UUI, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 68: Orientering om Udlændingestyrelsens landerapport vedrørende situationen for iranske kurdere i Iran og i det kurdiske selvstyreområde af Irak (KRI), fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2019-20
UUI Alm.del Bilag 68
Offentligt

COUNTRY REPORT

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)

February 2020

Iranian

Kurds

Consequences of political

activities in Iran and KRI

nyidanmark.dk

UUI, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 68: Orientering om Udlændingestyrelsens landerapport vedrørende situationen for iranske kurdere i Iran og i det kurdiske selvstyreområde af Irak (KRI), fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren

The Danish Immigration Service

Ryesgade 53

2100 Copenhagen

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

newtodenmark.dk

February 2020

The publication can be downloaded for free at newtodenmark.dk

The Danish Immigration Service’s publications can be quoted with clear source

reference.

Front page: Private photo from the Iranian province of Kurdistan.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Contents

Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction and methodology ............................................................................................................... 4

Abbreviations and definitions used in the report .................................................................................... 6

Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 10

Background.......................................................................................................................................... 11

The Iranian Kurdish political parties ............................................................................................................ 12

Historic overview ......................................................................................................................................... 12

The al Tash refugee camp (1982-2005) ....................................................................................................... 14

Recent developments .................................................................................................................................. 14

Activities carried out by Iranian Kurdish political parties in Iran ...................................................... 16

Recruitment of new members to the political parties ..................................................................... 16

Armed conflicts between Kurdish opposition parties and the Iranian Government ......................... 17

3.1

Recent clashes ................................................................................................................................. 18

Conditions of Kurdish activists in Iran ............................................................................................ 19

4.1

4.1.1

4.1.2

4.1.3

4.1.4

4.1.5

4.1.6

4.2

4.2.1

Treatment of activists by the Iranian authorities ............................................................................ 19

Targeting of political activists ...................................................................................................... 19

Do the authorities differentiate between members and supporters of the Kurdish parties? .... 20

Monitoring of activists ................................................................................................................. 20

Arrest and detention ................................................................................................................... 22

Torture and punishment.............................................................................................................. 24

Access to fair trial ........................................................................................................................ 25

geti g of a ti ists fa il

e s

........................................................................................... 27

Family members of political activists abroad .............................................................................. 28

Conditions for Iranian Kurds in KRI ................................................................................................ 28

5.1

Monitoring and targeting by Iranian authorities of Iranian Kurds living in KRI ............................... 28

5.1.1 The monitoring and targeting of political activists and supporters by the Iranian intelligence

authoritiesin KRI....................................................................................................................................... 29

5.2

5.2.1

5.2.2

Residence permits in KRI for Iranian Kurds ..................................................................................... 30

Access to residency in KRI............................................................................................................ 30

Obtaining Iraqi passports as Iranian Kurds .................................................................................. 31

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Returning to Iran ........................................................................................................................... 32

6.1

6.1.1

6.1.2

6.2

6.2.1

Se u it Lette s a a

a eh

..................................................................................................... 32

Activists who return..................................................................................................................... 32

Family members who return ....................................................................................................... 34

Al-Tash Refugees ............................................................................................................................. 35

Return of refugees from the al-Tash camp ................................................................................. 35

Conditions in the border area between Iran and Iraq ..................................................................... 36

7.1

7.2

Legal crossings ................................................................................................................................. 36

Illegal crossings ................................................................................................................................ 36

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 38

Oral sources ................................................................................................................................................. 38

Written sources ........................................................................................................................................... 39

Appendix 1: Meeting minutes............................................................................................................... 47

Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan - Geneva (KMMK-G) ................................................................ 47

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights ..................................................................................................... 59

Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) .................................................................................... 66

KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Residency, Erbil Province ...................... 70

KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Passports, Erbil Province ....................... 73

A journalist in KRI (A) ................................................................................................................................... 74

Written note, Academic Researcher, Hemn Seyedi .................................................................................... 76

A journalist in KRI (B) ................................................................................................................................... 78

Kurdistan Human Rights Network ............................................................................................................... 85

A journalist in KRI (C), Nasser Piroti ............................................................................................................. 92

A journalist in KRI (D) ................................................................................................................................... 99

Appendix 2: Terms of Reference (ToR) ................................................................................................ 102

Map: Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 103

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology.

The report is primarily based on

approved minutes from meetings with carefully selected sources; however, written material is used as well.

Statements from sources are used in the report and all statements are referenced.

This report is not, and does not purport to be a detailed or comprehensive survey of all aspects of the

issues addressed in the report and should be weighed against other available country of origin information

on conditions for Iranian Kurds, who are in opposition to the Iranian Government in Iran, and in Kurdistan

Region of Iraq (KRI).

The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations or analysis. The information in the report

does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to

refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal

position.

EASO, Country of Origin Information (COI), Report Methodology, June 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Introduction and methodology

The report at hand focuses on conditions for Iranian Kurds who are in opposition to the Iranian government

in Iran and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

The report is the product of a mission conducted by the Country of Origin Information Division, Danish

Immigration Service (DIS) to Erbil, KRI and Geneva, Switzerland.

The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information on issues recurring in cases regarding

Iranian Kurds in Denmark. The terms of reference (ToR) for the mission were drawn up by DIS, in

consultation with the Danish Refugee Appeals Board as well as an advisory group on COI

Referencegruppen

The ToR are included at the end of the report (Appendix 2).

Due to lack of access to sources inside Iran, and because of lack of presence of free media or international

media in the country, the sources consulted were mostly exiled Iranian Kurds based in KRI. These sources

are connected to people living in the Kurdish region of Iran, but due to their activities they are barred from

travelling back and forth to Iran; and their narratives may be shaped by the negative experiences they had

before they left Iran. Views from other types of sources such as scholars, international organisations and

diplomates may have given a more balanced impression of the situation. However, such sources were to a

large extent not available to the delegation. In this respect it is relevant to mention that a foreign academic

researcher, who is a specialist in Iran, who DIS formerly interviewed, is no longer granted visa to Iran. With

regard to access to diplomatic sources, a report by DIS and DRC published in 2018 was based on diplomatic

sources from Tehran who stated that it is difficult to gain insight into the situation in the Kurdish area in

Iran as access for many is restricted by the Iranian authorities.

In the process of compiling this report, the delegation consulted 11 sources in total, comprising journalists,

NGOs, local governmental authorities in KRI who were all interviewed orally as well as an academic

researcher who answered questions in writing. In addition, two international organisations were consulted

for background information.

The sources interviewed were selected by the delegation based on expertise, merit and role of each source

relevant to the mission.

The sources were asked how reference might be made to them in the report. Three out of eleven sources

were given anonymity for the sake of discretion and upholding tolerable working conditions, as well as for

personal safety.

The sources consulted were informed about the purpose of the mission and that their statements would be

included in a public report. The minutes from the meetings with the sources were forwarded to them for

approval, giving them a chance to amend, comment or correct their statements. Nine sources approved

their statements. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities Directorate of Residency as well as

Directorate of Passports did not reply to several requests for approval of the minutes of the meetings

before the finalisation of the report. The notes are included in the report in the forwarded form.

The group consists of the Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International in Denmark, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Dignity,

representatives of two Christian organisations (Danish European Mission and Open Doors), the National Commissioner of Police

and the Danish Bar and Law Society (representing asylum lawyers).

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

The epo t is a s thesis of the sou es state e ts a d thus does ot i lude all details a d ua es of

each statement. Written material has been included in the report where relevant. Care has been taken to

present the views of the sources as accurately and transparently as possible. The statements of all sources

are found in their full extent in Appendix 1 of this report.

Certain concrete cases that were mentioned by the sources are anonymized with regard to protection of

the person in question and their families.

During the interviews, the sources highlighted issues that are not addressed in the ToR. Since these issues

could be relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the meeting notes in

Appendix 1,

but they are not fully addressed in the report.

Norwegian Landinfo peer-reviewed the report as they simultaneously visited KRI with a focus on issues

relating to Iranian Kurds. Some information from their meetings is included in the report.

For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the meeting minutes in

Appendix 1

have been given consecutive numbers, which are used in the report when referring to the

statements of the sources in the footnotes. The intention hereby is to make it easier to find the exact place

of a statement in the meeting minutes.

Finally, attention should be called to the changeable situation in Iran and in KRI and the fact that the

information provided may quickly become out-dated. Therefore, the issues addressed in this report should

be monitored periodically and be brought up to date accordingly.

The research and editing of this report was finalised by 16 January 2020.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Abbreviations and definitions used in the report

Aman-

nameh

Asayish

Basij

In English: Security letter

Security service in KRI.

A paramilitary force

The document is issued by the Iranian authorities

enabling a person to return to Iran.

The KDP and PUK maintain separate security and

intelligence services.

The Basij are a volunteer-based paramilitary force

under IRGC control.

Country of Origin Information (COI) refers to

information about countries of origin, habitual

residence, and transit or return countries used in

procedures for the individual assessment of

applications for international protection.

The offi ial u e

of I a . I dail life, the to a is

often used. One toman is equivalent to ten rials.

Iran's elite military force responsible for protecting the

Islamic regime from internal and external threats. The

IRGC's role is enshrined in the constitution and it

answers only to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei, thus also endowing it with an enormous

range of legal, political and religious powers.

The IRGC itself is a somewhat decentralized system,

with ten regional headquarters, defending the regime

against both high-intensity warfare and low-intensity

internal challenges such as insurgency.

The IRGC Intelligence Service was established by

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1997 after the election of

reformist president Mohammad Khatami as an

alternative organisation with functions that parallel the

Ministry of Intelligence. The IRGC Intelligence Service

has largely taken over domestic security, though

Ministry of Intelligence shares responsibilities for

actively preventing internal unrest.

Also commonly referred to as Islamic state or by use of

the acronyms ISI [Islamic State in Iraq], ISIS [Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria], ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the

COI

Country of Origin Information

DIS

IRR

IRGC

Danish Immigration Service

Iranian Rial

The Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps

i Fa si: Sepah-e

Pasdaran-e

Enghelab-e Eslami-e

I a

IRGC

Intelligence

Service

Also named IRGC Intelligence

Organisation (IRGC-IO))

i Fa si: Saz a

-e

Ettela at-e

Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e

Esla i

Islamic State

Kurdish Human Rights Network: 271

USDOS

–

US Department of State:

Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq,

20 April 2018,

url

WINEP - Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

Iran's Basij Mull a Wider Domestic and Regional Role

(author: Farzin Nadimi),

20 December 2016,

url

, p. 18 ; United States Congressio

al Resea h Se i e,

Ira s Foreig a d Defe se Poli ies

, 15 June 2017,

url

EASO, Country of Origin Information (COI),

Report Methodology,

June 2019,

url

DW - Deutsche Welle:

What is Iran's Revolutionary Guard?,

13 October 2017,

url

WINEP - Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Saeid Golkar,

Iran's Coercive Apparatus: Capacity and Desire,

5 January 2018,

url

WINEP - Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

Iran's Widening Crackdown Pressures Rouhani,

November 25, 2015,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

KDPI

Democratic Party of Iranian

(also

Kurdistan

abbreviated: (Ḥez

-e

De okrāt-e Kordestā

PDKI)

e Īrā

)

KDP-Iran

KDP

Kurdistan Democratic Party

(KDP-Iran)

Kurdistan Democratic Party

Le a t] a d DAESH [A a i a o

fo : al-dawla

al-

islamiyya fii-il-i

aa a-ash-shaa

ea i g Isla i

State in Iraq and Syria/the Le

a t ]

The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was founded in

the city of Mahabad on 16 August 1945.

KDP-Iran broke off from KDPI in 2006.

One out of two dominating political parties and

governing powers in KRI. KDP is governing Dohuk and

Erbil Governorates.

KMMK-G is an independent organisation with no

political affiliation. It was established in 2006 to serve

as a bridge between the Kurdish civil society and the

United Nations (UN) agencies and international

institutions as well as Kurdish and Iranian civil society.

The kolbars, who are living in a poor region, are working

illegally and transporting consumer goods across the

border.

The Komala is an Iranian Kurdish Party established in

1969. Its members at the time consisted of Kurdish

leftist students and intellectuals mainly from Tehran but

also from other Kurdish towns. Founded on socialist

values, Komala fights for Kurdish rights and a

democratic, secular and pluralist federal Iran.

Komala was split into three or more parties.

Autonomy rule of Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which

includes Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimania Governorates.

Area, including Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimania

Governorates under autonomy rule by KRG.

The I a ia Pe al Code defi es oha e as so eo e

KMMK-G

The Association of Human

Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva

(KMMK-G)

Kolbar

Komala

Fa si a d Ku dish fo a ie of

ite s

(in plural: kolbaran)

Farsi and Kurdish for

g oup o

fo u

KRG

KRI

Mohareb

Kurdistan Regional Government

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

In English: a person who fights

Denmark, DIS,

Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council: The

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Access,

Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian Situation, Report from fact finding mission to Erbil, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

(KRI) and Beirut, Lebanon, 26 September to 6 October 2015,

url,

p. 8

Norway, Landinfo,

Query response Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 February 2017,

url,

p.3

Norway,

Landinfo,

Query response, Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 FEBRUARY 2017,

url

; party website of

KDP-I:

url

Denmark, DIS,

Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council:

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian Situation, Report from fact finding mission to Erbil, the Kurdistan Region

of Iraq (KRI) and Beirut, Lebanon, 26 September to 6 October 2015,

url,

pp.12-13

The Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan - Geneva (KMMK-G), About us, n.d.,

url

IHRDC: 134

Komala official website,

url

Middle East Research Institute (MERI),

Iran and its Opposition Kurdish Parties: The Need for Dialogue,

4 December

2016,

url;

A journalist in KRI (C): 294; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 251; Hengaw: 82

Kurdistan Regional Government,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

God

Ministry of

Intelligence

(in Farsi: Vezarat-e

Ettela at

Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran)

(formerly named: Ministry of

Intelligence and Security

(MOIS))

NGO

OHCHR

non-governmental organisation

The Office of the High

Commissioner for Human

Rights (UN Human Rights)

Kurdistan Freedom Party (Parti

Azadi Kurdistan)

Translates from Kurdish and

Farsi to "those who face death".

Kurdistan Free life Party (Hezb-

e Hayat-e Azad-e Kurdistan-e

Iran)

ho takes up a s ith the

intention of taking

people s li es, p ope t , o ho ou i o de to ause

fea a o g the i a a e that auses i se u it

(Article 279 of the Iranian Penal Code).

The Ministry of Intelligence is an entity that conducts

domestic surveillance to identify regime opponents and

seeks to penetrate anti-regime cells. Ministry of

Intelligence answers directly to the Supreme Leader of

Iran. Although the president appoints the head of the

ministry, the Supreme Leader must approve the

appointment, and the president cannot remove the

appoi tee ithout the Sup e e Leade s app o al.

Refers to organisations who are not affiliated with any

government.

The leading UN entity on human rights.

PAK

Peshmerga

PJAK

An Iranian Kurdish party based in KRI.

The military forces of the Kurdish parties.

PJAK was founded in the late 1990s as an independent

student-based human rights movement aiming to build

a Kurdish national identity. The group is based in the

Qandil Mountains in the border area of Iran, Iraq and

Turkey.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên

Kurdistan, PKK) was established in 1978 aiming to

create an independent Kurdish state in Turkey. The PKK

has been designated a terrorist organisation by some

states and organisations, including Turkey, the

European Union (EU), the US, and Canada.

PKK

Kurdistan Workers Party

Iran: Islamic Penal Code, 20 November 1991,

url

; KMMK-G:8

ACCORD

–

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation:

Iran: COI Compilation,

July 2018,

url,

pp. 70-72

OHCHR

–

Who we are,

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,

url

–

Amnesty International:

Urgent Action: 166/18 [MDE 13/9054/2018],

10 September 2018,

url

Deutsche Welle,

Peshmerga,

3 September 2019,

url

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae -

The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics, Kurdish political parties in Iran,

Simone Langanger,

2015,

url,

pp. 173-176 ; Jamestown Foundation,

Party for Free Life in Kurdistan: The PKK's Iranian Wing Bides Its Time,

15 January 2018,

url

IRB

–

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada:

Turkey: The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), including areas of

operation and targets, methods of recruitment and activities; state response [TUR104075.E],

15 June 2012, url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

PUK

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Toman

ToR

UNHCR

Iranian currency

Terms of Reference

United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees

One out of two dominating political parties and

governing powers in KRI. PUK is governing Sulaimania

Governorate.

I dail life, the to a is ofte used. O e

toman is

equivalent to ten rials (IRR).

The scope and limitations of an activity or area of

knowledge. (See appendix 2)

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is a global organisation

dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building

a better future for refugees, forcibly displaced

communities and stateless people.

Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council:

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian Situation, Report from fact finding mission to Erbil, the

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Beirut, Lebanon, 26 September to 6 October 2015,

url,

pp.12-13

UNHCR,

About us,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Executive summary

The presence of Kurdish political parties in Iran is limited due to the pressure from the authorities.

Nevertheless, the parties are able to encourage the population to go on strike and protest with political

messages against the Iranian government.

The Kurdish Region of Iran is militarised and the Iranian government is closely monitoring the Kurdish

population, through regular checkpoints. The government also monitors people through their use of

telecommunications as well as social media. Spies for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Intelligence Service are present in the Kurdish region, while some members of the local population are

working as informants for the Iranian authorities.

Clashes between the Iranian government and the Kurdish political parties have continued over the last

years, following two decades of ceasefire. In 2015, Kurdish the political party Democratic Party of Iranian

Kurdistan (KDPI) re-established its Peshmerga forces in the border areas, as did one of the Komala parties,

Komala-Party of Iranian Kurdistan, in 2017.

The government of Iran perceives any sort of political or civil activism as a potential threat; as such both

political activists and civil activists are at risk of being persecuted. Members and supporters of KDPI and

Komala are generally treated harsher than other activists in the Kurdish area. Typically, the Iranian

authorities do not differentiate between members and supporters of the parties. While the Iranian

authorities tend to accuse people who get arrested of being connected to these parties, this is not always

the case.

Arrests take place for many different reasons, including actual or perceived membership of or support for

the Kurdish opposition parties. Torture is most frequently used during the pre-investigation phase and is

used to compel confessions. Harsh sentences such as long term imprisonment and the death penalty are

more likely to be given to members and perceived members of the Kurdish political parties.

Family members to party members and supporters are also at risk of being questioned, detained and

arrested by the Iranian authorities that are using family members to put pressure on activists. Close family

members are more likely to be subjected to arrest than members of the extended family.

The Iranian authorities are present in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and monitor activists. Political

activists are pressured to stop their activities, some through their families back in Iran, instigated by the

Iranian authorities. The (Iranian) authorities are also responsible for killings of political activists as well as

armed attacks, for instance the missile attack on KDPI camps on 8 September 2018.

Failed asylum seekers returning to Iran from Europe are at risk of being interrogated, arrested and in some

cases tortured and killed if connected to political activism by the Iranian authorities. Iranian Kurds who are

etu i g to I a f o KRI a appl fo a se u it lette a a

a eh f o the I a ia autho ities i KRI

in order to return legally. However, some party members have been summoned, arrested and detained

despite having a security letter. A similar uncertainty applies to returnees from the al Tash refugee camp

who are perceived of having a history of cooperation with the Kurdish opposition parties.

Despite intensified border control by the Iranian authorities, particularly the IRGC, it is still possible to cross

the border illegally. However, the transportation of goods across the border is taking place at a high risk, as

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

the IRGC has been killing persons who crosses the border illegally. The casualty figures for January to

October 2019 were 61 people killed and 150 people were injured.

Background

Fact box: Kurdish population in the Middle East

An estimated 25-35 million Kurds live across the broader Middle East. The majority of the Kurdish

population live in north-western Iran, northern Iraq, north-eastern Syria, south-eastern Turkey and

south-western Armenia; a region which is referred to as Kurdistan by ethnic Kurds.

28,

The Kurds

constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East.

In Iran there is an estimated Kurdish

population of 11-13 million.

Map:

Kurds in the Middle East

BBC,

Who are the Kurds?,

url

; BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger,

Peter [eds.]) (Author), published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum,

COI unit): regiones et res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics, A religious landscape of the

Kurds 2015,

url,

pp. 22-24

BBC,

Who are the Kurds?

url

KMMK-G: 2

Source: BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): Atlas Syria, July

2015,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

The Iranian Kurdish political parties

Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)

The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was founded in the city of Mahabad on August 16, 1945. On the

offi ial KDPI e site, it is stated that the ai of the pa t is

to attain Kurdish national rights within a

federal and demo

rati Ira

KDPI is traditionally regarded as the largest of the Iranian-Kurdish parties.

KDP-Iran broke off from KDPI in 2006 and is a separate party.

Komala

The Komala Party was established in 1969. Its members at the time consisted of Kurdish leftist students and

intellectuals mainly from Tehran but also from other Kurdish towns. Founded on socialist values, Komala

fights for Kurdish rights and a democratic, secular and pluralist federal Iran.

Komala consists of three or

more separate parties.

Th ee of the a e a ed the Ko ala Pa t of I a ia Ku dista , the Ko ala

u ist Pa t of Ku dista a d the

Komala Communist Party in Iran .

PJAK (Kurdistan Free life Party)

PJAK was founded in the late 1990s as an independent student-based human rights movement aiming to

build a Kurdish national identity. The group is based in the Qandil Mountains in the border area of Iran, Iraq

and Turkey. As opposed to Komala and KDPI, PJAK does not rely on the support of Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG).

Historic overview

The first and only Kurdish Republic

In 1946, with support from the Soviet Union (who occupied the northern parts of Iran, while the British

Empire occupied southern parts) the first and only Kurdish Republic was established, situated in the city of

Mahabad. Shortly after the establishment of the republic, the Soviet Union sided with Iran for oil related

gains, and Iranian troops recaptured Mahabad in December 1946. KDPI played an important role in the

proclamation of the Kurdish Republic. However, in the aftermath of its collapse, the KDPI saw a period of

diminishing capacities and a lessened influence. A number of KDPI leaders were either imprisoned or

executed and the party therefore started operating underground in the years to come.

Iranian Kurdish resistance after the Revolution in 1979

Under the leadership of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, KDPI actively supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution,

hoping to claim their right of autonomy in a democratically ruled Iran. At this time, the party managed to

KDPI official website,

url

Norway, Landinfo,

Query response Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 February 2017,

url,

p.3

Norway, Landinfo, Query response. Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran, 13 February 2017,

url,

p. 1

Komala official website,

url

Middle East Research Institute (MERI),

Iran and its Opposition Kurdish Parties: The Need for Dialogue,

4 December

2016,

url;

A journalist in KRI (C): 294;

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 251; Hengaw: 82

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics,

Kurdish political parties in Iran

2015,

url,

pp. 173-176;

Jamestown Foundation,

Party for Free Life in Kurdistan: The PKK's Iranian Wing Bides Its Time,

15 January 2018,

url

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics,

Kurdish political parties in Iran

2015,url,p. 165

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

build up an organisation with strong ties to the Kurdish population. Exiled party leaders returned or were

released from prison and with the assistance of Kurdish army officers, KDPI built up a strong organisation.

However, Ayatollah Khomeini banned the Kurdish parties and they were forced to operate in secrecy. Both

KDPI and Komala took up armed struggle against the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Armed clashes regularly

occurred between the parties and the Iranian government. In 1983, when the government regained control

of the Kurdish areas, the attacks on the parties intensified and resulted in both parties fleeing to Northern

Iraq, where they established their main bases.

Iranian agents allegedly assassinated Ghassemlou in August 1989 in Vienna and his successor Sadiq

Sharafkindi three years later in Berlin. Mustafa Hijri became the new leader of the KDPI.

In 1996 KDPI declared a unilateral ceasefire with Iran that was generally observed for the next two decades.

KDPI transferred its forces from the border areas near Iran and further into KRI.

Similarly, Komala put a

halt to their armed activities and also relocated their Peshmerga troops.

Since 2004, PJAK started

launching attacks against Iran, until it declared a ceasefire in 2011, though sporadic armed encounters with

the Iranian security forces occurred.

Reviving the armed struggle

In May 2015, KDPI began re-establishing its guerrilla forces in the border areas between KRI and Iran.

Similarly, in late April 2017, one of the Komala parties, Komala-Party of Iranian Kurdistan, deployed their

forces in the border area between KRI and Iran.

More recently, on 8 September 2018, Iran attacked both

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics,

Kurdish political parties in Iran

2015,url,p. 168

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics,

Kurdish political parties in Iran

2015,url,p. 167; Komala

official website,

url;

David McDowall (2000)

A Modern History of the Kurds,

Taurus,

url,

p. 272-274; Washington Post,

Khomeini Orders Offensive Against Kurdish Capital, 20 August 1979,

url;

Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of

Canada,

Iran: Update to IRN29342.E of 15 May 1998; information on Komala, a Kurdish Party in Kurdistan, Iran; its

activities inside and outside Iran; radio broadcasts, magazines and political publications; names of its leaders,

branches; treatment of its members by the government,

28 February 2002, IRN38663.E,url

BMI - Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author),

published by BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et

res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion - Language - Politics,

url,

p.169

Norway, Landinfo,

Query response Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 February 2017,

url

, p. 3

Rudaw,

Kurdish party resumes armed struggle against Iran, third party to do so,

30 March, 2017,

url

Jamestown Foundation,

Party for Free Life in Kurdistan: The PKK's Iranian Wing Bides Its Time,

15 January 2018,

url;

Rudaw,

PJAK War s Ira of Retri utio for Leader s E e utio ,

27 October, 2013,

url:

BMI - Bundesministerium für

Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]) (Author), published by BFA Staatendokumentation

(Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit): regiones et res publicae - The Kurds: History - Religion

- Language - Politics,

url,

p.173

Rudaw,

Kurdish party resumes armed struggle against Iran, third party to do so,

30 March, 2017,

url;

Komala-Party

of Iranian Kurdistan confirmed to Landinfo in a meeting on 29 October 2019 that the party deployed their forces. The

party denied having declared to resume armed struggle (email from Landinfo dated 20 December 2019).

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

KDPI bases in Koya in KRI.

For further reading on the armed struggle, please refer to chapter 3 Armed

conflicts between Kurdish opposition parties and the Iranian government.

The al Tash refugee camp (1982-2005)

During the Iran-I

a a i the

s thousa ds of I a ia Ku ds fled to I a . While a part

of the refugees

were people from border areas whose homes had been destroyed or occupied, others were members of

Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, particularly KDPI.

In 1982 the Iranian Kurdish refugees were all relocated to Al-Tash Refugee Camp, a controlled refugee

camp in Al-Anbar Province 145 km west of Baghdad.

According to UNHCR, 12,000 Iranian Kurds spent

more than 20 years in the camp.

Upo the fall of Sadda Hussei s egi e i

a d due to i easi gl diffi ult li i g a d se u it

conditions, 3,200 Al-Tash refugees moved to Sulaimania Governorate in KRI on their own initiative and they

were assisted by the local authorities, UNHCR and other agencies to resettle. The refugees, who settled in

KRI, either reside in rented accommodations or are now accommodated in the Kawa Refugee Camp near

Erbil and the Barika Refugee Camp near Sulaimania.

According to sources in these camps, many of the

residents have connections to the KDPI and Komala, and some have relatives in the camps of these

parties.

Recent developments

Since the approval of the meeting minutes included in this report, the situation in Iran has changed rapidly.

During November 2019, protests took place in more than 100 cities across Iran sparked by a hike in fuel

prices instated by the government. The government cracked down on the protesters in a violent manner

resulting in at least 200 people dead and 7,000 arrested.

Since 16 December 2019, Amnesty International

documented 304 deaths.

According to Hengaw, the number of deaths was relatively high in the Kurdish

populated provinces compared to other provinces of the country: Javanroud, Kermanshah province: 14;

Sp e , Jo atha , Ja e s I tellige e Re ie , Ja ua

Border crossings,

p. 26

UNHCR, Iraq,

Iranian Kurds to be transferred from insecure Al Tash camp,

11 October, 2005,

url;

UNHCR,

Iranian

refugees flee Al Tash camp,

8 July, 2003, and Human Rights Watch,

Flight From Iraq,

9 May 2003,

url

UNHCR, Iraq,

Iranian Kurds to be transferred from insecure Al Tash camp,

11 October, 2005,

url;

UNHCR,

Iranian

refugees flee Al Tash camp,

8 July, 2003, and Human Rights Watch,

Flight From Iraq,

9 May 2003,

url

UNHCR, Iraq: Iranian Kurds to be transferred from insecure Al Tash camp, 11 October 2005,

url

UNHCR, Iraq,

Iranian Kurds to be transferred from insecure Al Tash camp,

11 October, 2005,

url;

UNHCR,

Iranian

refugees flee Al Tash camp,

8 July, 2003, and Human Rights Watch,

Flight From Iraq,

9 May 2003,

url

Switzerland: Federal Office for Migration,

Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission to Amman and the

Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area,

May 10-22, 2011, 1 February 2012,

url,

p. 77

The Chatham House,

As Parlia e tar Ele tio s Loo , the Legiti a of Ira s Regi e Has Bee Shake

, 5

December 2019,

url

AI - Amnesty International,

Iran: Thousands arbitrarily detained and at risk of torture in chilling post-protest

crackdown,

16 December 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Kermanshah, Kermanshah province: 16; Mariwan, Kurdistan province: 9; Sanandaj, Kurdistan province: 1.

Hengaw identified a number of the Kurdish protesters who were killed.

AI - Amnesty International,

Iran: More than 100 protesters believed to be killed as top officials give green light to

crush protests, 19 November 2019,

url

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights,

45 Kurdish protesters killed and the identity of 20 has been verified,

November 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

1. Activities carried out by Iranian Kurdish political parties

in Iran

The level of civil political activities conducted by the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, specifically KDPI and

Komala in Iran is generally limited due to the scrutiny they are faced with. When the parties do conduct civil

political activities, this is done in secrecy to prevent the authorities clamping down on them. However, the

parties support the activities of others, such as organisations that focus on environmental issues as well as

social issues.

The Kurdish political parties are conducting propaganda activities to create awareness regarding the Iranian

go e

e t s

policies, encouraging people to protest by various peaceful and resolution oriented methods,

such as demonstrations, general strikes and symbolic means, like wearing Kurdish clothes on special

occasions.

Most activities carried out by the Kurdish parties take place in public spaces, including schools. For instance,

when the anniversary of the assassination of KDPI leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou occurs or the

anniversary of the foundation of Kurdistan Republic in Iran, letters are hung on government buildings to

inform people of these anniversaries. The parties usually encourage their members, supporters and the

public to undertake actions through social media, TV, and radio channels.

Two recent examples of activism that the Kurdish parties managed to organise are:



Following the attack by the Iranian government on the bases of KDPI and KDP-Iran bases in Koya on

8 September 2018, Iranian Kurdish parties coordinated and called on the population to go on strike

in order to express their condemnation of this attack, and their solidarity with the parties and the

i ti s fa ilies. Follo i g the all, a idesp ead st ike took pla e i

o e tha

15 cities. On that

day, stores and bazaars were closed.

In October 2019, on the urging of the Iranian Kurdish parties, people in most of the cities went on

a hes as a o de atio of Tu ke s atta k o S ia s Ku ds.



2. Recruitment of new members to the political parties

The rules for membership of the Iranian Kurdish political parties Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)

and Komala are not always straight forward, and it can be obtained through different procedures. People in

the Kurdish region of Iran can become members of the political parties through the secret networks of

these parties, or they can themselves contact members of the party in KRI and become members.

Those

ho a t to joi the pa t s a ks di e tl , ha e to

approach

these pa ties e tres

in KRI.

If they have not

IHRDC: 195

A journalist in KRI (C): 289; Kurdish Human Rights Network: 252;

KMMK-G: 22-23

Sp e , Jo atha , Ja e s I tellige e Re ie , Ja ua

Border crossings,

p. 26; A journalist in KRI (C): 293

A journalist in KRI (C): 293

A journalist in KRI (C): 303

A journalist in KRI (C): 303; KMMK-G: 27

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

committed any violations, such as theft, murder or similar, and the parties are ensured that they have not

been sent as spies, they will be accepted.

A person, who comes to Erbil and Sulaimania to join one of the parties, will go through a background check,

before they become a member to make sure that the new member is not part of or affiliated with the

Iranian intelligence authorities.

The same procedure applies to new members in Europe.

The Ministry of

Intelligence and IRGC threaten or bribe some people and use them as spies in their service where they are

se t to the pa ties

centres.

For further information on recruitment, please refer to Appendix 1, KMMK-G: 24-26 and a journalist in KRI

(A): 170.

3. Armed conflicts between Kurdish opposition parties

and the Iranian Government

Previously the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) halted the armed struggle. However, since the 1996

cease-fire, the government of Iran has increased its military presence in the Kurdish region of Iran

In February 2016, the KDPI leader, Mostafa Hijri announced that the party would re-launch their armed

operations after two decades of silence. Other Iranian Kurdish opposition parties followed and also sent

their forces to the border area.

In late April 2017,

o e of the Ko ala pa ties, Ko ala-Party

of Iranian

Ku dista

resumed its armed resistance against Iran and deployed their forces in the border area between

KRI and Iran.

One source noted that activities by KDPI at the border are limited. This is partly due to the presence of the

PKK main base. PKK have good relations with the Iranian authorities.

Clashes between the Iranian authorities and the Peshmergas mostly occur inside the Iranian Kurdish region,

when the Peshmergas go to the towns and villages. The Peshmergas most commonly travel in smaller

groups.

For example, a local journalist in KRI (A) explained that in August 2019, the Peshmergas of KDPI and Komala

were planning a mission to the Iranian border cities Sardasht, Marivan, Piransahr and Shino. The Iranian

A journalist in KRI (C): 303

KMMK-G: 28

A journalist in KRI (C): 304

MAR

–

Minorities at Risk: Chronology for Kurds in Iran, 16 July 2010,

url;

KMMK-G: 19

National Endowment for Democracy, Taimoor Aliassi,

Enough is Enough: Iranian Kurds Running Out of Patience

2 August 2016,

url;

KMMK-G: 19; IHRDC:114; A journalist in KRI (C): 297

Rudaw,

Kurdish party resumes armed struggle against Iran, third party to do so,

30 March, 2017,

url

Journalist in KRI (A): 172

KMMK-G:55; Hengaw:107; A journalist in KRI (A): 165

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

authorities became aware of this mission after a local family under threat reported it to them. To counter

the Peshmergas, the Iranian authorities relocated their military forces to these cities.

3.1

Recent clashes

According to a journalist in KRI (B), forces of all Kurdish parties are operating in the Qandil and Halgurd

Mountains. The area is outside control of both Iranian and Iraqi authorities and there is no clear border.The

IRGC have tried several times to take control of the mountains, but so far they have not succeeded.

In the past few years, there has been a gradual increase of military activity among some Iranian-Kurdish

pa ties i I a s o th-western

provinces West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah.

The Iranian

military guards the border more intensely; a development that was triggered by KDPI moving their bases to

the Qandil Mountains in 2016. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

a d I a s ilita

have attacked Kurdish opposition bases inside KRI several times with the use of missiles and artillery fire.

These attacks incurred great material damages to the inhabitants of the border areas, and several civilian

residents were also injured.

From May to September 2016, armed conflicts between Kurdish guerrilla forces and Iranian security forces

were reported almost weekly. In the past decade, it was mainly the Kurdish party PJAK that had military

operations in north-western Iran. But since May 2016, the parties KDPI, KDP-I and PAK have also

participated in military operations against Iranian security forces. All of these parties operate from military

bases and camps in Northern Iraq. The IRGC has also strengthened its presence in the region in the same

period and has attacked Kurdish villages on both the Iranian and Iraqi sides of the north-western border of

the country.

For number of clashes and casualty figures, please refer to Appendix 1, Hengaw: 108-110, 113 and KMMK-

G: 55 and A journalist in KRI (C): 318.

A few sources referred to meetings held in Norway, in which the Iranian government and the Iranian

Kurdish parties had engaged in talks to prevent clashes. Due to these talks, the clashes this year have

decreased compared to previous years.

A Journalist in KRI (A): 172; Rudaw,

IRGC kills two members of a Kurdish opposition group in western Iran,

28-08-

2019,

url

Journalist in KRI (B):249-250

Norway, Landinfo,

Query response Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 February 2017,

url,

p.1

KMMK-G: 55; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 254; Journalist in KRI (C): 298; Hengaw: 104; A journalist in KRI (A):

167, 173

Norway, Landinfo,

Query response Iran: Increased Kurdish military activity in Iran,

13 February 2017,

url,

p.1

Hengaw:106; A journalist in KRI: 334; Iran Wire,

Kurdish-Iranian Talks: Hope for Peace or Just Another Political

Stunt?,

17 July 2019,

url;

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

4. Conditions of Kurdish activists in Iran

4.1

Treatment of activists by the Iranian authorities

In Iran, any sort of political or civic activism that falls outside the purview of the Government creates

suspicion.

In particular in the Kurdish region, any activity is seen through a security lens; even civil and

cultural activities are often interpreted as political. Therefore, individuals conducting civil or cultural

activities are suppressed.

Many organisations and NGOs are active in the Kurdish region of Iran. These activities include organising

suppo t fo o e a d hild e s ights, e i o e tal asso iatio s a d lite a asso iatio s.

The

autho ities o side this t pe of a ti it as pote tiall ei g agai st I a s atio al se u it .

The sources gave some examples that are known to the public of civilian activism targeted by the

authorities:



In August 2018, four environmental activists died in an attempt to extinguish a fire in a forest near

Marivan. The fire was caused by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Service

bombing, as they were shelling Kurdish armed groups.

The director of the organisation named Noujin, Zara Mohamedi, has been in prison since she was

arrested by the intelligence forces on 23 May 2019 in Sanandej for teaching the Kurdish language

to children.

On 4 July 2018, the Intelligence Service arrested a civilian activist named Orfan Rashidi, in the town

of Paveh in Kermanshah Province, who assisted earth quake victims and extinguished forest fires.

He was accused of

p opaga da agai st the state a d se te ed i ou t to o e ea i p iso a d

banned for two years from carrying out civilian activities. The court also banned him from leaving

Iran for three years.



4.1.1 Targeting of political activists

As Kurdish opposition parties are illegal in Iran, the Iranian government treats members and those, who

support them, more harshly than civil activists in the Kurdish region and will be accused of severe

violations.

According to one source, even if they carry out simple activities, such as participating in an

UN General Assembly (GA),

Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Report of the Special

Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

[A/72/322], 14 August 2017,

url,

p.8;

IHRDC: 125; Amnesty International (AI),

Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - The State of the World's Human

Rights - Iran,

url,

Freedom House,

Freedom in the World 2018

–

Iran, January 2018

url;

IHRDC: 125

KMMK-G: 42, 56; Academic Researcher:168

A journalist in KRI (C): 290

Hengaw: 72 - -74; A journalist in KRI (B): 209; Kurdistan24,

Four Kurdish environmentalists die while extinguishing

forest fire in Iran: Rights Group,

25 August 2018,

url

KMMK-G: 16; A journalist in KRI (B): 209; PEN International, Statement,

Iran: detention of mother tongue volunteer

teacher,

10 June 2019,

url

A journalist in KRI (B); Kurdistan Human Rights Network,

Iran to Jail Kurdish Environmental Activist,

18 September

2019,

url

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 254; A journalist in KRI (C): 309-310

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

assembly of protesters or participating in a general strike, they will be accused of cooperating with

opposition parties.

Examples on political activist who are targeted by the Iranian Government are given in section 4.1.5.2

Punishment.

4.1.2 Do the authorities differentiate between members and supporters of the

Kurdish parties?

A journalist in KRI (C) stated that most of the time the government of Iran does not differentiate between

party members and supporters of the Kurdish political parties or even independent activists.

One of the

Komala parties, the Komala-Party of Iranian Kurdistan, informed Landinfo that if the Iranian authorities

reveal that a person is a party member, s/he will be punished harder that other activists.

Likewise, KDP-

Iran informed Landinfo that those who are affiliated with the party will be punished harder by the Iranian

authorities than those without affiliation.

The targeting of individuals is arbitrary and varies from case to case. Whether or not the Iranian

government makes a distinction between the targeting of party members and supporters depends, among

other things, on the intelligence officer in charge.

4.1.3 Monitoring of activists

The government considers the activities of the Kurdish political parties as dangerous. Therefore, more

effort is put into identifying and monitoring individuals, who work for these parties.

Any sort of political or

civic activism that falls outside the purview of the government creates suspicion and it raises the risk of

being monitored.

In the Kurdish areas of the country, the risk of being monitored increases if an individual engages in any

sort of activism and the level of monitoring in the Kurdish areas is higher than the average level of

monitoring across the country.

In May 2015, when KDPI decided to restart their military operations, the

monitoring by the authorities was intensified.

Party members are trained to protect themselves when conducting activities for the party. Party

supporters, however, do not usually receive such training and they may not be prepared sufficiently.

Considering that the government has a cyber-army monitoring social media, in some cases, the government

can identify supporters through social media activities. Therefore, supporters are also in danger of being

identified and contacted.

See also section 4.1.3.2 Monitoring of infrastructure and communication channels.

A journalist in KRI (C): 309-310

A journalist in KRI (C): 307.

Meeting held on 29 October 2019 (email from Landinfo dated 20 December 2019).

Meeting held on 1 November 2019 (email from Landinfo dated 10 December 2019).

KMMK-G: 31, 33

Kurdish Human Rights Network: 252

Hengaw: 75; IHRDC: 125

Hengaw: 66; IHRDC: 122, 125

KMMK-G: 38

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 261

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

4.1.3.1

Legislation on monitoring by the authorities

According to information from the UN Human Rights Council, the Iranian authorities have continuously

increased their surveillance capabilities. Since the introduction of new regulations in August 2017, the

authorities are allowed to monitor private accounts and to control national search engines. In November

2018, the government

p oposed a e ill o the o ga isatio of so ial esse ge s .

The bill is yet to be

passed by the Iranian parliament.

4.1.3.2

Monitoring of infrastructure and communication channels

The Kurdish area is militarized;

there is about 1,800 checkpoints, a number of military compounds and a

high security presence.

The authorities monitor the population through these checkpoints and arrest

individuals that are suspected of being politically affiliated.

Furthermore, and as already mentioned, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) created a cyber-

army consisting of an estimated 45,000 personnel whose main task is to monitor and collect information on

people opposing the Iranian government, including critics, academics, intellectuals, students and

activists.

100

Moreover, a separate department by the IRGC Intelligence Service has been established in the

Kurdish area.

101

As part of this monitoring the authorities monitor

i di iduals

phone calls and use of social media. In cases

where the objective is to collect information on a person, the authorities will monitor his social media

accounts to monitor

hat he is doi g. The autho ities a also liste to a pe so s pho e alls to o tai

knowledge on who he is talking to and about what. By use of GPS, the authorities will locate and arrest the

person.

102

In addition to the use of social media and phone calls for monitoring, the journalist in KRI (B) explained that

there are also a lot of spies in the Kurdish cities. The spies are working for the Ministry of Intelligence or the

IRGC I tellige e Se i e. The a e alled the A o

ous Soldie s , hi h ea s the use a pseudo

instead of their real names, making it difficult to identify them.

103

People from the local population also work as informants, but it is not known who these individuals are.

They have their own identity card. In order to remain anonymous, they do not tell anyone that they work

for the Ministry of Intelligence or the IRGC Intelligence Service.

104

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General [A/HRC/40/24], 8 February 2019,

url,

p.11

Tasnim,

Debating of the report of Islamic Parliament Research Center on [the bill regarding] the organisation of

social messengers in the parliament,

7 December 2019,

url

KMMK-G: 39

KMMK-G: 39; Hengaw: 60

Hengaw: 60

100

KMMK-G: 39

101

Hengaw: 66

102

A journalist in KRI (B): 196-197

103

A journalist in KRI (B): 199

104

A journalist in KRI (B): 201

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Examples of monitoring:



The Kurdish labor activist, Mahmoud Salehi, who had been affiliated with a political party during

the eighties, was arrested for his labor activism. When he was arrested, the authorities brought

forward old information relating to his previous political activities and they attempted to convict

him on these grounds. Thus monitoring goes back a long time. Mahmoud Salehi was first sentenced

to i e ea s i p iso e t, ut

after appeal his sentence was reduced to one year

imprisonment.

105

Recently, a young man was arrested in Urumieh. He was accused of sending news about Kurdish

parties by his Telegram app. In fact, they did not arrest him for having contact with a political party.

The reason for arresting him was the news that he sent about political parties.

106



4.1.4 Arrest and detention

4.1.4.1

Risk faced by political activists of getting arrested

According to a UN report, discrimination in the administration of justice has been illustrated by the

disproportionate number of arrests of members of minority groups, including Kurds.

107

The majority of the arrested people are not party members, but rather supporters or people who are not

affiliated with a political party.

108

Several sources noted that people without affiliation to the political

parties who conduct activities which the government perceives as being against its interests, may still

arbitrarily be subject to arrest.

109

However, the likelihood of getting arrested generally increases on the

basis of the level of involvement for members as well as supporters.

110

The authorities assume that every active Kurdish individual is connected to a political party.

111

People who

are arrested are therefore often accused of membership of such. Many individuals, who are accused of

having ties with Kurdish political parties, can in fact be innocent.

112

A source stressed that people get arrested for many different reasons, including being a family member of

someone who is in prison, or being in support of an idea that goes against the ideology of the Iranian

government.

113

The same source gave an example of a young man who had no political affiliation. The

young man walked by a demonstration without participating, but he was subsequently arrested for one

IHRDC: 122

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 262; KMMK,

Increased Imprisonment Sentence for Telegram Channel Admin

Detained at Orumiyeh Central Prison,

26 December 2018,

url

107

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of

Iran [A/HRC/40/67], 30 January 2019,

url,

p. 4

108

A journalist in KRI (C): 307; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 253, 259-260; KMMK-G: 31;

109

KMMK-G: 31, 33; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 259; A journalist in KRI (C): 307

110

IHRDC: 119

111

A journalist in KRI (C): 307-308, 315; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 259-260

112

A journalist in KRI (C): 307-308, 315; A journalist in KRI (B): 203; IHRDC: 121; A journalist in KRI (B): 248

113

KMMK-G: 40

106

105

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

month and was tortured during this time. After his release, he was given a paper by the authorities stating

that he was arrested, because he was a member of the terrorist organisation Islamic State.

114

4.1.4.2

Procedures from arrest to verdict

According to Iranian law, an individual must be transferred to court within a month of his/her arrest.

115

However, according to sources, when someone, who is suspected of being a political activist or other kind

of activist, is arrested, s/he will be detained for an unknown period. The sources estimated from 40 days to

a year, and the person will be investigated and exposed to psychological and physical torture. If the

detainee does not confess to the charges, the torture will be harsher.

116

During the detention period, the

prisoners are kept in a military intelligence facility without anyone knowing of their location.

117

Following the investigation, s/he will be transferred to court where a bail will be set. The size of the bail is

decided by the court depending on the charges. For political and security charges, the bail is more than 200

million tomans (approximately 15,000 US Dollars).

118

If the bail is paid, the detainee will be temporarily released until the next court date is set during which the

penalty will be decided on. Following the courts judgement,

the se te e ill e de ided at

the Ruling

I ple e tatio B a h Sho e e Ej a e Ahka , also also alled Ej a e Ahka . If s/he is gi e a p iso

sentence s/he will then be transferred to a prison. In cases of political charges it is sometimes possible to

be released temporarily on bail. If a person manages to flee while on bail, the government will confiscate

the bail.

119

After this period, convicted persons will be transferred to another prison in which the torture is less harsh;

however, they will not be given enough sleep and food. These conditions are, according to one source,

worse in the Kurdish region than in the rest of Iran. One source noted that Kurds are given harsher

treatment during imprisonment than other Iranian nationals.

120

A source highlighted that the security services do not have a uniform procedure within a legal framework

for treatment of detainees. They can torture the detainee, or they can keep him/her in solitary

confinement for a long time. They can deny him/her contact or visit of family or access to an attorney.

121

4.1.4.3

The silencing of politically affiliated prisoners by the authorities

A source pointed to the fact that in some cases, individuals who are members of an opposition party, but

are not active in public, are arrested quietly in the sense that the media is not informed. In some cases no

KMMK-G: 41

Iran: Criminal Code of Procedure for Public and Revolutionary Courts (repealed), 19 September 1999,

url

Article 33

– A de isio for te porar dete tio is ade a d issued the ourt s judge a d is approved the dire tor

of the District Court or his assistant, and review [of that decision] can be requested in the Court of Appeal of that

province within 10 days. The process of reconsideration by the Court of Appeal [can be immediate; the case need not

be put in a queue]. In any case, the status of the accused shall be verified within a month, and if the respective judge

considers the continuation of temporary detention necessary, it should be performed as explained.

116

Hengaw: 87; A journalist in KRI (B): 220, 225; A journalist in KRI (C): 311

117

Hengaw: 87

118

A journalist in KRI (B): 221

119

A journalist in KRI (B): 222-223

120

Hengaw: 88

121

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 279

115

114

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

o e is i fo ed of these detai ees o ditions,

as the media does not mention it, until the court hands

down its verdict. In some instances the individual may be released, but does not want his/her name

pu lished, fo e a ple e ause the pe so s fa il has ee u de p essu e. I su h ases, o one

will

k o a out the i di idual s elease.

122

4.1.5 Torture and punishment

4.1.5.1

Torture and ill-treatment

According to the UN Human Rights Council, torture and other ill-treatment to compel confessions is most

frequent in Iran during the initial investigative stage. This pattern has been reported particularly in the

cases of vulnerable groups, including minority groups.

123

In terms of torture of politically affiliated people, other sources corroborated that torture was used to

extract confessions or information about their connection with opposition parties.

124

If the Iranian authorities notice that someone is affiliated with one of the opposition parties, s/he is at risk

of being arrested and detained and be subjected to torture, including execution simulations. There are

examples of detainees who were wounded due to the ill-treatment and died in detention.

125

Once an

individual is arrested, s/he will be in danger of being tortured, regardless of actual political views or

affiliation.

126

4.1.5.2

Punishment

As previously mentioned, arrested party members will be in danger of being tortured, and s/he is in risk of

being sentenced to death.

127

Examples of punishment and torture of political prisoners



In a case monitored by the UN, Kurdish prisoners Zanyar Moradi and Loghman Moradi were

sentenced to death in 2009 on the basis of confessions made following alleged beatings.

128

In June 2017, another Kurd named Ramin Hossein Panahi was arrested for alleged membership of

Komala and was sentenced to death on charges of

oha e

129

fo i

olvement in the murder of

the Ma i a F ida I a s so . The th ee of the

e e e e uted o Septe e

, despite

serious concerns that they had not received fair trials and had reportedly been tortured in

Kurdistan Human Rigths Network: 255-256

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General [A/HRC/40/24], 8 February 2019,

url

p.4

124

IHRDC: 116; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 258

125

KMMK-G: 41; Hengaw: 75, 87; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 260

126

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 258

127

KMMK-G: 41; Hengaw: 75, 87; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 260

128

UN General Assembly:

Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General

[A/73/299], 6 August 2018,

url

129

Taking up a s ith the i te tio of taki g people s li es, p ope t , o ho ou i o de to ause fea a o g the

in a manner that causes insecurity

, A ti le

Iran: Islamic Penal Code, 20 November 1991,

url

123

122

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I



detention.

130

The government stated that Zanyar Moradi and Loghman Moradi and Ramin Hossein

Panahi had been sentenced to death in relation to acts against national security.

131

Hedayat Abdollapour, is a Kurdish Iranian on the death row, whose death sentence was upheld by

the Supreme Court upon its second review in October 2018, amidst reports that he had been

subjected to torture in detention and denied access to a lawyer of his choice.

132

If members of any of the Kurdish opposition parties are arrested during a military clash, they will be

treated much harsher.

133

A source pointed to a recent example concerning three Kurds who were

accused of killing three members of the IRGC forces:

Mohammed Sadqi was given a sentence of 40 years of imprisonment; and

Haider Qurvami was sentenced to 118 years and six months of imprisonment. After 6

months in prison Haider Qurvami was forced to confess on the Iranian government

affiliated TV channel Press TV

134

. The confession was evoked by using torture, including

electrification and penetration of warm iron torture.

Salah Rahmani, the third suspect and a KDPI military Peshmerga, was sentenced to death

twice in absentia by the Spreme Leader (the source stressed that the organisation had only

once observed such an order). He was never arrested.

135

For further examples, please refer to Appendix 1, A journalist in KRI (B): 204, 227, 228; KMMK-G: 32, 49-51;

Hengaw: 78

4.1.6 Access to fair trial

According to the UN, discrimination in the administration of justice has been illustrated by the

disproportionate number of convictions of members of minority groups, including Kurds.

136

Members of

minorities constitute the majority of political prisoners and a disproportionate percentage of persons

executed on political and national security-related charges.

137

One source said that in 2018, over 25 % of

the executions in Iran were of Kurds.

138

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General [A/HRC/40/24], 8 February 2019,

url

; Amnesty International,

Iran: Executions of three Iranian Kurds an outrage,

8 September 2018,

url

; KMMK-G: 12; Hengaw: 92; IHRDC: 130

131

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General [A/HRC/40/24], 8 February 2019,

url,

p. 5

132

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of

Iran [A/HRC/40/67], 30 January 2019,

url,

p. 3

133

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 255

134

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), January 6, 2020, MEMRI Daily Brief No.203,

An Iranian Attack

On The U.S. Homeland May Already Be In The Works,

url

135

Hengaw: 90-91; A journalist in KRI (B): 239; Rudaw,

PDKI Pesh erga dies fro i juries sustai ed i Thursda s

bombing,

2 March 2018,

url

136

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of

Iran [A/HRC/40/67], 30 January 2019,

url,

p. 4

137

HRC

–

UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights):

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran;

Report of the Secretary-General [A/HRC/40/24], 8 February 2019,

url, p. 5

138

KMMK-G: 11

130

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Human rights groups and international observers often identify the Revolutionary Courts, which are

generally responsible for hearing the cases of political prisoners, as routinely employing grossly unfair trials

without due process, handing down predetermined verdicts, and rubberstamping executions for political

purposes.

139

One source stated that when it comes to cases of national security and many political cases,

there is no fair trial.

140

Trials are carried out on the basis of reports and documents that are submitted to

the court by security authorities, or confessions made by the accused under torture. Individuals are

deprived of their due process rights, including the right to be represented by counsel.

141

The sources pointed to many different factors that constitute the lack of fair trials:



Iranian law states that an individual must be transferred to court within a month of his/her arrest.

However, most people are detained for more than three months.

142

Most judges are linked to the security forces and IRGC.

143

According to Iranian law, any person who is arrested is entitled to a lawyer. However, during

detention and before the court session, the lawyer is not allowed access to the detainee, and the

lawyer does not receive any information. In most cases, the lawyer will only be present at the final

court hearing.

144

One source noted that in political cases, the defendant is not allowed to have a

lawyer.

145

If a person is accused of crimes against national security, s/he can only select a legal

representative from a list of 40 lawyers pre-approved by the head of the judiciary during the

investigative phase (Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1999, art. 48).

146

However, the Kurdish

population rarely gets access to lawyers in any event.

147

Individuals, who do not have the means to hire a lawyer themselves, will mandatorily be provided

ith a la e , ho i Fa si is alled a taskhi i la e .

These mandatory lawyers are connected to

the government and security authorities, and they do not really defend the accused.

148

The official language of Iranian courts is Farsi, both orally and written. Some Kurds do not master

this language sufficiently. This worsens their case further. A female political prisoner, named Shirin

Alamholi was executed in 2010. She was accused of being a member of PJAK and for military

activity. When she was in prison in Tehran, she had told a prisoner in the same section that her

interrogations and trial were conducted in Farsi, which she did not fully understand.

149



139

US DoS

–

United States Department of State,

IRAN 2018 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT,

url,

p.15; HRW

–

Human Rights

Watch:

World Report 2020 - Iran,

14 January 2020,

url

140

IHRDC: 116

141

IHRDC: 116; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 131

142

Iran: Criminal Code of Procedure for Public and Revolutionary Courts (repealed), Article 33, 19 September 1999,

url;

A journalist in KRI (C): 311

143

A journalist in KRI (C): 311

144

A journalist in KRI (C): 312

145

A journalist in KRI (B): 224

146

United Nations A/74/273, General Assembly, Distr.: General, 2 August 2019,

Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran,

url,

section 12

147

KMMK-G:45

148

Hengaw: 89; A journalist in KRI (C): 313

149

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 270; HRW - Human Rights Watch, 11 May 2010,

Iran: Executed Dissidents

'Tortured to Confess',

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I



The la k of k o ledge of o e s ights as a a used pe so , i ludi g

the right to remain silent, or

the right to an attorney etc., can make the process of interrogations and trial for those, who are not

aware of these rights, is a disadvantage.

150

As previously stated, individuals who are arrested are often accused of being members of a political

party, in order to be able to increase their sentences.

151

There are numerous cases of individuals that have been falsely arrested and who are forced to

confess.

152

The I a ia Pe al Code defi es oha e

a person who fights God

as so eo e ho takes up

a s ith the i te tio of taki g people s li es, p ope t , o ho ou i o de to ause fea i a

manner that causes inse

u it A ti le

of the I a ia Pe al Code

153

). The crime

of oha e is

punishable by death, according to the Iranian Penal Code, but the judges have the option of

imposing an alternative punishment.

154

(See example in section 4.1.5.2 Punishment)

4.2

Targeting of

activists

family members

Family members to party members or supporters are also at risk of being called in, questioned, arrested

and detained.

155

The Iranian government relies on extracting information from family members, in order for

the family members to put pressure on the political party member or supporter.

156

One source stated that

if the authorities are aware that a person is a family member to a political party member, s/he is at risk of

being subjected to torture.

157

Family members of anyone conducting social or political activities will be put under surveillance, which

includes monitoring of phone calls and computer use as well as their movement.

158

The approach taken by the authorities towards the family can vary from case to case. In some cases a

father is required to report to the intelligence authorities and pledge that he has not left the city or taken

any other action to meet with his son/daughter. For example, two months ago, the father of a woman, who

is a political activist living in camps inside KRI affiliated with one of the political parties, was arrested in the

city of Marivan for visiting his daughter in KRI.

159

The punishment of the family members varies depending on the activity level of the activist. In some cases,

the families have been arrested and charged.

160

Close family members, such as spouses, children, parents, or siblings are more likely to be subject to

arrest.

161

In some cases,

the authorities have arrested extended family members, because they were in

touch with the politically active individual outside of the country.

162

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 270

A journalist in KRI (C): 307-308, 315; A journalist in KRI (B): 203; IHRDC: 121;

152

Hengaw 87; IHRDC: 119-120; A journalist in KRI (C): 307-308

153

Iran: Islamic Penal Code, 20 November 1991,

url

154

KMMK-G: 8

155

IHRDC: 130; KMMK-G: 33; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 263

156

IHRDC: 130; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 263; A journalist in KRI: 211, 218

157

IHRDC: 130;

158

A journalist in KRI (B): 212

159

A journalist in KRI (B): 211, 215

160

A journalist in KRI (B): 213

151

150

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Family members of arrested or detained activists are threatened to keep the arrest secret. If the arrest is

not kept secret, the torture against the arrestee will be harsher.

163

Family members may also be denied jobs in the public sector in their home town and will have to move to

another town to get a job.

164

4.2.1 Family members of political activists abroad

A family, who has a civil or political activist family member outside of Iran, is monitored more and

pressured harder.

165

There are examples of family members being arrested or threatened to be killed,

because one of their close relatives has conducted extensive political or human rights activities outside of

the country.

166

The Iranian authorities will gather information on the activist by continuing to call on the

family to give information on where the fled person is living and what s/he is doing.

167

The file of any social

or political activist remains open with the intelligence authorities, and they may monitor and investigate

the activists, as well as his/her family members.

168

The authorities may also implicate family members. For example, in the already mentioned case of Zaniar

and Loghman Moradi (see section 4.1.5.2 Punishment) the accused individuals insisted on being innocent

and lived on death row for a number of years until their execution in September 2018.

169

There were

serious questions concerning the

go e

e t s a usatio s. Za ia Mo adi s fathe as a political

activist

living outside of Iran, and he was assassinated in July 2018. Zaniar Moradi stated that he had been arrested,

e ause of his fathe s politi al a ti is .

170

A source gave examples of friends of activists who are also targeted by the Iranian government. See

Appendix 1, A journalist in KRI (B): 218-219.

5 Conditions for Iranian Kurds in KRI

5.1

Monitoring and targeting by Iranian authorities of Iranian Kurds living

in KRI

The Iranian authorities are active in KRI and work in different fields, such as monitoring of journalists and

human rights activists, lecturers, researchers and teachers with Iranian Kurdish background.

171

One source

stated that they are monitored by the authorities in order to know who they are in contact with and what

their activities are. It was the source s perception that a person who gets out of Iran is at risk of being

KMMK-G: 33; Hengaw: 96; A journalist in KRI: 218-2019; A journalist in KRI (C): 317

A journalist in KRI (B): 216; A journalist in KRI (C): 317

163

Hengaw: 93; A journalist in KRI (C): 316-317

164

Hengaw: 94

165

IHRDC: 124; A journalist in KRI (B): 212

166

A journalist in KRI (C): 316-317

167

Hengaw: 95; IHRDC: 130

168

A journalist in KRI (B): 214

169

AI - Amnesty International,

Iran: Executions of three Iranian Kurds an outrage,

8 September 2018,

url

170

IHRDC: 130

171

A journalist in KRI (B): 236; A journalist in KRI (C): 318

162

161

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

monitored, even if the person is not a political activist. The purpose of doing so is to find out why the

person left Iran, what s/he is doing and who s/he is in contact with, including family members who have left

Iran.

172

An international relations university professor in Sanandej was dismissed from his work, because he did not

cooperate with the Iranian intelligence. Hereafter the professor had no other option than to come to KRI.

The professor initially moved to Sulaimania city. He was later informed by the Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG) Intelligence Service (in Kurdish: Asayish) in Sulaimania that he could not stay and had to

leave as he was considered to be a target of the Iranian authorities and could be assassinated. According to

the source, the Asayish asked him to leave, for the sake of his own safety.

173

Many radio and TV stations in KRI have Iranian employees who work for the Iranian authorities as well as

the for KRI authorities. They provide information to both authorities about the activities of the political

parties. Overall, the Iranian regime has a wide ranging network in KRI gathering information.

174

5.1.1 The monitoring and targeting of political activists and supporters by the Iranian

intelligence authoritiesin KRI

Because of the influence of Iran, they pressure and threat political activists in KRI, including members and

Peshmergas of KDPI and Komala in order to halt their activities.

175

The Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Service are both active in KRI in different ways, and

they spy on the activities of the Iranian Kurdish political parties, political and human rights activists and

journalists. The IRGC international forces (the so-

alled Qods fo es

are also active in Iraq.

176

The Iranian intelligence authorities threaten and target the political parties in KRI. As an example, a source

pointed to the bombardments on 8 September 2018 of the KDPI camp Koya.

177

By directly attacking the

pa ties ases i I a , a d killi g Pesh e gas a d othe e e s a d distu i g the lo al populatio of

KRI,

Iranian security forces have caused great damage to Iranian Kurdish parties in KRI.

178

Since 1991, 321 Iranian Kurdish opposition members have been assassinated by Iranian elements based on

intelligence gathered from such spies.

179

The IRGC asks Iranian Kurdish residents in KRI to report on the movements and activities of the main

Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and political parties based in Erbil and Sulaimanya.

180

IRGC closely

monitors the parties and politically active individuals by using its forces or its collaborators in KRI, and

whenever there is an opportunity, the IRGC will damage them.

181

In this respect, a source gave the

172

173

A journalist in KRI (B): 242

A journalist in KRI (B): 237-238

174

A journalist in KRI (A): 175

175

A journalist in KRI (B): 243

176

A journalist in KRI (B): 244, 247

177

KMMK-G: 53

178

A journalist in KRI (C): 318

179

KMMK-G: 52; A journalist in KRI (C): 296

180

KMMK-G: 52

181

A journalist in KRI (C): 318

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

example, of the attack on Koya, where two bodyguards had been providing information to the Iranian

authorities.

182

One source assessed that threats by the Iranian authorities should be taken seriously.

183

There have been

examples of Iranian security authorities contacting activists residing in Kurdistan territory by telephone and

threatening them, by saying that if they do not cease their activities, they would kill them. For example, the

authorities will say that a person will probably be involved in a traffic accident, which mean that s/he will

be killed in a planned traffic accident.

184

The source provided an example that took place in Penjwin, a town

in Sulaimania governorate where Eghbal Moradi; the father of Zaniyar Moradi, who had been given a death

sentence, was killed in 2017 by a person riding by on a motorcycle.

185

Sources gave these following examples of assassinations and an attempt of an armed attack against

political activists carried out by the Iranian intelligence authorities in KRI:



The Iranian intelligence authorities are present in KRI and move around in secrecy. For example in

March 2018 in Erbil, a bomb was planted in the car of KDPI member, Sabah Rahmani.

186

Members of KDPI were assassinated in front of their base on Yelda night on 21 December 2016

[Iranian winter solstice celebration]. Members of KRG Asayish were also targeted and killed in this

incident.

187

3-4 years ago bombs were placed in Komala camp in Sulaimana. The bombs did not explode.

188



5.2

Residence permits in KRI for Iranian Kurds

5.2.1 Access to residency in KRI

Many Iranians come to KRI due to the current economic situation in Iran; the Iranian government goes

through hardship, because of the devaluation of the Iranian currency.

189

On some conditions Iranian

citizens have access to a residence permit on grounds of employment in KRI.

190

In terms of residency on grounds of protection, the Directorate of Residency explained that the first step in

the procedure is to approach UNHCR to be registered and have their identity paper issued. As the next

step, UNHCR refers the refugee to the Directorate of Residency where the case is processed based on the

documents sent by UNHCR. The Directorate then refers the case to the security directorate to check their

182

183

A journalist in KRI (A): 168

A journalist in KRI (C): 319

184

A journalist in KRI (C): 318

185

A journalist in KRI (D): 328

186

Rudaw,

PDKI Pesh erga dies fro i juries sustai ed i Thursda s o i g,

2 March 2018,

url

; A journalist in KRI

(B): 239; Hengaw: 90-91;

187

A journalist in KRI (B): 240

188

Deutsche Welle,

Komola Party accused the Islamic Republic [of Iran] of bombing,

10 August 2015,

url;

Radio Farda,

Ko ola Part a used Ira of o i g the part s ase,

9 August 2015,

url

;

A journalist in KRI (B): 241

189

KRG, Directorate of Residency: 136; A journalist in KRI (A): 175; A journalist in KRI (B): 235

190

KRG, Directorate of Residency: 136-138

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

background in order to see if these people are under threat and then they are given a final decision on their

stay in KRI.

191

Iranian Kurds can in most cases obtain a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) issued residency card in

KRI.

192

They are able to stay and travel in Iraq; they can work in the private sector, but only be promoted to

some level; and they can study at university.

193

They cannot obtain ID cards or passports from KRG.

194

Applicants, who do not give a convincing asylum motive in accordance with the KRG practice, as well as

applicants who have committed a crime, are not granted protection in KRI.

195

The armed groups belonging

to the political parties are not allowed to take up residency as long as they belong to the parties. With

regard to freedom of movement for the armed groups, according to the agreement made between KRG

and the parties, they have their own identity documents that can be used for commuting between towns

and cities.

196

A local journalist in KRI (A) stated that the inability to obtain Iraqi ID cards and passports applies to

members of all the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, including KDPI, Komala, PAK and PJAK. Contrary to

the lower ranks of the party, high ranked political party members are able to obtain a KRI ID that they can

travel on to Baghdad.

197

5.2.2 Obtaining Iraqi passports as Iranian Kurds

The Directorate of Passports stated that applications for Iraqi passports can be submitted in KRI; however,

the decisions are taken, on a case-by-case basis, by the Ministry of interior in Baghdad.

198

In terms of a previous possibility for Iranian Kurds in KRI to be granted a passport, a source noted that in

2010, the source and another close family member had an Iraqi passport issued by the Iraqi central

government, which expired in 2018. However, due to a policy change, the file is with Baghdad Passport

Directorate and the passport cannot be renewed.

199

An academic researcher said that around 2008, a very

small number of Iranian Kurds received some support, including a naturalisation of their citizenship, so that

they became Iraqi citizens. However, this was not recognised by the central government of Baghdad. The

passports that were issued by the KRG, expired after 10 years and according to the source, in the years

2017, 2018 none of these passports have been renewed.

200

KRG, Directorate of Residency: 140

A journalist in KRI (B): 235

193

A journalist in KRI (A): 184

194

A journalist in KRI (B): 235; A journalist in KRI (A): 183, 184; Kurdistan Human Rights Network:283

195

KRG, Directorate of Residency: 141-143

196

KRG, Directorate of Residency: 150

197

A journalist in KRI (A): 181-182

198

KRG, Directorate of Passports: 160

199

A journalist in KRI (A): 185

200

An academic researcher: 194

192

191

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

6 Returning to Iran

The Iranian

go e

e ts

security approach tends to suspect all Kurds of activism. Therefore, if a Kurd

leaves the country without permission, there is a risk that the suspicion towards the person is heightened

and the act of leaving can be seen as evidence of their activism.

201

6.1

Security Letters a a

a eh

According to Kurdistan Human Rights Network, the government of Iran claims that individuals returning to

Iran, who have obtained a security letter (in Farsi:

a a

a eh , should ot fa e diffi ulties. Eithe the

individual or a family member can apply for a security letter through the Iranian security authority.

202

There are cases of party members who have returned to Iran from KRI using a security letter. However, in

most cases returning to Iran has had consequences for the individuals who have been summoned, arrested

or detained.

203



In a recent case, a Kurdish woman named Maghbouleh Sekavand from Maku city returned to Iran

after receiving a security letter. The woman was a member of a political party. Two weeks after her

return, she was summoned and arrested by the intelligence authorities in Urumieh.

204

Maghbouleh

Sekavand, was sentenced to one year in prison for being a member of an opposition party. She was

released on 23 November 2019, after nine months in prison.

205

In another recent case, a Kurdish Iranian citizen returned from KRI to Iran. Despite having a security

letter, he was arrested by the IRGC and accused of

oha e

206

. He has been in prison for

approximately a year and a half and it is unclear when he will be released.

207



There are other examples illustrating that the security letter is not upheld in practice, particularly in

relation to cases where the individual is accused of political activism. In some cases individuals who have

returned have been summoned by security authorities, and in other cases the returnees have been

arrested and kept in detention for a prolonged period followed by imprisonment.

208

6.1.1 Activists who return

In general, a person, who has been accused of political affiliation with any of the Kurdish opposition parties,

will not be able to return to an ordinary life in Iran. In many cases, the individual will keep his/her past

political affiliation and activities secret, to avoid being subjected to monitoring by the Iranian authorities.

209

201

202

KMMK-G: 65

Kurdistan Human Rights Network:271-273

203

Kurdistan Human Rights Network:271-273

204

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 275-276

205

Apedit News,

Upon serving her sentence, Maghbouleh Sekavand was released from Khoj prison,

23 November

2019,

url

206

Taking up a s ith the i te tio of taki g people s li es, p ope t , o ho ou i o de to ause fea a o g the

in a manner that causes insecurity

Iran: Islamic Penal Code, Article 279, 20 November 1991,

url

207

Kurdistan Human Rights Network,

The latest report on the situation of Mohammad Moradi after one and half years

of limbo,

6 November 2019,url; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 272

208

Kurdistan Human Rights Network:271-277

209

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 278

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

6.1.1.1

Returning from a western country

One source noted that a person returning to Iran from Europe will be subjected to a higher level of

suspicion by the authorities, compared to someone returning from the KRI. Some returnees are arrested

and others are not.

210

Another source opined that an individual, who has applied for asylum in a foreign country, will face

difficulties upon return to Iran. The authorities will subject her/him to questioning related to the reason for

the asylum claim as well as what actions the individual has taken against the government of Iran.

211

The sources highlighted a number of cases where Iranian citizens, who had applied for asylum in European

countries, were arrested upon return to Iran:



In 2015, the Iranian Kurd, from Kermanshah, was arrested by the Intelligence authorities. He had

previously sought asylum in Denmark in 2015. When his asylum claim was rejected, the authorities

sent him back to Iran in Spring 2018. Upon his arrival at the airport in Tehran, he was arrested by

the Iranian authorities. He was then transferred to Dizel Abad prison in Kermanshah, which is

infamous for torture and executions.

212

According to local sources, the returnee has been

interrogated and tortured whilst in detention. The Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva (KMMK-G) does not know whether the person has been charged, tried or sentenced for

any crimes. He has not had access to a lawyer, nor visits from his family.

213

The source informed the

Danish Immigration Service (DIS) that the local sources who pointed to the case could not be

identified.

214

In another case, an Iranian Kurd from Sarpoole-Zahab, Kermanshah was sent back to Iran from the

UK after his application for asylum was rejected. He applied for asylum in 2016. After two years,

his request was rejected and he returned to Iran in September 2018. Upon arrival at the airport in

Tehran, he was arrested and taken to jail by the IRGC. Since his arrest, his family has been informed

that he was sentenced to four years of imprisonment. He has not had access to a lawyer, nor has he

had contact with his family. It is unknown what crime he was charged with and found guilty of. In

an email to the Danish Immigration Service (DIS), dated 18 December 2019, the Association of

Human Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva (KMMK-G) informed that he had been informed about the

release of the returnee.

215

The UK authorities informed DIS that the person in question returned

voluntarily.

216

In a case from 2017, a woman was rejected asylum in Norway. According to source journalist in KRI

(B), she was deported to Iran, where she was subjected to punishment by whipping

–

a sentence



KMMK-G: 59

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 284

212

Hrana - News Agency,

A Brief Report about the Diesel Abad Prison of Kermanshah,

8 May 2016,

url

213

KMMK-G: 57

214

Email dated 15 January 2020

215

KMMK-G: 58

216

Email dated 23 December 2019

211

210

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

handed down before her fleeing but which was carried out after her return.

217

The Norwegian

authorities concluded that the individual had not been flogged in accordance with a 2007 verdict,

as she claimed. This conclusion has been upheld by the District court in Oslo. The judgment has

been appealed, and the case is set to be reviewed by the Borgarting Appeals Court.

218

The

Norwegian authorities informed DIS that the case was reported upon in the Norwegian media

219



Three years ago, a returnee, who was not politically affiliated, voluntarily returned to Iran from

Finland. He was detained for 40 days and killed by the IRGC Intelligence Service under torture. The

authorities threatened his father that they would kill his other son, if he went public with the case.

Despite this, the father made the world know that the government threatened him; however, the

brother was not killed.

220

The Finish authorities informed the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) that

the person in question had been granted asylum in Finland.

221

According to sources, in 2011 an Iranian man was expelled from Norway to Iran; when he returned,

he was arrested and tortured; after he was released, he had to flee Iran and go to KRI.

222

In an

email, the Norwegian authorities informed the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) that information

obtained i.a. through the Norwegian embassy in Tehran, showed that the circumstances concerning

the i p iso e t e e ot i a o da e ith the i di idual s lai s.

223

The Norwegian

authorities further informed DIS that the case was reported upon in the Norwegian media

224



6.1.1.2

Returning from KRI

A political activist, who returns from KRI, will, according to one source, be sentenced to imprisonment upon

return to Iran. For example, an Iranian Kurdish university teacher in Sulaimania, originally from Bukan, was

arrested for affiliation with the Kurdish opposition parties. The university teacher is still imprisoned without

trial.

225

6.1.2 Family members who return

According to one source, individuals who have fled Iran, including family members of a political activist, are

unlikely to return to Iran, because they risk being investigated and in some cases also punished. Whilst

A journalist in KRI (B): 286; Radio Zamaneh,

Flogging sentence carried out against the asylum seeker deported from

Norway to Iran,

21 September 2017,

url

218

Email from the Norwegian authorities to the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) dated 23 January 2020

219

Email dated 11 December 2019

Bas News,

Kurdish National Died under Torture by Iranian Intelligence,

29 May

2017,

url;

Hufvudstadsbladet (HBL),

Kurd som beviljats asyl i Finland torterad till döds i Iran,

30 May 2017,

url

220

Hengaw: 99

221

Email dated 16 January 2020.

222

Iran Human Rights,

Rahim Rostami, the deported asylum seeker accused of propaganda against the government

was released on bail,

June 2011,

url;

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 285.

223

Email dated 23 January 2020

224

Email dated 11 December 2019

225

Hengaw:100

217

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

there are no clear criteria on who will be investigated and who will be punished, close family members are

at risk of being targeted by the authorities, not the extended family.

226

According to another source, the authorities treat family members of political activists well as to showcase

to the world that there is freedom in Iran, and that returnees are not being harmed. The source did not

provide any examples.

227

6.2

Al-Tash Refugees

6.2.1 Return of refugees from the al-Tash camp

Due to the war between Iran and Iraq du

i g the s,

a large group of Iranian Kurds from the border area

fled to Iraq and were placed in the al Tash camp close to Ramadi.

228

According to UNHCR, 12,000 Iranian

Kurds spent more than 20 years in the camp.

229

This group of refugees was not granted Iraqi citizenship, nor

did they have Iranian passports.

230

According to the Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva (KMMK-G), in 1991, a large number of

people from the al Tash camp returned voluntarily to Iran.

231

The KMMK-G representative has three family

members who were among these returnees and they were sentenced to 15 years of prison. The source is

unaware of new cases of returnees.

232

According to Hengaw, Al Tash refugees will not be treated well if they return to Iran. They do not have

identity papers; partly because their families are refugees and, more importantly, because the al Tash

refugees joined the KDPI. In order to get basic rights such as freedom of movement the al Tash refugees

have no choice but to join the political parties. The parties provide them with a party ID card that will allow

them to move around in KRI. Hengaw does not know of any cases of Al Tash refugees who voluntarily

returned to Iran

233

Another source assessed that if Al Tash refugees return to Iran, and they have a history of cooperation with

the Iraqi government or Iranian opposition parties, they will be in danger of being arrested and punished.

234

A e e of Ku dista s Hu a Rights Net o k as held i Dizelabad

prison in Kermanshah for two years.

During this time, the member personally met with several Kurdish citizens who had been in Ramadi and Al

Tash camp for several years. Following their return to Iran, they were arrested and sentenced to long prison

terms for cooperating with Kurdish opposition parties.

235

A Journalist in KRI (B): 231

Hengaw:97

228

Hengaw: 101. According to Hengaw more than 100,000 Iranian Kurds from the border area fled to Iraq and were

placed in the al Tash camp close to Ramadi.

229

UNHCR,

Iraq: Iranian Kurds to be transferred from insecure Al Tash camp,

11 October 2005,

url

230

Hengaw: 101.

231

KMMK-G: 60: In 1991, 20,000 people from the al Tash camp returned voluntarily to Iran.

232

KMMK-G: 60

233

Hengaw:101; Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 280

234

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 282

235

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 281

227

226

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

However, there have also been examples of individuals who have returned from Al Tash refugee camp to

Iran, and despite being summoned and interrogated, they were not sentenced to imprisonment. However,

they were still denied many of their social rights in Iran.

236

Children of al-Tash refugees might have Iranian ID, though it will state on the ID that they are born in Iraq

and this can create problems for them in Iran. They may face discrimination in access to education and

employment because of their place of birth.

237

7. Conditions in the border area between Iran and Iraq

7.1



Legal crossings

As of October 2017, there were five official entrances/crossings between Iran and Iraq

238

Haj Omran: Erbil

Basmaq/Bashmaq: Mariwan-Suleimania

Parwizhkhan/Parwez Khan: Qasr-e Shirin-Sulaymaniya;

Khosrawi: Karank-Kirkuk

The visa requirement between Iran and Iraq has been lifted which implies that a short term visa of 30 days

is granted on the border.

239

7.2

Illegal crossings

The border, between Iran and the Iraqi Kurdish areas, is mostly mountainous. Despite the Iranian border

gua ds st i ge t o t ol, it is still possi le to oss the o de illegall . Ho e e , g eat autio is ad ised

for safety reasons. One must travel with a person who is very familiar with the area.

240

Most of the o de i I a is gua ded a spe ial fo e, e o i tiza i ; ho e e , i the Ku dish a ea the

border is now guarded by the IRGC forces, by order of the Supreme Leader.

241

Over the last three to four years, the Iranian military have been guarding the border more intensely.

242

More military checkpoints have been built in the mountains in places where they were difficult to build.

There are mines in the border area stemming from earlier periods of hostility as well as new mines that

were recently planted. In 2019 (January to October), 23 people were victims of mines and either killed or

wounded.

243

In the Iranian Kurdish border area, the IRGC forces are given permission to kill anyone who crosses the

o de illegall . I

Ja ua to O to e , Ku dish po te s i Ku dish a d Fa si: kol a s e e killed

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 282-283

KMMK-G: 61

238

DW,

Closure of Ira s order to KRI

se urit authorities de isio

, 16 October 2017,

url

239

Directorate of Residency: 136

240

Kurdistan Human Rights Network: 288

241

Hengaw: 102

242

Hengaw: 104; A journalist in KRI (C): 322

243

Hengaw: 104

237

236

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

at the border and 150 have been injured.

244

In the same period 10 civilians, who were not kolbars, were

killed or wounded.

245

Other sources gave different numbers on kolbars who have become victims of

extrajudicial killings by the IRGC forces.

246

Hengaw,

130 Kurdish Porters Killed, Injured in Six Months,

6 July 2019,

url;

Hengaw,

At least 16 Kurdish Porters

Killed, Injured in August,

1 September 2019,

url

245

Hengaw: 102; IHRDC: 134

246

KMMK-G: 14: In 2019 from 1 of January until today, 188 Kurdish citizens were killed extrajudicially out of whom

136 were killed by shooting by the Iranian border security forces.

A journalist in KRI (C): 321: In the past 2 years, at least 14

kol a s ha e ee killed i Ku dista s o de egio , shot

by Iranian forces or due to natural incidents, such as falling from high points

244

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

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IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

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IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Appendix 1: Meeting minutes

Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan - Geneva (KMMK-G)

Geneva, 17 October 2019

The Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva (KMMK-G) is an independent organisation, with no

political affiliation established in 2006. The organisation has a dozen of partners in KRI and in Iranian

Kurdistan. The work of the organisation focusses on gathering information, conducting advocacy at the

United Nations (UN), and organising conferences in the EU parliament. Thus, KMMK-G serves as a bridge

between the Kurdish civil society and the UN agencies and International institutions on the one hand, and

Kurdish and Iranian civil society on the other hand.

247

KMMK-G shared some general information on human rights in the Kurdish region of Iran, including

their latest report

248

which was submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur for the upcoming report.

KMMK-G provides information to the Special Rapporteurs reports to the General Assembly and the

Human Rights Council. KMMK-G collects data on executions, extra-judicial killings, political

prisoners, arrests, landmines

249

Iranian Kurdistan

The Iranian Kurdistan covers an area of 111,705 km2, comprising of four western provinces of

Kermanshah, Ilam, West Azerbaijan and Kordestan and is situated in North West of Iran. The

population is estimated between 11–13 million people. Most of the Kurds are Muslims: 66% Sunni,

% Shi a a d the othe s a e: Ya asa , Yazidis, Qadi i a, Na esh a di a, Ch istia s a d Je s.

The governance of Iran including Iranian Kurdistan, is based on a system of one country, one

nation, one language and one religion. Kermanshah is a Kurdish town with various religious

identities. It is mainly composed of Sunnis, Yarasan (Ahlihaq) and Shia. They are all Kurds, but they

have different faiths. The Islamic Republic, from its beginning, is ruling by creating divisions among

ethnic and religious communities. In Kermanshah, the government uses the Shia group to repress

other faith groups.

However,

in the recent years especially after the earthquake in Kermanshah in

November 2017, all the groups including the Shias revolted against the government lacks of

response and help to the earthquake victims in Kermanshah.

Website of The Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan

–

Geneva (KMMK-G): http://kmmk-ge.org/sd/about-us/

Human Rights Violations in Kurdistan of Iran, Periodic Summary Report for the Attention of the OHCHR Desk of the

UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-

Geneva (KMMK-G), September 2019,

url

249

I o de to get the ost edi le data, KMMK-G

collects and verifies up-to-date information in the following ways:

(a) conducting interviews with family members of the victims, (b) conducting interviews with the lawyers of the

victims, (c) contacting and receiving information from various on-the-ground institution, local networks,

as well as informants within authorities and governmental entities, (d) monitoring the Isla

i Repu li s offi ial

statements, state media and publications, (e) receiving information from informal news agencies, (f) partnering with

the Human Rights Section of Kurdpa News Agency (g) and cross checking the executions data with the Abdorrahman

ou a d Ce te .

248

247

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Iranian Kurdistan like Turkmenstan, Ahwaz and Balochsitan suffers a high level of unemployment

a d dis i i ati e poli of the Gozi esh

(the Selection Law based on Religious and Ethical

Standards of 1995).

250

According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the

I a ia

Sele tio La ased o Religious a d Ethi al Sta da ds k o as the Gozi esh'

impairs equality of opportunity or treatment in employment for persons belonging to ethnic and

religious minorities. The Kurds as well as other minorities in Iran are facing challenges concerning

access to mother tongue language education, access to employment, poverty and lack of

investment, environmental challenges, and access to fair trial. In addition, ethnic minority women

are suffering multiple layers of discrimination.

General information on human rights in the Kurdish region of Iran

From the beginning of the revolution in 1979 the government of Iran adopted a hostile policy

towards the Kurdish people not only because of their national and democratic aspirations, but also

because the Kurds refused the establishment of Iran as an Islamic state in a referendum put

forward by the Supreme Leader Imam Khoemeini. Following the Kurdish refusal of the Islamic rule,

the Sup e e Leade I a Kho ei i at the ti e, de la ed a Hol Wa agai st the Ku dish people

and adopted a hostile and military approach towards the Kurds and generally towards ethnic

issues.

The Legal framework within the Iranian constitution and the Iranian Penal Code

I a s o stitutio o sists of ague a d o t adi ti g a ti les; o e a ti le states o e thi g a d the

follo i g a ti le efuses it. Fo e a ple, a ti le of the Co stitutio states that, All people of

Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race,

la guage, a d the like, do ot esto a p i ilege .

However,

article 1, 4 and 12 states that the

offi ial eligio of the ou t is the th I a Shi is , all la s ust e ased o this a h of

Shia and Persian is the only official language. So, in practice, a Kurd, a Baluchi, an Arab, a Kurdish

Yarasan or a Bahai are deprived from any significant posts.

Fu the o e, a o di g to A ti le of the Co stitutio , the e ust e o dis i i atio a o g

the various provinces with regard to the exploitation of natural resources, utilisation of public

revenues, and distribution of economic activities among the various provinces and regions of the

country, thereby ensuring that every region has access to the necessary capital and facilities in

a o da e ith its eeds a d apa it fo g o th .

However,

article 115 applies the already

e tio ed Gozi esh .

The I a ia Pe al Code defi es oha e eh a pe so ho fights God as so eo e ho takes up

arms with the

i te tio of taki g people s li es, p ope t , o ho ou i o de to ause fea a o g

the i a a e that auses i se u it A ti le

of the I a ia Pe al Code . The C i e of

oha e eh is pu isha le death i the I a ia Pe al Code ut the judge has

the option of

imposing an alternative punishment. Under the previous Iranian Penal Code (in place until 2013),

the ha ge of oha e eh as f e ue tl used agai st politi al disside ts a d people o e ted to

250

Further reference was made to report by Amnesty International, IRAN, SUBMISSION TO THE UN COMM

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

opposition groups abroad, even if they were non-violent. The new Iranian Penal Code (2013) has

p o ided fo pu ish e t u de the otio of o uptio o ea th a d e ellio . This e o ept

of e ellio e pa ds the s ope of the death pe alt fo all those ho a e o i ted of o uptio

on ea

th . Thus the death pe alt a o also e gi e to those ho o

it a i e o a

extensive level against the physical integrity of others or domestic or external security, spreads lies,

disrupts the national economic system, undertakes arson and destruction, disseminates poisonous,

microbiological and dangerous substances, establishes corruption and prostitution centres or

assists i esta lishi g the . The A ti le is ot legall p e ise a d does ot gi e o ete defi itio s

of the te

i e o e te si e , the efo e gi i g judges ide po e to a it a il i te p et the

law.

Fu the o e, a ti le

of the I a ia Pe al Code defi es e els as the e e s of a g oup

that stages armed uprisings against the Islamic Republic of Iran and stipulates that they shall be

sentenced to death.

Executions and extrajudicial killings

10.

The Ku dish people i I a a ou t to

% of I a s populatio of

illio . Ho e e , o e

all e e uted pe so s a e Ku ds a d al ost half of all I a s politi al p iso e s

are Kurds.

% of

11.

Ethnic minorities, especially Kurds and Baluchis, are over-represented in death penalty statistics. In

2018, over 25% of the executions in Iran were of Kurds. One third of Kurdish executions were

elated to the fa i ated ha ges of atio al se u it th eats a d oha e eh a pe so ho

fights god). 25% of Kurdish prisoners are executed outside Kurdistan and the government refuses

to return back their bodies to their families. All out of six juvenile offenders who were executed in

2018 were also Kurds.

12.

Last

Septe

, despite the UN spe ial appo teu s a i g, I a e e uted Luk a Mo adi,

Zanyar Moradi and Ramin Hossein Panahi for their political opinions. The number of executions

related to belief and political opinion were 10 in 2017 while this number was 29 in 2018.

251

13.

In October 2019, 49 of 177 executions were of Kurdish Iranians.

In 2018 there was a decrease in

the number of executions in Iran, due to an amendment to the law of drug offenses, but at the

same time there was a doubling of the number of extrajudicial killings. In 2017, the number was

152, but in 2018 the number almost doubled to 225 extrajudicial killings. All the killed individuals

e e kol a a i E glish: a ie s of ite s. I si gula : kol a .

14.

In 2019 from 1 of January until today, 188 Kurdish citizens were victims of extrajudicial killings out

of whom 136 were killed by shooting by the Iranian border security forces. The victims were

kol a a

252

The u e of Ku dish kol a a i ti s fo the pe iod of Ja ua

st,

to August

ITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 49TH SESSION, PRE-SESSIONAL WORKING GROUP (21-25 MAY2012),

url;

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

30th, 2019, constitutes 212 persons. 58 killed and 152 injured. 160 of them have been identified by

name.

Political prisoners

15.

The Kurdish political prisoners constitute 50% of all prisoners in Iran.

16.

The source referred to a case known to the public, of a young woman named Zara Mohammadi a

Kurdish volunteer teacher. She was arrested on May 23 2019 in Sanandej for teaching the Kurdish

language.

253

She was brought to court in September 2019. KMMK-G pointed to the fact that Zara

Mohammadi has been in prison for five months without access to a lawyer. Other cases included

Mohammad Nazari and Osman Nazari. They have been in jail for over 26 years for membership of a

Kurdish political party.

17.

According to the source, in the first eight months of 2019 352 Kurdish Iranians were arrested, out

of whom 124 were arrested for charges related to membership with Kurdish political parties.

254

Arrests

18.

Regarding Kurdish citizens who are arrested or sentenced in 2019, KMMK-G has collected names of

369 Kurdish citizens from January to September 2019. Almost 95 % of the arrests are related to

national security, civic or political activism. KMMK-G also collected the names of those arrested in

2016, 2017 and 2018. In addition, information was gathered on their location, reason for arrest and

duration of imprisonment.

Activities conducted by the Kurdish political parties in Iran

19.

Kurdish minorities in Iran live in a precarious situation, which has become intensified in recent

ea s. I Ma

, the De o ati Pa t of I a ia Ku dista KDPI , I a s ai Ku dish

armed

movement, previously exiled in Northern Iraq, re-launched their armed operations after two

decades of silence.

255

The KDPI previously put an end to the armed struggle in the hope that the

situations of Kurdish people in Iran would be improved by removing the armed conflict. However,

since the 1993 cease-fire, the government of Iran has increased its military presence in Kurdistan,

and the repression of Kurdish civil rights has continued to rise. KDPI has existed since 1945.

20.

The source informed that in 2015, KDPI sent back their Peshmergas from KRI to Iranian Kurdistan,

with the purpose of reorganising their members and sympathizers and engage them in activities

related to promoting Kurdish rights. As such, they distribute brochures, organise gatherings and

anniversaries of Kurdish holidays as well as protest, and events including writing slogans on the

Human Rights Violations in Kurdistan of Iran, Periodic Summary Report for the Attention of the OHCHR Desk of the

UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-

Geneva (KMMK-G), September 2019,

url,

p. 5

254

Human Rights Violations in Kurdistan of Iran, Periodic Summary Report for the Attention of the OHCHR Desk of the

UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-

Geneva (KMMK-G), September 2019,

url,

p. 5

255

National Endowment for Democracy, Taimoor Aliassi,

Enough is Enough: Iranian Kurds Running Out of Patience

2 August 2016,

url

253

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

walls, or putting Kurdish flags on government buildings, and raised money and clothes for

Peshmergas.

21.

With regard to Komala, they conduct similar activities but with less coverage in the Kurdish region

of Iran.

22.

The source informed that most activities take place in public spaces, including schools. For instance,

when the anniversary of the assassination of Ghasemloo takes place or the anniversary of the

foundation of Kurdistan Republic in Iran, letters are hung on government buildings to inform

people of these anniversaries.

23.

The Kurdish parties also use media and social media outlets. The Kurdish political parties, such as

KDPI, has a TV channel (Tishk TV), websites (Kurdistanmedia.com), radio (Voice of the Kurdistan of

Iran), Facebook, twitter and telegram. The parties usually encourage their members, sympathizers

and the public to undertake actions through these channels. Furthermore, when the parties

undertake special activities, members are contacted through human channels.

Recruitment of new members

24.

With regard to the possibility of KDPI to recruit new members in Iran, KMMK-G replied that KDPI

conduct training for newcomers in Koya and in Qandil. The training course takes 3 months. It

includes the teachi

g of Ku dish la guage, Ku dish histo , the politi al pa t s histo takes a d

geopoliti s. The a o di g to the e o e s edu atio al a kg ou d, s/he ill e se t to

different departments. For instance, if the new comer is a journalist, s/he will be sent to KDPIs

media department.

25.

The newcomers come voluntarily due to the fact that the level of repression is very high in Iranian

Kurdistan and they have lost hope in reforms within the system; in addition to the repression, they

suffer also discriminatio

i jo oppo tu ities e ause of the Gozi esh la . KDPI ge e all

encourage people, especially highly educated volunteers, to stay in Iran to work for KDPI in order to

ei fo e the pa t s p ese e i the illages a d to s. It is also ostl a d

equires space to house

recruits in the bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.

26.

Komala have adopted the same methodology as KDPI and the two parties have created a common

platform, in the sense that three years ago they established a center for cooperation of Iranian

political parties. KMMK-G noted that the parties were invited to participate in a conference in New

York by the US State Department and Saudi Arabia together with other Iranian opposition groups;

however, both parties including all factions declined the invitation.

27.

If someone in Iran wants to join Komala/KDPI, s/he should go to Erbil or Sulaimania and meet with

the representatives of the political party.

28.

KMMK-G added that a person, who come to Erbil and Sulaimania to join the parties will go through

a background check before they become a member. The committee of the political party in

question will address members that are linked to the place in Iran where s/he comes from. The

background check is performed in order to make sure that the new member is not part of the

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Iranian Intelligence Service. The security committee of each party is in touch with the committees

in the towns and villages in Iran in order to check the background of the said person. The same

procedure applies to new members in Europe.

Members versus sympathizers

29.

When party activities in the Kurdish region of Iran are being organised, the leadership of the

political parties asks the committees inside Iran to organise them, for instance the anniversary of

the assassination of Ghassemlou. The security cells used to consist of three to five persons, but for

security reasons, the Kurdish political parties prefer to organise their members within small cells

such as one person cell. In villages and towns there are experienced members who are trusted by

the party.

30.

Generally, active and experienced committee members are trusted members of the political

parties. The way to become a member is to gain the personal trust of these experienced members.

A new member does not easily gain the trust to be recruited. The consequences of recruiting

someone who is secretly also working for the government can be consequential and put at risk the

KDPI networks and members. The members of Kurdish political parties are often convicted for

oha e eh A ti le

of the I a Pe al Code a d atio al se u it ha ges A ti le

of the

Iranian Penal Code) and it means long-term imprisonment and death penalty.

31.

It is difficult to say whether the Iranian government makes a distinction between the targeting of

party members and sympathizers. This, amongst other things, depends on the intelligence officer in

charge. The targeting of individuals is arbitrary and varies from case to case. One can be a simple

citizen in the Kurdish region and charged of something and then the officer who interrogates

disapp o es of the i te ogated pe so ho ill e ei e a se te e fo

oha e eh a person

who

fights god) and executed; and on the other hand someone can be a member of an active opposition

party and go free.

32.

The source gave an example of a person well-known to him, who many years ago, was a

Peshmerga. He was previously wounded in a military conflict with the Iranian security forces to the

extent that he could not walk anymore. The person went to the military and surrendered himself at

the military base in Sanandej. However, despite his surrender, the military reported that he was

arrested during the fighting and imprisoned him. He was set free and after three years in prison he

was sent back to Kermanshah where he came from. After a while, a government car belonging to

IRGC Intelligence Service (in Farsi: Sazman-e

Ettela at-e

Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami)

stopped him in the middle of the town of Kermanshah. They showed him a paper in Kurdish which

stated that the Pesh e ga is the ight ha d of the people , a ki d of sloga , a d the asked hi to

translate it to Farsi; they wanted to test if he reads Kurdish. When they realised that he does, they

took him to an unknown prison where he was tortured. Finally, he was set free, because they did

not get any information from him. The point is, that it is really complicated and there is no system

in place.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Targeting of family members to party members

33.

Family members of political activists are at risk of being arrested and detained. It is not possible to

foresee the reaction of the government. The closer the family member is, the higher the chance of

being targeted and potentially arrested. The Iranian Government does not care if the arrestee is a

party member or a party sympathizer; many people are not even related to the party, and still

subject to arrest.

Monitoring by the Iranian government

34.

There are more than 17 different security organisations operating in Iran. The most repressive

organs operating in Kurdish territories are 1) IRGC Intelligence Service (in Farsi: Sazman-e

Ettela at-

e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) and 2) Ministry of Intelligence (Vezarat-e

Ettela at

Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran).

35.

The IRGC is a government agency and elite military force tasked with preserving the Islamic

Republic of Iran and the ideals of the 1979 revolution and protecting the Iranian Islamic State from

i te al a d e te al th eats. I a ia la defi es the IRGC as a i stitutio o

a ded the

supreme leader whose purpose is to protect the Islamic revolution of Iran and its accomplishments,

while striving continuously (...) to spread the sovereig

t of Gods la .

256

The IRGC has its own

intelligence unit, the IRGC Intelligence Service (IRGC-IO), set up by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,

which operates parallel to MOIS, and is instrumental in the targeting of ethnic and religious

minorities.

257

36.

MOIS is tasked with defending the Government and ensuring the strength of the government, and

ith p ote ti g I a s i te ests a oad. U de the o stitutio , the MOIS gathe s a d assesses

information and acts against conspiracies endangering the Islamic Republic

258

. All of

I a s se u it

forces belong to the Beite Rahbari or the House of Leadership, under the Supreme Leader Ali

Khamenei who is responsible for all armed forces in the country and has also a right to veto the

presidency or parliamentary decisions.

37.

In order to maintain this system of surveillance, the Iranian authorities, in particular the IRGC (in

Farsi: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran), IRGC Intelligence (in Farsi: Sazman-e

Ettela at-

e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) and Basijs (one of the 5 branches of the IRGC consisting of

volunteers), are known to push Kurdish citizens to spy for them.

256

Islamic Parliament Research Center Of The Islamic Republic Of IRAN,

Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Islamic Revolution,

ratified on 6 September 1982, article 1,

url

257

Center for Human Rights in Iran,

Rouhani's Intelligence Ministry and Khamenei's IRGC Widen Crackdown Ahead of

Election, 16 March 2017,

url

258

Byman, D. (2002).

Iran's security policy in the post-revolutionary era.

Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,

url

pp.31-

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

38.

In May 2015 when KDPI decided to restart their military operations, the level of monitoring by the

authorities got more intense, because the Iranian government fears a revolt. For someone who

participated in a demonstration there is a risk of being arrested. Once more the source pointed to

the Zara Mohammadi case, the woman who got arrested for teaching Kurdish language, to show

how the authorities operate randomly.

259

39.

Iranian Kurdistan is the most militarised part of Iran; between every single town, village and hill

there are checkpoints, military compounds and a high security presence. Furthermore, the IRGC

has created a cyber-army of an estimated 45,000 personnel whose main task is to monitor and

collect information on people opposing the Iranian government, including critics, academics,

intellectuals, students and activists.

Profile of people who are targeted by the Iranian Government

40.

KMMK-G stressed that people get arrested for many different reasons, including being a family

member of someone who is in prison, or who supported an idea that goes against the ideology of

the Iranian Government or someone who participated in Newroz (Kurdish New Year).

41.

When asked what happens to people who are targeted, the source gave an example of one of his

family members. A young man with no political affiliation, walk by a demonstration without

participating. He got arrested for one month and was tortured during this time. After his release, he

was delivered a paper telling that he was arrested because he was member of Islamic State. The

source informed that a party member, if arrested, would be exposed to torture, including execution

simulations and s/he would be sentenced to death penalty.

42.

Any activities of Kurdish people that could be interpreted as political are harshly suppressed. Any

works pertaining to social change critical to the Iranian Government, in particular by Kurdish

citizens, are perceived as being propaganda against the system. In connection with his 2012 film

Neveshtan Rooy-e Shahr (Writing on the City),

Keyvan Karimi, a prominent Kurdish documentary

and fiction filmmaker, was sentenced to

si ea s i p iso e t a d

lashes o De ember

23,

2015. The film depicted the growing anger from the youth expressed on the walls in Iran in the

fo of g affiti. Ka i i des i ed the fil as o tai i g g affiti a d all pai ti g that date a k to

ea s ago i Teh a . He fu the oted that it is sto of a all a d ho it efle ts hat has

happe ed i so iet

260

. He was sentenced by Branch 28 of Tehran Revolutionary Court, accused of

i sulti g the hol sa tities , sp eadi g p opaga da agai st the s ste a d illegiti ate

elatio s . Ka imi s fil

as e e sho i pu li apa t f o a t aile o YouTu e.

43.

The Iranian authorities operate with a complete lack of ethics, and use any methods available to

denigrate, harass and repress anyone they consider to be a political threat to the Government.

259

The KMMK-G calls on the UN Special Rapporteur for Iran to urge Iranian authorities the immediate and

unconditional release of Ms. Zara Mohammadi, a volunteer teacher in Kurdish language, from Sina/Sanandaj,

arrested at her home on 23 May 2019,

url

260

Pen-intemational.org. (2015).

Iran: Upcoming appeal of prominent Kurdish filmmaker Keywan Karimi.

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

They even employ these tactics in high profile cases with a great deal of international attention. For

example, in 2005, the Iranian lawyer, former judge and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ms. Shirin

E adi s fa il as ta geted a d i filt ated the autho ities. I a atte pt to dest o Ms. E adi s

reputation, the IRGC Intelligence Services infiltrated the Ebadis by using friends and acquaintances

of thei s as u de o e ope ati es ho o st u ted a ho e

-t

ap i o de to get e ide e of

adulte agai st M . E adi. M . E adi as lu ed to a f ie d s house he e he as seduced

by a

woman he knew. However, intelligence officers were hidden in the next room with cameras, and

caught and arrested Mr. Ebadi in the act of adultery.

261.

They then sentenced Mr. Ebadi to death by

stoning for his crimes of adultery. The sentence was used to blackmail Mr. Ebadi, forcing him to

appear on national television to denounce his wife and state that she is a Western agent

262

in order

to get his freedom. Ms. Ebadi subsequently fled Iran and applied for asylum in the UK.

44.

The source gave another example of a Kurdish man who was imprisoned for 26 years on the basis

of party activism. IRGC officials in Bukan, Iranian Kurdistan, arrested the already mentioned Mr.

Mohammad Nazari in May 1994 and he eventually spent

o e

ea s i p iso fo

oha e eh

person who fights god), after his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1999.

According to information from Amnesty International, he was held for over a month in solitary

confinement, first by the IRGC and then by the Ministry of Intelligence. Nazari said that, during this

period, he was subjected to torture, including beatings, kicking, and flogging on the soles of his

feet, and threats made against his sister, in order to make him confess to being involved in an

alleged assassination plot against a number of people affiliated with the IRGC. According to

Amnesty International the allegations against Nazari were fabricated, and the real reason for his

arrest was related to his political beliefs

263

. No evidence of the assassination plot or his

involvement in any armed activities was presented in court. At no point during his detention or trial

did he have access to a lawyer. He never received an official copy of the verdict. He since submitted

numerous requests for retrial but the Iranian authorities seemingly considered none of them.

Fair trial

45.

If a person is accused of crimes against national security, s/he can only select legal representative

from a list of 40 lawyers pre-approved by the head of the judiciary during the investigative phase

(Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1999, art. 48).

264

However, the Kurdish population rarely gets

access to lawyers in any event. KMMK-G work to train lawyers in Iranian Kurdistan in cases on

human rights. With regard to the previously mentioned case of Zara Mohammadi, she had two

independent lawyers who were imprisoned for four years due to taking her case. There is no access

to appeal for prisoners in Iranian Kurdistan.

261

NY Times, Ebadi, S.

Tricked Into Cheating and Sentenced to Death,

3 March 2016,

url

The news segment is available in Farsi:

تسیب و یس هیلع یوناب حلص ناریا

,10 June 2010,

url

263

Amnesty International,

Urgent Action: Iranian Prisoner of Conscience Critically Ill,

23 October 2017,

url

264

United Nations A/74/273, General Assembly, Distr.: General, 2 August 2019, Situation of human rights in the

Islamic Republic of Iran,

url,

section 12

262

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

46.

There are many well-documented reports from the UN and various international and Iranian NGOs

e ide i g that ge e all detai ees ha e ee fo ed to o fess to ollusio

e e ies .

ith fo eig

47.

On 8 January 2019, the Urumiyeh Revolutionary Tribunal sentenced Mr. Massoud Shamsnezhad to

six years and four months imprisonment for the crimes

of p opaga da agai st the s ste a d

th eat fo atio al se u it . These ha ges e e ased o the I a ia Pe al Code A ti les

a d

500. The Urumiyeh Revolutionary Tribunal, Section 3, pronounced the sentence against Mr

Shamsnezhad without the presence of his lawyer Mr. Saleh Nikbaght.

265

KMMK-G has reasons to

elie e that the eal easo ehi d the a est as Massoud s o k o defe di g a d gathe i g

information about the suspicious death of Ms. Shayda Hatemi, a Kurdish student in Urumiyeh

University.

266

48.

Affiliation with the Kurdish political parties is a strong charge, but it is not possible to say precisely

what the sentence will be; the sentences are arbitrarily given. There is no legal process; the

convicted person will have to abide by the sentence given. The only person that could change the

sentence is the local Imam appointed by the Guardian Council who has the right to veto the

sentence. Furthermore, this imam is empowered with appointing the local governor, the head of

security as well as nominating the local judges. He represents the grand ayatollah at local level.

49.

KDPI members Osman Mostafapour, Mullah Jasem Delneshin and Ayoub Jahangiri were arrested on

July 14, 1991. Their arrest followed the clashes between a number of KDPI Peshmergas and the

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces in the Asen Gran Valley of Urumiyeh. They were

detained for six months in the IRGC Detention Facility in the City of Urumiyeh under intense

physical and psychological torture. On December 18, 1991 after the interrogations were

completed, all three were transferred to the quarantine of Urumiyeh Central Prison. On December

5, 1991 they were sentenced to death by the Branch 1 of Revolutionary Court of Urumiyeh, chaired

by Judge Johari, without the right to have a lawyer on charges of membership in KDPI.

50.

Following the confirmation of the death sentences of these three Kurdish political prisoners by the

Court of Appeal in the summer of 1992, Mullah Jasem was hanged and Ayoub Jahangiri was

executed at Urumiyeh Central Prison the following year. In 1993, i.e. a year after the execution of

these two political prisoners.

51.

Osman Mustafapour was exiled to Tabriz Central Prison where he spent two years of his

imprisonment sentence. In 1996, Osman Mustafapour was transferred back to Urumiyeh Central

265

The source referred to an article in Farsi published on 17 February 2019 in which it is stated that Massoud

Shamsnezhad was released on bail:

دوعسم سمشداژن اب را ق هقیث

دا آ دش

20:50 - 28

نم ب

1397/ , url

266

Human Rights Violations in Kurdistan of Iran, Periodic Summary Report for the Attention of the OHCHR Desk of the

UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran-

Geneva (KMMK-G), September 2019,

url,

p. 4

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Prison and his death sentence was reduced to 10 years of imprisonment in 2000. However, in the

same year, the Branch 3 of Revolutionary Court of Urumiyeh sentenced him to 25 years in prison

on charges of membership in the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which meant that this political

prisoner should serve a total sentence of 35 years in prison, including his previous conviction. He

has lost his mother, one sister and one brother during his 27 years of imprisonment, but he has not

ee allo ed to atte d thei fu e al due to the oppositio of the P ose uto s Offi e a d O u i eh

Intelligence office.

Monitoring in KRI

52.

The IRGC asks Iranian Kurdish citizens to report on the movements and activities of the main

Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and political parties based in Erbil, the capital city of Kurdistan,

and Sulaimanya, part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Since 1991, 321 Iranian Kurdish opposition members have

been assassinated by Iranian elements based on intelligence gathered from such spies.

53.

The Iranian intelligence service threatens the parties in KRI. As an example, the source pointed to

the bombardments on 8 of September 2018 on the KDPI camps Koya.

54.

Furthermore, 30 Kurdish activists based in Iraqi Kurdistan were targeted by Iranian bombing,

assassination and missiles.

Armed conflict between the Kurdish parties and the government forces

55.

According to the source, in 2018 there were 58 operational armed conflicts between KDPI and

Iranian government entities. The clashes most frequently erupt due to government attacks on the

Peshmerga forces inside Iranian Kurdistan. Indeed, as in Iran, the Kurdish political parties are

prohibited, the Kurdish political parties send their Peshmergas units inside Iranian Kurdistan to

spread their ideas and promote the Kurdish rights but they are often ambushed and attacked by

Iranian military forces notably the IRGC. Sometimes their bases are also attacked by artillery in the

Qandil Mountains. Approximately 40 Peshmergas were killed. Between 150 and 300 members of

the security forces were killed in these conflicts. KDPI said that 38 to 40 government officials were

killed by them. There is no accurate data on the casualties, but KMMK-G gather information given

by the government, governors or the military officials. KMMK-G cannot confirm any of these

figures.

Consequences for returning

56.

Kurdish returnees can face risk of arrest for the fact alone that they are failed asylum seekers. The

I a ia Go e

e ts se u it app oa h is to suspe t e e o e Ku dish of a ti is . The efo e, if a

Kurd leaves the country without permission, the suspicion towards the person is heightened and

the act of leaving can be seen as evidence of their activism.

57.

For example, in 2015 an Iranian Kurd from Kermanshah was arrested by the Intelligence Service. He

had previously sought asylum in Denmark in 2015. When his asylum claim was rejected, the

authorities sent him back to Iran in Spring 2018. Upon his arrival at the airport in Tehran, he was

arrested by the Iranian authorities. He was then transferred to Dizel Abad prison in Kermanshah,

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

which is infamous for torture and executions

267

. There is even a cemetery behind the prison where

the o pses of the people e e uted the e a e u ied despite fa ilies e uest to u the odies

themselves. According to local sources, the returnee has been interrogated and tortured whilst in

detention. The source does not know whether the returnee has been charged, tried or sentenced

for any crimes. He has not had access to a lawyer, nor visits from his family.

58.

In another case, a Kurdish Iranian from Sarpoole-Zahab, Kermanshah was sent back to Iran from

the UK after his application for asylum was rejected. He sought asylum in 2016. After two years, his

request was rejected and he was returned to Iran on September, 2018. Upon arrival in Mehrabad

airport in Tehran, he was arrested and taken to jail by IRGC Intelligence Service. Since his arrest, his

family has been informed that he was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment. He has not had access

to a lawyer, nor has he had contact with his family. It is unknown what crime he was charged with

and found guilty of. In an email to the Danish Immigration Service, dated 18 December 2019 the

source informed that he had been informed about the release of the returnee.

Use of the death penalty

59.

According to the source it does make a difference if the returnee is returning from Europe rather

than from KRI in the sense that the level of suspicion will be higher for those returning from

Europe. Some returnees do get arrested; however, others do not get arrested.

Return of refugees from the al-Tash camp

60.

In 1991, 20,000 people from the al Tash camp returned voluntarily to Iran. The KMMK-G

representative has three family members who were among these returnees and was sentenced to

15 years of prison. The source is unaware of new cases of returnees.

61.

Children of al-Tash refugees are considered Iraqis, because they were born there; however, they

might have Iranian ID, though it will state on this that they are born in Iraq and this can create

problems for them. They face discriminations in access to education and employment because of

their place of birth.

Landmines

62.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian government planted 20 million landmines; however, the

government refuses to carry out the necessary demining. The provinces of West Azerbaijan,

Kurdistan, Kermanshah and Ilam which have large Kurdish majority populations together with

Khuzestan Province which has an Arab majority population continues to see the most deaths and

serious injuries from landmines.

268

According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur, 43 percent

of the victims are children under 13 years.

267

268

Hrana - News Agency,

A Brief Report about the Diesel Abad Prison of Kermanshah,

8 May 2016,

url

A/74/188, UN General Assembly, Distr.: General, 18 July 2019, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of

Iran, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

url,

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights

Erbil, 28 October 2019

Hengaw is an independent human rights organisation reporting on human rights violations in Kurdistan,

Iran. On their website Hengaw is collecting information from all cities in Iran and they are cooperating with

lawyers from the courts in all provinces.

269

Hengaw has trusted sources to confirmed information on

prisoners in Iran as well as on the Kurdish opposition parties.

63.

Hengaw cooperates with all the Kurdish parties. The parties share their news with Hengaw in order

for the organisation to publish it. The source further stated that all Kurds have a strong passion for

thei la d a d a e suppo ti g the Ku dish ase hi h also i plies

support for the Kurdish parties.

64.

According to the source, the Iranian government does not see the Kurdish region as a part of the

country partly due to the fact that the majority of the Kurdish population are Sunni Muslims,

whereas the government and the state are based on Shia Islam. Seen from a government

pe spe ti e, ei g Ku dish is a i e . Due to the politi al issues a d the u e t e o o i isis,

unemployment in the Kurdish region is reaching 60 percent. Over the last 10 years the government

has built 1,800 checkpoints to control the Kurds. The authorities monitor the Kurdish population

through these checkpoints and arrest individuals that are suspected of being politically affiliated.

65.

Through the use of media, the authorities are presenting the Kurdish region negatively, which

results in the Kurdish region having a bad image in the rest of the country.

Monitoring of party members and supporters in Iran

66.

If the Iranian government suspects anyone of working with one of the opposition parties, s/he will

be monitored. In Iran, there is an information centre dealing with opposition to the regime. In the

Kurdish area a separate department by the IRGC Intelligence Service (in Farsi: Sazman-e

Ettela at-e

Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) has been established. This department is monitoring

people s pho es a d put p essu e o people ho the suspe t of i te a ti g ith the politi al

parties. The pressure, in some instances, includes the authorities forcing wives to separate from

their politically active husbands.

67.

From January to October 2019, 487 people were arrested and detained by the Iranian government

on suspicion of being affiliated with the Kurdish opposition parties, out of whom 412 people were

members of the parties.

Monitoring of party members and supporters in Iraq

68.

Due to the political relation between Iraq and Iran, the Iranian authorities have some control over

the Kurdish parties .This causes problems for the Iranian party members residing in KRI. The way

the Iranian government makes problems for the party members requiring seeing their residence

permit at the checkpoints.

section 94

269

Website:

https://hengaw.net/en

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

69.

The source stated that even through media, Iran has a huge influence in Iraq. For instance, a few

years ago in Choman, Erbil Governorate the Iranian government attacked a Komala camp. The

incident was covered by a journalist from a magazine, even though the journalist was Kurdish, he

covered this due to the influence of Iranian.

70.

When asked if the Iranian authorities perform intelligence operations in Iraq, Hengaw replied that

no person has been captured in Iraq; one member of PAK surrendered himself to the Popular

Mo ilizatio Fo es i A a i : Hashd al Shaa i , ho e t adited hi to I a , a d he is o i

prison in Iran.

Targeting of members and supporters in Iran

71.

In general, when the Iranian government targets someone, s/he will be under telephone

surveillance. The suspect will in some cases be forced to separate from his wife and children; he

will be imprisoned and given a long sentence and the authorities will take advantage of him as a

financial source. For example the authorities set a financial guarantee to release the person. This

oftentimes causes the prisoner to escape, in which case the government will take over his house

and belongings.

72.

According to the source, in worst case scenario, individuals who are given a warning or a

notification from the authorities, and who do not comply with directions from the authorities, will

be killed. As an example on this, Hengaw pointed to the incident that occurred in August 2018 in

Ma i a , Fi e e i o e tal a ti ists f o the The G ee Mou tai Co

ittee , dis ega ded the

notification that they were given by the Iranian authorities. Four of them were killed. According to

the authorities they were burned in an accident. On Henga

s e site it is stated that She if

Bhawar and his friends were left to burn in a fire which was caused by IRGC bombings in an

atte pt to d i e out the Pesh e ga .

270

73.

A o di g to the sou e o e of the a ti ists alled his

ife a d said the a e shooti g at us . This

was the last anyone heard from the activists. The source added that the deceased were volunteers

in firefighting. One activist survived the fire but he was taken away by plane and no one has heard

from him since.

74.

The authorities targeted the environmental activist due to a conflict that occurred when the Iranian

government established a recycling factory next to the river in Marivan. The environmental

organisation/committee raised awareness about the fact that the factory was jeopardising the

ate ualit . The o sulti g head of Ma i a it ho is a e e of the IRGC i tellige e

se i e th eate ed the a ti ists, hi h as pu lished o He ga s e site. The autho ities e t to

the a ti ists fa ilies a d asked the to e su e that the i fo atio as deleted f o He ga s

e site. Ho e e , the a ti ists fa ilies efused to do so.

Hengaw,

Forest fires caused by the bombing of the Revolutionary Guard and the killing of four environmental

activists,

26 August 2018,

url

270

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

75.

There is no right to privacy in Iran. For instance the Iranian government arbitrarily monitors

people s pho e alls. If the oti e that so eo e is affiliated

with one of the opposition parties,

s/he will be arrested and detained and will be subjected to torture.

Political prisoners

76.

Conditions for political prisoners in the Kurdish region are difficult. Persons under suspicion of

being politically affiliated will be given a long sentence and prevented from seeing their families. In

comparison, other prisoners who are given 10 years of prison are allowed to see their families.

Defendants, who are affiliated with the communist branch of Komala, are given shorter sentences

than other branches of Komala than KDPI affiliates.

77.

There are cases in which Kurdish defendants were given sentences of 25 years or more in prison,

without the right to see their families. Kurdish prisoners are not granted their basic rights, for

instance when they fall ill, they are often refused treatment. In case treatment is provided, Kurdish

political prisoners are not allowed treatment in a hospital outside of the prison.

78.

According to the source, the following are examples of Kurdish political prisoners that have been

given long term sentences:



Artan Tibash from Orumieh. He was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment for being affiliated with

KDPI. The source did not provide further information on the case.

Osman Mostafapour. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison for being a member of KDPI. His

recent request for probation was denied.

271

He was imprisoned in Orumieh prison and has been

imprisoned for 29 years.

Hossein Osmani from Habat, has been imprisoned for 27 years. He was a member of Komala. The

source did not provide further information on the case.

Mohammed Moradi was sentenced for 33 years. He was under suspicion of being affiliated with

KDPI and is held in Nagada prison. Mohammed Moradi is the brother of Zaniar Moradi and

Loghman Moradi who were executed in a publically known case. When Mohammed Moradi heard

about the execution he attempted suicide.



Statistics on sentences to Kurdish prisoners

79.

According to the statistics, at the Hengaw statistics center, at least 70 Kurdish citizens were

executed in Iran in 2018.

272

80.

In total, there are 20 Kurdish prisoners who are given sentences of more than 20 years and seven

prisoners that are given life sentences.

81.

17 Kurdish minors have been sentenced to death and are awaiting the execution in the Iranian

prisons.

271

Hengaw,

Urmia's Revolutionary court denied Osman Mostafapour's request for parole. He's a political prisoner from

Piranshahr and has been jailed for almost three decades,

8 November 2018,

url

272

Hengaw,

10% of global executions were Kurdish citizens in 2018,

11 April 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

82.

The source added that in general members of the three Komala parties are not punished as harshly

as KDPI.

83.

Following the Turkish invasion of Syria in October 2019, 86 people were arrested for expressing

themselves against the invasion. Out of this group, ten people were sentenced to one year in

prison. All this happened during a period of 10 days.

Prison conditions

84.

The prison conditions in Iran are generally poor. Food is limited and inmates will not survive unless

their families send them money.

85.

According to Hengaw, 27 individuals died in suspicious ways inside Iranian prisons during 2018.

According to the authorities some committed suicide and others died due to ilness. The source

commented that sick prisoners were either not taken to hospital or they are taken there too late.

During the first 10 months of 2019, 14 prisoners died under suspicious circumstances in the Kurdish

region.

86.

Every city in the Kurdish region has its own prison, but the biggest prisons are in Orumieh,

Naqadeh, Qorveh, Sanandej, Saqqez, Kermanshah and Ilam. Political prisoners are transferred to

places like Tehran, Khorasan, Ardebil, and Iraj, places that are far away from the Kurdish region.

Torture

87.

People in the Kurdish region of Iran, who are suspected of political activities, are arrested in their

houses often in the early morning. In most cases the individual will be detained for three to four

months without any information given to the family. During this period s/he will be tortured

physically and psychologically. In some cases, male prisoners will be forced to watch their wives

being raped with the aim of disrespecting the values of the detainee. The authorities will pressure

him to confess to things that did not happen. In case the detainee is cooperating with the

authorities, the authorities will let him call his family. In case, he does not cooperate he will be

tortured more intensively. During these three to four months the prisoners are kept in a facility

under the military intelligence service without anyone knowing of their location.

88.

After this period they will be transferred to a real prison in which the torture is less harsh; however,

they will not be given enough sleep and food. These conditions are worse in the Kurdish region

than in the rest of Iran. The source stressed that Kurdish people are given harsher treatment than

other Iranian nationals.

Fair trial

89.

All trials are closed to the public and the defendant will not be present. In most cases the

defendant does not have the right to a lawyer. In case they are offered a lawyer, the defendant can

choose between 3-4 preselected lawyers. This lawyer will represent the government rather than

the client.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

90.

Hengaw, is aware of one case in which the Iranian court was overruled by the Supreme Leader

Khamenei. The case concerned three Kurds who were accused of killing three members of the IRGC

forces (in Farsi: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran). The defendant was sentenced to

death twice upon order from the Supreme Leader. Hengaw stressed that the organisation has only

once observed such an order.

91.

Furthermore, Hengaw noted that harsh sentences were also given to the two defendants, accused

of assisting in the killing of the three members of the military and for helping their third co-

defendant to escape. Mohammed Sadqi was given a sentence of 40 years of imprisonment; and

Haider Qurvami was sentenced to 118 years and six months of imprisonment. The sentences were

given ten days ago and they have currently been detained for three years without the right to see

their families. After 6 months in prison Haider Qurvami was forced to confess on Press TV. The

confession was evoked by electrification, warm irons inside his body and by showing disrespect for

his values. Moreover, 45 persons were arrested in this case and Haider Qurvami expressed that he

would take responsibility of the killings, to prevent more people from being arrested. Salah

Rahmani, the third suspect and a KDPI military peshmerga, was sentenced to death twice in

absentia. He was never arrested.

O Ma h

,a a o

as pla ted i Salah Rah a i s a

and his child died.

The Moradi-case

92.

The Moradi-case is well known and documented by several media and organisations, including the

UN: The political prisoners from Marivan, Zanyar Moradi and Loghman Moradi, were detained on

August 2009, by the Sanandaj Intelligence Ministry in the city of Marivan.

273

Zanyar Moradi and

Logh a Mo adi e e se te ed to death i De e e

fo i ol e e t i the u de of the

Marivan Friday prayer leade

s so a d fo e it ith God i Fa si: oha e eh . The e

denied the charges in court and said their confessions were done under torture by the Intelligence

Ministry. The confessions were published on video in which they were forced to sit on bottles. The

execution took place on 8 September 2018.

Targeting of family members of politically affiliated persons

93.

Family members of arrested or detained activists, are being threatened to keep the arrest secret. If

the arrest is not kept secret, the torture against the arrestee will be harsher. The Iranian authorities

will sometimes show videos to the family members of the arrestee crying and begging them not to

tell anyone about the arrest. In some cases, family members are brought to the prison and

disrespected in front of the arrestee. In one case, the authorities threatened to rape the wife of a

prisoner, in front of him and force him to divorce her while being in the prison.

94.

Family members may also be denied jobs in the public sector in their home town and will have to

move to another town to get a job.

273

Hengaw, Zanyar, Loghman and Ramin are at serious risk of execution, 7 September 2018,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

95.

With regard to the treatment of family members to political activists, who fled abroad, Hengaw

informed that the Iranian authorities will gather information on the family members. For example,

a political activist fled 15 years ago. The authorities continue to call on the family to give

information on where the fled person is living and what he is doing.

96.

All family members of activists are being treated the same way; the closer family, wife and children,

will be targeted before others. If the activist does not have a wife and children, sisters, brothers

and parents will be targeted.

Return

97.

According to the source, the authorities treat family members of political activists well as to

showcase to the world that there is freedom in Iran, and that returnees are not being harmed. The

source did not provide any examples.

98.

Hengaw does not have a case in which the activist returned himself. Hengaw assessed that if an

activist returns he will be sentenced to death.

99.

Three years ago, a returnee, who was not politically affiliated, voluntarily returned to Iran from

Finland. He was detained for 40 days and killed by the IRGC intelligence service under torture. The

authorities threatened his father that they would kill his other son, if he went public with the case.

Despite this, the father made the world know that the government threatened him; however, the

brother was not killed.

100.

With regard to activists who return from KRI, Hengaw informed that they will be sentenced to

imprisonment. In one case a woman, visited an Iranian political party in Sulaimania, and was

sentenced to three years in prison. Moreover, people who work in KRI are sometimes arrested

under suspicion of being affiliated with the Kurdish opposition parties. The source gave an example

of an Iranian Kurdish university teacher in Sulaimania, who is originally from Bukan. He was

arrested for being affiliated with the Kurdish opposition parties. The university teacher is still

imprisoned without trial.

Return of al Tash refugees

101.

Due to the

a et ee I a a d I a du i g the s, o e tha

I a ia Ku ds f o the

border area fled to Iraq and were placed in the al Tash camp close to Ramadi. This group of

refugees was not granted Iraqi citizenship, nor did they have Iranian passports. In 2014, when the

borders were open most of the third generation of al Tash refugees went to Europe to seek asylum;

however, they were not given nationality there, nor do they have citizenship in Iran or Iraq. In KRI

they are living in Barika and Kawa camps. According to Hengaw, Al Tash refugees will not be treated

well if they return to Iran. They do not have identity papers/nationality; their families were

refugees for a long time and, more importantly, because the al Tash refugees joined the KDPI.

Hengaw does not know of any cases who voluntarily returned to Iran. In order to get basic rights

such as freedom of movement the al Tash refugees have no choice but to join the political parties.

The parties provide them with a political residency ID card that will allow them to move around in

KRI.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Border area, illegal crossings

102.

Most of the o de i I a is gua ded

a spe ial fo e, e o i tiza i ; ho e e , i the Ku dish

area the border is now guarded by the IRGC forces, by order of the Supreme Leader. In the Kurdish

border area, the IRGC forces are given permission to kill anyone who crosses the border illegally. In

Ja ua to O to e , Ku dish po te s i Ku dish la guage: kol a s e e killed at the

border and 150 has been injured.

274

In the same period 10 civilians, who were not kolbars, were

killed or wounded in the fields.

e o i tiza i e e still gua di g the o de s of the Ku dish a ea et ee

Iran and Iraq, they were more flexible and people would be allowed to take goods between Iran

and Iraq.

103.

Du i g the pe iod

104.

Over the last three to four years, the Iranian military are guarding the border more intensely. This

development was triggered by KDPI moving their bases to the Qandil Mountains in 2016. There are

mines in the border area stemming from earlier periods of hostility as well as new mines that were

recently planted. In 2019 (January to October), 23 people were victims of mines and either killed or

wounded.

105.

Within the latest two or three years, the Iranian government has intensified its monitoring of the

border. More military checkpoints have been built in the mountains, including in Qandil and in KRI,

in places where they were difficult to build. This improves IRGC

i tellige e se i e a ilit to a est

people at the border.

Clashes between the Iranian government forces and the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties

106.

This year the number of clashes between the Iranian government forces and the Iranian Kurdish

opposition parties decreased compared to former years. This is due to an agreement between the

Iranian government and the Iranian Kurdish parties made through an organisation in Norway in

order to prevent clashed between the two sides

107.

The clashes often occur when the party members go the towns in the Iranian Kurdish areas to raise

awareness about the party. During this time they are attacked by the Iranian military and clashes

occur. Sometimes the Iranian authorities discover the party members crossing the border which

results in clashes.

108.

In 2019 (January to October), there were 32 clashes in which 17 peshmergas killed in the conflict

and 23 Iranian military personnel were killed.

109.

In 2019 (January to October), Iran bombed places in the Kurdish region of Iran 11 times. As a result

one girl died and four persons were wounded.

274

Hengaw,

130 Kurdish Porters Killed, Injured in Six Months,

6 July 2019,

url;

Hengaw,

At least 16 Kurdish Porters

Killed, Injured in August,

1 September 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

110.

In 2018, 48 clashes took place, which resulted in the killing of 15 members of KDPI and 14 members

of KDP-Iran, 15 members of PJAK, 2 members of Komala. In addition, 2 members of PAK were

arrested in the same year, 97 members of the Iranian government army were killed.

111.

When asked about the definition of a Peshmerga, Hengaw replied that a Peshmerga is someone

who is armed and with the party full time. The definition of a party member includes both civilian

members and Peshmergas.

112.

When asked how Peshmergas, who took part in armed conflicts, are treated by the government if

they are arrested, Hengaw gave some examples:



Two Peshmergas, who were caught in 2018 are still in prison and they have not been taken to

court.

In another case a member of PJAK was captured. He is now in prison in Orumieh and is intensively

tortured. The source did not provide information on time and place for the event.

On 9 September 2018 two peshmergas named Ahmed Shabab and Nasir Asisi both from Habat

were injured and taken as prisoners. They were subsequently killed by the Iranian military.

113.

The source noted that Hengaw started collecting statistics in 2016. They do not have any data prior

to 2016. Hengaw emphasized that before 2016 the number of clashes were lower. For instance, in

2016 the number of kolbars killed was 97. In 2017, the number was 230. Another example of the

development in the conflict is the number of arrests of activists. In 2016 less than 250 activists

were arrested. In 2017, the number was more than 600.

Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC)

Skype meeting on 21 October 2019

The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center is an independent non-profit organisation that was founded

in 2004 by human rights scholars and lawyers.

The mission of the Center is to establish a comprehensive and objective historical record of the human rights

situation in Iran, and on the basis of this record, establish responsibility for patterns of human rights abuses.

These records are made available in an archive that is accessible to the public for research and educational

purposes. The center also focusses on promoting accountability, respect for human rights and the rule of

law in Iran; as well as to encourage an informed dialogue on the human rights situation in Iran among

scholars and the general public in Iran and abroad.

275

KDPI Party presence and their activities in Iran

114.

In 2016, Mostafa Hejri, the leader of one of two KDPI factions, stated that they have resumed

armed conflict with the Iranian government after the presence of their armed fighters known as

275

Website of Iran Human Rights Documentation Center:

https://iranhrdc.org/mission/

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

peshmerga

were not tolerated by the Iranian government. The source cannot comment on their

capacity or whether they have engaged in armed operations in recent years. The source is unaware

of the extent of their influence and what activities they are engaged in.

115.

The Iranian Government arrests Kurdish activists and accuses them of armed engagement.

However because trials are neither fair nor public, it is impossible to comment on the activities of

individual defendants.

Members versus supporters

116.

The source noted that it is important to understand how the judiciary and the intelligence

apparatus operate. The basis of their work is to extract confessions from the defendant. In relation

to how these confessions are carried out, the use of torture has been documented. The authorities

may have limited information on the arrested persons but subject them to torture in order to make

them confess. In some cases the authorities do not even care if the confessions are accurate, but

rather focus on the fact that it can be reported to their superiors that a subject has been identified.

On the basis of this, it does not make a difference whether a person is a member or a sympathiser

as the objective of the intelligence agents is to extract a confession. Oftentimes torture is used to

extract the confessions and when a person has confessed, the authorities have obtained what they

want.

117.

If a supporter, who has not engaged in armed conflict, can withstand the torture and does not

confess, he will probably be charged of a lesser crime. The source reiterated that most often

evidence is extracted during confessions.

118.

Whereas the burden of proof ought to fall on the Government, it wrongly is put upon the accused

individual to proof his/her innocence.

119.

In relation to whether a sympathizer is treated differently than a member during the pre-arrest

stage, the source stated, that generally the likelihood of getting arrested, increases on the basis of

the level of involvement. The source underlined, that whilst this is a general observation, there are

numerous cases of individuals that have been falsely arrested.

120.

For example, it was recently revealed that a number of persons, who had been accused and

sentenced for the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, were found innocent following years

of imprisonment as well as public TV confessions. The individuals were therefore released.

121.

Many individuals, who are accused of having ties with Kurdish political parties, may in fact, be

innocent. The source reiterated that due to the working methods of the judiciary the arrest of

innocent people happens frequently.

Monitoring by the Iranian authorities

122.

The level of monitoring in the Kurdish areas is higher than the average level of monitoring across

the country. The Iranian authorities have the resources to monitor political activists. For example, a

Kurdish labor activist named Mahmoud Salehi, who had been affiliated with a political party during

the eighties, was arrested for his labor activism. When he was arrested, the authorities brought

forward old information relating to his previous political activities and they attempted to convict

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

him on these grounds. Thus monitoring goes back a long time. Mahmoud Salehi was first sentenced

to i e ea s i p iso e t, ut o appeal his se te e as edu ed to o e ea i p iso e t.

123.

The source stated that it is also important to consider that many of the people have a family

member who was involved with a Kurdish political party. If a person has a family member who has

been arrested or executed, it is more likely that the person will be monitored.

124.

Political active persons and their family members are at high risk of being monitored. The risk is

always present.

125.

Any sort of political or civic activism that falls outside the purview of the government creates

suspicion and it raises the risk of being monitored. In the Kurdish areas of the country, the risk

increases if an individual engages in any sort of activism.

Profile of people who are targeted by the Iranian government

126.

For example, many areas within the Kurdish region are populated by Sunni Muslim Kurds. Persons

with this ethnic religious background have been arrested by the authorities accused of having links

to extremist groups such as Islamic State (IS). Several of the accused have been sentenced to death,

after being subjected to torture and a closed trial. The individuals had no access to counsel and

their due process rights were violated. The source noted that the Iranian government did not prove

the guilt of any of the executed individuals. Conducting religious activism also increases the risk of

monitoring.

127.

As such, an individual may be Kurdish; however the reason for his arrest is national security charges

resulting from alleged affiliation with extremist Sunni groups.

128.

The source stated that there are reports of extremist groups operating in the Kurdish regions of

Iran. However, it is unknown whether the individuals who have been arrested are actually affiliated

o e e s of these g oups. The ha ges agai st the

e e agi g a agai st God

(moharebeh), which is punished by death. In 2014 there were 40 persons on the death row in

Rajaee Shahr prison because of allegations of being affiliated with an extremist Sunni group.

129.

With regard to people being targeted, the source pointed to three possibilities on the outcome:

1. If a person is arrested for and convicted of disseminating propaganda, s/he will be sentenced to 1

year in prison.

2. If a person is charged with and convicted of acting against national security, s/he will be sentenced

to 1 to 5 years in prison.

3. Under the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 the charge of moharebeh is only applicable if a person draws

a weapon. However, alleged membership or affiliation with an armed opposition group has been

the basis for the charge of moharebeh in some cases.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

The risk of family members to party members or supporters

130.

Family members to party members or sympathizers are also at risk of being called in, questioned

and detained. The Iranian government relies on extracting information from family members by

putting pressure on them, in order for the family member to put pressure on the political party

member. This is also the case for activist living abroad. Family members are at risk of being subject

to the same treatment as the members. If the authorities are aware that a person is a family

member to a political party member, s/he is at risk of questioning and being subjected to torture.

The authorities may also retaliate against family members. For example, there is the well-known

case of Zaniar and Loghman Moradi in which two young men (cousins) were accused of

assassinating a religious cleric. They insisted on being innocent and lived on death row for a

number of years until their execution in September 2018.

276

There were serious questions

o e i g the go e

e t s a usatio s. Za ia Mo adi s fathe as a politi al a tivist

living

outside of Iran, and he was assassinated in July 2018. Zaniar Moradi stated that he had been

a ested e ause of his fathe s politi al a ti is .

Fair trial

131.

The source stated that there is no fair trial in Iran and that this is the nature of the Iranian

government, particularly when it comes to cases of national security. Individuals are deprived of

their due process rights, including the right to be represented by counsel and not being subject to

torture.

Conflict between the Iranian authorities and political parties

132.

The source noted that he had no detailed information about this.

Consequences for Iranian Kurds voluntarily returning to Iran

133.

Whilst the source noted that he had no detailed information about this, he noted that generally the

government states that individuals, who have left Iran, are welcome to come back. He is aware of

cases of individuals that have conducted activism related to other issues than that of the Kurds, and

that these individuals have been arrested after returning to Iran. He assumes that the same

conditions apply for Kurdish activists. The source is not aware of whether a person is at risk after

voluntarily returning from Europe.

The border area

134.

One issue that is consistently raised relating to the border area is

that of the kol a s . The kol a s,

who are living in a poor region, are working illegally and transporting consumer goods across the

border. Despite this act being illegal under the law, the Iranian government further violates Iranian

law, by responding with disproportionate use of force, as they are shooting the kolbars who are

unarmed. Many kolbars have been killed as a result of these shootings.

276

AI - Amnesty International, Iran: Executions of three Iranian Kurds an outrage, 8 September 2018,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Residency,

Erbil Province

Meeting with Brigadier General Yadgar A. Faraj

Erbil, 27 October 2019

135.

The area of responsibility of the Directorate of residency includes foreign nationals seeking

eside e pe it at the Haj O a

o de ossi g poi t o theast of E il it at the o de to

Iran and Erbil International Airport (EIA); anyone who enters KRG through these border points is

under the responsibility of the Directorate of Residency. For anyone who wants to seek asylum in

KRI, including Iranian refugees the Directorate has established four camps outside Erbil city. Within

the Directorate, there is a special unit for people who seek asylum in KRI and do not want to live in

the camps. It falls within the responsibility of the directorate, to register and issue permits and

lisence to stay.

Residence permits on grounds of employment

136.

Many Iranians are coming to KRI due to the current economic situation in Iran; the Iranian

government goes through hardship because of the evaluation of the Iranian currency. The visa

requirement between Iran and Iraq has been lifted which implies that a short term visa of 30 days

is granted on the border.

137.

As for Iranian nationals who apply for residence permit on grounds of employment, a large number

of Iranians are coming to KRI and some of them make contracts with different local directorates

and organisations in KRI. For instance, some Iranian doctors and some Iranian university lectures

come to have a working contract. When they apply they go through different official channels. For

instance when a university lecturer applies s/he addresses the Ministry of High Education; on

behalf of the applicant the ministry sends a letter to the Directorate of Residency and requests a

residence permit for the teacher. When a medical doctor applies, the letter is sent by the Ministry

of Health. These types of contracts are temporary and depends on the approval and interest that

the KRG has in these applicants in the sense that if their field of specialty is needed they extent

their stay. If not, they will return.

138.

For Iranians applying for a longer stay in KRI, their children have the right to be registered in. KRG is

applying legal procedures and medical procedures to check their legal status and health.

Information on the address of the applicant is a requirement for issuance of a permit letter for

them to stay in KRI.

Residence permits on grounds of protection/asylum

139.

As for the political party members, when they take refuge in KRI because of security threat to their

lives; the first step in the procedure is to approach UNHCR to be registered and have their identity

paper issued. As the next step, UNHCR refers the refugee to the Directorate of Residency where the

case is processed based on the documents sent by UNHCR. The Directorate then refers the case to

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

the security directorate to check their background in order to see if these people are under threat

and then they are given a final decision on their stay in KRI.

140.

When asked whether the Directorate of Residency accepts all cases from UNHCR or if they make

their own assessment, the source replied that the refugees are firstly received by the UNHCR and in

accordance with their procedures, the refugees are referred to the Directorate of Residency. The

Directorate then processes the cases in accordance with their own procedures that are different

from those of UNHCR. Brigadier General Yadgar A. Faraj stated that it is not within the capacity of

KRG to receive every person who seeks asylum in KRI. When the directorate has decided the case, it

is efe ed to the se u it di e to ate i o de to he k the efugees a kg ou

d. Furthermore it is

being check that that the refugees are in fact under threat in Iran and that they cannot return,

because they will not be safe. During the period in which these checks are being carried out, they

are kept under surveillance by the KRG for some time to make sure that the reason they stated as

their asylum motive is the real reason why they came to KRI. After this procedure they are given

temporary residence permit in KRI.

Reasons for refusal of residence permit/asylum

141.

Refugees, who do not give a convincing asylum motive in accordance with the KRG, are not granted

residence permit in KRI. For instance, KRG does not give residency to Iranians who flee their

country in order to evade military service. KRG does not forcefully return these people, but on the

other hand they do not issue residence permit for them. As already stated KRG does not have the

capacity to give asylum to all applicants who are coming. KRI is under huge pressure to provide

services for internally displaced Iraqis as well as to a large number of Syrian refugees to stay in KRI.

This month [October 2019] KRI received 10,000 people from Syria. Compared to other countries,

KRI received a large number of refugees who fled to KRI that is a relatively safe area compared to

the rest of Iraq.

142.

A person, who commits a crime or kills someone and then takes refuge to KRI, will not be granted

residency.

143.

As an example the source noted that drug addiction and drug dealing is quite rampant in Iran, and

that the Iranian regime also focuses these issues. In this respect, a large number if Iranians have

come to KRI to sell drugs. KRG is combatting drug dealing in KRI by a special unit within Asayish

alled The Di e to ate of Co atti g D ugs . The Di e to ate of Reside

has est i tio s o

issuing residence permits for Iranians because of the treats that come from drug addiction and drug

dealing. It is a sensitive issue and it is being dealt with accordingly.

144.

It is a matter for the Directorate for Combatting Drugs to decide if an Iranian drug smuggler will be

returned to Iran. In case it has been decided that the person in question is to be returned, the

Directorate for Combatting Drugs issues a letter addressed to the Directorate of Residency

demanding to send the person back to Iran, the Directorate of Residency will carry out the return. If

not, sometimes the case will be dealt with according to the Iraqi civil law.

145.

If a person is registered by UNHCR, they will not be given a residence permit unless the Directorate

of Residency decides to issue one. Sometimes the Directorate might allow them to stay for a few

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

months but later on the Directorate will check their backgrounds and follow up their cases,

othe ise it is diffi ult fo the Di e to ate to issue i a a fo people ho appl fo esidency.

146.

KRG views the work done by UNHCR as a mean to check their status, but sometimes it does not

i pl that the p o edu es of the Di e to ate allo the to issue the i a a . So e o ete ases

were agreed by UNHCR, but the Directorate did not agree on them. These decisions on canceling

applications due to the lack of convincing evidence were explained to UNHCR.

Duration of residence permit

147.

For residence permit issued on protection grounds, they are issued for six months. For residence

permit issued on grounds of employment, one year stay will be granted with the possibility to

extent for another year.

Fees for residence permit

148.

For applicants coming from countries with no visa requirement, for instance Turkey and Iran, the

price is 675,000 IQD. For applicants from countries with visa requirement the price is 1,175,000

IQD. Renewal costs 175,000 IQD for a year; for six months 105,000 IQD. Asylum seekers are not

charged for a residence permit.

How many Iranians are currently staying in KRI?

149.

Some Iranians stay within their political factions and they do not ask for renewal of their residence

permit. Other Iranians come to renew their status.

Do the peshmergas have residence permit?

150.

As for civilians, it is a matter for the Directorate of Residency; as for armed groups it is being dealt

with by other authorities. The armed groups within the parties are not allowed to take up residency

as long as they belong to the parties. With regard to freedom of movement for the armed groups,

according to the agreement made between KRG and the parties, the parties have their own identity

documents that can be used for commuting between towns and cities. However, this question is

outside the field of the Directorate of Residency.

Possibility to be granted Iraqi passports

151.

When asked if it is possible for Iranian refugees to be granted Iraqi passports today, knowing that

previously this was possible for a period around 2008, the source replied that applications for Iraqi

passports are being processed in accordance with the Iraqi nationality Code. If requirements are

met, one will be granted a passport. Two different situations in KRI: When KRI was an independent

territory and separated from Baghdad, according to the Iraqi nationality code, those who met the

requirement were given citizenship and passport. After the loss of independency and KRI became a

part of the newly elected Iraqi government, the applications must be addressed to the Iraqi

authorities in order for them to decide.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

152.

As for these applications for Iraqi passports for Iranian refugees it is a matter for the Directorate of

Passports.

153.

Forged documents are tracked at the border and are being dealt with through a legal procedure.

Number of crossings

154.

For legal crossings, there are two types of statistics:

The official data on legal stay granted for 28 days; when this period is exceeded they are referred to the

Directorate of Passports to process the application for the extension that they ask for. In 2018, for Haj

Omaran crossing point: 137,000 Iranians entered the border legally.

155.

The figure for residency granted to Iranians this year is 5,267 people long term, i.e. 6 months or one

year.

156.

There is no official data for the number of illegal crossings, or for people who are caught crossing

the border illegally. No documents are issued in these cases; they are being asked to return. If they

are not asylum seekers they might be forcefully returned/repatriated.

Entry to KRI

157.

Most Iranians are coming by land. As for direct flights to Iran, currently only Mahan Air has three

flights a week from Tehran to EIA on Wednesdays, Fridays and Mondays. As for Sulaimania Airport

the Directorate is not aware.

Iranian authorities in KRI

158.

Asked to what extent the Iranian intelligence service is monitoring the Iranian politically parties in

KRI, the source replied that it could be true that the Iranian intelligence service monitor the parties,

however, there have been no incidences so far. KRG is monitoring the parties in order to assure

their safety. KRG does everything within its capacity to protect the refugees who are living on their

territory.

KRG, Ministry of Immigration and Displacement, Directorate of Passports,

Erbil Province

Meeting with Legal Brigadier Director Didar Omer Qadir

Erbil, 27 October 2019

159.

Director Didar Omer Qadir stated that Iraqi passports are solely issued to holders of an Iraqi citizen

certificate.

160.

Asked if Iraqi passports are granted to Iranian refugees, Director Didar Omer Qadir replied that the

Directorate received a number of requests and repeated that passports are only issues to persons

with an Iraqi citizen certificate. The same rule applies to Iranian nationals having lived for a longer

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

period in Iraq. The source added that there might have been some cases on Iranians in Ramadi,

who were given passports, but it is not the responsibility of KRG.

161.

The procedure for applications for passport in Erbil is to address the Directorate of Passports.

Applications for passports are sent for approval in Baghdad. Some cases are refused, but it is a

matter for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in Baghdad.

162.

The Directorate of Passports in Erbil was established in 2010 and is not responsible for what

happened before this date. In 2010, the information in the passport document was changed in the

sense that as of that time the location of issuance is stated. Before 2010, the location of issuance of

all passpo ts issued i I a as Baghdad, I a . Afte

, the lo atio of issua e i passpo ts

that e e applied fo i E il is E il, I a .

163.

When asked about the possibility for Feyli Kurds to apply for a passport, the source replied that

they have the right to apply. Applications should be submitted to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in

Baghdad. With regard to legislation on passports, the source referred to the Iraqi Nationality Code

(2006).

A journalist in KRI (A)

Erbil, 29 October 2019

Party activities

164.

The activities of KDPI are less than in previous years. In 1991, the party entered into an agreement

with the KRI authorities that they would not conduct any military actions against Iran.

165.

When the party conducts activities in Iranian cities, they go in small groups of five to seven people,

with the purpose of enhancing the knowledge of people as well as recruiting new members. The

group may be armed as a means of protection, but the purpose is not to go into fighting. The

objective is solely to raise awareness around party activities.

166.

There are cases of civilian party members living in Iran being killed. For example, a man was killed

in Mahabat in his bookstore. He was not conducting any civil activities for the party, but the

authorities knew that he was working for the opposition parties and for this reason he was killed.

167.

Since the Iranian authorities attacked the KDPI base in Koya in September 2018, the situation has

become precarious and the political parties have intensified their focus on security and military

capacity. Women and children also reside in the camp.

Conditions for members and supporters in KRI

168.

The Iranian authorities use infiltrators and spies to obtain information. For example, when the

attack happened in Koya, two bodyguards attending were providing information to the Iranian

authorities.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

169.

The source noted that the party is focusing on increasing their member base, rather than ensuring

that the individuals joining the party are not in fact working for the Iranian authorities. The source

explained while the party is focusing on increasing their member base, some of the recruited

people are joini

g the pa t fo othe easo s tha suppo ti g the pa t s ause a d a e e e

working for the Iranian authorities. As a result, there are individuals living with the party members

in the camps, who are working for the authorities.

170.

According to the source, the Iranian authorities have various policies aiming at gathering

information about individuals through the use of spies and informants. For example, some families

work for both the political party and the Iranian authorities.

171.

According to the source, for family members of a Peshmerga who are living in the KRI it is not

possible to travel to Iran. Many Peshmergas are living on a very low income. Generally, a

Peshmerga member earns 60 USD per month per family. In many cases, family members living

outside the camps, support the Peshmergas financially through their salaries.

Conflict at the border

172.

Two months ago the Peshmergas of KDPI and Komala were planning to enter into the Iranian cities

on the border: Sardasht, Marivan, Piransahr and Shino to conduct civilian activities and inform

members of their activities. The duration of the stay was planned to be five days. The purpose of

this mission was to publish and disseminate a publication among the Iranian Kurds. The Iranian

forces became aware of the mission after a local family under threat reported it to them and

therefore relocated forces to those areas in order to counter the Peshmergas with military forces. A

press release was also issued by the Iranian authorities stating that anyone who enters Iran and

who is against Iranian policies will be attacked.

173.

Activities by KDPI at the border is limited, also due to the presence of the main base of PKK who

have good relations with the Iranian authorities.

174.

Some media activities still take place in the camp in Koya, however one year ago the KDPI-run TV

ha el a ed Tishk as losed do fo o e ea . Offi iall due to la k of fi a ial esou es,

but most likely it was a politically motivated decision.

Monitoring by Iranian intelligence service of members and supporters in KRI

175.

According to the source, many radio and TV stations in KRI, have employees that are Iranian and

working for the Iranian authorities as well as the KRI authorities and who provide information

about the activities of the political parties. Overall, the Iranian regime has a wide ranging network

in KRI gathering information. This is also a result of the increasingly difficult economic situation in

Iran. Many people travel to KRI working for the Iranian authorities of which many are Kurds from

Iran.

176.

Another reason why many Iranian Kurds are employed in KRI is due to their high level of education.

However, Iranian Kurds are limited in terms of employment and can only work for the KRG on

consultancy basis. Furthermore, in order to advance career wise, it is necessary to be linked to a

political party.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

177.

The importance for the KRI intelligence service is that nothing happens, that will affect the security

situation in KRI.

178.

As an example of the Iranian intelligence operations in KRI, last year in Kasnazan, west of Erbil, a car

bomb was planted in a car of a man who had been politically active inside of Iran. This happened

when the man came back to KRI after six months. The man and his son were killed by the bomb.

Many Kurds from Iran live in Kasnazan.

Legal entry

179.

Some people can cross the border if they have documentation and if one has political affiliation it

becomes easier. Particularly, there is no longer a need to obtain a visa to cross the border.

180.

Lack of ID documents and citizenship

181.

With regards to the KDPI members who previously lived in the camps in the Qandil Mountains and

moved to Koya in 1990, the source explained that many of them are unable to obtain any identity

paper, such as a passport or an ID card. They may have a political party ID card, but they have no

rights. In the Iraqi ID document they are provided with, it states that they are not originally Iraqi

and that they are born in Iran. For this reason they cannot obtain a passport. The inability to obtain

ID documents applies to members of all the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, including KDPI,

Komala, PAK and PJAK.

182.

Contrary to the lower ranks of the party, high ranked political party members are able to obtain a

KRI ID that they can travel on to Baghdad.

183.

Iranian Kurds

i I a ,

a hold a atio alit a d i A a i : je si a a d a ID a d i A a i :

ha i a . Ho e e , a e atio al ID a d has ee i t odu ed i I a , hi h epla es the je si a

a d the ha i a . Without this a d, a pe so a ot appl fo a passport.

184.

Basically, Iranian Kurds are able to stay and travel in Iraq; they can work in the private sector, but

only be promoted to some level; and they can study at university. They cannot obtain a passport

185.

In 2010, the source and another close family member had an Iraqi passport issued by the central

government, which expired in 2018. However, due to a policy change, the file is with Baghdad

Passport Directorate and the passport cannot be renewed.

Written note, Academic Researcher, Hemn Seyedi

13 November, 2019

186.

Over the last four decades the Iranian Government has enforced strict security on the Kurdish

region of Iran. Any activity in this region has been seen through a security lens; even civil and

cultural activities have been interpreted as political and individuals conducting civil or cultural

activities are given the same punishment. Many people in Iran and in particular in the Kurdish

region of Iran were arrested and have been sentenced for cultural activities, as well as for

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

environmental activities, in more recent times. The Kurdish question in Iran is broadly linked to the

security status of the country.

187.

According to the source, there is no legal basis for any punishment of civil activities, but in practice

punishment of such activities takes place. Albeit those who are linked to political parties will face

the worst punishments but in many cases it is difficult to say which case is political and which cases

that are civil or cultural.

188.

The source informed that he had firsthand knowledge of arrest in Iran. He pointed out that the

legal situation, including the behaviors of the courts and Judges, and the political situation in

Iranian Kurdistan was and still is worse than the rest of Iran. According to the source, activists who

have been sentenced and impriso

ed i the Ku dish egio , state that Teh a E i P iso looks like

a hotel o pa ed to the p iso s i Ku dish egio .

189.

The source was asked if he was aware of a truce between the Iranian government and the Iranian

Kurdish opposition parties facilitated by a Norwegian organisation. In relation to this, the source

explained that meetings had been held in Oslo last summer. However, it was not a negotiation

process to address the Kurdish issues in Iran. Iranian representatives just declared that they would

respond strongly to any military campaign by the Kurdish political parties with armed members;

Peshmergas. The Iranian representatives furthermore stated that Iran is currently under US

sanctions and that the Iranian Government will not tolerate any activities or any sort of potential

cooperation with Americans by the Kurdish groups.

190.

The socio-economic situation in the Kurdistan region of Iran is linked to the political situation. The

Kurdish question in Iran is political and dates back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Kurds did not

endorse the idea of Islamic rule in Iran and this created a political problem with the Iranian

Government. The Revolution in Kurdistan had a democratic and secular orientation. The Kurds did

not participate in the Revolution to create an Islamic society but they revolted for freedom,

democracy and for creating a Kurdish autonomous administration to obtain their ethnic demands.

191.

When asked if PJAK executes military operations or other types of operations in Iran, PJAK operates

on the same grounds and principles as other Kurdish groups like Komala and KDP, KDP-I, and

Khabat. PJAK is more active in the northern and southern parts of the Kurdish region while the

other groups traditionally focus on central parts of the Kurdish region of Iran.

192.

The source was asked about the status of Iranian Kurds in KRI, specifically their civil and social rights

(including the right to ID cards, passports, work and education.)

193.

The source explained that most of the Iranian Kurds do not have any legal rights to stay in KRI.

They do not receive standard refugee supports and even their security is not guaranteed by KRG.

According to the source, only a small number, who have lived in KRI for more than a decade, and

that has political ties with the ruling parties in KRG receive limited support. The majority of people

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

live in a dire situation.

194.

When asked if the source was aware of whether the KRG authorities have granted passports to

Iranian Kurds around 2008, the source reiterated that a very small number of Iranian Kurds

received some supports during that time, including naturalising their citizenship and becoming Iraqi

citizen. However, this was not recognised by Baghdad and therefore the passports were terminated

shortly after. This resulted in most of the people losing the rights given to them. In addition, the

passports that were issued, had expired after 10 years and according to the source, in the years

2017, 2018 none of them have received a new one so far.

A journalist in KRI (B)

Erbil, 29 October 2019

Conditions for Iranian Kurds in Iran

Political civil activities by members and supporters of the Iranian Kurdish opposition parties

195.

The source informed that the level of civil political activities conducted by the Iranian Kurdish

opposition parties in Iran is limited due to the scrutiny they are faced with. When the party does

conduct civil political activities, this is done in secrecy to prevent the authorities clamping down on

them. However, the parties support the activities of others, such as organisations that focus on

environmental issues as well as other social issues. The Kurdish political parties support political

and social activities in Kurdistan, and they also support peaceful gatherings of Kurds in which they

demand their rights.

Monitoring of activists

196.

In Iran anyone put under monitoring can be arrested and imprisoned for no reason and without any

evidence against them. Individuals are taken from their homes or from their workplace without

informing the families. Oftentimes 3-4 Intelligence Service personnel arrive by car to arrest the

person. Investigation of the individual may take 20 days or up till 1 month. Following this period,

the person will be allowed to contact family to inform that s/he has been taken by Ministry of

I tellige e i Fa si: Veza at-e Ettela at Jo hu i-ye

Eslami-

e I a , the IRGC I tellige e Se i e

(in Farsi: Sazman-e

Ettela at-e

Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami) or by the IRGC Military

Forces (in Farsi: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran).

197.

As part of the monitoring, the authorities monitor the phone calls as well as social media of

individuals. In cases where the objective is to just collect information on a person, the authorities

will monitor his social media accounts to see what he is doing. If the objective is to arrest someone,

the pe so s pho e ill e o ito ed a d the autho ities ill liste to his pho e alls to o tai

knowledge on who he is talking to and about what. By use of GPS, they authorities will locate the

person and arrest her/him.

198.

The source informed that he has seen such monitoring himself as well as heard of it through friends

who have been arrested and monitored.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

199.

When asked if the authorities rely on social media and phone calls only for monitoring, the source

explained that there are also a lot of spies in the Kurdish cities. The spies that are working for

Ministry of Intelligence or the IRGC Intelligence Service have their own formalities and they are

alled the A o

ous Soldie s , hi h ea s the use a pseudo

i stead of thei eal a es,

making them difficult to identify. They often wear certain types of clothes and are shaved in a

certain way, but it is not known to everyone how they look.

200.

If they appear in the cities people would know them, but the Iranian government provides them

with special accommodation such as in hotels or other private places to avoid them being visible in

the community.

201.

People from the local population also work as informants, but it is not known who these individuals

are. They have their own identity and card and no one knows about it. In order to remain

anonymous, they do not tell anyone that they work for Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) or the IRGC

Intelligence Service.

202.

In December 2012, the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress published the result

of a esea h u de the title I a s Mi ist of I tellige e a d Se u it

277

in which it was explained

how the Iranian intelligence operates and what activities they conduct outside of Iran as well as

how departments are operating and managed.

Targeting of activists

203.

Anyone who is arrested in Iran will be accused of either helping the political parties or doing

environmental activities or activities that are affecting the national security in Iran. Ministry of

Intelligence or the IRGC Intelligence Service will threaten the activist by saying that if s/he leaves

Iran, the punishment for the activist will be tripled.

204.

The source mentioned the case of Mohammad Sadiq Kabudwand who was detained in Evin prison

for 10 years and now lives in Tehran, as an example. He was the head of an organisation called

Defense of Kurdistan Human Rights Organisation. Mohammad Sadiq Kabudwand wrote on his

private tweet that following his release from prison, the authorities withdrew his passport and

documents which make it impossible for him to leave Iran.

278

205.

The source has firsthand knowledge on the Intelligence Service and how it operates. There is two

different corps of intelligence service in Iran, and the source has been called for investigation at

both; namely the IRGC Intelligence Service and Ministry of Intelligence.

206.

Activists that are arrested in Iran are either arrested by the IRGC Intelligence Service or by Ministry

of Intelligence.

207.

In Urumieh there is a specific military intelligence service under the IRGC, where there is a

detention

e te

277

278

hi h is efe ed to as Al Mahdi Dete tio Ce t e . A

pe so held i this

The Library of Congress,

Ira s Mi istr of I tellige e a d Se urit

, December 2012,

url

Kurdpa,

Mohammad Sadiq Kabudwand was banned to exit Iran,

9 July 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

detention center is subject to hard torture until they confess. Upon completing the interrogation,

detainees are taken to trial before Urumieh Revolutionary Court where severe sentences are issued

to those with security and political charges .

208.

In Sanandej there are two different detention centers; one is under the IRGC Intelligence Service

and one is under Ministry of Intelligence.

209.

The source gave examples of targeting of activists by the authorities:



The source referred to a case of two environmental activists, named Sharif Bajaur, Omid Kohneh

Poushi, who died in summer 2018 while conducting environmental activities. They died while

extinguishing forest fires in Mariwan.

In the cities of Marivan and Sanandej, two cultural organisations, called Nourjin and Wajin,

conducted Kurdish cultural activities, including teaching the Kurdish language. The director of

Noujin (Zahra Mohamedi) has been in prison for more than five months. The court requested 700

million Iranian Toman

279

in bail, as a guarantee for her release. The family provided the funds, but

the court is still not willing to release her. The authorities have accused her of conducting political

activities, though all she was doing was teaching the Kurdish language to children. She was arrested

by the intelligence forces on 23 May 2019.

210.

In Iran, anyone who is arrested for conducting civil activities will be accused of conducting political

or security related activities.

Treat e t of a ti ists’ fa ily

ers a d frie ds

211.

The source left Iran in 2013 and since then the Iranian authorities have not allowed for any family

to visit the source. In addition, family members have been taken several times for investigation and

been threatened and therefore do not dare visiting the source. Generally, the Iranian authorities

use families to put pressure on the person living outside of Iran with the aim of having the family

convincing her/him to return to Iran. They investigate the family and put pressure on them. Every

once in a while, the intelligence forces contact the families by telephone asking them to report to

the intelligence department in order to answer their questions, and when they report, they are

interrogated about the activities of their children.

212.

The source explained that according to information received from a university teacher, who

previously worked with the Iranian Intelligence Service, families of anyone doing social or political

activity will be put under surveillance, which includes monitoring of phone calls, computer use as

well as their movement. According to the source there are many examples of parents of activists

who have been threatened and pressured. Any family who has a civil or political activist family

member outside of Iran is put under more monitoring and pressure than other families.

213.

The punishment of the family members depends on how active the activist has been. In some

cases, the families have been arrested and accused.

279

Corresponding to approx. 17,515 USD

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

214.

The file of any social or political activist is always open with the Intelligence Service, and they are

always monitoring and investigating the activists as well as his/her family members.

215.

Generally, the Intelligence Service calls on the family three times throughout the year. However,

the approach by the authorities towards the family can vary from case to case. In some cases the

father is required to come to the Intelligence Service and pledge that he has not left the city or

taken any other action to meet with his son/daughter. For example, two months ago, the father of

a woman who is a political activist living in one of the political party camps inside KRI, was arrested

in the city of Marivan, for visiting his daughter in KRI.

216.

Generally, the Intelligence Service will target close family members (mother, father and siblings)

first. Hereafter relatives more broadly are targeted. In some cases also friends of the activist can be

targeted. Through family members and relatives, the Intelligence service will try to obtain personal

information about the activist, including the address and phone number.

217.

The Intelligence Service will seek information from both close family and relatives to see if any

family member has had contact to the activist family member living outside of Iran and in case

contact has been made, the family member will be threatened with the possibility of arrest. The

authorities see it as a violation against the law and a threat to national security and therefore may

punish the family member accordingly.

218.

For example, five years ago a close friend of the source was an activist in Erbil. The friend asked to

see the source for a meeting. Following the meeting, the friend travelled back to Iran and was

taken in for investigation by the authorities. The friend was told that if he ever met with an activist

again, as this is against the national security of the country, he would be arrested. In addition the

friend was forced to sign a pledge stating that he would never meet his friend or any other activist

again. The authorities further stated that if he met with the source again he would be arrested and

prosecuted.

219.

According to the source, there are other cases of individuals who have been in contact with the

source and with other political activists, who were imprisoned for five years. In one incident, a

friend was in contact with the source through social media. The person was taken in by the

Intelligence Service for interrogation in January 2019. Following his arrest, he was sentenced five

years in prison because he had contact with a political party and political activists outside of Iran.

The source informed that the same person was previously dismissed from university as he had the

Kurdish flag on his laptop background. Since the Kurdish flag is banned in Iran, many students have

been terminated from University because they have shown the Kurdish flag publically.

Procedure by the authorities from arrest to verdict

220.

The source explained the procedure by the authorities from arrest to verdict as follows: When an

activist has been arrested, s/he will be detained for an unknown period and will be investigated

and exposed to psychological and physical torture. If the detainee does not confess to the charges,

the torture will be harsher. There are examples of detainees who were wounded due to the ill-

treatment and died in detention.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

221.

Following the investigation, s/he will be transferred to court where a bail will be decided for the

detainee to be released. The size of the bail is decided by the court depending on the charges. For

political and security charges, the bail is more than 200 million tomans (approximately 18,000 US

Dollars and above) .

222.

If the bail is paid, the detainee will be temporarily released until the next court date is set during

which the penalty will be decided on. Following the ruling of the judgement the source explained,

that the se te e ill e de ided at Ruli g I ple e tatio B a h Sho e e Ej a e Ahka , also

also alled Ej a e Ahka . If s/he is gi e a p iso se te e s/he ill the

be transferred to prison.

223.

In cases of political charges it is sometimes possible to be released temporarily on bail. In some

cases, the person managed to flee while on bail. In such cases the government will confiscate the

bail.

224.

In political cases, the defendant is not allowed to have a lawyer, and s/he will not be given hospital

treatment if s/he gets sick. The source stated that such cases receive very cruel treatment.

225.

The timeframe for detention to verdict depends on the case and may vary from 40 days and up to

five months or more.

226.

When asked whether there is a difference in treatment of the various minority groups compared to

the majority, the source replied that there are different rules for how minorities are being treated.

Kurds are seen as the enem

of the go e

e t a d ei g Ku dish is o side ed a i e . The

Iranian government is doing everything it can to make the Kurdish political activists give up their

demands to prevent them from obtaining their human rights and civil rights.

Examples of long term prisoners sentenced for political activities

227.

The source provided the following examples of long term prisoners:

Osman Mustafapour from the city of Piranshahr. He has been in prison for 28 years. He is in

Urumieh prison and he has not been allowed to get out on parole. He was not allowed to go to his

othe s fu e al.

Mohamed Nasari has been in prison for 25 years. He was arrested in 1994 for alleged membership

of KDPI, he is very sick and not taken to hospital. He is currently in Urumieh prison. He was never

allowed to get out on parole.

228.

Due to a general amnesty, these two prisoners were released from Urumieh Prison on 21

November 2019, and the news about their release were widely reflected in the news networks and

social media.

280

Rudaw,

Iran pardons Kurd and Azeri political prisoners held for 30 years,

21 November 2019,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Return of activists

229.

The source noted that politically affiliated Iranian Kurds who have left their country will never

return to Iran, because if they do, they will be punished by the authorities in a harsh way, including

many years of imprisonment. The source pointed to the case of Kamil Ahmadi, who is a researcher

on social issues on women and children. He is a dual Iranian-British citizen with a long term stay in

Iran and is currently living in Tehran. He was arrested in August 2019 and was in Evin Prison until 18

November where he was released on a 500 million tomans bail (approximately 46,000 US Dollars).

230.

The source has never seen anyone from Europe who has returned to Iran, and no one has dared to

do so.

Retur of a ti ists’ fa ily

ers

231.

Those who fled from Iran, including family members to activist will not dare to go back to Iran,

because they will be investigated and in some cases also punished. There are no clear criteria on

who will be investigated and who will also be punished. When asked to elaborate, the source

stated that only close family is at risk of being targeted by the authorities, not the extended family.

According to the source, no family has ever returned to Iran.

ID documents for Iranian Kurds in Iran

232.

In Iran, there is a new system of civil ID cards, which implies that former ID documents are now

invalid. On the new electronic ID card there is a bar code that will be screened at checkpoints,

giving a wide range of information on the card holder, includi

g the pe so s i e e o d. So e

people in the Kurdish and Balouch areas do not have ID documents. Asked about the scope of the

lack of ID cards, the source said that in the Balouch area 3,000 children do not have documents and

very few people in the Kurdish region does not have any documents. When asked to clarify the

scope of Iranian Kurds who do not hold an ID card in Iran, the sources opined that due to lack of

free media, no precise information on this issue is available.

233.

In Iran, political activists have ID cards but when they go to KRI these ID cards become invalid. For

the past ten years, political activists are unable to get documents and their papers are no longer

valid.

Mine risk

234.

Over the last three months 20 people have been killed due to mines (so-

alled No.

pedali

i es

copied from an Israeli brand) planted by the IRGC.

Conditions for Iranian Kurds in KRI

Why Iranian Kurds live in KRI

235.

I a ia Ku ds o e to KRI to o du t politi al a d hu a ights a ti ities, I a s i flue e i

KRI is increasing; the political and economic situation in the Kurdish region of Iran is grave. Iranian

Kurds can in most cases get a KRG issued residency card in KRI, but they cannot get ID card or

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

passport, and they were never recognised as KRI citizens. Most of the Iranian Kurds in KRI only

possess residency card, and they do not have ID cards or passports from KRG.

Iranian authorities in KRI

236.

Asked if agents of the Iranian government are present in KRI, the source stated that they are active

here and working in different fields, such as monitoring of journalists and human rights activists.

Despite the presence of the Iranian authorities in KRI, organisations continue their activities.

237.

As an example, an international relations university professor in Sanandej, was dismissed from

university, because he did not cooperate with the Iranian intelligence. Hereafter the professor had

no other option than to come to KRI.

238.

The professor initially moved to Sulaimania city. He was later informed by the KRG Intelligence

Service (in Kurdish: Asayish) in Sulaimania that he could not stay and had to leave as he was

considered to be a target of the Iranian authorities and could be assassinated. According to the

source, the Asayish asked him to leave, for the sake of his own safety.

239.

The Iranian Intelligence Service is always present in KRI and moving around in secrecy. For example

in March 2018 in Erbil, a bomb was planted in the car of KDPI member, Sabah Rahmani. He was

from the city of Kamyaran.

240.

Members of other parties have also been assassinated. For example members of KDPI, were

assassinated in front of their base on Yelda night on 21 December 2016 [Iranian winter solstice

celebration]. KRG Asayish were also targeted and killed in this incident.

241.

3-4 years ago bombs were put in Komala camp in Sulaimana. The bomb did not explode.

281

242.

All journalists with Iranian Kurdish background are monitored to know who they are in contact with

and what their activities are. When asked if lecturers, researchers and teachers are monitored, the

source answered that anyone who gets out of Iran will be monitored, even if not a political activist,

to know why the person left Iran and what s/he is doing and who s/he is in contact with. This also

includes family members who have left Iran.

243.

Because of the influence Iran has in KRI, they pressure and threat political activists, including

members and Peshmergas in order to have them stop conducting their activities.

The Iranian intelligence services in KRI and their modus operandi

244.

Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) and the IRGC Intelligence are both active in KRI in different ways, and

they spy on the activities of the Iranian Kurdish political parties, political and human rights activists

and journalists.

281

DW - Deutsche Welle,

Komola Party accused the Islamic Republic [of Iran] of bombing,

10 August 2015,

url;

Radio

i g the part s ase,

9 August 2015

url

Farda,

Ko ola Part a used Ira of o

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

245.

Until 2003, an IRGC base called Ramezan Base headed by Mohammad Jafar Sahra Roodi was

present in KRI where they conducted espionage against Iranian Kurds in KRI. After the USA

offensive and the occupation of Iraq in 2003, these cells were removed, and they are now active

and conduct espionage in other ways.

246.

It is the duty of the agents of Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) and IRGC Intelligence to monitor and

spy on the Iranian Kurdish political parties and Iranian Kurdish activists.

247.

The IRGC forces, which are under the command of Ghasem Soleimani, are also active in Iraq, and

the Iranian Governments intelligence services outside Iran have almost a common duty.

248.

Members of the Iranian intelligence have studied psychological warfare. They will make you lose

your mind and hate yourself during investigation. Anyone who is captured will be accused of

political activities or other activities that can be seen as an act against the Security of Iran. There is

a spe ial u i e sit i Teh a , alled I a Sada U i e sit . This u i e sit fo uses o pe so s

who wish to work for the IRGC Intelligence. The University teaches its student special techniques,

which can lead to success in security operations. Individuals joining this university are preselected.

Not anyone can join.

Location of KDPI bases in the Qandil Mountains

249.

KDPIs bases in the Qandil and Halgurd Mountains are located in a rough landscape where only

Kurdish people live. In this respect the

Ku dish sa i g o f ie ds ut the ou tai s e o es

relevant in the sense that the Kurds living in these mountains feel protected by them. The area is

outside control of the Iranian authorities as well as the Iraqi authorities and there is no clear

border. According to the source, the IRGC Military Forces have tried to reach the KDPI base but

they did not succeed.

250.

Two mountains in the Iranian Kurdish region named Shaho and Kuh-i-Salan (Kurdistan and

Kermanshah Provinces) and IRGC have tried many times to take control of these mountains but

they have never succeeded. Forces of all Kurdish parties are moving around in these mountains. In

June 2016, there was a severe clash in Kuh-i-Salan between KDPI forces and IRGC. The Iranian

forces used the illegal weapon phosphor to burn the forest which caused the death of 11

Peshmerga.

Kurdistan Human Rights Network

Skype meeting, Copenhagen 15 October 2019

Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN), is an apolitical, independent and non-profit organisation. (KHRN)

conducts activities for documentation of human rights violations in Kurdistan on the basis of international

standards. KHRN has reliable sources in Iran, and outside of the country it cooperates with human rights

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

activists, and the international organisation for defending human rights, in order to achieve progress and

for improvement of human rights in the Kurdish society and in Iran.

282

Ira ia authorities’ treat e t of party

ers a d

supporters

251.

Regarding democratic parties and Komala, it is important to be aware, that Democratic Party in

Iranian Kurdistan, is not a single party. After the party was divided in 2006, there are 2 separate

political parties. One of them is Iranian Kurdista

s De o ati Pa t KDPI , a d the othe o e,

Ku dista s De o ati Pa t KDP . Ko ala has also, th ough ea s of a ti it , ee di ided se e al

ti es. At p ese t ti e, the e a e a ti e pa ties u de the a e of Ko ala: Ko ala, I a s

Communist Party

Ku dista O ga izatio , I a ia Ku dista s Ko ala Pa t , Ku dista s o ke s

Komala, and a smaller group with the name of Ravand-e Socialistie Komala (Komala socialistic

process). Besides these parties, there are other parties that are active in Iranian Kurdistan. For

example, Hezb-e Hayat-e Azad-e Kurdistan (PJAK), Hizb-e Azadi-e Kurdistan (PAK), Zaseman-e

Khabat-e Enghelabi-e Kurdistan (Khabat) etc. All of the headquarters of these parties are in Iraqi

Kurdistan territory. As none of these parties are legally recognised in Iran, and are not officially

allowed to be active, members of these parties do not reveal their official membership of the

parties inside the country. They are so called secret members.

252.

The most important activities of the members of these parties inside the country, are organizing

o k a d p opaga da fo thei espe ti e fa o ite pa t . I a s Isla i Repu li o ito s its

citizens. One of its purposes is identifying those individuals, who are active for opposition groups.

I a s Islamic

Republic considers the activities of these parties as dangerous. Therefor it struggles

harder to identify and monitor the individuals, who work for these parties. They even send spies

among them in order to identify members of the secret organisation. For example, a journalist or

an active individual, who writes in his/her own name, is identified by the government.

However,

person, who cooperates with an opposition party, which is illegal in Iran, does not engage in these

activities in his/her own name, or in public.

253.

It is difficult to say which individuals get arrested because of their place in the organisation, or kind

of activities for the party. Getting arrested and prosecuted is not even contingent on being official

member of a party. Individuals who are in danger of being arrested, and are arrested, are from

various placements in the party, and various levels of activity. Some of them live in Iran, others may

be residing in Iraqi Kurdistan, and have gone to Iran to engage in party activities and propaganda

work. At any rate, they are all in danger of being arrested.

254.

As Kurdish opposition parties are illegal in Iran, the Iranian government treats members and those,

ho oope ate ith the , o e ha shl . I the s, just a ea afte the I a ia e

olution, there

as o l o e ilita

a et ee I a s e t al go e

e t a d I a ia Ku dista s de o ati

parties and Komala in Kurdistan. Consequently, these parties had to withdraw to Iraqi Kurdistan

territory. In recent years, there have been a few military clashes in some Iranian Kurdish areas,

between the parties and Iranian government. IRGC have already several times attacked these

282

Website of Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN):

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

pa ties e te s i I a i Ku dista te ito ,

issiles a d a tille fi e. If a e e of a of these

Kurdish opposition parties is arrested during a military clash, s/he will be treated much worse and

much harsher. This however does not mean that individuals, who are arrested in connection with

the parties, have participated in military operations. Many detainees are, as earlier mentioned are

arrested only because of their political and propaganda activities.

255.

In some cases, individuals who are members of an opposition party, but are not active in public, are

arrested quietly, eg. the media are not informed, or with

edia s a uies e e. The efo the

Islamic Republic can treat these individuals as it wants to, without any news of it finding its way

into media.

256.

The sou e highlighted, that i so e ases o o e is i fo

ed of these detai ees o ditio s, as the

media does not mention it, until the court hands down its verdict. In some cases, the individual

may be released, but s/he does not want his/her name published, for example because the

pe so s fa il has ee u de p essu e. I su h ases, o o e ill k o a out the i di idual s

elease.. e.g., ostl pu li i fo atio ega di g the dete tio a d the detai ees o ditio s,

particularly media and human rights activists.

257.

As an example, the source mentioned that intelligence authorities in Kermanshah arrested him in

. He as kept i this it s i tellige e offi e s dete tio fa ilit fo

o ths. While i

detention, he met a young man, who was about 20 years old, who was in the next cell. The young

man, who was arrested for having relationship with PJAK, was treated more brutally and he was

subjected to harsher torture. The information that the source had about the treatment of the

ou g a as li ited, e ause talki g ith ea h othe i i tellige e autho it s dete tio as

banned and limited. The young man was from a village near the town of Javanroud, in Kermanshah

Province. His family had no knowledge of his detention and his conditions at that time. There was

no mention of him in the media either.

However,

the sou e s fa il as i tou h ith the edia,

and received information about his detention and conditions.

258.

Once an individual is arrested, regardless of being member of a political party or a supporter, s/he

will be in danger of being tortured. This is because security authorities will try to get some

information about his/her connection with the party and other members of the party.

259.

Individuals in Iranian Kurdistan, who are in danger of being arrested, are not necessarily members

of a political party. The Kurdish people in Iran are a rather political society, and the parties in the

society play an active role also. This however does not mean that all the activists in Iranian

Kurdistan belong to parties. There are many activists, who operate independently, as critics and

non-partisans. They are in danger of being arrested as well.

260.

Asked whether supporters are considered as party members, the source said, as there are many

a ti e pa ties i I a ia Ku dista , a d the o

u it is athe i flue ed these pa ties ultu e,

the authorities always assume, that every active Kurdish individual, is connected to a party.

However,

as stated before, there are many independent, non-partisan activists in Kurdistan.

Regarding the treatment of these party supporters, they are also in danger of being arrested and

tortured.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

261.

Party members are trained to be active and protect themselves. Party supporters, however, do not

usuall e ei e su h t ai i g a d the a ot e p epa ed suffi ie tl . Co side i g C e A

monitoring of social media, government can, in some cases, identify supporters through their

activities in social media. Therefor it can be said, that supporters are also in danger of being

identified and contacted.

262.

As an example, recently a young man was arrested in Orumieh. He was accused of sending news

about Kurdish parties, through his Telegram app. In fact, they did not arrest him for having contact

with a political party. The reason for arresting him, was the news, that he sent about political

parties through his Telegram app.

283

Iranian authorities’

treat e t of the party

ers’ fa ily

ers

263.

It is not only party members, who are in danger of being arrested. Family members can also be

a ested o e su je t to p essu e, e ause of a fa il e e s a ti ities fo a pa t a d usi g the

excuse, that they are in contact with that party as well. Kurdistan Human Rights Network has

e e tl pu lished a epo t o p essi g fa il e e s of oppositio pa ties e e s. I this

epo t the e is a efe e e to the I a ia se u it autho ities p essi

g families, who have a son or

another member of the family, who is member of a party and lives in Iraqi Kurdistan, in order to

have them return to Iran.

284

Ira ia authorities’ treat e t of i di iduals, ho ha e othi g to do ith parties

264.

The source was asked whether an individual, who has no political connections, is also in danger.

The source replied that the question is ambiguous.

However,

he told about an example about a

general strike in Iranian Kurdistan. The strike that was carried out in the summer of 2018, was a

protest against execution of Kurdish political prisoners. Stores closed in many Kurdish cities. Not

everyone, who participated in the strike, was politically connected.

However,despite

this, these

individuals may be summoned by security authorities, or be in danger of being arrested.

265.

According to the source, considering presence of the parties in the Kurdish community, it is

possible, that in many cases, the first accusation made against a detainee, is connection to these

political parties.

266.

One of the usual questions that interrogators ask is: Are you in touch with such and such party? Or

as an example: Have you participated in a strike, called by the parties?

267.

There are also other examples of detaining individuals that have no connection or cooperation with

any particular party. For example, they accused a mountain climber of meeting members of one of

the parties, in the mountains, that he climbed. There are also cases about individuals, who travel to

283

KMMK, Increased Imprisonment Sentence for Telegram Channel Admin Detained at Orumiyeh Central Prison, 26

December 2018,

url

284

Kurdistan Human Rights Network,

Families of Kurdish activists abroad summoned, pressured and threatened,

October 2010,

url

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Iraqi Kurdistan. They may be accused of having been in touch with the parties there. In other cases,

security authorities interrogate individuals in order to get information about their family members,

who are members of one of the parties there. At any rate, there are such pressure in Kurdistan.

Fair Trial

268.

Rega di g fai t ial, I a ia justi e s ste

is a d la ge u fai . This is oth the sou e s pe so al

experience, and many of the political cases, that he and his organisation have pursued. Trials are

carried out on the basis of reports and documents that are submitted to the court by security

authorities, or confessions made by the accused under torture. In Iranian justice system, there is no

such a thing as independent verdict or fair trial.

269.

In Kurdish cities, where the majority of the population is Sunnis, security authorities and judges are

mostly Shia, and they come from other parts of the country. They treat the accused more harshly

and severely.

270.

At the same time, the official language of Iranian courts is Farsi, both orally and written. Some

Kurds do not master this language sufficiently. This worsens their cases further. A female political

prisoner, named Shirin Alamholi was executed in 2010. When she was in prison in Tehran, she had

told a prisoner in the same section, and she was an active woman as well, that her interrogations

a d t ial as i Fa si, hi h she did ot full u de sta d. Fu the o e, la k of k o ledge of o e s

rights as an accused person, including right to remain silent, or right to have an attorney etc., can

make the process of interrogations and trial for those, who are not aware of these rights, more

difficult.

Returning to Iran from other countries

271.

There are cases of party members have returned to Iran from KRI to live a private life. Returning is

a a ged

e ei i g a a a

a eh se u it lette f o state autho ities. Eithe the pe so

himself or his family can apply to the Iranian security autho

ities, fo a a a eh .

272.

In Kurdistan Human Rights Network, they have not had a case yet, where a Kurdish active individual

has received a security letter and has returned to Iran from Europe.

However,

in a recent case, a

Kurdish citizen returned from Iraqi Kurdistan to Iran. Despite having a security letter, IRGC

I tellige e Se i e, a ested hi . He as a used of Moha e eh ei g at a ith God a d has

now been in prison for approximately one and a half years, still with no end in sight.

285

273.

Government claims, that those returning to Iran, in possession of security letters, should not have

any difficulties.

However,

that s ot the a it is i p a ti e. The e a e ases, he e i di iduals

have returned, and they have been summoned by security authorities, who have demanded

information about the party, which the person has been a member of. There are also cases where

individuals, who have returned, have been arrested, and some of them remain in detention for a

long time, and they are even sentenced to imprisonment. In some cases, security officials subject

Kurdistan Human Rights Network,

The latest report on the situation of Mohammad Moradi after one and half years

of limbo,

6 November 2019,

url

285

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

the individual to pressure, in order to persuade them to cooperate with intelligence services. If they

refuse to do so, they will risk punishment.

274.

In case of refusing to cooperate with the security forces, they will undoubtedly be punished.

A o di g to Ku dista Hu a Rights Net o k s i fo

different prisons in Kurdistan.

atio , the e a e at least

pe so s i

275.

Generally returning has, in most cases had consequences for them, and they will be entangled in a

web of intelligence services and courts. For example, recently, there was a Kurdish woman, from

Maku by the name Maghbouleh Sekavand, who was a member of one these parties. She also went

back to Iran by getting an aman nameh. However, after 2 weeks the intelligence authorities in

Orumieh summoned and arrested her. She was detained for 3 months, and until March of this year,

the organisation had not received any news about her situation.

276.

Maghbouleh Sekavand, has been sentenced to one year in prison for being a member of an

opposition party. She was released on 23 November 2019, after spending 9 months of her

sentence.

286

277.

In another case, a married couple, Komala peshmergas, by the names of Mahin Shokrollahpour and

Farahmand Sadegh Vaziri, who had su

e de ed the sel es to the I a ia autho ities i the s,

were denied work, social rights etc., eventually they had to decide to leave Iran. They were

arrested at the border, and afterwards, Farahmand Sadegh Vaziri was hanged. Mahin

Shokrollahpour and her child, after 7 years living in Iraqi Kurdistan, went to France. Read Mahin

Shok ollahpou s sto a d a ati e o these li ks:

287

278.

Individuals, who previously have been accused of having a connection to an illegal party, have no

possibility of returning to an ordinary life in Iran. They cannot get permission to work or study, and

they will be confronted with many obstacles. In many cases, these individuals prefer, that others

should not find out about their past, so they will not be subjected to monitoring.

279.

The source highlighted, that security services do not have a uniform procedure in a legal framework

for treatment of detainees. They can torture the detainee, or they can keep him/her in solitary

confinement for a long time. They can deny him contact or visit with his family, or access to an

attorney. These are the treatment that political prisoners in Iran, particularly Kurdistan, are often

subjected to.

Al Tash refugees

280.

The source has no particular information about Al Tash refugees. Considering the fact that Al Tash

refugees went from the province where they lived to Iraq, the source says: Once the Islamic

government took over after the revolution, they left Iran and went to Iraq in groups. The Iranian

authorities accused them of treason, because it was claimed, that they had collaborated with Iraq,

286

Apedit News,

Upon serving her sentence, Maghbouleh Sekavand was released from Khoj prison,

23 November

2019,

url

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran,

Farhad Sadegh Vaziri, a biography,

no date,

url

287

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

which was an enemy country. A large number of these refugees had then and later, cooperated

with the opposition parties. Considering this fact, it is probable, that if Al Tash refugees return to

Iran, and they have a history of cooperation with Iraqi government or opposition parties, they will

be in danger of being arrested and punished.

281.

The source did not have any particular information about Al Tash refugees, who have returned to

Iran.

However,

one of the

e e s of Ku dista s hu a ights et o k, ho as i Dizela ad

prison in Kermanshah for 2 years, met personally with several Kurdish citizens, who had been in

Ramadi and Al Tash camps for several years. After they had returned to Iran, they were arrested

and sentenced to long prison terms for cooperating with Kurdish opposition parties.

282.

But another member of the network knows others, who have returned from Al Tash to Iran, and

despite being summoned and interrogated, they were not sentenced to imprisonment.

However,

they have also been denied many of their social rights in Iran.

283.

The source had also a conversation with a former resident of Al Tash camp, who in 2001 was

granted asylum with his family in Sweden. Through this conversation, the source received

information about those remaining in this camp in the Iraqi Kurdistan territory. According to the

source, after the American attack on Iraq, a group of residents of the Al Tash camp, were able to

receive asylum in European countries. A number of them returned to Iran.

However,

they were also

subjected to harassment there. They are still denied official identity documents. Those who are still

left in Iraqi Kurdistan, live under difficult conditions in 2 camps, Kaveh and Barikeh, and in the cities

of Soleimanieh and Erbil. Iraqi Kurdistan territory government refuses to issue valid identity and

residency documents for them.

284.

The source believes that if a person applies for asylum in a foreign country, and he later returns to

Iran, the Iranian authorities would want to know what reason that individual has given for fleeing

and applying for asylum, and what he has said against the government, and what actions he has

taken against the government. These subjects can create difficulties for the person, who returns.

285.

In 2011 an Iranian man was expelled from Norway to Iran. When he returned, he was arrested and

tortured. After he was released, he had to flee Iran and go to Iraqi Kurdistan. The source, who

himself was at that time an asylum seeker in Iraqi Kurdistan, met him. At that time, Mahmoud

Amiri Moghadam, head of Iranian human rights organisation in Norway, was in touch with this

individual.

288

286.

There is also the recent case of a woman, who after her asylum application was rejected in Norway,

she was deported to Iran, where she was subjected to punishment by whipping. The sentence was

handed down before her fleeing. The sentence was carried out after her return.

289

Iran Human Rights,

Rahim Rostami, the deported asylum seeker accused of propaganda against the government

was released on bail,

June 2011,

url

289

Radio Zamaneh ,

Flogging sentence carried out against the asylum seeker deported from Norway to Iran,

September 2017,

url

288

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Conditions in the border areas

287.

IRGC has g eat po e i Ku dista s o de a eas. IRGC f o

pa ti ula l

Ha zeh

Seyed-ol-Shohada base, has a

o side a le p ese e i the I a ia Ku dish egio s a d Ku dista s o de a eas.

288.

Ku dista s o de is e ause of its geog aph , i a ge e all

ou tai ous a ea. Despite the o de

gua ds st i ge t o t ol, it

is still possible to cross the border illegally. However, great caution is

advised for safety reasons. One must travel with a person, who is very familiar with the area.

A journalist in KRI (C), Nasser Piroti

Erbil, 28 October 2019

Politi al parties’

activities

289.

Ku dista s politi al pa ties ha e a

ilita fo e alled

Peshmergas.

However, in the recent period

of more than 2 decades, they have mostly focused on political and civic activities inside Iranian

Ku dista . These pa ties fo es o i g to I a ia Ku dista ha e also ee o du ti g

propaganda activities and having direct contact with people. The purpose has never been attacking

I a s ilita a d ad i ist ati e e te s. The ill ho e e defe d the sel es, i ase the a e

subjected to attacks. These parties apply various methods such as awareness-raising regarding the

Isla i Repu li s poli ies, e ou agi g people to p otest

by various peaceful and reconciliatory

methods, such as demonstrations, general strikes and symbolic means, such as wearing Kurdish

clothes on special occasions. These parties socially originate from and have their roots among the

Kurdish people of Iran. In many cases people have embraced their proposals for protesting against

the Iranian government.

290.

It should also be mentioned, that civilian activities in Iranian Kurdistan are not only carried out by

the opposition parties. Many organisations and NGOs are active in towns and even villages in

Iranian Kurdistan, and they are engaged in independent activities. For example, these activities

i lude o ga izi g suppo t fo o e a d hild e s ights, e

vironmental associations and literary

associations. Even though these types of activities are apolitical, the Government of the Islamic

Repu li , Mi ist of I tellige e a d IRGC, o side thei a ti ities agai st I a s atio al se u it .

In some cases, they are arrested and imprisoned. For example, 15 environmental activists, who are

engaged in voluntary work, such as extinguishing forest fires, or collecting trash in towns and

villages, were summoned by the intelligence authorities in September 2019 in the town of

Piranshahr, a small, border town in West-Azarbaijan Province. They were threatened and they were

told to stop their activities. The source mentioned another example: In the evening of July 4, 2018,

the intelligence authorities arrested one of the most active civilian activists, named Orfan Rashidi,

in the town of Paveh in Kermanshah Province, for assisting earth quake victims and extinguishing

forest fires. After several months, he was sentenced in court to 1 year in prison and banned for 2

years from carrying out civilian activities. The court even banned him from leaving Iran for 3 years.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

291.

There are plenty of such examples in Kurdistan. This shows that the Iranian authorities do not

tolerate even activities that are completely civilian and peaceful.

292.

Regarding the reaction of political parties to such activities, it should be mentioned, that these

parties support these kinds of popular and independent activities.

However,

that does not mean,

that civilian activities are carried out by these parties

di e t i st u tio s a d o t ol. Me e s a d

sympathizers of these parties inside Iranian Kurdistan can also participate in these activities as well

as any other citizen of the towns.

Kurdish parties’ foothold i Ira

293.

These parties are not allowed to conduct free and legal activities in Iran. The Iranian Government

considers them as being against it. However, these parties have relatively strong social foothold in

Iranian Kurdistan. These parties, considering their social foothold, sometimes call on

I a s

Ku dista s populatio to a out a p otest a tio . A lea ase of su h alli g as the ge e al

st ike

ea s ago, follo i g the issile atta k o Ku dista s De o ati Pa t s, KDP-I a s,

political headquarters on September 8, 2108, which resulted in 16 members of the party

leade ship, o di a

e e s a d Pesh e gas, ei g killed. I a ia Ku dista s pa ties oo di ated

a d alled o I a ia Ku dista s populatio to st ike i o de to e p ess thei o de atio of this

attack, and their solidarity with the KDP-I

a a d the i ti s fa ilies. This idesp ead st ike took

place in more than 15 cities. On that day, stores and bazaars were closed. Furthermore, in October

o the u gi g of the I a ia Ku dista s pa ties, people i

ost of the

cities went on marches

as a o de atio of Tu ke s atta k o S ia s Ku ds.

294.

Responding to a question on whether various parties carry out activities, the source said, there are

over 15 opposition political parties in Iranian Kurdistan. The most importa

t o es a e Ku dista s

Democratic Party KDP-IRAN,

I a s Ku dista s De o ati Pa t KDPI, Ku dista s Wo ke s Ko ala,

I a s Ku dista s Ko ala, Ko ala-I a s Co

u ist Pa t s Ku dista s a h, Ku dista s

Li e atio Pa t PAK, Ku dista s F ee Life Pa t PJAK a d I a ia Ku dista s St uggle O ga izatio .

Some of these parties are offshoots of other parties. All of these parties have relative social

foothold, and they have their own particular followers. However, as KDPI is the oldest party, and

has struggled and fought for 74 years, the 2 branches of this party probably have greater influence

among the people. Furthermore, the only elections held in 1980 to elect representatives to the 1

parliament after the revolution, the KDPIs representatives achieved first place in most of the cities.

This, however, would probably not be the case now. Not all of the parties mentioned took part in

the elections, because some of them were established in later years. However, the KDPI and

Komala, which were 2 main parties, did participate in the elections.

Historical backdrop

295.

The sou e

e tio ed the histo i al a kd op fo I a ia Ku dista s politi al pa ties ilita

activities,

a d said that afte the I a ia e olutio i

, Ku dista s pa ties st uggled a

lot to

have the new government to, at least officially recognize the demands and expectations of the

Kurdish people. In order to achieve this goal, they had several rounds of negotiations with the

Isla i Repu li s leade s, i ludi g A atollah Kho ei i.

However,

the new Government did not

pay any attention to their demands, and the leader of the Islamic Republic at the time, issued an

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

order to attack Kurdistan, for annihilation of the political parties and the people, who had national

and democratic demands.

Co f o ted ith this atta k, Ku dista s Populatio ose to its o

defe se. Usi g the eapo s that the had take f o the p e ious Go e

e t s ilita e te s,

they confronted the attackers. Komala and KDPI organized the population and they consolidated

the

Peshmergas

military forces. This war and conflict lasted for at least 10 years, until the parties

withdrew from the cities and villages completely, and reestablished their bases in the Iraqi

Kurdistan territory.

296.

The Islamic Republic also attacked these parties beyond the border, and so far, they have

assassinated more than 400 politically active members of the parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, or other

countries. These parties have always declared that they wish to solve the Kurdish problem in Iran

peacefully, by negotiations and talks. The Iranian Government, however, does not pay any

atte tio . I a ia fo es e e assassi ated Do to A dol ah a Ghasse lou, the KDPI s leade i

1989 in Vienna, at the negotiation table, with the Iranian representatives.

297.

According to the source, in 2016, a security gap arose at the border as KRI focused their resources

toward fighting IS. The Iranian government tried to exploit this vacuum to organize the extremist

a d eligious g oups. I a ia Ku dista s pa ties thought

also about expanding their activities and

further approach the borders. Therefor KDPI declared that it would deploy part of its forces to the

border areas. Afterwards other parties also sent their forces to the border areas. These parties

declared, that establishing bases in the border areas did not mean the beginning of military

activities and conflicts with the Iranian forces.

However,

responsible Iranian authorities, such as

Hossein Salami, chief commander of the Islamic Revolutions Guard Corps (IRGC), (he was deputy

hief o

a de at that ti e , a d Moha

ad Pakpou , Sepah s a

a de , de la ed that

the ould atta k these pa ties ases.

298.

Du i g

a d

IRGC a d I a s ilita , se e al ti es atta ked these ases

using their artillery. These attacks incurred great material damages to the inhabitants of the border

a eas, a d se e al o de a eas i ilia eside ts e e also i ju ed. These a i gs esulted i

issiles falli g o Ku dista s De o ati Pa t s, KDP-Iran,

political base, deep in Iraqi Kurdistan

territory, near the town of Koy Sanjagh, on 8 September 2018, while a meeting of the political

leaders of the party was in session. KDP-Iran urged the population more than other parties, to

engage in civic activities. The Party seeks a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem. One of the

leaders of the party, named Rahman Piroti, who was killed during the missiles attack, always talked

of the i i st uggle s e essit i his iti gs a d i te ie s. He u ged the population

to engage in

civic activities.

Members versus supporters

299.

The e a e th ee ge e al atego ies of oope atio

300.

The fi st g oup o p ises pa t

ith I a ia Ku dista s politi al pa ties:

e e s, ho a e at the pa t s disposal fullti e. These a e alled

Peshmergas. These individuals live in camps and party locations with their families. In accordance

ith the pa ties ad i ist ati e ules, o e e e fe ea s i a o g ess, leade s of the pa t a e

elected by these members by direct voting and they assume the position of running the party.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

301.

The second group are party members, who cooperate with the party on part time basis. Some of

these individuals are in Iranian Kurdistan and are secret party members. If it comes to light that

they are party members, security forces will arrest and prosecute them. The second group of party

e e s a e pe so s, ho eside i I a i Ku dista s to s o fo eig ou t ies. Thei pa t

activities are in public, and they carry out duties, that the party has assigned to them.

302.

The third group are supporters or sympathizers of the parties. Most of the supporters of Iranian

Ku dista s pa ties a e i side I a , ut the do ot ha e a lea a d o ga ised elatio ship ith the

pa t . The defe d ostl thei fa o ite pa t s poli ies,

but they are not members directly. The

number of supporters of the parties is higher than that of Peshmergas and members.

303.

The source was asked about the procedure for becoming a member of these parties. In his

response, the source was cautious, because there are not always clear rules for membership, and it

can be done through different procedures. The source explained that people of Iranian Kurdistan

can become members of these parties. Those who are in Iran can become members through the

secret networks of these parties, or they can themselves get in touch with members of the party in

I a i Ku dista a d e o e e e s. Those ho a t to joi the pa t s a ks di e tl , ha e to go

to these pa ties e te s i I a i Ku dista te ito . If the ha e ot

committed any social

violations, such as theft, murder and so on, and they have not been sent as spies, they will be

accepted.

304.

Ministry of Intelligence

and IRGC

threatens or bribe some people and use them as spies in their

service. They are sent to these

pa ties e te s. Those appl i g fo e e ship ha e to egi

goi g th ough the pa t s i estigatio p o ess, a d if the ha e o diffi ulties, the ill e

accepted.

305.

When asked if supporters may conduct activities by their own initiative, the source stated that

supporters do not have any direct duties. The source stressed that if the Iranian authorities find out

that an individual is a member of the Kurdish Iranian opposition parties, s/he will be punished

harshly. As it is generally not possible to have contact with the members, general instructions are

followed,

such as conducting propaganda for the party that one sympathizers with.

306.

When asked what the number of Peshmergas living in the camps is, the source stated that there

are no official statistics or recordings of this. Every month approximately, 40 to 50 individuals

contact each of these parties and ask for membership hereof.

Activities of the members and supporters

307.

It is generally very difficult and dangerous to conduct political activities in the Kurdistan region of

Iran. Most of the time, the Government of Iran does not differentiate between party members and

supporters or even independent activists and ordinary people. The majority of the people that are

arrested are not party members, but rather supporters. They are accused of membership and

arrested and forced to confess.

308.

Iranian authorities mostly accuse the persons arrested of being members of parties opposed to the

Government, in order to be able to punish them more harshly. In many cases accused people are

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

forced to confess on TV. To give an example, the source referred to the case of the killing of an

Iranian nuclear scientist The individuals accused and sentenced had confessed to the killing of

u lea s ie tists i Teh a o I a s offi ial TV. Se e al ea s afte thei i p iso e t, Ho e e ,

they were freed, as it turned out they were innocent. Such events happen also in Kurdistan. For

example, a teacher was forced to falsely confess on TV, that he conducted terrorist activities.

Following his release after many years in prison, he fled to Germany. The source could not give

more information.

Targeting of members and supporters

309.

Generally Iranian security and judicial authorities in Kurdistan, treat every kind of political and civic

activity as a security case. If they receive information or news about a person or one of the

opposition parties, they will treat that person harsher. In order to avoid difficulties, members and

supporters of the parties try to conceal their interest for and contact with the parties.

310.

However, sometimes their interest and connection to the parties are revealed, and if they are not

able to flee Iran, they will be arrested and taken to court, accused of severe violations. Even if the

carry out simple activities, such as participating in a protesting assembly or participating in a

general strike, they will, with certainty, be accused of cooperating with opposition parties. This is in

I a s judi ial s ste a g a e iolatio . I these ases, hi h a e pu li , se u it fo es ha e

do u e tatio fo the a used pe so s pa ti ipatio i a politi al

or protest activity, which is not

o ealed. Ho e e , i

ases, I a se u it fo es do ot ha e a ki d of do u e tatio ,

a d the el o l o the a used pe so s fo ed o fessio . Fo e a ple, this ea se e al i il

and environmental activists were arrested in the cities of Kamyaran and Sanandaj in Kurdistan

Province, accused and killing an ambulance driver. According to what the accused families have

said, the accused are under pressure to confess to killing the driver. However, they have no proof

against them and they deny having committed the crime.

Fair trial

311.

The source informed that he has seen a lot of people who have been arrested that have not been

treated in accordance to law. For example, Iranian law states that an individual must be transferred

to court within a month of his/her arrest. However, most people are detained for more than 3

months, and in some cases, the detention period can last 6 months or a year, without the family

being informed of their arrest. Their fate is unknown, until they are taken to court. The source

further explained that most judges are members of the security forces and IRGC, which is why they

support the security forces.

Access to lawyer

312.

According to Iranian law, any person who is arrested is entitled to a lawyer. However,during

detention and before the court session, the lawyer is not allowed access to the detainee, and the

lawyer does not receive any information. In most cases, the lawyer will only be present at the final

court hearing. This means, that from the time of arrest until the court ruling. The security forces

can treat the detainee in any way they want, and he has no access to the outside world.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

313.

Individuals, who do not have the means to hire a lawyer themselves, will mandatorily be provided

with

a la e , ho i Fa si is alled a taskhi i la e . Ma dato la e s a e o e ted to the

Government and security authorities, and they do not really defend the accused. On the other

hand, there are a number of lawyers, who take political and civic priso

e s ases f ee of ha ge.

The most experienced of these lawyers is Mohammad Saleh Nikbakht, who has practiced law more

than 40 years in Tehran.

314.

The source was asked whether access to a lawyer is dependent on gravity of the crime. The source

replied that he does not have much information on social violations such as theft, conflicts and

economic cases.

315.

Regarding individuals, who are accused of having political opposition connections, and are

dangerous to the country, the source is of the opinion, that many people and activists, who are

dissatisfied with the present conditions and they protest, will be accused of this grave violation. For

example, even people who protested against building of a dam, were subjected to this kind of

accusation.

Targeting of family members

316.

The le el of

o ito i g of fa il e e s depe ds o the pe so s le el of a ti it . Ma

individuals, who directly or through a party carry out political activities, have near relatives such as

father, mother, sister, brother, child and so on. Most of the relatives of the politically active

individual come under pressure. However, not all of them will be arrested or threatened.

Intelligence authorities or IRGC who want to silence politically active individuals or force them to

cooperate, usually apply heavy pressure on their relatives. There are examples of families of

individuals being arrested or threatened to be killed, because their one of their close relatives has

extensive political or human rights activities outside of the country. The source knew of cases, in

hi h the hole o se e al e e s of the politi all a ti e i di iduals fa il ha e ee a ested.

317.

When asked if close family members are more likely to be targeted by the Iranian authorities than

extended family, the source informed that generally the security department will threaten family

members with the aim of silencing the political active person. Close family members, such as

mother, father, brother or sister are more subject to arrest. In other cases, the authorities have

arrested extended family members because of being in touch with the politically active individual

outside of the country. The authorities may also threaten to kill family members, if the politically

active person does not return. As an example, that took place 30 years ago, the intelligence

authorities arrested the brother of a Peshmerg in the city of Orumieh. They threatened to kill him,

if the Peshmerg brother did not return. The brother knew that if he returned, he himself would also

be killed. Therefor he did not return. Security authorities carried out their threat and killed his

brother.

Monitoring of political party members in Iraqi Kurdistan territory KRI

318.

The leade ship head ua te s of I a ia Ku dista s pa ties a e i I a i Ku dista s te ito . I a a d

I a i Ku dista ha e a lo g o

o o de . B di e tl atta ki g these pa ties ases i I a , a d

killing Peshmergas and members and disturbing the local population of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

se u it fo es ha e aused g eat da age to I a ia Ku dista s pa ties i I a i Ku dista te ito .

During the last 5 years, that these parties have been in Iraqi Kurdistan, more than 500 of their

Peshmergas and members have been killed. Iran by using its forces or its collaborators in Iraqi

Kurdistan, closely monitors the parties and politically active individuals, and whenever there is

opportunity, damages them. Even if there are peaceful protests in Iraqi Kurdista

, agai st I a s

policies or against repression of the population, Iran protests to Kurdistan territory authorities and

demands that such activities not be allowed.

However,

despite this, I a i Ku dista te ito s

responsible authorities have provided a secure place for most Iranian political activists and

journalists. They allow less often now, that they get hurt. There have, of course, been examples of

Iranian security authorities contacting activist residing in Kurdistan territory by telephone and

threatening them, that if they do not cease their activities, they would kill them. For example, they

say that they will probably be involved in a traffic accident, which mean that they will be killed in a

planned traffic accident.

319.

The source noted that threats by Iranian authorities should be taken seriously, because Iran does

not view its enemies as weak, and they will strike them, when they can.

Border area between Iran and KRI

320.

While Ku dista is a la d

hi h agai st Ku dish people s ish is di ided a

ong Iran, Iraq, Turkey

and Syria, the Kurdish people do not believe in this separation of borders. They consider the Kurds

as one nation and Kurdistan as one land. It is at present however divided and ruling it is, aside from

Iraqi Kurdistan territory, not in Kurdish hands. The border region between Iranian and Iraqi

Kurdistan has been from ancient times, an area, where the local population has earned a living.

They transport goods across the border to both sides. This is done legally through authorized

border crossings.

However,

this can only be done by traders, and local poor people do not have the

means to trade over the borders. They usually carry smaller and less valuable goods across the

border to both sides. They are called kolbar. The Iranian government legalized the kolbars from

2015 till 2017 and it allowed the people of the border regions to work as kolbars.

However,

in 2017

using prevention of smuggling as an excuse, it closed the border for kolbars.

However,

even within

the government there was opposition to this decision. As an example, Ebrahim Raeisi, head of the

judicial sector, states that fighting smugglers did not mean forbidding kolbars to work. According to

semi-official statistics for Iranian provinces, there are approximately. 85,000 kolbars working.

321.

In the past 2 years working as a kolbar has become very difficult and dangerous. Kolbars are forced

to pass across mountainous and dangerous areas. They are constantly in danger of Iranian forces

shooting at them. In the past

ea s, at least

kol a s ha e ee killed i Ku dista s o de

region, shot by Iranian forces or natural incidents, such as falling from high points.

322.

When asked, if the Iranian authorities have increased border control, the source explained that

IRGC and border guards in border areas, are always in the state of high alert. Recently the military

forces have also assisted them. Two months ago, the chief commander of Iranian military (artesh)

announced, that this force is guarding parts of the border with the use of sophisticated equipment,

such as laser, as well as with the Special Forces.

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

A journalist in KRI (D)

Erbil, 29 October 2019

Level of monitoring of political party members and supporters in Iran

323.

Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iranian authorities announced that the Kurds were

considered as a threat to the State. The Iranian authorities have consistently committed violent

acts against the Kurds and other religious minorities, such as the Baluchis and the Christians. The

Iranian authorities also banned all political activity and therefore parties now have to operate in

secrecy.

324.

Individuals that conduct political activism are at risk of being interrogated and imprisoned.

Furthermore, persons who conduct other forms of civil activism are also subject to being arrested

and imprisoned.

325.

According to the source, it is not possible to distinguish between political active members and

supporters. Even environmental activists may be considered as political activists, as alleged political

activities can serve as a reason to arrest and sentence them.

326.

It is difficult to organise and implement any activism or political activity, as any such activity will be

considered political. Many party members leave Iran, as it is impossible to conduct any activities

there.

Monitoring of members and supporters in KRI

327.

According to the source, the Iranian authorities have an extensive knowledge of activities that take

place in all three governorates in KRI. The source noted that is a very sensitive issue to discuss and

that KRI is not a safe place for Iranian Kurds. The source was aware of threats against colleagues

and that the Iranian authorities monitor activities as well as social media. For example a writer

known to the source who works on a local radio station, was threatened through the use of his

family by the Iranian authorities.

328.

The level of monitoring differs, but the source stated that if the Iranian authorities want to kill you,

they can. The source gave an example that took place in Penjwin, a town in Sulaimania governorate

Eghbal Moradi, who is the father of Zaniyar Moradi, who had been given a death sentence, was

killed in 2017 by a person riding by on a motorcycle. The assassination was made public by Eghbal

Mo adi s ife, ho e a e a a ti ist defe di g othe a ti ists i I a a d thei ight to justi e.

The wife, who lost two of her children, is living in Sulaimania Governorate in KRI.

329.

In another example, a filmmaker named Rahim Zabihi was working on a film focusing on the

situation of the Kolbars. Rahim and his brother died in an alleged car accident. Following their

death, a friend of theirs stated that Rahim had told him, he had been approached by the security

department. Due to this, he was no longer sure he would be able to complete the film.

Armed conflict

IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

330.

Clashes take place regularly on the border between IRGC and the Peshmerga, who act in defense.

For example, 2-3 months ago clashes erupted near Haj Omran, which resulted in the killing of a girl

and the injury of some of her family members

331.

Generally, it is not safe to move around in the border area. In another example, a group of hikers

were attacked by the Iranian authorities during a mountain hike.

332.

In 2018 Prime Minister (PM) Nechirvan Barzani visited Iran and during the visit the Iranian

authorities stated that no armed activity would be accepted in the border area. Upon return, the

PM announced that no political activities should take place against the neighbouring country.

According to the source, the Kurdish population felt that the authorities were not supporting them.

Shortly after this announcement by the PM, the attack on Koya took place. The source stated that

this was a warning to the KRG, indicating that any support to the political parties could result in an

attack on the KRG.

333.

Following the attack on Koya, demonstrations took place in Erbil in front of the UN compound,

urging the international community to take action.

334.

The sou e i fo

ed of a No egia i itiati e the Ha ka Ce t e . A o di g to the sou e,

the centre gathered the Kurdish political parties to have a joint front. However, 2-3 parties

withdrew from the initiative. It seems KDPI did not participate from the outset and influenced

other parties to withdraw. According to the source, the purpose of the initiative was to enter in to

dialogue with the Iranian authorities

Legal entry

335.

When asked about the entry and exit in to Iran, the source stated that it is necessary to see this in

light of the current Iranian/American dispute. US sanctions have resulted in an increase of people

from Iran travelling to Iraq. In addition, according to the source, it is now possible for more people

to enter Iran without a visa. However, this does not mean that individuals that are politically active

can easily go to Iran. According to the source, anyone conducting the slightest political activities

will be arrested upon return to Iran. As an example the source mentioned the well-known case of

Ramin Hossein Panahi who was executed when he returned to the Kurdish region of Iran.

Illegal entry

336.

According to the source, the issue of the kolbars is a big problem for the Iranian authorities. The

authorities are preventing factories opening in Iranian Kurdistan which results in joblessness, and

even newly educated graduates are forced to work as spies for the Iranian authorities

337.

The Kurdish region of Iran was already a poor area prior to the sanctions. These have only further

increased the poverty level. In most cases people have no other way of earning money than to

work as a kolbar. The kolbars are often subject to attack and killed by the Iranian authorities in the

border area.

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IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Lack of documents

338.

According to the source, Iranian refugees in KRI have no home or country that they can obtain

nationality in. Many people are born in KRI and have lived there for 30 years and do not have any

ID documents.

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IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Appendix 2: Terms of Reference (ToR)

Conditions for members and supporters of KDPI/Komala in Iran

1. Party presence in Iran

a. What type of activities does the party conduct?

b. Examples on specific activities and events? (Protests, leaflets, posters, recent

demonstrations/gatherings)

2. Treatment of party members of the Iranian authorities (monitoring, arrests, interrogations,

detention, torture, fair trial, executions)

3. Treatment of party supporters of the Iranian authorities (monitoring, arrests, interrogations,

detention, torture, fair trial, executions)

4. Persecution of family members of party members/supporters

5. Armed conflict between the Iranian government and the party (distinction between Iranian and

Iraqi territory)

Conditions for members/supporters of KDPI/ Komala and for al Tash refugees in KRI

1. To what extent is the Iranian intelligence service able to monitor members/supporters of KDPI/

Komala and al Tash refugees in KRI?

III

Consequences for returning Iranian Kurds

1. Situation of returnees with no other profile than having lived in al-Tash refugee camp and their

family members upon return to Iran

2. Situation of members/supporters of KDPI/ Komala and their family members upon return to Iran

Border area between KRI and Kurdish region of Iran

1. Possibility to cross the border legally and what are the consequences in terms of reaction from the

Iranian authorities

2. Possibility to cross the border illegally and what are the consequences in terms of reaction from the

Iranian authorities

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IRA NIA N K U RD S - C ONSE QUE N CE S O F PO LI TI CA L AC T IV I TIE S IN IR AN AND KR I

Map: Iran

Source: Map No. 3891 Rev.9, January 2004, UNITED NATIONS,

https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/iran.pdf

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