank redresses beyond the legal obligation of 10
‒
A series of training material and IT tools should be developed to
years, the redress will be taxable for the customers
ensure proper support for the first line organization to qualify the
dialogue with customers. The tool for the claims process would have
The incorrect tax filings on behalf of the customers have led to
to be developed, tested and deployed quickly and prior to Day Zero
customers, potentially having had to high deductions in their tax income
statements, which the Bank should repay to the Tax Authority on behalf
•
In the letters to the entitled customers they will be asked to substantiate
of the customers. This is however deemed a minor issue as correct,
indirect losses within a time limit (suggested 4-6 weeks). Further, the
internal
ta marking DK
Restance markering
ithin the DCS and PF
letter will contain information about the expected compensation amount
systems, has led to limited incorrect interests filings to the Tax
Authorities
•
A revised programme governance structure has been put in place to
effectively realize the ambition of completing the remediation of the two
Hence, with the level of uncertainty currently present, it is impossible to
customer groups not entitled to a compensation ((i) & (ii)) by end of Q2
estimate the total financial impact for the Bank of the potentially
2021
incorrect tax filings
Root cause specific e amples of customers ta handling and proposed
redress methodology are being presented to Tax Authority to achieve
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7
•
1
Although, customers
3
entering DCS in 2004 have to be manually reviewed regardless of repayment ratio due to root cause 3 and 4 |
2
See p. 12 for further description of estimate I
Moving number as further calculations are performed, further additional redress is possible due to indirect losses
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Project Athens -
Question 1
Ensuring that no new over-collection cases are created is a prerequisite for executing a
remediation. EY review has identified a manual working process
•
Evaluating the current correction process* put in place since 16
th
of July 2019, revealed a manual but working processes that enforce control and avoid generation of
new over-collection cases
Process risks
EY has assessed associated risks and concludes the following:
1.
The process has few controls and has not been subject to an internal risk assessment yet
•
•
Has the tap been turned off?
EY has not been able to find cases that
ould increase the olume of redress, but…
Assessment has shown that there is a risk that the current mitigation process
could generate new cases of over-collection
EY has reviewed 100 new cases and not been able to identify any amongst
these that have led to over-collection, but EY concludes that the process lacks
controls and 2nd line review
EY recommends independent review from 2nd and 3rd line and tight process
control going forward, but do not recommend that this should stall the redress
execution as no evidence of over-collection have been found
2.
3.
4.
5.
Local customer teams can immaturely mark Light cases green or use non-standardized operating
procedures compared to the procedures applied in the Correction Team
Resource constraints prevent the Correction Team from handling cases proactively which increases
the backlog of in-active cases which could expire down the line if not attended to
Seemingly correct green DCS cases could be wrong since quality control is conducted once a month
Customers could repay the debt based on information previously taken from Netbank or annual tax
return (rare but could happen) which could lead to over-collection
•
6.
7.
Customers could have been granted debt relief, which had been judged before 17
th
of June 2019, and
fulfills his/her obligations leaving Danske Bank with more money than they should
Untimely re-submission of estate and bankruptcy cases could cause the executor to process the case
based on incorrect claims
Customer
defaults and
enters Soft
Collection
Customer moved
from FEBOS to
DCS
DCS case is
automatically
marked red
Activate, review,
assign case and
notify customer
If the case is Light;
Local customer team
corrects case, from
backlog
7
Mark corrected
case green and
mail Hard
Collection
8
Receive correction
mail and try to
contact customer
Normal DCS flow
and debt
collection
10
GRDM
•
Soft collection
•
Hard collection
1
Termination of
engagement
2
3
4
5
9
•
Customer
•
Customer
representatives
(lawyers, family
member, advisor)
Customer
Payment
Receives notification
and may act and
cause a trigger
6
6
6
Trigger
examples
Phone / mail
Settlement request
6
Correction
Team
•
Appointed
Corrections Team
7
Backlog / non-active
portfolio of red-
marked cases
If the case is
complex; Correction
corrects case from
backlog
7
7
Mark corrected
case green and
mail Hard
Collection
8
Continuous quality
control of green-
marked cases
11
8
*See appendix pp.31-32 for process description and further details | **Process steps that poses the biggest risks have been marked with red in the process flow illustrated above
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Project Athens -
Question 2
Four root causes have led to the majority of the issues identified, however five side issues
have been identified and investigated
Description
•
•
home
fees
Documented practice within GRDM
never to negotiate fees with
home
when approving property deals
Undocumented practice when
approving property deals in insolvent
estates where GRDM have
recommended
home
to the estate
handler, despite the existence of
lower offers from competitors
•
•
•
GDPR concerns
Processing of incorrect data is not
adherent to the GDPR regulation and
a fine is plausible (2.5-7.5 mDKK)
Some customers could be entitled to
redress (10-20 tDKK), if they can
justify a loss i.e. tort
Processing of incorrect data does
not require the Bank to proactively
communicate to all customers
Country dimensions
•
The four root causes have not had
an impact beyond Denmark as
manual processes have mitigated
the incorrect data in DCS
The other side issues investigated in
Denmark can as result also be ruled
out
•
RKI reporting
Customers who are unrightfully (or
with incorrect data) reported to RKI,
can claim a loss and should be
entitled to a redress
The Bank is under no regulatory
requirement to report customers
that are sent for debt collection to
RKI
•
Court cases / DCAs
Court cases:
Legal proceedings
conducted prior to June 17th 2019
are potentially based on incorrect
documentation
DCAs:
Flaws in the data flows
between Danske Bank and DCAs
can lead to discrepancies in the
customer s pa ment status
•
•
•
Analysis Phases
•
Status
–
28-Feb
SteerCo decision to resolve
home
issue within a separate project,
coined Project Agency Fees
Quantitative analysis of property
deals in insolvent estates is not
started
Plesner is reviewing internal policies
for managing conflict of interest
•
Status
–
28-Feb
Approved remediation principles
entail treatment of GDPR losses as
indirect losses, where a process to
handle customer claims will be built
A panel will treat these customer
inquiries and asses documentation
of their indirect losses
•
Status
–
28-Feb
EY data team and local teams have
performed data sample checks
which found no cases eligible for
redress
All local teams have documented
their analysis, confirming there is no
issue and was signed off by
EY has compiled documentation on
SharePoint for 2
nd
line review*
SteerCo decision to close the issue
regarding root causes in DCS
pending positive 2
nd
line review
Once approved, Project Athens
(Regulatory Affairs) should notify
local FSAs
This will reduce remediation scope
to Denmark and allow discharge of
country representatives in Operating
Committee
•
Status
–
28-Feb
Approved remediation principles
entail treatment of losses related to
RKI reporting as indirect losses,
where a process to handle customer
claims will be built
A panel will treat these customer
inquiries and asses documentation
of their indirect losses
•
Status
–
28-Feb
Court cases:
Quantitative
assessment of closed cases with
legal action since 2004 is initiated
to estimate potential redress
amount
DCAs:
Data received from 2 DCAs.
See appendix p. 33 for initial
analysis and current findings
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Comments
•
•
•
Plesner assessed that a case-by-
case approach is required to
determine whether Danske Bank
has incurred liability towards the
affected customers using
home
EY has built a financial model to
narrow the scope of potential
redress worthy property deals
(based on voluntary deals only)
Compensation can either be based
on individual assessment or model
•
•
Plesner has not covered the
potential consequences related to
personal data transferred to 3rd
parties
Danske Bank Group Deputy DPO
and Regulatory Affairs to liaise with
Plesner and coordinate
communication to the DPA and/or
DFSA to get sign-off on approach
•
EY concludes that the likelihood that
a customer has been reported to RKI
with a time-barred principal is very
low, and hence that the error is
confined to the root causes
•
•
Adjacent to Triage stream, three EY
resources have been onboarded to
uncover:
•
# of outsourced cases
•
# of cases with mismatch
•
Average deviation as % of
principal
EY recommends to include the
mismatched customer cohort in the
portfolio for redress, and investigate
further
Further concerns include incorrect charged legal fees, conduct related losses and incorrect settlements which will be further investigated. See next page
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Project Athens
- Question 2
Additional potential side issues analysed prior to Day Zero
•
EY has applied the same procedure utilized to investigate the Country Dimension issue, which overall involves
Planning, Analysing
and
Execution
Phases
‒
Planning: Mobilize dedicated team, draft action plan, conduct initial interviews and gather necessary data for analysis
‒
Analysing: Analyse and evaluate collected data within dedicated team and with business SMEs
‒
Execution: Finalize report and supporting audit trail and utilize report as a guideline for (potential) compensation and/or implementation according to remediation principles
•
Responsibility and completion of the last phase (Execution) is handed over to internal Danske Bank project managers
#
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
Investigation Topic
Legal fees allocated towards court cases
Interest rate on defaulted mortgage loan
Outsourcing to DCAs
Court cases involving other creditors
Legal fees incorrectly merged with principal
Treatment of ill customers
Description
–
based on output from work sessions conducted during Q4 2018 to Q3 2019 with representatives from GRDM, Group Non-Financial Risk and Compliance
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Clarification needed on the process for how legal fees and allocated towards court cases and who is responsible (Danske Bank or customer) for the fees
Current understanding is that fees are paid by customers although they should be paid by Danske Bank
If the customer has obtained the mortgage from Realkredit Danmark (RD) through referral from local Danske Bank branch, then an agreement in place between RD and the bank stipulates
that the bank has to provide a 20% guarantee towards RD in case the mortgage defaults. The interest rate on the debt owed to RD and the bank will often differ
Issues of concern requiring further investigation into case handling, customer agreements, payment visibility, DCA financial reporting, proper reconciliation of data between the bank and
DCAs and data flow between DCAs and Danske Bank
Issue regarding cases which have gone to court with incorrect data and where decisions made on allocation of estates have impacted other creditors
Issue regarding cases where court fees have incorrectly merged with the principal amount (similar to RC1)
How do we process customers who have gone into default, then paid towards their debt after which they become ill rendering them not able to pay? Are these customers allowed to go into
default a second time?
Issue regarding cases where the correct procedures have not been followed in order to adhere to limitation rules, various products, effect on cases of not following happy-flow patterns, effect
on customer agreements if interests have affected principal, rates and market changes
Item of interest related to (1) supplementary booking process and (2) information flow between group finance and central bookkeeping. More clarity required on the topic of information flow
between the two
Identification of additional stakeholders (Group Finance). Further work required to understand full impact on Group Finance
Potential issue linked to process of how we manage markers: if markers are not in place and we provide credit to customers where we should not; or if markers remain for longer than
necessary and customers stay in bankruptcy for longer than required
Potential issue as Tableau data is used for various decision making processes (i.e. data feeds into risk assessments). Due to further lack of analytical competencies and GRDM expertise in
those who are reviewing such data, potential risk lies with what conclusions we are drawing out of the tableau data (in particular related to risk assessments)
#6
#7
Interest application in DCS & PF
#8
Central bookkeeping and Group Finance
•
•
#9
Risk markers practice
#10
Evaluation and use of Tableau data
•
Customer Concern
Technical Concern
Process Concern
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Project Athens -
Question 2
Status on remaining potential side issues
Phases
Overall status
–
(and path to green)
Planning
Analysis
Execution
Analysis
status
•
•
•
Planning phase complete Anal sis phase nearl done hile considering each issue s potential impact on redress
Confirmation that side issues will not impact Day Zero as pilot customers have been adjusted accordingly
Handover of non-Athens side issues with no impact on Day Zero or redress initiated
Impact on
Day Zero/Redress
Closed /
Open
Open
Closing
Closing
Open
Closing
Side issue
#1 Legal fees allocated towards court cases
#2 Interest rate on defaulted mortgage loan
#3 Outsourcing to DCAs
#4 Court cases involving other creditors
#5 Legal fees incorrectly merged with principal
Comments
Sample check indicates that higher than allowed legal fees has been charged to some
customers. Implicated customers removed from pilot. No issue for PF
Review interest rate practice in PF. Handed over to
High impact on redress as the correct legal
fee requires case investigation
No impact
EY separate DCA report is finalized
Potential liability towards other creditors. Plesner has provided legal opinion on how to
address issue and potential liability towards third parties
Confirmed no systemic issue for DCS and PF
No legal conflict. Issue is related to conduct. A Conduct Risk policy draft is due year-end,
that will reference protection of vulnerable customers.
No systematic errors in interest application in DCS and PF. However, interest rate
practice in PF needs review (same outcome as side issue #2‘)
Root causes in DCS have potentially resulted in inaccurate reporting in the Bank’s
central bookkeeping system (KRS). PF needs further investigation
No impact on pilot payout, but will impact
redress in subsequent batches
No impact on Day Zero but redress of other
creditors is likely
No impact on Day Zero or redress
#6 Treatment of ill customers
#7 Interest application in DCS & PF
#8 Central bookkeeping and Group Finance
#9 Risk markers practice)
No impact
No impact
No impact on Day Zero or redress
No impact on Day Zero or redress
Closing
Open
Open
Closing
•
The Bank received an injunction based on its manual risk marker practice some years
ago. New SOPs and policies have been implemented to mitigate risks
#10 Evaluation and use of Tableau data
Known issue since 2018 and mitigating actions has been in place since. No formal risk
assessment seems to be conducted based on GRDM data exhibited in Tableau.
Separate track is already working to resolve data feed issues
No impact
Closing
•
On track
•
Requires Attention
Not on track, requires attention
•
= Impact on Day Zero
Completed
= Impact on redress
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Project Athens
- Question 3
Segmenting the customers into cohorts and splitting between direct and indirect losses
•
On top of direct losses from over-collection indirect losses should be redressed as well, which creates an
dependency upon a loss committee
•
Of all the customers (402k) who have been in the two systems, 106k have been affected by the four root
causes to such an extent that they have potentially been subject to over-collection
•
42.85k customers of these have paid less than 80% of their principal and impact from root causes are
assumed to be offset in their remaining debt
1
. These are therefore sent to the line organization for data
cleansing, but out of scope for redress
•
Of the remaining 63k customers, 20k of these can be recalculated as loan data exist in electronical
format
•
The last 43,15k have to be manually reviewed to determine whether they are entitled to a redress
•
These customers should be redressed based on the direct loss that the Bank have caused them,
however indirect losses exist beyond this customer group
•
Pp. 10-11 contain a summary of all concerns that potentially could have caused losses to the customers
(home fees, GDPR concerns, settlements, etc. are examples hereof)
•
EY has created a model that will identify the over-collected customers and calculate the direct loss that
the customer is entitled to in redress
•
This should form the basis for the redress, but all customers can potentially substantiate any indirect
loss they have suffered. As such, it is necessary to inform all customers that are identified with incorrect
debt registered in DCS and PF so the customer is able to state a claim of indirect loss
Dashed line
=Cohort is not entitled to
redress
Possible origin of customer claims
based on valid indirect loss leading
to additional redress
Recalculation
possible
20,000
x
x
x
<3 years
24,000
2
Repay < 80%
See p. 34 in
appendix
(2005-2020)
Repay > 80%
or entered DCS 2004
Send to BAU
42,850
Manual handling
43,150
At risk of over-collection
106,000
Entering DCS/PF
correctly
15,000
Scope for
redress cohort
Valid
Non-payers
Excluded as over-
collection is not
possible
Depending on claim
type and evaluation
Offset possible
Excluded as impact
from root causes can be
set off in the remaining
debt
Depending on claim
type and evaluation
In scope for
redress
Identified through EY
model and entitled to
redress
Depending on claim
type and evaluation
Time-barred
Non-DK
Portfolio
152,000
Non-payers
106,000
Direct loss
Indirect loss
1
See
Is included
Depending on claim
type and evaluation
All customers
in both systems
402,000
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
12
p. 34 in appendix I
2
p. 35 in appendix for further description of the filter removing customers active less than 3 years in the systems
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Project Athens
- Question 3
Customer segmentation
–
Top-down logic for identifying customers in scope and
at risk of customer impact
•
Before calculating potential impact, the customer population can be narrowed down to customers that are in scope, where calculations are feasible, and where monetary
corrections are needed
–
resulting in 24,000 customers that are at risk of an impact
Waterfall of customers potentially in scope
Number of customers in scope
450
402
Waterfall of customers ultimately at risk of impact
Number of customers at risk of over-collection
120
106
20
43
80
60
40
20
-
Customers in Customers
scope
where
sufficient data
is not
available and
repayment
ratio < 80%
DCS
Customers Customers
Possibly
with data not entitled to affected DCS
available or
redress
and PF
repayment
customers
ratio > 80%
-
63
4
58
Customers (thousands)
Customers (thousands)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
-
Total
Non-DK
DK
Non-payers Customer Customers
Paid
Customers Customers
customers customers customers
who has active less principal
entering in need of
paid
than 3
with
DCS/PF monetary
possible
years,
correctly corrections
having
limitated
entered
fees and
DCS/PF
interest
after 2004
DCS
Both DCS and PF
PF
-
49
181
-
105
145
29
108
24
-
121
28
85
-
15
106
20
-
80
49
333
152
250
100
80
38,5
24,0
-
4
19
Both DCS and PF
PF
The waterfall above shows how the total population of customers in DCS and PF can be narrowed down to the
customers that are potentially in scope. Customers are filtered out if they are registered in DCS in other Group
countries (Non-DK customers),
ha en t paid an thing or ha e been acti e less than
ears in DCS after
2004
and entered PF less than 3 years ago, as well as customers where no issue was identified. The resulting
106,000 customers are considered in scope.
The waterfall above seeks to further reduce the number of customers to
focus on customers that are likely to receive a compensation. Estimation of
impact will be performed on these, taking potential offset in remaining debt
into account. Please note that customers entering DCS in 2004 are part of
the 63k cohort illustrated above regardless of their repayment ratio which is
due to the potential impact from root cause 3 and 4.
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Project Athens
- Question 3
It is now becoming possible to indicate the volumes and means to redress relevant
customers. Further analysis including manual review required to provide precise picture
Breakdown into customer redress actions or non-actions
Entire customer portfolio
–
no 10 years limitation
A.
B.
In scope
customers
Infliction point logic
Account for ability to apply advanced
modelling for analysis in DCS system
Apply empirical data about overpayment
ratios, including uncertainty factor, to
exclude customers extremely unlikely to
be in scope for redress
Apply detailed data modelling where
transaction data quality enable accurate
answers
Apply advanced data modelling to identify
customers relevant for redress
Apply empirical data about overpayment
ratios, including uncertainty factor, to
exclude customers extremely unlikely to
be in scope for redress
Analyse debt creation dates to identify
root cause 3 and 4 issues
i.
For RC3, all previous BG cases
1
are
identifiable and are potentially exposed to
RC3
–
this amounts to 5,000
RC4 can not be readily identified in the data
but exists in the form of physical case
documents. These amounts to 6,000 cases
where 50% have been checked resulting in
10 cases in scope for redress
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
14
106,000
A
PF system
DCS
C.
26,000
80,000
C
Sufficient data
Insufficient data
Sufficient data
(after 2010)
Insufficient data
(before 2010)
D.
E.
25,000
1,000
20,000
60,000
B
Repayment >
80%
Repayment <
80%
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
redress
D
Certain of no
redress
No redress
identified
E
Repayment >=
80%
Repayment <
80%
5,149
Manual
handling for
redress
19,851
Not in scope
Handover to BAU
1,000
Manual
handling for
redress
7,500
4,000
Not in scope
Handover to BAU
8,500
Further adv.
data modelling
28,500
Manual
handling for
redress
31,500
Debt creation
dates
Pay out in pilot
F.
5,149
1,000
28,500
31,500
Out of scope for
redress
~23-26,500
F
Total #customers for manual
handling: 43,149
PF (5,149 + 1,000) = 6,149
DCS (28,500 + 8,500) = 37,000
Possibility
of redress
Certain of
no
redress
Lessons learned from Louisiana:
Analysis will shift customers to the
two other groups
Root cause 3 &
4
~5-8,500
Further data
analysis
ii.
Uncertain
of redress
Not in scope
Handover to BAU
8,500
1
Legacy cases
from BG Bank. BG Bank became part of Danske Bank Group in 2001 as part of the merger with Realkredit Danmark. In 2007 BG bank was discontinued
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Project Athens -
Question 4
Financial impact analysis - Bottom-up estimation of over-collection in DCS where re-
calculations are possible
For customers in DCS with
available FEBOS data 20,000
customers are at risk of over-
collection
Over-collection estimate: 11.6 mDKK
The estimate of over-collection amounts to approximately
11.6 mDKK excluding interest compensation (for time value of
money), but accounting for set-off
The individual over-collection is at an customer level and log-
normally distributed as shown below
Cohort characteristics:
The cohort consists of ~18,800
private customers and ~1,200
corporate
Out of these ~7,500 customers are
estimated to be entitled to redress
3.000
Distribution of estimated over-collection
DCS customers with available FEBOS data (7,383 customers)
2.845
2.346
= 2,126 DKK
= 11,982 DKK
Number of customers
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
500
-
0-150
150-
500
DCS is affected by
root cause 1-4
For the customers in scope where
transaction data is electronically
available, the customers entering DCS
earlier are more probable to be affected
by over-collection
1.372
230
500-
1,000
1,000-
3,000
291
100
6,000-
10,000
116
40
43
3,000-
6,000
10,000- 30,000- 50,000 <
30,000 50,000
Over-collection in DKK
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Project Athens -
Question 4
Financial impact analysis*
–
Estimated over-collection from customers in scope for
manual handling
For customers where manual handling is required, the total number of customers at risk
of over-collection is equal to 43,150
Over-collection estimate: 38 mDKK
DCS: 25 mDKK
PF: 13 mDKK
Cohort characteristics:
These customers have repaid at least 80% of their principal (except customers entering
DCS in 2004 that are potentially impacted by root cause 3 and 4)
37,000
customers are in DCS. However, assuming similar characteristics as cases with
available FEBOS data (previous page)
~11,500
customers are estimated for redress
6,150
are in PF and likely to be entitled to redress
DCS
4.000
Distribution of estimated over-collection**
Customers with repayment ratio > 80% estimated to be entitled to redress
(11,541 customers)
3.490
2.998
= 2,793 DKK
= 17,638 DKK
PF
1200
Distribution of estimated over-collection
Customers with repayment ratio > 80% estimated to be entitled to
redress (5,149 customers across 3,743 cases
)
965
672
515
228
= 7,042 DKK
= 11,422 DKK
Number of customers
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
500
29
0-150
3.398
1000
914
800
600
935
333
150-
500
500-
1,000
1,000-
3,000
3,000-
6,000
240
38
80
400
200
111
146
173
19
-
6,000- 10,000- 30,000- 50,000 <
10,000 30,000 50,000
0
0 - 150
Over-collection in DKK
150 -
500
500 -
1.000
1.000 -
3.000
3.000 -
6.000
6.000 - 10.000 - 20.000 - 50.000 >
10.000 20.000 50.000
16
Over-collection in DKK
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
*All over-collection estimates on this page is based on statistical estimates I
**The estimated over-collection is based on the assumption that the cases follow the average characteristics identified by the cases with available electronic FEBOS data
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Project Athens -
Question 4
Costumers will be compensated for time-value of money by adding a interest
compensation to their redress
Plesner concludes that Danske Bank is legally obliged to compensate customers
1
according to the Danish Interest Act
section 5
Customers included in pilot will receive interest compensation accordingly
Interest compensation is calculated as simple interest (i.e. not compound)
The rate will equal the official lending rate (stated semi-annually) plus a surcharge of either 7% or 8% p.a. dependent on the
vintage of the customer’s claim (see below)
The lending rate varies significantly over time
–
se development illustrated in graph to the right
–
and have been equal to
0,5% p.a. since July 2015
See appendix p. 36 for more background on legal basis and implementation of interest compensation principles and
calculation of sample case on pp. 37-38
Lending rate
March 1 2013
7% + lending rate
Before
Customers with claims arising
before
the 1st of
March 2013 will receive official lending rate plus a
surcharge of
7%
p.a. as interest compensation
1
8% + lending rate
After
Customers with claims arising
after
the 1st of March
2013 will receive official lending rate plus a surcharge
of
8%
p.a. as interest compensation
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
Customers that are eligible to receive interest compensation as part of their redress either have no current debt, or no outstanding debt after offset is performed
17
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Project Athens
–
Question 4
Financial impact analysis
–
Redress composition
Over-collection
Over-collection is just one of the
parts of the redress amount for a
customer. Over-collection stems
from the four root causes identified
Interest compensation
Interest compensation is paid to
eligible customers as a time
compensation for the period that
Danske Bank had collected the
debt on an incorrect basis.
The estimate provided below
uses the minimum of when the
debt entered DCS or PF and 10
years.
Indirect losses
Indirect losses refer to any loss
incurred as a consequence of
identified root causes
Indirect losses will be gathered
through the claims process that the
programme will establish prior to
Day Zero
No statistical modelling has been
made to estimate the amount of
these indirect losses. While EY
expects that the number of claims
will be limited the claims that do
arise are, however, expected to be
significant. EY estimates the indirect
losses to 50 mDKK - although a lot
of uncertainty is tied to this number
For customers with electronically
available FEBOS data over-
collection is estimated to 11.6
mDKK
Customers in scope for manual
handling in PF, over-collection is
estimated to 13 mDKK
Customers in scope for manual
handling in DCS, over-collection is
estimated to 25 mDKK
See appendix p. 36 for more
background on legal basis and
implementation of interest
compensation principles.
Appendix pp. 37-38 contain
walkthrough of a sample
customer case from the pilot
batch case H incl. the interest
compensation calculation
Estimated interest compensation
for over-collection:
In total, estimated over-collection
amounts to:
49.6 mDKK
42.7 mDKK
Adding a conservative time
compensation of 50 mDKK, puts the
combined indirect losses at
approximately:
100 mDKK
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Project Athens
–
Question 4
Financial impact analysis
–
Tax impact
Tax impact (high level)
Direct tax effect
Wrongfully collected debt which according to Danske
Bank/Plesner was time-barred
Condictio
Indebiti
►
Post 31 December 2009: Claiming refund of
previously paid debt (interest, fees etc.), which is
time-barred, may be reclaimed by the customer
without taxation, assuming that the refund occurs
less than 10 years from when the payment was
made
►
Prior to 31 December 2009: Repayment by the
Bank to the customer of paid debt (interest, fees,
etc.), which is time-barred, is taxable for the
customer, if the refund occurs more than 10
years from when the payment was made. Such
taxation will be based on a
gift-like
consideration
Interests
►
Any interest (or time compensation) paid by
Danske Bank to debtor on redress amount should
be taxable as interest
Examples
Tax reporting
►
Applicable to all customers in DCS and PF incl.
debtors that have not paid on debt
►
Based on examples, the wrong tax reporting
appears in following cases:
•
•
•
•
Too large principal amount
Wrong debtor status
Interests amount
No arrears mark, etc.
When transferred to debt collection, the default date and
not the relevant due date was used as the origination date
of the debt. Danske Bank wrongfully collected the debt
Condictio Indebiti
•
Condictio Indebiti -claim is not taxable
•
Interests on redress are taxable
•
The tax reporting is flawed and should be re-assessed
Indirect tax effect
Interest and fee deduction
►
Interests are generally deductible if the interest
amount for previous years have been paid. Fees
are as main rule not deductible but special rules
may apply
►
In some cases of wrongfully collected debt
interest deducted is reversed when the Danish
Tax Authorities re-assess within three years
period (ordinary re-assessment deadline) when
there is no arrears mark Restance markering
►
In cases where arrears mark has been made the
debtor has not received deduction of interests.
Information shows arrears mark occurred in 51%
- 68% of the cases implying that a large part of
debtors have not received interest deduction and
therefore minimizing indirect tax effect
►
Other indirect tax effects (if any) are still under
investigation
RC1
Principal, interest and fees collapsed
Too high principal amount (incl. fees and interests) was
transferred into DCS. The derived effect is that the accrued
interest amount is too high. The debt may be time-barred
and hence wrongfully collected
•
Condictio Indebiti -claim is not taxable
•
Interests on redress are taxable
•
The tax reporting is flawed and should be re-assessed
RC2
Incorrect debt origination date
►
Currently being analyzed how to correct and how
far back in respect of data and tax reporting rules
RC3
Guarantors and co-debtors treated alike
•
Currently pending as data search is complex
Recommendation
•
•
•
•
•
Danske Bank to consider time period of redress amount given direct tax effects for customers prior to 2009
Dialogue with the Danish Tax Authorities regarding direct and indirect customer tax effects and reporting correction approach
Potential VAT issues should be analyzed further
Binding ruling of the customer taxation of redress amount to be considered by Danske Bank
Further work on root cause 1-4 examples to assess tax effect and additional root causes (if any)
RC4
Co-debtors charged full principal
In DCS the debtor and co-debtor both were registered as
main debtor. The debt was redeemed twice. Tax reporting
of interests are non-existing but debt reliefs were agreed in
2016
•
Condictio Indebiti -claim is not taxable
•
Interests on redress are taxable.
•
The tax reporting is flawed and should be re-assessed
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Project Athens
–
Question 4
Financial impact analysis
–
Overview of Tax consideration process
RC1
Principal, interest and fees collapsed
RC2
Incorrect debt origination date
RC3
Guarantors and co-debtors treated alike
RC4
Co-debtors charged full principal
Accrued interest and fees are collapsed into the principal amount
Incorrect collection on limited interest / fees due to difference in
limitation between principal and interest
When transferred to debt collection, the default date not the due
date is used a origination date of the debt
Collection could happen on expired interest and principal
A guarantor would then appear as fully liable for the debt, and the
bank would incorrectly treat both parties equally
Full principal amount assigned to each co-debtor
Potentially full debt would then be collected from multiple debtors
Has time-barred
debt been charged?
(New vs. old rule)
Over Payment
(Paid interest is wrong)
Has time-barred
debt been charged?
(New vs. old rule)
Has too much debt
been charged?
(Taxation of guarantors)
Errouneous tax
reporting?
Doube payment
Errouneous tax
reporting?
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Yes
Start
No
Combined proces flow
Compensation
Elements:
Principal amount
(Non-taxable)
Condictio Indebiti
(Index demand)
Is the demand time-barred?
No
Interests
(Taxable)
Correction of taxation
(Determined by law)
No
Yes
Deducted taxation
(Historical taxation)
Re-assessment of taxation
(includes default interest and surcharge(pct.))
Further
compensation
to be paid
Yes
Potential redress
(to be considered)
No arrears mark
(Deductables recieved)
Wrong principal
amount reported?
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–
Question 5
The project will move into execution phase
–
Based from EY redress methodology
0
Identification
Identification of
issue (Project
Texas)
1
Initiation and methodology development
Findings from QA and
analysis can lead to
changes in previous steps
2
Data analysis and redress calculation
Learning from
outpayment pilot to
include in step 3
3
Execution plan (compensation & communication)
4
Pilot
5
Execution
6
Closure
Investigate
root cause
Define
Methodology
Quality Assurance
Define &
identify
customer
population
Gather
and
analyze
data
Build
analysis
platform
Perform
redress
calculations
Customer
redress
decision
Outpayment
process
Customer
communi-
cation
Outpayment
pilot
Outpayment
in batches
Quality Assurance
Engage with regulators
Program
closure:
Insight &
Business
improvement
Preparations before Day Zero
Day Zero
Ongoing customer communication and reporting after Day Zero
Main steps going forward
Current Focus
Calculation:
•
Agree on indirect / consequential losses
•
Estimate impact of DCA data
Communication:
•
Coherent communication strategy with
Authorities
•
Secure data for key messages in public
communication
Calculation, Communication, Compensation
Considerations
Execution Phase
Compensation:
•
Agree on date for Day Zero
(proposed April 14 2020)
•
Secure resources for execution,
DOCS, Advisors,
Implementation etc.
•
Decisions on thresholds for
calculations
•
Remediation principles must be approved before execution
•
Certainty that no new over-collection cases are being generated during execution
•
Agreement on scope setting parameters
–
triage stream execution closed
•
Legal advise from Plesner on remediation and compensation principles
•
Organisation and governance for execution in place
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–
Question 5
Communication planning* towards Day Zero to customers receiving a compensation
PRE-PLANNING:
28 FEB
(press and authorities)
PLANNING:
28 FEB
–
Day Zero
EXECUTION:
Day Zero
Day Zero:
June 18 2020
Orientation to authorities
FOLLOW UP AND
OUTPAYMENT: Day 1
EMPLOYEES CUSTOMERS EXTERNAL
28. Feb:
EY report
Ongoing dialogue with
authorities and orientation of
plans
Ongoing dialogue with
authorities and update on plans
Monitoring of customer
reactions, SoMe, politicians and
press
Update on Dansk Bank front
page
–
see appendix p. 41
Development of communications
plans and key messaging
Finalising communications plans
and key messages with final
data
**Letter is sent to customers
included in pilot batch
–
see
appendix p. 42
Letter to customers that have
submitted a claim based on
indirect losses incl. conclusion
on claim
Notification to selected
customers with incorrect debt
incl. how it has been rectified
Ongoing communication on
outpayment process
Development of materials for
Day Zero
Website regarding indirect
claims with submission form
–
see appendix p. 41
Headlines
Material for Danske
Direkte/advisors + DCM
Look-up tool for advisors (WOID)
Development of materials for
advisors and debt collection
management
Development of look-up tool for
advisors
*See appendix pp. 39-40 for additional best practice methodology leading up to execution of Day Zero **e-boks is delivered within 1-2 days. Physical letters is delivered within 2-5 days
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
Remediation of customers that are not eligible to receive compensation on the basis of
identified four root causes
A workstream dedicated to the remediation of customer groups (i) and (ii) will work towards identifying and rectifying customers with incorrect debt
registered in DCS and PF
Remediation of customer groups (i) and (ii):
•
•
•
Programme structure has been revised and simplified to ensure a clear
remediation focus and speed of execution
A programme plan has been outlined with expected completion Q3
2021, subject to changes. See timeline on next page
Specificall , the purpose of the stream Portfolio trimming & clean-up
is to rectify incorrect data on customers debt with expected completion
end of Q2 2021, pending further investigation
The programme is committed to ensure a suitable communication is
delivered to the impacted customers:
Portfolio
trimming &
clean-up
Reference
Group
Programme
Manager
PMO
Programme governance structure (June 2020):
SteerCo
•
•
•
•
Business Owner
Retail Banking DK
Non-Financial risk
Compliance
•
•
•
•
•
•
Regulatory Affairs
Comms & Public Affairs
Insolvency
Group Legal
GRDM Manager
CIO Area
•
Remediation
& data
analysis
Outpayment
execution
DCS & PF
Compliance
(Horizon)
Mitigate DCA
issues
Analysis of
side issues
Customer group (i)
•
Customers that have debt
incorrectly registered, but not
repaid any debt will be notified
about the correction hereof
Customer group (ii)
•
Customers subject to over-
collection, but have sufficient
outstanding debt to allow offset
will also receive adequate
communication about correction
of their case as they are
identified and recalculated
GRDM SME s
Corporate Functions (Finance, Legal, Risk, Compliance & Communications, etc.)
Internal and external resource suppliers
(IT, Integrators, Platform providers, Management Consultants, etc.)
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
Programme Athens timeline
Q2-2020
Q3-2020
Project scope & plan
Subject to changes following dialogue with regulatory
bodies related to e.g. remediation principles, Tax
treatment and further calculations etc.
Q4-2020
Q1-2021
Q2-2021
Q3-2021
Portfolio trimming & clean-up
Develop portfolio strategy
Proof-of-Concept
Portfolio trimming & clean-up execution
Specify automation
tool
Develop & test
automation tool
Remediation & data analysis
Cohort segmentation, analysis, ready for out-payment
Out-payment pilot
Customer batches prepared for out-payment
Customer batch out-payments
Outpayment execution
DCS & PF compliance (Horizon)
TBD
Court cases corrected & resubmitted to courts
Mitigate DCA issues
Assess Vendor set-up
Plan and implement new Vendor set-up
Align with GRDM SME and Remediation workstream
Analysis of issues
Analysis of side issues
Hand-over to line for execution
: Decision milestones
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Appendix
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Project Athens
Appendix overview
Page
Examples of the four root causes
Evaluation of correction process
Scope of the remediation
Customer segmentation
Financial impact
Remediation plan
27-30
31
33
34
36
39
Question
NA
1
2
3
4
5
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Project Athens
Root Cause 1: Principal, interest and fees collapsed - Example
Situation description
a.
b.
c.
When Customer A is transferred into DCS, the principal amount of 97,000
DKK is not mo ed into DCS s data field –
Principal. Rather, 102,000
DKK (interests plus principal) is incorrectly transferred to principal (field 3)
As a direct result, the interests of 10% PA is now being calculated on an incorrect principal amount > 100,000 DKK resulting in an even higher
monetary amount left for Customer A to pay
Interest has a limitation of 3 years, and Principal has a limitation of 10 years. Danske Bank would ordinarily have 10 years to collect 97,000 DKK
and 3 years to collect 5,000 DKK. Now that the combined amount is residing in Principal, Danske Bank runs the risk of loosing out of the interest
amount of 5,000 DKK, for which they have no claim to after 3 years
Danske Bank tries to
contact Customer A and
sends reminders (fee*) each
month. After the 4
th
reminder, Customer A is
transferred into DCS
DCS Data fields
Customer A and Danske Bank
agrees to a loan of 100,000 DKK
with an interest rate of 10% PA,
with quarterly accrued interests,
starting the 1
st
of Jan 2018
Payment terms are that
Customer A is to pay 1,000 DKK
and the end of each month
Customer A diligently pays 1,000
DKK each month until Sep 2018,
after which Danske Bank does
not receive any payments
1
Legal/court
costs
2
10% PA
Interests
2018
Monthly
payment
Interests
Principal
amount
(primo)
Balance
(ultimo)
Jan
1,000
Feb
1,000
Mar
1,000
2,500
Apr
1,000
May
1,000
Jun
1,000
2,500
Jul
1,000
Aug
1,000
Sep
No
payment
2,500
Oct
No
payment
Nov
No
payment
Dec
No
payment
2,500
3
102,000
Principal
4
100,000
99,000
98,000
98,000
97,500
97,500
97,500
97,000
97,000
97,000
97,000
97,000
Acknowledge
Interests
99,000
98,000
99,500
98,500
97,500
99,000
98,000
97,000
99,500
99,500
99,500
102,000
5
Accrued
Interests
* For the purpose of this example fees are not included.
Each reminder is
DKK and ill e entually be put into DCS’s Interest data field
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Project Athens
Root Cause 2: Incorrect debt origination date - Example
Situation description
a.
b.
c.
d.
Interest has a limitation of 3 years, and Principal has a limitation of 10 years
The incorrect origination date in DCS will make the debt appear 90 days younger than it actually is
The due date is wrong and shifted in the customers favor so the outdated interests will appear to have a 3 years and 3 months expiring period
instead of the legal 3 years
Collection post expiration is therefore a large risk
Danske Bank now has Customer
A in DCS, but with the wrong
origination date along with the
wrong principal amount
consisting of interests, fees* and
correct principal amount
DCS Data fields
Danske Bank starts to send
Customer A reminders as no
payment was received in Sep
2018
After having sent the 4
th
reminder
to Customer A, Danske Bank
transfers Customer A to DCS
(maximum 90 days after first
failure of payment)
DCS logs Customer A and his
owed amount from the due date
of the 4
th
reminder and not from
the default date where Customer
A first missed the payment
1
29-Dec
Legal/court
costs
2
Limitation: 3 year
29-Dec
Interests
•
•
•
•
•
•
In the example, Customer A misses out on
his instalment on 30-Sep-2018
90 days passes, were 4 reminders are sent
On 29-Dec-2018, Customer A defaults on
his loan
The advisor terminates the product and
sends Customer A to debt collection
In the transfer to DCS the default date and
not the due date is used as origination date
This leads to incorrect limitation
30-Sep
Due date
4 reminders
29-Dec
Default date
3
Limitation: 10 year
Principal
2018
Monthly
payment
Interests
Aug
1,000
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
4
Acknowledge
Interests
No payment No payment No payment No payment
2,500
2,500
5
Accrued
Interests
* For the purpose of this example fees are not included.
Each reminder is
DKK and ill e entually be put into DCS’s Interest data field
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Project Athens
Root Cause 3: Guarantors and co-debtors treated alike - Example
Situation description
a.
b.
During the conversion into DCS in 2004 there were no differentiation between co-debtors and guarantors, as both (technically) needed an
account in the system and no flag for marking them as guarantors existed
Hence the Bank was not able to distinguish the two from each other and could potentially be pursuing the full debt from both individuals, despite
that the guarantor could by liable for a smaller amount
As a guarantee has to be called in order to be valid, the incorrect registration have led to incorrect collection
Danske Bank introduces the DCS
system July 2004, leaving them
with one consolidated system
used for debt collection
Guarantors, such as Customer A,
is treated as co-debtor and is
incorrectly created in DCS as
such
Legally the Bank cannot collect
from Customer A till Customer B
has defaulted, and the Bank will
have to call the guarantee before
collecting from Customer A
DCS Data fields
Guarantor
Customer B is liable for
200,000 DKK
Customer A is guarantor
for 50,000 DKK
c.
Customer B signs a loan of
200,000 DKK for her business
and has Customer A as guarantor
for 50,000. This is done before
the year 2004
DCS Data fields
1
Legal/court
costs
1
Legal/court
costs
2
Interests
Customer B s debt is correctl
migrated into DCS system
during the conversion
Guarantee is incorrectly
migrated as debt of 50,000 into
DCS, and he now appears as
debtor
2
Interests
3
200,000 DKK
Principal
3
50,000 DKK
Principal
4
Acknowledge
Interests
4
Acknowledge
Interests
5
Accrued
Interests
Only Customer B owes Danske Bank
200,000 DKK
5
Accrued
Interests
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Project Athens
Root Cause 4: Co-debtors charged full principal - Example
Situation description
a.
b.
c.
When data was converted into DCS in 2004, the link between co-debtors was in some instances left out
Hence the Bank was unable to correctly track the collection of the shared debt, and would treat the payments separately
There have been instances where settlements have been agreed with each part of the shared debt, leading to a combined overpayment
Potentially the collection team
will now pursue both Customer
B and Customer A for the full
amount, even despite one of
them might have paid it all
DCS Data fields
Customer B and Customer A
collectively signs a loan from
Danske Bank as co-debtors for
200,000 sometime before the
DCS Data fields
year 2004
Danske Bank introduces the DCS
system July 2004, leaving them
with one consolidated system
used for debt collection
Co-debtors
Customer B is liable for
200,000 DKK
Co-debtors, such as Customer B
and Customer A, were created in
DCS each with the full loan
amount and with not linking
between the cases
Customer A is liable for
200,000 DKK
1
Legal/court
costs
1
Legal/court
costs
2
Interests
When migrated to DCS,
Customer A and Customer B are
created as two separate cases
without linkage
Hence the debt collection team
will potentially collect the full
amount from both Customer A
and Customer B (double
payment)
2
Interests
3
200,000 DKK
Principal
3
200,000 DKK
Principal
4
Acknowledge
Interests
4
Acknowledge
Interests
5
Accrued
Interests
The co-debtors collectively owes Danske
Bank 200,000 DKK
5
Accrued
Interests
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Project Athens -
Question 1
In order to ensure that no new over-collection cases are created, it is necessary to review
GRDM s correction process including the implemented red/green case markings
•
•
•
•
•
When Danske Bank became aware of the issues in DCS, GRDM implemented a manual failsafe process in order to minimize the risk of creating new issues
In general, all Danish cases registered in DCS are considered incorrect and need correction before reaching out to the customer
Each case transferred to DCS will (since 16
th
of July 2019) automatically be marked red, stating that it has not been reviewed by the Corrections Team
Only cases that have been treated / corrected by the Corrections Team can be viewed as correct
–
exemplified by a green tick-marker post-correction
Current correction process* since 16
th
of July 2019 looks as follows:
GRDM
•
Soft collection
•
Hard collection
1
Customer
defaults and
enters Soft
Collection
Termination of
engagement
2
3
Customer moved
from FEBOS to
DCS
DCS case is
automatically
marked red
Activate, review,
assign case and
notify customer
If the case is Light;
Local customer team
corrects case, from
backlog
7
Mark corrected
case green and
mail Hard
Collection
8
Receive correction
mail and try to
contact customer
Normal DCS flow
and debt
collection
10
4
5
9
•
Customer
•
Customer
representatives
(lawyers, family
member, advisor)
Customer
Payment
Receives notification
and may act and
cause a trigger
6
6
6
Trigger
examples
Phone / mail
Settlement request
6
Correction
Team
•
Appointed
Corrections Team
7
Backlog / non-active
portfolio of red-
marked cases
If the case is
complex; Correction
corrects case from
backlog
7
7
Mark corrected
case green and
mail Hard
Collection
8
Continuous quality
control of green-
marked cases
11
Flow description
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
An customer in FEBOS suddenly defaults on his loan e.g. missing payment and is
moved to Soft Collection which initiates the Dunning Process
Dunning Process is unsuccessful and the engagement is terminated (4
th
reminder)
10 days after termination the (customer) case is moved from FEBOS to DCS
When the case is registered in DCS it is automatically marked red
Hard Collection (Lithuania) activates the latent case in DCS, reviews the case, assigns
the appropriate customer team if the case is deemed Light or to the Correction Team
Correction if the case is more comple the case is no in the backlog depositor
The notified customer (or customer representative) could activate a trigger* (e.g. make
communicative contact, make a payment or send a settlement request)
9.
10.
11.
7.
8.
If a trigger is activated it prompts either the local customer team (Light) or the
Correction Team to locate, review and correct the case from the backlog of cases
Once the case is corrected it is marked green followed by a mail to Hard Collection that
the particular case has been corrected
After receiving the mail, Hard Collection seeks to contact the customer in order to
address the specific trigger
Regardless if customer contact happens or not, the green-marked case is now
following normal flow in DCS
As a quality measure, a list of green-marked cases are reviewed by GRDM each month
in order to double check that the case has been handled and corrected the right way
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6.
* There are more triggers (externally and internally) but it is important to note that any handling of a red-case starts with a trigger
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Project Athens -
Question 1
Is it ensured that over-collection does not still occur despite implementing red/green
mitigation process?
•
Current correction process* since 16
th
of July 2019 looks as follows:
Get an overview of the case
Correction of the case
Immediate post-
correction activities
Apply mitigating
red/green process
•
•
•
•
Locate a red-marked / non-
corrected case
Check basis information in
DCS
Determine expiration / statute
of limitation for each account
Assess which type of account
needs correction (promissory
notes, overdraft, overdraft
facility etc.)
•
•
Review bank statements
Conduct correction(s) by
utilizing appropriate
correction table
•
•
Create notification date for
each stakeholder s CPR
number pertaining the case
Create playtast
–
predefined
table for case comments
•
When the case has been
corrected, notification date
and playtast has been
correct, apply green tick in
the overview image
Once a month a quality control of corrected cases marked green is conducted
If one or several elements are missing (e.g.
notification date and/or playtest), the Corrections Team is alerted in order to rectify the administrative mistake
* Vejledende løsning til tilretning – Sager efter
. 9.
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Project Athens -
Question 2
Outsourcing to DCAs has not significantly impacted data quality
Background for DCA stream
A task team within the project has been working to analyze and understand the data on customers who were
outsourced to DCAs. The purpose is to determine whether or not the data quality is acceptable to proceed with the
remediation project in its current form
Active DK customers in DCS identified as
potentially outsourced:
40,500
DK customers in data received
from the four largest DCAs:
Review of the outsourcing to Debt Collection Agencies (DCAs) shows that flaws are minor
The total number of potentially outsourced and active DK customers in DCS is estimated to be
40,500.
EY has
received data from the four largest DCAs
1
, which contained
21,700
unique costumers. The received data was then
matched with data from DCS resulting in
20,750
matched costumers.
96%
of the matched customers had the
correct status in DCS (i.e. active / closed). EY therefore concludes that the data quality issues with the DCAs
should not postpone execution of remediation
~21,700
DCS data matched
with data from four
largest DCAs (sample
used for analysis on
case status):
How the initial analysis was carried out
For this analysis EY built a total overview of the data in DCS. From here EY:
1.
Isolated potentially outsourced data for the DK organization
2.
Identified and focused on data associated with the 4 largest DCAs
3.
Matched outsourced DCS data with data received from the 4 largest DCAs
4.
Compared the case status between the matched DCS and DCA data
Throughout this process EY has validated relevant data and aligned across all EY data teams on the DCS project.
Furthermore, EY has sparred with Danske Bank SMEs
20,750
Case status
agreement
rate:
96%
Bias in data
Initial analysis of sample data has shown a modest error rate.
However, EY needs to understand the rest of the data foundation and
although the error rate is likely to resemble the sample error rate,
further analysis is required to ensure that this is the case
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
33
Next steps
The next steps are to:
1.
Deep dive analysis of the exhaustive data foundation (a large sample was investigated for this analysis)
2.
Analyze the data flow between Danske Bank (DCS and PF) and the DCAs
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Athens
- Question 3
The 106k customers in scope can be split between DCS (80k) and PF (26k)
A repayment ratio of 80% will yield 43,150 customers for manual handling
PF
•
26,000 customers in PF system are in scope for redress
•
A repayment ratio (percentage of principal that has been repaid) of 80%
will yield 5,149 customers to be manually reviewed
•
This is under the assumption that lower repayment ratios will ensure
that possible corrections can be offset in the remaining debt
•
Additionally, 1,000 customers have insufficient data and as a result will
have to be manually reviewed leaving a total of 6,149 customers for
manual review
120.000
100.000
80.000
60.000
40.000
26.000
20.000
0
Customers in scope
Customers in DCS
Customers in PF
(incl. overlap)
80.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0
PF customers in scope Remove customers with
repayment ratio less
than 80%
Customers to be
manually reviewed
19.851
6.149
106.000
30.000
25.000
PF - 80% repayment ratio*
26.000
DCS
•
80,000 customers in DCS are in scope for redress
•
20,000 of these can be modelled by re-calculating the debt with data
from after 2010
•
60,000 customers can not be modelled due to lack of data
•
By reviewing the corrections made since June 2019, data shows that
corrections remain below 20% of principal. Corrections are (for 98.5%)
maximum 20% of principal
•
Assuming that corrections can be offset in remaining debt, will allow for
discarding customers with repayment ratios below 80% (28,500)
•
However, all customers entering DCS in 2004 (8,500) have to be
manually reviewed due to their potential exposure to root cause 3 and 4
•
In total, 37,000 customers in DCS have to be manually reviewed
120.000
100.000
80.000
80.000
26.000
60.000
40.000
20.000
0
Customers in Customers in Customers in Customers
scope
PF
DCS
that can be
(incl. overlap)
modelled
(after 2010)
Customer
with
insufficient
data
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
34
20.000
60.000
106.000
80% repayment ratio
43,150 customers for
manual handling
* These are all customers that are potentially eligible, the actual number after further investigation is expected to change
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Athens -
Question 3
24k customers that have entered and left the two systems after 2004 and been there for
less than 3 years. Hence they can not have been impacted by the four root causes
Characteristics of the cohort
•
All of these customers have been in the systems less than 3 years*
•
For
DCS,
customers who has been active less than 2.5 years in DCS are removed by this
filter
•
For
PF,
customers entered in the system less than 3 years ago are removed as no debt is
at risk of being time-barred (arrears date will always be correct for PF)
•
That principal, fees and accumulated interest might have collapsed does not lead to
incorrect interest calculation as the interest is consistent across debt types
•
Hence root causes 1 and 2 have not impacted the 24k customers:
‒
RC1
–
Collapsing of fees, interest and principal
As interest rates are consistent across all debt types, collapsing of debt has no impact
‒
RC2
–
Incorrect arrears date
Not an issue for PF customers as independent review ensures correct input date. Not an
issue for DCS, as long as soft collection process is less than 180 days
‒
RC3 - Guarantors and co-debtors
Only applicable for DCS, but none are among the 24k as they are all after 2004. The root
cause only occurred during the migration into DCS
‒
RC4 - Co-debtors charged full principal
Only applicable for DCS, but none are among the 24k as they are all after 2004. The root
cause only occurred during the migration into DCS
Breakdown of the cohort across DCS and PF
24k
23k
DCS
< 1k
PF
< 1k
Both systems
Areas of risk are non-systemic operational errors as e.g.:
Court fees being incorrectly collapsed when entering DCS. Interest should not
be calculated on these fees. The issue is currently under investigation
Duration of soft collection exceeds 180 days (standard duration is 90 days)
* For DCS a conservative cut-off
equal to .
foreclosure process
ears is applied as a rolling indo
throughout the period. For PF an e act cut-off
equal to 3 years is applied going back to 2017, as the arrears date is correctly registered due to independent review in a
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Project Athens -
Question 4
How interest compensation will be implemented in redress calculations
Legal basis for interest compensation
•
•
•
•
Plesner has provided their legal assessment
1
of Danske Bank s set-off right and hen the bank is obliged to compensate customers and add interest to the customer s compensation
Plesner concludes that Danske Bank is legally obliged to compensate according to the Interest Act section 5, for customers with no current debt and when set-off in existing debt will not fulfil the
costumer s restitution claim
Such customers should recei e compensation
ith attributed interest corresponding to the rele ant process rate in Danish
morarenten
at the time of each o erpa ment made b the customer
Customers that have been subject to over-collection, but have sufficient existing debt to allow for set-off should not receive interest compensation
Implementation of interest compensation principles
How to apply the interest rates on over-collection?
•
From a legal perspective, Danske Bank is required to;
•
•
Option 1a
- Add interest to over-collections incrementally as they occur (i.e. add interest to
the individual over-collection from the time of the respective collection)
•
Which time period to apply?
•
From a legal perspective, Danske Bank is required to;
•
Option 1b
–
Add interest from the point in time of each individual payment by the customer
that was paid on an incorrect basis (i.e. time-barred or in excess of actual correct debt)
Implementing such logic is impractical and instead EY suggest to;
•
Option 2a
- Add interest on the entire over-collection amount starting from the time that
the first over-collection event took place
Implementing such logic is impractical and instead EY suggest to;
•
Option 2b
- Add interest from the earliest point in time that the customer theoretically risk
overpayment
–
i.e. the first payment by the customer after 2.5 years in debt collection
•
Option 2a is chosen
as it will (always) result in a benefit for the customer as opposed to option 1a.
•
Although, this might lead to unintended taxation as the interest compensation will fall beyond
Danske Bank s legal
obligation
Option 2b is chosen
as it will (always) result in a benefit for the customer as opposed to option 1b.
Although, this might lead to unintended taxation as the interest compensation will fall beyond
Danske Bank s
legal obligation
Tax effect of such interest compensation should be clarified
with Danish Tax Authorities (pending)
1
Further complexities such as interest compensation to customers with time-barred claims (i.e. older
than 10 years), will have to addressed by programme as fulfilment progress
Memorandum prepared by Plesner the 8
th
of April 2020
– SET-OFF RIGHT IN RELATION TO DEBT COLLECTION ON A UNJUSTIFIED BASIS
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Project Athens -
Question 4
Sample customer in pilot batch
case H
H have been subject to over-collection as
he has repaid;
H obtains an uncollateralized
retail loan (Danske Lån) at
Danske Bank
Feb
2011
(i)
Dunning #1 is
sent without a fee
fees that were limited (DKK 300)
interest on limited fees (DKK 37.6)
Dunning #2
100 DKK
fee
Dunning #3
100 DKK
fee
Dunning #4
with DC warning
100 DKK
fee
(ii)
2008
He starts paying his
monthly installments
H stops repaying his
monthly installments
Soft collection starts
Dunning proces in FEBOS
FEBOS
Hard collection starts
Registration in DCS
DCS
Apr
2011
Dunning fees are
incorrectly collapsed with
principal when migrated to
DCS
2016
H has repaid his debt in full
making him eligible for redress
GRDM contacts H and convinces him to sign
settlement agreement
Case is
closed in
DCS
Derivatively, incorrect reporting
is made to DTA
1
in 2016
However, fees (300 DKK) have now limited
incl. interest on them (37,6 DKK)
Day
Jun 18
2020
Zero
#2
Unpaid
‘ordinary’ interest + fees
and penalty interest
Limitation = 3 years
#3
Principal
Limitation = 10 years
H will receive a compensation equal to 476,2 DKK
2
2
476,2 DKK = 337,6 DKK (over-collection) +138,6
DKK (interest compensation
–
See next page)
1
Danish
Apr
2015
H’s total debt of
35,782 DKK
is
registered in DCS
–
see entry balance
Actual registration
DCS
Data field
#2
DKK
929
34,853
Dunning fees (300 DKK) are
incorrectly registered as principal debt
#3
4
Total
35,782
H will then have 2 years to
substantiate any indirect losses….
Fulfillment complete
Tax Authorities
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Project Athens -
Question 4
Interest compensation -
case H
•
H’s
debt was registered in DCS in 2011 and his first repayment was made on April 23
2015
•
Thus,
H’s
claim against Danske Bank fell after March 2013
•
For simplicity, it is assumed that the entire over-collection amount occurred on this
date to the benefit of the customer
•
Interest compensation is calculated as simple interest (i.e. not compound) from date of
over-collection until fulfilment date
•
For H, the time period is April 23 2015 to June 18 2020 (Day Zero)
Calculation of
H’s
interest compensation
Total over-collection amount x Interest compensation rate (per day) x Number of days
= Interest compensation amount
DKK 337.6 x (8.20% / 365 days) x 68 days + 337.6 x (8.05% / 365 days) x 1,815 days
= DKK 138,6
March 1 2013
Interest compensation rate
7% surcharge
Before
8% surcharge
After
Lending rate
8.20%
(April 23 2015
–
June 30 2015)
8.05%
(July 1 2015
–
June 18 2020)
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
Based on best-practice redress methodology, EY suggests to plan towards a Day Zero,
with compensation commencing immediately after the press release
BEFORE
DAY 0
DAY 0
TBD: Potential outreach to
selected stakeholders
PILOT & OUTPAYMENT PERIOD
AFTER
COMPLETION
Comms
Press/public affairs
Dialogue with the Danish FSA
Customer comm.
Populate database for
individual customer
look-up in WOID
Customer letter 1:
Information about the
issue identified
Customer letter 2:
Information about how much in compensation they will receive. If the
tax matter is clarified, this will be included
Advisors
Advisor tools
development
Advisor training
Ensure proper
documentation
Taxation
Settle taxation on each re-dress strategy
Build scenarios for
Straight to Pay (STP)
outpayment flow
Benchmark (BM)
and calculation
approach
StC sign-off for
BM and calc.
approach
Calc’s
Scenarios
Calculation
Approach &
methodology
Build scenarios
for manual flow
Review
learnings
Outpayment
Prepare
payment file
Design QA
and controls
Code systems
with rules for
STP annual flow
Train staff on
scenarios for
manual flow
Run test pilot with
letter, advisor lookup
and outpayment
Close program
Pilot
Execution
outpayment
Scope payment phases
(current expectation)
Execute
payment file
phase 1
Execute
payment file
phase 2
Execute
payment file
phase 3
Execute
payment file
phase 4
39
Calculation, Communication, Compensation
Athens Remediation Analysis - July-2020 - Version 0.3
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
EY recommends to use best-practice communication approach and platform from
previous remediation projects
Communications Day Zero
1
2
3
4
Decision for SteerCo to agree on
Tel.: XX XX XX XX
•
EY suggests to use the familiarities of the
communication approach, tools, platforms
and training approach from previous
remediation projects
Headlines
On at 9.00am
Press release
Published at 9.00am
Website
www.danskebank.dk/
Athens
Letter
Sent to affected customers with
hotline campaign number
Material for advisers
1
2
3
WOID
The Regulations about in estments
item, Q&A, background info, copies of
letters to customers, calculation look-up
Customer and Advisor experience
Messages for customers
Available Monday morning -
Overview of affected customers,
possibility of proactive contact
Opslagsværk
Find out whether a specific
customer is affected and how.
Find it on WOID
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 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
Announcement on the front page of Danske Bank s site links to a site with details on the
issue; incl. Q&A and a form to submit claim based on indirect losses
1
Danske Bank front page,
Aktuelt
www.danskebank.dk/privat/kunde
2
Athens site with details and form
www.danskebank.dk/tilbagebetaling
3
Indirect losses form
[indirect loss form]
Application form will be available
to all site visitors, but a review
process is designed to filter away
applicants without legitimate
claims
Tilbagebetaling af tidligere inddrevet gæld
Ved en fejl har vi opkrævet nogle kunder i vores
inkassoafdeling for meget på deres gæld. Er du berørt, får
du nu penge tilbage.
Information to public will be
announced under
Aktuelt
on the
front page of Danske Bank s
homepage
Ne updates under
Aktuelt
hen
critical outpayment batches are
due, e.g. when outpayments
amounts are large
Detailed information on the issue
are outlined with further details in
Q&A setup
Link is also provided in the letter
sent to customers in scope for
outpayment
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41
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Athens
–
Question 5
The redress process is designed to ensure customers are compensated as soon as possible
In addition to swift payout the process is designed to ensure proper consideration of customers indirect losses
Danske Bank
customer
Compensation for direct
losses paid into
NemKonto immediately
Hotline number provided
Customer have
further questions
Customer
letter sent to
inform about
issue and
compensation
?
Including time compensation
if applicable
14 days
If customers have no indirect
loss claims and no further
questions the redress is
considered fulfilled
Running 3 years after
last letter is sent
Webpage provided in
letter
Compensation for
direct losses paid
into chosen account
Customer wish to
claim in-direct
losses
Non-Danske
Bank customer
Customer request
payout to non-
Nemkonto account
Customer reports
claim in webpage form
Debt collection
experts
Senior
management
Indirect claim is
recognised by
board
Customer informed
about conclusion
Indirect claim is not
recognised by
board
Customer wish to dispute
conclusion
Compensation for
indirect losses paid
into chosen account
If customer have no disputes the
customer is considered redressed
in full
Legal
Indirect loss compensation board
assess the claim for indirect losses
Opportunity to dispute conclusions
on indirect loss claims will be
provided in information letter and
managed on ad hoc basis
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42
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
BILAG 2.5
–
YDERLIGERE PROBLEMSTILLINGER
Danske Bank er på nuværende tidspunkt ved at undersøge en række problemstillinger, der kan have
været af betydning for vores kunder, og som er blevet opdaget i forbindelse med vores interne
undersøgelse af inkassosagen.
Undersøgelserne af disse problemstillinger er i mange tilfælde på et tidligt stadie, men vi synes, at det
er vigtigt at give en opsummering af dem. Konsekvensen af den enkelte problemstilling kan være
forskellig for vores kunder og for os. Oversigten er ikke udtømmende, idet den igangværende
undersøgelse kan bringe yderligere problemstillinger frem i lyset.
Afsluttede retssager om inkasso
Resumé:
Fejl i data i DCS og PF kan have påvirket en række afsluttede retssager, der involverer vores
kunder. Dette kan have betydet, at udfaldet har påvirket disse kunder negativt, og i nogle tilfælde kan
det også have haft betydning for andre tredjeparter, der har været involveret i den enkelte sag.
Rykkergebyrer
Resumé:
Når en kunde modtager et rykkerbrev, opkræves der et gebyr og renter pålægges
rykkergebyret og opkræves hos kunden. Der er i banken nedsat en arbejdsgruppe med henblik på at
identificere og dække eventuelle tab som følge af uretmæssigt tilskrevne renter på rykkergebyrer.
Modregning af kunders gæld mellem koncernselskaber
Resumé:
Risiko for mulig uberettiget modregning mellem koncernenheder. Denne praksis er nu
suspenderet og afventer resultatet af yderligere undersøgelser.
Data vedrørende kunders kreditvurdering i DCS og PF
Resumé:
DCS- og PF-systemerne tildeler automatisk en kunde en D4-rating (den lavest mulige rating),
når kunden misligholder sine afdragsbetalinger og derfor overføres til systemerne. Når en kunde har
misligholdt et lån, vil kunden være ratet D4 i 5 år efter det tidspunkt, hvor gælden er fuldt indfriet. Der
er indledt yderligere undersøgelser af, hvorvidt kunder uretmæssigt har været ratet D4 på grund af
systemiske datafejl.
Inddrivelse af gæld hos sårbare kunder
Resumé:
Danske Banks metode til gældsinddrivelse hos sårbare kunder er ved at blive undersøgt,
således at det kan fastslås, hvorvidt der tages tilstrækkeligt hensyn til disse kunders situation i
inkassoprocessen. En koncernpolitik er under udarbejdelse for at sikre en retfærdig og hensynsfuld
behandling af sårbare kunder på tværs af Danske Bank.
Renter på misligholdte lån
Resumé:
Problemstillingen vedrører situationer, hvor en kunde misligholder sin betalingsforpligtelse
på et lån, og hvor der opkræves en forkert rente i misligholdelsesperioden. Indikativt kan oplyses, at
den rente, som blev anvendt over for kunderne, var betydeligt lavere end standardrenten på
misligholdte lån.
Tableau-data på grundlag af DCS og PF
Resumé:
Den dårlige datakvalitet i systemerne blev indberettet i Tableau, som er bankens interne
data ase til opfølg i g på KPI’er. I d eret i gerne
fra Tableau var derfor unøjagtige, hvilket medførte
et mindre præcist grundlag for driftsmæssige beslutninger. Problemstillingen er løst af Customer
Service Delivery. Der er ikke udarbejdet nogen risikovurdering på grundlag af de tidligere forkerte data.
Advokatsalærer i retssager
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
Resumé:
Foreløbige undersøgelser har indikeret, at der var fejl i allokeringen af advokatsalærer i
specifikke sager før overgangen til DCS. Retspraksis er at allokere salærer tilkendt af retten og ikke de
faktiske salærer. Dette forhold er undersøgt yderligere, og der foretages stikprøvekontrol. Midtvejs i
forløbet er der ingen tegn på fejl.
Advokatsalærer indeholdt i hovedstolen
Resumé:
I sjældne tilfælde kan der i bedragerisager være risiko for, at advokatsalærer fejlagtigt er
medregnet i hovedstolen. Dette er imidlertid kun forkert, hvis de allokerede advokatsalærer er de
faktiske advokatsalærer og ikke de af retten tilkendte advokatsalærer. Denne mulige problemstilling
eksisterer kun, såfremt ovennævnte stikprøvekontrol mod forventning viser tegn på forkert allokering
af advokatsalærer.
Home-problemstilling
–
mæglersalærer
Resumé:
Dette er et område, hvor der kan have været en interessekonflikt vedrørende mæglersalærer
i for i delse ed ”volu tary defi it sales”. Pro le stilli ge vedrører ale e
home,
og proceduren er
rettet i juli 2019, så der tages højde for eventuelle problemstillinger. Det udpegede team har
identificeret problemstillingens karakter og konkluderet, at ejendommenes tilstand ikke blev taget i
betragtning i den oprindelige analyse. Projektet har analyseret hele porteføljen af kunder med
”volu tary defi it sales” og
udarbejdet en grundig analyse af de godkendte salærer for
salgsporteføljen.
Unøjagtig skatteindberetning
Resumé:
Det er muligt, at Danske Bank som følge af hovedårsag 1 har indberettet et forkert rentebeløb
til skattemyndighederne, hvilket i så fald har medført et forkert beløb for fradragsberettigede renter
for nogle kunder. Kunder, der har lidt et tab som følge af forkert skatteindberetning fra bankens side,
vil modtage fuld godtgørelse. Danske Bank har taget kontakt til skattemyndighederne vedrørende
dette forhold.
GDPR
Resumé:
Det er muligt, at der er visse dele af persondataforordningen, som Danske Bank ikke har
overholdt som følge af fejlbehæftede data i DCS og PF, og Danske Bank er i kontakt med Datatilsynet
vedrørende dette forhold.
Inkassobureauer
Resumé:
Danske Bank outsourcer inkassosager til en række inkassobureauer, der handler på vegne af
banken og bruger data, som leveres af banken. Banken er i gang med at vurdere og tage forbyggende
tiltag i forhold til potentielle yderligere problemstillinger.
Asset Finance
–
Nordania Finans
Resumé:
Der kan være privatkundeaftaler, hvor flere rykkergebyrer er blevet opkrævet flere gange,
end det er tilladt. På baggrund af Danske Banks undersøgelse af beregningen af renter på gebyrer har
Asset Finance fastslået, at der kan være en udfordring i forhold til opkrævning af morarenter på
rykkergebyrer i forbindelse med bankens erhvervsaftaler.
2
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
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Project Data Quality
Conference call
24
th
October 2019
 ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 412: Danske Banks redegørelse til Finanstilsynet om gældsinddrivelses sagen
2243786_0109.png
Introduction
Impact of system and control failures
Facts informed by Danske Bank
•
Approx. 600,000 cases (both active and historic)
in the DCS
•
80,000
–
130,000 active cases
•
Incorrect calculation of loans, interests, costs
and fees
•
Around 55 % of the active cases are estimated
to be flawed (based on actually recalculated by
the collection team today)
•
The financial size of customer claims cannot be
determined
•
Interviews with employees supports view as to
severity of the facts
Risks
•
Reputation
•
TAX
•
FSA
•
GDPR
•
Regulatory and Criminal Liability
•
Financial risk
•
Prudent Practice and Conduct
Remediation
•
Maintaining the reputation of Danske Bank,
•
Reimbursement of suffered losses, and
•
Develop a compliant debt collection framework
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High impact flaws
Examples of high impact flaws (pre and post 2004)
•
Improper integration of existing loans into DCS in 2004 resulting in interest and fees being merged and added to a single field/entry in the DCS system, which
uses the statute of limitation for the principle amount
•
The time limitation for principal and interest is generally counted from the time the debt is entered into DCS rather than from the time the debt was established
•
Statute-barred interest, costs and fee payments have incorrectly been included in settlement agreements entered with customers, and also in successful claims
made against customers in courts, estates etc.
The key impact of the system flaws
•
Customers in risk of overpaying
•
Customers have overpaid
•
Customers have paid debt that was statute-barred
•
Danske Bank has collected debt that was not owed
•
Danske Bank has submitted inaccurate tax reports to the Tax Agency
•
Inability to accept payments from debtors who wants to make total repayments on their outstanding debt
➢
It is not possible to "auto-correct" the incorrect debt calculations
➢
An update to the DFSA should be provided
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Tax
Tax reporting obligations
•
By law banks are required to report the interest of the customers on a
quarterly and annual basis to the Danish Tax Authorities. These reports will
affect the customers' ongoing tax returns.
–
The reporting deadline for Q3 2019 is on October 31, 2019.
•
Danske Bank will not be able to submit an accurate report for all
customers due to the systems flaws, and subsequent improper calculation
of interest etc.
•
It is a criminal offense to knowingly make inaccurate, misleading or
incomplete reports.
•
Historic tax assessments (10 years back) for the customers reporting
might have to be re-opened and re-calculated due to inaccurate reporting.
•
Pragmatic solution;
–
Engage with the Danish Tax Authorities og the Danish FSA to seek a
preliminary plan of actions.
Skatteindberetningsloven
§ 58
Den indberetningspligtige efter denne lov bortset fra § 41, der forsætligt
afgiver urigtige, vildledende eller ufuldstændige oplysninger, der resulterer i en
for lav skatteansættelse, straffes med bøde eller fængsel i indtil 1 år og 6
måneder, medmindre højere straf er forskyldt efter straffelovens § 289.
Stk. 2. Begås overtrædelsen i stk. 1 groft uagtsomt, er straffen bøde.
§ 59
Med bøde straffes den indberetningspligtige, der forsætligt eller groft
uagtsomt undlader at opfylde sine pligter efter § 23, stk. 1 eller 2, overtræder §
52, stk. 2, undlader at foretage indberetning efter §§ 1, 5, 6, 8, 11 a-19, 24-36,
37-40 eller 42, § 43, stk. 1, eller §§ 44-46 inden for fristerne i medfør af § 15,
stk. 2, § 39, § 42, stk. 3, eller § 54, stk. 1-4, eller § 4, stk. 1, i lov om et
indkomstregister, undlader at foretage genindberetning inden for den frist, som
told- og skatteforvaltningen har meddelt efter § 54, stk. 5, eller undlader at
opfylde pligten til at opbevare eller indsende materiale efter reglerne i § 56.
Stk. 2. I forskrifter, der udfærdiges i medfør af loven, kan der fastsættes straf af
bøde for den, der forsætligt eller groft uagtsomt overtræder bestemmelser i
forskrifterne.
§ 60
Der kan pålægges selskaber m.v. (juridiske personer) strafansvar efter
reglerne i straffelovens 5. kapitel.
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Regulatory and criminal investigations (prior "page 12")
The key tasks for Plesner in connection with the project is;
•
•
•
To describe the main flaws that have been identified in the system and associated processes,
To analyse and describe the main regulatory legal risks resulting from the identified flaws, and
To assist Danske Bank in identifying possible ways of solving the issues resulting from the system flaws
At present we have not made final assessments of whether or not Danske Bank is likely to be found in breach of the following (and some of
the points are outside our scope of work), however, at this stage it may be too premature to rule any of them out:
•
Market abuse
•
•
•
•
Governance failure
System and control failures
Fit and proper / accountability of senior management
Failure to manage conflicts of interest between Danske Bank and the customers
•
•
Long term failure to address known regulatory non-compliance in the collection systems
Potential Criminal charges (economic crime/fraud)
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Governance failures
•
The management body of a bank defines, oversees and is accountable for
the implementation of the governance arrangements to ensure effective
and prudent management of the bank.
•
Danske Bank is expected to take reasonable steps to ensure continuity and
regularity in the performance of their services, and employ appropriate
and proportionate systems, resources and procedures to achieve this.
–
–
To our knowledge; Senior management at Danske Bank has been
made aware of various system flaws pervasive in the debt collection
department.
Furthermore, at implementation of the DCS the system was known to
inhibit system flaws.
•
To our knowledge neither compliance or internal audit have been made
aware of, nor have they themselves identified the system flaws
•
Interviews with employees supports the above. Furthermore, it is our
understanding that senior management has been made aware of the
ongoing faulty collection of debt.
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Fit and proper
•
Senior management must at all times have sufficient knowledge,
professional competence and experience to perform their job concerned.
•
Failure to address known system flaws might represent a long-term and
repeat failure to address known regulatory non-compliance in the
collection systems, which in turn might demonstrate a lack of adequate
and timely remediation.
•
The DFSA will likely initiate an investigation as to who knew what and
when with particular focus on senior management.
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System and controls
•
Danske Bank is required to maintain robust systems and controls, as well
as sound administrative and accounting procedures.
•
System flaws (both pre- and post implementation of DCS in 2004) has
resulted in inaccurate calculation of loans, interests, costs and fees.
–
–
Interests, costs and fees incorrectly forms part of the principal
outstanding amount for the purposes of calculating new interests.
Statute-barred interest, costs and fees
–
and potential principal
amounts - have incorrectly been included in settlement agreements,
court decisions, notifications in various estates etc.
•
There is a risk that Danske Bank may be found to have failed to properly
adhere to organisational requirements under the Danish Financial Business
Act.
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Potential Criminal Charges
Specific obligations by law is imposed on the management and non-compliance or violation of such might lead to civil or criminal liability
•
At present it cannot be ruled out that members of the management/and relevant decision-makers (historic and present) may become
subject to criminal liability (fines and potentially imprisonment) due to having accepted continuing collecting of debt that were known to
possibly be incorrect
Danske Bank has made severe violations of proper debt collection management
Danske Bank has reported incorrect data to the Danish Tax Agency
•
•
A more detailed description and assessment will require a greater insight in the individual cases, the underlying documentation,
correspondence etc.
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Key non-financial risks (analysis not completed)
Key non-financial risks
Reputational damage
Comments
•
•
•
Failure of a bank to perform 'basic' services such as calculating principal amounts, interest and fees on loans correctly
Ongoing awareness of system issues poses a risk that this will be viewed as "yet another" example of bad culture in Danske Bank
Sanctions from the authorities
Stress and pressure
Backlog of 1,500 customers who wants to make repayments, but are awaiting manual re-calculation of their debt
Public disclosure risks causing huge increase in customer requests
Increased work-load and possible bad press will increase the risk of resignation by employees in the debt collection team, and in
particular in the correction team
The authorities will likely initiate an investigation into accountability, with initial focus on the management and possibly also a
subsequent investigation into individual employees
The DFSA will likely demand a timetable for resolving the issues including ongoing updates, primarily in respect of customers that
have paid too much, but also in respect of a future state solution
Employees leaving
•
•
•
•
Accountability of management and employees
Pressure on organisation to fix issue asap
•
•
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Key financial risks (analysis not completed)
Key financial risks
Repayments to the customers
Depreciation of debt that is actually time barred
Tax related liabilities
Sanctions from Tax Agency/SØIK
Sanctions from DFSA/SØIK
Comments
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The obligation to repay customers will result in a net loss
Debt registered in DCS as 'owed', but which is actually statute-barred will need to be depreciated
There is a risk that re-opening customers' annual tax assessments will result in "late payments" of the relevant taxes. Such a cost will
likely be borne by Danske Bank
Risk of being fined for having reported incorrect data to the Tax Agency (Skattestyrelsen)
Breach of conduct of business rules (god skik) for collecting debt that was statute-barred, or otherwise not owed by the customer
Governance failures for not resolving the issues despite escalation efforts made by employees and the continuation of debt collection
whilst knowing that the calculations might not be correct
Governance failures for not having sufficient systems in place
Customers and other third parties may claim against Danske Bank for damages for the consequences of incorrect debt collection
The DCS contains incorrect data on customers' debt and other personal data in breach of GDPR.
Due to the number of customers impacted by the issue, the costs in fixing the issue will likely be sizeable. Work on re-calculating debt
correctly will take a lot of effort and resource. The need to resolve the impact on customers' tax returns may be costly. Finding a new
solution for debt collection will naturally also be costly (we understand this aspect is already ongoing)
Damages for losses suffered by customers and
other third parties
Fine for GDPR-non compliance
Work to fix issues may be costly
•
•
•
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Q&A
12
RLESIMER
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Project overview
Governance structure
To respond to the new requests from DFSA the
programme is now organized to handle both
remediation and BaU activities
Executive
Steerco
ELT
SteerCo
Authorities
Communications
Programme
Manager
PMO
Group Recovery &
Debt Management
Insolvency
Remediation &
data analysis
Mitigate side
issues
Banking DK
GRDM SME’s
Corporate Functions (Finance, Legal, Risk, Compliance & Communications, etc.)
Internal and external resource suppliers
(IT, Integrators, Platform providers, Management Consultants, etc.)
0
0