SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Social- og Indenrigsudvalget 2019-20
SOU Alm.del Bilag 191
Offentligt

Februar 2020

Evaluering af den

politiske aftale fra

2014 om et nyt

adoptionssystem

Del 2:

Adoptivfamiliens

forhold

- Høringssvar

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

ANKESTYRELSEN

Telefon: 33 41 12 00 mandag til fredag klokken 9-15

Postadresse: Ankestyrelsen, 7998 statsservice

Mailadresse: [email protected]

Hjemmeside: www.ast.dk

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

KAPITEL 1

Høringssvar fra adoptionsom-

rådets aktører og interessen-

ter

•

Høringsbrev fra Ankestyrelsen af 2. oktober 2019

Adoptionsnævnet

DIA

Familieretshuset

ACT

Adoption & Samfund

Adoptionspolitisk Forum

Adoptionstrekanten

Bedsteforeningen

Foreningen Klip

Koreaklubben

Åbenhed i Adoption

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Adoption & Samfund

Adoption & Samfund Ungdom

Tænketanken Adoption

Adoptionspolitisk Forum

Adoptionstrekanten

Koreaklubben

Høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne for et nyt

adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016

I 2019 påbegyndte Ankestyrelsen en undersøgelse af mulighederne for

et nyt adoptionssystem og tog samtidig hul på en evaluering af

adoptionsreformen fra 2016. Vi forventer, at undersøgelsens resultater

afleveres til social- og indenrigsministeren den 1. december 2019.

Evalueringen af de tiltag der vedrører adoptivfamiliens forhold, forventes

afleveret den 1. februar 2020.

Vi vil gerne inddrage så mange perspektiver som muligt. Derfor vil vi

gerne modtage jeres eventuelle inputs til undersøgelsen og

evalueringen. Jeres inputs vil blive vedlagt det materiale, der overdrages

til social- og indenrigsministeren.

Vi skal bede om at modtage jeres eventuelle inputs senest

onsdag den

6. november 2019.

Efter resultaterne af undersøgelsen er overdraget til social- og

indenrigsministeren vil der foregå en politisk behandling af strukturen for

et fremtidigt bæredygtigt formidlingssystem for international adoption. Vi

forventer, at ministeren vil have opmærksomhed på at inddrage alle

interessenter i denne proces.

1. Baggrund

I oktober 2014 indgik et flertal af de politiske partier i Folketinget en

aftale om et nyt adoptionssystem. Store dele af aftalens indhold vedrørte

alle adoptionsansøgere, adoptivfamilier og adopterede. Aftalen fastsatte

også rammerne for den internationale adoptionsformidling til Danmark.

Aftalepartierne var enige om, at der skulle gennemføres en evaluering af

2. oktober 2019

J.nr. 18-39833, 19-16282

Ankestyrelsen

7998 Statsservice

Tel +45 3341 1200

[email protected]

EAN-nr:

57 98 000 35 48 21

Åbningstid:

man-fre kl. 9.00-15.00

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

aftalens konsekvenser efter en treårig periode fra initiativerne fik

virkning den 1. januar 2016.

Siden 2014 er antallet af internationale adoptioner i Danmark faldet til et

historisk lavt niveau fra 124 adoptioner i 2014 til 64 adoptioner i 2018.

Antallet af godkendte ansøgere, der ønsker at adoptere, via den

adoptionsformidlende organisation DIA, er også faldet markant fra 84

tilmeldinger i 2014 til 48 tilmeldinger i 2018.

Aftalepartierne bag satspuljeaftalen for 2019 besluttede derfor i

november 2018 at afsætte midler til at undersøge, hvilke alternativer der

findes til den nuværende formidlingsstruktur, hvor formidlingsopgaven

varetages af en privat organisation, der primært er finansieret af

gebyrindtægter fra adoptivfamilierne.

2. Undersøgelsen og evalueringen af rammerne for den

internationale adoptionsformidling

Ankestyrelsen har fået til opgave at undersøge, hvordan der kan skabes

økonomisk

bæredygtig

struktur

for

den

internationale

adoptionsformidling i Danmark. Undersøgelsen skal også afdække

behovet for understøttende tiltag i overgangen til et eventuelt nyt

system for at skabe den tilstrækkelige tryghed og sikkerhed for

kommende og nuværende ansøgere.

Formålet med undersøgelsen er at tilvejebringe et grundlag for en

politisk drøftelse af, hvordan et bæredygtigt adoptionssystem bør

udformes set i lyset af den aktelle udvikling.

Det betyder, at evalueringen af de dele i den politiske aftale om et nyt

adoptionssystem, der vedrører de strukturelle rammerne for

formidlingen, erstattes af en undersøgelse. Evalueringen af tilsynet med

adoptionsformidlingen vil blive afleveret sammen med undersøgelsen og

indeholder efter aftale med Social- og Indenrigsministeriet en gengivelse

af Ankestyrelsens erfaringer og observationer fra tilsynet siden 2016

(evaluering del 1).

Kommissoriet for undersøgelsen kan findes her:

https://ast.dk/born-familie/hvad-handler-din-klage-

om/adoption/undersogelse-af-adoptionssystemet

Ankestyrelsen forventer at aflevere undersøgelsens resultater til social-

og indenrigsministeren den 1. december 2019.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

3. Evalueringen

adoptionsreformen

fra

2016

–

adoptivfamiliens forhold

Evalueringen af de forhold, der vedrører adoptivfamilien, bliver evalueret

i en særskilt publikation (evaluering del 2). Evalueringen vil belyse,

hvilke elementer der er velfungerende, og hvilke elementer der kalder på

en justering, herunder hvilken form for justering der nærmere er tale

om.

Del 2 af evalueringen om den politiske aftale om et nyt adoptionssystem

omhandler temaerne:

•

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Åbenhed og adoption

Indsamling og formidling af viden

Ankestyrelsens evaluering af konsekvenserne af del 2 af den politiske

aftale vil, i forhold til de enkelte temaer, blive struktureret på følgende

måde:

1. Beskrivelse af de tiltag der blev igangsat på baggrund af aftalen

2. Vurdering af hvilke tiltag der med fordel kan fortsætte (her

inddrages bidrag fra høringen)

3. Vurdering af hvilke tiltag der kan ændres eller justeres (her

inddrages bidrag fra høringen)

Den politiske aftale fra 2014 om et nyt adoptionssystem i Danmark kan

findes her:

https://ast.dk/filer/born-og-familie/undersogelse-af-den-fremtidige-

struktur-for-adoptionsformidlingen/bilag-2-den-politiske-aftale-2014.pdf

Hvis I har inputs til de enkelte temaer, må I meget gerne skrive dem i

nedenstående skema. Har I ikke inputs eller bemærkninger til enkelte

temaer eller deltemaer er i velkommen til at springe felterne over.

Ankestyrelsen forventer, at aflevere evalueringen til social- og

indenrigsministeriet den 1. februar 2020.

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Når kommende adoptanter godkendes, sker det med den hensigt at

udvælge de bedst egnede adoptanter af hensyn til barnet.

Fremadrettet skal benyttes en ny

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

godkendelsesramme i form af én

godkendelse, der rummer ældre børn

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

og børn med flere behov.

Der skal fortsat være krav om

sammenhæng mellem ansøgernes

alder og barnets alder.

Godkendelses- og

undersøgelsesforløbet skal tilpasses,

så det understøtter en ny

godkendelsesramme.

Der skal være mulighed for at

iværksætte en nærmere undersøgelse

af de individuelle ressourcer allerede i

godkendelsesforløbets første fase.

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Den rådgivning og støtte adoptivfamilien tilbydes før og efter, at barnet

kommer til Danmark skal afspejle formidlingsbilledet og de krav der

stilles til adoptanterne, samt de behov adoptivfamilien har.

Obligatorisk PAS-rådgivning lige før

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

og efter, at barnet kommer til

Danmark, i et øget omfang.

Temaaftener med PAS-konsulenter

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

og adoptanter for kommende

adoptanter.

Obligatoriske landemøder i

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

organisationerne, som kommende

adoptanter skal deltage i som en

fortsat forberedelse på adoptionen,

mens de venter på at blive matchet

med et barn.

Omlægning af eksisterende PAS-

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

rådgivning for at sikre adgang til

rådgivning frem til den adopterede

fylder 18 år, hvor der vil skulle være

et stigende fokus på rådgivning til

den adopterede selv i takt med

dennes alder.

PAS-rådgivningen kan fremover

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

rumme spørgsmål om åbenhed og

kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Forsøgsprojekt med PAS-rådgivning

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

til voksne adopterede med en

efterfølgende politisk drøftelse som

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

opfølgning på forsøget.

Åbenhed og adoption

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes

ret til egen historie understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang

til orientering om barnets opvækst skal støttes.

Krav om at organisationer og

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

myndigheder løbende har fokus på at

sikre tilgængeligheden af oplysninger om

den adopteredes baggrund, børnehjem

m.v.

Krav om fokus på at sikre slægten viden

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

om barnets opvækst gennem

opfølgningsrapporter, i det omfang der er

ønske om denne viden, og i det omfang

den kan videregives i overensstemmelse

med oprindelseslandets regler.

Indskærpelse af den moralske og

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

aftaleretlige forpligtigelse til som adoptant

at udarbejde opfølgningsrapporter.

Temaaftener med PAS-konsulenter om

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

åbenhed og kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Iværksættelse af forskning der belyser

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

åbenheds betydning for den adopteredes

trivsel og livskvalitet.

https://ast.dk/publikationer/abenhed-i-

adoption

Indsamling og formidling af viden

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes

ret til egen historie understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang

til orientering om barnets opvækst skal støttes.

Allerede eksisterende viden skal i spil og

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

være tilgængelig på en måde, som kan

bringe den i anvendelse hos de

fagprofessionelle, som møder de

adopterede og deres familie.

Fokus på muligheden for at iværksætte

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

selvstændige initiativer med henblik på at

understøtte den faglige vidensopsamling,

der i forvejen sker.

SFI skal have fokus på adoptionsområdet

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

og i den forbindelse igangsætte relevante

undersøgelser og vidensindsamling.

https://www.vive.dk/da/udgivelser/at-

vokse-op-som-adopteret-i-danmark-5678/

Skærpet fokus på inden for de

eksisterende rammer at dokumentere den

viden, som genereres gennem PAS-

ordningen, og som på anden måde

udvikles og indsamles i forbindelse med

administrationen af området.

Oprettelse af en kontakt mellem

Ankestyrelsen og VISO for så vidt angår

international adoption.

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og

4. Kontakt til Ankestyrelsen

Hvis vores henvendelse giver anledning til spørgsmål kan I kontakte

Charlotte Karstenskov Mogensen eller Karin Rønnow Søndergaard på

Ankestyrelsens e-mail

[email protected]

eller hovedtelefonnummer 33 41 12

00 mandag til fredag klokken 9-15.

Hvis I har forslag til andre interesseorganisationer, der kan være

relevant at inddrage i processen, er I også velkomne til at kontakte os.

gør

opmærksom

på,

Danish

International

Adoption,

Adoptionsnævnet og Familieretshuset allerede er inddraget i vores

arbejde med undersøgelsen, og vil også blive hørt i relation til

evalueringen del 2.

Venlig hilsen

Karin Rønnow Søndergaard

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Når kommende adoptanter godkendes, sker det

adoptanter af hensyn til barnet.

Fremadrettet skal benyttes en ny

godkendelsesramme i form af én

godkendelse, der rummer ældre børn og børn

med flere behov.

med den hensigt at udvælge de bedst egnede

Adoptionsnævnet bemærker, at den nye

godkendelsesramme ikke endnu synes at

være fuld integreret. Det må forventes at der

fortsat vil være ansøgere med den almene

godkendelse frem til 2021.

Adoptionsnævnet har i efteråret 2019

indkaldt alle sager, hvor samrådet har taget

stilling til udvidelse af ansøgeres godkendelse

til et konkret barn i perioden 1. januar 2017-

15. august 2019. Nævnet modtog i alt 55

sager. 38 af sagerne omhandlede den almene

godkendelsesramme og 17 sager omhandlede

den generelle godkendelsesramme.

I den nævnte periode blev der ansøgt om

udvidelse af ansøgeres godkendelse i 25 % af

alle matchningssager.

Den overordnede gennemgang viste, at der

alene blev givet et afslag på udvidelse af

godkendelse. Sagerne omhandler udvidelse

på grund af alder, helbred eller søskende – i

visse tilfælde flere af de nævnte forhold.

Nævnet har ikke haft mulighed for at tage

konkret stilling til samrådets afgørelser i de

enkelte sager, men forventer at gøre dette på

et nævnsmøde i foråret 2020.

Den overordnede gennemgang viser dog, at

der er flere udvidelser af den almene

godkendelse, som ville være rummet i den

generelle godkendelse, fx manglende

HIV/hepatitis testning af børn.

Der skal fortsat være krav om sammenhæng

mellem ansøgernes alder og barnets alder.

Adoptionsnævnets overordnede gennemgang

viser, at der ikke er givet afslag på udvidelse

af godkendelser på grund af alder. Det

gælder både i sager, hvor barnet falder under

aldersrammen og i sager hvor barnets alder

ligger over godkendelsesrammen.

Overordnet set ønsker man som

udgangspunkt ikke at forældre er mere end

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

42 år ældre end barnet.

Nævnet er enig i hensynet til, at forældre til

adopterede børn som udgangspunkt ikke skal

være mere end 42 år ældre end barnet. Dog

viser gennemgangen af sagerne, at ansøgere

får udvidet godkendelsen til at omfatte det

konkrete barn, selvom det ligger under

aldersrammen.

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Godkendelses- og undersøgelsesforløbet skal

tilpasses, så det understøtter en ny

godkendelsesramme.

Der skal være mulighed for at iværksætte en

nærmere undersøgelse af de individuelle

ressourcer allerede i godkendelsesforløbets

første fase.

Nævnet har alene behandlet en klagesag

herom. Nævnet fandt i den konkrete sag, at

det var korrekt at samrådet havde givet

afslag på godkendelse i fase 1 med

henvisning til ansøgernes ressourcer.

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Den rådgivning og støtte adoptivfamilien tilbydes før og efter, at barnet kommer til Danmark

skal afspejle formidlingsbilledet og de krav der stilles til adoptanterne, samt de behov

adoptivfamilien har.

Obligatorisk PAS-rådgivning lige før og efter,

I forhold til national adoption oplever nævnet,

at barnet kommer til Danmark, i et øget

at det kan være svært for ansøgere, der skal

omfang.

hjemtage et barn at nå den obligatoriske

PAS-rådgivning, fordi udslusningsforløbet ofte

starter hurtigt efter matchet og accept heraf.

Nævnet mener, at man med rette kan

overveje om PAS-rådgivning før hjemtagelsen

skal gøres mere specifik på barnet, sådan at

PAS rådgiveren læser barnets sag og

forbereder ansøgerne mere konkret på

hjemtagelsen af det specifikke barn. Dette for

at styrke og støtte ansøgerne i deres

forberedelse på hjemtagelsen.

Temaaftener med PAS-konsulenter og

adoptanter for kommende adoptanter.

Obligatoriske landemøder i organisationerne,

som kommende adoptanter skal deltage i

som en fortsat forberedelse på adoptionen,

mens de venter på at blive matchet med et

barn.

Adoptionsnævnet har i 2019 oplevet at

markant flere ansøgere på den nationale liste,

har sagt nej til den matchning som

voteringsgruppen har foretaget. For fleres

vedkommende har deres afslag på at

hjemtage et konkret barn ikke noget med

barnets helbredsmæssige forhold, men

skyldes ansøgernes manglende

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

adoptionsmotiv.

Matchninger på den nationale liste foretages

ikke ud fra et anciennitetsprincip og

ansøgerne ved derfor ikke hvornår de kan

påregne at modtage et barn, hvis

overhovedet. Denne matchning tilgodeser det

konkrete barns behov. Det medfører dog en

ulempe for adoptanter, som ikke kan følge

med i deres adoptionsproces. For at

imødekomme dette, kan det overvejes, om

der burde oprettes landegruppe for de

nationale adoptioner, sådan at der kan

dannes netværk blandt ansøgerne, ligesom

det kendes fra international adoption.

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Omlægning af eksisterende PAS-rådgivning

for at sikre adgang til rådgivning frem til den

adopterede fylder 18 år, hvor der vil skulle

være et stigende fokus på rådgivning til den

adopterede selv i takt med dennes alder.

PAS-rådgivningen kan fremover rumme

spørgsmål om åbenhed og kontakt med

oprindelig slægt.

Forsøgsprojekt med PAS-rådgivning til voksne

adopterede med en efterfølgende politisk

drøftelse som opfølgning på forsøget.

Åbenhed og kontakt med oprindelig slægt får

tiltagende betydning i nationale sager,

grundet bestemmelsen i FÆL § 20a, hvoraf

det fremgår at der kan fastsættes samvær

med biologisk slægt efter adoptionen.

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Åbenhed og adoption

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie

understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal

støttes.

Krav om at organisationer og myndigheder

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

løbende har fokus på at sikre

tilgængeligheden af oplysninger om den

adopteredes baggrund, børnehjem m.v.

Krav om fokus på at sikre slægten viden om

Det er nævnets vurdering, at der fortsat er

barnets opvækst gennem

vanskeligheder med at få adoptanter til at

opfølgningsrapporter, i det omfang der er

lave opfølgningsrapporter.

ønske om denne viden, og i det omfang den

kan videregives i overensstemmelse med

oprindelseslandets regler.

Indskærpelse af den moralske og aftaleretlige Se venligst ovenfor

forpligtigelse til som adoptant at udarbejde

opfølgningsrapporter.

Temaaftener med PAS-konsulenter om

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

åbenhed og kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Iværksættelse af forskning der belyser

åbenheds betydning for den adopteredes

trivsel og livskvalitet.

https://ast.dk/publikationer/abenhed-i-

adoption

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Indsamling og formidling af viden

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie

understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal

støttes.

Allerede eksisterende viden skal i spil og

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

være tilgængelig på en måde, som kan bringe

den i anvendelse hos de fagprofessionelle,

som møder de adopterede og deres familie.

Fokus på muligheden for at iværksætte

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

selvstændige initiativer med henblik på at

understøtte den faglige vidensopsamling, der

i forvejen sker.

SFI skal have fokus på adoptionsområdet og i

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

den forbindelse igangsætte relevante

undersøgelser og vidensindsamling.

https://www.vive.dk/da/udgivelser/at-vokse-

op-som-adopteret-i-danmark-5678/

Skærpet fokus på inden for de eksisterende

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

rammer at dokumentere den viden, som

genereres gennem PAS-ordningen, og som på

anden måde udvikles og indsamles i

forbindelse med administrationen af området.

Oprettelse af en kontakt mellem

Ankestyrelsen og VISO for så vidt angår

international adoption.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Til Ankestyrelsen

Den 20. januar 2020

Vedr. Høring angående evaluering af adoptionsreformen fra 2016 -

Evaluering del 2

Vi henviser til Ankestyrelsens høring af 2. oktober 2019, samt møde afholdt med

Ankestyrelsen den 14. januar 2020, og referat fra mødet modtaget i DIA den 16.

januar 2020.

DIA bemærker, at rammen for vores besvarelse af denne høring har været et 1-

times møde med Ankestyrelsen. Grundet den korte tid, der var afsat til dette møde,

har fokus fra vores side især været på de udfordringer, vi har oplevet siden

reformen fra 2016, og i mindre grad de positive effekter der har været siden

reformen.

Af forbedringer vi vil derfor særligt nævne, at oplysning af sagerne i de konkrete

matchningssager er blevet væsentligt bedre efter indførelse af ”forklæderne” og

Fase 4 er ligeledes en stor forbedring, som skaber store værdi for den samlede

adoptivfamilie.

DIA har forstået det således, at formålet med denne del 2 ikke er, at der på

nuværende tidspunkt skal ske konkrete ændringer på de anførte områder

(godkendelsesramme, støtte til adoptivfamilien etc.), men at formålet alene er at

undersøge om, der i det kommende nye adoptionssystem bør ses nærmere på om

der skal ske ændringer. Vores drøftelser på mødet med jer den 14. januar 2019

og vores bemærkninger skal derfor ses i lyset heraf.

DIA har enkelte bemærkninger til referatet, som vi har indsat i referatet. Vi

vedhæfter referatet med bemærkninger.

Derudover har vi bemærkninger til referatets punkt 3 ”Åbenhed og adoption”; vi

skal anføre, at vi ikke finder det problematisk at PAS- konsulenterne afholder

temaaftner om åbenhed uden vores deltagelse. Det vi forsøgte at udtrykke på

mødet var, at vi finder det ønskværdigt med et samarbejde omkring temaftnerne,

således at både PAS konsulenternes og DIAs viden og ekspertise på området kan

komme i spil og komme adoptivfamilierne til gode. Det ville derfor være en

Hovedgaden 24, 1.

DK-3460 Birkerød

Tlf.: 45 81 63 33

Fax: 45 81 74 82

Mail: [email protected]

Cvr.nr 49661517

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

forbedring, hvis de temaaftner, hvor det kunne give god mening, kunne

koordineres i fælleskab mellem PAS-rådgivningen og DIA.

Øvrige og supplerende bemærkninger

I forhold til punktet ”Godkendelse

af adoptanter”

og den nye

godkendelsesramme bemærker DIA, at der inden for de sidste 1�½ år har været

fire breakdowns, dvs. adoptioner, hvor familier efter overdragelsen af barnet, har

valgt at afbryde adoptionen og efterlade barnet. I to af sagerne var der som

bekendt allerede truffet afgørelse om adoption i den udenlandske domstol, og

adoptionen kunne derfor ikke bare afbrydes.

Det er DIAs opfattelse, at denne stigning i afbrydelse af adoptionerne – en situation

vi aldrig tidligere har set i Danmark, eller ses i de øvrige skandinaviske lande, bør

undersøges nærmere.

Det vil efter DIAs opfattelse både være relevant at inkludere selve de konkrete

forløb, men også godkendelsesforløbet, og betydningen af den nye

godkendelsesramme, jf. vores bemærkninger herom i forhold til familiernes

mulighed for at forholde sig åbent til hvad de kan magte og har ressourcer til,

samt selve forberedelsen af familierne (både i DIA og i PAS-regi).

Det er vores opfattelse, at godkendelsen af adoptanterne og sikringen af at de har

de rette ressourcer og er tilstrækkeligt forberedt i forhold til det konkrete barns

behov, er helt centralt i at sikre gode adoptionsforløb og i at sikre bæredygtige

adoptioner til Danmark.

DIA anbefaler et langt større fokus på betydningen og indholdet af

godkendelsesforløbet og sammenhængen i forberedelsen, da det er mange år

siden, at de metoder der ligger grund for godkendelsen af adoptanter, har været

evalueret. Eksempelvis om det kunne være relevant at inkludere psykologiske

testninger som et værktøj i godkendelsesforløbet.

For så vidt angår punktet ”Støtte

til adoptivfamilien”

skal vi ift. underpunktet

om obligatoriske landemøder bemærke, at der i praksis ikke har været tale om en

ændring, idet der altid har været afholdt landemøder. DIA afholder fortsat årlige

landemøder, som led i forberedelse af de kommende adoptivforældre.

Under punktet ”Åbenhed

og adoption”

skal vi ift. underpunktet om sikring af

tilgængeligheden af oplysninger om den adopterede, bemærke at dette krav har

medvirket til et skærpet fokus på barnets legale baggrund. Særligt ”forklæderne”

har medført en forbedring i forhold til at sikre sig mest mulig viden om barnets

baggrundsoplysninger, hvilket er til gavn for den adopterede og adoptivfamilien.

Ift. underpunktet om krav om fokus på, at slægten sikres viden om barnets

opvækst i form af opfølgningsrapporter, skal vi bemærke, at vores fokus herpå

ikke har haft ændret sig sammenholdt med tidligere, og kravet har ikke medført

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

en ændring hos os – vi har som tidligere fokus på vigtigheden af barnets biologiske

slægt i det omfang det er muligt sikres adgang til informationer om barnet.

Vi bemærker dog, at det kan været forbundet med store udfordringer at få

opfølgningsrapporterne videreformidlet til biologiske familie, særligt når

formidlingen er blevet lukket ned i et afgiverland, og vi ikke længere har

kontaktpersoner til at bistå os med opgaven med videreformidling af

opfølgningsrapporterne til biologisk familie. DIA anbefaler et større fokus på,

hvordan man kunne sikre sig, at opfølgningsrapporterne reelt kom ud til de

biologiske familier, og ikke blot til myndighederne, således at de danske

myndigheder og DIA også tager et medansvar for at sikre tilgængeligheden af

rapporter til biologisk familie gennem dialog og samarbejde med afgiverlande.

Vedrørende underpunktet om indskærpelse af forpligtelse til at udarbejde

opfølgningsrapporter, skal vi bemærke, at vi har fortsat har udfordringer med

familier, som ikke ønsker at efterleve rapporteringsforpligtelsen. DIA anbefaler af

hensyn til at sikre tilgængeligheden for biologisk familie, at de danske familiers

forpligtelse for at udarbejde opfølgningsrapporter skærpes, således at der ikke kun

er tale om en moralsk forpligtelse, men også en juridisk forpligtelse, således at

manglende overholdelse af forpligtelsen reelt kunne sanktioneres. Dette primært

for at sikre den biologiske slægt retten til at få adgang til viden om barnets

opvækst samt efterlevelse af DIAs og de danske myndigheders forpligtelse til at

sikre, at rapporterne udarbejdes og fremsendes til afgiverlandet.

Vedrørende punktet ”indsamling

og formidling af viden”

Ift. underpunktet om at al eksisterende viden skal i spil, skal vi bemærke, at der

desværre ikke er blevet skabt nogen form for forum, hvor fagprofessionelle på

området har kunne mødes og dele viden til gavn for den samlede adoptivfamilie.

Der er heller ikke et samlet sted, hvor der kan søges viden inden for området i

form af fx fælles hjemmesiden, ”vidensbank” eller lignende.

Vedr. underpunktet Fokus på at iværksætte selvstændige initiativer, er det uklart

for DIA, hvad dette punkt retter sig imod, hvorfor vi ikke forholder os nærmere til

dette.

Vedr. underpunktet om, at SFI (VIVE) skal have fokus på adoptionsområdet, er

DIA kun bekendt med, at der udfærdiget en undersøgelse på området. DIA har

ikke været inddraget i denne undersøgelse, og er heller ikke blevet oplyst eller

orienteret om undersøgelsens resultater. Jf. ovenfor er der ikke blevet skabt et

fagfælleskab, hvor det ville have været oplagt at få formidlet og drøftet resultater

af undersøgelser på området.

Vedrørende underpunktet om skærpet fokus på inden for de eksisterende rammer

at dokumentere den viden, som genereres gennem PAS- ordingen, har DIA ikke

kendskab til, at der skulle være iværksat initiativer i dette øjemed.

Vedrørende underpunktet om oprettelse af en kontakt mellem Ankestyrelsen og

VISO, har DIA ikke kendskab til dette, og er ikke orienteret om en sådan kontakt,

hvorfor vi ikke har nogen bemærkninger hertil.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

DIA opfordrer til et større samarbejde og vidensdeling mellem de forskellige

aktører på området, så der kan skabes et større fælles fundament for rådgivningen

af familierne og det internationale adoptionsarbejde.

DIA har ikke yderligere bemærkninger til Ankestyrelsens høring.

Såfremt vores besvarelse giver anledning til spørgsmål er I velkomne til at

kontakte os.

Med venlig hilsen

Andrea Jedrzejowska

Juridisk konsulent/

Adoptionskoordinator

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Referat af møde med DIA den 14. januar 2020

På mødet deltog fra DIA Jeanette Larsen, Tina Brandt-Olsen, Andrea Haugsted Jedrzejowska, Debby

Pedersen, Rikke Klestrup, Tina Schwendson og Marina Bonetti. Fra Ankestyrelsen deltog Charlotte

Mogensen og Karin Søndergaard.

Mødet blev holdt som et led i høringen af DIA over evalueringen af de tiltag, der retter sig mod

adoptivfamilien og er blevet iværksat efter den politiske aftale om et nyt adoptionssystem i 2014.

1. Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Bredden i den nuværende godkendelsesramme har ifølge DIA haft betydning i forhold til både

ansøgerfeltet, ansøgerne og for DIAs samarbejde med afgiverlandene.

I nogle lande oplever DIA, at rammerne ikke giver mening for samarbejdsparterne, som forventer en

konkretisering af hvilke ressourcer ansøgerne reelt har og hvilke udfordringer eller problematikker

ansøgerne reelt har kompetencer til at imødekomme.

Forventningerne bliver nogle gange forsøgt imødekommet bl.a. i socialrapporten og ved landevalg. Men

DIA oplever også, at ansøgerne af det konkrete land kan blive bedt om, at udfylde ”afkrydsningsskemaer”,

hvor de konkretiserer hvilke problematikker de vil være åbne overfor.

DIA mener, at der er en risiko for, at den brede godkendelsesramme påvirker ansøgerne og ansøgernes

mulighed for at forberede sig til en adoption negativt. Da ansøgerne forventes at være åbne overfor en

bred vifte af problematikker og ikke får mulighed for at konkretisere deres ressourcer, forholder de sig

måske ikke til disse problematikker før de får et barn i forslag. Derved kan man ende med et match, som

ikke er det optimale. Samtidig kan det være svært for ansøgerne ikke at acceptere matchningen, da

ansøgerne kan være bange for at miste deres godkendelse. DIA efterspørger i den forbindelse muligheden

for at ansøgerne får bedre mulighed for kvalificeret at afvise et match.

DIA mener også, at der kan være risiko for, at de rummelige ansøgere, som der efterspørges med den

generelle godkendelsesramme, får afslag på godkendelsesforløbet hvis de er ærlige omkring deres reelle

åbenhed, i modsætning til de ansøgere, der holder deres bekymringer om rammens spændvidde tilbage.

DIA mener desuden, at godkendelsesrammerne kan give ansøgere et indtryk af at alle børn der frigives til

international adoption er special needs børn. Det er ikke det indtryk DIA har. Generelt oplever DIA, at

godkendelsesrammerne er for vidtgående og ikke afspejler børnene. DIA mener, at der fortsat bør være en

generel godkendelsesramme, der er bredere end den foregående almene godkendelsesramme og i højere

grad lægger vægt på barnets udviklingspotentiale. Den nuværende generelle ramme er dog efter DIAs

opfattelse for bred, og der bør gives mulighed for positive tilvalg for ansøgerne ift. hvilke udfordringer de

kan rumme.

En periode på fire år fra godkendelse til hjemtagelse eller en eventuel forlængelse af godkendelsen er lang

tid og det kan påvirke adoptionsparatheden ved ansøgerne. Det er derfor ifølge DIA vigtigt at sikre nye

oplysninger om ansøgernes ressourcer og adoptionsmotiv herunder deres helbred mm. Det ville være

ønskeligt med en generel opfølgning på ansøgerne hvert år i perioden fra godkendelse til adoption fx i

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Familieretshuset. I det hele taget vigtigt med et tættere samarbejde også på medarbejdersiden blandt

områdets aktører.

DIA oplever ikke, at der er stor forskel på ansøgernes ressourcer i de tilfælde hvor ansøgerne får en

udvidelse til et konkret barn og hvor ansøgerne matches med et barn inden for deres godkendelse. DIA

oplever, at der ikke er ensartethed i de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige for ansøgerne om barnet, og som

ansøgerne får i forhold til, om sagen behandles i Adoptionsnævnet (inden for ansøgernes godkendelse)

eller i Adoptionssamrådet (uden for ansøgernes godkendelse). Ansøgerne oplever generelt tryghed i

forhold til oplysningerne om barnet i sagerne behandlet i Adoptionsnævnet, hvor nævnets pædiater

supplerer/underbygger den vurdering som DIAs pædiater har foretaget.

DIA foreslår, at PAS-konsulenterne eventuelt kan indgå i den række af eksperter, som ansøgerne kan søge

råd hos i forbindelse med stillingtagen til matchningen. For størstedelen af ansøgerne kan det være

relevant at modtage rådgivning ift. de psykosociale /psykologiske oplysninger der er om barnet.

DIA foreslår, at PAS-konsulenterne eventuelt kan indgå i den række af eksperter, som ansøgerne kan søge

råd hos i forbindelse med stillingtagen til matchningen. For nogle ansøgere Ikke for nogle ansøgere men det

kan i det hele taget være relevant i forbindelse med de psykosociale /psykologiske oplysninger der er om

barnet at familierne kan få rådgivning om den del også. kan en psyko-social eller psykologisk vurdering af

det konkrete match være meget gavnligt.

2. Støtte til adoptivfamilien

DIA oplever, at rådgivningen fra de involverede myndigheder kan virke fragmenteret og efterspørger en

større grad af samarbejde mellem myndigheder og organisation og fokuserer på en helhedsorienteret

tilgang.

Forberedelsen af ansøgerne i forbindelse med hjemtagelsen (fase 4) kan ifølge DIA mangle det

internationale aspekt og en forberedelse af ansøgerne på, at ”den perfekte overdragelse” måske ikke

eksisterer eller måske opfattes anderledes i afgiverlandet. Ansøgerne bør, ifølge DIA, forberedes på, at

fleksibilitet fra ansøgernes side kan forventes i udlandet og derfor ikke skal komme som en overraskelse for

dem. DIA efterspørger derfor også et større samarbejde mellem PAS-rådgiverne i Ankestyrelsen og DIA i

fase 4, da en koordinering af den psykologisk/mentale og den praktiske forberedelse kunne være med til at

sikre en bedre oplevelse for ansøgerne, barnet og for samarbejdsparterne i afgiverlandene.

DIA oplever, at nogle samarbejdslande ikke mener, at ansøgere med biologiske børn er godt nok forberedte

på overdragelsen og efterspørger derfor mere fokus på dette aspekt i fase 4. Det gælder både forberedelse

af ansøgerne og af det biologiske barn.

DIA efterspørger også et beredskab i forbindelse med udfordrende situationer for ansøgerne i forbindelse

med overdragelsen af barnet og ved breakdowns, som involverer alle relevante aktører, hvem der skal

være tilgængelig, hvordan de skal være tilgængelige etc. I den forbindelse mener DIA i øvrigt, at åbenhed i

dialogen mellem de danske myndigheder, PAS-rådgiverne og DIA om den vejledning og de samtaler, der er

foregået med ansøgerne, er afgørende.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

3. Åbenhed og adoption

DIA giver udtryk for, at åbenhed er et spændende emne, som på godt og ondt fylder meget. DIA

efterspørger mere dialog om emnet, blandt andet om det altid er etisk og kulturelt forsvarligt at forlange

eller forvente åbenhed. Det kræver ifølge DIA også en dialog med samarbejdslandene om opfattelsen og

forståelsen af begrebet. DIA efterspørger mere viden om de etiske og kulturelle aspekter ved åbenhed med

særlig fokus på biologisk slægt.

DIA mener generelt, at man måske underkender det kulturelle aspekt i de enkelte lande og i stedet

problematiserer ”ikke-åbenhed”, fx i sager om hittebørn. DIA mener fx at det er problematisk at PAS-

konsulenter holder temaaftner om åbenhed uden DIAs deltagelse, da temaaftnerne dermed ikke også får

fokus på det kulturelle aspekt. Se DIAs bemærkninger i høringsvaret.

4. Indsamling og formidling af viden

DIA mener ikke at den store viden der findes på området er kommet i spil. DIA efterspørger desuden mere

dialog omkring resultater af undersøgelser og forskning på området.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Ankestyrelsen

Teglholmsgade 3

2450 København

Birkerød den 22. april 2019

Vedr.: Jeres j.nr. 18-39833

–

DIAs svar på Ankestyrelsens høring vedrørende

undersøgelse af den fremtidige adoptionsstruktur

Ankestyrelsen har i brev af 22. marts 2019 bedt om DIAs bemærkninger til en række

ændringsforslag vedrørende den fremtidige adoptionsstruktur samt eventuelle

generelle bemærkninger. Det fremgår af høringen, at Ankestyrelsen alene ønsker

DIAs eventuelle bemærkninger til de beskrevne delelementer, mens der ikke ønskes

bemærkninger til et eller flere helstøbte alternativer til en samlet struktur.

Ankestyrelsens høring indeholder en række ændringsforslag til den eksisterende

ansvars- og opgavefordeling samt den økonomiske ramme for international adoption,

herunder:

Ændrede rammer for økonomi og opgavefordeling

Tilsynets fremadrettede udformning

Retningslinjerne for adoptionsrelateret støtte

Post Adoption Service (PAS)

Ændrede snitflader

DIAs generelle bemærkninger

Der har været international adoption til Danmark i mere end 50 år og de mange års

erfaringer har medført løbende udvikling af adoptionssystemet og opgave-

varetagelsen. Det betyder at adoption som alternativ familieform i dag er en af de

sikreste alternative familieformer, bl.a. fordi adoptionssystemet i høj grad er bygget

op omkring et stort fokus på særligt barnets rettigheder, men også de biologiske

familiers rettigheder og adoptivfamiliers rettigheder.

Et bæredygtig system, bør derfor efter DIAs opfattelse understøtte international

adoption til Danmark som mulighed, både for de mange udsatte børn, der ikke har

andre muligheder, men også for de familier, der ønsker at skabe en familie gennem

adoption.

DIA bemærker helt overordnet, at vi finder det beklageligt, at årsagerne til den

aktuelle situation, hvor der mangler godkendte ansøgere til international adoption,

ikke er inddraget i undersøgelsen. Hvis der skal findes løsninger, der i fremtiden

understøtter international adoption til Danmark, er det efter DIAs opfattelse

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

afgørende, at årsagerne til udviklingen inddrages i undersøgelsen. I modsat fald er

det vanskeligt at se, at der kan findes relevante svar på de aktuelle udfordringer.

Som vi tidligere har påpeget, jf. DIAs analyse af 3. september 2018, synes den

nuværende regulering og de ændringer, der blev gennemført med adoptionsloven i

januar 2016, at begrænse international adoption til Danmark, både i forhold til antallet

af internationale adoptioner til Danmark, men også i forhold til antallet af ansøgere,

der godkendes til adoption.

De nye godkendelsesrammer, der trådt i kraft i januar 2016, har således efter vores

opfattelse stor betydning for antallet af nye ansøgere til international adoption. Efter

DIAs opfattelse understøtter godkendelsesrammen desværre ikke princippet om, at

enhver adoption bør tage sit udgangspunkt i hensynet til barnets bedste, men

tværtimod afspejler rammen en nærmest mekanisk opfattelse af børns behov og

familiers ressourcer, der ikke passer til virkelighedens forskelligheder.

Efter DIAs opfattelse, er det desuden helt centralt i en fremtidig struktur, at opgave-

og ansvarsfordelingen mellem DIA som formidlende organisation og Ankestyrelsen

som tilsynsmyndighed i langt højere grad adskilles og præciseres. Dette med henblik

på at sikre, at DIA som privat organisation er efterladt et vist råderum og ansvar til, at

varetage opgaven med at formidle internationale adoptioner, og dermed bevare fokus

på organisationens kerneopgave

–

selve formidlingsopgaven, herunder det meget

væsentlige arbejde med at sikre et godt og respektfuldt samarbejde med vores

udenlandske samarbejdspartnere.

Hvis der også i fremtiden skal være en høj adoptionsfaglighed i formidlingsarbejdet,

er det således afgørende, at rammerne giver mulighed for, at DIAs primære fokus på

formidlingsarbejdet bibeholdes, fremfor at organisationens ressourcer primært

anvendes på besvarelsen af tilsynet, der siden lovændringen har været støt stigende,

og i tiltagende grad udgør en stadig større andel af organisationens opgave-

varetagelse. I modsat fald er der en risiko for, at organisationen over tid mister den

viden og de kompetencer, der er opbygget gennem mange år, og som udgør

fundamentet for opgavevaretagelsen og samarbejdet med udlandet. Den viden og

de kompetencer findes ikke andre steder i Danmark, og det vil tage mange år at

genskabe hvis de udhules eller endnu værre, går helt tabt, således som ISS også

anfører i sin rapport.

Slutteligt bemærkes det, at en bæredygtig struktur for international adoption til

Danmark i fremtiden, efter DIAs opfattelse ikke alene er et økonomisk spørgsmål,

men også et spørgsmål om rammerne for - og opgaverne forbundet med -

international adoption til Danmark.

Det er derfor DIAs opfattelse, at en række yderligere elementer vil være særdeles

relevante at inddrage i undersøgelsen af, hvordan der kan skabes en bæredygtig

struktur for international adoption til Danmark, herunder en samling af visse af

opgaverne omkring forberedelsen af adoptanterne samt i forhold til bistand og støtte

til adopterede og familier efter adoptionen i DIA. Dette vil medvirke til en langt større

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

kvalificering og sammenhæng i opgavevaretagelsen

–

én indgang for familier og

adopterede.

Om DIAs besvarelse

Det bemærkes indledningsvist, at DIA i vores høringsvar har fokuseret på de

elementer, der er relevante for en fortsat opgavevaretagelse i DIA i fremtiden.

Da vi tidligere har beskrevet samt dokumenteret, at de nuværende rammer for

formilingsarbejdet ikke er tilstrækkelige til, at DIA kan varetage opgaven i fremtiden,

jf. vores analyse af 3. september 2018, har vi ikke yderligere bemærkninger til de

elementer i høringen, der vedrører uændrede rammer for økonomien og

opgavevaretagelsen.

Da Ankestyrelsen alene har ønsket bemærkninger til de beskrevne delementer i

høringen og ikke en eller flere helstøbte alternativer til en samlet struktur, skal DIA for

god ordens skyld gøre opmærksom på, at DIAs bestyrelse ikke på nuværende

tidspunkt har taget stilling til, om organisationen også i fremtiden ønsker og har

mulighed for at varetage opgaven med at formidle internationale adoptioner .Dette

afhænger dels af den økonomiske struktur for en fremtidig opgavevaretagelse, dels

de øvrige rammer.

Slutteligt tager DIA forbehold for eventuelle kontraktsretlige konsekvenser ved

overgangen til et nyt system. Det bør således efter DIAs opfattelse indgå i

undersøgelsen af overgangen til et evt. nyt system, om der vil være evt.

aftaleretlige/kontraksretlige konsekvenser, hvis vilkårene for familierne ændrer sig

væsentligt undervejs i processen, herunder i forhold til de indbetalte gebyrer og

udgifterne fremadrettet.

1. Ændrede rammer for økonomi og opgavefordeling

Grundlæggende set handler adoption om at hjælpe de mest udsatte og sårbare børn

i verden til at få en familie i Danmark, så de kan vokse op i trygge rammer, der kan

skabe den nødvendige udvikling for dem

–

naturligvis alene i de situationer, hvor

barnet ikke har en familie eller andre trygge omsorgspersoner i deres hjemland, der

kan varetage omsorgen for dem.

Som DIA tidligere har peget på, er det DIAs holdning, at internationale adoptioner bør

sidestilles med nationale adoptioner, sådan at det sikres, at det er de menneskelige

ressourcer, der er afgørende for, at vi kan hjælpe børn gennem international adoption

og ikke de økonomiske ressourcer.

Gennem en driftsaftale, der sikrer, at alle faste udgifter afholdes af staten, kan det

dels sikres, at økonomi ikke bliver en barriere for international adoption til Danmark i

fremtiden, dels sikres, at organisationen kan bevare et højt adoptionsfagligt niveau,

uafhængigt af formidlingen samt antallet af godkendte ansøgere.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Dermed vil familierne alene skulle afholde de direkte sagsrelaterede udgifter

forbundet med behandlingen af deres sag i Danmark og i udlandet samt udgifterne

forbundet med at rejse ud og hente barnet.

For at sikre et bæredygtigt grundlag, er det således DIAs opfattelse at hensynene til

stabilitet, robusthed og et højt fagligt niveau i organisationen bedst sikres gennem en

driftsaftale, der er baseret på en dækning af alle faste udgifter i organisationen dvs.

den model, som beskrives i afsnit tegnes 1, b), b) i Ankestyrelsens høring.

Med denne model vil det sikres, at organisationens opgavevaretagelse er

fuldstændig uafhængig af formidlingen, både fsva. antallet af adoptioner og antallet af

nye ansøgere.

Samme hensyn kan ikke i samme grad sikres ved en model, hvor tilskuddet er

baseret på et beløb, som svarer til en andel af organisationens udgifter dvs. den

model som beskrives under 1 b), a) i høringen. I denne model vil organisationen

fortsat vil være følsom over for ændringer i formidlingen, hvilket ikke kan udelukkes at

kunne påvirke opgavevaretagelsen.

DIAs bemærkninger til overgangsfasen

I forhold til overgangsfasen til en statslig model, bemærker DIA, at der er en meget

høj risiko for, at den viden og de kompetencer der igennem mange år er opbygget i

organisationen, vil forsvinde. Det kan således ikke forventes, at det vil være muligt, at

bibeholde de nuværende kompetencer ved overgangen til en statslig model, bl.a.

fordi det vil blive vanskeligt at holde på medarbejderne, der i givet fald må forventes

at søge videre. Dette vil uundgåeligt påvirke såvel opgavevaretagelsen i den statslige

model og selve overgangsfasen, men i høj grad også muligheden for at bevare de

eksisterende samarbejder.

Dertil kommer, at det efter DIAs opfattelse højst sandsynligt ikke vil være muligt, at

videreføre alle de igangværende samarbejder i en statslig model, idet det formentligt

ikke vil være alle samarbejdspartnere, der ønsker at samarbejde med en

centralmyndighed. DIAs samarbejder er opbygget gennem mange år og kan ikke

nødvendigvis bare overdrages. Dette vil afhænge af afgiverlandene og de

myndigheder og organisationer, som DIA samarbejder med i dag.

2. Tilsynets fremadrettede udformning

I forhold til Ankestyrelsens forslag om et større samarbejde i form af møder,

årsplaner m.v., finder DIA forslagene gode. DIA finder, at der i samme ånd kan findes

andre opgaver, der i højere grad kan løses i samarbejde, f.eks. akkrediteringer af

samarbejdspartnere, der også med fordel kunne ske ved fælles rejser til udlandet.

Det vil i højere grad kunne kvalificere grundlaget, ligesom spørgsmål kunne afklares i

fællesskab undervejs, samt i dialog med myndigheder og samarbejdspartnere i

udlandet.

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DIA mener endvidere, at indberetningsforpligtelsen bør ændres til væsentlige

ændringer, idet det må antages, at Ankestyrelsen i dag har oparbejdet en viden om

og et kendskab til DIAs samarbejder, der gør, at alene væsentlige oplysninger og

ændringer fremover er af relevans. Desuden bør der efter DIAs opfattelse indføres

bagatelgrænser for de økonomiske anmeldelser.

I forhold til et særskilt tilsyn med PAS er det uklart for DIA, hvad et sådan tilsyn i givet

fald skulle bestå af. DIA går således som udgangspunkt ud fra, at PAS-opgaven er

omfattet af de almindelige krav til DIAs sagsbehandling, som fremgår af

akkrediteringsvilkårene.

I forhold til det økonomiske tilsyn, hvis rammerne for strukturen ændres, sådan at

DIAs administrative udgifter finansieres af staten via en driftsaftale, er det DIAs

opfattelse, at tilsynet med det forhøjede tilskud kan ske på samme måde som det

tilsyn, der i dag er forbundet med DIAs nuværende årlige driftsstøtte.

Som udgangspunkt kan driftstilskuddet udregnes på baggrund af det årlige budget,

og sådan at der rapporteres kvartalsvist på udgifterne og tilskuddets anvendelse,

ligesom i dag. Der kan ved årets udgang ske en efterregulering, sådan at for meget

udbetalt tilskud overføres til næste år, mens for lidt udbetalt tilskud udbetales til

organisationen i forbindelse med aflæggelse af årsregnskabet.

I forhold til en hjemmel til at tilbageholde tilskudsmidler, hvis DIA ikke har leveret de

opgaver, som Ankestyrelsen fastsætter indholdet af og fristerne for, finder DIA det

noget problematisk, idet et sådan indgreb er egnet til at påvirke opgavevaretagelsen i

forhold til formidlingsopgaven og dermed påvirke familiernes sager.

Hvis Ankestyrelsen ønsker at sikre, at DIA i tilstrækkelig grad har mulighed for at

besvare Ankestyrelsens henvendelser og tilsyn, bør dette istedet ske gennem

øremærkede midler til besvarelse af tilsynet, og sådan at det sikres, at de ressourcer

der tildeles organisationen til efterlevelse af kravene og tilsynet fra Ankestyrelsen

matcher de ressourcer, der tildeles Ankestyrelsen til udførelse af tilsynet.

DIA opfodrer ligeledes til, at det generelle planlagte tilsyn så vidt muligt tilrettelægges

i samarbejde, så tilsynet kan indpasses i organisationens øvrige opgaver og løses på

en for alle parter tilfredsstillende måde. Dette gælder både for det generelle tisyn og

for de særopgaver, der opstår undervejs, og som der har været mange af siden

2015.

3. Retningslinjerne for adoptionsrelateret støtte

Helt overordnet bemærker DIA, at samme hensyn som var gældende ved

lovændringen i 2016, herunder bevarelse af muligheden for, at organisationen fortsat

kan yde adoptionsrelateret støtte er uændret. Ydermere er det med de indførte

restriktioner og tilsynet med den støtte, der ydes, konstateret at der ikke konkret har

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

været anledning til bekymring, og at der altså heller ikke konkret er set en forbindelse

med antallet af adoptioner og ydelse af adoptionsrelateret hjælpearbejde.

Det er DIAs opfattelse, at der er stor gennemsigtighed i den støtte DIA yder til

adoptionsrelateret hjælpearbejde, ligesom at der er tale om støtte der ydes til

projekter, der understøtter forbedring af børns levevilkår samt

subsidiaritetsprincippet.

Det er efter DIAs opfattelse væsentligt at bevare muligheden for denne støtte, der er

er bistand, der naturligt forudsættes at være en del af samarbejdet med flere af DIAs

samarbejdspartnere. Det præciseres, at denne forudsætning ikke bare er DIA´s, men

kommer fra samarbejdspartnerne, der stiller samme krav til deres øvrige

samarbejdspartnere i andre lande. Dette sker med henblik på at yde hjælp til de

børn, for hvem international adoption ikke er den rigtige eller mulige løsning. Denne

støtte er således en nødvendig del af samarbejdet i flere af DIAs samarbejdslande.

Det er samtidig DIAs opfattelse, at begrænsningen om, at DIA ikke må yde andre

former for ikke adoptionsrelateret støtte eller bistand (humanitært hjælpearbejde), der

blev indført med lovændringen i 2016, er unødvendig og også uhensigtsmæssig.

Hvis der ønskes en adskillelse mellem humanitært hjælpearbejde og

adoptionsarbejdet, kan det imødegås gennem en væsentligt mindre indgribende

begrænsning f.eks. om, at DIA kun må yde ikke adoptionsrelateret hjælpearbejde i de

lande, hvor DIA ikke aktivt har et samarbejde om adoptionsformidling.

I forhold familiers mulighed for efter adoptionen at yde støtte, opfordrer DIA til at

muligheden bevares. I modsat fald vil dette formodes at ske uden om organisationen

med den konsekvens, at det ikke længere vil være gennemsigtigt, hvad der ydes af

støtte og til hvem.

4. Post Adoption Service

DIA har i vores analyse til Ankestyrelsen af 3. september 2018 om konsekvenserne

af det aktuelle formidlingsbillede beskrevet den bistand, DIA yder i dag, samt

omfanget og indholdet af de henvendelser, som DIA behandler. DIA modtog i 2018

samlet set 458 anmodninger fra 367 familier/adopterede.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

102

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Som DIA har beskrevet, består DIA´s bistand bl.a. af rådgivning og vejledning om

mulighederne i landene samt omkring kulturelle forhold. Hvor, hvordan og af hvem

kan de adopterede få hjælp. Vi følger op på mulighederne for og udviklingen af PAS i

udlandet i forbindelse med kontaktrejser, og når vi får besøg fra vores

samarbejdspartnere. Vi fungerer som bindeled til myndigheder og børnehjem i

udlandet samt til andre familier/landegrupper, Ankestyrelsens PAS samt øvrige

tilbud, f.eks. kommunalt. DIA afholder også landetræf for familier og adopterede i

forbindelse med besøg fra udlandet.

Mens den rådgivning, der ydes af de eksterne konsulenter, der i dag er tilknyttet

Ankestyrelsen, i høj grad er finansieret af staten, er den bistand, der ydes af DIA til

såvel adoptivfamilier, som adopterede og biologiske familier ikke særskilt finansieret.

Ofte oplever DIA i praksis, at de to forskellige tilbud rækker ind over hinanden, uden

at der er nogen former for koordinering eller samtækning. Ydermere er det DIAs

opfattelse, at PAS i de kommende år også skal kunne rumme en række specialtilbud,

herunder bl.a. rådgivning og mediering i forbindelse med f.eks. åbne adoptioner i

forbindelse med eller efter adoptionen.

Da DIA allerede besidder konkret viden om afgiverlandene og har løbende kontakt til

netværk og relevante aktører i afgiverladene, samt rådgivningsmæssigt har relevant

viden om denne del af PAS-arbejdet, opfordrer DIA til, at PAS opgaven samles i DIA,

sådan at der sikres én indgang for familier og adopterede, der søger støtte og

rådgivning, og at der sikres en samlet finansiering af støtte og bistand til familier og

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adopterede. For familien og den adopterede er der ikke tale om to adskilte behov,

men om et behov for støtte og bistand.

For at dette kan lykkedes i praksis, er det naturligvis et centralt element, at de

eksterne konsulenter, der i dag er tilknyttet Ankestyrelsen, også indgår i det nye

PAS-tilbud og dermed i stedet tilknyttes DIA.

Som DIA tidligere har påpeget, er det vore vurdering, at det vil være

hensigtsmæssigt, hvis de afsluttede sager DIA i dag opbevarer på et fjernarkiv,

overdrages til Ankestyrelsen. Alternativt, at der tildeles DIA midler til at digitalisere

alle de nuværende sager. Dette vil bl.a. kunne være med til at sikre muligheden for

en hurtigere sagsbehandling af henvendelser fra adopterede og familier, der ønsker

en kopi af deres sag, samt at oplysningerne og akterne i sagerne består.

5. Ændrede snitflader

Ankestyrelsen beskriver en række forskellige muligheder for ændrede snitflader,

herunder

a. Statslig bistand til uafhængig adoption

b. Centralmyndigheder overtager det direkte ansvar for at sikre, at samarbejdet med

udlandet sker efter konventionens principper

c. Generel viden om modtagerlandets børnebeskyttelsessystem vedligeholdes af

centralmyndigheden

d. Centralmyndigheden pålægges ansvar for at indsamle, bearbejde og formidle

viden om adoption

e. Tilsynsmyndigheden indgår i den formidlende organisations bestyrelse

Det fremgår ikke nærmere af høringen, hvad baggrunden er for udvælgelsen af

snitfladerne, samt evt. hvilke erfaringer fra andre lande, som forslagene muligvis

kunne være inspireret af.

Det er derfor også vanskeligt på det foreliggende konkret at forholde sig til

forslagene. DIA har dog følgende umiddelbare bemærkninger;

Ad a) statslig bistand til uafhængig adoption

Umiddelbart er det DIAs opfattelse, at denne konstruktion strider mod

grundlæggende principper for adoptionsarbejdet, herunder at sikre, at det er barnets

bedste, der er bærende for alle beslutninger vedrørende adoptionen. Forslaget

indebærer efter DIAs opfattelse en række usikkerheder, bl.a. når ansvaret for

formidlingsarbejdet lægges hos familien, der uundgåeligt har en personlig interesse i

adoptionens gennemførelse.

Det er et grundlæggende princip efter dansk ret, at familien skal lade sig bistå af en

formidlende organisation ved adoption af et barn fra udlandet. Hensynet bag er netop

at sikre, at en professionel organisation er ansvarlig for processen, behandlingen af

sagen samt samarbejdet med udlandet. Det er i den forbindelse DIAs opfattelse og

erfaring, at et samarbejde omkring en adoption ikke alene kan ske på skriftligt

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

grundlag, men også kræver praktisk viden om forholdene i afgiverlandet,

adoptionsprocessen samt adoptionens gennemførelse.

Derudover kan der opstå en række situationer i forbindelse med en adoptions

gennemførelse, der kræver håndtering og evt. bistand i afgiverlandet. Ydermere

rummer privat formidling risiko for, at der lægges pres på afgiverlandet, ligesom at

der i højere grad vil være risiko for, at uetisk adfærd kan påvirke processen

undervejs. Det anses ikke for at være i overensstemmelse med konventionernes mål.

Ad b) Centralmyndigheder overtager det direkte ansvar for at sikre, at

samarbejdet med udlandet sker efter konventionens principper

Det er DIAs opfattelse, at samarbejdet med afgiverlandet varetages løbende og såvel

generelt som konkret. Det er derfor også DIAs opfattelse, at selve samarbejdet ikke

kan opdeles på den foreslåede måde.

DIAs samarbejder og relationer er opbygget gennem mange år, og det generelle

samarbejde indbefatter ikke kun samarbejde med myndigheder, men også med

andre NGO’er og børnehjem. Det er derfor DIAs erfaring, at varetagelsen af

samarbejdsrelationerne forudsætter særlig viden og kompetencer

–

viden og

kompetencer, der i dag kun eksisterer i organisationen, og ikke bare uden videre kan

overføres til centralmyndigheden.

Det er således DIAs opfattelse, at det overordnede, det generelle og det konkrete i

samarbejdet ikke kan adskilles. Der vil ligeledes være en risiko for, at det ikke vil

være muligt at videreføre de samarbejder, organisationen har i dag, da det ligesom i

en statslig model forudsætter, at DIAs eksisterende samarbejdspartnere ønsker at

have et direkte samarbejde med en dansk centralmyndighed.

Slutteligt vil det kunne påvirke kvaliteten i adoptionsarbejdet, idet varetagelsen af

opgaverne, herunder de konkrete sager netop kræver såvel generel viden om, som

samarbejde med afgiverlandet.

Ad c) Generel viden om modtagerlandets børnebeskyttelsessystem

vedligeholdes af centralmyndigheden

DIA er enig i, at opgaven med indhentelse af viden om generelle forhold i

afgiverlandet, der ikke er direkte forbundet med adoptionsarbejdet, med fordel kan

ligge hos centralmyndigheden.

Samme gælder efter DIAs opfattelse lovgivningen fra afgiverlandene. DIA foreslår

derfor, at centralmyndigheden også overtager ansvaret for indhentelse, oversættelse

og formidling til DIA om udenlandsk lovgivning i DIAs samarbejdslande.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Ad d) Centralmyndigheden pålægges ansvar for at indsamle, bearbejde og

formidle viden om adoption

DIA støtter op om tanken om et videnscenter om adoption i Danmark. DIA forslår

dog, at det overvejes i hvilket regi et sådan videnscenter placeres, sådan at det

sikres, at den viden der indsamles og anvendes ikke alene tager sit udgangspunkt i

et myndighedsperspektiv, men i et perspektiv der rummer de mange facetter og

forskellige former for faglighed, der er forbundet med adoption.

Det kunne f.eks. være et selvstændigt og uafhængigt center oprettet ved lov med det

formål bredt at indsamle viden om adoptionsspecifikke emner, forske i adoption samt

være ansvarlig for at udbrede viden om adoption.

Ad e) Tilsynsmyndigheden indgår i den formidlende organisations bestyrelse

DIA er enig i, at det med fordel kan overvejes at udvide bestyrelsen i DIA med et

antal medlemmer, f.eks. et medlem udpeget af ministeren.

I forhold til Ankestyrelsens forslag om, at tilsynet indgår i DIAs bestyrelse evt. med

stemmeflertal, er det vanskeligt for DIA at se, hvordan Ankestyrelsen kan bevare

habiliteten i forhold til tilsynet, hvis Ankestyrelsen samtidig er en del af DIAs øverste

ledelse.

Helt grundlæggende bør hensynet til at sikre, at tilsynsmyndighederne har størst

mulig indsigt i organisationens opgavevaretagelse afvejes mod hensynet til, at DIA

som privat organisation har et vist råderum, hvis det skal give mening, at DIA som

privat organisation varetager adoptionsformidlingsopgaven. Med en organisering,

hvor tilsynet får stemmeflertal i DIAs bestyrelse, er der efter DIAs opfattelse ikke

længere tale om en privat organisation, ledet af en professionelt udvalgt, men frivillig

og ulønnet bestyrelse. Det må lige som på personalesiden anses for tvivlsomt, at

medlemmerne i den nuværende bestyrelse vil kunne indgå i en sådan konstruktion.

DIAs forslag til ændrede snitflader, model 4

Som DIA tidligere har præsenteret for Ankestyrelsen, foreslår DIA en model 4, der

ligeledes indebærer en række ændrede snitflader.

I denne model foreslår DIA, at en række opgaver, der i dag varetages af

centralmyndigheden flyttes til DIA, sådan at der sikres en langt bedre sammenhæng i

opgavevaretagelsen

–

én indgang for familier og adopterede.

I denne model flyttes varetagelsen af opgaverne med national adoption

(administration af venteliste og matchning) til DIA. Dette vil dels sikre en større

fleksibilitet for familier, der er godkendt til adoption ved valg af land og evt. skifte af

venteliste undervejs, men også at de modtager samme tilbud og rådgivning

undervejs i processen, som familierne på de internationale ventelister.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Derudover samles forberedelsen (pre adoption service) ved den formidlende

organisation, der allerede har kontakt til de kommende adoptivforældre i forbindelse

med deres deltagelse i informationsmøder samt ved den løbende generelle

vejledning og rådgivning om adoption.

Dette kunne være en del af en naturlig forberedelsesproces, og samtidig give

forældrene ”en dør”

at gå ind af inden adoptionen. Derved kan det samtidig hele tiden

sikres, at den aktuelle viden om forholdene i afgiverlandet samt børnenes behov kan

inkluderes i forberedelsen af de kommende familier.

Vi oplever, at mange forældre forholder sig til de mange instanser, de er i berøring

med i adoptionsprocessen. DIA mener derfor, at en samling af forberedelsen af

adoptanterne hos DIA kunne være mulighed for en forenkling, men også en kvalitativ

styrkelse i forhold til rådgivningsindsatsen inden adoptionen.

PAS samles i DIA, dvs. både rådgivning

og ”teknisk” PAS,

så der er et

sammenhængende system for familier og adopterede, der søger støtte, rådgivning

og vejledning om adoption og om bistand til tilbagerejser, kontakt med biologisk

slægt m.v., jf. det ovenfor beskrevne om PAS-ordningen, både nu men også som vi

ser behovet i fremtiden, jf. DIAs bemærkninger under ad 3) adoptionsrelateret støtte.

DIA medsender som aftalt DIAs power-point med en overordnede beskrivelse af

modellen til Ankestyrelsen. DIA stiller sig naturligvis til rådighed for yderligere

drøftelse og uddybning af de enkelte elementer i den foreslåede model.

Med venlig hilsen

DIAs bestyrelse

Lars Ellegaard, formand for bestyrelsen

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Til Ankestyrelsen

Familieretshuset

Storetorv 10

6200 Aabenraa

Telefon: 7256 7000

Skriv til os via borger.dk

www.familieretshuset.dk

2019 - 37584

EAN-Nr. 5798000362222

Svar på Ankestyrelsens høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne

for et nyt adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016,

fremsendt den 2. oktober 2019

Familieretshuset har følgende bemærkninger til evalueringen af adoptionsrefor-

men fra 2016:

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

* Den aktuelle godkendelsesramme er meget bred. Vi foreslår, at de kommende

adoptanter får mulighed for at konsultere en PAS-rådgiver for at få en vurdering

af barnets psyko-sociale forhold, inden de kommende adoptanter beslutter sig for

at give samtykke til modtagelse af barnet. I dag har de kun mulighed for at kon-

takte DIA´s pædiater.

* Det bør i Adoptionsvejledningen præciseres i hvilke tilfælde – hvis nogen – de

kommende adoptanter kan afvise at modtage et barn inden for rammen uden at

miste deres godkendelse.

* Generelt foreslås det, at pjecen vedrørende den nye godkendelsesramme ud-

dybes for så vidt angår barnets helbreds- og aldersmæssige forhold. Endvidere

bør kommunikationen af dette optimeres.

* I Adoptionsvejledningens pkt. 7.4.1.2 bør det oplyses, at der som udgangspunkt

gennemføres 3 samtaler med ansøgerne, hvoraf én samtale gennemføres i

hjemmet.

* Individuelle ressourcer hos kommende adoptanter. Familieretshuset har kun en

enkelt gang allerede i godkendelsesforløbets første fase iværksat en nærmere

undersøgelse af adoptanternes individuelle ressourcer. Det er imidlertid vores

opfattelse, at det er vigtigt, at muligheden herfor er til stede. Det er i den forbin-

delse ønskeligt, at det bliver præciseret efter hvilke kriterier, at vi allerede i fase 1

kan iværksætte undersøgelse af individuelle ressourcer.

* Særligt om børn frigivet ved tvang. De kommende adoptanter udtrykker bekym-

ring for, om barnet får tildelt samvær med de biologiske forældre, hvilket de fryg-

ter kan komme til at virke forstyrrende for barnet med det til følge, at adoptanter-

ne skal bruge ekstra ressourcer på at samle barnet op.

En anden bekymring er konstruktionen med ”midlertidig placering”, hvor ansø-

gerne kan være tilbageholdende med at turde knytte sig fuldt ud til barnet af frygt

for, at barnet ikke bliver endeligt frigivet.

Dato:

10-01-2020

Direktion

Sagsbehandler:

Sandra Rieder Snitgaard

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Det kan overvejes om adoptanternes bekymring i relation til samvær kan imødekommes ved at beskrive sam-

været som et ”kendesamvær” og ikke et ”kontaktsamvær” efter forældreansvarslovens § 20a.

Endvidere kan det overvejes om adoptanternes bekymring kan imødekommes med to spor i Adoptionsnæv-

net? Ét spor for ansøgere, der ønsker et barn, der er frigivet med samtykke. Og et andet spor, hvor barnet er

frigivet uden samtykke.

* Generelt gælder det for adoptanter af børn født i Danmark, at de ikke har et naturligt sammenhold. Adoptan-

ter af børn fra udlandet finder typisk sammen i landegrupper.

Disse adoptanter efterspørger en ”Danmarksgruppe”.

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

* Vi foreslår et opfølgende kursus inden godkendelsen forlænges (brush-up).

* Vi foreslår et kursus målrettet barn-2-ansøgere (søskende relationer).

* Vi foreslår et kursus målrettet ansøgere til biologiske søskende og ældre børn. (Vi oplever, at par, der har

adopteret søskende, opdager, at de to søskende ikke har nogen relation til hinanden, da de har boet adskilt

på børnehjemmet).

* Børnegrupper. Nogle børn må vente længe på at komme i et kursusforløb. Måske skal der udbydes flere

kurser.

* PAS-rådgivning bør i et eller andet omfang være obligatorisk ud over 3 måneder, herunder i forbindelse med

barnets start i institution. Vi kan endvidere tilslutte os en omlægning og udvidelse af adgangen til frivillig PAS-

rådgivning. Vi oplever bedre adoptionsforløb i de sager, hvor adoptanterne løbende gør brug af den frivillige

PAS-rådgivningen.

Indsamling og formidling af viden

* Familieretshuset kan tilslutte sig, at allerede eksisterende viden skal være tilgængelig, således den kan an-

vendes hos de fagprofessionelle, ligesom der bør være fokus på initiativer med henblik på at understøtte den

faglige vidensopsamling, der allerede sker. En sådan formidling og indsamling af viden kan eksempelvis vare-

tages af et nationalt videnscenter for adoption.

Med venlig hilsen

Rie Thoustrup Sørensen

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Comments regarding the Appeals Board-Consultation on the study of the

possibilities for a new adoption system and the evaluation of the adoption reform

of 2016;

Copenhagen 15.11.2019

ACT has in the last 20 years intensively worked in the field of child trafficking for the

purpose of adoption and child rights.

Our founder Roelie Post was an EU Official in DG Enlargement responsible for the

Reforms of the Child Protection System in Romania.

More information about this can be found at:

www.againstchildtrafficking.org

and on the personal page of Ms. Post,

www.romaniaforexportonly.com

ACT has exposed many criminal practices of European adoption agencies.

Respectively for Denmark we exposed the scandals in Andhra Pradesh (John Abraham

Memorial Bethany Home), Preet Mandir, Priya Darshani, (A Baby Business, DR 2007),

Ethiopia (DR 2012)

Sheyar Chayya (2019)

Amys Vilje (2019)

We also assisted the parents whose children were adopted by criminal means to

Denmark, Sinkenesh and Hussein, (Masho) , Genet (Amy) and Ramesh Kulkarni.

Due to our assistance the adoptions of Masho and Amy were revoked by the Federal

First instance court in Ethiopia in 2016.

The book of Dorrit Saietz “Adoptionens Slagmarker” is in part based on information

supplied by us and it shows a bleak picture of the affairs of the Adoption System in

Denmark.

The Kenya scandal from 2015:

“Kenya, another adoption scandal. The cost of Impunity” available at:

http://www.againstchildtrafficking.org/de/2015/08/kenya-another-adoption-scandal-the-

cost-of-impunity/

), is the best example that the new adoption system is a total failure.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

We have to conclude that neither did the Danish government ever look into what

happened with regards to adoptions from Romania, nor was any of the above mentioned

scandals ever thoroughly investigated, nor have the victims found any relief. It has been

just cover- up.

In other EU states, adult adoptees demand now, parliamentary enquiries and

compensation for the damage done to them as well as practical and financial

independent assistance for re-establishing their original identity

In 2016 the Dutch council for criminal justice and youthwelfe, has advised the

government to stop intercountry adoptions. (summary attached)

The Danish government has in the past connived and subsidised a private organisation,

DIA, which was involved in child trafficking.

The Danish government has failed to address the gross human rights violations and

criminal practices of DIA's predecessor AC and Danadopt.

Further, the practices of Terre des Hommes in Bangladesh and Romania have not really

been addressed.

In the light of the fact that in 2018 there were only 64 intercountry adoptions (source

DIA), the state financing DIA is a misuse of taxpayer's money. It is predictable that the

number of intercountry adoptions continue to decrease which would make any

government funding a predictably failed rescue operation.

We request the Danish government to address the above mentioned scandals in a

serious and thorough manner and support financially, independent organisations who

assist adult adoptees in re-establishing their original identity in line with the obligations

under international human rights treaties.

Further, as the RSJ concluded, the problems are systemic, and cannot be improved,

Denmark should simply stop with intercountry adoptions and respect children's rights as

enshrined in the UNCRC.

Arun Dohle

Executive Director

David Kildendal Nielsen

Contact Person, ACT

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Summary

advisory report ‘Reflection

on Intercountry

Adoption’ of the

Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of

Juveniles

(2 November 2016)

The Minister of Security and Justice requested the Council for the Administration

of Criminal Justice and Youth Protection (the Council) to render advice on a

number of proposed future scenarios for the system of intercountry adoption.

Andersson Elffers Felix (AEF) was commissioned to develop these scenarios.

These scenarios all proceed from the current system of intercountry adoption

and relate to its management and control.

The Minister submitted the following question to the Council:

Which of the future intercountry adoption scenarios outlined by AEF is preferable?

To provide the Minister with proper advice on the management of the adoption

system (the various scenarios), the Council believes it first needs to answer a

more fundamental question:

How can we provide the highest level of protection to children of the intercountry

adoption target group (children unable to grow up with their own families)?

Asking this fundamental question is in line with the Council’s advisory function.

The Council is charged with rendering independent advice on the subject of

youth protection to the government.

The Council’s advice

is comprised of two parts and consists of an advice on the

fundamental question on intercountry adoption and an advice on the choice of

the future scenarios provided.

Advice on the fundamental question on intercountry adoption

Developments with respect to intercountry adoption

There has been a sharp decline in the number of children adopted into the

Netherlands from abroad in the past ten years. The profile of these children, too,

has changed: they tend to be older when first arriving in the Netherland and to

belong to

the subset of ‘special

need’

children, children requiring special care in

addition to what is provided to other adopted children.

Positive aspects and bottlenecks

Scientific studies, publications and interviews with experts show that the current

adoption system has its positive aspects and also its negative aspects.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Positive aspects

It has become evident that children who grow up in institutions will lag behind in

their physical, cognitive and social emotional development. Adoption offers a

child the opportunity to grow up within a family instead of in an institution,

keeping the child from suffering more and permanent developmental delays.

Research has shown that adoption usually is an effective intervention, as it may

result in a recovery of the developmental process of the child (especially in the

case of children adopted at an early age). Intercountry adoption into the

Netherlands also allows the adopted child to grow up in a prosperous country

and allows adoptive parents with a desire to have children to have their wish

granted.

Bottlenecks



The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Hague Adoption

Convention recognise that the rights and interests of a child are best protected

by a family in their own country. The country of origin often lack a youth

protection system to provide alternatives to intercountry adoption.



Research has also shown that intercountry adoption negatively affects the

advancement of the youth protection system in the country of origin.

Intercountry adoption inadvertently results in local youth protection services

being of a lesser quality than would be the case if no intercountry adoption

existed.



Furthermore, intercountry adoption involves financial interests. These

carry the risk of illegal and undesired practices.



These risks increase the need for supervision. However, supervision on

the adoption process and on whether the provisions of the Hague Adoption

Convention are observed is very limited.



Specific obstacles exist in a number of countries (China, the US and the

EU countries).



The quality of the adoption process is subject to a lot of criticism.



The well-being of the children may suffer from unsafe attachment.

Arguments and assessment

Positive aspects and bottlenecks do not, in themselves, provide arguments for or

against adoption. While the existence of the problem areas might result in the

conclusion that the very phenomenon of intercountry adoption as such should be

questioned, it might also result in a drive to change the system, instead. Some

of the positive aspects and problem areas come to serve as arguments for and

against intercountry adoption. These arguments can be divided into arguments

at the micro level (related to the individual child) and arguments at the macro

level (related to the system of intercountry adoption). The Council subsequently

weighed these arguments against each other.

The ‘interest of the child’

can be divided into various components that each

provide an individual argument for or against adoption. In assessing these

arguments, the Council prefers ‘placement

of children in a family in the country

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

of origin able to provide

adequate

care’ over ‘placement

of children in a family of

adoptive parents in a foreign country able to provide

optimum

care’.

This means

that the

Family in own country-argument

counts heavily and the

Prosperous

Netherlands-argument

and

Optimum care-argument

are given relatively less

weight in our assessment.

The intercountry adoption dilemma is complex. While there are very strong

arguments in favour of intercountry adoption at the micro level, the Council

believes these are countered by strong arguments against it at the macro level.

The Council, in weighing the above arguments against each other, finds as

follows. Despite the benefits it provides to the individual child (micro level), the

Council believes that the adoption system is not the ideal solution to protect the

target group of children at large (macro level). This conclusion is highly reliant

on the fact that, in view of the obligations of the government, arguments at the

macro level (system) must be given more weight than arguments at the micro

level.

A couple of macro-level arguments against intercountry adoption are decisive in

the Council’s view. Multiple scientific studies have demonstrated the ‘pull’

effect

of adoption. The system of intercountry adoption creates a supply of children in

children’s homes. In addition, intercountry adoption undermines

focusing on the

solution preferred under the CRC (a family of the child’s own culture, in the

child’s own country). Intercountry adoption impairs the implementation and

advancement of a youth protection system in the country of origin. The Council

believes that these arguments count more heavily than arguments related to

individual children benefitting from intercountry adoption. The fact that most of

the children adopted into the Netherlands do well does not change the fact that

the CRC (Article 20) considers it better for these

–

and other

–

children to do

well in their own countries. Finally, the Council attaches great value to the

principle of subsidiarity: adoption of the child should only be considered if no

other solution can be found. The Council believes that the principle of

subsidiarity cannot, in practice, be properly observed, meaning that this

Principle

of subsidiarity- argument

is, to the Council, a convincing argument against

intercountry adoption.

In the opinion of the Council, intercountry adoption and the provision of aid with

advancing the youth protection system cannot convincingly stand side by side.

The option of having children adopted impairs in itself the further advancement

of the youth protection system. A shift of focus to advancing such youth

protection systems is essential. The Council

refers to this scenario as the ‘Family

in country of origin’

scenario.

Read the full report for a definition of these arguments.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Advice on scenarios with management models

Having given its advice on the fundamental question on intercountry adoption,

the Council gives its advice on the future scenarios presented by AEF.

Scenarios

The AEF report presents four scenarios.



Scenario 1: ‘Optimise the current model’

In this scenario, the current situation is kept the same as much as possible. All

current parties remain in existence and all roles remain intact. This scenario

revolves around the various actors changing their conduct at their own initiative.



Scenario 2: ‘Government

manages the

system’

No fundamental reform of the system takes place. All current parties remain

existant and will continue to fulfil their current duties. However, in this scenario,

the discharge of responsibilities does change. While the government will put

more frameworks in place, it will distance itself from the actual performance.



Scenario 3: ‘Fewer actors’

In this scenario, the number of licensees will decrease (possible by way of a

minimum number of matches) and the government will combine all supervision

duties.



Scenario 4: ‘A public service’

In this scenario, intercountry adoption becomes a public service: the entire chain

will be managed by the government.

Conclusion on the scenarios

The Council states that these scenarios are insufficiently able to provide an

improvement to the identified problem areas. Various obstacles cannot be

removed, as their nature makes it impossible for them to be solved by means of

a different organisation of the intercountry adoption system. This has resulted in

the Council recommending another scenario for the future

(‘Family in country of

origin’).

In answering the Minister’s question, the Council asked itself which of the four

scenarios are best able to provide an improvement of the established

bottlenecks. The Council therefore assessed the future scenarios in relation to

the identified bottlenecks. Regarding some of these bottlenecks the AEF

scenarios can result in improvements. The principle of subsidiarity served as the

standard criterion for the Council to assess which scenario is preferable.

Weighing the opportunities and risks,

the Council concludes that the ‘A public

service’

scenario is best able to remove the concerns with respect to the

principle of subsidiarity (to the extent possible).

Conclusion

This advisory report centres around two core questions. The Council has the

following answer to the fundamental question,

‘How

can we provide the highest

level of protection to children belonging to the intercountry adoption target

group (children unable to grow up with their own families)?’

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

The Council is of the opinion that intercountry adoption is not the best way of

protecting children and calls upon the government to shift its focus and to

protect these children by supporting the implementation and advancement of

the youth protection system in the country of origin. This ideal scenario is

referred to as the ‘Family in country of origin’

scenario by the Council.

With respect to the question

‘Which

of the future intercountry adoption scenarios

outlined by AEF is preferable?’,

the Council advises that the government selects

none of the four scenarios presented by AEF, but adopts the aforementioned

‘Family in country of origin’

scenario. Considering these four future scenarios

presented, the Council advises that the Minister

adopts scenario 4 (‘A public

service’).

This scenario is best able to remove the concerns with respect to the

principle of subsidiarity (to the extent possible).

In addition to providing an advice on the fundamental question on intercountry

adoption and an advice on the future scenarios presented by AEF, the Council

makes the following recommendations.

Besides the five scenarios discussed, the Council recommends to terminate

immediately the collaboration with countries with specific problems. This

concerns China (supervision by Central Authority and accredited bodies not

possible), the US (violates the intention of the Convention’s provisions with

respect to the principle of subsidiarity and freely given consent) and countries of

origin that are EU Member States (principle of subsidiarity).

The Council calls upon the Minister to have a fundamental debate on adoption

with the House of Representatives and not just to debate management models

and their performance. The Council emphasises that, in view of the sensitivities

involved in the debate on intercountry adoption, this debate must be based on

arguments. The Council aims to contribute to this debate by way of this advisory

report.

Intercountry adoption is a complex subject involving interests in addition to the

interest of the child, including the interest of the parents wishing to adopt a child.

The various interests involved render the subject politically complex. The Council

calls upon the Minister to put the interests of the foreign children in need of

protection first (also, or even in particular, because they cannot make

themselves heard). The Council hopes that the Minister is willing, in the near

future, to make a policy decision that will serve to better protect the rights of

these children (as provided in the CRC) and, thus, the children themselves.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Adoption & Samfund

Adoption & Samfund Ungdom

Tænketanken Adoption

Adoptionspolitisk Forum

Adoptionstrekanten

Koreaklubben

Høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne for et nyt

adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016

I 2019 påbegyndte Ankestyrelsen en undersøgelse af mulighederne for et

nyt adoptionssystem og tog samtidig hul på en evaluering af

adoptionsreformen fra 2016. Vi forventer, at undersøgelsens resultater

afleveres til social- og indenrigsministeren den 1. december 2019.

Evalueringen af de tiltag der vedrører adoptivfamiliens forhold, forventes

afleveret den 1. februar 2020.

Vi vil gerne inddrage så mange perspektiver som muligt. Derfor vil vi gerne

modtage jeres eventuelle inputs til undersøgelsen og evalueringen. Jeres

inputs vil blive vedlagt det materiale, der overdrages til social- og

indenrigsministeren.

Vi skal bede om at modtage jeres eventuelle inputs senest

onsdag den

6. november 2019.

Efter resultaterne af undersøgelsen er overdraget til social- og

indenrigsministeren vil der foregå en politisk behandling af strukturen for

et fremtidigt bæredygtigt formidlingssystem for international adoption. Vi

forventer, at ministeren vil have opmærksomhed på at inddrage alle

interessenter i denne proces.

1. Baggrund

I oktober 2014 indgik et flertal af de politiske partier i Folketinget en aftale

om et nyt adoptionssystem. Store dele af aftalens indhold vedrørte alle

adoptionsansøgere, adoptivfamilier og adopterede. Aftalen fastsatte også

rammerne for den internationale adoptionsformidling til Danmark.

Aftalepartierne var enige om, at der skulle gennemføres en evaluering af

aftalens konsekvenser efter en treårig periode fra initiativerne fik virkning

den 1. januar 2016.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Siden 2014 er antallet af internationale adoptioner i Danmark faldet til et

historisk lavt niveau fra 124 adoptioner i 2014 til 64 adoptioner i 2018.

Antallet af godkendte ansøgere, der ønsker at adoptere, via den

adoptionsformidlende organisation DIA, er også faldet markant fra 84

tilmeldinger i 2014 til 48 tilmeldinger i 2018.

Aftalepartierne bag satspuljeaftalen for 2019 besluttede derfor i november

2018 at afsætte midler til at undersøge, hvilke alternativer der findes til

den nuværende formidlingsstruktur, hvor formidlingsopgaven varetages

af en privat organisation, der primært er finansieret af gebyrindtægter fra

adoptivfamilierne.

2. Undersøgelsen og evalueringen af rammerne for den

internationale adoptionsformidling

Ankestyrelsen har fået til opgave at undersøge, hvordan der kan skabes

økonomisk

bæredygtig

struktur

for

den

internationale

adoptionsformidling i Danmark. Undersøgelsen skal også afdække behovet

for understøttende tiltag i overgangen til et eventuelt nyt system for at

skabe den tilstrækkelige tryghed og sikkerhed for kommende og

nuværende ansøgere.

Formålet med undersøgelsen er at tilvejebringe et grundlag for en politisk

drøftelse af, hvordan et bæredygtigt adoptionssystem bør udformes set i

lyset af den aktelle udvikling.

Det betyder, at evalueringen af de dele i den politiske aftale om et nyt

adoptionssystem, der vedrører de strukturelle rammerne for formidlingen,

erstattes af en undersøgelse. Evalueringen af tilsynet med

adoptionsformidlingen vil blive afleveret sammen med undersøgelsen og

indeholder efter aftale med Social- og Indenrigsministeriet en gengivelse

af Ankestyrelsens erfaringer og observationer fra tilsynet siden 2016

(evaluering del 1).

Kommissoriet for undersøgelsen kan findes her:

https://ast.dk/born-familie/hvad-handler-din-klage-

om/adoption/undersogelse-af-adoptionssystemet

Ankestyrelsen forventer at aflevere undersøgelsens resultater til social- og

indenrigsministeren den 1. december 2019.

3. Evalueringen

adoptionsreformen

fra

2016

–

adoptivfamiliens forhold

Evalueringen af de forhold, der vedrører adoptivfamilien, bliver evalueret

i en særskilt publikation (evaluering del 2). Evalueringen vil belyse, hvilke

elementer der er velfungerende, og hvilke elementer der kalder på en

justering, herunder hvilken form for justering der nærmere er tale om.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Del 2 af evalueringen om den politiske aftale om et nyt adoptionssystem

omhandler temaerne:

●

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Åbenhed og adoption

Indsamling og formidling af viden

Ankestyrelsens evaluering af konsekvenserne af del 2 af den politiske

aftale vil, i forhold til de enkelte temaer, blive struktureret på følgende

måde:

1. Beskrivelse af de tiltag der blev igangsat på baggrund af aftalen

2. Vurdering af hvilke tiltag der med fordel kan fortsætte (her

inddrages bidrag fra høringen)

3. Vurdering af hvilke tiltag der kan ændres eller justeres (her

inddrages bidrag fra høringen)

Den politiske aftale fra 2014 om et nyt adoptionssystem i Danmark kan

findes her:

https://ast.dk/filer/born-og-familie/undersogelse-af-den-fremtidige-

struktur-for-adoptionsformidlingen/bilag-2-den-politiske-aftale-2014.pdf

Hvis I har inputs til de enkelte temaer, må I meget gerne skrive dem i

nedenstående skema. Har I ikke inputs eller bemærkninger til enkelte

temaer eller deltemaer er i velkommen til at springe felterne over.

Ankestyrelsen forventer, at aflevere evalueringen til social- og

indenrigsministeriet den 1. februar 2020.

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Når kommende adoptanter godkendes, sker det med den hensigt at udvælge de bedst egnede

adoptanter af hensyn til barnet.

Fremadrettet skal benyttes en ny

Der er problemer med de nuværende

godkendelsesramme i form af én

godkendelsesrammer for børnene:

godkendelse, der rummer ældre

børn og børn med flere behov.

Det må indledningsvist slås fast, at godkendelsesrammen

er meget, meget bred, til trods for at de børn, der kommer

i forslag, er som før, såvel alders- som helbredsmæssigt:

Der er en uoverskuelig bredde i hvilke

helbredsmæssige forhold, man skal kunne

acceptere, og det kan skræmme de ellers

velkvalificerede og

–motiverede

ansøgere væk

Der kan konstateres stærkt stigende

afslagsprocenter de sidste år, nu afvises halvdelen

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

af alle ansøgere, og ofte med begrundelsen i

ansøgernes ressourcer.

Der er ingen, der siger nej til barn i forslag. Er det i barnets

tarv? Kan man risikere at barnet havner i en familie, der

har ”gabt” over for stor en opgave?

Vi mener, at de nuværende meget brede

godkendelsesrammer har konsekvenser for ansøgere,

barnet, DIA, de lokale kommunale tiltag og

støtteforanstaltninger:

Der er en for ansøgerne helt uoverskuelig bredde i,

hvilke helbredsmæssige forhold man skal

kunne/ville acceptere som ansøgere, og det kan helt

klart skræmme mange ellers særdeles

velkvalificerede og -motiverede ansøgere helt væk.

Ansøgerne vælger erfaringsmæssigt derfor så i

stedet surrogat-/rugemødre eller andre muligheder,

lovlige eller ej, og uanset de personlige og

økonomiske omkostninger for alle parter!

Hvorfor må det ikke være OK at sige, at man er klar

til et barn med HIV smitte, på grund af ansøgernes

faglige baggrund, det kunne være som f.eks. læge

eller lignende- uden at man skal sige ja til samtlige

andre mulige sygdomme?

Hvorfor må man ikke vælge, at barnet har f.eks.

klumpfod eller læbe-/ganespalte, fordi man har

erfaring og dermed ressourcerne til netop det?

Det handler ikke om

”ikke

at være rummelig”, men om at

være helt realistisk om egne og familiens ressourcer.

Afslagsprocenten har som nævnt senest nærmet sig

halvdelen af alle ansøgere, og ofte med begrundelsen

ressourcer. Adoption & Samfund ønsker, at der

gennemføres en undersøgelse af, hvad der bevirker de høje

afslagsprocenter, så det kan afklares, om de typiske

ansøgere har en helt anden profil i dag end tidligere, eller

om det er forhold i godkendelsessystemet eller hos de

godkendende instanser, der bevirker den markante forskel.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Hvad er baggrunden for, at man ikke i højere grad lytter til

ansøgernes ressourcer og ønsker på særlige områder, frem

for at alle skal kunne klare alt?

Hvor er beviserne for, at disse godkendelsesrammer er til

barnets bedste, baseret på erfaringerne siden ændringerne

i 2016?

Der skal fortsat være krav om

sammenhæng mellem ansøgernes

alder og barnets alder.

Godkendelses- og

undersøgelsesforløbet skal

tilpasses, så det understøtter en

ny godkendelsesramme.

Der skal være mulighed for at

iværksætte en nærmere

undersøgelse af de individuelle

ressourcer allerede i

godkendelsesforløbets første fase.

Overveje at øge grænsen til 50 års aldersforskel.

Se ovenfor.

Vi fraråder en obligatorisk psykologisk undersøgelse af alle

ansøgere, da det vil være spild af tid og ressourcer.

Almindelige mennesker med almindelige ressourcer, ikke

super-mennesker, skal kunne adoptere, men naturligvis

forberedes godt til at særlige forhold, der gør sig gældende

i adoption..

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Den rådgivning og støtte adoptivfamilien tilbydes før og efter, at barnet kommer til Danmark

skal afspejle formidlingsbilledet og de krav der stilles til adoptanterne, samt de behov

adoptivfamilien har.

Obligatorisk PAS-rådgivning lige

Nuværende:

før og efter, at barnet kommer til Før udrejse: 3 timers PAS rådgivning

Danmark, i et øget omfang.

Efter udrejse: 3 timers PAS rådgivning

Vores forslag:

Før udrejse: 5 times PAS-rådgivning

Efter udrejse: 5 timers PAS-rådgivning, herunder mulighed

for PAS-rådgivning under opholdet i oprindelseslandet.

Vi vurderer, at der er manglende videndeling mellem f.eks.

DIA og de adoptionsforberedende kurser. Man kunne med

fordel lade DIA’s erfaringer med de konkrete hjemtagne

børn indgå i de adoptionsforberedende kurser i fase 4, hvor

den helt specifikke forberedelse til at modtage et helt

konkret barn kan forbedres betragteligt ved at anvende

kendt viden fra virkelige sager.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Temaaftener med PAS-

konsulenter og adoptanter for

kommende adoptanter.

Nuværende:

Der holdes mange relevante og gode tema- aftener/-

eftermiddage.

Forslag:

Vi ønsker at tilføje ”Ventekuller” arrangementer, hvor

forhold som

- ventetid

- uklarhed

- det ikke at kunne påvirke processen

- forskel mellem oplevelsen hos parterne i parforholdet

- etc.

behandles.

Obligatoriske landemøder i

organisationerne, som

kommende adoptanter skal

deltage i som en fortsat

forberedelse på adoptionen,

mens de venter på at blive

matchet med et barn.

Omlægning af eksisterende PAS-

rådgivning for at sikre adgang til

rådgivning frem til den

adopterede fylder 18 år, hvor der

vil skulle være et stigende fokus

på rådgivning til den adopterede

selv i takt med dennes alder.

Forslag:

Vi støtter, at den adopterede selv kan få rådgivning

uafhængigt af forældrene, før den adopterede er fyldt 18 år.

Der skal desuden oprettes en instans, der alene skal

fokusere på barnets/den unge adopteredes rettigheder =

Den adopteredes ambassadør, som taler barnets/den unge

adopteredes rettigheder i vigtige og fundamentale livskriser

og usikkerhed om identitet, ønske om rejse for at søge

biologisk ophav osv.

Vi mener, at den nuværende PAS-rådgivning giver mulighed

for spørgsmål om åbenhed og kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Den bør derfor fortsættes uændret, jf. dog vores

bemærkninger nedenfor under emnet åbenhed.

PAS-rådgivningen kan fremover

rumme spørgsmål om åbenhed

og kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Forsøgsprojekt med PAS-

rådgivning til voksne adopterede

med en efterfølgende politisk

drøftelse som opfølgning på

forsøget.

Vi minder lige om, at PAS til voksne er blevet gjort

permanent!

PAS-rådgivningen skal være livslang og permanent

finansieret via Finansloven. I denne rådgivning skal man

kunne inddrage en partner eller andet familiemedlem

tilsvarende som i rådgivning til adoptivforældre.

Årsagen til vores forslag er, at voksne adopterede kan have

gavn at deres partner deltager i rådgivningen og således

bedre forstår den adopteredes reaktionsmønstre.

Åbenhed og adoption

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie

understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal

støttes.

Krav om at organisationer og

Kravet bør indebære både sikring af, at disse oplysninger i

myndigheder løbende har fokus

videst muligt omfang tilvejebringes allerede i forbindelse

på at sikre tilgængeligheden af

med adoptionen, og at de derefter opbevares på en måde,

oplysninger om den adopteredes

som giver mulighed for, at den adopterede og

baggrund, børnehjem m.v.

adoptivforældrene kan få adgang til oplysningerne.

Adoption & Samfund ser det som en nødvendighed for at

sikre tilgængeligheden fremover, ved at der foretages en

fuld digitalisering af alle oplysninger om barn og oprindelig

familie. Dette vil selvfølgelig være en bekostelig opgave i

både tid og penge, men vil spare tid og personaleressourcer

på længere sigt, når det ikke længere bliver nødvendigt at

gå i gamle arkiver og lede i gamle kasser efter oplysninger.

I forbindelse med aktindsigt er det dog stadig yderst vigtigt,

at der er en sagsbehandler involveret med kendskab til

adoption, som kan læse sagen igennem, inden den

videregives og dermed sikre, at eventuelle svære

oplysninger følges op af rådgivning og vejledning.

Den pågældende medarbejder skal ikke sortere eller

censurere de oplysninger, der videregives, men sikre at den

adopterede og/eller adoptivfamilien får den fornødne

psykologiske og juridiske rådgivning og bibringes indsigt i,

hvordan sociale og kulturelle forhold i oprindelseslandet bør

tages i betragtning, hvis en kontaktetablering ønskes. (Se

mere under punktet Temaaftener.)

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Det vides ikke med sikkerhed, hvad omfanget af fremtidige

søgninger bliver, men alt tyder på, at interessen blandt de

20.000 personer, der de sidste fem årtier er adopteret i

Danmark (ved national eller international adoption), vil

være stigende i takt med en øget forståelse for, hvad

åbenhed og eventuel kontakt kan betyde for adopteredes

identitetsudvikling.

Adoption & Samfund mener derfor, at der specifikt skal

sikres midler til såkaldt teknisk PAS (dvs. administrativ,

juridisk bistand til de adopterede og deres forældre

forbindelse med aktindsigt, kontaktetablering og

tilbagerejser). DIA kender de kulturelle normer i de

oprindelseslande, hvor de har et samarbejde, og kan

rådgive om og formidle viden og erfaringer, som de har

gjort sig gennem mange års tæt arbejde med disse lande.

Dette er ikke en opgave, vi mener uden videre kan gives

videre til andre.

En naturlig mulighed er, at denne opgave varetages af en

særlig task-force i DIA, eftersom DIA dels pt. opbevarer

sagsakterne, og dels har en historik med samarbejde med

de adopteredes oprindelseslande. Uanset om denne task-

force til søgning, kontaktetablering og genforening med

biologisk familie placeres i DIA eller et andet sted, er det

nødvendigt, at der afsættes midler til at udføre

arbejdsopgaverne med digitalisering, behandling af

sagsakter og rådgivning på kompetent vis, og det er ikke

acceptabelt, hvis denne opgave (fortsat) skal betales af

kommende adoptanters brugerbetaling.

Krav om fokus på at sikre

slægten viden om barnets

opvækst gennem

opfølgningsrapporter, i det

omfang der er ønske om denne

viden, og i det omfang den kan

videregives i overensstemmelse

med oprindelseslandets regler.

De danske myndigheders fokus på at sikre den adopteredes

biologiske slægt viden om den adopteredes opvækst og

tilværelse bør række videre end blot at sørge for, at

rapporter udarbejdes og sendes til oprindelseslandet.

Danmark bør som modtagerland af adoptivbørn bidrage til

aktivt at sikre, at rapporterne om de adopteredes opvækst

og tilværelse i Danmark videreformidles til den biologiske

familie, hvis de ønsker det, uden at de selv skal sætte sig i

udgifter eller besvær for at modtage rapporterne (f.eks. ved

selv at skulle hente dem på en institution eller et kontor i en

by langt fra deres bopæl.)

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Indskærpelse af den moralske og

aftaleretlige forpligtigelse til som

adoptant at udarbejde

opfølgningsrapporter.

Forpligtelsen til at udarbejde opfølgningsrapporter har

eksisteret i mange år, og der bør udarbejdes et overblik

over, hvorvidt denne forpligtelse generelt opfyldes af

adoptanterne

–

eller om hvor udbredt det evt. er ikke at

udarbejde rapporterne.

Der bør etableres en instans, hvor forældre

–

f.eks. hvis de

er ordblinde eller ikke føler sig stærke i skriftlig formulering

–

kan få bistand til udarbejdelse af rapporten.

Temaaftener med PAS-

konsulenter om åbenhed og

kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Der bør etableres en rådgivningsenhed, hvor adopterede,

adoptivforældre og biologiske forældre til adopterede kan få

rådgivning i alle aspekter af en søgning, kontaktetablering

og genforening mellem adopterede og den oprindelige

slægt, f.eks.

Juridisk:

Hvilke rettigheder har parterne i adoptionstrekanten i

de involverede lande (oprindelsesland og

modtagerland, dvs. Danmark)? Hvis der er

modsatrettede interesser, hvilke rettigheder og

hvilke parters rettigheder vejer da tungere? Hvilke

regler er der m.h.t. søgning og kontaktetablering i

den adopteredes oprindelsesland? Krav om alder?

Krav om samtykke?

Socialt og kulturelt:

Er der særlige forhold, man skal tage i betragtning i

forbindelse med søgning af og kontaktetablering

medoprindelig slægt i det berørte land?

Politisk:

Er der bestemte politiske forhold, man skal tage

hensyn til, når man søger eller etablerer kontakt til

oprindelig slægt, f.eks. oprindelseslandets tidligere

eller nuværende familiepolitik eller generelle politiske

forhold, som kan have betydning for at finde og

genforenes med biologisk slægt, så som konflikter og

krig.

Psykologisk:

Rådgivning af adoptivforældre i betydningen af

kommunikativ åbenhed i familien om den

adopteredes behov for viden om og ønske om

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

kontakt med den oprindelige familie. Mental

forberedelse af den adopterede og evt.

adoptivforældrene til en søgning og

kontaktetablering. Motivafdækning,

forventningsafstemning, mental forberedelse på

forskellige scenarier og udfald af søgningen,

indføring i, hvordan man tager hensyn til de andre

parter i adoptionstrekanten, ikke mindst den

oprindelige familie, især hvis de lever i et kulturelt

anderledes samfund. Hvordan bearbejder man

(sammen) skuffelsen, hvis det ikke lykkes at finde

den familie, man søger?

Praktisk:

Hvordan kan man foretage en søgning, hvis de

nødvendige oplysninger ikke umiddelbart foreligger?

Hvilke typer af spor kan man følge? Hvor kan man få

hjælp? Hvordan undgår man at blive snydt af

forskellige aktører?

Brug af informationsteknologi og bioteknologi:

Der skal kunne rådgives i, hvordan man kan bruge

sociale medier til søgning og kommunikation efter

kontaktetablering, og ikke mindst i de faldgruber, det

rummer. Tilsvarende muligheder og risici ved brug af

gen-databaser.

Der skal endvidere kunne rådgives vedrørende

spørgsmålet om at gå et skridt videre end åbenhed,

kontaktetablering og genforening: midlertidig eller

permanent repatriering i oprindelseslandet.

Iværksættelse af forskning der

belyser åbenheds betydning for

den adopteredes trivsel og

livskvalitet.

https://ast.dk/publikationer/aben

hed-i-adoption

Forskning på området er helt generelt ikke tilstrækkelig. Vi

har i mange år hos Adoption & Samfund gjort opmærksom

på behovet, og det er da også blevet til lidt, men slet ikke

så dybdegående, som man kunne have ønsket sig.

Vi kunne især godt tænke os at følgende områder blev

bedre belyst:

Åbenhed i adoption er en relativt ny tendens, efter at man i

mange år har hyldet og værnet om anonymiteten inden for

adoptioner, og derfor er erfaringer med og forskning i

åbenhed også sparsom.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Da alt tyder på, at åbenhed

–

både på grund af

holdningsændring og forbedrede søgemuligheder

–

vil

komme til at præge adoptionslandskabet mere i fremtiden,

og lukkede adoptioner måske endda meget snart vil tilhøre

fortiden, er forskning i feltet både vigtigere og lettere end

tidligere. Der findes efterhånden trods alt en del adopterede

og adoptivfamilier, der har erfaring med søgning, kontakt og

genforening med oprindelig familie i mange forskellige

lande. Dette muliggør f.eks. en erfaringsdatabase også af

konkret, praktisk karakter gældende for forskellige lande

foruden de overordnede, generelle temaer især af

psykologisk art.

Adoption & Samfund kunne f.eks. ønske en kortlægning af

rettighederne i adoption, sådan som de gælder for de

forskellige parter i adoptionstrekanten og med hensyntagen

til både internationale konventioner og nationale

lovgivninger i de involverede lande.

Indsamling og formidling af viden

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie

understøttes, ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal

støttes.

Allerede eksisterende viden skal i

Adoption & Samfund foreslår, at der etableres et videns- og

spil og være tilgængelig på en

kompetencecenter for adoption, som skal stå for både

måde, som kan bringe den i

vidensindsamling/forskning og vidensformidling. Centrets

anvendelse hos de

arbejde skal derfor være en del af alle de fire

fagprofessionelle, som møder de

arbejdsområder inden for adoptionsforskning, der er

adopterede og deres familie.

skitseret i nærværende høring.

Adoption & Samfund har, da vi for mere end 10 år siden

foreslog, at der oprettes et videns- formidlings- og

kompetencecenter for adoption, beregnet, at det kan

etableres for forholdsvist få midler. I 2012 fremsatte

foreningen igen forslaget med grundige og

gennembearbejdede beregninger af de forventede årlige

omkostninger til drift mv. i lyset af de på daværende kendte

tal og prognoser for antallet af adoptioner til Danmark.

Det skønnes, at disse omkostninger, i det mindste i en

opbyggelsesperiode, kan være lavere end hidtidigt anslået,

da antallet af årlige adoptioner er siden faldet betydeligt,

men behovet for opfølgende aktiviteter vedrørende allerede

adopterede er til gengæld steget bl.a. inden for behovet for

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

bistand og rådgivning til søgning af biologisk ophav, og da

der forhåbentlig igen bliver større interesse og mulighed for

at adoptere et barn i Danmark.

Videns- og kompetencecentret skal ligeledes forestå

formidling af eksisterende viden til andre målgrupper end

fagprofessionelle, herunder også adopterede og

adoptivfamilier og den almene offentlighed.

Videns- og kompetencecentret skal have til opgave:

- At formidle viden og erfaring med alle

adoptionsrelaterede områder

At være ansvarlig i Danmark for den årlige

begivenhed ”Nordic Adoption Joy Week”, efter finsk

forbillede, hvor de nordiske lande en uge i marts

samarbejder om at udbrede det positive budskab om

adoption som en god familieform, bl.a. gennem sociale

medier mv.

At være overordnet ansvarlig for de

adoptionsforberedende kurser, der fremover planlægges,

gennemføres og udvikles i samarbejde med alle

interessenter på adoptionsområdet

At være overordnet ansvarlig for pre- og post

adoption services (samlet herefter betegnet PAS)

rådgivningen, der udvides yderligere til at være ”livsvarigt”,

idet adoption er en livslang proces, og PAS udbygges i takt

med at yderligere faglige og sociale erfaringer indhentes,

herunder erfaringer med og ønsker om grader af åbenhed i

adoption

At være ansvarlig for uddannelses- og

rådgivningstilbud til fagpersoner samt sikre, at der

stadighed er relevante og tidssvarende tilbud til

fagpersoner, der møder adopterede og adoptanter, samt

biologiske familier, der må forventes at få en stadig større

betydning for den adopterede og dennes familie i takt med

udvikling af nye kontaktmuligheder, sociale medier, gen-

banker, søgning efter rødder osv.

At være ansvarlig for det såkaldte ”tekniske PAS”,

der omhandler det at søge rødder: Opgaven og ansvaret

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

skal placeres her, så det ikke længere påhviler og bebyrder

DIA, der skal fokusere på formidlingsopgaven

At medvirke til udarbejdelse af

kommunikationsmaterialer og kampagner, der understøtter

tanken om adoption som en god familieform.

Vi har forsøgt at sætte videnscentrets opgaver ind under de

fem punkter vedrørende viden og forskning i denne

undersøgelse, skønt opgaverne efter vores opfattelse et tæt

forbundne.

Fokus på muligheden for at

iværksætte selvstændige

initiativer med henblik på at

understøtte den faglige

vidensopsamling, der i forvejen

sker.

Opsamling og udnyttelse af den viden, der opstår bl.a. i

PAS-systemet, men også decentralt i børne- og

uddannelsesinstitutioner samt i familier bør samles og

benyttes mere systematisk og aktivt, end det sker nu.

Videns- og kompetencecentret skal have til opgave at

indsamle og formidle viden og erfaring med alle

adoptionsrelaterede områder.

Videns- og kompetencecentret skal have til opgave:

At igangsætte relevante forskningsprojekter, gerne i

tæt samarbejde med VIVE, til belysning af hvordan det går

de adopterede, ikke mindst i sammenligning med

institutionaliserede børn og unge, uden reelle

tilfredsstillende kontakt til voksne, familie og andre

At søge fonds- og andre midler til at finansiere disse

tiltag.

At igangsætte forskningsprojekter og Ph.d.-opgaver

om adoption i samarbejde med relevante forsknings- og

uddannelsesinstitutioner eller uddelegering til disse.

Emner for forskningsprojekter:

- Åbenhed/lukkethed i adoption. Hvilke former for

åbenhed findes der de facto i de danske

adoptivfamilier? Hvilke konsekvenser har åbenhed

hhv. lukkethed i adoption for den adopteredes trivsel

og livskvalitet? Forske i forskellige former for og

grader af åbenhed og konsekvenserne af disse for

både den adopterede og de øvrige parter i

adoptionstrekanten. Erfaringer efter mødet med

biologisk familie: Hvilke konsekvenser har det, og

SFI skal have fokus på

adoptionsområdet og i den

forbindelse igangsætte relevante

undersøgelser og

vidensindsamling.

https://www.vive.dk/da/udgivelse

r/at-vokse-op-som-adopteret-i-

danmark-5678/

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

hvad sker der efterfølgende med

kontakten/relationen?

Sprogtilegnelse og dens betydning for den kognitive

udvikling. Herunder: har barnets oprindelige sprog

(sprogstamme), sproglige niveau og alder ved

adoption betydning for sprogtilegnelsen. Hvilken

rolle spiller det, om barnet får

modersmålsundervisning efter ankomst til Danmark

eller ej? Har barnets oprindelige sprog og

sprogskiftet betydning for udviklingen af f.eks.

dysleksi eller andre boglige eller indlæringsmæssige

vanskeligheder?

Rettigheder for parterne i adoptionstrekanten set i

tværnationalt perspektiv. Hvilke rettigheder findes

ifølge internationale konventioner og hvilke i

nationale lovgivninger? Hvilke rettigheder og hvilke

parters rettigheder har forrang for andre, hvis der er

konflikt?

I hvilket omfang møder internationalt adopterede i

Danmark racisme og etnisk stigmatisering i det

danske samfund, evt. i den udvidede familie, og

hvad betyder det for de adopteredes trivsel og

livskvalitet?

Barselsperioden i et adoptionsperspektiv

–

herunder

barselsregler for eneadoptanter.

Skærpet fokus på inden for de

eksisterende rammer at

dokumentere den viden, som

genereres gennem PAS-

ordningen, og som på anden

måde udvikles og indsamles i

forbindelse med administrationen

af området.

Videns- og kompetencecentret skal have til opgave:

At indsamle og formidle viden og erfaring med alle

adoptionsrelaterede områder

At sikre at faserne i godkendelsesprocessen til

stadighed evalueres og tilpasses i forhold til eksisterende

rammer og vilkår, og ikke mindst de faktuelle forhold i

oprindelseslandene, herunder ændringer i de lokale sociale

forhold og kulturelle forudsætninger

Indtast bidrag ift. pkt. 2 og 3

Oprettelse af en kontakt mellem

Ankestyrelsen og VISO for så vidt

angår international adoption.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

4. Kontakt til Ankestyrelsen

Hvis vores henvendelse giver anledning til spørgsmål kan I kontakte

Charlotte Karstenskov Mogensen eller Karin Rønnow Søndergaard på

Ankestyrelsens e-mail

[email protected]

eller hovedtelefonnummer 33 41 12 00

mandag til fredag klokken 9-15.

Hvis I har forslag til andre interesseorganisationer, der kan være relevant

at inddrage i processen, er I også velkomne til at kontakte os. Vi gør

opmærksom på, at Danish International Adoption, Adoptionsnævnet og

Familieretshuset allerede er inddraget i vores arbejde med undersøgelsen,

og vil også blive hørt i relation til evalueringen del 2.

Venlig hilsen

Karin Rønnow Søndergaard

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Midgårdsgade 15, 4th.

2200 København N

Telefon: 26744969

E-mail: [email protected]

København, d.4.11.2019

Indledende bemærkninger fra Adoptionspolitisk Forum til Ankestyrelsens undersøgelse og

evaluering af adoptionsreformen fra 2016

Adoptionspolitisk Forum vil indledningsvis understrege, at transnational adoption som internationalt

system skaber en økonomisk ikke-rentabel struktur, idet man ikke kan forhindre, at det nuværende

adoptionssystems økonomiske struktur skaber afhængighed på tværs af grænser.

Adoptionspolitisk Forum noterer sig, at Ankestyrelsens undersøgelse alene fokuserer på, hvorledes

adoptionsformidlingen i Danmark økonomisk kan oppebære sig selv og ikke ligge staten til byrde i form

at fordyrende omkostninger. Derfor forudser vi, at denne undersøgelse udmønter sig i en række

anbefalinger med henblik på besparelser, der på ingen måde grundlæggende ændrer ved eller sikrer

en retfærdig og uafhængig økonomi i adoptionssystemet.

Udtrykket “et bæredygtigt adoptionssystem” må derfor siges at være hult, eftersom adoption i sig selv

skaber forskellige former for afhængighed, der aldrig bliver bæredygtige, og fordi ankestyrelsen ikke

undersøger sig selv samt adoptionssystemets påvirkning uden for Danmark grænser. Derved kan man

fortsætte en udbytning af afgiverlande, i hvilke man som følge af økonomisk afhængighed stadig griber

til kriminelle handlinger i formidlingen af personer til adoption.

APF finder det i det hele taget upassende at brugen af begrebet “bæredygtigt” i forbindelse med et

system, der bygger på udveksling af mennesker og betydelige pengebeløb på tværs af grænser.

Vores kommentarer til Ankestyrelsens spørgsmål er derfor foretaget ud fra ovenstående fokus.

Adoptionspolitisk Forum påpeger fortsat at man fra statslig side bør arbejde på:

a) at fjerne af Haagerkonventionen som juridisk konvenstionsramme for al fremtidig

adoptionsarbejde

b) at afskaffe privatformidlende adoptionsorganisationer

c) at sikre et øget fokus på at forhindre forfalskninger af papirer, ulovligheder og økonomisk

afhængighed af adoptionsøkonomien i afgiverlandene.

Med venlig hilsen

Adoptionspolitisk Forum

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Se venligst kommentarerne fra Adoptionspolitisk Forum (i svarene APF)

Godkendelse af kommende adoptanter

Når kommende adoptanter godkendes, sker det med den hensigt at udvælge de bedst egnede adoptanter

af hensyn til barnet.

Fremadrettet skal benyttes en APF mener, det bør præciseres:

ny godkendelsesramme i form

a) Man skal ikke kunne adskille søskende efter adoptionen. De ældre

af én godkendelse, der

søskende bør i tilfælde af institutions-, plejefamilieanbringelse eller

rummer ældre børn og børn

andet ophold uden for hjemmet sikres en ret til jævnlig kontakt til øvrige

med flere behov.

søskende.

b) Adoptanter må ikke kunne foretage en prioritering i forhold til typer af

børn, hvor visse børn bliver anset som “sidste løsning”.

c) Det bør sikres, at adoptanter i valget af børn ikke foretager

prioriteringer, de egentlig ikke ønsker eller magter.

d) Det bør kræves, at adoptanter anerkender og opretholder den

adopteredes ret til egen historie før adoptionen og betragter

adoptionspapirer som den adopteredes ejendom.

Der skal fortsat være krav om

sammenhæng mellem

ansøgernes alder og barnets

alder.

Godkendelses- og

undersøgelsesforløbet skal

tilpasses, så det understøtter

en ny godkendelsesramme.

Ved søskendeadoption udregnes aldersvurderingen ud fra det yngste

barns alder.

Godkendelsesrammen skal indeholde:

a) en screening af racisme hos ansøgerne - herunder ubevidst/uerkendt

racisme

b) en undersøgelse af ansøgernes viden om håndtering af racisme,

herunder racisme i familie, skole og nære omgivelser.

Der skal være mulighed for at Det bør præciseres, hvad der menes med ”individuelle ressourcer”, og

iværksætte en nærmere

hvorledes de kan få betydning for adoptionsprocessen.

undersøgelse af de

individuelle ressourcer

allerede i

godkendelsesforløbets første

fase.

Støtte til adoptivfamilien

Den rådgivning og støtte adoptivfamilien tilbydes før og efter, at barnet kommer til Danmark skal afspejle

formidlingsbilledet og de krav der stilles til adoptanterne, samt de behov adoptivfamilien har.

Obligatorisk PAS-rådgivning

APF ønsker, at den obligatoriske PAS-ordning er rettet mod og følger den

lige før og efter, at barnet

adopterede, og at den skal kunne tilbydes i hele den adopteredes liv.

kommer til Danmark, i et øget

På baggrund af kendskabet til den eksisterende PAS-rådgivning ønsker

omfang.

APF at understrege, at de udvalgte PAS-rådgivere udtrykkeligt bliver

instrueret i:

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

a) ikke at sygeliggøre den adopteredes normale emotionelle reaktioner

på adoptionen

b) at have et øget fokus på sorgbearbejdelse og chokreaktioner hos den

adopterede og mindre på ad hoc-diagnoser

c) at PAS-rådgivningen også omfatter rådgivning om racisme og

diskriminationshåndtering.

Temaaftener med PAS-

konsulenter og adoptanter for

kommende adoptanter.

APF ønsker, at de udvalgte PAS-konsulenter skal:

a) være trænet i at rådgive om håndtering af racisme generelt samt i den

nære familie og nære omgivelser

b) kende til nyeste dansksprogede forskning om adoption og racisme

c) kunne håndtere adoptanters forventninger versus den adopteredes ret

til egen historie og identitet.

APF foreslår derudover, at de planlagte temaaftener kan afholdes af

andre end PAS-konsulenterne, f.eks. af personer, der repræsenterer

specialviden inden for adoptionsrelaterede områder.

Obligatoriske landemøder i

organisationerne, som

kommende adoptanter skal

deltage i som en fortsat

forberedelse på adoptionen,

mens de venter på at blive

matchet med et barn.

Omlægning af eksisterende

PAS-rådgivning for at sikre

adgang til rådgivning frem til

den adopterede fylder 18 år,

hvor der vil skulle være et

stigende fokus på rådgivning

til den adopterede selv i takt

med dennes alder.

PAS-rådgivningen kan

fremover rumme spørgsmål

om åbenhed og kontakt med

oprindelig slægt.

Forsøgsprojekt med PAS-

rådgivning til voksne

adopterede med en

efterfølgende politisk

drøftelse som opfølgning på

forsøget.

APF ønsker, at adoptanterne bliver pålagt obligatoriske møder med

organisationer for adopterede - f.eks. alle modtagere af invitationen til

dette høringssvar.

Evt. landemøder bør afholdes og faciliteres af en uvildig enhed, der ikke

har en politisk agenda i forhold til adoptionsområdet.

Der bør ikke være en økonomisk eller politisk interesse i at afholde

landemøder.

APF ønsker (jf. ovenfor):

a) adgang for den adopterede til selvstændig og uafhængig PAS-

rådgivning fra det 12. år og resten af livet

b) at den adopterede skal have mulighed for selv at vælge PAS-rådgiver/-

forløb i form af en økonomisk tildelingsordning, hvor bevillingen følger

den adopterede.

APF finder det afgørende, at de udpegede PAS-rådgivere skal kunne

håndtere spørgsmål om åbenhed og kontakt til oprindelig familie i den

adopteredes interesse.

Se ovenfor.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Åbenhed og adoption

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie understøttes,

ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal støttes.

Krav om at organisationer og

APF mener:

myndigheder løbende har

Der skal være krav om, at afgivende og modtagende

fokus på at sikre

adoptionsformidlende organisationer samt myndigheder i afgiver- og

tilgængeligheden af

modtagerland løbende sikrer validiteten af og tilgængeligheden af

oplysninger om den

oplysninger om den adopteredes baggrund - herunder den udvidede

adopteredes baggrund,

familie med kontaktoplysninger - dokumenteret samtykke om adoption,

børnehjem m.v.

oplysninger fra børnehjem m.m.

Krav om fokus på at sikre

slægten viden om barnets

opvækst gennem

opfølgningsrapporter, i det

omfang der er ønske om

denne viden, og i det omfang

den kan videregives i

overensstemmelse med

oprindelseslandets regler.

Indskærpelse af den moralske

og aftaleretlige forpligtigelse

til som adoptant at udarbejde

opfølgningsrapporter.

APF mener:

a) Der skal være krav om, at den adopterede sikres kontakt med den

oprindelige udvidede familie, og at denne kontakt formidles gennem en

uafhængig organisation, der får overdraget ansvaret for sikring af

kontakten.

b) Der skal være krav om, at adoptanter sikrer, at den adopterede kan

fastholde oprindelig kultur gennem hjemrejse samt gennem sprog- og

kulturundervisning.

APF gør opmærksom på, at spørgsmålet om opfølgningsrapporter ikke

er uproblematisk, eftersom:

a) der er ikke tillid til, at håndteringen af rapporterne foregår gennem de

korrekte instanser

b) de ikke er garant for ægtheden af den oprindelige familie

c) der kan være tvivl om, at kommunikationsformen er den optimale og

opfylder sit formål

d) opfølgningsrapporter ikke opfylder deres oprindelige formål.

Opfølgningsrapporter bør i stedet erstattes med:

a) en alderssvarende undervisning af den adopterede i oprindelig sprog

og kultur

b) kontaktmuligheder der tilgodeser den adopteredes behov og alder.

Temaaftener med PAS-

konsulenter om åbenhed og

kontakt med oprindelig slægt.

Iværksættelse af forskning der

belyser åbenheds betydning

for den adopteredes trivsel og

livskvalitet.

https://ast.dk/publikationer/a

benhed-i-adoption

Temaaftener om åbenhed i adoption bør have en bred repræsentation

af viden om og erfaring med adoption - meget gerne repræsentation af

den oprindelige familie.

APF ønsker at understrege:

a) at det skal være et krav, at forskningen er uvildig uden støtte fra eller

medvirken af private eller statslige aktører i adoptionssystemet

b) at bevillingerne af forskningsmidler skal gå til projekter, der inddrager

forskere fra flere fagområder

c) at der i første omgang prioriteres en grundlæggende undersøgelse af

spørgsmålet om åbenhed i adoption og følgerne for den adopterede.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Indsamling og formidling af viden

I forhold til spørgsmålet om åbenhed og adoption skal den adopteredes ret til egen historie understøttes,

ligesom den oprindelige slægts adgang til orientering om barnets opvækst skal støttes.

Allerede eksisterende viden

APF vil understrege vigtigheden af:

skal i spil og være tilgængelig

a) at den formidlede viden er bredt fagligt funderet og både inddrager

på en måde, som kan bringe

dansk og international indsamlet viden

den i anvendelse hos de

b) at indsamlingen af viden inddrager adopteredes egne vidnesbyrd og

fagprofessionelle, som møder

de adopterede og deres familie. oplevelser såvel som den sum af erfaringer og viden, der indhentes på

organisations- og aktivistniveau, og som formidles gennem

adopteredes egne organisationer.

Fokus på muligheden for at

iværksætte selvstændige

initiativer med henblik på at

understøtte den faglige

vidensopsamling, der i forvejen

sker.

Der bør være fokus på at understøtte initiativer, der er bredt

funderede og indsamler viden på mange niveauer om adoption og

adopterede. Dette indbefatter bl.a.:

a) voksne adopteredes oplevelser med racisme og forskelsbehandling i

sociale og professionelle sammenhænge (f.eks. job/arbejdsløshed og

karriere)

b) ældre adopteredes erfaringer og levevilkår i arbejdslivet og som

pensionister

c) tilbundsgående undersøgelser på tværs af lande om brud på

rettigheder og ulovligheder i adoptionssystemet fra f.eks. Grønland,

Tyskland, Bangladesh, Korea osv.

SFI skal have fokus på

adoptionsområdet og i den

forbindelse igangsætte

relevante undersøgelser og

vidensindsamling.

https://www.vive.dk/da/udgive

lser/at-vokse-op-som-

adopteret-i-danmark-5678/

Skærpet fokus på inden for de

eksisterende rammer at

dokumentere den viden, som

genereres gennem PAS-

ordningen, og som på anden

måde udvikles og indsamles i

forbindelse med

administrationen af området.

Oprettelse af en kontakt

mellem Ankestyrelsen og VISO

for så vidt angår international

adoption.

APF henviser til kommentaren under “Åbenhed og adoption” pkt. 5.

APF finder det derudover ikke betimeligt at udpege en bestemt aktør

til foretagelse af undersøgelser om indsamling af viden om

adoptionsområdet.

APF ønsker, at der kommer skærpet fokus på at dokumentere den

viden, som genereres gennem hele adoptionsprocessen.

Dette indbefatter indsamling af oplysninger om forfalskede papirer og

oplysninger om den adopterede (navn, alder, familieforhold m.m.).

I tillæg hertil anbefaler APF, at der oprettes en dansk klageinstans for

adopterede til udpegelse af juridisk ansvar for uregelmæssigheder og

ulovligheder.

IAB - så længe det ikke omhandler en øget sygeliggørelse af den

adopterede.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

På vegne af Adoptionstrekanten takker jeg hermed for det tilsendte Høringsmateriale. Vi ser det

som en positiv udvikling, at der siden 2014 er sket en gradvis nedgang af antallet af internationale

adoptioner ligesom antallet af godkendte ansøgere er faldet markant, for det betyder jo, at langt

færre familier bliver splittet ad. Vi erkender, at adoption i enkelte tilfælde kan være den rette

beslutning til barnets bedste, men dette skal være absolut sidste udvej, som det jo også hedder sig i

Haagerkonventionen. Det må være klart for enhver, at børn tager varig skade af, at blive unødigt

skilt fra sin familie, og vi mener derfor, at det nære familiebånd i langt højere grad skal værnes om,

bevares og respekteres.

Vi kan forstå, at der er store økonomiske udfordringer med den fortsatte adoptionsformidling, og at

det er anledning til denne undersøgelse. Vi finder det dog langt vigtigere at sikre, at alt foregår på et

etisk og juridisk forsvarligt grundlag med samme respekt for alle tre parter i adoptionstrekanten.

Etik og legalitet bliver gentagne omtalt i kommissoriet, men der er nu ikke meget, der tyder på, at

dette bliver overholdt. Eksempelvis bliver det fremhævet, at Ankestyrelsen skal godkende af alle

matchningsforslag som et centralt element i en øget styring af området fra myndighedernes side.

Dette bliver omtalt som en meget væsentlig kilde til viden om adoptionsforløbene og dermed til at

sikre legaliteten i adoptionerne. Det siger jo intet som helst om, hvorvidt det drejer sig om stjålne,

kidnappede eller franarrede børn, eller hvordan vi sikrer os mod dette.

Der står endvidere, at ”undersøgelsen har ikke til hensigt at undersøge årsagen til udviklingen, men

retter sig imod, hvordan konsekvenserne af udviklingen kan håndteres” Der kan dog ikke ske

fremskridt, hvis der ikke bliver stillet spørgsmålstegn til selve fundamentet. Danmark bliver endda

fremhævet som foregangsland, når det kommer til legalt og etisk forsvarlige adoptioner. Der er dog

langt igen, for at vi kan leve op til disse ord. Hermed nogle vigtige punkter til forbedring:

1. I høringen omtales gentagne gange tryghed og sikkerhed for nuværende og kommende ansøgere,

men ikke en eneste gang omtales der tryghed og sikkerhed for børnenes oprindelige familier, Dette

må prioriteres mindst lige så højt. Man bør sikre sig, at alle familier har haft mulighed for at træffe

et indformeret valg.

2. Alle adoptioner bør fremover så vidt muligt være åbne således, at familiebåndet bevares,

vedligeholdes og respekteres.

3. Så nær kontakt som muligt bevares. Dette kan gøres gennem brevveksling, udveksling af fotos,

gaveudveksling og besøg, når det er muligt.

4. Man bør sikre, at alle familier får de pligtige opfølgningsrapporter direkte tilsendt oversat til

deres eget sprog samt en kopi til formidlingsbureauet.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

5. Ligesom der stilles rådgivning til rådighed for nuværende og kommende adoptanter, bør der

sikres rådgivning og livslang krisehjælp til rådighed for de familier, der har mistet eller er i fare for

at miste deres børn til adoption.

6. Ligesom der bliver lavet spørgeskemaundersøgelser til adoptanterne, skal der også laves

spørgeskemaundersøgelser til de oprindelige familier, således at man sikrer sig, at de er helt trygge,

føler sig hørt og respekterede, og at alt er foregået på et etisk og juridisk korrekt grundlag.

7. Barnets ret til en familie. I bilag 2 under kommissoriet står bl.a. ”Akkrediteringen skal bygges

op omkring et fokus på organisationernes evne til at varetage barnets interesser og prioritere barnets

bedste i arbejdet med barnets ret til en familie .”

Det er almindeligt kendt, at omkring 95 % af de børn, der får prædikatet forældreløse faktisk har

mindst 1 levende forælder. Hvis vi skal leve op til en standart som foregangsland for etisk og

juridisk korrekte adoptioner, er vi nødt til at sikre os, at børn, der har en funktionel familie ikke

bliver adopteret bort.

6. Alle adopterede og deres oprindelige familier skal om ønsket have den nødvendige hjælp og

støtte til at finde hinanden og genoptage kontakten

7. Ingen samarbejde med lande, der ikke er tilsluttet Haagerkonventionen.

8. Ingen samarbejde med lande, som ikke kan tilgodese etisk og juridisk forsvarlige adoptioner

9. Ingen samarbejde med lande som nægter, at de oprindelige familier får opfølgnings-rapporter.

10. I kommissoriet bliver det pointeret, at økonomi må ikke påvirke adoptionsformidling og at

adoption må ikke ske med profit for øjet. Men i andre afsnit bliver det beskrevet hvor mange mio.

den danske stat yder til international adoptionsformidling: Der er til den samlede aftale om et

fremtidigt adoptionssystem afsat 14,4 mio. kr. i 2015, 13,2 mio. kr. i 2016, 11,5 mio. kr. i 2017 og

herefter 8,5 mio. kr. årligt fra 2018 og frem. Grundet et fortsat underskud hos DIA, er der

bevilliget sats-puljemidler til dette. I november 2018 blev der bevilget midler til at understøtte

DIA’s drift i 2019 og 2020 samt iværksætte en undersøgelse Der er for 2019 afsat 0,3 millioner for

at understøtte den nuværende formidling, 1,8 mio. kr. Til understøttelse af Dia, samt 1 mio. kr. til

denne undersøgelse

Der er rigtig mange penge på spil her, alt sammen for at formidle relativt få børn, mange mennesker

bliver aflønnet i dette system, mens det er ikke på nogen måde er godtgjort, at det er til børnenes

bedste – tværtimod. Som vi ved, har et stort antal adopterede meget store udfordringer i livet

sammenlignet med den øvrige befolkning. Hvis vi gjorde en reel indsats for, at disse børn kunne

blive i deres egne familier, ville vi kunne spare rigtig mange penge både til adoptionsformidling og

til livslang PAS-rådgivning til de adopterede samt PAS-rådgivning til adoptiv-familierne i 18 år.

Hvis man reelt ønsker børnenes bedste, så skulle vi i langt højere grad yde bistand til, at børn kunne

blive i deres egne familier. Pengene ville kunne gøre langt større gavn ved, at de blev brugt som

hjælp til, at de udsatte familier kunne beholde deres egne børn, og mange lidelser kunne undgås.

Uanset hvor veluddannede adoptivfamilierne bliver og uanset hvor meget psykologbistand, der

bevilliges kan dette aldrig erstatte den tryghed og sikkerhed, det er for et barn at vokse op i og være

omgivet af sin egen familie i sit eget land. Der er postet rigeligt med penge i formidling af børn til

danske familier, hvis man fremadrettet sørger for at kun reelt forældreløse børn og børn uden anden

familie der kan tage sig af dem, bliver tilbudt en ny familie, vil der ske en yderligere reduktion af

adoptioner og dermed en yderligere besparelse.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Tilbage i 2013 søgte jeg om satspulje midler til støtte for et projekt der skulle være til gavn for de

ca. 10.000 danske familier, der har mistet børn til adoption. Min ansøgning blev afvist. Der gives

heller ingen hjælp til de familier fra andre lande, som har mistet børn til adoption, end ikke de, som

er blevet franarret deres børn til danske familier. Der ydes fortsat kun hjælp og støtte til de, der

modtager andre folks børn, mens de, der mister deres børn til adoption såvel her i landet som i de

lande, vi adopterer børn fra, er ladt fuldstændig i stikken. Det kan vi ikke være bekendt.

Det er helt rimeligt, at der ydes den nødvendige hjælp til adoptivfamilier, og som det bliver

pointeret, at de får den samme hjælp som den øvrige befolkning, dette ligestillingsprincip mangler

dog at blive overholdt i forhold til de familier, der har mistet eller er i fare for at miste børn til

adoption jævnfør punkt 5. og 6

Som sagt anerkender vi, at der kan være enkelte børn, som reelt har brug for en ny familie, men vi

er nødt til at sikre os, at det er de rette børn, der får dette tilbud. Det er menneske-skæbner, vi

arbejder med. Alt for mange lider og har lidt under dette systems fejl livet igennem. Det er vi nødt

til at få rettet op på.

Den danske statsminister Mette Frederiksen har for nylig givet en undskyldning til Godhavns-

drengene godt nok 50 år senere end, overgrebene fandt sted, de for længst voksne børn fra det

grønlandske eksperiment bliver de næste, der får en undskyldning. I 2013 gav Prime Minister Julia

Gillard Australien en officiel undskyldning til de mange ofre for tvangs-adoptioner. Der sker en

udvikling, men vi er mange der synes, det går alt for langsomt, mon vi skal vente yderligere 50 år

på at få en undskyldning for de mange børn, som under det nuværende systems fejl og er blevet

frarøvet et liv i deres egen familie, og de familier der unødigt har mistet deres børn til adoption?

Set i lyset af de senere års udvikling må vi nok gøre os klart, at international adoption over de

kommende år vil blive mere eller mindre afviklet og med tiden afløst at et nyt tidsvarende system,

der bygger på medmenneskelighed frem for profit og udnyttelse af de svageste borgere. Det ser vi

frem til. Et samfund skal kendes på den måde det behandler sine svageste borgere.

Med kærlig hilsen

Aniella Bonnichsen

Adoptionstrekanten

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Foreningen for bedsteforældre og øvrig familie til anbragte

børn

www.bedsteforeningen.dk

eller

www.facebook.com/bedsteforeningen

Aarhus 3. november 2019

Til Ankestyrelsen!

Høringssvar angående ny undersøgelse af mulighederne for et nyt adoptionssystem og

evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016

Bedsteforeningen her i Aarhus har igennem et par år arbejdet med emnet adoption uden

samtykke, vi får udelukkende henvendelser fra bedstemødre der oplever at deres voksne børn får

tvangsfjernet nyfødte til tvangsbortadoption. Adoptionsreformen er af afgørende betydning for de

her forældre og bedsteforældre. Der kom nogle lempelser i 2015/16, som gjorde det lettere at

adoptere et barn uden samtykke. Man skal blot godkendes som plejeforældre for at adopter et

barn uden samtykke.

Det er dog glædeligt at internationale adoptioner er faldet historisk lavt, det er glædeligt at man

måske er begyndt at bruge prævention i udviklingslandene, samt at man er ved at få så god en

økonomi, at man selv kan forsørge sine børn globalt set. Det kan jo betyde at man kan begynde at

udfase internationale adoptioner, og på den måde nedlægge den adoptionsformidlende Dias, den

vil jo blive overflødiggjort eftersom, der bliver mindre efterspørgsel på udenlandske børn

efterhånden, som der kommer mere velstand på globalt plan. Men det har været til stor

bekymring for os, der arbejder frivilligt på anbringelses området, at der er blevet

tvangsbortadopteret 21 børn i 2017. Tallet for 2018 kendes ikke. Tallet er mørke lagt,

kommunerne har tvangsfjernet et par hundrede nyfødte/ufødte til tvangsbortadoption 2018/19,

en kommunen alene ca. 50 ufødte/nyfødte, nogle kommuner har oprettet familie teams, der

tvangsfjerner nyfødte omkring 2 måneders alderen. Man stresser forældrene/enlig mødre og

barn. Begrundelse er manglende mentalisering og øjenkontakt. Amningen bliver ødelagt bevidst

og barnet taber sig.

Med hensyn til internationale nationale adoptioner er det også kommet frem i Sporløs, at mange

af di internationale adoptioner ikke er på frivilligt basis. Vi er betænkelige ved at Dan Adopt er

blevet til DIA, sammen med AC Børnehjælp. Det er jo kommet frem i medierne at Dan Adopt har

været indblandet i tyveri af nyfødte i Afrika og Indien. Vi i Bedsteforeningen, der får henvendelser

fra bedstemødre, der skal have tvangsfjernet ufødte/nyfødte børn bliver urolig, når økonomien

har betydnings for DIA, s økonomi og bæredygtighed.

En anden vig ting, Vi vil gerne at der står Ankestyrelsens hjemme side, hvor mange ufødte/nyfødte

der bliver tvangsfjernet om året. Hvor mange der officielt står på venteliste til at

adopter/plejefamilie til nyfødte børn. Samt at der står helt præcist, hvor mange børn der er

adopteret uden samtykke, så vidt jeg kan se, er tallet blandet sammen med anonyme adoptioner.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Foreningen for bedsteforældre og øvrig familie til anbragte

børn

Man kan jo bortadopter sit barn væk frivilligt. Hvor mange gør det, samt har adoptionsnævnet

taget stilling til at der frivilligt. Det er glædeligt at Adoptionsnævnet er strenge, det ville være

ønskeligt, hvis plejefamilier til børn under 3 år også bliver lagt under adoptions nævnet, og

underlagt de samme regler som adoptanter.

Det er yderst bekymrende at læse (landsmøde

18 og årsberetning 2018 adoptionsnævnet). At

det er blevet lettere at adopter et barn på det Grå marked Polen eks.

Vi har desværre stor

erfaring for at dem, som bliver afvist til at adoption, forholds vist let kan adopter et tvangsfjernet

barn på gråt papir, via kommunerne. Man skal blot være pleje forældre, det er meget let at blive

godkendt til plejeforældre, kommunerne har svært ved at rekrutter plejeforældre, så de er

rimeligt desperate.

På side 22-23 i Adoptions nævnets Årsberetning: afslag på godkendelse som

adoptant fra 24 % -37 % i perioden 2014-2017.

Når vi mener de barnløse plejefamilier adopter tvangsfjernede nyfødte på gråt papir, er det fordi

at forældrene til de tvangsfjernede børn ikke er mental retederet men ordblinde, de kan ikke

bestå intelligens test, da de ikke kan læse. De beskikkede advokater har ikke tid til at sætte sig ind i

sagerne. I mange af sagerne er borgerne på overførsels indkomst, det har ikke betydning, at den

ene forældre har fast arbejde og aldrig har været i systemet. Man går ind og ser på

bedsteforældrenes liv og barndom i de her sager, selv om bedsteforældrene ikke er part i sagen.

Hele familien er i kommunens søgelys. Kommuner overholder ikke loven om netværkspleje i de

her sager, familien ofte bedsteforældre, får afslag på netværkspleje og familie adoption. Det

betyder at forældre/bedsteforældre er retsløse i de her sager, forældrene får ikke altid , et officielt

dokument på at deres børn er bortadopteret. Ingen kender det præcise tal, det tal vi har på

adoption uden samtykke passer ikke med Ankestyrelsens tal. Det er mere reglen end undtagelsen,

at kommunerne ikke overholder Forældrenes retssikkerhed. Vi vil anbefale at tvangsbortadoption

bliver gjort ulovligt. Der er ikke grundlag for at tvangsbortadopter børn i Danmark, da samfundet

yder økonomisk støtte til fattige i Danmark, gode uddannelses muligheder, skoler, daginstitutioner

i Danmark. Vi vil gøre opmærksom på at ansøger til nationale adoptioner også falder, på grund af

bedre fertilitetsbehandling. Mange barnløse vil i øvrigt også hellere gøre brug af ruge mor, der er

barnløse der tager til udlandet for at bruge rugemor. I Danmark vil man helst have sine egne børn,

de fleste får også kun to børn i Danmark, så føles det urimeligt at myndighederne bestemmer,

hvem der skal være forældre, og ikke giver borgerne en chance for at danne familie. Det handler

ikke om barnets tarv, det er et yderst misbrugt ord i anbringelses og adoptions regi. Det kan også

retfærdiggør at systemet ødelægger børn og voksne få at få ret.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Foreningen for bedsteforældre og øvrig familie til anbragte

børn

I følge rapporten august 2018 Adoption uden samtykke side 27. Er nogle plejefamilier heller ikke

interesseret i at adopter på grund at plejefamilien vil miste støtte og plejevederlag fra

kommunen.

Tvangsbortadoption af børn til plejefamilie er en overtrædelse af alle konventioner, som Danmark

har forpligtet sig til. Da Danmark har skrevet under på EU grundloven. at de overhold forpligtelser

i henhold til mennesket rettighederne. Vi henviser til Lobben dommen fra Norge her i september

måned, EU menneske rettigheder artikel 8, alle har ret til familie, man ikke må adskille familie.

Tvangsbortadoption af børn er også en overtrædelse af grundloven, samt i henhold til alle

konventioner, Haag og FN. Der udover er det også en overtrædelse af børns rettigheder i henhold

til børnekonventionen der giver dem beskyttelse, i ikke at blive brugt som en handelsvare.

Danmark er et rigt land og skal løft opgaven til at i værk sætte hjælp til de børnefamilie, der har

det svært i samfundet. Således at det kan komme børn og forældre til gode. Det er ikke meningen

som der nu, hvor samfundet gør det svært at være familie.

Den nuværende lov giver ikke familien beskyttelse af deres rettigheder. Men derimod sker der

over greb i form af fysiske og psykiske totur. Både på børn og forældre. Mange af de berørte

familier får P.TS.D. som ikke bliver behandlet i form af psykologhjælp, da systemet ikke yder gratis

psykologhjælp i forbindelse med tvangsfjernelse og tvangsbortadoption. Det er kun plejefamilier

der kan få gratis psykologhjælp. Men i stedet burde man sætte målrettet ind, med støtte

foranstaltninger i sted for tvangsfjernelser og tvangsbortadoption. Den hjælp der målrettet sættes

ind tilgodeses både børn og forældre. Tvangsbortadoption har store menneskelige omkostninger

for den enkelte familier, som bliver ramt. Familierne bliver kørt ud over kanten, i den sidste ende

kan det medføre døden for nogle forældre, der er flere der har taget deres eget liv eller er døde af

stress.

De forældre og bedsteforældre vi er i kontakt med gerne vil samarbejde med kommunen. De har

gentagne gange bedt om forældre undervisning, støtte og vejledning i hjemmet, men det er blevet

afvist gang på gang af kommunerne.

Vi vil gøre opmærksom på side 24, i Adoptionsnævnets årsberetning 2018: En nylig rapport, der

er udarbejdet af det nationale forsknings og analyse center for velfærd, viser bland andet, at der

blandt adoptivbørn er 7 % der anbringes uden for hjemmet, mens der for ikke adopteret er 5 %.

Her udover har op mod 18 % af de adopteret været i kontakt med psykiatrien, hvorimod tallet

for ikke adopteret er 9 %.

Det er jo tegn på at internationale adoptioner skal udfases og adoption uden samtykke skal

stoppes. Der er jo mulighed for frivillig adoption, selv om gratis tilbud om

svangerskabsforebyggelse og klinikker hvor kvinder kan henvende sig anonymt vil være det mest

optimale. Her op weekenden 1,2 november 2019, har Ankestyrelsen meldt ud at kommunerne har

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Foreningen for bedsteforældre og øvrig familie til anbragte

børn

lavet fejl i mere end 50 % af sagerne. Både danske og udenlandske undersøgelser viser at

tvangsfjernelse er skadeligt for børn, nyfødte får svære tilknytnings forstyrrelser. Større børn får

også tilknytningsforstyrrelser, men de er i loyalitets konflikt mellem kommune/plejefamilie og

forældre. De føler sig ofte svigtet af forældrene, fordi at forældrene ikke har kunnet beskytte dem

i od de ”gode e eskers i te tio er i ko

u e ”. Det skal være svære at ku e tva gsfjer e

børn. Kommunen skal kunne dokumenter at forældrene er til skade for barnet. De børn der er

skadet, tager ikke skade af at vente med anbringelsen. Men de børn der har trygge og kærlige

hjem, får psykiske skader af de brutale tvangsfjernelsesmetoder, med politi o.sv. Underetninger

skal ikke være anonyme, det skal være med Nem ide og cpr. Tvangsfjernelse og adoption uden

samtykke er et stor indgreb i menneskers liv. Man må stå ved sine underretninger og handlinger. V

i foreslår også at alle personer på området får autorisation, og kan retsforfølges, når de laver

fiktive sager underretninger. For det er i virkeligheden på bekostninger af de familier ,som har

brug for anbringelse. De er glade for anbringelsen, har et godt samarbejde med kommunen, derfor

blander de sig ikke i debatten.

Kilder:

Ankestyrelsens hjemmeside:

Adoptionsnævnet landsmøde 2018

Adoptionsnævnet: Årsberetning 2018

Rapport :August 2018 Adoption uden samtykke, kommunernes brug af og kendskab til reglerne og

mulighederne for råd og vejledning

På bedsteforeningens Aarhus, vegne

Heidi Christensen

Dorte Bøgeskov

Gitte Christensen

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Ankestyrelsen

7998 Statsservice

[email protected]

att.: Charlotte Karstenskov Mogensen og Karin Rønnow Søndergaard

5. november 2019

Vedrørende jeres J.nr. 18-39833, 19-16282: Høringsrunde angående ændringer i adoptionsloven –

internationale adoptioner

Til trods for at Ankestyrelsen ikke har henvendt sig til ”Foreningen for bedsteforældre og øvrig familie til

anbragte børn” - i daglig tale blot kaldet ”Bedsteforeningen” - så finder vi det alligevel påkrævet, at vi giver

vort bidrag. Internationale adoptioner og nationale adoptioner har så mange beslægtede træk og stadig

flere og flere tvangsfjernelser i Danmark ender ud i en tvangsbortadoption.

Et etiopisk søskendepar i førskolealderen blev i 2008 bortadopteret til et dansk barnløst par.

Dette adoptionsforløb blev fulgt tæt af et dokumentar-hold fra DR, og pågældende dokumentar blev vist i

2012. Sagen tog dog undervejs en helt ukendt drejning på flere fronter: adoptivforældrene endte med at

anbringe den ældste, pigen Masho, på et børnehjem i Danmark, da de ikke magtede hende i det lange løb.

Det viste sig også, at børnene var nogle år ældre end det danske par havde fået oplyst. Endvidere var det

etiopiske forældrepar ikke døende, som man ellers havde fået at vide. De var godt nok fattige og havde HIV

men medicin hjalp dem til at få et normalt liv. De biologiske forældre havde fået oplyst af de etiopiske

myndigheder, at de stadig ville kunne have kontakt med børnene og få løbende underretninger om,

hvordan det gik med dem. Begge dele var usandt.

Mediernes søgelys var også rettet mod sagen om Amy Steen, som ligeledes var adopteret fra Etiopien.

Hun trivedes heller ikke med sine adoptivforældre, men kom så i en plejefamilie, hvor det gik langt bedre.

Men adoptivforældre og kommune ville have hende på en institution i stedet og det ville hun absolut ikke.

Begge ovenstående sager var massivt dækket af mange medier. Også politisk kom der fokus på

adoptionsområdet. Etiopien og andre 3. verdens lande lukkede mere eller mindre ned for bortadoption til

Danmark, da sagsbehandlingen på området viste sig at være bundkorrupt. Danmark begrænsede ligeledes

sin tidligere interesse for adoptivbørn fra disse lande. Begge de to pigers adoption blev senere omstødt af

hjemlandet i 2016.

Så vidt vides befinder Masho sig dog stadig på en dansk døgninstitution, da hendes

biologiske forældre stiller sig ambivalente i forhold til at få hende hjem.

Kort efter – i Danmark – blev lovgivningen omkring adoptioner af danske børn også ændret. Det blev nu

langt lettere for de sociale myndigheder at indstille til tvangsbortadoption af et barn, som tidligere ”blot”

ville have været anbragt udenfor hjemmet barndommen ud, men stadig med kontakt til sin oprindelige

familie. Hvor myndighederne førhen havde skullet ”godtgøre”, når de vurderede manglende

omsorgskompetence hos de biologiske forældre, så skulle de fremadrettet blot ”sandsynliggøre”.

Muligheden for at blive adopteret som voksen af fx plejeforældre var og er stadig til stede og havde været

https://www.bt.dk/udland/husker-du-dokumentaren-om-masho-nu-har-sagen-taget-en-dramatisk-drejning

Side

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

fuldt tilstrækkelig, såfremt det drejede sig om tilknytning til omsorgsperson under opvæksten og

fremadrettet.

Mange var betænkelige, da loven trådte i kraft i sommeren 2015 og med rette: man må konstatere, at

kommunerne i stadigt større udstrækning bruger muligheden for tvangsbortadoption som en spare-øvelse

og som substitut i stedet for en ordinær anbringelse.

Tvangsfjernelsesområdet i Danmark trænger i forvejen til et stort ”service-eftersyn”, da det kniber

gevaldigt med overholdelse af borgernes retssikkerhed; og der menes i denne forbindelse ikke ubetydelige

”kommafejl”. Både borgerrådgiveren i København samt Rigsrevisionen har udtalt omfattende og alvorlig

kritik i offentligheden. Det er derfor yderst kritisabelt at øge myndighedernes beføjelser relateret til

tvangsbortadoptioner, når man end ikke overholder den gældende lovgivning for anbringelser.

Her følger – i spontan rækkefølge – en række udvalgte eksempler på fejl og mangler i de aktuelle

tvangsfjernelsessager – det skal bemærkes, at listen ikke er udtømmende:

1. Notatpligt overholdes ikke: 1. Sagsbehandler skriver ikke, hvad borger oplyser, når oplysningen

er til fordel for pågældende. 2. Sagsbehandler skriver gerne og overdriver til det uigenkendelige,

hvis borgers oplysning kan opfattes som belastende for pågældendes sag. 3. Sagsbehandler

fordrejer borgers oplysninger ved fx at tage en sætning ud af kontekst, så denne får en helt

anden og negativ betydning for borgeren og dennes sag. Det skal bemærkes, at det er noget

nær umuligt at få slettet sådanne forkerte og skadelige oplysninger i en sag uanset om man har

omfattende dokumentation for det modsatte. Det skal ligeledes oplyses, at såfremt man får

kendskab til muligheden for at sende sin indsigelse og gør det, så bruger myndighederne det

ikke. Indsigelse mod et eller flere sagsakter ligger ofte langt fra det dokument, det vedrører, når

sagen fx behandles i Børn og Unge udvalget. Det kræver således et større arbejde for 3. part at få

”parret” indsigelser med de pågældende sagsdokumenter og oftest sker dette ikke. Hvis

indsigelse altså overhovedet udleveres til udvalget.

2. Berigtigelsesanmodninger og indsigelser ignoreres eller afvises altså i massivt omfang jf.

ovenstående. Det skal bemærkes, at Datatilsynet yderst sjældent er til nogen hjælp for borgerne

i dén forbindelse.

3. Formandsbeslutninger træffes ofte på et uoplyst grundlag. Fx er et nyfødt barn som

udgangspunkt ikke i umiddelbar fare, når det og dets forældre end ikke har forladt

fødeafdelingen og de i øvrigt får pæne udtalelser derfra. Det ses endvidere ofte, at disse

formandsbeslutninger træffes på baggrund af forældede oplysninger, således at familiens

problemer allerede er løst, når forvaltningen møder frem på adressen for at tage familiens

barn/børn eventuelt i selskab med politiet. (Det findes dog også eksempler på, at familiens

problemer er vokset til et langt alvorligere niveau end dengang de kom i myndighedernes

søgelys eller selv henvendte sig dertil. Altså at kommunerne undlader at skride ind med mindre

indgribende foranstaltninger for at forebygge en anbringelse, mens det stadig er muligt.

Kommunerne reagerer for langsomt i mange sager, mens de i andre sager reagerer overilet og i

så fald ikke med den mest optimale og hensigtsmæssige løsning.)

4. De politiske medlemmer af kommunens Børn og Unge udvalg er ofte beskæftiget i helt andre

erhverv end på det sociale område. De lader sig derfor ofte dupere af de mange socialfaglige

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

termer i sagsbehandlers indstilling til tvangsfjernelse og godkender derfor denne til trods for, at

det jo altså er deres opgave i dén forbindelse at repræsentere den menige borger

Der afsættes ved forelæggelse af sagen for Børn og Unge udvalg helt uhørt utilstrækkelig tid til at

den berørte familie og deres advokat kan forelægge deres synspunkter samt moddokumentation

for forvaltningens påstande – se eventuelt punkt 1. Det kan dreje sig om 0-1 eller få minutter,

hvilket slet ikke er tilstrækkeligt, såfremt man tilstræber en sober partshøring. Det skal i denne

forbindelse bemærkes, at mængden af manglende/forkerte/fordrejede oplysninger, som omtalt

under punkt 1 meget hurtigt bliver særdeles omfattende, hvilket familien på ingen måde kan

lastes for, tværtimod. Det er derfor påkrævet med al den tid, som forældre/barn/deres advokat

har behov for til at kunne afparere de mange urimelige anklager mod deres familie. �½ dag ville

formentlig ikke være for meget.

Sagsakter relateret til sagens forelæggelse i Børn og Unge udvalg udleveres oftest alt for sent til

familien og deres advokat. Dette bevirker, at sagsakter ikke kan nås hverken at gennemlæses

eller at opbygge et retvisende og fyldestgørende kontrasvar/forsvar desangående.

Der findes tilfælde, hvor sagen afgøres i børn og unge udvalg helt uden papirer og hvor

genbehandlingsfristen desuagtet fastsættes til flere år.

De berørte familier orienteres i mange sager ikke om deres rettigheder eller misinformeres om

samme. Fx ses det ofte, at sagsbehandler ”truer”/”lokker” forældre til at vælge en frivillig

anbringelse med forkerte påstande om flere rettigheder, mere samvær etc selvom forældre slet

ikke er enige i beslutningen om anbringelsen. Dette er usaglige hensyn, magtmisbrug og i strid

med flere bestemmelser i blandt andet Serviceloven.

Sagsbehandlers såkaldte ”børnesamtale” med den anbragte afholdes ofte ikke eller afholdes ikke

med de frekvenser, som loven foreskriver.

§50 undersøgelse udarbejdes ikke eller udarbejdes alt for sent

Handleplan for det anbragte barn udarbejdes ikke, udarbejdes alt for sent jf. gældende

lovgivning og opdateres ofte ikke såfremt den altså er udarbejdet

Handleplan for forældre udarbejdes ikke, udarbejdes alt for sent jf. gældende lovgivning og

opdateres ofte ikke såfremt den altså er udarbejdet.

Psykologer, som udarbejder forældrekompetenceundersøgelse er ofte og tydeligvis svært

påvirkede af forvaltningens forudindtagede opfattelse af forældrene. Forældre tilsværtes i en

grad, så andre fagfolk med kendskab til familien slet ikke kan genkende de pågældende

Vedrørende ovenstående punkter 5-9 ses i overvejende grad en flittig brug af ”Copy/Paste” fra

myndighedspersoners side dvs der kopieres og sættes ind (klippes og klistres) og ovennævnte er

i så fald slet ikke individuelle vurderinger af de pågældende. En del familier konstaterer et meget

stort sammenfald af beskrivelser i deres sagsakter, når de sammenligner med hinanden. For så

vidt angår psykolograpporter, så er der mange tilfælde, hvor rapporterne er enslydende hele

vejen igennem og kun navne er ændret. Ja, nogle gange har psykologen endda ”glemt” at ændre

navne på de personer, undersøgelsen omhandler.

Familien mødes ofte af ignorance, når der anmodes om aktindsigt.

Rekvireret aktindsigt modtages alt for sent jf. gældende lovgivning

Til trods for at IT systemer hos størstedelen af landets sociale forvaltninger er opsat til at

udskrive både sagsakter og dokument-lister samtidig så er det typisk en langvarig ”kamp” for

familierne at få udleveret dokument-listerne, således at de kan afstemme de udleverede

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sagsakter dertil. Efterfølgende er der endnu en ”kamp” for at få udleveret de manglende

sagsakter jf. dokument-listen.

18. I en del tilfælde tvangsanbringes børn med handicap eller udviklingsforstyrrelser selvom det

havde været fuldt ud tilstrækkeligt med en langt mindre indgribende indsats. Dette har i sagens

natur medført at stadigt færre familier tør kontakte forvaltning for ekstern faglig hjælp til

familiens problemer. (Proportionalitets princippet) Det vil være vanskeligt at få officielt overblik

over blandt andet denne problematik, da sagsbehandler samt psykolog etc blot sørger for at

forvanske de faktiske omstændigheder angående familien, således at indhold i sagsakter

stemmer overens med en indstilling om anbringelse. Se eventuelt punkt 1 m.fl.

19. Ved anbringelse af nyfødte, spæde eller få måneder gamle børn begrunder socialforvaltning ofte

deres påstand om omsorgssvigt/mangelfuld forældreevne med ”manglende øjenkontakt hos

barnet”. Dette burde udløse stor-alarm hos børn og unge udvalg, Ankestyrelse, byretter osv idet

små børn slet ikke har udviklet deres synssans så tidligt. Endvidere kan den ”øjenkontakt” som

trods alt forekommer også blive for intens/langvarig, så barnet ”trækker sig”. Dette burde også

være elementær viden hos fagfolk, at småbørn let afledes af lyde og således drejer hovedet væk

fra mor/far og i en anden retning, når det fx hører en kommunal familiekonsulent tale eller lave

andre lyde.

20. Det er et stort retssikkerhedsmæssigt problem, at såvel børn og unge udvalg, Ankestyrelse samt

byretter hovedløst ”blåstempler” afgørelser fra anden ”lavere” instans desuagtet, at familien har

omfattende mod-dokumentation overfor de mange forkerte påstande i sagsakter. Dette gør

forelæggelse for børn og unge udvalg samt klage til de to ankeinstanser til en ren skueproces.

Året før reglerne for tvangsbortadoption blev markant mere lempelige

for myndighederne så

blev også muligheden for at anke en anbringelsessag til Landsretten stort set elimineret i 2014.

Den politiske begrundelse var at man i lighed med andre typer af sager betragtede en

anbringelsessag som en ”bagatelsag

”. Ligeledes begrundede man ændringen med, at stort set

ingen ordinære borgere fik medhold i Landsretten i en tvangsfjernelsessag, hvorfor man ligeså

godt kunne afskaffe denne mulighed. Det anerkendes ikke – og blev derfor heller i dén anledning

taget i betragtning – at retssikkerheden i meget vid udstrækning ikke overholdes i

tvangsanbringelsessager jf. samtlige ovenstående punkter. Og at dette er årsagen til manglende

medhold.

Det skal endnu en gang oplyses og præciseres, at ovenstående liste jo altså ikke er udtømmende.

Som det kan konstateres, så er der en masse forhold at rette op på. Det er derfor helt forkert at

implementere yderligere lovgivning førend den helt grundlæggende – borgernes retssikkerhed –

er på plads og overholdes fuldt ud i samtlige sager.

Det ville være hensigtsmæssigt såfremt Ankestyrelsen som minimum løbende registrerede

ovennævnte problemstillinger og des lignende, når en tvangsfjernelsessag påklages til AST og gerne

https://www.kl.dk/nyhed/2014/oktober/regeringen-vil-lempe-reglerne-for-adoption-ved-tvang/

https://www.domstol.dk/Procesbevillingsnaevnet/nyheder/Oevrigenyheder/Pages/Nyeappelbegr%C3%A6nsningsregl

erpr1juli2014.aspx

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SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

også tog sig af en tilsvarende registrering af statistik, når sagerne ender i retterne samt allerede i

børn og udvalgene.

F. s. v. a. de hidtidige sager om tvangsbortadoptioner, som Bedsteforeningen har kendskab til, kan det

oplyses at:

•

Moderat ordblinde forældre beskrives i FKUer og sagsakter som multiretarderede og barnet

tvangsbortadopteres

Udviklingshæmmede med en i øvrigt normal, rask og velfungerende familie/netværk får

tvangsbortadopteret deres barn, som derved mister kontakten til hele sin biologiske familie

Socialt udsatte/skrøbelige forældre beskrives som tilsvarende ovenstående og barn indstilles til

tvangsbortadoption

Forældre med ”udseendet imod sig” samt eventuelt sociale og/eller mentale udfordringer

beskrives som tilsvarende ovenstående og mister deres barn til adoptanter

Forældre på overførselsindkomster er i langt større risiko for at få tvangsbortadopteret deres

barn/børn, som fjernes permanent i lighed med ovenstående

Afslutningsvis skal det bemærkes, at vi finder det ønskværdigt at blive en del af den officielle

høringsliste fremadrettet ved behandling af emner relateret til vort virke på det sociale

børneområde. Kontakt kan rettes til vores formand Tove Clausen

[email protected]

eller Tove

Clausen Dommervænget 5F 4000 Roskilde.

Tak fordi I tog jer tiden til at inddrage vores betragtninger i jeres arbejde.

Med venlig hilsen

På vegne af Bedsteforeningen

Tove Clausen, formand for foreningen

Heidi Christensen, tovholder i Aarhus

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SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

CVR-nummer : 40584951

København 3. November 2019

Til Charlotte Karstenskov Mogensen

og Karin Rønnow Søndergaard

i Ankestyrelsen

Svar på Høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne for et nyt adoption-

ssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016

Foreningen Klip

som undertegnede er formand for, har oplevet den ære, at

blive inviteret til, at give høringssvar i denne sag.

Kort om os:

Foreningen Klip

er en nystar tet forening som primær t består af forældre til an-

bragte børn og som har en bestyrelse hvor alle medlemmer selv har anbragte børn. Vi

er så vidt os bekendt den eneste formelt registrerede forening som bestyres af men-

nesker som selv har anbragte børn. Vi mener derfor, at det er oplagt, at vi giver vores

stemme til kende i forhold til denne høring da vi kan belyse en side af dette som ellers

meget sjældent er belyst. Vi kan for tælle noget om hvordan det er, at være forældre til

et barn som fjernes.

Vores høringssvar

Lad mig starter dette høringssvar med, at gøre opmærksom på det simpel

forhold, at love og regler kan misbruges. Vi ser det hele tiden. Særlig med skattere-

gler ved vi, at der altid vil sidde nogen som er gode til, at analysere regler og ﬁnde

smuthuller og anvende dem til egen vinding. Selv regler som er skabt med de bedste

hensigter vil kunne drejes og bruges af mennesker som har egennyttige hensigter.

Det udsendte materiale i forbindelse med denne høring omtaler ikke direkte

spørgsmål vedrørende tvangsadoption. Vi vil dog mene, at dette spørgsmål er essen-

tielt i forbindelse med overvejelser omkring muligheden for et nyt adoptionssystem og

evaluering af de ændringer af adoptionssystemet som blev indfør t i 2016.

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Klip-Nordic Association

Høringssvar

02/10/19

Systemets mulighed for tvangsadoption er netop siden 2016 blevet et særligt ak-

tuelt med indførelsen af den lettede adgang til anvendelse af tvangsadoption i sys-

temet og med et øget politisk fokus på denne mulighed. Særlig den nye so-

cialdemokratisk leddede regering er kommet tæmmelige utvetydige udmeldinger, om

at de vil arbejdet på, at gøre det nemmere, at tvangsadoptere børn fra Danmark.

Der er nogle umiddelbart foruroligende perspektiver ved dette. Udgifter til an-

bringelsesområdet er meget høje. Vi er i

Foreningen Klip

nået frem til, at det koster

cirka en million kroner om året, at anbringe et barn. Hvis man i stedet for, at anbringe

barnet kunne tvangsadoptere det så ville det koste stort set ingen ting. Der ligger altså

et stort økonomisk incitament til, at lave ﬂere tvangsadoptioner. Vi er i

Foreningen

Klip

sikre på, at det økonomiske incitament allerede nu fører til, at der gennemføres

tvangsadoptioner som ikke burde være gennemfør t. Med det øgede politiske pres på

netop denne løsning tror vi kun det retssikkerhedsmæssige skred som vi mener er

opstået vil for tsætte.

I oplægget til denne høring gøres der opmærksom på, at adoptioner fra udlandet

er faldet drastisk i de sidste 10 - 15 år. Det som der ikke gøres opmærksom på er, at

ventelisterne til indenrigsadoptioner i den samme periode er steget proportionalt. Det

er endnu et incitament i systemet til, at gennemføre ﬂere tvangsadoptioner og, at

sænke de retssikkerhedsmæssige barriere for disse adoptioner.

Selvom høringsoplægget slet ikke kommer ind i overvejelser vedrørende

tvangsadoptioner så mener vi, at det er det vigtigste spørgsmål overhovedet, at tage

op i forbindelse med mulighederne for et nyt adoptionssystem og evalueringen af

adoptionsreformen fra 2016.

Vores høringssvar vedrøre derfor alene denne problemstilling. Det er en prob-

lemstilling som vi i

Foreningen Klip

har nogle helt særlige forudsætninger for, at ud-

tale os om på et kvaliﬁceret grundlag.

Omkring år 1992 foretog man i Danmark og øvrige nordiske lande i skift i sit syn

på børneforsorg. Man gik fra en familiebaseret indsats til en børnecentrisk indsats. En

børnecentrisk indsats vil sige, at man begyndte, at se barnets behov som isoleret fra

familiens behov.

Selvom indførelsen af den børnecentriske forståelsesramme sikker t er sket ud

fra de bedste hensigter så har det vist sig, at det er en model som er særlig sårbar for

misbrug.

Det ved vi forældre til anbragte børn for vi har selv mærket det på vores egen

krop. Vi har set hvordan plejefamilier, institutioner, psykologer og sagsbehandler har

tiltaget sig magt ved, at deﬁnere hvad der var barnets behov. Vi har set hvordan barnet

er blevet udsat for påvirkning så det svarede og reagerede på en måde, som

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Klip-Nordic Association

Høringssvar

02/10/19

understøttede det som de forskellige professioncelle ønskede.

Vi i

Foreningen Klip

har spurgt hinanden, om vi overhovedet kan se et formål

med tvangsadoption når vi ser det fra barnets synspunkt og vi er kommet frem til, at

tvangsadoption ikke lader sig forsvare ud fra hensyn til barnets tarv.

Man har talt om en tvangsadoption kan give barnet ro. Vi kan ikke se, at en

tvangsadoption giver barnet mere ro. Det vil stadig kunne blive opsøgt af sine biolo-

giske forældre og det vil stadig have nogle biologiske rødder, som det i en eller anden

udstrækning er forbundet med.

Man har talt, om at tvangsadoption vil kunne sikre barnet en en tryg og stabil

tilknytning. Vi kan ikke se, at tilknytningen til en plejefamilie skulle blive mere tryg eller

stabil af, at man gennemtvinger en adoption imod de biologiske forældres vilje.

Der hvor vi kan se, at adoption vil gøre en forskel er i de økonomiske forhold. Det

er dyrt for stat og kommune, at have et barn anbragt. Med 14 tusinde anbragte i børn i

Danmark er der tale om en voldsom belastning af budgetterne. Adoption derimod er

stor t set gratis. Vi er i

Foreningen Klip

ikke i tvivl om, at grunden til, at man fra lov-

givningens side ønsker, at lempe reglerne for tvangsadoption er et håb om, at ﬁnde

løsning på et økonomisk problem. Det er uacceptabelt, at det er jagten på besparelser

som skal være udslagsgivende for et barns ret til, at behold den formelle tilknytning til

sine biologiske forældre og forældres ret til, at beholde den formelle tilknytning til

deres børn.

Det er også vigtigt for os, at gøre opmærksom på, at Norge den 10 september

2019 blev dømt for overtrædelse af menneskerettighederne ved en dom i storkam-

meret ved den

Europiske menneskerettighedsdomstol

herefter kaldet

EMD.

Det var

sagen "Strand Lobben mf. v. Norway". Denne sag var netop en sag om tvangsadop-

tion. Når en sag afgøres i storkammeret i

EMD,

er det fordi det er en principiel sag af

særlig vigtig betydning.

Det som blev klar t under denne sag og i den endelige dom var, at

EMD

ikke

deler det syn på tvangsanbringelse og tvangsadoption som Norge og Danmark anven-

der. Man tilslutter sig ikke den børnecentriske tilgang, hvor man ser barnets tarv isol-

eret fra familiens (Det er i stred med artikel 8). Danmark er nød til, at rettes sig ind i

disse sager efter den linje der lægges fra EMD.

Jeg vedlægger en kopi af dommen så udvalget selv vil kunne danne sig et

overblik over domstolens forståelser og holdning. Det skal nævnes, at

EMD

har op-

taget et uhørt stor t antal sager fra den norske børneforsorg (36 på nuværende tid-

spunkt). Der er ingen tvivl, om at

EMD

ønsker, at understrege, at den adoptionspolitik

som Norge har før t er i strid med menneskerettighederne.

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Klip-Nordic Association

Høringssvar

02/10/19

Konklusionen på dette høringssvar fra

Foreningen Klip

er, at vi mener, at

tvangsadoption slet ikke bør ﬁndes sted. Hvis en forældremyndighedsindehavende

forældre har åndsnærværelse nok til aktivt, at kunne sige "nej" til adoption, så bør den

ikke kunne iværksattes. Vi er klar over, at børneforsorgen er voldsomt udgifttung og,

at der er behov for, at ﬁnde besparelser, men vi mener ikke, at disse besparelser skal

ﬁndes ved, at overgå fra tvangsanbringelser til tvangsadoptioner. Vi mener i stedet, at

de skal ﬁndes ved en drastisk nedbringelse af antallet af anbringelser. Nedbringelsen

af anbringelser kan ske ved, at man overgår fra en separerende princip til en reha-

biliterende princip.

I sundhedsvæsenet indfør te man omkring årtusindeskiftet den rehabiliterende til-

gang. Den rehabiliterende tilgang har medfør t store besparelser på sundhedområdet.

Samtidig har den rehabiliterende tilgang før t til oplevelser af bedre livskvalitet og større

oplevelser af sammenhæng for borger, som kommer i kontakt med sundhedssystemet.

Det var det vi fra

Foreningen Klips

side fandt det vigtigt at biddrage med i

forbindelse med denne høring.

Med venlig hilsen

Formand for

Foreningen Klip,

Mikkel Meinike Nielsen.

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GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY

(Application no. 37283/13)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

10 September 2019

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

In the case of Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber

composed of:

Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,

President,

Guido Raimondi,

Robert Spano,

Vincent A. De Gaetano,

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,

Ganna Yudkivska,

Egidijus

Kūris,

Carlo Ranzoni,

Armen Harutyunyan,

Georges Ravarani,

Pere Pastor Vilanova,

Alena

Poláčková,

Pauliine Koskelo,

Péter Paczolay,

Lado Chanturia,

Gilberto Felici,

judges,

Dag Bugge Nordén, ad hoc

judge,

and Søren Prebensen,

Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 17 October 2018 and 27 May 2019,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned

date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 37283/13) against the

Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

(“the Convention”) by five Norwegian nationals, Ms Trude Strand Lobben,

her children, X and Y, and her parents, Ms Sissel and Mr Leif Lobben, on

12 April 2013.

2. The first applicant, Ms Trude Strand Lobben, and the second

applicant, X (“the applicants”), who had been granted legal aid, were

ultimately represented by Mr G. Thuan Dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practising

in Strasbourg. The Norwegian Government (“the Government”) were

represented by their Agents, Mr M. Emberland and Ms H.L. Busch, of the

Attorney General’s Office (Civil Matters).

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the domestic authorities’

decisions not to lift the care order for X and instead withdraw the first

applicant’s parental responsibilities for him and authorise his adoption by

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his foster parents, violated their rights to respect for family life under

Article 8 of the Convention.

4. The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court

(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 1 December 2015 the President of

the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the applicants’ complaint to the

Government. On 30 November 2017 a Chamber of that Section, composed

of Angelika Nußberger, Erik Møse, André Potocki, Yonko Grozev,

Síofra O’Leary, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,

Lәtif

Hüseynov, judges, and

Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, gave judgment. The Chamber

unanimously declared the application by the first and second applicants

admissible and the remainder inadmissible. It held, by a majority, that there

had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The joint dissenting

opinion of Judges Grozev, O’Leary and Hüseynov was annexed to the

judgment.

5. On 30 January 2018 the applicants requested the referral of the case to

the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. On

9 April 2018 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request.

6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to

the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the

Rules of Court. At the final deliberations, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, substitute

judge, replaced Aleš Pejchal, who was unable to take part in the further

consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3).

7. The applicants and the Government each filed observations

(Rule 59 § 1) on the merits of the case.

8. The President of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the

Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy,

Slovakia and the United Kingdom, and Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF)

International, the Associazione Italiana dei Magistrati per i Minorenni e per

la Famiglia (AIMMF), the Aire Centre and X’s adoptive parents, to

intervene in the written procedure, in accordance with Article 36 § 2 of the

Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules.

9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,

Strasbourg, on 17 October 2018.

There appeared before the Court:

(a)

for the respondent Government

Mr F. S

EJERSTED

, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office,

Mr M. E

MBERLAND

, Agent, Attorney General’s Office,

Ms H. L

UND

USCH

, Agent, Attorney General’s Office

Agents,

Ms A. S

YDNES

GELAND

, Attorney, Attorney General’s Office,

Mr H. V

AALER

, Attorney, Attorney General’s Office,

Mr D.T. G

ISHOLT

, Director, Ministry of Children and Equality,

Ms C. F

IVE

ERG

, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Children

and Equality,

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Ms H. B

AUTZ

-H

OLTER

EVING

, Ministry of Children

and Equality,

Ms L. W

IDTH

, Municipal Attorney,

(b)

for the applicants

Mr G. T

HUAN

IEUDONNÉ

, Lawyer,

Ms T. S

TRAND

OBBEN

Advisers;

Counsel,

First applicant.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Thuan Dit Dieudonné and Mr Sejersted

and their replies to questions put by the judges.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. Background

10. In May 2008 the first applicant turned to the child welfare services

because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation: she did not have a

permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents.

11. On 10 June 2008 the first applicant and the putative future father, Z,

visited a gynaecological polyclinic at the regional hospital. According to the

medical notes recorded that day, the doctor was informed that the first

applicant had had a late abortion in October 2007 and that she also wanted

to abort this time. A chlamydia test and an ultrasonography were carried

out, and the first applicant and Z informed that an abortion would not be

possible.

12. On 23 June 2008 the hospital confirmed that the result of the

chlamydia test taken on 10 June 2008 was positive. As one of the measures

taken by the birth clinic to monitor the first applicant and her situation, the

doctor noted that a social worker would make contact with the child welfare

services, in agreement with the first applicant. A social worker, J.T., at the

hospital noted the following day that the first applicant had expressed a

strong wish for a place at a parent-child institution on the grounds that she

was limited on account of a brain injury (begrensninger

på grunn av

hjerneskade)

sustained following an epileptic seizure; she had no home, and

a difficult relationship with the child’s putative father and other family

members; and that she wanted help to become as good a mother as

possible. It was noted by the hospital that any stay at a parent-child

institution would be voluntary and that the first applicant and her child

could leave whenever they wished.

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13. On 1 July 2008 the hospital notified the child welfare services that

the first applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and

monitoring with regard to motherhood. The hospital also indicated that she

needed to stay at a parent-child institution. The child welfare services took

on the case, with the first applicant’s consent. She agreed to stay at a

parent-child institution for three months after the child was born, so that her

ability to give the child adequate care could be assessed.

14. On 16 July 2008 a meeting with the child welfare services took

place. A psychologist, I.K.A., from the Office for Children, Youth and

Family Affairs attended the meeting. According to the notes from the

meeting, it was agreed that the first applicant should receive psychological

counselling on a weekly basis in the social worker’s absence during the

summer, and that the psychologist would give subsequent reports to the

child welfare services.

15. On 16 September 2008 a formal decision was taken to offer the first

applicant and her child a place at a parent-child institution for three months.

The decision stated that the child welfare services were concerned about the

first applicant’s mental health and her ability to understand the seriousness

of taking responsibility for a child and the consequences.

16. Some days earlier, on 9 September 2008, the child welfare services

and the first applicant had agreed on a plan for the stay. In the plan it was

stated that the main purpose of the stay would be to examine, observe and

guide the first applicant in order to equip her with sufficient childcare skills.

A number of more specific aims were also included, involving observation

of the mother and child and examination of the mother’s mental health

(psyke) and maturity, her ability to receive, understand and avail herself of

advice in relation to her role as a mother, and her developmental

possibilities. Working with the first applicant’s network was also included

as an aim in the plan.

17. On 25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to a son, X, the

second applicant. The first applicant then refused to provide the name of

X’s father. Four days later, on 29 September 2008, the first applicant and X

moved to the parent-child institution. For the first five days X’s maternal

grandmother also stayed there with them.

18. On 10 October 2008 the parent-child institution called the child

welfare services and expressed concern on the part of their staff. According

to the child welfare services’ records, the staff at the institution stated that X

was not gaining sufficient weight and lacked energy. With regard to nappy

changes, the staff had to repeatedly (gang

på gang)

tell the first applicant

that there were still traces of excrement, while she continued to focus on

herself.

19. On 14 October 2008 the staff at the parent-child institution said that

they were very concerned about X and the first applicant’s caring skills. It

had turned out that the first applicant had given an incorrect weight for the

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baby and that X had, accordingly, lost more weight than previously

assumed. Moreover, she showed no understanding of the boy’s feelings

(viser

ingen forståelse av gutten sine følelser)

and seemed unable to

empathise with the baby (sette

seg inn i hvordan babyen har det).

The staff

had decided to move the first applicant into an apartment on the main floor

in order to get a better overview and to monitor her even more closely. The

next meeting between the first applicant, the staff at the parent-child

institution and the child welfare services had been scheduled for

24 October 2008, but the staff at the institution wanted to bring the meeting

forward as they were of the view that the matter could not wait that long.

B. Proceedings to place X in emergency foster care

20. On 17 October 2008 a meeting between the parent-child institution,

the first applicant and the child welfare services was held. The first

applicant stated at the meeting that she wanted to move out of the institution

together with her child, as she no longer wanted guidance. The staff at the

institution stated that they were very concerned about the first applicant’s

caring skills. She did not wake up at night, and the boy had lost a lot of

weight, lacked energy and appeared dehydrated. The health visitor was also

very concerned, whereas the first applicant was not. The institution had

established close 24-hour monitoring. Staff had stayed awake at night in

order to wake the first applicant up to feed the child. They had monitored

the first applicant every three hours round the clock in order to ensure that

the boy received nourishment. They expressed the fear that the child would

not have survived had they not established that close monitoring pattern.

The child welfare services considered that it would create a risk if the first

applicant removed the child from the institution. X was below critical

normal weight (kritisk

normalvekt)

and in need of nutrition and monitoring.

21. In the decision taken on the same date it was also stated that the first

applicant had given information about the child’s father to the child welfare

services, but that she had refused him permission to take a paternity test and

to sign as father at the hospital. It was stated that the father wanted to take

responsibility for the child, but that he did not yet have any rights as a party

to the case.

22. It was decided to place X in an emergency foster home and that the

first applicant and her mother should visit him for up to one and a half hours

weekly. As to the boy’s needs, it was stated that he had lost a lot of weight

and accordingly needed close and proper monitoring. It was emphasised as

very important that good feeding routines be developed. Further, according

to the plan, the placement was to be continuously assessed by the first

applicant, the emergency foster parents, a specialist team (fagteam) and the

child welfare services. The municipality was to stay in contact with the

emergency foster parents and be responsible for being in contact with and

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following up on the first applicant. Preliminary approval of the decision was

given by the chair of the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda

for

barnevern og sosiale saker)

on 21 October 2008.

23. On 22 October 2008 the first applicant appealed to the County Social

Welfare Board against the emergency decision. She claimed that she and X

could live together at her parents’ house, arguing that her mother stayed at

home and was willing to help care for X and that she and her mother were

also willing to accept help from the child welfare services.

24. On 23 October 2008 a family consultant and a psychologist from the

parent-child institution drew up a report of the first applicant’s and her

mother’s stay there. The report referred to an intelligence test that had been

carried out in which the first applicant had obtained a higher score than 67%

of persons of her age on perceptual organisation (meaning organisation of

visual material) and below 93% of persons her age on verbal understanding.

On tasks that required working memory – the ability to take into account

and process complex information – the first applicant had scored below

99% of persons her age. According to the report, the tests confirmed the

clinical impression of the first applicant. Furthermore, the report stated that

the institution’s guidance had focused on teaching the first applicant how to

meet the child’s basic needs in terms of food, hygiene (stell) and safety. The

first applicant had received verbal and hands-on guidance and had

consistently (gjennomgående) needed repeated instructions and

demonstration. In the staff’s experience, the first applicant often did not

understand what was told or explained to her, and rapidly forgot. In the

conclusion the report stated,

inter alia:

“The mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner. During the time the

mother and child have stayed [at the parent-child institution] ..., the staff here ... have

been very concerned that the child’s needs are not being met. In order to ensure that

the child’s primary needs for care and food are met, the staff have intervened and

closely monitored the child day and night.

The mother is not able to meet the boy’s practical care needs. She has not taken

responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner. The mother has needed

guidance at a very basic level, and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several

times.

Throughout the stay, the mother has made statements that we find very worrying.

She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son, and has several times

expressed disgust with the child. The mother has demonstrated very little

understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control.

The mother’s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in

several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care. Her ability to provide

practical care must be seen in the light of this. The mother’s mental health is marked

by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other

people. The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need.

Our assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child. We

are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow-up. As we have

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verbally communicated to the child welfare services, we believe it to be important that

especially close care is taken of the mother during the period following the emergency

placement.

The mother is vulnerable. She should be offered a psychological assessment and

treatment, and probably needs help in finding motivation for this. The mother should

have an individual plan to ensure follow-up in several areas. The mother has resources

(see the abilities tests) that she needs help to make good use of.”

25. On 27 October 2008 the Board heard the appeal against the

emergency placement decision (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). The first

applicant attended with her legal-aid counsel and gave evidence. Three

witnesses were heard.

26. In a decision of the same day, signed by the Board’s chairperson, the

Board concluded that it had to rely on the descriptions given by the

psychologist at the parent-child institution, who had drafted the institution’s

report, and the representative from the municipal child welfare services.

According to those descriptions, the first applicant had been unable to care

for X properly (betryggende) in entirely essential and crucial respects (helt

vesentlige og sentrale områder).

Furthermore, she had said that she wanted

to leave the institution. It had been obvious that she could not be given care

of X without creating a risk that he would suffer material harm. Afterwards,

the first applicant’s parents had said that they would be capable of ensuring

that X was adequately looked after. However, the Board concluded that this

would not provide X with sufficient security. The first applicant’s mother

had given evidence before the Board and had stated that during her stay at

the parent-child institution she had not experienced anything that gave rise

to concern with respect to the first applicant’s care for X. This was in stark

contrast to what had been reported by the psychologist. The Board also

concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the

daily care of X, not her mother.

27. On the same day, 27 October 2008, X was sent to a child psychiatry

clinic for an assessment.

28. On 30 October 2008 the first applicant appealed against the Board’s

decision of 27 October 2008 (see paragraphs 25-26 above) to the City Court

(tingrett).

29. On 13 November 2008 the first applicant visited X in the foster

home; according to the notes taken by the supervisor, Z had received the

result of a paternity test the day before which had shown that he was not the

father. The first applicant stated that she did not know who the father could

be. She could not remember having been with anyone else. The first

applicant and the adviser from the child welfare services agreed that the first

applicant would contact her doctor and ask for a referral to a psychologist.

30. On 21 November 2008 an adviser working with emergency

placements (beredskapshjemskonsulent) at the Office for Children, Youth

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and Family Affairs produced a report on the implementation of the

emergency measure. In the conclusion she stated:

“The boy arrived at the emergency foster home on 17/10 with little movement in his

arms and legs, and making few sounds. He could not open his eyes because they were

red, swollen and had a lot of discharge. He was undernourished, pale and weak

[(slapp)]. After a few days he started to move, make sounds and develop skin colour.

He ate well at all meals, and enjoyed bodily contact. He opened his eyes upon

receiving the correct medication and gradually started to be in contact with his

surroundings. Good routines were put in place and he was closely followed up with

respect to nourishment and development.

The boy has developed very well in all areas in the five weeks he has been living in

the emergency foster home. The doctor and health visitors were satisfied with the

boy’s development and have monitored him closely. Bup [(Barne-

ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk –

the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-

Patient Clinic)] has also followed up on the boy and reported possible stress

symptoms developed by the boy during the pregnancy or the first weeks of his life.

The emergency foster parents have provided favourable conditions for the boy to

work on his development, and this has worked well. The boy needs stable adults who

can give him good care, appropriate to his age [(aldersadekvat

omsorg)],

and satisfy

his needs in future.”

31. On 28 November 2008 the municipality applied to the County Social

Welfare Board for a care order, submitting that the first applicant lacked

caring skills with respect to a child’s various needs. They considered that X

would rapidly end up in a situation in which he would be subjected to

serious neglect if he were returned to the first applicant. As to contact rights,

the municipality submitted that they assumed that it would be a matter of a

long-term placement and that X would probably grow up in foster care.

They stated that the first applicant was young, but that it was assumed that

her capacity as a mother would be limited, at least in relation to X ([m]or

ung, men det antas at hennes kapasitet som mor vil være begrenset, i hvert

fall i forhold til dette barnet).

32. On 5 December 2008 the team at the child psychiatry clinic, who

had carried out six different observations between 3 and 24 November 2008,

in accordance with the instructions of 27 October 2008 (see paragraph 27

above), set out their results in a report, which read,

inter alia,

as follows:

“[X] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for

assessment and observation. Today he is functioning as a normal two-month-old baby,

and has the possibility of a good normal development. He has, from what can be

observed, been a child at high risk. For vulnerable children the lack of response and

confirmation, or other interferences in interaction, can lead to more or less serious

psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not receive other corrective

relationship experiences. The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and

the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive

development. [X] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development

now.”

33. The City Court, composed of one professional judge, one

psychologist and one lay person, pursuant to section 36-4 of the Dispute Act

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(see paragraph 133 below), heard the appeal against the Board’s decision in

the emergency case (see paragraphs 25-26 and 28 above) on

12 January 2009. In its judgment of 26 January 2009 it stated first that an

interim decision pursuant to the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the

Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) could only be made if the risk

of harm was acute and the child would suffer material harm if not moved

immediately. It went on to state that the case concerned a child who had

been practically newborn when the interim care order had been made, and

that the placement had since been reconsidered several times following

appeals on the part of the mother.

34. In its conclusion the City Court stated that it was in no doubt that

X’s situation had been serious when the interim care order had been issued.

He had shown clear signs of neglect, both psychologically and physically.

The City Court found that the “material” harm requirement

(vesentlighetskravet) in the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child

Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) had been met. X was at the time of

its judgment in better health and showed normal development. This was due

to the emergency foster parents’ efforts and follow-up. The City Court did

not consider that the first applicant’s ability to provide care had changed and

feared that X would suffer material harm if he were now returned to her.

This was still the case even if the first applicant lived with her parents and

they supported her. It was her ability to provide care that was the matter of

assessment.

35. Based on the above, the City Court did not find grounds to revoke

the emergency care order pending a decision by the County Social Welfare

Board on the question of permanent care.

36. The first applicant did not appeal to the High Court (lagmannsrett).

C. Proceedings for a care order

1. Proceedings before the County Social Welfare Board

37. The Board, composed of an administrator qualified to act as a

professional judge, a psychologist and a lay person, in accordance with

section 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), held a

hearing on the child welfare services’ request for a care order (see

paragraph 31 above) on 17 and 18 February 2009. The first applicant

attended and gave evidence. Seven witnesses were heard, including experts

and the first applicant’s parents, their neighbour and a friend of the family.

At the hearing the child welfare services requested that X be taken into local

authority care, placed in a foster home and that the first applicant be granted

contact rights for two hours, four times per year, under supervision. The

first applicant sought to have the request for a care order rejected and X

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returned to her. In the alternative, she asked for contact rights of a minimum

of once per month, or according to the Board’s discretion.

38. In a decision of 2 March 2009 the Board stated at the outset that,

independently of the parties’ arguments and claims, its task was to decide

whether X was to be taken into care by the child welfare services. If a care

order were issued, the Board would also choose a suitable placement and

determine the contact arrangements.

39. The Board concluded that the fundamental condition set out in letter

(a) of the first paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act had been

met (see paragraph 122 below). In its opinion, a situation involving serious

deficiencies in both psychological and practical care would arise if X were

returned to live with the first applicant.

40. The Board emphasised that it had assessed the first applicant’s

ability as a caregiver and changes in her approach, not her condition or

personality traits. However, the Board noted that the parent-child institution

had considered the first applicant’s inability to benefit from guidance to be

linked to her cognitive limitations. Reference was made to conclusions

drawn by the institution to the effect that the relevant test results were

consistent with their daily observations (see paragraph 24 above). The tests

carried out at the institution were also largely consistent with previous

assessments of the first applicant, and also with the concerns reported by,

inter alia,

the psychologist at the Office for Children, Youth and Family

Affairs in the summer of 2008 (see paragraph 14 above). In the Board’s

view, the above factors suggested that the first applicant’s problems were of

a fundamental nature and that her potential for change was limited (sier

noe

om at mors problematikk er av en grunnleggende karakter og at

endringspotensialet er begrenset).

41. The Board stated that it had to conclude that a care order was

necessary and in the best interests of X. As to a suitable placement, the

Board stated that, having regard to his age and care needs, a foster home

placement was clearly the best solution for X at the time. It issued a care

order to that effect. Based on X’s age and vulnerability, the Board also

decided that he should be placed in enhanced foster care – an arrangement

whereby the foster home was given extra assistance and support – at least

for the first year.

42. Turning to the question of contact rights, the Board went on to state

that, under section 4-19 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122

below), children and parents were entitled to contact with each other unless

otherwise decided. When a care order was issued, the Board would

determine the amount of contact and decisions regarding contact had to be

in the child’s best interests, as provided for by section 4-1 of the Child

Welfare Act (ibid.). The purpose and duration of the placement also had to

be taken into consideration when the amount of contact was determined.

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43. On the grounds of the information available at the time of the

Board’s decision, the Board envisaged that X would grow up in the foster

home. This was on account of (har

sammenheng med)

the first applicant’s

fundamental problems and limited potential for change (mors

grunnleggende problematikk og begrensede endringspotensial)

(see

paragraph 40 above). This meant that the foster parents would become X’s

psychological parents, and that the amount of contact had to be determined

in such a way as to ensure that the attachment process, which was already

well under way, was not disrupted. X had to be given peace and stability in

his everyday life, and he was assumed (det

legges til grunn)

to have special

needs in that respect. In the Board’s opinion, the purpose of contact had to

be to ensure that he had knowledge of his mother.

44. Based on an overall assessment, including of the above factors, the

amount of contact was set at two hours, six times per year. The Board stated

that it had some misgivings as to whether this was too frequent, particularly

considering X’s reactions. However, it believed that contact could be

somewhat improved by the child welfare services providing more guidance

and adaptation and by a considerable reduction in the frequency of contact.

45. In the Board’s opinion, it was necessary for the child welfare

services to be authorised to supervise contact in order to ensure that X was

properly cared for.

46. The Board’s decision concluded with a statement to the effect that it

would be for the child welfare services to decide on the time and place of

the contact sessions.

2. Proceedings before the City Court

47. On 15 April 2009 the first applicant appealed to the City Court

against the Board’s decision that X should be taken into public care (see

paragraphs 38-46 above). She submitted, in particular, that adequate

conditions in the home could be achieved through the implementation of

assistance measures and that the care order had been decided without

sufficient assistance measures having first been implemented.

48. On 6 May 2009 the child welfare services sent the first applicant a

letter in which she was invited to a meeting to discuss what sort of help they

could offer her. The letter stated as follows:

“The child welfare services are concerned that you receive help to process what you

have been through in relation to the taking into care, etc. It is still an offer that the

Child Welfare Service cover the costs of a psychologist, if you so wish.”

49. On 14 May 2009 the first applicant attended a contact session

together with two acquaintances. According to the report, a situation arose

in which the supervisor from the child welfare services stated that the first

applicant would have a calmer time with X if she were alone with him. The

first applicant said that the supervisor had to understand that she wanted to

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

bring people with her because she was being badly treated. It was ultimately

agreed that one of the acquaintances would accompany the first applicant.

During the session the first applicant stated that she had received an

unpleasant (ukoselig) letter from the child welfare services offering her an

appointment to discuss any help that she might need (see paragraph 48

above). The first applicant stated that she did not want any help and that she

certainly did not need psychological counselling.

50. On 19 August 2009 the City Court gave judgment on the question of

the care order (see paragraph 47 above). At the outset the City Court stated

that the case concerned judicial review of a care order issued pursuant to

section 4-12 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below), which

was to be considered pursuant to the rules in chapter 36 of the Dispute Act.

When undertaking a judicial review of the County Social Welfare Board’s

decision, the court had power to review all aspects of the decision, both

legal and factual, as well as the administrative discretion. It was well

established in law that its review of the Board’s decision should not be

based on the circumstances at the time of the Board’s decision, but on the

circumstances at the time of its judgment. The court would not therefore

normally go into more detail regarding the Board’s assessment of the

grounds for issuing a care order. However, the City Court went on to state

that it nonetheless found that special reasons made it necessary to do so in

the instant case.

51. Based on the evidence presented to it, the City Court ultimately

concluded that it had not, either at the time of its judgment or previously,

been sufficiently substantiated that there existed such deficiencies in the

first applicant’s ability to provide care that the conditions for the child

welfare services maintaining care and control of X were met. It found,

inter

alia,

that X’s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye

infection. The Board’s decision should therefore be revoked.

52. X was therefore to be returned to the first applicant and the City

Court found that the parties understood that this had to be done in a way that

would prevent X from facing further trauma. X had lived with his foster

parents for ten months and had formed an attachment to them. Based on

what had emerged during the proceedings, the City Court assumed that the

child welfare services would give the first applicant and the foster parents

the assistance they needed. The first applicant had said that she was willing

to cooperate and, given that willingness, the City Court believed that it must

be possible to establish the cooperative environment necessary for the child

welfare services to be able to provide the help she might need.

53. In the days following the City Court’s judgment there were a number

of email exchanges between the first applicant’s counsel and the child

welfare services, and a meeting was held on 26 August 2009. The following

day the first applicant, through her counsel, requested an appointment so

that she could immediately (omgående) pick X up from the foster home and

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

bring him home with her. She also requested that this be on Saturday

29 August 2009. She stated that the foster mother could deliver X and stay

as long as she wanted. The foster mother was also welcome to visit X when

she wished, upon agreement with the first applicant. Representatives from

the child welfare services were not welcome.

54. The applicant’s request to have X immediately returned to her was

not met by the child welfare services, but the amount of contact was

increased. On 1, 3, 4 and 7 September 2009 contact sessions were held at

the house of the first applicant’s parents. The supervisor took detailed notes

from each session as well as from conversations with the foster mother, and

made a summary report of all the sessions. She noted,

inter alia,

that the

foster mother had stated that the session on 1 September 2009 had “gone

well [(gikk

greit)]

in many ways”, but that X had become very tired

afterwards. He had been uneasy and difficult to put to bed. At the end of the

session on 3 September, the supervisor noted that X appeared completely

exhausted and pale. X’s apparent tiredness was noted also in relation to the

sessions on 4 and 7 September. Furthermore, it emerges from the notes that

the supervisor found it strange (underlig) that X had not been offered food,

even though the family had been informed that it was his meal time. The

supervisor had noted that the first applicant had taken note of this

information on the first day, but then forgotten it again by the next day. The

report stated that the supervisor was uncertain as to whether this had to do

with the first applicant’s insecurity and fear of asking. The report also

contained details about X’s reactions to the sessions, with respect to crying,

sleeping, digestion and other behaviour.

3. Proceedings before the High Court

55. On 4 September 2009 the municipality sought leave to appeal

against the City Court’s judgment (see paragraphs 50-52 above), requested

that the Board’s decision of 2 March 2009 be upheld (see paragraphs 38-46

above), and concurrently applied for implementation of the City Court’s

judgment to be suspended. The municipality argued, firstly, that the City

Court’s judgment was seriously flawed. They claimed that it was unlikely

that the eye infection could have been the reason for X’s slow weight gain.

Moreover, the first applicant had had visits with X, but they had not worked

well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them. X had

had strong reactions after those visits. Secondly, the municipality submitted

that the case raised a question of general interest, namely relating to the first

applicant’s intellectual functioning (kognitive

ferdigheter).

They stated that

she had general learning difficulties and that tests had shown that she had

specific difficulties, with consequences for her daily functioning. Her

abilities in verbal reasoning, relating to complex information and analysing

and acting in situations that arose, were matters relevant to the provision of

adequate care for a child. In that context the municipality referred to a

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number of questions that, in their view, had to be answered, relating,

inter

alia,

to what the first applicant was or was not capable of doing – and

whether it was appropriate to leave a small child with her – and whether

there were realistic assistance measures that could compensate for her

shortcomings.

56. On 8 September 2009 the City Court decided to stay enforcement of

its judgment until the High Court had adjudicated the case.

57. In her response of 11 September 2009 to the municipality’s appeal,

the first applicant, through her counsel, stated that the municipality had

proceeded on the grounds that she was almost retarded (nærmest

tilbakestående)

and therefore incapable of taking care of a child, which she

found to be an insulting allegation (grov

beskyldning).

Nor were there, in

her view, any flaws in the City Court’s judgment.

58. On 9 October 2009 the child welfare services decided to appoint two

experts – a psychologist, B.S., and a family therapist, E.W.A. – to assess X

in relation to his strong reactions after the period in which there had been

frequent contact sessions at the home of the first applicant’s parents (see

paragraph 54 above). In addition to examining the reasons for X’s reactions,

the experts were asked to provide advice and guidance to the foster mother

as to how to handle the reactions and to the first applicant, if she agreed,

with respect to the contact sessions.

59. On 12 October 2009 the High Court granted leave to appeal on the

ground that the ruling of, or procedure in, the City Court had been seriously

flawed (see paragraph 55 above and paragraph 133 below). It also upheld

the City Court’s decision to stay enforcement of the judgment (see

paragraph 56 above).

60. On 4 November 2009 the first applicant’s counsel asked the child

welfare services whether the offer of counselling to the first applicant (see

paragraph 48 above) was still valid. In their response, of

12 November 2009, the child welfare services stated that they were worried

about the first applicant and that it was important that she obtained help.

They confirmed that they would cover the costs of a psychologist or other

counsellor of the first applicant’s choice and that they would not ask the

person chosen for any information or to act as a witness in the child welfare

case.

61. On 15 November 2009 the High Court appointed an expert

psychologist, M.S., to assess the case.

62. On 20 February 2010 the two experts appointed by the child welfare

services to examine the contact sessions and the effects on X (see

paragraph 58 above) delivered their report, which was over 18 pages long.

In the report they stated that they had not observed any contact sessions, “as

this [had been] done by the expert appointed by the High Court”. They

further stated that the first applicant had refused guidance with respect to the

contact sessions. In the chapter entitled “Is it possible to hypothesise on

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parents’ competence in contact situations based on their competence as

caregivers?”, the following was stated:

“When reviewing the various documents we find that [the parent-child institution]

describes a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the mothering role, which is

similar to the pattern we see during the contact sessions more than one year later. For

example, the mother demonstrates a lack of ability in basic parental care during the

contact sessions, as we have described above. Furthermore, her parental regulation

during the contact sessions is insensitive. She seems to have significant problems with

identifying X’s affects by sharing joy and making him feel secure and guiding him

through confirmation and putting names on things. This is very serious.

We find that the mother has significant problems in all the contact sessions and that

it is difficult not to say that these problems will also extend to her general competence

as a caregiver. In a report dated 19 February 2008, i.e. two years ago, Dr Philos.

[H.B.], a specialist in clinical neurology, states the following:

‘There are no significant changes in the results of intelligence tests conducted

before the operation and at the check-up two years after the operation. Her results in

the intelligence tests have been very similar since she was 10.5 years old, i.e. her

intelligence has been stable throughout all these years.’

He says that her intellectual functioning is approximately two standard deviations

below her peers and that she has problems with her long-term memory and with

transferring information from one thing to another.

We find that it is more problematic than usual for the mother to have supervised

contact sessions because of her cognitive issues, because from time to time [(fra

gang

til gang)]

she does not know what to do in relation to the boy and because she is very

driven by impulses. [H.B.]’s report also states that she has problems understanding the

content of what she is reading, and we also find that she cannot read and understand

the situation when she is with her child. We find this to be an important and

fundamental issue in shedding light on the mother’s competence in contact situations

and her competence as a caregiver. As regards the mother’s competence as a caregiver

in relation to the mother’s cognitive skills, we assume that this will be further

elucidated by [M.S.], the expert psychologist appointed by the Court of Appeal. This

is considered to play a role in relation to the mother’s behaviour vis-à-vis X during the

contact sessions and her struggle to become emotionally attuned to his needs at

different ages.

On page 5 of its report [(judgment)] from 2009, the City Court summarises [the

situation] as follows:

‘It is generally known that many women, especially women who are giving birth

for the first time, can have a psychological reaction after the birth which, in extreme

situations, can take the form of serious postnatal depression. All reactions in the

form of feelings of alienation and insecurity in relation to the newborn are within the

normal range.’

We find that the mother’s difficulties during the contact sessions cannot be regarded

as serious postnatal depression since the mother’s difficulties during the contact

sessions have shown a similar pattern for more than 1.5 years. This is more a sign of

inadequate basic parenting skills and is not related to postnatal depression alone. We

consider it crucial [(avgjørende

viktig)]

that the mother’s difficulties during the

contact sessions and her competence as a caregiver in general be understood in the

light of more complex psychological explanatory models relating to both cognitive

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issues and serious traumatic experiences both early in life and as an adult, which we

know, based on research, affect a person’s ability to function as a parent without

considerable individual efforts and treatment. We assume that the expert psychologist

will describe this in more detail.”

63. On 3 March 2010 the expert psychologist appointed by the High

Court, M.S. (see paragraph 61 above), delivered her report. She had

observed two contact sessions, one attended by the first applicant alone and

the other attended by the first applicant together with her mother and sister.

The chapter entitled “Social and academic functioning” contained,

inter

alia,

the following:

“Throughout the years SSE [(Statens

senter for epilepsi)]

has carried out repeated

assessments of [the first applicant] using tests that measure the course of her illness

and tests that focus more on describing her functioning. In this case, there has been a

particular focus on the WISC-R test, which has been conducted both pre- and

postoperatively. The results from this test are expressed as an IQ score which has been

a topic of discussion in the child welfare case of which the present report is also a

part. It is therefore relevant to make some comments on these test scores.

The WISC-R is a very well-known and frequently used test to measure intellectual

abilities in children. Such abilities are associated with school performance. The test

result provides useful information about a child’s ability to learn and make use of

learning. A functioning profile from a WISC-R test therefore forms the basis for

targeted special education measures in school and can help when preparing

individually adapted educational arrangements for children with special needs.

The end-product of an intelligence test is an IQ score, which is an operational

definition of intelligence that provides a numeric expression of how abilities defined

as intelligence are distributed among individuals in a population. The test is

standardised, i.e. there is a statistical normal distribution with an average deviation on

both sides. The WISC-R has a defined average of 100 with a standard deviation of +-

15. A score within the range of distribution 85-115 is said to be within the normal

range, where 68% of the population of comparison are situated, whereas 98% are

within two standard deviations, i.e. 70-130 points. When conducting a diagnostic

assessment of an IQ score, persons with IQ scores between 50 and 69 are defined as

slightly mentally retarded. Intelligence test performance can be improved in the

course of a person’s developmental history if the fundamental cognitive resources are

there. In this case, there is information that [the first applicant]’s IQ score has been

stable throughout her childhood and adolescence, which means that she has not caught

up intellectually after her brain surgery.

1.3. Summary

Anamnestic information from the school, the specialist health service and the family

provides an overall picture of weak learning capacity and social functioning from

early childhood into adulthood. [The first applicant] performed poorly at school

despite good framework conditions, considerable extra resources and good efforts and

motivation on her own part. It is therefore difficult to see any other explanation for her

performance than general learning difficulties caused by a fundamental cognitive

impairment. This is underlined by her consistently low IQ score – regardless of the

epilepsy surgery.

She also had problems with socio-emotional functioning, which has also been a

recurring topic in all the documents that deal with [the first applicant’s] childhood and

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adolescence. A lack of social skills and social adaptation is reported, primarily related

to social behaviour that is not commensurate with her age [(ikke-aldersadekvat

sosial

fremtreden)]

(‘childish’) and poor impulse control. It is also stated that [the first

applicant] has been very reserved and had low self-confidence, which must be seen in

conjunction with her problems.”

In the chapter entitled “Assessment of care functioning, competence in

contact situations and the effect of assistance measures”, the report

contained the following:

“5.1. Competence as a caregiver

As is clear from the above, I have placed particular emphasis on the consequences

of [the first applicant’s] condition in relation to her general functioning and whether

she has what it takes to care for a child. It is important to note that neither [the first

applicant] herself nor her parents believe that there is a connection between her

history of illness, her adult functioning and her ability to provide care.

It is not the case that epilepsy deprives people of their ability to provide care, just as

a low IQ score in itself is not a reason to take a child into care. However, a test result

can help to elucidate why someone’s functioning capacity is impaired, particularly if

this is seen in conjunction with other observations and descriptions.

[The first applicant] has had serious refractory epilepsy since she was an infant. This

is an unstable form of epilepsy that changes the brain and affects the entire personality

development. There is also the matter of the side effects of the strong medication she

took throughout her childhood. Dr [R.B.L.] at SSE, who knows [the first applicant]’s

history very well, talks about ‘the burden of epilepsy’, i.e. the socio-emotional

problems that can be generated through a reduced ability to learn and social

maladjustment. It is therefore completely reasonable to assume that the burden of the

disease in itself has set her back somewhat. Objective measurements of her

functioning made at different times during her upbringing confirm this. Seen in

conjunction with clinical observations, an impression is formed of [the first applicant]

as a young woman with significant cognitive impairment. In my opinion, this is what

the public health services identified when [the first applicant] reported her pregnancy

and that gave cause for concern. Terms such as ‘immature’ and ‘childish’ frequently

occur in descriptions of her behaviour throughout her upbringing and are still used

now that she is 24 years old. [The first applicant]’s appearance and behaviour largely

qualify her for the use of such adjectives: she is small, delicate and looks much

younger than her chronological age. She lives at home with her parents where her

room has

Moomins

wallpaper and is filled with objects you would expect to see in a

teenager’s room.

I am concerned about [the first applicant]’s self-care. She seems young, insecure and

partly helpless. Her relationship with men seems unclear. She had a romantic

relationship with a man whom she also lived with for a short time, but the relationship

was characterised by turbulence with episodes of sexual violence. She became

pregnant with X while she was still together with her boyfriend, without [the first

applicant] having been able to explain how it came about that her boyfriend is not the

child’s father. She has seemed confused about this and has told different stories. She

has also contracted a sexually transmitted disease (chlamydia) without knowing the

source of the infection. [The first applicant] has wanted a child, but has left things up

to chance without considering the consequences of having sole responsibility for the

child and what this requires. On 7 November 2007 she told the doctor at SSE that she

was not using birth control and thought that she might be pregnant at that time. Later

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that same day she said that she wanted to become pregnant. An abortion was carried

out on the basis of social indications at [R. hospital] in November 2007 of a foetus in

the 18th week of the pregnancy. [The first applicant] took a photograph of the foetus,

which may seem like a bizarre action. She also received a hand and footprint of the

foetus. [R. hospital] described [the first applicant] as immature with a limited

network.

The circumstances surrounding both pregnancies say something about [the first

applicant]’s awareness of her own choices and their consequences. This is important

in the assessment of her ability to care for a child.

Furthermore, [the first applicant] has not completed an education and has not been

in permanent employment. She has for the most part lived at home in her old room

and has little experience of living as an independent adult with responsibility for

creating structure in her life, ensuring an income and deciding on financial priorities.

Her relationship with her parents is described as good at the moment, but there have

been conflicts in the past. I perceive their relationship to be vulnerable. [The first

applicant] herself expresses a great deal of ambivalence towards her mother, because,

on the one hand, she thinks that her mother interferes too much with her life, while, on

the other hand, she is very dependent on her, takes her opinions as her own and trusts

her to be her guide. At the same time she is annoyed that her mother defines many

things for her and wishes that her mother ‘would get it into her thick head’ that she

needs a bit more privacy than at present. According to her mother, [the first applicant]

just sat in her room after her son was taken into care. Her mother is very worried and

says that she ‘can hardly stand’ seeing her daughter like that.

In my opinion, [the first applicant] has problems with emotional regulation, which

makes interaction with other people difficult for her. Since the child was taken into

care, [the first applicant] has been offended, hurt and angry. These emotions are fully

understandable when you feel that you have been treated unfairly, but in this case they

are expressed without censorship to such an extent that it seems conspicuous.

Describing the County Social Welfare Board as ‘a bunch of rotten women who are

bought off by the child welfare services’ and the staff at [the parent-child institution]

as ‘those psychotic people’ does not help to create an impression of an adult person

who is capable of socialising with other adults in a socially appropriate manner. [The

first applicant]’s intense outbursts of crying, both at home with her parents when we

are discussing the case and during contact sessions, is also unusual behaviour for an

adult. Nor is sobbing into the lap of one’s father or mother (as described in connection

with the contact sessions) a sign that one is able to control one’s emotions in a manner

that is commensurate with one’s age. Nor has [the first applicant] handled her son’s

behaviour very maturely, but has rather felt personally rejected and acted accordingly.

It is difficult to stick to the matter at hand with [the first applicant]. Her cognitive

style is characterised by an inability to see connections, or to generalise. She

demonstrates egocentric thinking when she keeps bringing up the evil child welfare

services and when referring to how her parents and everyone else find it

incomprehensible that the child was taken into care. I refer to the statement by the

psychologist from [the parent-child institution] that ‘the mother makes statements that

are difficult to attach any meaning to.’ The view that I have formed of [the first

applicant] during our conversations is that she has a fragmented view of situations,

meaning that different episodes are understood as individual episodes that have no

connection. Accordingly, guidance is perceived as criticism, good advice as scolding

etc. This inability to generalise is characteristic of [the first applicant]’s thinking. She

also lacks the capability of abstract thinking and formal thought operations. It is

difficult for her to think forwards and backwards in time. Hence, it is not easy to get

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

an answer as to what ideas she has regarding a possible return of the child. She makes

some general statements, for example that she must ask what he likes to eat and

whether he watches children’s TV, whereas she does not offer any reflections on what

special measures should be taken relating to the child’s emotional stress if he were to

be moved. When I ask what the foster mother should do to help during the process of

returning the child, [the first applicant] has no constructive suggestions. What she

wants, however, is ‘that she (the foster mother) should feel as shitty as I have for the

past year’. Such a statement, combined with the manifest hostility (uttalt

fiendtlighet)

during the contact sessions, does not bode well for co-operation with either the foster

home or the child welfare services should the boy be returned.

[The first applicant] has used a lot of energy on her aggression and developing

hostile opinions. This has contributed to cementing the stereotypes about the child

welfare services and all other helpers as adversaries. [The first applicant]’s thinking is

characterised by an ‘if you’re not with me, you’re against me’ attitude, and she is

unable to see nuances. Such black-and-white thinking is characteristic of individuals

with limited cognitive capacity. Furthermore, I perceive [the first applicant] as being

depressed. I consider her intense aggression as a strategy for holding it together

psychologically.

There is no reason to doubt [the first applicant]’s intense wish to become a good

mother. She contacted the support services herself for this purpose. What ideas and

expectations she had in that regard remain unclear, however. Her mother has indicated

that they thought [the parent child-institution] was a sort of hotel where you could get

practical help with child care. Despite all the preparatory work and thorough

information provided beforehand, they did not understand that an assessment stay

requires the parent to show their qualities, be observed and be placed in a learning

situation. Consequently, [the first applicant] feels very betrayed and deceived – which

is expressed as abusive language and threats.

The stay at [the parent-child institution] illustrates that [the first applicant] had

problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to

guide her behaviour. It is not a question of a lack of willingness but of an inadequate

ability to plan, organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment

will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect.

5.2. The effect of assistance measures

Weight is attributed to the fact that [the first applicant] is now living with her

parents and can continue to do so for as long as is necessary. This is an assistance

measure of sorts. This may become more problematic than it would seem, however:

[the first applicant] is 24 years old and wishes to become autonomous, a desire which

may conflict with her mother’s desire to help. Neither her parents nor anyone else will

be able to dictate how [the first applicant] should organise her life and her child’s life.

If [the first applicant] wants to move out, she can do this whenever she wishes. Her

parents are not concerned about this. A decision must therefore be based on the fact

that – should the child be returned – one cannot with a sufficient degree of certainty

know where the child’s care base will be in future. It must therefore primarily be

based on [the first applicant]’s ability to provide care, not her network’s ability to

provide care.

The stay at the family centre was a strong assistance measure which had no effect.

The child welfare services’ follow-up of contact sessions has had a negative impact on

the cooperation between the [applicant’s] family and the child welfare services. Both

the family and [the first applicant] have stated that they do not want follow-up or

assistance in connection with returning the child.

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

5.3. Conclusions

In my assessment, there are grounds for claiming that there were serious

deficiencies in the care the child received from the mother, and also serious

deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security he needed according to his

age and development. [The first applicant]’s cognitive impairment, personality

functioning and inadequate capacity for mentalisation make it impossible to have a

normal conversation with her about the physical and psychological needs of small

children. Her assessments of the consequences of having the child returned to her care

and what it will demand of her as a parent are very limited and infantile, with her own

immediate needs, there and then, as the most predominant feature. It is therefore

found that there is a risk of such deficiencies (as mentioned above) continuing if the

child were to live with his mother.

It is also found that satisfactory conditions for the child cannot be created with the

mother by means of assistance measures pursuant to section 4-4 of the Child Welfare

Act (e.g. relief measures in the home or other parental support measures) due to a lack

of trust and a reluctance to accept interference from the authorities – taking the case

history into consideration.”

64. The High Court held a hearing from 23 to 25 March 2010. The first

applicant attended with her legal-aid counsel. Eleven witnesses were heard

and the court-appointed expert, psychologist M.S. (see paragraph 61 above),

made a statement. The municipal child welfare services submitted,

principally, that there should be no contact between the applicants. In the

alternative, contact should take place only twice a year. The child welfare

services maintained that it was a matter of a “long-term placement”

(langvarig

plassering av barnet).

65. In a judgment of 22 April 2010 the High Court upheld the Board’s

decision that X should be taken into compulsory care (see paragraphs 38-46

above). It also reduced the first applicant’s contact rights to four two-hour

visits per year.

66. The High Court had regard to the information in the report produced

by the parent-child institution on 23 October 2008 (see paragraph 24 above).

It also took account of the family consultant’s testimony before the court, in

which it had been stated that the first applicant’s mother had lived with her

at the institution for the first four nights (see, also, paragraph 17 above). It

went on to state:

“It was particularly after this time that concerns grew about the practical care of the

child. The agreement was that [the first applicant] was to report all nappy changes etc.

and meals, but she did not. The child slept more than they were used to. [The family

consultant] reacted to the child’s breathing and that he was sleeping through meals.

Due to weight loss, he was to be fed every three hours around the clock. Sometimes,

the staff had to pressure the mother into feeding her son.”

67. The High Court found that the parent-child institution had made a

correct assessment and – contrary to the City Court (see paragraph 51

above) – considered it very unlikely that the assessment would have been

different if X had not had an eye infection.

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68. Furthermore, the High Court referred to the report of

5 December 2008 from the child psychiatry clinic (see paragraph 32 above).

It also took into account the report of the court-appointed expert, M.S. (see

paragraph 63 above).

69. As the stay at the parent-child institution had been short, the High

Court found it appropriate to consider the first applicant’s behaviour

(fungering) during the contact sessions that had been organised subsequent

to X’s placement in foster care. Two people had been entrusted with the task

of supervising the sessions, and both had written reports, neither of which

had been positive. The High Court stated that one of the supervisors had

given an “overall negative description of the contact sessions”.

70. The High Court also referred to the report of the psychologist and

the family therapist appointed by the child welfare services, who had

assessed X in relation to the reactions that he had shown after visits from

the first applicant (see paragraphs 58 and 62 above).

71. Furthermore, the High Court noted that the court-appointed

psychologist, M.S. (see paragraphs 61 and 63 above), had stated in court

that the contact sessions had appeared to be so negative that she was of the

opinion that the mother should not have a right of contact with her son. The

contact sessions were, in her view, “not constructive for the child”. In

conclusion to the question of the first applicant’s competence as a carer, she

stated in her report (see paragraph 63 above) that the stay at the parent-child

institution had illustrated that the first applicant “had problems handling and

retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her

behaviour”. She went on to state:

“It is not a question of a lack of willingness, but of an inadequate ability to plan,

organise and structure. Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive

in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect” (ibid.).

72. The High Court agreed with the expert M.S.’s conclusion before

proceeding to the question whether assistance measures could sufficiently

remedy the shortcomings in the first applicant’s parenting skills. In that

respect, it noted that the reasons for the deficiencies in competence as a

carer were crucial. The High Court referred at this point to the expert’s

description of the first applicant’s medical history, namely how she had

suffered from serious epilepsy since childhood and until brain surgery had

been carried out in 2005, when the first applicant had been 19 years old.

73. The High Court noted that M.S. had also pointed out that the first

applicant’s medical history must necessarily have affected her childhood in

several ways. It based its assessment on the description by M.S. of the first

applicant’s health problems and the impact they had had on her social skills

and development. It further noted that placement at a parent-child institution

had been attempted as an assistance measure (see paragraph 17 above). The

stay had been supposed to last for three months, but had been interrupted

after just under three weeks. As a condition for staying longer, the first

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applicant had demanded a guarantee that she be allowed to take her son

home with her after the stay. The child welfare services had been unable to

give such a guarantee, and the first applicant had therefore returned home

on 17 October 2008.

74. The High Court noted that relevant assistance measures were

assumed to consist of a supervisor and further help and training in how to

care for children. However, the High Court found that it would take so long

to provide the first applicant with sufficient training that it was not a real

alternative to continued foster-home placement. Furthermore, the result of

such training was uncertain. In that connection the High Court attached

weight to the fact that both the first applicant and her immediate family had

said that they did not want follow-up or assistance if X were returned to

them. It agreed with the conclusions of the court-appointed expert, M.S.

(see paragraph 63 above).

75. The High Court’s conclusion in its judgment of 22 April 2010 was

that a care order was necessary and that assistance measures for the mother

would not be sufficient to allow her son to stay with her. The conditions for

issuing a care order under the second paragraph of section 4-12 of the Child

Welfare Act were thus met (see paragraph 122 below). In that connection

the High Court also gave weight to the attachment that X had formed to his

foster parents, particularly the foster mother. As to contact rights, the High

Court stated that exceptional and strong reasons were required to deprive a

parent of the right of contact after a child had been taken into care, since

contact was normally considered to be in the child’s best interests,

particularly in a long-term assessment. In the instant case, despite the

negative information about the contact sessions and the expert psychologist

M.S.’s recommendation that the first applicant should not be given any

contact rights, the High Court found that exceptional and strong reasons for

denying contact did not exist, but that contact sessions should not take place

at too short intervals. It went on to state:

“As regards the frequency of the contact sessions, the High Court is split into a

majority and a minority.

The majority ... have found that an appropriate amount of contact would be two

hours four times a year.

The majority find reason to emphasise that only the mother has a right of contact.

The fact that she has rarely met with [X] alone has had some unfortunate

consequences. The tense atmosphere between the adults present has intensified. The

stress for the child must be assumed to increase when more people are present. Fewer

participants will lead to a calmer atmosphere. This is also in line with the psychologist

[M.S.]’s observations. The atmosphere between the adults may also become less tense

when the case has been legally resolved and some time has passed. The fact that the

contact sessions will become less frequent than under the previous arrangement will

also reduce the stress for the child. It must be assumed that the child’s subsequent

reactions will then decrease. However, the most important factor will be whether the

mother and, if relevant, any other family members manage to cooperate better and

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preferably convey a positive attitude towards the foster mother, in particular during

the contact sessions.

The majority’s conclusion that the contact sessions cannot be more frequent than

four times a year is related to what is discussed above. In addition, the placement will

most likely be a long-term arrangement. The contact sessions may thus serve as a way

of maintaining contact between the mother and son so that he is familiar with his

roots. This is believed to be important to the development of identity. The purpose of

the contact sessions is not to establish a relationship with a view to a future return of

the child to the care of his biological mother.

The child welfare services must be authorised to supervise the exercise of the right

of contact. This is necessary for several reasons, including to limit the number of

participants during the sessions.”

The minority of the High Court – one of the professional judges – was of

the opinion that the contact rights should be fixed at twice a year.

76. The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against the judgment,

which thus became legally binding.

D. The first applicant’s complaint to the County Governor

77. In an undated letter the first applicant complained about the child

welfare services to the County Governor (fylkesmannen). She alleged that

the child welfare services had lied and said that she was retarded; the

psychologist appointed by the High Court (see paragraph 61 above) had

been partial and should never have been allowed to come into her home; in

contact sessions, the first applicant was bullied and harassed by the

supervisor and the foster mother if she came alone, and she was not allowed

to bring her own parents any more. She stated that one could only wonder

how retarded they were, or how low an IQ they had. The whole case, she

maintained, had been based on lies. She also alleged that the child welfare

services removed a person’s capacities (umyndiggjør) and gladly made

people retarded (gjør

gjerne folk evneveike)

in order to procure children for

themselves or their friends.

78. The director (barnevernleder) of the municipal child welfare

services replied on 22 July 2010 saying that the first applicant and her

family were more interested in conflict with the child welfare services than

in establishing good and positive contact with X. The first applicant had

complained early on about the staff from the child welfare services, who, in

return, had met her wish to be assigned a new supervisor, but nothing had

changed in the first applicant’s attitude. The amount of contact had been

increased to three times a week in accordance with the City Court’s

judgment (see paragraph 54 above), and X had had strong reactions to this.

The director of the child welfare services further stated that they understood

that the situation was difficult for the first applicant and had offered her help

(see,

inter alia,

paragraph 48 above). With respect to the contact sessions,

they had tried several alternatives. They had at first carried out the sessions

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in a meeting room at their offices, where the supervisor and foster mother

could sit at a table some distance away from the first applicant and X,

though in a manner that enabled them to intervene if supervision were

necessary. The first applicant had complained about this solution. There had

then been some sessions in the foster home, but the foster mother had found

this difficult because the atmosphere was very bad and they wanted the

foster home to be a secure environment for X. Thereafter they had borrowed

an apartment designated for purposes such as contact sessions. This had also

not suited the first applicant, who had again complained. They had then

gone back to having visits at the child welfare services’ offices, where a

new room for such purposes had since been made available.

79. The director of the child welfare services also stated that the foster

mother was still present during contact sessions. This had been considered

as entirely necessary, as she was the secure carer for X. It had also been

considered necessary to have a supervisor present to guide the first

applicant. The supervisor’s task was also to stop the contact sessions if the

first applicant refused guidance. So far, sessions had not been stopped, but

the supervisor had tried to tell the first applicant that it was important to

focus on X and enjoy being with him, instead of yelling at the child welfare

services and the foster mother.

80. In a letter to the first applicant, dated 26 July 2010, the County

Governor, following the child welfare services’ response to their inquiry,

informed her that they had no objections to the work of the child welfare

services in the case.

E. Proceedings to lift the care order or withdraw the first applicant’s

parental responsibilities for X and authorise his adoption

1. Proceedings before the County Social Welfare Board

(a) Introduction

81. On 29 April 2011 the first applicant applied to the child welfare

services for termination of the care order or, in the alternative, extended

contact rights with X.

82. On 13 July 2011 the municipal child welfare services forwarded the

request to the County Social Welfare Board. The municipality proposed that

it be rejected; that the first applicant’s parental responsibilities for X be

withdrawn (transferred to the authorities), and that X’s foster parents, with

whom he had resided since he was taken into care (see paragraph 22 above),

be granted permission to adopt him. The identity of X’s biological father

was still unknown to the authorities. In the alternative, the municipality

proposed that the first applicant’s contact rights be removed.

83. During a contact session on 6 September 2011 the supervisor noticed

that the first applicant was pregnant and asked when the baby was due, to

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which the first applicant, according to the supervision notes, answered that

she thought it was around New Year’s Eve. According to the notes, the

contact session went well.

84. On 13 September 2011 the first applicant’s counsel engaged a

specialist in clinical neurology to test her abilities and to map her cognitive

capacities.

85. In letters of 14 September and 28 October 2011, in the course of the

proceedings before the Board, the municipality asked for further

information about the first applicant’s husband, in order to be able to make

contact with him and talk to him about his future role in the first applicant’s

life.

86. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2011, the first applicant gave birth to Y.

She had married the father of Y in the summer of that year. The new family

had moved to a different municipality. When the child welfare services in

the first applicant’s former municipality became aware that she had given

birth to another child, they sent a letter expressing concern to the new

municipality, which started an investigation into her parenting abilities.

87. Also on 18 October 2011, the specialist in clinical neurology

engaged by the first applicant’s counsel (see paragraph 84 above) produced

his report. His conclusion read as follows:

“Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) shows an IQ of 86. Standard

errors in measurements indicate that, with a 95% probability, she has an IQ of

between 82 and 90. The normal range is between 85 and 115. Ability-wise, [the

applicant] is within the lower part of the normal range. In addition she shows

considerable learning difficulties that are ... [greater] than what her IQ should indicate

[(betydelige

lærevansker som er svakere enn hva hennes IQ skulle tilsi)].

These

difficulties are considered to be consistent with a cognitive impairment.”

In response to a request for follow-up, he wrote to the first applicant’s

counsel on 27 October 2011 stating as follows:

“A general IQ of between 82 and 90 is not in itself a disqualifying factor with

respect to having care for children. Care abilities should to a greater extent be

examined through observation of the care person and the child, and anamnestic

information about other circumstances. Not being an expert in this field, I think that

an assessment of crucial factors would include, among other things, the care person’s

ability for empathy and meeting the child, understanding of the child’s needs, ability

to interpret signals from the child, and ability to set aside [(utsette)] their own wishes

for the benefit of the child’s needs.

Such an assessment should be made by a qualified psychologist with experience in

the field.”

88. On 8 November 2011 the first applicant’s counsel sent a copy of a

medical journal dated 2 November 2011 to the Board. It appeared from the

copy that a doctor had agreed to give evidence by telephone during the

upcoming case and that the doctor could not see that there was anything

connected with the first applicant’s epilepsy or cognition that would indicate

that she was not capable of taking care of her child.

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89. On 28, 29 and 30 November 2011 the County Social Welfare Board,

composed of a lawyer, a psychologist and a lay person, held a hearing at

which the first applicant was present together with her legal representative.

Twenty-one witnesses were heard.

(b) The Board’s decision

90. On 8 December 2011 the Board decided that the first applicant’s

parental responsibilities for X should be withdrawn and that X’s foster

parents should be allowed to adopt him. The Board found that there was

nothing in the case to indicate that the first applicant’s parenting abilities

had improved since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 (see

paragraphs 65-75 above). Therefore she was still considered incapable of

giving X adequate care. Moreover, the Board stated:

“In her statement before the County Social Welfare Board, the mother maintained

her view that the care order was a conspiracy between the child welfare services, [the

parent-child institution] and the foster parents for the purpose of ‘helping a woman

who is unable to have children’. In the mother’s words, it was a question of ‘an

advance order for a child’. The mother had not realised that she had neglected [X],

and stated that she spent most of her time and energy on ‘the case’.

The reports from the contact sessions between the mother and [X] consistently

[(gjennomgående)] show that she is still unable to focus on [X] and what is best for

him, but is influenced by her very negative view of the foster mother and of the child

welfare services.

[The first applicant] has married and had another child this autumn. The

psychologist [K.M.] has stated before the Board that he observed good interaction

between the mother and child and that the mother takes good care of the child. The

Board takes note of this information. In the County Social Welfare Board’s opinion,

this observation cannot in any case be used as a basis for concluding that the mother

has competence as a caregiver for [X].

The County Social Welfare Board finds it reasonable to assume that [X] is a

particularly vulnerable child. He experienced serious and life-threatening neglect

during the first three weeks of his life. Reference is also made to the fact that there

have been many contact sessions with the mother, some of which have been very

stressful for [X]. All in all, he has been through a lot. He has lived in the foster home

for three years and does not know his biological mother. If [X] were to be returned to

the care of his mother, this would require, among other things, a great capacity to

empathise with and understand [X] and the problems he would experience, not least in

the form of mourning and missing his foster parents. The mother and her family

appeared to be completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding. Both the

mother and grandmother stated that it would not be a problem, ‘he just had to be

distracted’, and thus gave the impression of not having sympathy with the boy and

therefore also being incapable of providing the psychological care he would need in

the event of a return.”

91. In addition, the Board had especially noted the conclusions of the

expert M.S. (see paragraph 63 above). They had been quoted by the High

Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs 65-75 above). The

Board found that this description of the first applicant was still accurate. In

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any event, it was decisive that X had established such a connection to his

foster family that removing him would result in serious and permanent

problems for him.

92. The Board further stated:

“[X] has lived in the foster home as an equal member of the family for three years.

These three years are the boy’s whole life. We find it to be substantiated that his

primary source of security and sense of belonging is his foster family. He sees the

foster parents as his psychological parents. In addition to his foster family, [X]

receives good follow-up in kindergarten and from the rest of the foster parents’

family. We have no doubt that removing [X] from this environment and returning him

to his biological mother would lead to considerable and serious problems. Reference

is made to the fact that he had already developed considerable problems after one

year, when the amount of contact was increased significantly. In our assessment, it is

of crucial importance to the boy’s development and welfare that he continue to live in

the foster home.

On this basis the County Social Welfare Board must determine the question of

withdrawal of parental responsibilities and, if relevant, consent to adoption.

The first and second paragraphs of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act state that a

decision to withdraw parental responsibilities from the parents can be made, and is a

precondition for granting consent to adoption. The condition is that the County Social

Welfare Board has made a care order for the child.

The Board bases its decision on established case-law allowing for parental

responsibilities to be withdrawn from biological parents in order to make an adoption

possible. This is the primary objective of the child welfare services’ proposal to

withdraw the mother’s parental responsibilities in the present case.

The wording of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act specifies far stricter

conditions for granting consent to adoption than for withdrawing the parents’ parental

responsibilities. However, when the purpose of a decision pursuant to the first

paragraph is to open up the possibility for adoption, the grounds that indicate adoption

will also constitute the grounds for withdrawal of parental responsibilities.

The matter to be determined in this case is thus whether the conditions for granting

consent to adoption are met. The third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare

Act reads as follows:

‘Consent may be given if

(a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable to

provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to persons

and the environment in which he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall

assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her, and

(b) adoption would be in the child’s best interests, and

have shown themselves to be fit to bring up the child as their own, and

(d) the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act are satisfied.’

The County Social Welfare Board will start by observing that there are good

grounds for withdrawing the mother’s parental responsibilities for [X], regardless of

the issue of adoption. Reference is made to the fact that [X] has lived in the foster

home for practically his whole life, and it is therefore most natural that the foster

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parents make the decisions on his behalf that come with parental responsibilities. The

mother’s insensitive behaviour, not least online, also indicates that she could cause

many problems for him [(ramme

ham hardt)]

when he becomes old enough to

understand.

The County Social Welfare Board considers [(legger

til grunn)]

that the mother will

be permanently unable to provide [X] with proper care, and that [X] has become so

attached to his foster parents, foster brother and the rest of the family that moving him

would lead to serious problems for him. Reference is made to the above discussion.

The condition in letter (a) of [the third paragraph of] section 4-20 of the Child Welfare

Act is met.

Adoption is a particularly invasive measure in relation to the biological parents and

the child. Therefore, particularly weighty reasons are required. Pursuant to Supreme

Court case-law, the decision must be based on a concrete assessment, but must also

build on general experience from child psychology or child psychiatry. Reference is

made in particular to the Supreme Court decision in Rt. 2007 page 561 ff., which

refers to a court-appointed expert who had stated that general experience indicated

that a foster-home relationship was not the preferable option for long-term placement

of children who had come to the foster home before establishing an attachment to

their biological parents. In such cases, adoption would be most conducive to the

child’s development. The judgment stated that considerable importance must be

attached to such general, but nuanced experience.

The County Social Welfare Board bases its decision [(legger

til grunn)]

on the

mother not consenting to [X] being adopted. As shown above, she has a strong, if

inappropriate [(uhensiktsmessig)], commitment to having him returned to her care.

In the County Social Welfare Board’s assessment, consent to an adoption will

clearly be in [X]’s best interests. The County Social Welfare Board does not believe

that returning [X] to his mother’s care is an option. This foster-home placement is

considered permanent. [X] sees his foster parents as his psychological parents, and

they are the only parents he knows. An adoption would give [X] further assurance that

he is his foster parents’ son.”

93. The Board went on to make another reference to the Supreme

Court’s (Høyesteretts) decision in

Norsk Retstidende

(Rt.) 2007, page 561

(see, also, paragraph 125 below) and found that the reasoning underlying

the following passage from that judgment – reiterated in

Aune v. Norway

(no. 52502/07, § 37, 28 October 2010) – was also pertinent in the present

case:

“A decision that he should remain a foster child would tell him that the people with

whom he has always lived and who are his parents and with whom he established his

earliest ties and sense of belonging should remain under the control of the child

welfare services – the public authorities – and that they are not viewed by society as

his true parents but rather as foster parents under an agreement that can be terminated.

...”

The Board considered these general reflections to be an accurate

description of X’s situation as well. An adoption would be in X’s best

interests. The condition in letter (b) of the third paragraph of section 4-20 of

the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 below) was deemed to be met.

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94. Furthermore, the foster parents had been X’s emergency foster

parents and later his foster parents since his emergency placement when he

was three weeks old. The Board stated that it had been documented that they

had provided X with excellent care and that the attachment between them

and X was good and close. The foster parents had a strong wish to adopt X.

In the Board’s opinion, the foster parents had demonstrated that they were

suited to raise X as their own child. The conditions set out in letter (c) of the

third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act Section 4-20 (see

paragraph 122 below) were deemed to be met.

95. In conclusion, the adoption would be in X’s best interests. The

Board took Article 8 of the Convention into consideration when making its

decision.

2. Proceedings before the City Court

(a) Introduction

96. On 19 December 2011 the first applicant appealed against the

decision, claiming that the Board had made an incorrect evaluation of the

evidence when deciding that she was unable to give X adequate care. She

considered that it would be in X’s best interests to be returned to her and

argued that her situation and her caring skills had changed. She was now

married and the couple had a baby. She submitted that the child welfare

services in their new municipality assisted them in taking care of the baby.

Moreover, in her view, removing X from the foster home would cause him

problems only in the short term; no long-term problems could be expected.

X had only stayed in the foster home for a short time, and it had not been

the foster parents who had expressed a wish to adopt the child but the child

welfare services who had taken that initiative. The first applicant also

claimed that the visits between her and X had worked satisfactorily; if the

child welfare services considered the contact sessions to be inadequate it

was for them, as the stronger party, to take action to ensure that they be

made satisfactory.

97. The municipality opposed the appeal and submitted in their response

that X, who was then three years and four months old and had lived in the

foster home since he was three weeks old, had become attached to the foster

home. They maintained that it would cause serious and long-lasting

problems for him if he were returned at the present time. He had no

recollection of the period when he had been in his mother’s care. In the

municipality’s view, the first applicant’s ability to care for X had not

changed since the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010. The visits

between X and the first applicant had not worked well. She had had

outbursts during the visits and had left before the time was up. Afterwards

X had reacted negatively. The first applicant and her mother had manifested

a very negative attitude towards the child welfare services. The first

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applicant had claimed that the child welfare services assisted them in taking

care of the baby, whereas the truth was that they had denied the child

welfare services access to their home and, accordingly, no assistance

measures had been implemented. It had, admittedly, been the child welfare

services that had taken the initiative to petition for adoption, but this was

their duty in a case such as the present. It was better for X to be offered the

firm attachment to the foster home that an adoption would give him. The

municipality stressed that it was not the first applicant’s epilepsy or her IQ

that gave reason to take measures, but her immaturity and actual lack of

caring skills. The psychologist, K.M., engaged by the first applicant (see

paragraph 98 below) should not be allowed to give evidence. He had

videotaped a contact session without the parties’ agreement; refused to send

the video to the child welfare services; had never provided anything in

writing, nor anything that had been quality-checked such as was the

ordinary procedure for expert reports; the municipality had already reported

him to the health supervision authorities and the Ethics Council of the

Psychologists’ Association.

98. On 22 February 2012 the City Court, composed of one professional

judge, one psychologist and one lay person, in accordance with section 36-4

of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below), upheld the decision after

having held a hearing which lasted from 13 to 15 February 2012 and during

which twenty-one witnesses were heard. Among the witnesses called by the

child welfare services were the persons responsible for supervision of the

foster home and the contact sessions, S.H. from the Children’s and Young

People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic, expert psychologists B.S. and M.S.

(see,

inter alia,

paragraphs 58, 61, 62 and 63 above) and the family

consultant from the parent-child institution (see, for example, paragraph 24

above). Among the witnesses called by the first applicant were members of

her family, her husband and members of his family, the medical director at

the hospital where the first applicant had undergone surgery in 2005 (see

paragraph 72 above) and specialist in psychology K.M. (see paragraph 97

above). The first applicant was present together with her legal aid counsel.

(b) The City Court’s reasoning regarding whether X’s public care could be

discontinued

99. As a preliminary point in its judgment the City Court stated that

during the hearing some time had been spent shedding light on the

circumstances existing prior to the decision ordering X to be taken into care.

The City Court stated that it would only examine the situation prior to the

placement decision in so far as necessary to assess the situation at the time

of its judgment appropriately.

100. The City Court went on to note that the first applicant’s situation in

some areas had improved during the last year. She had married in August

2011, her husband had a permanent job and they had a daughter, Y. It also

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noted that the child welfare services in the couple’s current municipality

were conducting an ongoing inquiry concerning the mother’s ability to care

for Y. A staff member of the child welfare services in that new municipality

had testified at the oral hearing, stating that they had not received any

reports of concern other than the one from the child welfare services in the

first applicant’s former municipality. As part of their inquiry they had made

observations at the first applicant’s home. They had observed many good

aspects but also that the parents might need some help with routines and

structure. The City Court found that this indicated that the child welfare

services in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved

considered that the parents could give Y adequate care if assisted by the

child welfare services. Y was not a child with any special care needs.

101. However, on the basis of the evidence the situation was different

with regard to X, whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child.

The City Court referred in particular to a statement from a professional at

the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic

explaining that, as late as December 2011, X was easily stressed and needed

a lot of quiet, security and support. If his emotional development in the

future were to be sound, the carer would have to be aware of that and take it

into account. When the first applicant gave evidence in court, she had

clearly shown that she did not realise what challenges she would face if X

were to be moved from the foster home. She could not see his vulnerability,

her primary concern being that he should grow up “where he belonged”.

The first applicant believed that returning him would be unproblematic and

still did not understand why the child welfare services had had to intervene

when he was placed in the emergency foster home. She had not wished to

say anything about how she thought X was developing in the foster home.

In the City Court’s view, the first applicant would not be sufficiently able to

see or understand X’s special care needs, and if those needs were not met,

there would be a considerable risk of abnormal development.

102. The City Court also took account of how the foster parents and

supervisor had described X’s emotional reactions after contact sessions with

his mother, namely, his inconsolable crying and need for a lot of sleep.

During the contact sessions X had repeatedly resisted contact with the first

applicant and, as the sessions had progressed, reacted with what had been

described as resignation. The City Court considered that a possible reason

for that was that the boy was vulnerable to inexpedient interaction and

information that was not adapted to his age and functioning. The first

applicant’s emotional outbursts in situations during the contact sessions, for

example when X had sought out his foster mother and called her “Mummy”,

were seen as potentially frightening (skremmende) and not conducive to X’s

sound development.

103. The City Court held that the presentation of evidence had “clearly

shown” that the “fundamental limitations” (grunnleggende

begrensningene)

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that had existed at the time of the High Court’s judgment still existed.

Nothing had emerged during the City Court’s consideration of the case to

indicate that the first applicant had developed a more positive attitude to the

child welfare services or to the foster mother, beyond a statement made by

her to the extent that she was willing to cooperate. She had snubbed the

foster mother when she had said hello during the contact sessions and had

never asked for information about X. The first applicant had left in

frustration forty minutes before the last visit had been scheduled to end.

Everyone who had been present during the contact sessions had described

the atmosphere as unpleasant. The City Court considered that one possible

reason why the first applicant’s competence at contact sessions had not

improved was that she struggled so much with her own feelings and with

missing X that it made her incapable of considering the child’s perspective

and protecting him from her own emotional outbursts. An improvement was

contingent upon her understanding X and his needs and on her being willing

to work on herself and her own weaknesses. The first applicant had not

shown any positive developments in her competence in contact situations

throughout the three years she had had rights of contact. The fact that her

parents had a remarkably negative attitude to the municipal child welfare

services did not make it any easier for her.

104. The first applicant had claimed in court that she was a victim of

injustice and that she would fight until X was returned to her. To shed light

on her own situation, she had chosen to post her story on the Internet in

June 2011 with a photograph of herself and X. In that article and several

comments posted during the autumn of 2011, she had made serious

accusations against the child welfare services and the foster parents –

accusations which she had admitted in court were untrue. The first applicant

did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could

be harmful for the child in the long term.

105. The City Court noted that the psychologist K.M. (see

paragraphs 97-98 above), who had examined and treated the first applicant,

had testified that she did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric diagnosis.

He had counselled her in connection with the trauma inflicted on her by

having her child taken away. The goal of the treatment had been to make the

first applicant feel like a good mother. He believed that the previous

assessments of the first applicant’s ability to provide care had at that time

been incorrect, and argued before the City Court that the best outcome for X

would be to be returned to his biological mother. However, the City Court

stated that the psychologist K.M.’s arguments had been based on research

conducted in the 1960s, and found them to be incompatible with recent

infant research. It noted that the other experts who had testified in court,

including the psychologists B.S. and M.S., had advised against returning X

to his mother, as this would be very harmful for him.

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106. In conclusion thus far, the City Court agreed with the County

Social Welfare Board that the first applicant had not changed in such a way

as to indicate that it was highly probable that she would be able to provide

X with proper care. It endorsed the Board’s grounds, holding that the first

applicant’s clear limitations as a carer could not be mitigated by an adapted

transitional scheme, assistance measures or support from her network. It did

not find reason to consider other arguments regarding her ability to provide

care in more detail, as returning X to her was in any case not an option

owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the

foster home. The City Court agreed at this point with the Board in its

finding that X had developed such an attachment to his foster parents, his

foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would lead to

serious problems if he had to move. X’s primary security and sense of

belonging were in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his

psychological parents. On those grounds the care order could not be

revoked.

X should be withdrawn and consent to his adoption given

107. Turning to the issues of withdrawal of parental responsibilities and

consent to adoption, the City Court stated at the outset that where a care

order had been issued, it was in principle sufficient for removal of parental

responsibilities that this be in the child’s best interests. At the same time, it

had been emphasised in several Supreme Court judgments that removal of

parental responsibilities was a very invasive decision and that therefore

strong reasons were required for making such a decision (see,

inter alia,

paragraph 125 below). The requirements in respect of adoption were even

more stringent. However, the questions of withdrawal of parental

responsibilities and consent to adoption had to be seen in conjunction, since

the primary reason for withdrawing parental responsibilities would be to

facilitate adoption. The court also took into consideration that if the first

applicant retained her parental responsibilities, she might engage in conflicts

in the future about the rights that such responsibility entailed, such as

exposing the child on the Internet.

108. The City Court went on to declare that adoption could only be

granted if the four conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the

Child Welfare Act were met (see paragraph 122 below), and endorsed the

Board’s grounds for finding that such was the case regarding the criteria in

letters (a), namely that it had to be regarded as probable that the first

applicant would be permanently unable to provide X with proper care or

that X had become so attached to his foster home and the environment there

that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing him could lead to

serious problems for him; (c), namely that the persons applying for adoption

had been X’s foster parents and had shown themselves fit to bring him up as

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their own child; and (d), namely that the conditions for granting an adoption

under the Adoption Act (see paragraph 132 below) were satisfied; as to

letter (d), further documents had also been submitted to the court. In the

present case the decisive factor was therefore whether adoption was in X’s

best interests under letter (b), and whether consent for adoption should be

given on the basis of an overall assessment. Regarding that assessment,

several Supreme Court judgments had stated that strong reasons must exist

for consenting to adoption against the will of a biological parent. There

must be a high degree of certainty that adoption would be in the child’s best

interests. It was also clear that the decision must be based not only on a

concrete assessment, but also on general experience from child-psychology

research. Reference was made to the Supreme Court’s judgment in

Rt.

2007,

page 561 (see paragraph 125 below).

109. Applying the general principles to the instant case, the City Court

first noted that X was at that time three and a half years old and had lived in

his foster home since he was three weeks old. His fundamental attachment

in the social and psychological sense was to his foster parents, and it would

in any event be a long-term placement. X was moreover a vulnerable child,

and adoption would help to strengthen his sense of belonging with his foster

parents, whom he regarded as his parents. It was particularly important to a

child’s development to experience a secure and sound attachment to its

psychological parents. Adoption would give X a sense of belonging and

security in the years ahead for longer than the period a foster-home

relationship would last. Practical considerations also indicated that persons

who had care and control of a child and who in reality functioned as its

parents should carry out the functions that derived from parental

responsibilities.

110. The City Court noted that adoption meant that the legal ties to the

biological family were severed. In its opinion, X, despite spending the first

three weeks of his life with his mother and having many contact sessions,

had not bonded psychologically with her. That had remained the case even

though he had been told at a later stage that the first applicant had given

birth to him.

111. Furthermore, the court took account of the fact that even if no

further contact sessions were organised, the foster parents had taken a

positive view of letting X contact his biological parent if he so wished.

112. Based on an overall assessment, the City Court found that it would

be in X’s best interests for the first applicant’s parental responsibilities to be

withdrawn and for the foster parents to be allowed to adopt him. The court

believed that particularly weighty reasons existed for consenting to adoption

in the present case.

113. The City Court stated, lastly, that since it had decided that X should

be adopted, it was unable to decide on contact rights for the first applicant,

since that question would be up to the foster parents to decide. It mentioned

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that section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act provided a legal basis for

determining rights to contact subsequent to adoption (see paragraph 122

below, where that provision is reiterated, and paragraph 128 below, on the

“open adoption” system). The City Court was not competent, however, to

examine or determine such rights since its competence was dependent on a

party to the case having made a request to that effect. In the instant case,

neither of the parties had done so.

3. Proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court

114. On 14 March 2012 the first applicant, through her counsel,

appealed against the judgment, claiming that the City Court had evaluated

the evidence incorrectly when concluding that the first applicant was

permanently unable to care for X. Counsel stated that the High Court should

appoint an expert to assess the first applicant’s husband’s help to mother

and child, and the first applicant’s caring skills at the time. In response to a

letter from the High Court, dated 16 March 2012, counsel also argued that

the City Court should have obtained an assessment by an expert witness

concerning her and her husband’s ability to provide adequate care.

115. In their response, dated 26 April 2012, to the first applicant’s

arguments that an expert assessment was necessary in the light of her new

situation, the municipality stated,

inter alia,

that they had made several

requests to be allowed to get to know the first applicant’s husband (see, for

example, paragraph 85 above), and that the first applicant had consistently

chosen to disregard those requests. Since the child welfare services

responsible for X did not have any insights into the family’s situation in

their new municipality, they could only rely on the information they had

received from the child welfare services in that municipality, from which

they could not infer that the first applicant could take care of X.

116. On 12 June 2012 the first applicant, who had then instructed new

counsel, submitted to the High Court a statement from the child welfare

services in her new municipality. It emerged from the statement, dated

21 March 2012, that those child welfare services had visited the family five

times, each time for one and a half hours. They considered that the family

needed assistance in the form of guidance with respect to interaction with

their baby, which they could obtain from the local “baby team”

(spedbarnsteamet) as well as a social worker (miljøterapeut) in the home,

who could help with routines, structure and cleanliness. The first applicant’s

counsel also argued that the foster mother’s presence during the contact

sessions had disturbed (virket

forstyrrende på)

their implementation.

117. On 23 August 2012 counsel for the first applicant submitted a

report from the child welfare services in the first applicant’s new

municipality, dated 5 June 2012. In the report it was stated,

inter alia,

that

the parents had stated early on that they would accept advice and guidance

if the child welfare services so recommended. The mother had stated that

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she had had a bad experience with the “baby team”, but that she could

accept help from them if another person on the team was appointed to be her

contact. In the report it was further stated that the child welfare services

considered that it had observed two parents who showed that they wanted

the best for their child. The first applicant played with the child, talked to

her and engaged actively with her. On the basis of all the information

contained in the observations, the child welfare services considered that the

parents had to work on routines, cleanliness and involvement with the child.

The parents accepted that a social worker be assigned to help them in the

home.

118. In the meantime, on 22 August 2012, the High Court had decided

not to grant leave to appeal because the conditions in section 36-10 of the

Dispute Act (see paragraph 133 below) had not been met. The High Court

stated that the case did not raise any new legal issues of importance for the

uniform application of the law. With regard to whether new information had

emerged, the court noted that the assessment dated 21 March 2012 had been

made by,

inter alia,

a person who had testified before the City Court and

that the document would not change the outcome of the case. The first

applicant’s caring skills had been thoroughly examined in connection with

the Board’s processing of the case and no new information had emerged that

indicated changes in that respect. Moreover, the City Court’s reasons were

convincing and the High Court observed that the first applicant had not

asked for an expert witness to be heard in the City Court and had not given

any reasons as to why it was necessary to appoint an expert before the High

Court. As had just been mentioned, there was no new information that

indicated any changes in her caring skills. Thus there were no serious flaws

in the City Court’s judgment or procedure and no reasons for granting leave

to appeal.

119. On 24 September 2012 the first applicant appealed against the

decision to the Supreme Court. She submitted an assessment concerning the

experience of the social worker in respect of her work with the family and

their care for Y (see paragraph 117 above), dated 14 August 2012. In that

document it was concluded that a positive development had started and that

the social worker should continue to assist the family. The first applicant

argued that the City Court had relied more on older documents than on the

circumstances at the time of its judgment and had disregarded the fact that

its judgment would have the effect of depriving Y of contact with X. She

further repeated her argument that the foster mother’s presence had

disturbed the contact sessions (see paragraph 116 above) and maintained

that the child welfare services had not properly organised the sessions.

120. In its reply of 4 October 2012 the municipality stated,

inter alia,

that it was positive that the first applicant and her husband had managed to

avail themselves of the guidance received from the social worker, but that X

was a vulnerable child whereas Y did not face similar challenges. As to the

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first applicant’s argument that the City Court had not based its decision on

the circumstances at the time of its judgment, the municipality pointed to

the fact that five out of the eight witnesses they had called, and all the

witnesses called by the first applicant, had given evidence before the City

Court on the circumstances as they were at that time. They further stated

that Y would not be deprived of contact with X as long as the first applicant

accepted X’s foster home and contributed to making it a good experience

for the children. As to Y’s father, it was argued that it had emerged from his

testimony before the Board and City Court that he knew little about X’s

placement in care and about the challenges surrounding the contact sessions.

The municipality also submitted that they would argue before the Supreme

Court that X’s right to respect for his family life was also protected by

Article 8 of the Convention and that his need for stability in the foster home

and good care would be best ensured if he were adopted.

121. On 15 October 2012 the Supreme Court Appeals Board

(Høyesteretts

ankeutvalg)

dismissed the first applicant’s appeal against the

High Court’s decision.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. The Child Welfare Act

122. The relevant sections of the Child Welfare Act of 17 July 1992

(barnevernloven) provide:

Section 4-1. Consideration of the child’s best interests

“When applying the provisions of this chapter, decisive importance shall be attached

to finding measures which are in the child’s best interests.

This includes attaching importance to giving the child stable and good contact with

adults and continuity in the care provided.”

Section 4-6. Interim orders in emergencies

“If a child is without care because the parents are ill or for other reasons, the child

welfare services shall implement such assistance as is immediately required. Such

measures shall not be maintained against the will of the parents.

If there is a risk that a child will suffer material harm by remaining at home, the

head of the child welfare administration or the prosecuting authority may immediately

make an interim care order without the consent of the parents.

In such a case the head of the child welfare administration may also make an interim

order under section 4-19.

If an order has been made under the second paragraph, an application for measures

as mentioned in section 7-11 shall be sent to the county social welfare board as soon

as possible, and within six weeks at the latest, but within two weeks if it is a matter of

measures under section 4-24.

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If the matter has not been sent to the county social welfare board within the time-

limits mentioned in the fourth paragraph, the order shall lapse.”

Section 4-12. Care orders

“A care order may be issued

(a) if there are serious deficiencies in the daily care received by the child, or

serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security needed by a child

of his or her age and development,

(b) if the parents fail to ensure that a child who is ill, disabled or in special need of

assistance receives the treatment and training required,

(d) if it is highly probable that the child’s health or development may be seriously

harmed because the parents are unable to take adequate responsibility for the child.

An order may only be made under the first paragraph when necessary due to the

child’s current situation. Hence, such an order may not be made if satisfactory

conditions can be created for the child by assistance measures under section 4-4 or by

measures under section 4-10 or section 4-11.

An order under the first paragraph shall be made by the county social welfare board

under the provisions of Chapter 7.”

Section 4-19. Contact rights. Secret address

“Unless otherwise provided, children and parents are entitled to have contact with

each other.

When a care order has been made, the county social welfare board shall determine

the extent of contact, but may, for the sake of the child, also decide that there should

be no contact. The county social welfare board may also decide that the parents

should not be entitled to know the child’s whereabouts.

...

The private parties cannot request that a case regarding contact be dealt with by the

county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the county social

welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months.

...”

Section 4-20. Withdrawal of parental responsibilities. Adoption

“If the county social welfare board has made a care order for a child, it may also

decide that the parents must be stripped of all parental responsibilities. If, as a result

of the parents being stripped of parental responsibilities, the child is left without a

guardian, the county social welfare board shall as soon as possible take steps to have a

new guardian appointed for the child.

Where an order has been made withdrawing parental responsibilities, the county

social welfare board may give its consent for a child to be adopted by persons other

than the parents.

Consent may be given if

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(a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable to

provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to persons

and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall

assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her, and

(b) adoption would be in the child’s best interests, and

have shown themselves fit to bring up the child as their own, and

(d) the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act are satisfied.

Where the county social welfare board consents to adoption, the Ministry

[

Children and Equality] shall issue an adoption order.”

Section 4-20a. Contact between the child and his or her biological parents after

adoption [added in 2010]

“Where the county social welfare board issues an adoption order under section 4-20,

it shall, if any of the parties have requested it, at the same time consider whether there

shall be contact between the child and his or her biological parents after the adoption

has been carried out. If limited contact after adoption in such cases is in the child’s

best interests, and the persons applying for adoption consent to such contact, the

county social welfare board shall make an order for such contact. In such case, the

county social welfare board must at the same time determine the amount of contact.

...

A contact order may only be reviewed if special reasons justify doing so. Special

reasons may include the child’s opposition to contact or the biological parents’ failure

to comply with the contact order.

...”

Section 4-21. Revocation of care orders

“The county social welfare board shall revoke a care order where it is highly

probable that the parents will be able to provide the child with proper care. The

decision shall nonetheless not be revoked if the child has become so attached to

persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall

assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her. Before a

care order is revoked, the child’s foster parents shall be entitled to state their opinion.

The parties may not request that a case concerning revocation of a care order be

dealt with by the county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the

county social welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months. If a

request for revocation of the previous order or judgment was not upheld with

reference to section 4-21, first paragraph, second sentence, new proceedings may only

be requested where documentary evidence is provided to show that significant

changes have taken place in the child’s situation.”

Section 7-5. The board’s composition in individual cases

“In individual cases, the county social welfare board shall consist of a

chairman/chairwoman, one member of the ordinary committee and one member of the

expert committee. When necessary due to the complexity of the case, the

chairman/chairwoman may decide that the board, in addition to the

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chairman/chairwoman, shall consist of two members of the ordinary committee and

two members of the expert committee.

If the parties consent thereto, the chairman/chairwoman may decide cases as

mentioned in the first paragraph alone unless this is precluded by due regard for the

satisfactory hearing of the case.

Where the case concerns a request for an alteration in a previous decision/order or

judgment, the chairman/chairwoman may decide the case alone if this is

unobjectionable with due regard for the subject of the case, its complexity, the need

for professional expertise, and a proper hearing of the case.

Where the case concerns an extension of a placement order made by the county

social welfare board under section 4-29, the chairman/chairwoman shall decide the

case alone.”

B. Case-law under the Child Welfare Act

123. The Supreme Court has delivered several judgments on the Child

Welfare Act. Of relevance in the present context is its judgment of

23 May 1991 (Rt. 1991, page 557), in which the Supreme Court stated that

since withdrawal of parental responsibilities with a view to adoption

involves permanently severing the legal ties between the child and its

biological parents and other relatives, strong reasons have to be present in

order for a decision of that sort to be taken. It emphasised, moreover, that a

decision to withdraw parental responsibilities must not be taken without

first having carried out a thorough examination and consideration of the

long-term consequences of alternative measures, based on the concrete

circumstances of each case.

124. In a later judgment, of 10 January 2001 (Rt. 2001, page 14), the

Supreme Court considered that the legal criterion “strong reasons” in this

context should be interpreted in line with the Court’s case-law, in particular

Johansen v. Norway,

no. 17383/90, § 78, 7 August 1996. This meant,

according to the Supreme Court, that consent to adoption contrary to the

wish of the biological parents could only be given in “extraordinary

circumstances”.

125. The above case-law was developed further,

inter alia,

in the

Supreme Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007, page 561), after the

Court had declared a second application by the applicant in the

above-mentioned case of

Johansen v. Norway

inadmissible (see

Johansen

v. Norway

(dec.), 12750/02, 10 October 2002). The Supreme Court

reiterated that the requirement that adoption be in the child’s best interests,

as set out in section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122

above), meant that “strong reasons” (sterke

grunner)

must be present in

order for consent to adoption to be given contrary to the wish of the

biological parents. In addition, the Supreme Court emphasised that a

decision of this kind had to be based on the concrete circumstances of each

case, but also take account of general experience, including experience from

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research into child psychology or child psychiatry. The Supreme Court

examined the general principles in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court and

concluded that the domestic law was in conformity with those principles: an

adoption could only be authorised where “particularly weighty reasons”

were present. That case was subsequently brought before the Court, which

found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see

Aune,

cited above,

§ 37, for a recapitulation of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the general

principles developed in the case-law of the Supreme Court and the Court).

126. The Supreme Court again set out the general principles applicable

to adoption cases in a judgment of 30 January 2015 (Rt. 2015, page 110). It

reiterated that forced adoptions had a severe impact and generally inflicted

profound emotional pain on the parents. Family ties were protected by

Article 8 of the Convention and Article 102 of the Constitution. Adoption

was also an intrusive measure for the child and could, under Article 21 of

the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 134 below),

accordingly only be decided when in his or her best interests. However,

where there were decisive factors from the child’s point of view in favour of

adoption, the parents’ interests would have to yield, as had been provided

for in Article 104 of the Constitution and Article 3 § 1 of the Convention on

the Rights of the Child (ibid.). Reference was made to

Aune,

cited above,

§ 66, where the Court had stated that an adoption could only be authorised

where justified by “an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best

interests”, which corresponded to the standard of “particularly weighty

reasons” as established by the Supreme Court in the judgment that had been

scrutinised by the European Court of Human Rights in

Aune

(see

paragraph 125 above).

127. Parliament had examined, and a majority had supported, a proposal

from the Government (Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009)) discussing the issue of a

considerable decline in adoptions in Norway. In the proposal it had been

suggested that the child welfare services had developed a reluctance to

propose adoptions in the aftermath of the Court’s finding of a violation in

Johansen,

cited above, even though research had shown that it was in a

child’s best interests to be adopted rather than experience a continuous life

in foster care until reaching their majority. The Supreme Court interpreted

the proposal as emphasising that the child welfare services should ensure

that adoption would actually be proposed where appropriate, but that the

proposal did not imply that the legal threshold, under Article 8 of the

Convention, had changed. The Supreme Court added that the general

information obtained from research on adoption was relevant to the concrete

assessment of whether an adoption should be authorised in an individual

case.

128. The Supreme Court also examined the implication of amendments

of the rules concerning contact between the child and the biological parents,

which had been coined as an “open adoption” in the above proposal. The

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rules had been incorporated into section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act,

which had been in force since 2010. They required that an “open adoption”

be in the child’s best interests and that the adoptive parents consent (see

paragraph 122 above). It observed that the legislature’s reasons for

introducing the system of “open adoptions” had been to secure the child

stable and predictable surroundings in which to grow up, while at the same

time ensuring some contact with its biological parents where this would be

in the child’s best interests. The child would thus have all the benefits of the

adoption, while still having contact with its biological parents. The Supreme

Court found that the introduction of the system of “open adoptions” had not

meant that the legal threshold for authorising adoptions had been lowered.

However, in some cases further contact between the child and the biological

parents could mitigate some of the arguments against adoption. Reference

was made to

Aune,

cited above, § 78.

129. The Supreme Court considered anew the general principles

concerning adoption in a judgment of 11 September 2018. The Supreme

Court observed,

inter alia,

that the European Court of Human Rights, in the

case of

Mohamed Hasan v. Norway,

no. 27496/15, § 148, 26 April 2018,

had stressed the strict procedural requirements that must be met by the

domestic decision-making authorities in cases concerning adoption. When

summarising the subject of its review, the Supreme Court stated that the

best interests of the child were the most important and weighty concerns

when deciding the adoption issue. As adoption was such a radical and

irreversible measure, it could only be justified – from the child’s point of

view – by particularly weighty reasons. These grounds had to be balanced

against the consequences of adoption for the child’s contact with its

biological parents in the individual case. Where there had been little or no

contact between the parents and the child, the concern for protection of their

family life would be given less weight than in cases where a more normal

family life had existed.

130. The current position in respect of knowledge and research on

adopted children had been studied by a court-appointed expert and

presented in an appendix to his statement to the Supreme Court. The expert

believed that the summary in the Supreme Court’s judgment of

20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007, page 561; see paragraph 125 above) was still

accurate. Based on an updated study of relevant research and professional

experience as a psychologist, the expert had stated the following in the case

at hand:

“Children in long-term foster care who are adopted undergo better psychosocial

development than children in a similar situation who are not adopted. It is the

durability of the child’s sense of belonging that seems to be essential.”

131. The expert had specified in his statement before the Supreme Court

that this was a difficult area of research, one of the reasons being that few

forced adoptions were carried out annually in Norway. And, as had been

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emphasised in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (Rt. 2007

page 561; see paragraph 125 above), a specific, individual assessment had

to be made in each case. But, as emphasised in the same judgment, such a

research- and experienced-based perception of what was generally best for

the child, had to be given particular weight. Also, the abovementioned (see

paragraph 127) proposal from the Government (Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009))

had stressed that research showed that “... for some children, adoption may

give a safer and more predictable upbringing than long-term foster care”.

C. The Adoption Act

132. The Adoption Act of 28 February 1986, in force at the relevant

time, contained the following relevant provisions:

Section 2

“An adoption order must only be issued where it can be assumed that the adoption

will be to the benefit of the child [(til

gagn for barnet)].

It is further required that the

person applying for adoption either wishes to foster or has fostered the child, or that

there is another special reason for the adoption.”

Section 12

“Adoptive parents shall, as soon as is advisable, tell the adopted child that he or she

is adopted.

When the child has reached 18 years of age, he or she is entitled to be informed by

the Ministry

[

of Children and Equality] of the identity of his or her biological

parents.”

Section 13

“On adoption, the adopted child and his or her heirs shall have the same legal status

as if the adopted child had been the adoptive parents’ biological child, unless

otherwise provided by section 14 or another statute. At the same time, the child’s legal

relationship to his or her original family shall cease, unless otherwise provided by

special statute.

Where one spouse has adopted a child of the other spouse or cohabitant, the said

child shall have the same legal status in relation to both spouses as if he or she were

their joint child. The same applies to children adopted pursuant to section 5 b, second,

third and fourth paragraphs.”

Section 14 a. Contact after adoption

“In the case of adoptions carried out as a result of decisions pursuant to section 4-20

of the Child Welfare Act, the effects of the adoption that follow from section 13 of the

present Act shall apply, subject to any limitations that may have been imposed by a

decision pursuant to section 4-20 a of the Child Welfare Act regarding contact

between the child and his or her biological parents.”

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D. The Dispute Act

133. The first paragraph of section 36-4 and the third paragraph of

section 36-10 of the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 (tvisteloven) read:

Section 36-4 The composition of the court. Expert panel

“(1) The district court shall sit with two lay judges, one of whom shall be an

ordinary lay judge and the other an expert. In special cases, the court may sit with two

professional judges and three lay judges, one or two of whom shall be experts.”

Section 36-10 Appeal

“(3) An appeal against the judgment of the district court in cases concerning the

County Board’s decisions pursuant to the Child Welfare Act requires the leave of the

court of appeal.

Leave can only be granted if

a) the appeal concerns issues whose significance extends beyond the scope of the

current case,

b) there are grounds to rehear the case because new information has emerged,

c) the ruling of the district court or the procedure in the district court is seriously

flawed [(vesentlige

svakheter ved tingrettens avgjørelse eller saksbehandling)],

d) the judgment provides for coercive measures that were not approved by the

County Board.”

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS

A. The United Nations

134. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,

concluded in New York on 20 November 1989, contains,

inter alia,

the

following provisions:

Article 3

“1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative

bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

Article 9

“1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her

parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review

determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is

necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a

particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or

one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the

child’s place of residence.

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2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested

parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their

views known.

3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or

both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a

regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.

4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as

the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from

any cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of

the child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if

appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information concerning

the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the

information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall

further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse

consequences for the person(s) concerned.”

Article 18

“1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle

that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of

the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary

responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of

the child will be their basic concern.

2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present

Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal

guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure

the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.

3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of

working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for

which they are eligible.”

Article 20

“1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment,

or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall

be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State.

2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care

for such a child.

3. Such care could include,

inter alia,

foster placement,

kafalah

of Islamic law,

adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children.

When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity

in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic

background.”

Article 21

“States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that

the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:

(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities

who determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of

all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the

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child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required,

the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis

of such counselling as may be necessary;

...”

135. In its General Comment no. 7 (2005) on implementing child rights

in early childhood, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child

sought to encourage the States Parties to recognise that young children were

holders of all rights enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child

and that early childhood was a critical period for the realisation of those

rights. In particular, the Committee referred to the best interests of the child:

“13. Article 3 sets out the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary

consideration in all actions concerning children. By virtue of their relative immaturity,

young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their

rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being,

while taking account of their views and evolving capacities. The principle of best

interests appears repeatedly within the Convention (including in articles 9, 18, 20 and

21, which are most relevant to early childhood). The principle of best interests applies

to all actions concerning children and requires active measures to protect their rights

and promote their survival, growth, and well-being, as well as measures to support

and assist parents and others who have day-to-day responsibility for realizing

children’s rights:

(a) Best interests of individual children. All decision-making concerning a child’s

care, health, education, etc. must take account of the best interests principle,

including decisions by parents, professionals and others responsible for children.

States parties are urged to make provisions for young children to be represented

independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child’s interests,

and for children to be heard in all cases where they are capable of expressing their

opinions or preferences.”

136. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General

Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best

interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013,

mentions the following as elements “to be taken into account when

assessing the child’s best interests”:

“(a) The child’s views

...

(b) The child’s identity

...

(d) Care, protection and safety of the child

...

(e) Situation of vulnerability

...

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(f) The child’s right to health

...

(g) The child’s right to education

...”

Under the headings “Balancing the elements in the best-interests

assessment” and “Procedural safeguards to guarantee the implementation of

the child’s best interests”,

inter alia,

the following is included:

“84. In the best-interests assessment, one has to consider that the capacities of the

child will evolve. Decision-makers should therefore consider measures that can be

revised or adjusted accordingly, instead of making definitive and irreversible

decisions. To do this, they should not only assess the physical, emotional, educational

and other needs at the specific moment of the decision, but should also consider the

possible scenarios of the child’s development, and analyse them in the short and long

term. In this context, decisions should assess continuity and stability of the child’s

present and future situation.

...

85. To ensure the correct implementation of the child’s right to have his or her best

interests taken as a primary consideration, some child-friendly procedural safeguards

must be put in place and followed. As such, the concept of the child’s best interests is

a rule of procedure ... .

...

87. States must put in place formal processes, with strict procedural safeguards,

designed to assess and determine the child’s best interests for decisions affecting the

child, including mechanisms for evaluating the results. States must develop

transparent and objective processes for all decisions made by legislators, judges or

administrative authorities, especially in areas which directly affect the child or

children.”

B. The Council of Europe

137. The Council of Europe’s Revised Convention on the Adoption of

Children of 27 November 2008 contains,

inter alia,

the following

provisions:

Article 3 – Validity of an adoption

“An adoption shall be valid only if it is granted by a court or an administrative

authority (hereinafter the ‘competent authority’).”

Article 4 – Granting of an adoption

“1. The competent authority shall not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied that the

adoption will be in the best interests of the child.

2. In each case the competent authority shall pay particular attention to the

importance of the adoption providing the child with a stable and harmonious home.”

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Article 5 – Consents to an adoption

“1. Subject to paragraphs 2 to 5 of this article, an adoption shall not be granted

unless at least the following consents to the adoption have been given and not

withdrawn:

a the consent of the mother and the father; or if there is neither father nor mother to

consent, the consent of any person or body who is entitled to consent in their place;

b the consent of the child considered by law as having sufficient understanding; a

child shall be considered as having sufficient understanding on attaining an age which

shall be prescribed by law and shall not be more than 14 years;

c the consent of the spouse or registered partner of the adopter.

2. The persons whose consent is required for adoption must have been counselled

as may be necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent, in particular

whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship

between the child and his or her family of origin. The consent must have been given

freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing.

3. The competent authority shall not dispense with the consent or overrule the

refusal to consent of any person or body mentioned in paragraph 1 save on

exceptional grounds determined by law. However, the consent of a child who suffers

from a disability preventing the expression of a valid consent may be dispensed with.

4. If the father or mother is not a holder of parental responsibility in respect of the

child, or at least of the right to consent to an adoption, the law may provide that it

shall not be necessary to obtain his or her consent.

5. A mother’s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid when it is given at

such time after the birth of the child, not being less than six weeks, as may be

prescribed by law, or, if no such time has been prescribed, at such time as, in the

opinion of the competent authority, will have enabled her to recover sufficiently from

the effects of giving birth to the child.

6. For the purposes of this Convention ‘father’ and ‘mother’ mean the persons who

according to law are the parents of the child.”

138. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted

Resolution 2049 on 22 April 2015. The Resolution includes,

inter alia,

the

following:

“5. Financial and material poverty should never be the only justification for the

removal of a child from parental care, but should be seen as a sign for the need to

provide appropriate support to the family. Moreover, showing that a child could be

placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing is not enough to

remove a child from his or her parents, and even less of a reason to sever family ties

completely.

...

8. The Assembly thus recommends that member States:

...

8.2. put into place laws, regulations and procedures which truly put the best interest

of the child first in removal, placement and reunification decisions;

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8.3. continue and strengthen their efforts to ensure that all relevant procedures are

conducted in a child-friendly manner, and that the children concerned have their

views taken into account according to their age and level of maturity;

8.4. make visible and root out the influence of prejudice and discrimination in

removal decisions, including by appropriately training all professionals involved;

8.5. support families with the necessary means (including financially, materially,

socially and psychologically) in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions in the

first place, and in order to increase the percentage of successful family reunifications

after care;

8.6. ensure that any (temporary) placement of a child in alternative care, where it

has become necessary as a measure of last resort, be accompanied by measures aimed

at the child’s subsequent reintegration into the family, including the facilitation of

appropriate contact between the child and his or her family, and be subject to periodic

review;

8.7. avoid, except in exceptional circumstances provided for in law and subject to

effective (timely and comprehensive) judicial review, severing family ties completely,

removing children from parental care at birth, basing placement decisions on the

effluxion of time, and having recourse to adoptions without parental consent;

8.8. ensure that the personnel involved in removal and placement decisions are

guided by appropriate criteria and standards (if possible in a multidisciplinary way),

are suitably qualified and regularly trained, have sufficient resources to take decisions

in an appropriate time frame, and are not overburdened with too great a caseload;

...

8.10. ensure that, except in urgent cases, initial removal decisions are based only on

court orders, in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions and to prevent biased

assessments.”

139. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted

Resolution 2232 (“Striking a balance between the best interest of the child

and the need to keep families together”) on 28 June 2018. The Resolution

states,

inter alia:

“4. The Assembly reaffirms that the best interest of the child should be a primary

consideration in all actions concerning children, in accordance with the United

Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the implementation of this

principle in practice depends on the context and the specific circumstances. It is

sometimes easier to say what is not in the best interests of children: coming to serious

harm at the hands of their parents, or being removed from a family without good

cause.

5. It is with this caveat in mind that the Assembly reiterates the recommendations it

made in Resolution 2049 (2015) and recommends that Council of Europe member

States focus on the process in order to achieve the best results for children and their

families alike. Member States should:

...

5.2. give the necessary support to families in a timely and positive manner with a

view to avoiding the necessity for removal decisions in the first place, and to

facilitating family reunification when possible and in the child’s best interest: this

includes the need to build better collaboration with parents, with a view to avoiding

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possible mistakes based on misunderstandings, stereotyping and discrimination,

mistakes which can be difficult to correct later on once the trust has gone;

...

5.5. seek to keep at a minimum the practices of removing children from parental

care at birth, basing placement decisions on the effluxion of time, and adoptions

without parental consent, and only in extreme cases. Where in the child’s best

interests, efforts should be made to maintain family ties;

5.6. where the decision to remove a child from their family has been made, ensure

that:

5.6.1. such decisions are a proportionate response to a credible and verified

assessment by competent authorities subject to judicial review that there is a real

risk of actual and serious harm to the children involved;

5.6.2. a detailed decision is provided to the parents and a copy of the decision is

also retained, that the decision is explained in an age-appropriate way to the child

or that the child is otherwise granted access to the decision, and that the

determination outlines the circumstances that led to the decision and provides

reasons for the removal;

5.6.3. removing children is a last resort and should be done only for the

necessary period of time;

5.6.4. siblings are kept together in care in all cases where it is not against the

best interest of the child;

5.6.5. as long as it is in the best interest of the child, children are cared for

within the wider family unit so as to minimise the disruption of family bonds for

the children involved;

5.6.6. regular consideration is given to family reunification and/or family access

as is appropriate taking into account the best interests and views of the child;

5.6.7. visitation and contact arrangements facilitate the maintenance of the

family bond and work towards reunification unless manifestly inappropriate;”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

140. The applicants complained that the refusal to discontinue the public

care of X and the deprivation of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities

for him and the authorisation granted to his foster parents to adopt him had

violated their right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of

the Convention, which reads:

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and

his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right

except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society

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in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the

country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,

or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

141. The Government contested that submission.

A. Preliminary issues before the Grand Chamber

1. Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber

(a) Temporal scope

(i) The parties’ submissions

142. The Government maintained that it fell outside the Grand

Chamber’s jurisdiction to consider whether the domestic proceedings

relating to the taking into care of X and the first applicant’s contact rights –

prior to those relating to the authorisation of adoption – had complied with

Article 8 of the Convention. Contrary to the requirements in Article 35 § 1

of the Convention, the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies

and to comply with the six-month time-limit with respect to the emergency

care order of 17 October 2008, the care order of 2 March 2009 and the

decisions on contact rights. In any event, the application to the Court of

12 April 2013 had been directed only at the measures upheld by the

Supreme Court decision of 15 October 2012, that is, the removal of parental

responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Chamber minority had

overstepped the Court’s competence and disregarded the scope of the

applicants’ application in order to voice abstract criticism against an entire

child welfare system. It was not open to the applicants to expand the case

through their referral request to the Grand Chamber. While the latter could

have regard to prior proceedings, this was only to the extent that they had

been referred to and relied upon in the decision relating to the removal of

parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption.

143. Disagreeing with the Government’s position, the applicants

submitted that the Grand Chamber had competence to examine not only the

removal of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption but

also the initial emergency decisions, the decisions relating to X’s being

taken into public care and those relating to the first applicant’s contact

rights. Its jurisdiction comprised the entirety of the domestic proceedings –

even if it were ultimately to find a violation only in respect of a part of

these. The consent to adoption had to be considered as the final decision in a

sequence of events that had started with the emergency decision. The

decision to remove parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption had

been a consequence of the lack of attachment between X and the first

applicant, which in turn had been a direct result of the decisions of

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2 March 2009 and 22 April 2010 on long-term public care, in which the first

applicant’s contact rights had been considerably and unjustifiably reduced.

(ii) The Court’s considerations

144. The Court reiterates that the content and scope of the “case”

referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber’s decision on

admissibility. This means that the Grand Chamber cannot examine those

parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the

Chamber (see, for example,

Ilnseher v. Germany

[GC], nos. 10211/12 and

27505/14, § 100, 4 December 2018). In the present case, the Grand

Chamber notes that the Chamber declared admissible the complaint lodged

by the applicants (see paragraph 2 above), which concerned the deprivation

of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption first decided by the

County Social Welfare Board on 8 December 2011 and then upheld on

appeal (see,

inter alia,

paragraphs 3, 76, 93, 94 and 111 of the Chamber’s

judgment).

145. The Grand Chamber observes that X was taken into emergency

foster care in 2008 (see paragraphs 20-22 above) and into ordinary foster

care following the decision of the County Social Welfare Board of

2 March 2009 (see paragraphs 38-46 above). In the same decision the first

applicant was granted limited contact rights (see paragraphs 42-46 above).

She appealed against that decision, which was ultimately upheld by the

High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs 65-75 above),

again granting the first applicant limited contact rights (see paragraph 75

above). As the applicant did not avail herself of the possibility of lodging an

appeal, the High Court’s judgment became final on the expiry of the

time-limit for doing so.

146. In their request for referral to the Grand Chamber, the applicants

sought to expand their complaints to encompass also the above proceedings

from 2008 to 2010. These grievances did not, however, form part of their

application as it was declared admissible by the Chamber. They were in any

event filed for the first time before the Grand Chamber more than six

months after the last domestic decisions taken in the proceedings in question

and, as mentioned above (see paragraph 145), without domestic remedies

having been exhausted in the most recent of these.

147. Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the

compatibility with Article 8 of the Convention of the proceedings, including

those relating to the restrictions on contact rights, that predated or ended

with the High Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraph 76 above).

148. Nonetheless, in its review of the proceedings relating to the County

Social Welfare Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and the decisions

taken on appeal against that decision, notably the City Court’s judgment of

22 February 2012, the Court will have to put those proceedings and

decisions in context, which inevitably means that it must to some degree

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have regard to the former proceedings and decisions (see, similarly, for

example,

Jovanovic v. Sweden,

no. 10592/12, § 73, 22 October 2015, and

Mohamed Hasan,

cited above, § 151).

(b) Material scope

149. The Court observes that the applicants’ application lodged with the

Court on 12 April 2013 expressly targeted only the decision to withdraw the

first applicant’s parental responsibilities in respect of X and to authorise the

latter’s adoption by his foster parents (see the City Court’s decision in

paragraphs 107-12 above), not the concurrent conclusion reached on the

same occasion that the conditions for lifting the care order concerning X had

not been met (see paragraphs 99-106 above).

150. The Chamber considered that the decision not to lift the care order

was nonetheless intrinsically related to the decision to deprive the first

applicant of her parental responsibilities for X and to authorise the latter’s

adoption, and accordingly reviewed the former decision on the merits (see

paragraphs 113-17 of the Chamber’s judgment) regardless of the applicants’

having focused expressly on the latter decision in their application and

submissions before the Chamber.

151. The Grand Chamber notes that, while the respondent Government

did not express disagreement with the Chamber’s approach in this regard,

the applicants made submissions before it indicating that their complaint

also encompassed the decision not to lift the care order taken in the same

proceedings.

152. The Grand Chamber observes that the refusal to lift the public care

order is so closely related to and intertwined with the decision to remove the

first applicant’s parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption that it

must be considered to be an aspect of her initial complaint to the Court.

Indeed, as follows from the terms of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act

(see paragraph 122 above), it was a prerequisite for application of that

provision that public care continued to be justified. The Grand Chamber

will therefore, as was done by the Chamber, include the decision not to lift

the care order in its examination of whether the applicants’ Article 8 rights

have been violated.

2. The first applicant’s standing to lodge a complaint on behalf of the

second applicant

(a) The Chamber’s judgment

153. The Chamber, emphasising that the complaint concerned the

decision to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for X

and to authorise his adoption – which resulted in the former losing legal

guardianship over X – rather than facts subsequent to that decision,

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concluded that the first applicant was competent to lodge a complaint on

behalf of the second applicant, X.

(b) The parties’ submissions

154. By way of preliminary objection before the Grand Chamber, the

Government argued that the first applicant did not have standing to lodge an

application on behalf of X. His adoptive parents would have had standing,

but had not done so. The Court’s acceptance of the mother’s lodging of an

application on her child’s behalf in

Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy

[GC],

nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000-VIII, had been due to the

particular circumstances of that case. In the instant case X’s interests were

also represented by his adoptive parents, who had intervened before the

Court.

155. The applicants submitted that, according to the Court’s established

case law, a biological parent whose parental responsibilities had been

withdrawn could submit a complaint against that withdrawal on behalf of

the child in question. The first applicant accordingly had an unquestionable

right to represent X in the instant case.

156. The Court observes that the disputed deprivation of parental

responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption decided by the County

Social Welfare Board on 8 December 2011 and upheld by the City Court on

22 February 2012, against which leave to appeal was refused by the

appellate courts, undoubtedly led to the severance of the legal ties between

the first and second applicants. The Court has held that this factor is not

decisive for whether a parent may have

locus standi

to lodge an application

on behalf of the child before the Court (see, for example,

A.K. and L.

v. Croatia,

no. 37956/11, § 46, 8 January 2013). In that judgment, the Court

further stated:

“... The conditions governing the individual applications under the Convention are

not necessarily the same as national criteria relating to

locus standi.

National rules in

this respect may serve purposes different from those contemplated by Article 34 and,

while those purposes may sometimes be analogous, they need not always be so (see,

mutatis mutandis, Norris v. Ireland,

26 October 1988, § 31, Series A no. 142).

47. The Court would draw attention to the principle that the object and purpose of

the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings

requires that its provisions, both procedural and substantive, be interpreted and

applied so as to render its safeguards both practical and effective (see amongst other

authorities,

Loizidou v. Turkey

(preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, §§ 70-72,

Series A no. 310). The position of children under Article 34 calls for careful

consideration, as children must generally rely on other persons to present their claims

and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any

steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (P.C.

and S. v. the United Kingdom

(dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). The Court considers that a restrictive or

technical approach in this area is to be avoided” (ibid., § 46-47).

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157. Since X was adopted, his only representatives under national law in

respect of any issues concerning facts that occurred after the adoption had

become final would be his adoptive parents. However, in respect of the

adoption proceedings, conducted at a time when the first applicant still had

full responsibilities for X, according to the Court’s case-law, it is in

principle in a child’s interests to preserve family ties, save where weighty

reasons exist to justify severing those ties (see, for example,

A.K. and L.

v. Croatia,

cited above, § 49). In addition, on several occasions the Court

has accepted in the context of Article 8 of the Convention that parents who

did not have parental rights could apply to it on behalf of their minor

children (see

Scozzari and Giunta,

cited above, §§ 138-39), the key criterion

for the Court in these cases being the risk that some of the children’s

interests might not be brought to its attention and that they would be denied

effective protection of their Convention rights (see

mutatis mutandis,

Lambert and Others v. France

[GC], no. 46043/14, § 94, ECHR 2015

(extracts)).

158. Where an application has been lodged before it by a biological

parent on behalf of his or her child, the situation may nonetheless be that the

Court identifies conflicting interests between parent and child. A conflict of

interest is relevant to the question of whether an application lodged by one

person on behalf of another is admissible (see, for example,

Kruškić

v. Croatia

(dec.), no. 10140/13, §§ 101-02, 25 November 2014). The

Government have objected on such grounds in the instant case.

159. The Court considers that the question of a possible conflict of

interest between the first and second applicants overlaps and is closely

intertwined with those which it is called upon to examine when dealing with

the complaint, formulated by the first applicant on her own behalf and on

behalf of the second applicant, of violations of their right to respect for

family life under Article 8. It discerns no such conflict of interest in the

present case as would require it to dismiss the first applicant’s application

on behalf of the second applicant. Accordingly, the Government’s objection

must be dismissed.

B. Merits

1. The Chamber’s judgment

160. The Chamber was satisfied that the domestic proceedings

complained of were in accordance with 1992 Child Welfare Act and

pursued the legitimate aims of “the protection of health or morals” and the

“rights and freedoms” of X in accordance with Article 8 § 2 of the

Convention. As to the further question whether the disputed interference

was also “necessary”, the Chamber considered that the first applicant had

been fully involved in the domestic proceedings, seen as a whole, and that

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the domestic decision-making process had been fair and capable of

safeguarding the applicants’ rights under Article 8. The majority of the

Chamber further observed that the City Court had been faced with the

difficult and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant

competing interests in a complex case. In the majority’s view, the City

Court had clearly been guided by the interests of X, notably his particular

need for security in his foster-home environment, given his psychological

vulnerability. Also taking into account the City Court’s conclusion that

there had been no positive development in the first applicant’s competence

in contact situations throughout the three years in which she had had contact

rights and the fact that the domestic authorities had had the benefit of direct

contact with all the persons concerned, the majority of the Chamber found

that there were such exceptional circumstances in the present case as could

justify the measures in question and that the domestic authorities had been

motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X’s best interests.

2. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicants

161. The applicants submitted that in its judgment the Chamber had

failed to take account of the particular context concerning Norway, namely

that there was widespread criticism both nationally and internationally of

the Norwegian child welfare system, indicating a serious systemic problem.

162. Under the Court’s case-law, the margin-of-appreciation concept

was, in the applicants’ opinion, characterised by its casuistic nature. The

margin to be accorded to the competent national authorities would vary in

the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at

stake. It was well established that in cases relating to placement of children

in public care and adoption, the domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin

of appreciation. However, the Court tended to hide behind the margin-of-

appreciation concept in a way which could to some extent undermine its

control and functions.

163. Given the nature and seriousness of the interference at stake, the

margin of appreciation ought to have been particularly narrow even in

regard to the first child-welfare measures that had been taken. The Chamber

majority had, moreover, not addressed the grounds for the extremely limited

contact rights that had been granted from the beginning.

164. It was clearly established in the Court’s case-law that the protection

of the biological family was a priority. The instant case concerned a very

young child; in such cases the authorities could act only on extraordinarily

compelling grounds. X’s particular vulnerability referred to by the domestic

authorities in their decisions had never been supported by concrete and

tangible evidence. Nor had his special care needs ever been explained, as

pointed out by the minority in the Chamber.

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165. Contact rights in Norway were notably restrictive and had been

denounced by the Court in several cases. Considering that limited contact

rights had a particularly detrimental impact in the first weeks, months and

years of an infant’s life, the facts of the instant case were particularly

shocking. The first applicant’s contact rights had been drastically limited

without objective reasons and over a very short space of time. The

imposition of extremely restricted access rights had destroyed any chance of

family reunification and had made it impossible for X to forge natural bonds

with the first applicant. Since the domestic authorities were directly

responsible for the family breakdown, the argument that X had had no

psychological bonds with his mother was unacceptable.

166. There had been a conflict between the first applicant, the foster

mother and the child welfare services; a conflict of that nature was hardly

exceptional and was readily understandable. The authorities had done

absolutely nothing to pacify the first applicant’s relations with the

authorities and the foster mother. On the contrary, the foster mother had

been present during all contact sessions, even though this had not been

ordered or permitted by any of the domestic decisions. The positive

obligation incumbent on the authorities under Article 8 of the Convention

required that they proposed altering the terms of the contact rights or took

decisions to that effect. The County Social Welfare Board and the City

Court had focused only on the short-term consequences of a separation of X

from his foster parents and had failed to consider the long-term impact on

him of a permanent separation from his biological mother. The domestic

authorities should have resorted to less intrusive measures.

167. The domestic authorities had not dealt with the case in good faith,

quite the contrary. The alleged lack of caring skills on the part of the first

applicant was firmly contradicted by the case-material. She could not be

blamed for having asked the same questions several times when at the

parent-child institution, and the institution’s staff had threatened her with

taking X into public care. While the expert reports contained global

formulas such as “a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the

mothering role”, “problems with emotional regulation” and “inadequate

basic parent skills”, these had not been substantiated. There had been no

concrete and tangible evidence to justify the alleged fundamental limitations

of the first applicant and her caring skills.

168. Old and new research on infant attachment suggested that the

domestic authorities had failed to abide by basic and fundamental

attachment principles to support reunification. They had not proved that

returning X to the first applicant would cause him serious problems.

(b) The Government

169. Overall, the Government invited the Grand Chamber to follow the

approach of the Chamber majority, which had been correct and exemplary

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both in interpretation and application of Convention law. In contrast, they

cautioned against the Chamber minority’s attempt to carry out a “forensic

examination of the facts”: reassessing facts that had been established by the

national courts many years ago risked making the review arbitrary and was

contrary to the Court’s fourth-instance doctrine.

170. The Government argued that the domestic decision-making process

had been fair and capable of safeguarding the applicants’ rights under

Article 8 of the Convention. The case had been reviewed independently and

impartially by several levels of court.

171. The child’s best interests, which had changed over time, were

paramount. The first applicant sought to assert her right to family life, but

although she had submitted a claim that had to be assessed under Article 8

of the Convention, it was in essence not so much a claim for the protection

of existing “family life”, as an assertion of a biological right even under

circumstances involving little or no actual attachment. The second

applicant, X, also had a right under Article 8 to have his family life

protected. The question therefore arose as to whether his “family life”

consisted of his biological ties to the first applicant or of the only family life

that he had known, namely with the persons who had assumed care for him

since he was three weeks old and who, in his mind, were his actual parents.

172. The case involved competing interests, but there was no consensus

among the Contracting States as to the extent to which public authorities

could interfere with family life in the interests of the well-being of a child,

which suggested that they should be accorded a wider margin of

appreciation. In the case under consideration, the reasons given by the

domestic authorities for the impugned decisions had been relevant and

sufficient. X had been subjected to very serious neglect during the first

weeks of his life. The first applicant had subsequently failed to show any

development with regard to her approach to him. X was vulnerable to a

repetition of the same pattern of disturbances and reactions. If his care needs

were not met, there was a risk of retraumatisation and a reversal of positive

development with regard to his functioning. The first applicant had

continued to appear “completely devoid of any such empathy and

understanding” that would be called for should X be returned to her.

173. The domestic authorities had complied with their positive

obligations. The first applicant had not accepted help from the child welfare

services. The authorities had also taken note of her recent marriage and

second child, but those developments had not been sufficient to outweigh

the necessity of the impugned measures. The Chamber minority had

erroneously assumed that the inquiry made by the child welfare services in

the municipality to which the first applicant had moved had disclosed “no

shortcomings”.

174. The Chamber minority had disregarded Article 35 § 1 of the

Convention and had “reopened” earlier cases. In doing so, the minority had

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wrongfully applied the standard of a “stricter scrutiny”, not merely to the

adoption decision, but also to the prior decisions relating to the taking into

care of X. In addition, the minority had erred with respect to the facts. There

had been a previous order awarding the minimum legal contact rights;

further contact had not been precluded had this been in X’s best interest.

However, three experts had concluded that there had been no positive

development whatsoever in the relationship between X and the first

applicant. Rather than availing herself of the supportive measures, the first

applicant had continued to use the contact sessions as an arena for

cultivating her opinion that she had been a victim of injustice, instead of

focusing on X. It had been primarily in the first applicant’s and her family’s

view that there had been a “conflict” between the first applicant, the child

welfare services and the foster mother.

175. In short, the circumstances had been exceptional and the impugned

decisions had clearly been motivated by an overriding requirement

pertaining to X’s best interests. The City Court had succeeded in its difficult

and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant competing

interests in a complex case.

3. Third-party comments

(a) The Government of Belgium

176. The Government of Belgium stated that, while perceptions varied

as to what manner of intervention with respect to child welfare was

appropriate, Belgian legislation did not allow for adoption contrary to the

biological parents’ wishes. They further submitted that domestic authorities

in cases such as the present one had to balance the best interests of the child

against the interests of the biological parents. The Belgian Government

went on to express a number of considerations as to the facts as they had

been restated in the Chamber judgment, and highlighted that these differed

from those in the case of

Aune,

cited above.

(b) The Government of Bulgaria

177. The Government of Bulgaria submitted that the child welfare case

should be reviewed in its entirety because earlier decisions such as on

placement in care and contact rights were intrinsically linked to the adoption

proceedings. The Contracting Parties had a wide margin of appreciation

when deciding on placement in public care, but a stricter scrutiny was called

for in respect of any further limitations. When further limitations were

involved, the Court was called upon not only to examine the procedural

aspects of the decision-making process, but to go beyond the form, if

necessary, and assess the substance of the case. Furthermore, the Bulgarian

Government emphasised the positive duty to make concrete efforts to

facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible and stressed

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that it was not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more

beneficial environment for his upbringing.

178. The Government of the Czech Republic focused mainly on the

approach of the respective authorities after emergency or permanent

placements of children in foster care, since, they submitted, immediate

active work with the biological families after the placement as well as the

frequency of contact between the children and their biological parents

appeared to be crucial factors in maintaining original family ties.

179. They further stressed that when assessing the compliance of

authorities with their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, the

situation of all members of the family must be taken into account. There

was a broad consensus, including in international law, that in all decisions

concerning children, their best interests must be paramount. However, the

“best interests” principle was not designed to be a kind of “trump card”.

Article 8 covered both the best interests of the child and the right of the

parents to be assisted by the State in staying or being reunited with their

children. The child welfare systems should not disregard the existence of the

biological parents’ rights, which should be duly taken into account and

balanced against the best interests of the child, rather than minimised to the

point of being ignored.

180. In addition, the Government of the Czech Republic emphasised the

importance of contact between biological parents and their child in public

care and other measures to reunite the family,

inter alia,

in order to ensure

that a taking into care remained a temporary measure: restrictions on contact

could be the starting point of the child’s alienation from his or her biological

family and, thus, of the impossibility for the family to reunite. In order for

the effort to reunite the family to be serious, contact would have to occur

several times a week, even under supervision or with assistance, and

increase in time up to daily visits. If that were the case, it would be possible

to talk about a slow establishment of a bond between the child and their

biological parents. Speedy procedures were also required.

181. As to adoption, they maintained that the Court must strike a balance

between the rights of the biological and the adoptive parents. The best

interests of the child had to be assessed on an

ad hoc

basis that sometimes

conflicted with other interests involved: there were other rights that had to

be taken into account when determining whether or not a child should be

considered adoptable.

(d) The Government of Denmark

182. The Government of Denmark argued that the domestic authorities

had made a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the matter, and the

Court’s assessment should be limited to an assessment of the decision-

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making process. The Court should not, as had the Chamber minority, carry

out a “forensic examination of the facts” and substitute its own assessment

for that of the domestic courts, who had undertaken a balancing exercise in

conformity with the criteria laid down in Article 8 of the Convention and

the Court’s jurisprudence.

183. The Chamber majority had made a correct assessment of the matter

and there were no strong reasons why the Court should reassess the facts of

the case as a fourth-instance tribunal several years after the incidents and

based on documentary evidence presented to the Court. Reference was

made to paragraph 28(c) of the Copenhagen Declaration. By expressing a

dissenting opinion implying an entirely new assessment, the Chamber

minority had attempted to don the mantle of a fourth-instance tribunal. The

domestic authorities had clearly demonstrated that they had made a

thorough assessment of the matter comprising a comprehensive balancing of

opposing interests and had shown an understanding of the fact that the case

concerned far-reaching intrusions into family and private life, and had also

taken into account Article 8 of the Convention and loyally applied the

criteria laid down in the Court’s jurisprudence.

(e) The Government of Italy

184. The Government of Italy submitted that the first applicant’s

interests did not necessarily align with those of X. If the Court wanted to

ensure that X’s interests were looked after, it could indicate to the

respondent Government that counsel should be appointed for him.

Moreover, the Italian Government argued that the decisions taken prior to

that concerning X’s adoption had become final and if the Court were to

re-examine them now in connection with the complaint against the adoption

decision, this would run counter to Article 35 of the Convention. Those

prior decisions were only facts and ought to be treated as such.

185. In addition, the Italian Government emphasised that there was no

European consensus on the topic of protecting parents and children’s rights

to respect for their family life; the Contracting Parties had a wide margin of

appreciation. There were examples in the Court’s jurisprudence of cases that

had been approached in contradiction to the general principles usually set

out by the Court, cases where the Court had taken on a fourth-instance role

and examined whether there existed circumstances justifying the removal of

the child – which was linked to the idea of a “forensic examination of the

facts” mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Chamber judgment – as

well as cases in which the Court had assumed that the best interests of the

child coincided with those of his or her biological parents.

186. As to the best interests of the child, the Italian Government

emphasised that in the relevant international materials a child was

considered to be neglected when the parents did not maintain the necessary

relations for his or her upbringing or development, or provide psychological

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and material assistance. In that connection the Italian Government raised

issues with long-term care; children in care lived in limbo between

biological parents and substitute carers, with resulting problems such as

loyalty conflicts. References were made to

Barnea and Caldararu v. Italy,

no. 37931/15, 22 June 2017 and

Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy

[GC],

no. 25358/12, 24 January 2017. Specialists and experts had emphasised that

it was not a rule that biological family ties should be preserved, and that

should only be the case where it represented a benefit to the child in the

specific case. Only the national decision-makers could carry out the

necessary assessment of that individual question. The Court did not have the

necessary tools to be a fourth-instance tribunal and carry out a “forensic

examination of the facts”.

(f) The Government of Slovakia

187. The Government of Slovakia submitted that the Court’s case-law

was perfectly clear in that it primarily protected the biological family.

Placing a child in foster care was an extreme measure and domestic

authorities were required to adopt other measures if such were able to

achieve the pursued aim. In particular, where a decision had been explained

in terms of a need to protect the child from danger, the existence of such a

danger should be actually established. Simultaneously, taking a child into

care should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon

as circumstances permitted, and any measure of implementation should be

consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent with his or

her child.

188. The Slovakian Government made further comments on a case in

which Slovak citizens had been affected by child welfare measures and on

international concern about child welfare measures adopted in the

respondent State.

(g) The Government of the United Kingdom

189. The Government of the United Kingdom submitted that in cases

such as the present the Court ought in principle to focus on the adequacy of

the procedures and sufficiency of the reasons adopted by the domestic

authorities, rather than undertake a

de novo

analysis of the facts.

190. The Court had enumerated a number of identifiable factors that

were likely to be relevant in a case such as the present. The UK Government

noted, in particular, that permanency was an inherent part of any adoption

decision, and that a balancing of interests was required, but guided by the

paramountcy of the best interests of the child. The child’s bonds to his or

her

de facto

family were therefore to be considered, and Article 8 of the

Convention did not require that domestic authorities make endless attempts

at family reunification.

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191. With respect to subsidiarity, the UK Government pointed to

paragraph 28 of the Copenhagen Declaration. In cases such as the present,

account should be taken of the relative expertise and involvement of the

domestic authorities compared with the Court, the level of participation of

the parties affected by the domestic process, and the level of consensus

amongst Contracting States. The seriousness of the intervention at issue was

also relevant, but a closer scrutiny could not entail a fresh assessment of the

facts and particularly not if considerable time had elapsed since the decision

under review. The Chamber minority could be understood as seeking to

establish that the Court should undertake its own assessment of the

underlying facts, rather than reviewing the decisions, particularly by its

reference to the need for “a forensic examination of the facts” and by

indications that the dissenting judges envisaged that the Court itself should

render a “substantive” decision. The Grand Chamber was invited to reject

this approach; as had been stated by the Chamber majority, the Court was

required to consider whether the domestic authorities had adduced relevant

and sufficient reasons for their decisions, but only the domestic authorities

were in a position to determine what was in the child’s best interests.

(h) ADF International

192. ADF International submitted that family was internationally

recognised as the fundamental group of society and of particular importance

to children. According to the Court’s case-law, the Contracting Parties were

required to organise their child welfare services in a manner aimed at

facilitating family reunification, unless there was clear evidence of danger

to the child’s welfare. Furthermore, ADF International emphasised the duty

to maintain contact between parents and children and to provide practical

assistance to families.

(i) The AIMMF

193. The AIMMF emphasised the importance of personal participation

of the natural parent, with legal assistance, before the domestic authorities,

as had been the case for the first applicant. In addition to making some

comments on the emergency decision, the organisation also highlighted the

need for the child to have legal assistance in order to ensure that his or her

best interests be protected.

194. Furthermore, the AIMMF submitted that the multi-disciplinary

composition of the County Social Welfare Board and the City Court was a

particularly important aspect that had also been highlighted by the Court in

Paradiso and Campanelli,

cited above, § 212. Decision-makers with

multi-disciplinary competences formed a crucial aspect of a justice system

adapted for children.

195. Moreover, the organisation emphasised the importance of bearing

in mind that this case concerned X specifically, and solutions had to be

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found for him in the light of his vulnerability and history, including the

experiences with contact sessions and his ties to the foster parents. Based on

the Chamber judgment, the Chamber majority had shown a greater

understanding of X’s needs than what was reflected in the dissenting

opinion. It was precisely on the basis of X’s individual circumstances and

history that the domestic authorities had arrived at the conclusion that it was

in his best interests to strengthen his relations with the foster parents.

(j) The AIRE Centre

196. The AIRE Centre invited the Court to reiterate that the Convention

was a “living instrument” and that the evolving nature of children’s rights

under the Convention on the Rights of the Child had to be taken into

account.

197. As to the assessment of the child’s best interests, the organisation

emphasised the importance of family unity and the child’s right to be heard,

as protected by Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

With respect to the thresholds for removal and adoption of a child, the

organisation reiterated the principles relevant to the questions of necessity

and proportionality. It further pointed to the need for both legal certainty

and flexibility, and highlighted “adoption

simple”

or long-term fostering as

alternatives to a “closed” adoption. While it could be that in very

exceptional circumstances it would not be in a child’s best interests to retain

contact with the birth parents (for example, when those parents had been

operating a paedophile ring or engaging in child trafficking or serial child

abuse), this conclusion should not flow automatically from the decision that

the child needed a stable, permanent home that was not with the birth

parents.

198. The AIRE Centre further submitted that children of parents with

intellectual disabilities were commonly taken away as infants, with neglect

such as slow weight gain, general failure to thrive, and lack of

understanding of children’s needs, as the primary concern. Parents with

intellectual disabilities had the right to support and,

inter alia,

General

Comment No. 14 (2013) to the Convention on the Rights of the Child

stressed this positive obligation.

(k) The adoptive parents

199. X’s adoptive parents submitted that his representation before the

Court raised a crucial question in the case. The principle of the best interests

of the child had also to be applied to the procedural rules of representation.

Under the Court’s case-law, the rules relating to representation of children

had been flexible and applied so as to ensure that all relevant interests

would be brought to the Court’s attention. Allowing the natural parents to

represent a child who had a protected family life with foster or adoptive

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parents did not ensure an effective protection of the child’s rights under the

Convention.

200. According to the Court’s case-law, “family life” was essentially a

question of fact. Striking a fair balance between the public interest and the

many different private interests at play had been emphasised by the Court as

particularly important in a case where the child had developed family ties

with two different families. Reference was made to,

inter alia, Moretti and

Benedetti v. Italy,

no. 16318/07, 27 April 2010. Due regard also had to be

given to other ties that had formed, for instance with siblings.

201. Furthermore, the Court’s case-law had established the principle of

the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration and the

decisive factor in cases relating to the placement in public care and adoption

of children. The Grand Chamber should seek to combine the case-law

concerning family life between the child and the foster parents and that

concerning the paramountcy of the best interests of the child in the instant

case.

4. The Court’s considerations

(a) General principles

202. The first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention guarantees to

everyone the right to respect for his or her family life. As is well established

in the Court’s case-law, the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each

other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and

domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference

with the right protected by this provision. Any such interference constitutes

a violation of this Article unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues

an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under its second paragraph and can

be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” (see, among other

authorities,

K. and T. v. Finland

[GC], no. 25702/94, § 151, ECHR

2001-VII; and

Johansen,

cited above, § 52).

203. In determining whether the latter condition was fulfilled, the Court

will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons

adduced to justify that measure were relevant and sufficient for the purposes

of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (see, among many other authorities,

Paradiso

and Campanelli,

cited above, § 179). The notion of necessity further implies

that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular,

that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the

fair balance which has to be struck between the relevant competing interests

(ibid., § 181).

204. In so far as the family life of a child is concerned, the Court

reiterates that there is a broad consensus, including in international law, in

support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best

interests are of paramount importance (see, among other authorities,

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Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland

[GC], no. 41615/07, § 135, ECHR

2010). Indeed, the Court has emphasised that in cases involving the care of

children and contact restrictions, the child’s interests must come before all

other considerations (see

Jovanovic,

cited above, § 77, and

Gnahoré

v. France,

no. 40031/98, § 59, ECHR 2000-IX).

205. At the same time, it should be noted that regard for family unity

and for family reunification in the event of separation are inherent

considerations in the right to respect for family life under Article 8.

Accordingly, in the case of imposition of public care restricting family life,

a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures to facilitate family

reunification as soon as reasonably feasible (K.

and T. v. Finland,

cited

above, § 178).

206. In instances where the respective interests of a child and those of

the parents come into conflict, Article 8 requires that the domestic

authorities should strike a fair balance between those interests and that, in

the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best

interests of the child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may

override those of the parents (see, for instance,

Sommerfeld v. Germany

[GC], no. 31871/96, § 64, ECHR 2003-VIII (extracts)), and the references

therein).

207. Generally, the best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand,

that the child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases

where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties

means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that family ties may only

be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be

done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to

“rebuild” the family (see

Gnahoré,

cited above, § 59). On the other hand, it

is clearly also in the child’s interest to ensure its development in a sound

environment, and a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such

measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development (see,

among many other authorities,

Neulinger and Shuruk,

cited above, § 136;

Elsholz v. Germany

[GC], no. 25735/94, § 50, ECHR 2000-VIII; and

Maršálek v. the Czech Republic,

no. 8153/04, § 71, 4 April 2006). An

important international consensus exists to the effect that a child shall not be

separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent

authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with

applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best

interests of the child (see Article 9 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on

the Rights of the Child, recited in paragraph 134 above). In addition, it is

incumbent on the Contracting States to put in place practical and effective

procedural safeguards for the protection of the best interests of the child and

to ensure their implementation (see the United Nations Committee on the

Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the

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child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,

paragraphs 85 and 87, quoted at paragraph 136 above).

208. Another guiding principle is that a care order should be regarded as

a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit,

and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent

with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see, for

instance,

Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1),

24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130).

The above-mentioned positive duty to take measures to facilitate family

reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the

competent authorities with progressively increasing force as from the

commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced

against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see, for example,

K. and T. v. Finland,

cited above, § 178). In this type of case the adequacy

of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, as the

passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between

the child and the parent with whom it does not live (see,

inter alia, S.H.

v. Italy,

no. 52557/14, § 42, 13 October 2015). Thus, where the authorities

are responsible for a situation of family breakdown because they have failed

in their above-mentioned obligation, they may not base a decision to

authorise adoption on the grounds of the absence of bonds between the

parents and the child (see

Pontes v. Portugal,

no. 19554/09, §§ 92 and 99,

10 April 2012). Furthermore, the ties between members of a family and the

prospects of their successful reunification will perforce be weakened if

impediments are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access

to each other (see

Scozzari and Giunta,

cited above, § 174; and

Olsson

(No. 1),

cited above, § 81). However, when a considerable period of time

has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest

of a child not to have his or her

de facto

family situation changed again may

override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited (see

K. and

T. v. Finland,

cited above, § 155).

209. As regards replacing a foster home arrangement with a more far-

reaching measure such as deprivation of parental responsibilities and

authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the applicants’ legal

ties with the child are definitively severed, it is to be reiterated that “such

measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could

only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement

pertaining to the child’s best interests” (see, for example,

Johansen,

cited

above, § 78, and

Aune,

cited above, § 66). It is in the very nature of

adoption that no real prospects for rehabilitation or family reunification

exist and that it is instead in the child’s best interests that he or she be

placed permanently in a new family (see

R. and H. v. the United Kingdom,

no. 35348/06, § 88, 31 May 2011).

210. In determining whether the reasons for the impugned measures

were relevant and sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of

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the Convention, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to

the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of

children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such

factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State

intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public

measures in this particular area. However, consideration of what is in the

best interests of the child is in every case of crucial importance. Moreover,

it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of

direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when

care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their

implementation. It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is

not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their

responsibilities for the regulation of the care of children and the rights of

parents whose children have been taken into public care, but rather to

review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the

exercise of their power of appreciation (see, for example,

K. and T.

v. Finland,

cited above, § 154; and

Johansen,

cited above, § 64).

211. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent

national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the

seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the

importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously

threatening his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim

to reunite the family as soon as circumstances permit. The Court thus

recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in

assessing the necessity of taking a child into care (see, for example,

K. and

T. v. Finland,

cited above, § 155; and

Johansen,

cited above, § 64).

However, this margin is not unfettered. For example, the Court has in

certain instances attached weight to whether the authorities, before taking a

child into public care, had first attempted to take less drastic measures, such

as supportive or preventive ones, and whether these had proved

unsuccessful (see, for example,

Olsson (no. 1),

cited above, §§ 72-74;

R.M.S. v. Spain,

no. 28775/12, § 86, 18 June 2013, § 86; and

Kutzner

v. Germany,

no. 46544/99, § 75, ECHR 2002-I). A stricter scrutiny is called

for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the

authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed

to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to

respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that

the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively

curtailed (see

K. and T. v. Finland,

cited above, ibid., and

Johansen,

cited

above, ibid.).

212. In cases relating to public-care measures, the Court will further

have regard to the authorities’ decision-making process, to determine

whether it has been conducted such as to secure that the views and interests

of the natural parents are made known to and duly taken into account by the

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authorities and that they are able to exercise in due time any remedies

available to them (see, for instance,

W. v. the United Kingdom,

8 July 1987,

§ 63, Series A no. 121, and

Elsholz,

cited above, § 52). What has to be

determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the

case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents

have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a

degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their

interests and have been able fully to present their case (see, for example,

W. v. the United Kingdom,

cited above, § 64;

T.P. and K.M. v. the United

Kingdom

[GC], no. 28945/95, § 72, ECHR 2001-V (extracts);

Neulinger

and Shuruk,

cited above, § 139; and

Y.C. v. the United Kingdom,

no. 4547/10, § 138, 13 March 2012). From the foregoing considerations it

follows that natural parents’ exercise of judicial remedies with a view to

obtaining family reunification with their child cannot as such be held

against them. In addition, in cases of this kind there is always the danger

that any procedural delay will result in the

de facto

determination of the

issue submitted to the court before it has held its hearing. Equally, effective

respect for family life requires that future relations between parent and child

be determined solely in the light of all relevant considerations and not by

the mere effluxion of time (see

W. v. the United Kingdom.,

cited above,

§ 65).

213. Whether the decision-making process sufficiently protected a

parent’s interests depends on the particular circumstances of each case (see,

for example,

Sommerfeld,

cited above, § 68). With a view to its examination

of the present instance, the Court observes that in the aforementioned case it

was called upon to examine the issue of ordering a psychological report on

the possibilities of establishing contact between the child and the applicant.

It observed that as a general rule it was for the national courts to assess the

evidence before them, including the means to ascertain the relevant facts

(see

Vidal v. Belgium,

22 April 1992, § 33, Series A no. 235-B). It would be

going too far to say that domestic courts are always required to involve a

psychological expert on the issue of awarding contact to a parent not having

custody, but this issue depends on the specific circumstances of each case,

having due regard to the age and maturity of the child concerned (see

Sommerfeld,

cited above, § 71).

(b) Application of those principles to the present case

214. It is common ground between the parties, and the Court finds it

unequivocally established, that the impugned decisions taken in the

proceedings instituted by the first applicant on 29 April 2011 (see

paragraph 81 above), starting with the Board’s decision of 8 December 2011

and ending with the Supreme Court Appeals Board’s decision of

15 October 2012, entailed an interference with the applicants’ right to

respect for their family life under the first paragraph of Article 8. It is

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further undisputed that they were taken in accordance with the law, namely

the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), and pursued legitimate

aims, namely the “protection of health or morals” and “rights and freedoms”

of X. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The interference thus

fulfilled two of the three conditions of justification envisaged by the second

paragraph of Article 8. The dispute in the present case relates to the third

condition: whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.

215. Bearing in mind the limitations on the scope of its examination as

described in paragraphs 147 to 148 above, the Court will centre its

examination on the City Court’s review as reflected in its judgment of

22 February 2012, which ultimately gained legal force on 15 October 2012

when the Supreme Court Appeals Board dismissed the first applicant’s

appeal (see paragraphs 98-113, 118 and 121 above).

216. At the outset the Court notes that the City Court’s bench was

composed of a professional judge, a lay person and a psychologist. It held a

three-day hearing that the first applicant attended together with her legal-aid

counsel and in which twenty-one witnesses, including experts, gave

testimony (see paragraph 98 above). In addition, the Court notes that the

City Court acted as an appeal instance and that proceedings similar to those

before that court had previously been conducted, and similarly extensive

reasons given, by the County Social Welfare Board, which had also had a

composition similar to that of the City Court (see paragraphs 89-95 above).

The City Court’s judgment was subject to review in leave-to-appeal

proceedings before the High Court (see paragraphs 114-18 above), which

were in turn examined by the Supreme Court Appeals Board (see

paragraphs 119-21 above).

217. In its judgment the City Court decided not to lift the care order for

X, to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for him and

to authorise his adoption by his foster parents, in accordance with

sections 4-21 and 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act respectively (see

paragraph 122 above). While observing that the City Court relied on several

grounds in order to justify its decisions, the Court notes that under the

aforementioned provisions a central condition for the imposition of the

impugned measures related to the natural parent’s ability to assume care.

Thus, pursuant to section 4-21, a precondition for revoking the care order

was the high probability that the parent would be able to provide the child

with proper care. Under section 4-20, consent to adoption could be given if

it had to be regarded as probable that the parent would be permanently

unable to provide the child with proper care.

218. The City Court assessed that issue primarily in the part of its

reasoning devoted to the applicant’s request to have the care order lifted,

which can be summarised as follows. Her situation had improved in some

areas (see paragraph 100 above). However, X was a vulnerable child who

had shown emotional reactions in connection with the contact sessions (see

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paragraphs 101-02 above). The evidence adduced had clearly shown that the

first applicant’s fundamental limitations at the time of the High Court’s

judgment in the previous set of proceedings still persisted. She had not

improved her ability to handle contact situations; she had affirmed that she

would fight until the child was returned to her; and she had stated that she

did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could

be harmful for the child in the long term (see paragraphs 103-04 above).

Moreover, the experts who had testified in court, other than K.M., had

advised against returning X to his mother (see paragraph 105 above). There

was no reason to consider in further detail any other arguments regarding

the first applicant’s ability to provide care, since returning X to her was in

any event not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to

be moved from the foster home (see paragraph 106 above).

219. In deciding on the child welfare services’ application for removal

of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities in respect of X and

authorisation of the latter’s adoption, the City Court endorsed the Board’s

reasoning regarding the alternative criteria in letter (a) of section 4-20 of the

Child Welfare Act, namely that it had to be regarded as probable that the

first applicant would be permanently unable to provide X with proper care

or that X had become so attached to his foster home and the environment

there that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing him could cause

him serious problems (see paragraph 108 above). In so far as the question of

caring skills is concerned, the following findings of the Board are

noteworthy in this context. There was nothing to indicate that the first

applicant’s caring skills had improved since the High Court’s judgment of

22 April 2010. She had not realised that she had neglected X and was

unable to focus on the child and what was best for him. Whilst note had

been taken of the information that the first applicant had married and had

had a second child, this was not decisive in respect of her capacity to care

for X. He was a particularly vulnerable child and had experienced serious

and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. The

Board had also taken account of the experience during the contact sessions.

Moreover, since X had lived in the foster home for three years and did not

know the first applicant, returning him to her would require a great capacity

to empathise with and understand him and the problems that he would

experience. Yet the first applicant and her family were completely devoid of

any such empathy and understanding (see paragraph 90 above).

220. The Court is fully conscious of the primordial interest of the child

in the decision-making process. However, the process leading to the

withdrawal of parental responsibilities and consent to adoption shows that

the domestic authorities did not attempt to perform a genuine balancing

exercise between the interests of the child and his biological family (see

paragraphs 207 and 208 above), but focused on the child’s interests instead

of trying to combine both sets of interests, and moreover did not seriously

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contemplate any possibility of the child’s reunification with his biological

family. In this context, the Court, in particular, is not persuaded that the

competent domestic authorities duly considered the potential significance of

the fact that at the time when the first applicant applied to have the care

order lifted or, in the alternative, to be granted extended contact rights she

was going through substantial changes in her life: in the same summer and

autumn as the impugned proceedings commenced she married and had a

second child. In this regard, as the City Court’s decision was largely

premised on an assessment of the first applicant’s lack of capacity to

provide care, the factual basis on which it relied in making that assessment

appears to disclose several shortcomings in the decision-making process.

221. The Court notes that the decisions under consideration had been

taken in a context where there had only been very limited contact between

the first applicant and X. The Board, in its decision of 2 March 2009, and

the High Court, in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (overturning the City

Court’s judgment of 19 August 2009), had relied on the consideration that it

was most likely that the foster care arrangement would be a long-term one,

and that X would grow up in the foster home (see paragraphs 31, 43 and 75

above). The High Court stated that contact sessions could thus serve as a

means of maintaining contact between the mother and son, so that he would

be familiar with his roots. The purpose was not to establish a relationship

with a view to the child’s future return to the care of his biological mother

(ibid.). As regards the implementation of the contact arrangements, the

Court also notes that these had not been particularly conducive to letting the

first applicant freely bond with X, for example with regard to where the

sessions had been held and who had been present. Although the contact

sessions had often not worked well, it appears that little was done to try out

alternative arrangements for implementing contact. In short, the Court

considers that the sparse contact that had taken place between the applicants

since X was taken into foster care had provided limited evidence from

which to draw clear conclusions with respect to the first applicant’s caring

skills.

222. Furthermore, the Court regards it as significant that there were no

updated expert reports since those that had been ordered during the previous

proceedings between 2009 and 2010 relating to the taking into public care.

Those were the report by psychologist B.S. and family therapist E.W.A,

ordered by the child welfare services and concerning X’s reactions to the

contact sessions in the beginning of September 2009 (see paragraph 58

above), and the report by psychologist M.S., who had been appointed by the

High Court on 15 November 2009 (see paragraph 61 above). The former

dated back to 20 February 2010 and the latter to 3 March 2010 (see

paragraphs 62 and 63 above respectively). When the City Court delivered its

judgment on 22 February 2012, both reports were two years old. Indeed,

alongside other witnesses such as family members, psychologists B.S. and

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M.S. also gave evidence during the hearing held by the City Court in 2012

(see paragraph 98 above). However, the two psychologists had not carried

out any examinations since those prior to their reports dating back to early

2010 and only one of the reports, the one by psychologist M.S., had been

based on observations of the interplay between the applicants, and then only

on two occasions (see paragraph 63 above).

223. The Court does not overlook the fact that the child welfare services

had sought information from the first applicant concerning her new family

that she apparently refused to provide (see paragraphs 85 and 115 above).

At the same time it notes that counsel for the first applicant had expressly

requested that a new expert assessment be made but that the High Court

dismissed the request (see paragraphs 114 and 118 above). Nor had the City

Court ordered a new expert examination

proprio motu

in the course of the

proceedings before it. While it would generally be for the domestic

authorities to decide whether expert reports were needed (see, for example,

Sommerfeld,

cited above, § 71), the Court considers that the lack of a fresh

expert examination substantially limited the factual assessment of the first

applicant’s new situation and her caring skills at the material time. In those

circumstances, contrary to what the City Court seems to suggest, it could

not reasonably be held against her that she had failed to appreciate that

repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long run

(see paragraphs 104 and 218 above).

224. In addition, from the City Court’s reasoning it transpires that in

assessing the first applicant’s caring skills it had paid particular regard to

X’s special care needs, seen in the light of his vulnerability. However,

whereas X’s vulnerability had formed a central reason for the initial

decision to place him in foster care (see, for instance, paragraphs 31 and 42

above), the City Court’s judgment contained no information on how that

vulnerability could have continued despite the fact that he had lived in foster

care since the age of three weeks. It also contained barely any analysis of

the nature of his vulnerability, beyond a brief description by experts that X

was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support, and

stating his resistance to and resignation toward having contact with the first

applicant, notably when faced with her emotional outbursts (see

paragraphs 101 to 102 above). In the view of the Court, having regard to the

seriousness of the interests at stake, it was incumbent on the competent

authorities to assess X’s vulnerability in more detail in the proceedings

under review.

225. Against this background, taking particular account of the limited

evidence that could be drawn from the contact sessions that had been

implemented (see paragraph 221 above), in conjunction with the failure –

notwithstanding the first applicant’s new family situation – to order a fresh

expert examination into her capacity to provide proper care and the central

importance of this factor in the City Court’s assessment (see

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paragraphs 222-3 above) and also of the lack of reasoning with regard to

X’s continued vulnerability (see paragraph 224 above), the Court does not

consider that the decision-making process leading to the impugned decision

of 22 February 2012 was conducted so as to ensure that all views and

interests of the applicants were duly taken into account. It is thus not

satisfied that the said procedure was accompanied by safeguards that were

commensurate with the gravity of the interference and the seriousness of the

interests at stake.

226. In the light of the above factors, the Court concludes that there has

been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

227. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols

thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only

partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to

the injured party.”

A. Damage

228. The applicants each claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of

non-pecuniary damage.

229. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a finding of a

violation, to afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the

Convention.

230. The Court considers that awarding damages to the first applicant is

appropriate in this case, having regard to the anguish and distress that she

must have experienced as a result of the procedures relating to her claim to

have X returned and the child welfare services’ application to have her

parental responsibilities for X withdrawn and his adoption authorised. It

awards the first applicant EUR 25,000 under this head. In respect of X,

having regard to his age at the relevant time and to the fact that he did not

experience the procedures in question in the same way as the first applicant,

the Court finds that a finding of violation can be regarded as sufficient just

satisfaction.

B. Costs and expenses

231. The applicants also claimed EUR 50,000 for the costs and expenses

incurred before the domestic authorities and the Chamber and EUR 9,564

for those incurred before the Grand Chamber.

232. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a violation, to

afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the Convention.

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233. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the

reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown

that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as

to quantum.

234. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its

possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and

expenses in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber, since the

applicants have not shown that these expenses were actually incurred. As to

the costs and expenses before the Grand Chamber, the Court observes that

apart from travel expenses, the claim is submitted with reference to a

contingency (no-win no-fee) arrangement, according to which the first

applicant is obliged to pay counsel EUR 9,000 in the event of “success

before the European Court of Human Rights”. Agreements of this nature –

giving rise to obligations solely between lawyer and client – cannot bind the

Court, which must assess the level of costs and expenses to be awarded with

reference not only to whether the costs are actually incurred but also to

whether they have been reasonably incurred (see, for example,

Iatridis

v. Greece

(just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 2000-XI).

Accordingly, the Court must as a basis for its assessment examine the other

information provided by the applicants in support of their claim. In

accordance with Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of

all claims must be submitted, failing which the Court may reject the claim

in whole or in part (see,

inter alia, A, B and C v. Ireland

[GC],

no. 25579/05, § 281, ECHR 2010). In the instant case, the Court, taking into

account that the claim has not been contested, considers it reasonable to

award the sum of EUR 9,350 for the proceedings before the Grand

Chamber. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to award this compensation

to the first applicant only.

C. Default interest

235. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate

should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,

to which should be added three percentage points.

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,

Dismisses,

by fifteen votes to two, the Government’s preliminary

objection;

Holds,

by thirteen votes to four, that there has been a violation of

Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants;

Holds,

by sixteen votes to one, that the finding of a violation constitutes

in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage

sustained by the second applicant;

Holds,

by thirteen votes to four,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant, within three

months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in

accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following

amounts, to be converted into Norwegian kroner (NOK) at the rate

applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may

be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 9,350 (nine thousand three hundred and fifty euros), plus

any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until

settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a

rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank

during the default period plus three percentage points;

Dismisses,

unanimously, the remainder of the first applicant’s claim for

just satisfaction.

Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the

Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 September 2019.

Søren Prebensen

Deputy to the Registrar

Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos

President

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of

the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this

judgment:

(a) concurring opinion of Judge Ranzoni, joined by Judges Yudkivska,

Kūris,

Harutyunyan, Paczolay and Chanturia;

(b) concurring opinion of Judge

Kūris;

Poláčková,

Koskelo and

Nordén;

(d) joint dissenting opinion of Judges Koskelo and Nordén.

L.A.S.

S.C.P.

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78 STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE RANZONI, JOINED

BY JUDGES YUDKIVSKA,

KŪRIS,

HARUTYUNYAN,

PACZOLAY AND CHANTURIA

I. Introduction

1. I have voted with the majority in finding a violation of Article 8 of the

Convention. However, I partly disagree with the reasoning which, to my

mind, does not sufficiently address the main issues which led to the case

being referred to the Grand Chamber. In this respect, the majority opted for

an excessively narrow approach, entailing a very limited “procedural”

violation.

2. The present case can be summarised as follows. On

25 September 2008 the first applicant gave birth to her son, the second

applicant. Subsequently, she stayed with him at a family centre. On

17 October 2008 the authorities decided to place the baby in a foster home

on an emergency basis, allowing the mother to visit her son for up to one

and a half hours per week. By decision of the County Social Welfare Board

of 2 March 2009 he was taken into ordinary foster care, and the duration of

the mother’s contact was set at two hours, six times per year. This decision

was revoked by the City Court, but the High Court, in a judgment of

22 April 2010, upheld the Board’s decision on compulsory care and reduced

the mother’s contact rights to four two-hour visits per year. The child

remained in foster care until the Board decided on 8 December 2011 to

remove the mother’s parental authority and to authorise the foster parents to

adopt him. Upon an appeal by the first applicant, the City Court on

22 February 2012 upheld that decision, which became final with the

Supreme Court Appeals Board’s decision of 15 October 2012.

3. Whereas the majority’s reasoning focused on the proceedings

surrounding the Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and, in particular, the

City Court’s judgment of 22 February 2012, in my view the “real” issues to

be addressed related to the proceedings prior to these decisions and to the

specific legal situation in Norway.

II. Shortcomings in the period before December 2011

4. According to the Court’s case-law, a care order should be regarded as

a temporary measure and, in principle, be consistent with the ultimate aim

of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see paragraphs 207-208 of the

judgment). In the present case, however, this ultimate aim was absent from

the outset of the domestic proceedings. On 21 November 2008 – two

months after the child’s birth and one month after issuing the care order –

the Office for Children, Youth and Family Affairs stated that the boy would

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 79

need “stable adults who can give him good care” (see paragraph 30). Seven

days later the Social Welfare Board, in the application for a care order,

assumed “that it would be a matter of a long-term placement and that X

would probably grow up in foster care” and that the applicant’s capacity as

a mother would be “limited” (see paragraph 31).

5. Even at this early stage the Board did not pursue the aim of reuniting

the child with his mother. In its decision of 2 March 2009 – four and a half

months after the care order – the Board again envisaged that the child would

grow up in the foster home. It emphasised that this would mean “that the

foster parents would become X’s psychological parents, and that the amount

of contact had to be determined in such a way as to ensure that the

attachment process [between the foster parents and the child], which was

already well under way, was not disrupted” (see paragraph 43). On

22 April 2010 – eighteen months after the care order – the majority of the

High Court confirmed that the purpose of the contact sessions was not to

establish a relationship with a view to the child’s future return to the care of

his biological mother (see paragraph 75).

6. Furthermore, the authorities in no way facilitated the development of

a good relationship between the mother and her son. On the contrary, the

contact sessions were extremely limited – two hours, respectively four and

six times a year – and had to take place under supervision and in the

presence of the foster mother, sometimes even in the foster home. Under

such circumstances these sessions were obviously unable to create a positive

atmosphere and to facilitate any rapprochement between mother and child.

The authorities’ argument that the child’s reactions would decrease and the

degree of contact could be improved if the sessions became less frequent

(see paragraph 75) cannot be considered as anything other than cynical.

7. The domestic authorities never considered the foster care of the child

as a temporary measure with the ultimate aim of reuniting the mother and

her child, and they did not seriously engage in supporting the mother with a

view to improving her capacity as a mother. In this respect, they disregarded

the Court’s case-law and their respective obligations.

8. The authorities’ attitude concurs with the domestic law, setting a very

low threshold for taking a child into public care, but an extremely high

threshold for discontinuing this public care (see, in particular, section 4-21

of the Child Welfare Act, referred to in paragraph 122). In order for the

foster care order to be revoked, the parents have to show that it is “highly

probable” that they would be able to provide the child with proper care.

Such a requirement is problematic in the light of the Court’s case-law and

the State’s duty to take measures in order to facilitate family reunification as

soon as reasonably feasible (see paragraph 208). The Child Welfare Act also

seems to grant the authorities unfettered discretion. Moreover, even if in a

specific case the parents succeeded in this regard, their attempts would be

futile if “the child has become so attached to persons and the environment

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80 STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS

where he or she is living that ... removing the child may lead to serious

problems for him or her” (see, again, section 4-21 of the Act). In other

words, the simple passage of time makes it most unlikely that a care order

will ever be revoked.

III. The majority’s approach and my own view of the case

9. The focus of the majority’s reasoning lay in the assessment of the

proceedings of 2011-12, entailing the withdrawal of the first applicant’s

parental responsibilities for her son and the consent to his adoption. More

precisely, the majority centred their examination on the City Court’s review

as reflected in its decision of 22 February 2012 (see paragraph 215).

However, the judgment does not as such deal with the shortcomings in the

period from the issuing of the care order in October 2008 until the Board’s

decision of November 2011. These flaws are briefly mentioned in

paragraphs 220 and 221, but solely in order to explain the shortcomings that

occurred in the proceedings before the City Court in 2012, particularly the

fact that the sparse contact which occurred between the applicants had

provided only limited evidence from which to draw clear conclusions with

regard to the mother’s caring skills. This aspect, together with the lack of

updated expert reports, led the majority to conclude that the decision-

making process leading to the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012

was flawed and in “procedural” violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

10. I am of the opinion that the finding of a violation of Article 8 is not

easily reconcilable with such a narrow approach, and I would have preferred

to assess the case more broadly and to look at the “full picture”.

11. The judgment only examines the decision-making process before the

City Court, which on 22 February 2012 upheld the Board’s decision to

withdraw the applicant’s parental responsibilities and consent to adoption.

However, although some shortcomings in this decision-making process

before the City Court may have occurred, it should also be recognised that

at that point – by which time the child had already lived for three years and

four months with the foster parents – the national court had to some extent

its hands tied, on account of the previous events and proceedings as well as

the simple passage of time. It was confronted with a kind of

fait accomplis.

At that stage the balancing exercise between the interests of the child and

those of his biological family would almost inevitably have led to the result

of the child remaining with his foster family. As confirmed by the experts

and accepted by the court, the child had developed such an attachment to his

foster parents, his foster brother and the general foster home environment

that it would entail serious problems if he had to move, since his primary

security and sense of belonging were in the foster home and he perceived

the foster parents as his psychological parents (see, in particular,

paragraph 106 of the judgment).

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 81

12. The Court should not disregard the reality of life, and it should not

engage in a formalistic assessment of the City Court’s decision of

22 February 2012 and overemphasise, in particular, the lack of updated

expert reports. It seems more than questionable whether any new report on

the mother’s abilities could at that point in time have overruled the child’s

best interests in staying with the foster parents. The main shortcomings, for

which the authorities were responsible, did not occur in the proceedings of

2011-12, but rather had occurred at the earlier stages.

13. The judgment does not directly address these main shortcomings,

due to the lack of jurisdiction (see paragraph 147). While, strictly speaking,

it is correct that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review as such the

compatibility of the decisions that predated or were reviewed by the High

Court’s judgment of 22 April 2010 with Article 8 of the Convention, this

does not exclude the possibility that the previous flaws can, nevertheless, be

addressed directly.

14. The majority (referring to

Jovanovic v. Sweden,

no. 10592/12, § 73,

22 October 2015, and

Mohamed Hasan v. Norway,

no. 27496/15, § 121,

26 April 2018) conceded in paragraph 148 that, in its review of the

proceedings relating to the decisions taken in 2011-12, the Court was

required to put these proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably

meant that it had to some degree to have regard to the former proceedings

and decisions. While I accept that statement as such, I disagree with the

majority’s narrow understanding of the “related” proceedings, as well as

with their restricted interpretation of the “degree” of regard.

15. The judgment examines only the decision-making process directly

surrounding the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012. To my mind,

the Court should have assessed the entire inter-connected process which

ultimately led to the impugned decision. This “process” should, particularly

in a case such as the instant one, be understood in a broader context. It

concerns not only the final proceedings before the courts, but extends to the

previous proceedings before the administrative authorities, which were

intrinsically linked to the later proceedings resulting in the impugned

decision. Therefore, “related proceedings” should include all relevant

actions, omissions and decisions by the authorities which paved the way for

the final court decisions, built their inseparable factual and/or legal basis

and predetermined their outcome to a large extent.

16. In this respect, the Court has stated in previous cases that the

necessity of the interference needs to be assessed in the light of the case as a

whole (see, for example,

Paradiso and Campanelli

[GC], no. 25358/12,

§ 179, 24 January 2017). The Court cannot confine itself to considering the

impugned decisions in isolation (see

Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1),

judgment of

24 March 1988, Series A no 130, § 68). The decisions relating to the

withdrawal of the first applicant’s parental responsibilities and the

authorisation of the adoption have thus to be placed in context, which means

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82 STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS

in my understanding to be put in direct context with the preceding

proceedings and the respective facts. It seems to me that the term “case as a

whole” should, at least in the present circumstances, be understood in this

broader sense, that is, not limited to the final court proceedings, but

extended to the full process surrounding a given case and the actual

consequences of the decisions taken within that process.

17. Such an approach finds some support in the Court’s case-law.

Therefore, let us examine to what degree the Court had regard in other cases

to the “related proceedings”.

18. In

Gnahoré v. France

(no. 40031/98, ECHR 2000-IX) the

application was lodged in 1997 and concerned,

inter alia,

a father’s

complaint against a decision taken in 1996 dismissing his request to have a

care order lifted. However, the Court’s assessment was not restricted to

these proceedings, but also explicitly included the original care order of

1992, the subsequent measures and the several renewals of the care order

(ibid., §§ 56-58).

19. In

K. and T. v. Finland

([GC], no. 25702/94, ECHR 2001-VII) two

children were taken into emergency care in June 1993 and one month later

were placed in “normal” public care. Whereas the latter decisions were

upheld in court proceedings, the former decisions were not appealed against.

The Court accepted that the ratification of the emergency care orders had

“in effect” been confirmed by the normal care orders and had dispensed the

applicants from filing a separate appeal (ibid., § 145). It therefore assessed

also the emergency care orders, although the application had been lodged

with the Court more than one year after these orders had been issued, and

although the Court found that there existed substantive and procedural

differences between the two sets of proceedings and that the respective

decisions were of different kind.

20. In

Zhou v. Italy

(no. 33773/11, 21 January 2014) the applicant

complained about the adoption of her child, decided by court decisions in

2010. However, the Court considered that the decisive point consisted in

establishing whether the domestic authorities, before extinguishing the legal

relationship between mother and child, had taken all necessary and adequate

measures that could reasonably be required in order for the child to live a

normal family life within his own family (ibid., § 49). It therefore assessed

all of the authorities’ previous decisions relating to the placement of the

child in a foster family and the mother’s contact rights.

21. In

Jovanovic

(cited above) the Court first declared inadmissible the

complaints concerning the decision to take the child into public care.

However, in its assessment of the complaints concerning the subsequent

decision not to terminate the public care, the Court nevertheless examined in

some detail the proceedings which had resulted in the first care order and

found that the national authorities’ decision to place the child in compulsory

public care was “clearly justified” (ibid., § 78). Therefore, the Court did not

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 83

limit itself to placing the later decisions in the simple context of these

preceding proceedings, but took an explicit stand on the justification of the

previous decisions, even though it had declared the respective complaints

inadmissible.

22. Finally, in the recent case of

Mohamed Hasan

(cited above), the

Court began by limiting its examination to the proceedings concerning the

removal of parental responsibility and adoption, declaring the earlier

proceedings on placement in care to be relevant only in so far as it was

necessary for the Court to have regard when carrying out its examination of

the later proceedings. However, in a kind of

obiter dictum

the Court stated

that there were no grounds to assume that the procedural issues in the

previous care proceedings had consequences for the later adoption

proceedings “or [for] the case overall in such a manner that they require

further examination by the Court when assessing the applicant’s complaints

against the removal of parental authority and adoption” (ibid., § 151).

23. In contrast, these requirements are fulfilled in the present case. The

preceding care proceedings between 2008 and 2011 actually had decisive

consequences for the decisions taken in the subsequent 2011-12 proceedings

and thus did require such further examination by the Court when assessing

the applicants’ complaints against the removal of parental responsibility and

the adoption.

24. In such a situation the Court is compelled to scrutinise, as set out,

inter alia,

in the above-cited

Zhou

case, whether the domestic authorities,

before extinguishing the legal relationship between parent and child, had

taken all necessary and adequate measures that could reasonably be required

in order for the child to live a normal family life within his own family. In

so doing, it needs to take into account all previous proceedings that were

intrinsically linked to this final decision, irrespective of whether or not the

previous decisions were officially taken within the same formal framework

of adoption proceedings or in separate proceedings preceding the adoption

proceedings.

25. As already mentioned above, the authorities in the present case

failed from the outset to pursue the aim of reuniting the child with his

mother, but rather immediately envisaged that he would grow up in the

foster home. This underlying assumption runs like a thread through all

stages of the proceedings, starting with the care order. The City Court’s

decision of 22 February 2012 – taken when the child had already lived with

the foster parents for three years and four months – seems to have been

merely the “automatic” and “unavoidable” consequence of all the previous

events and decisions. In other words, the shortcomings from October 2008

onwards led to the

de facto

determination in 2011-12 that the relationship

between the applicants had broken down.

26. This aspect also formed an essential element of the dissenting

opinion to the Chamber judgment. The minority underlined that the

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84 STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS

decisions to place the child in care “fed inexorably into the decisions

leading to adoption, created the passage of time so detrimental to the

reunification of a family unit, influenced the assessment over time of the

child’s best interests and, crucially, placed the first applicant in a position

which was inevitably in conflict with that of the authorities which had

ordered and maintained the placement and with the foster parents, whose

interest lay in promoting the relationship with the child with a view

ultimately to adopting him.” While not calling into question the decisions of

the domestic authorities regarding placement, the minority held that it was

“not possible to ignore the sequence of events which preceded and led to the

adoption” (see paragraph 18 of the separate opinion). I fully agree with

these considerations.

27. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that assessing the “process” at

national level and the reasons given by the domestic authorities does not

mean, as the Chamber majority did and, to an extent, the Grand Chamber

majority have also done, exclusively focussing on the procedural steps

taken. Procedural requirements have no end in themselves, but they rather

provide a means for protecting an individual against arbitrary action by

public authorities. Therefore, one must look beyond and behind the

formalities of a procedure. The authorities’ attitudes and objectives have

likewise to be examined. Procedural assessment cannot be reduced

exclusively to an assessment of the form taken by the final decisions. If at

national level, as in the present case, the authorities performed only a

“formalistic” assessment from the outset, without a real and substantive

engagement in taking account of all interests involved and without

balancing these interests in the light of the Court’s case-law on Article 8 of

the Convention, the proceedings seen “as a whole”, including the relevant

previous decisions and actions, were not conducted in a satisfactory manner

and were not accompanied by safeguards commensurate with the gravity of

the interferences and the seriousness of the interests at stake.

IV. Conclusion

28. I would very much have hesitated to vote in favour of finding a

violation of Article 8 of the Convention had I been required to follow the

majority’s approach and formally to assess only the review proceedings

leading to the City Court’s decision of 22 February 2012 – at a time when

the child had already lived with the foster parents for three years and four

months. However, by examining the case as brought before the Court in a

broader manner and addressing the “real” issues related to the proceedings

prior to the said decision, which were the actual source of the problem, I had

no difficulties in joining the majority with regard to the outcome of this

application and in finding that there has been a violation of Article 8 in

respect of both applicants.

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 85

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE

KŪRIS

1. I (together with some other colleagues) have joined the Concurring

opinion of Judge Ranzoni. Here I add only a few remarks.

2. It has been observed by many that case-law in general (not only that

of the Strasbourg Court) has become increasingly “analytical” in the

disruptive sense of the word, in that the facts which are complained of by

litigants and, accordingly, the application of law to these facts tend to be

severed into small parts, which are then dealt with separately. In a recent

Grand Chamber case (with a different subject matter) my two colleagues

and I expressed our disagreement with the majority’s decision to split,

artificially and very formalistically, the period under consideration into two

parts and to assess only the later part of it as a separate period,

notwithstanding the fact that whatever took place during that latter “period”

had its roots in the preceding one (I refer to the separate opinion of judges

Yudkivska,

Vehabović

and myself in

Radomilja and Others v. Croatia,

[GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, 20 March 2018). In the present case a

similar structural problem has been created.

3. From whichever angle we consider it, reality is a whole. This is a

matter of fact – and of principle. While it has been admitted in the present

judgment that “in its review of the proceedings relating to the County Social

Welfare Board’s decision of 8 December 2011 and the decisions taken on

appeal against that decision, notably the City Court’s judgment of

22 February 2012, the Court will have to put those proceedings and

decisions in context, which inevitably means that

it must to some degree

have regard

to the former proceedings and decisions” (see paragraph 148;

emphasis added), it is unclear what that “degree” is and what is meant by

“having regard”.

Courts must not leave ambiguities in their judgments. Here, an ambiguity

has been deliberately created.

4. I surmise that the ambiguity in question has something to do with the

formula that has been repeated and made use of in so many cases, to the

effect that “the content and scope of the ‘case’ referred to the Grand

Chamber are delimited by the Chamber’s decision on admissibility” (see

paragraph 144 of the present judgment). While in many instances the

concurrence of the Chamber’s and the Grand Chamber’s views on the scope

– temporal or material – of a given case does not raise problems, this is not

always so (on this point, I refer to my separate opinion in

Lupeni Greek

Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania,

[GC], no. 76943/11,

29 November 2016). Such “pruning” of the applicants’ complaint is overly

mechanical. It is undertaken without the Grand Chamber having itself

considered the matter. What is more, the Chamber judgment whereby part

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86 STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS

of an applicant’s complaint is found inadmissible never becomes final.

Thus, no legal basis for the “pruning” ever in fact comes into existence.

Although the Court’s determination to “have regard [to some unspecified

degree] to the former proceedings and decisions” (which, at least formally,

are

not

under examination from the perspective of

their

compliance with

Article 8 of the Convention) has helped to bypass the rigidity of the limits

imposed on the Grand Chamber by the Chamber (through its never-finalised

judgment), would it not be rational and fair, at some point in time, to look

into whether these limits themselves are justified? For until this matter is

properly addressed and reviewed, the Grand Chamber will constantly find

itself obliged to invent ingenuous formulas in order to circumvent the

obstacle which it has itself erected. What is at stake in such cases is the

comprehensiveness of the Court’s examination of the case.

Perhaps it is a fortunate coincidence that in the present case an

acceptable outcome (a finding of a violation of Article 8) has been reached,

despite the fact that a process which ought to have been examined as a

whole was divided into two parts: the one formally under consideration, and

the other only being “had regard” to.

5. Had the process in question been examined as a whole (that is, the

initial period not merely been given “regard” to), it would have been even

more obvious that the fundamental problem dealt with in this case lies not

only and not so much in the concrete circumstances of the applicant’s case,

but rather, to put it very mildly, in certain specificities of the Norwegian

policy which underlies the impugned decisions and the process as a whole.

It is hardly a coincidence that so many third-party interveners have

joined the present case. They include those States whose authorities have

had to deal with the consequences for their under-age citizens of the

decisions taken by Norway’s

Barnevernet.

Sapienti sat.

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STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 87

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KJØLBRO,

POLÁČKOVÁ,

KOSKELO AND NORDÉN ON THE MERITS

OF THE CASE

1. We have regrettably been unable to agree with the majority in its

finding that there has been a violation of Article 8 in the present case.

2. Amongst ourselves we have taken different positions on the

admissibility of the application in so far as the first applicant’s right to

pursue the complaint on behalf of the second applicant is concerned. As

regards the merits of the case as declared admissible by the majority,

however, our views are shared.

3. Essentially, we concur with the position taken by the majority in the

Chamber, the judgment of which we find both well-considered and

well-reasoned, and consonant with the proper role of this Court (see

paragraphs 111-30 of the Chamber judgment).

4. In the following considerations, however, we would like to make

some further observations arising from the subject matter of the present case

and the approach taken by the majority.

Some remarks on the Court’s general principles

5. We note at the outset that the present case concerns issues in relation

to which the general principles developed in the Court’s case-law have a

rather long history, marked in part by changes in the societal and legal

environment which informs the Court’s approach to the rights of persons as

individuals, family members and children. The complexity of the issues, the

dynamics of the underlying factual and legal developments and the diversity

of the values and contextual conditions prevailing in these matters have all

contributed to a situation where, at present, the general principles as set out

by the Court are riddled not only with some inevitable ambiguities but also

with some undeniable tensions and outright contradictions, “internally” as

well as in relation to the relevant specialised legal instruments, particularly

the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

6. One notable point of such tensions and contradictions concerns the

question of how to reconcile the “sanctity” of the biological family with the

best interests of the child – the latter as enshrined in the CRC, as well as in

many subsequent constitutional provisions at national levels and in the EU

Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is indeed no doubt that the removal

of a child from his or her natural parents cannot be justified by a finding that

such a measure would enable the child to be placed in a more beneficial

environment for his or her upbringing. The principle according to which the

removal of a child from the care of his or her natural parent(s) is subject to a

test of necessity in terms of the child’s best interests and is available only as

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a measure of last resort is uncontroversial. The same is true for the position

that the domestic authorities must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation

in determining whether the best interests of the child do require that he or

she should be taken into public care. The main point of difficulty and

tension arises in situations where long-term measures come under

consideration.

7. In the general principles as set out in the Chamber judgment, it was

reiterated as “the guiding principle” that a care order should be regarded as

a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit,

and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent

with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child. The

positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as

reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with

progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of

care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the

best interests of the child (see paragraph 105 of the Chamber judgment).

Similarly, according to the present judgment, “regard for family unity and

reunification... are inherent considerations in the right to respect for family

life under Article 8” and, “in the case of an imposition of public care

restricting family life, a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures

to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible” (see

paragraph 205).

8. The dilemma is well illustrated by the above rendition of the position

in the Chamber judgment. Under this approach, reuniting the natural

parent(s) and the child is the “inherent” and “ultimate” aim and the “guiding

principle” to be followed. This guiding principle is “subject to” the proviso

that the “ultimate aim” (of reuniting the biological family) must be

“balanced against” the duty to “consider” the best interests of the child. This

gives the impression that the “ultimate aim” of reuniting the biological

family might override the best interests of the child. Under the CRC, and

similar constitutional or other provisions in many domestic legal orders,

however, the position has evolved to one where the best interests of the

child are recognized as a primary, or paramount, consideration – based on

children’s particular need for protection as dependent and vulnerable human

beings. This in turn implies that the best interests of the child may, where

the circumstances so demand, override the aim of reuniting the child with

the biological parent(s).

9. The background of these two approaches can no doubt be traced back

to the history and context of each legal instrument. The ECHR is rooted in

the protection, and balancing, of the rights of everyone within a State’s

jurisdiction, including those who have formed a family, whereas the CRC is

focused on strengthening and protecting children as holders of distinct

individual rights. The tension referred to above should be neither

over-emphasised nor ignored. It is always the case that efforts must be made

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to reconcile the rights of each of the individuals concerned. There are,

however, inevitable limits to the possibilities available for such

reconciliation. Consequently, it may ultimately be necessary to decide

which consideration takes precedence. In this sense, it does make a

difference whether the determinative precept is that reuniting the biological

family can take precedence over the best interests of the child, or whether

the determinative precept is that the best interests of the child may take

precedence even where this entails renouncing the child’s reunification with

his or her biological parent(s).

10. It appears undeniable that this remains a point of principle on which

the Court is struggling. As a result, it has difficulty formulating general

principles with all the desirable clarity and coherence.

11. Another manifestation of the tension referred to above is the fact that

on the one hand, the Court has – quite rightly – been concerned about the

impact of time on the prospects of successful family reunification. Thus, it

has held that the positive obligation to take measures toward family

reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will weigh on the authorities

with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the

period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to

consider the best interests of the child (see § 209 of the present judgment).

On the other hand, the Court has also accepted that the impact of time may

weigh against such reunification. Thus, it has held that when a considerable

period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public

care, the interest of a child not to have his or her

de facto

family situation

changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family

reunited (see

K. and T. v. Finland

[GC], no. 25702/94, § 155, ECHR 2001

VII). In this context, the Court has thus made it clear that the best interests

of the child may ultimately take precedence over the “ultimate aim” of

reunification.

12. Yet another manifestation of the tensions mentioned above is the fact

that the Court has held that it is “in principle in a child’s interests to

preserve family ties, save where weighty reasons exist to justify severing

those ties” (see paragraph 157 of the present judgment). However,

especially in situations where it has been necessary to adopt care measures

in respect of an infant and to maintain placement with a foster family for a

long period, the child’s

de facto

family life and family ties may be almost

exclusively with the foster family rather than the biological parent(s). In this

sense, too, the ultimate question may be which perspective, namely that of

the child or that of the biological parent(s), and (accordingly) which family

life, should take precedence.

13. These tensions in the general principles are bound to be a source of

some real difficulties for the domestic authorities in several Contracting

States, not least those where constitutional provisions entail that the best

interests of the child be regarded as a pivotal consideration.

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The majority’s approach

14. In the present case, the position taken by the majority is presented as

being concerned with the decision-making process at the domestic level.

The key paragraph (§ 220) reveals, however, that the actual underlying

problem as perceived by the majority is a substantive one, namely that the

domestic authorities “focused on the interests of the child” and did not

“seriously contemplate” the child’s reunification with his biological family.

This key passage recaptures and reveals the tension discussed above, and

reflects the view taken by the present majority on the question of principles.

15. We find it problematic that the Court should proceed in this manner,

effectively substituting its own preferences for the assessment made by the

domestic authorities, despite the fact that the latter have carried out a

thorough examination of the case in proceedings involving courts composed

of both judicial and other professionals with expertise in the field, and on

the basis of extensive evidence. The problem is not only that the Court is

extremely ill-placed to take on a “fourth-instance” role in these kinds of

situations. The more profound problem is that by giving priority to its own

preferences as to how the competing interests should be weighted and

balanced, the Court in effect curtails the margin of appreciation that it is

important to preserve, especially in situations where the domestic authorities

must consider individual rights and interests that may well be contradictory

and where views may differ as to how the relevant values, principles and

competing considerations should best be reconciled in the given

circumstances. This is all the more so in a context such as the present one,

where the domestic authorities are under a duty to fulfil positive obligations

toward a vulnerable child.

16. In the present case, it clearly appears that the manner in which the

majority have identified “procedural shortcomings” in fact arises from the

substantive view taken, as a result of which the domestic authorities are

faulted for “focusing on the interests on the child” instead of his

reunification with the biological family. The majority thus consider that

they are in a position to conclude that the “lack of a fresh expert

examination substantially limited the factual assessment” (see

paragraph 223 of the present judgment) and that any evidence that could be

drawn from the contact sessions was “limited” (see paragraph 225).

17. Moreover, the majority even question the domestic court’s findings

concerning the (particular) vulnerability of X (the child). On this point, we

refer to paragraph 224 of the judgment, where the majority imply doubts as

to “how the vulnerability could have continued despite the fact that the child

had lived in foster care since the age of three weeks”, which is to be

contrasted with paragraph 90, citing the Social Welfare Board’s conclusion

in this regard concerning the “serious and life-threatening neglect suffered

by the child during the three first weeks of his life”). In this matter, our

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reservations go beyond the problem of the Court adopting a “fourth-

instance” mode. Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar

with child psychology in general, or with research concerning the long-term

effects of early neglect of an infant in particular. Furthermore, we find it

highly problematic that the Court should question the domestic findings on

the particular vulnerability of the individual child – which were reached by

instances having taken evidence on this matter and possessing the

professional expertise which this Court is clearly lacking – without having

raised this particular question in the course of the proceedings before the

Court, and thus without providing the parties with the opportunity to shed

light on the “nature of the vulnerability” of X (the child), which the Court is

apparently unable to comprehend or attach much credence to. The Court

should ensure that issues identified as being of particular significance are

subjected to adversarial debate.

18. In sum, this is a case where it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the

majority dislike the outcome of the case at the domestic level and have

sought to address the substantive objections or misgivings under the guise

of procedural shortcomings. Yet the underlying value judgments and

preferences deserve to be ventilated with greater transparency.

Our position

19. First of all, and limiting our attention now to the specific context of

the impugned decisions (refusal to discontinue the care order, deprivation of

parental rights, permission for the foster parents to adopt the child), we

subscribe to the Court’s case-law to the effect that measures which totally

deprive a parent of his or her family life with his or her child and which thus

abandon the aim of reuniting them should “only be applied in exceptional

circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an

overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests” (see, for

instance,

Jansen v. Norway,

no. 2822/16, 6 September 2918, § 93, and

Aune

v. Norway,

no. 52502/07, § 66, 28 October 2010).

20. In our view, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that the

impugned decisions failed to comply with the above requirements, or to

hold that there were any significant deficiencies in the domestic

decision-making process.

21. Although the Court is concerned only with the most recent set of

decisions, taken in 2012, it should not be overlooked that the case has a long

history, starting with support measures put in place even before X (the

child) was born, followed by assiduous support measures after his birth,

with a view to assisting the mother in learning to take responsibility and

care for her baby. Nor can it be overlooked that the care measures were

triggered because the assistance provided, although intensive, proved to be

unsuccessful. Instead, extremely serious circumstances arose which

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rendered the care measures necessary for the protection of the child’s life

and health. The facts of the case as recounted in the present judgment

provide plenty of insight into the challenges faced by the domestic

authorities. In particular, it is to be noted that although the first applicant did

not contest the High Court’s care order of 2010, she appears not to have

realised why any of the imposed measures had been deemed necessary, and

continued to perceive the authorities’ actions as a “conspiracy” against her

(see paragraphs 77, 90 and 101 of the present judgment). Furthermore, it

appears that the contact sessions were also affected by these difficulties, in

that the first applicant’s antagonism toward the welfare authorities and

foster mother tended to prevail over her attention to the child (see

paragraphs 90, 101-03).

22. As regards the particular point that no fresh expert report was

requested on the alleged recent improvements in the mother’s situation and

caring skills (see paragraph 223 of the present judgment), we do not

consider that the facts of the case justify departing from the usual approach

under which it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them,

including the means to ascertain the relevant facts (see, in particular,

Sommerfeld v. Germany

[GC], no. 31871/96, § 71, ECHR 2003-VIII

(extracts)). We find it rather far-fetched to criticise the City Court, as the

majority do, for not having commissioned a new expert examination. The

domestic court was informed of the positive developments in the mother’s

situation, and it was not in dispute that, together with her husband and

assisted by a social worker, she was capable of taking care of her daughter.

However, given the concurrent findings by the County Board and the City

Court regarding the mother’s striking lack of empathy and understanding

with regard to X and the challenges entailed for the latter if he were to be

returned to her care (see paragraphs 90 and 101 of the present judgment),

together with his strong social and psychological attachment to his foster

parents, we are unable to share the conclusion that the lack of a new expert

examination could, in the circumstances of the present case, be considered a

significant shortcoming in the domestic decision-making process.

23. In view of the facts of the case as recorded in the present judgment,

it is clear that the domestic authorities were faced with a situation where

serious issues were at stake in terms of the child and his best interests. It

would be wrong, from the perspective of this Court, to underestimate the

complexity and difficulty arising from such circumstances. Against this

background, the domestic authorities should not, in our view, be criticised

for having “focused on the best interests of the child”. We are unable to

perceive a sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that, in the particular

circumstances of the case, their efforts were misguided or are to be regarded

as an unjustified failure to reunify the child with his biological family

(mother). Whilst it is true that the impugned measures were based on an

assessment of what was required to secure the best interests of the child, we

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can accept that in the present case, in the light of the facts of the case and

the thorough examination given to them in the domestic proceedings, there

were exceptional circumstances which justified the drastic measures taken,

for reasons pertaining to the overriding requirement to protect the child’s

best interests (see point 19 above).

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JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES KOSKELO AND

NORDÉN ON THE QUESTION OF THE FIRST

APPLICANT’S RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE SECOND

APPLICANT

1. We have voted against point 1 of the operative part of the present

judgment, whereby the majority dismiss the Government’s preliminary

objection concerning the first applicant’s (i.e. the mother’s) capacity to act

before the Court also on behalf of the second applicant (i.e. the child). We

consider that there is, in the circumstances of the present case, a conflict of

interests between the mother and the child which is of such a nature as to

preclude the mother from representing her child in the proceedings before

the Court. In this respect, the present case exemplifies issues which, in our

view, require changes to be made in the practice followed by the Court to

date.

General remarks

2. As holders of rights under the Convention, children give rise to

particular challenges in terms of the procedural safeguarding of those rights,

in that, as minors, they are unable to act on their own as applicants before

the Court. It has been acknowledged in the case-law that the position of

children under Article 34 of the Convention calls for careful consideration,

since children must generally rely on other individuals to present their

claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to

authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense (see

A.K.

and L. v. Croatia,

no. 37956/11, § 47, 8 January 2013, and

P., C. and S.

v. the United Kingdom

(dec.), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). The Court

has found it necessary to avoid a restrictive and purely technical approach in

this area; in particular, consideration must be given to the links between the

child in question and his or her “representatives”, to the subject-matter and

the purpose of the application and to the possibility of a conflict of interests

(see S.P.,

D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom,

no. 23715/94, Commission

decision of 20 May 1996, unreported;

Giusto, Bornacin and V. v. Italy

(dec.), no. 38972/06, ECHR 2007-V; and

Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy

(no. 16318/07, § 32, 27 April 2010). One example of a case where the

situation of minors was considered to justify granting

locus standi

to a

relative who had lodged an application only on behalf of the minors and not

on her own behalf is that of

N.TS. and Others v. Georgia,

no. 71776/12,

§§ 55-59, 2 February 2016).

3. In situations involving public care measures, the Court’s concern has

been the danger that the child’s interest may not be brought to the Court’s

attention and that the child will therefore be deprived of effective protection

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of his or her rights under the Convention. In the event of a conflict between

a natural parent and the State over a minor’s interests with regard to the

question of deprivation of custody, the State as holder of custodial rights

cannot be deemed to ensure the child’s Convention rights, which is why the

natural parent has been recognised as having

locus standi

on behalf of his or

her child before the Court, even though the parent may no longer be vested

with parental rights as a matter of domestic law (see

Lambert and Others

v. France

([GC], no. 46043/14, § 94, ECHR 2015;

Scozzari and Giunta

v. Italy

[GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000 VIII; and

Sahin v. Germany

(dec.), no. 30943/96, 12 December 2000).

4. While this approach is understandable and justifiable in the light of

the underlying concern relating to minors’ access to the Court, it

nevertheless gives rise to problems in situations where the natural parent

who wishes to act on behalf of the child is himself or herself involved in the

facts of the case in such a way that the parent’s and the child’s interests are

not aligned but are instead in conflict.

5. This brings us to the crux of the issue. The need to ensure effective

protection of the rights of minors under the Convention entails two key

requirements: firstly, it must be possible to bring before the Court

complaints alleging the violation of a child’s Convention rights; secondly,

the child’s interests must be properly represented in proceedings brought on

behalf of a child. Focusing on the first aspect is not sufficient for the

effective protection of the rights of children. The second aspect becomes

acute precisely in situations where the circumstances of the case indicate

that there may be a conflict between the interests of the person acting on

behalf of the child, be this a natural parent or anyone else, and the child

himself/herself.

6. The need to distinguish between the positions of the parent and the

child, particularly in situations involving measures taken by the domestic

child-welfare authorities, is accentuated by the fact that their perspectives

may differ. From the perspective of the parent any measures taken – notably

where they are imposed against his or her will – constitute interference in

family life between the parent and the child, whereas from the perspective

of the child such measures represent fulfilment of the positive obligations

incumbent on the State authorities

vis-à-vis

the child in order to protect the

his or her rights and vital interests, while simultaneously entailing an

interference in the child’s existing family life. The very context and its

complex nature thus indicate that the two perspectives, that of the parent

and that of the child, may not be aligned on the question of the necessity

and justification of the impugned measures.

7. Ensuring the proper representation of the child in proceedings before

the Court is all the more important when, as is often the case, the issues to

be resolved depend on an assessment of whether the best interests of the

child have been adequately safeguarded at the domestic level. The concept

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of the child’s best interests is a broad, multifaceted and complex one. It

comprises various elements which, in the specific circumstances of a given

case, may be in a relationship of tension or conflict with each other. The

perception of where a child’s best interests lie in specific situations may

depend on the perspective taken, especially for those personally involved,

and become intertwined with the individual’s own interests. When a serious

conflict has arisen between a natural parent and the State’s child-welfare

authorities over the child’s interests, the reality is that neither those

authorities nor the parent whose acts or omissions are at issue can be

regarded as detached from that conflict. If the child’s rights and best

interests are to be taken seriously, the child needs independent

representation by a person who is not involved in the underlying conflict

and is capable of taking the child’s perspective in the matter.

8. The International Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted

already three decades ago and in force for nearly as long, established the

position of a child as a subject of distinct individual rights. As stated in its

Preamble “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs

special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection” (citing

the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the UN General

Assembly on 20 November 1959). Accordingly, the key standard of the

child’s best interests has an important procedural component, also set out in

the General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or

her best interests taken as a primary consideration. In this document, the UN

Committee on the Rights of the Child states,

inter alia:

“The child will need

appropriate legal representation when his or her best interests are to be

formally assessed and determined by courts and equivalent bodies. In

particular, in cases where a child is referred to an administrative or judicial

procedure involving the determination of his or her best interests, he or she

should be provided with a legal representative, in addition to a guardian or

representative of his or her views, when there is a potential conflict between

the parties in the decision.”

9. In this Court, the need for a child to be separately and independently

represented in situations of a conflict of interest between the child and the

parent purporting to act on both his or her own and the child’s behalf has so

far not been given the attention it requires. The case of

X, Y and Z v. the

United Kingdom

(no. 21830/93, 22 April 1997,

Reports of Judgments and

Decisions

1997-II) appears to have been the first occasion where, in a

context different from the present one, Judge Pettiti in his concurring

opinion referred to the conflict of interests between parents and children and

observed that in similar situations arising in the future, “it would no doubt

be desirable for [the Commission and] the Court to suggest to the parties

that a lawyer be instructed specifically to represent the interests of the child

alone”. This suggestion, however, has remained without impact on the

Court’s practices.

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10. It appears clear to us that changes are required in this respect, but

also that the present legal framework governing proceedings before the

Court is not adequate to meet the needs of ensuring that children are able to

have both access to and appropriate, non-conflicted representation in

proceedings before the Court. In this context, it seems necessary to make a

distinction between the admissibility of an application lodged on behalf of a

child by a natural parent (or other person) and the right to represent the child

for the purposes of submissions relating to the merits of alleged violations

of that child’s rights under the Convention.

11. This issue merits consideration by the Court and the Contracting

Parties in order to develop adequate solutions and practices, taking into

account also the need to comply with the constraints set out in Article 35(1)

of the Convention (see, in this respect, the recent joint concurring opinion

by Judges Koskelo, Eicke and Ilievski in the case of

A and B v. Croatia,

no. 7144/15, 20 June 2019).

Assessment in the present case

12. Turning to the present case, the majority “discern no such conflict of

interest in the present case as would require it to dismiss the [mother’s]

application on behalf of the [child]” (see paragraph 159 of the judgment).

We are unable to agree with this assessment, which furthermore is devoid of

any explanation or reasoning.

13. On the contrary, the existence of a conflict of interests is in our view

obvious in the light of the facts of the case. When assessing this particular

issue – and notwithstanding the position taken on the scope of the Court’s

examination on the merits (with which we are in agreement), namely that

the latter must be limited to the proceedings which resulted in the domestic

judgment by the City Court on 22 February 2012, which subsequently

became final – it is also pertinent to take into account the background to the

measures taken by the child-welfare authorities in respect of the second

applicant. The facts of the case as established by the domestic courts show

that during her first pregnancy the first applicant was identified as requiring

assistance and support once the child would be born. Having given birth,

she was accommodated in a specialised facility with a view to receiving

such assistance and support, foreseen as lasting for three months. Even in

the early days of this stay, the professionals in charge of the facility grew

increasingly concerned about the mother’s ability to care for the infant and

satisfy his basic needs, including feeding and hygiene. The situation was

serious, as baby was suffering from dramatic weight loss. The staff were

forced to introduce round-the-clock monitoring in order to safeguard him,

including measures to wake the mother up at night-time to ensure she would

feed her newborn (see paragraph 20 of the present judgment). However, less

than three weeks into a stay scheduled to last three months, the mother

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announced her intention to leave the facility with the baby, which is when

and why the initial emergency care measure was imposed (ibid.).

14. Thus, the facts from which the present case originate lie in a

situation where the assistance and support given to the mother had to be

replaced by emergency care measures, because the mother’s behaviour and

her intention to abandon the support and assistance put in place gave rise to

a real risk of life-threatening maltreatment of the newborn child. Yet the

facts as they transpire from the case file also show that the mother was

unable to understand, even at the time of the impugned proceedings before

the City Court, why the measures had been taken, and was unaware that

there had been any neglect of the baby on her part (see paragraphs 101 and

220 of the present judgment). Instead, she perceived the imposed measures

as being based on lies (as per her complaint to the County Governor; see

paragraph 77 of the judgment) and characterised them as a conspiracy

against herself (statement to the County Social Welfare Board in 2011; see

paragraph 90 of the judgment).

15. If such circumstances do not make for a conflict sufficing to

preclude the mother from acting before the Court to represent not only her

own position but also the interests of her child, it is difficult to see what

would. The interests at stake cannot be assimilated with each other; there is

a stark tension between them. Neither the fact that the issue raised before

the Court concerns a domestic decision to sever the legal ties between the

mother and the child, nor the Court’s case-law according to which it is in

principle in a child’s interests to preserve family ties, nor the fact that the

domestic proceedings were conducted while the mother was vested with

parental rights over the child (see paragraphs 156-57) are capable of

overriding the existence of a conflict of interests arising from the specific

circumstances of the case. In our opinion, such a conflict cannot be

disregarded when determining whether the parent may act on behalf of the

child throughout the proceedings before this Court.

Conclusion

16. In our opinion, the facts show the existence of a clear and serious

conflict of interests. Under such circumstances, the first applicant should not

have been allowed to represent her child before this Court.

17. It is high time for the Court to reconsider its approach and practices

regarding the issue of permitting a natural parent to act on behalf of his or

her child even where the circumstances of the case indicate an actual or

potential conflict of interests between them. If the Court is genuinely to

embrace, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the idea of

children as subjects of distinct individual rights and the need to regard the

best interests of the child as a primary consideration, it appears necessary to

make changes also in the procedural practices.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Korea Klubben

Næstformand Sanne Mogensen

[email protected]

6. november 2019

Ankestyrelsen

7998 Statsservice

Vedrørende høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne for et nyt

adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016.

Vi ønsker at bidrage med information til denne høring, da vi mener, et vigtigt tema er

negligeret i det oprindelige skema.

Vi fremstiller undren over den manglende repræsentation af de voksne adopterede. På

nuværende tidspunkt tilhører vi en kategori afhængig af adoptivfamilierne. Det er blot

en understregning af den infantilisering, vi som oftest oplever i systemet.

Den nye PAS-ordning for voksne adopterede burde derfor stå isoleret og ikke som en

underkategori, der udspringer fra støtte til adoptivforældrene.

Den omtalte PAS-ordnings permanentgørelse er imødekommende over for de voksne

adopteredes udfordringer. Vi har erfaret markant gavn af ordningen og ønsker derfor,

at denne fortsætter.

Ydermere vil vi gøre opmærksom på den manglende hjælp til de børn og unge

voksne, der nu befinder sig i Danmark.

Vi foreslår, at man afsætter midler til et støtteprogram, hvor voksne adopterede støtter

og videreformidler viden om adoption til unge adopterede. Dette program skulle være

et mentorprogram.

Da vi er en forening, hvor adopterede drager nytte af indbyrdes erfaringer, ved vi,

hvor gavnligt dialog med ligesindede er.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Hos Korea Klubbens søsterforening har man stor succes med mentorprogrammet.

Also-Known-As. Inc i New York hjælper unge adopterede på områder, hvor PAS-

ordningen alene viser sig utilstrækkelig.

Vi håber, dette vil tilgås med stor alvor og værdsætter muligheden for at bidrage til

denne høring.

Venlig hilsen

Sanne Mogensen

Næstformand, Korea Klubben

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Karin Rønnow Søndergaard

Ankestyrelsen

7998 Statsservice

København/Aalborg 1. november 2019

Ankestyrelsen - Høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne

for et nyt adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen

fra 2016

”Åbenhed

i Adoption (ÅIA) har følgende svar og kommentarer til

Ankestyrelsens høring angående undersøgelsen af mulighederne for et nyt

adoptionssystem og evalueringen af adoptionsreformen fra 2016.

ÅIA arbejder for adopteredes rettigheder iht. FN’s Børnekonvention.

ÅIA vil gerne gøre opmærksom på, at adopteredes organisationers

høringssvar til

helhedsanalysen (Socialministeriet, 28. juni

2013)

desværre ikke blev taget i betragtning ved adoptionsreformen fra

2016.

Vi anmoder om følgende bliver taget i betragtning, før der bliver taget

flere tiltag til nye adoptionssystemer:

FN’s

Børnekonvention implementeres fuldt ud i Ankestyrelsens arbejde

med børn og familier.

Haagerkonventionen

er i modstrid med FN’s

Børnekonvention, herunder

artikel 7, 8, 20 og 21 litra b (subsidaritetsprincippet). Dertil legitimerer

Haagerkonventionen ikke finansiering til adoptionsbureauer.

Adoptionsbureauerne er private virksomheder.

Der findes fortsat ingen uafhængig hjælp til adopterede, som søger

oprindelig familie, genoprettelse af identitet og bevarelse af kontakt til

oprindelig familie. DIA, Datatilsynet og Ankestyrelsen kan ikke hjælpe

med genoprettelse af identitet.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Tidligere adoptionsskandaler bør stadig afdækkes og undersøges

tilbundsgående, så disse kan forsøges undgået i fremtiden, og ofrene for

disse kan få både undskyldning og kompensation, og de ansvarlige drages

til ansvar. Dette fordrer en åbning og systematisk dybdegående

gennemgang af alle adoptionssager til Danmark.

Der er utallige gange verden over, igennem tiden, forsøgt at evaluere og

forbedre adoptionssystemet. Dette har ikke medført, at handlen med børn

er blevet fjernet fra adoptionssystemet, eller at børn og familiers

rettigheder er blevet respekteret. Det har ikke modvirket adopteredes

traumer over mistet identitet, racistiske overgreb, mord eller selvmord.

Myndighedernes økonomiske, administrative og politiske støtte til

adoptionsbureauerne, gør myndighederne og ministrene medansvarlige

for overgreb, børnehandel, skandaler og krænkelser

af FN’s

Børnekonvention.

Luk Danish International Adoption (DIA), før der påbegyndes og

gennemføres yderligere adoptioner.

Åben alle gennemførte adoptioner op, både internationalt og nationalt, og

påbegynd en systematisk gennemgang af dem alle.

Undersøg om adopterede special needs børn, både internationalt og

nationalt adopterede, i Danmark har fået den støtte de har krav på i

kommunerne og regionerne.

Opret et finansieret uvildigt organ af adopterede der kan varetage

adopteredes rettigheder for høringsret, genoprettelse og opretholdelse af

identitet, familiesøgning og kontakt, også til søskende, herunder DNA-

tests og tilbagerejser, sprogkurser, uvildig gratis eller tilskudsberettiget

psykolog/adoptionhealing bistand hele livet, kompensation mv.

Opret en fond med midler - bestyret af det uvildige organ - til at støtte

adopterede i familiesøgning, DNA-tests, tilbagerejser, kontakt,

sprogkurser mv.

Opret en kommission med deltagelse af det uvildige organ af adopterede

der kan se på hvorledes de lande, der er adopteret fra, og fortsat

adopteres fra, bedst kan støttes til at opbygge egne bæredygtige

socioøkonomiske understøttende systemer til udsatte børn og

kvinder/familier.

Dertil bør Danmark tage initiativ til oprettelse af en international fond der

arbejder for at støtte disse lande i at opbygge bæredygtige alternativer til

international adoption f.eks. ud fra Guardianship og børneby principperne

og støtter lokale udsatte familier med behov for socioøkonomisk hjælp

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

eller/og specialpædagogisk støtte, præcis som den hjælp f.eks. enlige

forsørgere i blandt andet Danmark får, tilpasset de enkelte landes

prissætning og i respekt for deres egne ønsker.

Desuden bør der oprettes

et center for åbenhed i adoption/åben adoption

med levede erfaringer og uvildige ansatte der kan vejlede og bistå i

søgning og kontakt i samråd med det uvildige organ, hvor adoptanter,

adopterede og oprindelige familier, herunder søskende, kan få uvildig

hjælp.

Opret et nationalt special register under Justitsministeriet til

kvinder/forældre der siden 1955 og til igangværende sager i dag med og

uden tvang bortadopterer deres børn til undersøgelse af de oprindelige

familiers forhold, hvor mange børn det handler om og hvorfor

kvinderne/forældrene bortadopterede. Vær opmærksom på skyggetal fra

uregistrerede og illegale sager. Lav en undersøgelse om overgreb i

adoptionerne baseret på telefon/interviews som udmøntes

anonymt/navngivent i en offentlig rapport. Brug erfaringerne

internationalt, da det er samme mønster i landene der adopteres fra.

Adopterede børn sikres samme ret i samme alder (førskole) til at blive

hørt til ønsker om kontakt med oprindelige forældre som børn i

skilsmisse, samværs- og bopælssager. Adopterede børn sikres retten til at

vide, at de altid må høres uafhængigt af deres adoptivforældre. Der kan

f.eks. oprettes en uvildig åben anonym børnetelefon for adopterede via

det uvildige organ eller/og centeret for åbenhed i adoption/åben adoption.

Iværksættelse og uvildig økonomisk støtte til selvstændige initiativer fra

særligt adopterede til vidensopsamling på området.

Guardianship- og uvildig adoptionsforskning samt forskning i totale

familiebrud og adoption trafficking sættes på finansloven.

Det uvildige organ, kommissionen og centret for åbenhed i adoption/åben

adoption skal sammen med Ankestyrelsen være VISO-leverandør.”

Ankestyrelsen har fået til opgave at undersøge, hvordan der kan

skabes en økonomisk bæredygtig struktur for den internationale

adoptionsformidling i Danmark.

”Som

svar på Ankestyrelsens opgave til at undersøge, hvordan der kan

skabes en økonomisk bæredygtig struktur for den internationale

adoptionsformidling i Danmark, gør ÅIA opmærksom på, at økonomisk

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

bæredygtighed og international adoptionsformidling ikke kan forenes, da

økonomisk bæredygtighed i hjælpearbejde med børns bedste altid vil

indebære, at børn hjælpes i egen familie, placeres i slægtspleje/adoption,

pleje, institution, børneby eller adoption i eget fødeland, hvor langt flere

børn og deres familier kan hjælpes socioøkonomisk bæredygtigt end de få

børn der adopteres internationalt for flere penge, og måske har så særlige

behov, at de ikke kan hjælpes medicinsk eller specialpædagogisk i egne

fødelande, men heller ikke får rette støtte i Danmark.

Disse reelle special needs børn med betydelige og varige fysiske og

psykiske funktonsnedsættelser kan Danmark ikke tage vare på, da de

danske kommuner ikke har hverken specialiseret ekspertise eller

økonomisk råderum til at hjælpe som Serviceloven ellers skal. Dette

gælder også allerede adopterede børn og unge med betydelige og varige

psykiske og fysiske funktionsnedsættelser i nationale adoptioner og

tvangsbortadoptioner, der ikke støttes som de skal i kommunerne trods

Serviceloven foreskriver, at de skal. Dette bør undersøges nærmere i alle

gennemførte nationale adoptioner, før der tages stilling til om special

needs børn overhovedet kan rummes i Danmark. Ellers er det en stort set

umulig opgave for de danske adoptivfamilier.

Selvsagt kan der ikke findes en bæredygtig økonomisk model for

international adoptionsformidling, da denne netop modvirker oprettelse

og opretholdelse af bæredygtige beskyttende socioøkonomiske modeller i

landene der adopteres fra. Erfaringen er, at pengestrømmene i

international adoption skaber så stærke økonomiske incitamenter, at

handel med børn finder sted på en måde, så selv de bedste intentioner og

tilsyn ikke har mulighed for at udelukke dem. Det er et kæmpe problem,

at adoptionsindustrien forhindrer lande i at oprette sociale offentlige og

private systemer som Danmark selv gennem tiden har udviklet.

Såfremt myndighederne overtager adoptionsformidlingen, bliver

myndighederne direkte ansvarlige for børnehandel og eventuel øvrig

kriminalitet i den sammenhæng, som ex. kidnapning, afpresning,

udbytning, overgreb, dokumentfalskneri, overtrædelse af børn og

familiers menneskerettigheder, fejl i rapporter, forfalskning af persondata

mv.

ÅIA anbefaler, at det eneste danske adoptionsbureau Danish International

Adoption (DIA) lukkes, så den lempelige pengepolitik stoppes, da

Haagerkonventionen ikke legitimerer finansiering af adoptionsbureauer og

det tydeligt har vist sig, at de massive økonomiske vanskeligheder ikke

kan afhjælpes varigt af endnu en tilførsel af midler fra staten som i 2018,

og det dermed ikke har haft nogen egentlig effekt at fusionere AC

Børnehjælp og Dan Adopt i 2014.

“NYT FRA SATSPULJEN

(1.november 2018)

I dag har DIA modtaget en orientering om, at der gennem de næste år tilføres yderligere midler til

adoption fra satspuljen.

Dette fremgår af aftaleteksten på Børne- og Socialministeriets hjemmeside:

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

"Der er sket en række væsentlige ændringer i formidlingsbilledet for international adoption siden

indgåelsen af den politiske aftale fra 2014 om et nyt adoptionssystem i Danmark. Disse ændringer

har skabt et væsentligt ændret økonomisk grundlag for international adoption. Aftalepartierne er

derfor enige om, at der afsættes midler til at understøtte den nuværende struktur for international

adoptionsformidling og til at undersøge, hvordan der kan skabes en bæredygtig struktur for

formidlingsopgaven. Der afsættes i alt 3,1 mio. kr. i perioden 2019-2020."

Direktør Jeanette Larsen:

”Vi synes, at det er positivt at de udfordringer vi har peget på, er blevet imødekommet og at der

bliver tilført midler til vores arbejde i de næste år. Nu afventer vi en nærmere tilbagemelding om,

hvordan midlerne vil blive udmøntet, og når vi ved mere om det vil vi kunne orientere vores

familier yderligere.”

Formidlingsbilledet er ændret fordi international adoption lukker ned i de

forskellige lande, fordi landene forsøger at opbygge egne bæredygtige

socioøkonomiske systemer til at hjælpe børnene i egne fødelande, så de

kan forblive i deres egne familier, deres eget land, med deres eget sprog,

egen kultur og egen religion. Dette bør Danmark støtte, da det er det

mest skånsomme for børnene og langt flere børn kan hjælpes.

DIA er tydeligvis under fortsat massivt økonomisk pres, præcis som Dan

Adopt og AC Børnehjælp var, hvorfor høringen finder sted. Det har intet

at gøre med et nyt og bedre adoptionssystem. Årsrapporten fra 2018

viser, at DIA har udsigt til minus i 2020, måske allerede i 2019, og næppe

kan overleve trods yderligere statstilskud fra 2021.

ÅIA kan ikke anbefale nogle adoptionsansøgere at stille sig på venteliste

hos DIA. Der er ikke argumentation for flere ansøgere med færre børn til

international adoption. Der er kun gennemført 64 adoptioner i 2018 og

formentlig færre endnu i 2019. DIA er ikke garanteret overlevelse med

negative tal udover 2020. DIA sælger ud af deres akter og obligationer.

Hvorfor har de overhovedet investeret i disse? En non-profit organisation?

Forretningen er ikke bæredygtig og selvom statsstøtte måske vil give DIA

5 år mere på markedet, overlever DIA næppe. Derfor er det ikke

bæredygtigt økonomisk at investere mere i DIA. Skal international

adoption fortsætte, skal det nødvendigvis overgå til staten - ellers

stoppes helt.

Det ses over hele verden at adoptionsbureauer lukker grundet mangel på

børn til adoption. Information spredes hurtigt via internettet og skaber

bevidsthed som modvirker det globale nords udnyttelse af det globale

syd. Vi har set adoptionsindustrien flytte sig fra kontinent til kontinent,

land til land for at finde nye steder, hvor adoption ikke har været kendt.

En epoke er formentlig omsider ved at være slut.

Dog er den Europæiske Union særligt gennem de sidste 10 år blevet

manipuleret af adoptions lobbyister og økonomiske investorer, hvilket har

påvirket måden der ses på adoption og børns rettigheder. Den

Europæiske Union har ikke kompetencer til legalisering af

familielovgivning, det har de enkelte medlemslande suverænt selv. I 1997

bestemte Europarådet, at FN’s børnekonvention er EU lov. Haager

konventionen derimod er en privat lov som oprindeligt var ment til at

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

modvirke handel med børn, men i praksis i f.eks. Rumænien skabte netop

et marked i børn, hvor der øverst i isbjerget lå adoption og under

overfladen korruption, magtmisbrug og udnyttelse af børn i pædofile

undergrundsmiljøer. Både den Europæiske Union og Europarådet

krævede, at Rumænien skulle overholde FN’s Børnekonvention, særligt

artikel 21b der handler om at begrænse international adoption ved

udelukkende at bruge den som en allersidste udvej efter at alle andre

lokale muligheder som plejefamilie, institution eller lokal adoption er

forsøgt afprøvet (subsidiaritetsprincippet).

USA, Israel, Frankrig, Spanien, Sverige, Danmark, Norge mv. valgte dog

at fortolke børns rettigheder/barnets bedste på anden vis. På den ene

side respekterer disse lande (med undtagelse af USA)

–

endnu

–

artikel

21b for deres egne børn, mens de benytter Haagerkonventionen i de

lande de adopterer fra. Haagerkonventionen er tydeligvis i konflikt med

artikel 21b, da den ikke ser plejefamilie eller anbringelse i institution som

barnets bedste, kun som en kortere midlertidig transit, hvor

hjemsendelse til familien, lokal eller international adoption er det eneste

rigtige. De to første muligheder er underlagt strenge tidsbegrænsninger

for gennemførelse, hvilket nærmest automatisk fører til international

adoption.

ÅIA ser med meget stor bekymring på om de stærke økonomiske

incitamenter, der udnytter barnløses drømme om adoption, lykkedes med

at fjerne FN’s Børnekonvention som EU lov, så den reduceres til

anvisninger, hvor Haagerkonventionen promoveres stærkt, hvilket nu ses

i f.eks. Bulgarien, hvor det lykkes med at ødelægge de gode initiativer der

er taget lokalt, så international adoption igen kan dyrke rovdrift på

udsatte børn og familier. UNICEF og EU kommissionen samarbejder om

dette. EU er hovedsponsor af UNICEF.

EU medlemslande og tiltrædelseslande som Portugal, Bulgarien, Letland,

Polen, Serbien og Montenegro mv. bliver kørt i stilling til adoptions

afgiverlande. Det lykkes ikke at lave Den Europæiske Adoptionspolitik i

årene 2006-2009, men nu prøves der igen under navnet Cross-border

adoptions med alvorlige konsekvenser for udsatte familier der kunne

hjælpes lokalt. Det er imod europæiske værdier og dansk lovgivning der

kræver, at udsatte familier hjælpes til at beholde deres børn eller at

børnene anbringes midlertidigt til de igen kan komme hjem. ÅIA ser

derfor med stor bekymring på, at også Danmark gennemfører

sandsynliggjorte tvangsadoptioner ud fra kritisable metoder. Lige nu

foregår det lokalt. Vil det indgå i det europæiske Cross-border

adoptionsprogram om nogen år? ÅIA henviser til Romania For Export

Only, The Untold

Story Of The Romanian ‘Orphans’

af Roelie Post, Against

Child Trafficking (ACT) for forståelse af disse mekanismer.

Ankestyrelsens egen

forskning i åben adoption viser tydeligt, at FN’s

Børnekonvention bør være “best practice” i adoption.”Åbenhed i adoption

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

og betydningen heraf” sat i udbud og bestilt af Ankestyrelsen og

udarbejdet af Inger Glavind Bo & Hanne Warming, Aalborg Universitet

2017

file:///C:/Users/ibenh/Downloads/%C3%85benhed%20i%20adoption.pdf

Åbenhed i adoptions (ÅIA) feedback på rapporten kan læses her:

https://www.facebook.com/groups/aabenhediadoption/permalink/910095212529853/

Ankestyrelsen taler om at sikre kommende og nuværende

adoptionsansøgere tryghed og sikkerhed i formidlingen. Adoption handler

ikke om at finde børn til barnløse, men om at finde forældre til

forældreløse. Mange børn har mindst en levende forælder eller mulighed

for at blive i egen slægt eller i pleje i eget land med rette økonomiske

støtte. Forældreløse eller børn der ikke kan bo hjemme har mulighed for

plejeanbringelse i andre familier, Guardianship, børneby eller institution,

såfremt disse systemer styrkes lokalt bæredygtigt økonomisk uden

stærke økonomiske incitamenter fra udenlandske adoptionsbureauer og

barnløse.

Bæredygtighed og fair trade er begreber der omhandler f.eks. økologiske

bananer produceret under ordentlige forhold for mennesker og natur.

Essensen i bæredygtighed er kort og godt en levemåde og produktion

som ikke har konsekvenser for kommende generationer. International

adoption har intet med bæredygtighed at gøre. De økonomisk sårbare

familier taber og de rige familier vinder på den globale ulighed. Adoption

har derfor massive konsekvenser for kommende generationer lokalt. Og

de mange økonomiske tilskud til DIA er selvsagt ikke bæredygtigt

økonomisk heller. Økonomisk bæredygtighed i international adoption er

ikke eksisterende, men er et opfundet buzz-ord for at fastholde

international adoption i en tid der er løbet fra international adoption.

International adoption er i krise, fordi tiden er løbet fra international

adoption. Bag de oprindelige gode intentioner ligger udnyttelse og brud

på FN’s Børnekonvention.

I stedet for at genopbygge et korthus, der hele

tiden vælter, bør der i stedet for endnu

”et

nyt adoptionssystem” og

udnyttelse af f.eks. sårbare tiltrædelseslande i EU, arbejdes for forandring

og håndgribelige resultater i et globalt samfund med social og økonomisk

lighed og lokal bæredygtighed, hvilket forudsætter en grundlæggende

ændring i måden

”barnets

bedste” tænkes og økonomiske strømninger

prioriteres.”



FNs Børnekonvention, gældende dansk lov.

“I henhold til kgl. resolution af 5. juli 1991, og efter at Folketinget den 31. maj 1991 har meddelt sit

samtykke dertil, har Danmark ratificeret en på De Forenede Nationers generalforsamling den 20.

november

1989 vedtagen konvention om Barnets Rettigheder.”

“Artikel 7

1. Barnet skal registreres umiddelbart efter fødslen og skal fra fødslen have ret til et navn, ret til at opnå

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

et statsborgerskab og, så vidt muligt, ret til at kende og blive passet af sine forældre.

2. Deltagerstaterne skal sikre gennemførelsen af disse rettigheder i overensstemmelse med deres

nationale lovgivning og deres forpligtelser ifølge de relevante internationale instrumenter på dette

område, især hvis barnet ellers ville blive statsløs.

Artikel 8

1. Deltagerstaterne påtager sig at respektere barnets ret til at bevare sin identitet, herunder

statsborgerskab, navn og familieforhold, som anerkendt af loven og uden ulovlig indblanding.”

https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=60837

Ankestyrelsen har fået til opgave at evaluere adoptionsreformen

af 2016

–

adoptivfamiliens forhold. Herunder elementer der er

velfungerende og elementer der kalder på justeringer.

”ÅIA

mener ikke, at der er grundlag for at tale om at styrke de i forvejen

privilegerede adoptivfamilier yderligere før adopteredes

–

samt deres

oprindelige familiers - rettigheder styrkes, herunder implementering af

FN’s Børnekonvention, åbning og undersøgelse samt støtte og

kompensation af alle allerede gennemførte adoptioner, oprettelse af

uvildigt organ, fond og kommission samt center og nationalt special

Udvælgelse af eventuelle kommende adoptanter bør ske ud fra en

overholdelse af FN’s Børnekonvention og en tilstræbelse af så vidt muligt

at barnet mest skånsomt matches med de bedst egnede uanset nummer

på venteliste, så der tages hensyn til barnets behov for ret til egen

identitet, egen race dvs. racial spejling i match, sprog, kultur, religion

mv., hvorfor ansøgere med oprindelse eller tilhørsforhold til barnets

fødeland eller fast bopæl i barnets fødeland sammen med børnefaglige

erfaringer, herunder erfaringer med forældresamarbejde, foretrækkes.

Alle ansøgere skal tidligt i forløbet igennem psykologisk undersøgelse med

hovedfokus på barnløshed, børnefaglig egnethed, samarbejde med

oprindelig familie og racisme. Godkendelse skal indebære foretræde for

det uvildige organ bestående af adopterede. Dette gælder internationale

såvel som nationale adoptioner.

Ankestyrelsens PAS-rådgivning er ikke uvildig og skal enten erstattes af

eller have supervision og deltagelse af det uvildige organ bestående af

adopterede. Ansøgere og adoptanter skal helt obligatorisk deltage i

rådgivning før, under og efter adoptionen i hele barndommen, præcis som

plejefamilier (tilsyn).

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Adoptantorganisationer, herunder landeforeninger, og adoptionsbureauer

bør ikke være en del af dette, da disse ikke er hverken uvildige eller

besidder de nødvendige børnefaglige kvalifikationer.

Adopterede skal frit kunne vælge gratis eller tilskudsberettiget uvildig

psykologbistand/adoptionhealing på lige fod med PAS-rådgivningen.

Al erfaring med PAS-rådgivning viser, at den ingen brugbar viden har om

racisme, familiesøgning og åbne adoptioner i praksis.

Der skal oprettes et center for åbenhed i adoption med levede erfaringer

og uvildige ansatte der kan vejlede og bistå i søgning og kontakt, hvor

adoptanter, adopterede og oprindelige familier, herunder søskende kan få

uvildig hjælp. Adoptanter forpligtes til at gennemgå kurser i dette regi

som en del af godkendelsen og forpligtelsen før og efter adoption. Al

eksisterende viden sættes i spil og er tilgængelig på en måde, så den kan

bringes i anvendelse hos de fagprofessionelle som møder adopterede og

familierne omkring dem.

Alle adopterede fra børn til voksne har ret til at kende deres identitet,

familie og historie hvor muligt. Alle adopterede fra børn til voksne har ret

til at kende og rejse til deres fødelande og mulige familie og bevare en

åben kontakt. Dette må aldrig være op til adoptanterne. Adopterede børn

sikres samme ret i samme alder til at blive hørt til ønsker om kontakt som

børn i skilsmisse, samværs- og bopælssager.

Alle oprindelige familier skal sikres retten til at kende deres børn med

undtagelse af de ganske få sager, hvor dette er til direkte fare for barnets

sikkerhed. Økonomisk bistand, juridisk bistand, psykologbistand mv

sættes ind for at sikre de oprindelige familier dette.

Alle gennemførte adoptioner åbnes op.

Åbne adoptioner er ikke en ny metode til at gennemføre nye adoptioner.

Børn i transit skal have undersøgt alle muligheder for at blive hos eller

genforenes med forældre og slægt eller alternative anbringelsesformer i

eget fødeland, og hvor der er kendt familie og slægt gennemføres

adoptioner ikke. Barnet støttes i guardianship til at bevare en kontakt

med familie og slægt i eget fødeland f.eks. i børneby-lignende koncepter,

hvor familiekontakt kan ske. Alternativt kan adoptanter tage permanent

ophold i børnenes fødelande.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Nationale og internationale tvangsbortadoptioner er ikke en acceptabel

metode til at skaffe udsatte børn til barnløse, det er en økonomisk model

der tilgodeser kommunernes økonomi. Gennem historien har

tvangsadoption og tvangsforflytning af børn fra oprindelig slægt og kultur

vist sig at være et uholdbart socialt eksperiment som mange nationer nu

undskylder for. Historien har ligeledes vist, at disse børn har lidt massiv

skade af indgrebene, den tabte identitet og tabte slægt og kultur. Hvorfor

gentager Danmark historien?

Opret et nationalt special register under Justitsministeriet til

kvinder/forældre der siden 1955 og til igangværende sager i dag med og

uden tvang bortadopterer deres børn til undersøgelse af de oprindelige

familiers forhold, hvor mange børn det handler om og hvorfor

kvinderne/forældrene bortadopterede. Vær opmærksom på skyggetal fra

uregistrerede og illegale sager. Lav en undersøgelse om overgreb i

adoptionerne baseret på telefon/interviews som udmøntes

anonymt/navngivent i en offentlig rapport. Brug erfaringerne

internationalt, da det er samme mønster i landene der adopteres fra.

Styrkelse af guardianship fremfor totalt familiebrud ved adoption bør

være vejen frem, så juridiske bånd til søskende og udvidet familie ikke

brydes, selvom båndene til forældre måske brydes. Guardianship og

forældremyndighed er to sider af samme sag. Hvis et barns forældre ikke

er egnede til forældremyndighed, vil en kvalificeret værge få

forældremyndigheden over barnet, men forældrene stadig være forældre.

Er forældrene ikke egnede til at have barnet boende, kan barnet

anbringes hos slægt, værge, plejefamilie, søskendehus, børneby,

institution. Forældre eller/og slægt kan bevare en kontakt, hvor stor eller

lille den måske er. Børnene bevarer en ret til identitet og ret til at kende

til egen historie

–

også selvom der ikke længere er samvær. Kun i få

særlige situationer, hvor barnet er i direkte fare bør ophør af kontakt

finde sted. Barnets kendskab til historien bevares uanset.

Iværksættelse og uvildig økonomisk støtte til selvstændige initiativer fra

særligt adopterede til vidensopsamling på området.

Uvildig guardianship- og adoptionsforskning samt forskning i totale

familiebrud og adoption trafficking sættes på finansloven.

Det uvildige organ, kommissionen og centret for åbenhed i adoption skal

sammen med Ankestyrelsen være VISO-leverandør.

ÅIA imødeser yderligere brugerinddragelse, særligt blandt adopteredes

organisationer, og medvirker naturligvis meget gerne i videre dialog og

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

samarbejde om de massive udfordringer adopterede og udsatte familier

der udnyttes til adoption står med.

Jin Vilsgaard

[email protected]

, adopteret, & Iben Krarup Brown

Høgsberg

[email protected]

, adoptant, Åbenhed i adoption,

København/Aalborg november 2019.

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Bilag 5

E ploring

Potential Solutions to Improve the Danish Intercountry Adoption system for Children, January

–

Jul

9 ISS, juli

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

EXPLORING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE THE

DANISH INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION SYSTEM FOR CHILDREN

January – July 2019

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Prefatory note

This independent assessment was commissioned by the Division of Family Affairs, the

Central Adoption Authority of Denmark (CA), which is part of the National Social Appeals

Board, under the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior. It was carried out by Mia

Dambach (Director, International Reference Centre for the Rights of Children Deprived of

their Family and Coordinator of the Advocacy and Policy Development Unit) and Cécile

Jeannin, (Coordinator, Research and Publication Unit) based at the General Secretariat of

International Social Service

, Geneva (ISS/IRC). A special thanks to Amanda Lowndes for her

background research in preparing this report, as well as to Christina Baglietto and Lisa

Robinson for their precious feedback and editing.

As this assessment was carried out by an independent team and consequently, any opinions

and/or recommendations in the present report do not necessarily reflect the policies and

views of actors in Denmark. Any recommendation seeks to be grounded in the framework of

international standards, notably the 1993 Hague Convention.

The report is part of a broader study of the future structure for intercountry adoption

mediation, which examines the role of different service providers in the adoption procedure

in Denmark and explores alternatives to the current structure. Such service providers include

the CA, competent authorities and bodies (including accredited adoption bodies) and other

actors. One reason for the initiation of this broader study has been the decrease in the

number of PAPs application and/or approvals since 2014, which has directly impacted upon

the operations of Danish International Adoption (DIA), the sole accredited adoption body

(AAB) in Denmark.

In November 2018, resources were granted to initiate a study to explore the feasibility of a

new and sustainable economic structure for international adoption mediation in Denmark.

The objectives of the study are to identify alternatives to the current structure, including the

degree of State involvement required by any proposed alternative. Likewise, consideration is

given to improving the status quo as a way forward.

The report will therefore serve as a basis for political decisions about the structure for

mediation in intercountry adoption. The study is undertaken by the National Social Appeals

Board. A steering group has been appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior

to approve the direction and framework of the study. This report by ISS/IRC has been

included in the study at the request of the Division of Family Affairs, and provides its

international expertise by way of assessing the current system and providing an analysis of

the envisaged solutions in terms of advantages and disadvantages.

ISS is an international non-governmental organisation that has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and

Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as with UNICEF and other intergovernmental bodies. For more information, see

https://www.iss-ssi.org/index.php/en/.

DIA communication on 1 May clarifies that “according to the statistical data it is not the number of adoption applications

that has declined since 2014, but the number of applicants that are actually approved. There has only been a small decline

in the number of new applicants since 2014, from 169 in 2014 to 147 in 2017, whilst in the same period there has been a

significant decline in the number of applicants that gets an approval, from 119 in 2014 to 57 in 2017.”

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

The report aims to:



Analyse the current system and the role and competences of each actor involved

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of at least three possible solutions

Examine solutions with a view of maintaining the ethical Danish intercountry

adoption system in any future developments

To this end, in addition to reviewing pertinent documentation, the authors of the

assessment undertook remote interviews with the Danish CA, DIA and State Administration

bodies, including the Secretariat of the Joint Council in January and February 2019. A pre-

mission report was shared with the Danish CA to help frame the assessment. An in-country

visit to Denmark occurred on 11 and 12 March 2019, where relevant actors, notably

governmental officials and DIA, were met with. A first draft version of the report was

reviewed by the Danish CA, the National Board of Adoption, the Agency of Family Law and

DIA with helpful suggestions to improve the accuracy of our findings and clarify our

understanding of the current system. A revised version was then submitted to the Danish CA

for any final comments.

We would like to express sincere thanks to all the actors (see Annex 1) that provided

valuable input throughout the drafting of this report, remotely and in person. A special note

of thanks to Thomas Colerick, Karina Haahr-Pedersen, Sidsel Lund Nielsen and Karin Rønnow

Søndergaard for giving us the privileged opportunity to be part of the Danish reforms and

their endless hours of assistance in understanding the issues at stake.

We hope that this report will build on the momentum of multiple initiatives and political will

for ensuring intercountry adoptions are truly in the child’s best interests.

Mia Dambach and Cécile Jeannin

July 2019, Geneva

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Contents

Abbreviations............................................................................................................................... 6

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7

Global trends in Intercountry Adoption ..................................................................................... 7

Statistics collected by ISS/IRC between 2002 and 2017 (receiving countries in order of

adoptions)........................................................................................................................................ 7

Statistics collected by ISS/IRC between 2010 and 2017 (countries of origin) ................................. 9

Historical Legal and Policy Developments ................................................................................ 11

Historical Practical Developments by way of statistics ............................................................. 12

Section 1: Current adoption system ............................................................................................ 14

1.1 Legal framework and policies ............................................................................................ 14

1.2 Government actors ........................................................................................................... 15

1.2.1 The Minister of Social Affairs and the Interior ..................................................................... 15

1.2.2 Division of Family Affairs, National Social Appeals Board, Danish Central Adoption

Authority........................................................................................................................................ 15

1.2.3 National Board of Adoption ................................................................................................. 15

1.2.4 Agency of Family Law (previously named Regional State Administration’s) and Joint Council

....................................................................................................................................................... 17

1.3 Adoption accredited body ..................................................................................................... 18

1.3.1 Legal and ethical framework ................................................................................................ 19

1.3.2 Supervision ........................................................................................................................... 20

1.3.3 Supervision and education ................................................................................................... 20

1.3.4 Supervision of general activities........................................................................................... 20

1.3.5 Supervision of general economic activities .......................................................................... 22

1.3.5b Supervision of economic activities related to development aid and contributions .......... 24

1.4 Other actors ...................................................................................................................... 26

Section 2: Procedural framework ................................................................................................ 26

2.1 Domestic adoption ............................................................................................................ 26

2.1a Domestic adoption with the consent of biological family ..................................................... 26

2.1b Domestic adoption without the consent of biological family ............................................... 27

2.2 Intercountry adoption ....................................................................................................... 27

2.2.1 Cooperation with COs .......................................................................................................... 27

2.2.2 Preparation of the PAPs – first opportunity ......................................................................... 29

2.2.3 Approval of the PAPs ............................................................................................................ 29

2.2.4 Completion of the adoption procedure in the CO ............................................................... 32

2.2.5 Matching and probationary period ...................................................................................... 32

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2.2.6 Adoption decisions and storage of orders ........................................................................... 33

2.2.7 Post Adoption Services (PAS) ............................................................................................... 34

2.2.8 Fees....................................................................................................................................... 36

2.2.9 Sanction ................................................................................................................................ 36

2.2.10 Illicit practices ..................................................................................................................... 37

2.2.11 Adoption breakdowns ........................................................................................................ 38

Section 3: Possible future ICA system .......................................................................................... 40

3.1 Model 1: AAB with funding from the State, but with an economy still primarily based on fees

paid by PAPs........................................................................................................................... 42

3.1.1 Brief description ................................................................................................................... 42

3.1.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................................. 42

3.1.3 Drawbacks ............................................................................................................................ 43

3.1.4 Impact on CA’s current activities (supervision AAB, cooperation with CA and economic

relationship) .................................................................................................................................. 44

3.1.5 Transitional considerations should model 1 be chosen ....................................................... 44

3.2 Model 2: A model where the AAB and the State enters a Service Agreement and the AAB is

primarily State funded ............................................................................................................ 45

3.2.1 Brief description ................................................................................................................... 45

3.2.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................................. 46

3.2.3 Drawbacks ............................................................................................................................ 47

3.2.4 Impact on CA’s current activities (supervision AAB, cooperation with CA and economic

relationship) .................................................................................................................................. 48

3.2.5 Transitional considerations should model 2 be chosen ....................................................... 49

3.3 Model 3: A model where the AAB and the State enters a Service Agreement and the AAB is

wholly State funded................................................................................................................ 50

3.3.1 Brief description ................................................................................................................... 50

3.3.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................................. 50

3.3.3 Drawbacks ............................................................................................................................ 51

3.4.4 Impact on CA’s current activities (supervision AAB, cooperation with CA and economic

relationship) .................................................................................................................................. 53

3.4.5 Transitional considerations should model 3 be chosen ....................................................... 53

Annexes ..................................................................................................................................... 55

List of Danish adoption actors interviewed....................................................................... 55

SOU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 191: Orientering om anden del af evaluering af adoptionssystemet og høringssvar, fra social- og indenrigsministeren

Abbreviations

AAB

AFL

DIA

GGP1

Adoption Accredited Bodies

Agency of Family Law

Central Adoption Authority

Danish International Adoption

The Implementation and Operation of the

1993 Intercountry Adoption Convention:

Guide to Good Practice No 1

Accreditation and Adoption Accredited

Bodies: General Principles and Guide to

Good Practice No 2

Intercountry adoption

International Social Service/International

Reference Centre for children deprived of

their families

National Board of Adoption

Prospective Adoptive Parents

Post adoptive service

Special commission on the practical

operation of the 1993 Hague Intercountry

Adoption Convention

Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of

Children and Co-operation in Respect of

Intercountry Adoption

Convention of 19 October 1996 on

Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition,

Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect

of Parental Responsibility and Measures for

the Protection of Children

GGP2

ICA

ISS/IRC

NBA

PAPs

PAS

Special Commission

The 1993 Hague Convention

The 1996 Hague Convention

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Introduction

Global trends in Intercountry Adoption

A brief look at intercountry adoption (ICA) trends is necessary to contextualize the broader

study undertaken in Denmark. In terms of historical ICAs considerations

, the overall

numbers of adoptions by receiving countries began an upward curve from 1980 until 2004 -

the peak year with more than 42,000 ICAs for the top 12 receiving countries alone. In 2005

however a gradual decrease began and is still ongoing today, although less steep in the last

few years. According to Peter Selman

between 2004 and 2009, a fall of 35% of the number

of ICAs was registered (see statistics collected by ISS/IRC below).

The reasons behind and the long term consequences of this steady decrease are numerous.

For instance, changes occurred in many countries of origins linked to the ratification of the

1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of

Intercountry Adoption (1993 Hague Convention) and ensuing development of improved

systems. Likewise in countries of origin, social changes played an important role such as the

development of the middle class, increasing domestic adoption rates, legalisation of

abortion in certain countries, and evolving attitudes towards certain groups (single mothers,

ethnic minority groups, etc.). As a result the profile of the children declared adoptable for

ICA has evolved. ICA today mainly concerns older children, siblings, and children with health

problems including disabilities. Simultaneously, supplementary criteria are required for PAPs

by the countries of origin

Statistics collected by ISS/IRC between 2002 and 2017 (receiving countries in order

of adoptions)

Receiving

countries

USA

Italy

France

Spain

Germany

2002

20 099

2 225

3 551

3 625

1 919

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

17 433

3 977

3 271

3 156

1 251

2009

12 753

3 964

3 017

3 006

1025

21 616 22 884

2 772

3 995

3 951

1 720

3 402

4 079

5 541

1 632

22 728 20 679 19 613

2 874

4 136

5 423

1 453

3 188

3 977

4 472

1 388

3 420

3 162

3 648

1 432

For more detailed information on this issue

Historical considerations: irregularities in intercountry adoption by Hervé

Boéchat

in Baglietto C, Cantwell N, Dambach M (Eds.) (2016).

Responding to illegal adoptions: A professional handbook.

Geneva, Switzerland: International Social Service

See

Twenty years of the Hague Convention: a Statistical Review

by Peter Selman, available in English at:

https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/publications1/?dtid=32&cid=69

See ISS/IRC monthly review n°226 of November 2017.

Sources:

CIC (Canada), Department of Family Affairs (Denmark), Service de l’Adoption Internationale (France),

Commissione per le Adozioni Internazionali (Italy), Dutch Ministry of Justice (The Netherlands), Bufdir (Norway), Ministerio

de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (Spain), Swedish National Board of Intercountry Adoptions, MIA (Sweden), Autorité centrale

fédérale en matière d’adoption internationale (Switzerland), Statistisches Bundesamt (Germany), US Department of State

(USA).

1) From 1st October 2008 to 30 September 2009.

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Canada

Sweden

Netherlands

Denmark

Switzerland

Australia

Norway

Total

Receiving

countries

1 926

1 107

1 130

609

558

561

747

36 938

2 180

1 046

1 154

522

722

472

714

1 955

1 109

1 307

527

658

502

706

1 871

1 083

1 185

586

452

585

582

1 535

879

816

448

455

576

448

1 712

800

782

429

394

568

426

1 208

793

767

395

497

440

304

32 834

605

912

682

497

444

441

344

27691

39 670 43 142

41 921 38 285 35 818

2010

2011

2012

2013

7 094

2014

6441

2015

5648

2016

5372

2017

4714

United States 11 058

of America

Italy

France

Canada

Spain

Sweden

Netherlands

Belgium

Norway

Germany

Denmark

Switzerland

Australia

Total

419

301

222

27 552

4 130

3 504

2 006

2 891

551

705

n/a

353

1 412

9 319

4 022

1 995

1 785

2 560

538

528

360

297

934

(579)

338

367

215

8 668

3 106

1 569

1 367

1 669

466

488

265

231

801

(420)

219

314

149

2 825

1 343

1 242

1 188

341

401

219

154

661

(272)

176

280

129

2206

1 069

905

824

345

354

144

142

209

2216

815

895

799

336

304

136

132

308

1872

953

790

567

257

214

121

126

213

1439

685

621

531

240

210

133

127

124

226

114

197

101

10 752

8 998

23 258 19 312

16 053 13 103 11 966

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Statistics collected by ISS/IRC between 2010 and 2017 (countries of origin)

Countries of origin

1. China

2. Colombia

3. India

4. Ethiopia

5. Haiti

6. South Korea

7. Vietnam

8. Russia

9. Philippines

10. Bulgaria

11. Ukraine

12. Hungary

13. Thailand

14. Nigeria

15. Poland

16. Taiwan

17. South Africa

18. Brazil

19. USA

20. Latvia

21. Uganda

22. DRC

23. Liberia

24. Ghana

2010

4 672

1 549

473

3 977

1 361

991

n/a

3 158

413

230

1 091

n/a

124

n/a

310

373

n/a

120

n/a

166

n/a

107

172

188

128

2011

4 098

1 522

688

3 144

142

920

620

3 017

472

259

1 054

154

258

218

304

311

120

359

116

219

339

2012

3 998

901

362

2 648

262

797

216

2 442

374

350

713

145

251

238

236

291

337

178

246

499

2013

3 316

562

298

1 933

460

206

293

1 703

525

421

674

104

272

225

332

188

147

246

167

131

289

580

2014

2734

355

242

975

551

494

285

381

405

323

560

207

175

106

147

176

155

203

240

2015

2817

359

233

543

236

406

287

210

354

262

339

172

163

107

172

160

189

208

229

2016

2475

314

323

235

324

362

248

151

313

324

339

250

139

148

150

103

147

191

627

2017

2189

542

518

466

398

396

356

319

304

289

270

233

218

206

191

157

130

127

25. Central African 12

Republic

In the context of a decrease in ICA, and generally limited opportunities for domestic

adoptions in receiving countries, adoption applications by prospective adoptive parents

Sources: Central Authorities in intercountry adoption and other governmental entities; for further information, please

contact the ISS/IRC.

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(PAPs) in receiving countries remain significantly higher than the number of children

declared adoptable.

Yet, at the same time, there is a growing awareness by PAPs of the changing ICA landscape

through awareness raising by authorities as well as the media. There is a better

understanding that adoption is a child protection measure providing a family for a child and

that there is no right to a child. For example, it is now clearer that the profile of children

needing adoption are not small babies in good health, and that fewer children are being

declared adoptable. Additionally, it seems that media attention to illicit practices linked

primarily to the earlier years of ICAs

– as many of these adoptees are now adults - has

likewise contributed to the reluctance of PAPs to initiate proceedings. This reluctance has

also been influenced by the growing attention surrounding adoption breakdowns

again by

the media, and also within the wider community.

However the reality remains that many people are still seeking to parent children.

Consequently in the context explaining the decrease in ICA and growing waiting times, it is

recognised that PAPs may turn to other forms of parenting. This has led to, for example, the

growth in assisted reproductive procedures including surrogacy. The 2019 COE report

Anonymous donation of sperm and oocytes: balancing the rights of parents, donors and

children estimates approximately 8 million children have been born to date through ART

medical procedures.

As a consequence, receiving countries therefore are facing challenges – a primary question

being rethinking the role of adoption accredited bodies (AABs). AABs must adapt – not only

to these decreases, but also to the changing profiles of internationally adopted children, and

to the supplementary criteria required for PAPs. Given this changing landscape, arguably the

expertise of AABs’ is increasingly more desired. AABs operating well with the framework of

the 1993 Hague Convention offer quality and specialised services.

Yet the changing landscape means that their financial sustainability is at risk – calling into

question, their continued ability to offer services. This precarious situation is essentially due

to the decrease in adoption cases as adoption fees are, for many of them, the main source of

income. This situation is compounded by the lack of public understanding and support of

their work – all of which is made even more challenging due to the financial crisis that

occurred in 2014 and politics of austerity.

Baglietto C, Cantwell N, Dambach M (Eds.) (2016).

Responding to illegal adoptions: A professional handbook.

Geneva:

Switzerland. International Social Service

Jeannin, C. (Ed.) (2018).

Towards a greater capacity: Learning from intercountry adoption breakdowns.

Geneva:

Switzerland. International Social Service

http://website-pace.net/documents/19855/5665827/20190128-DonationRights-EN.pdf/1ea3d70f-4da0-440b-a243-

9f28c0670bd6

More and more AABs provide specialized services. For instance : AAB Emmanuel Adoption en Communauté française de

Belgique, Médecins du Monde in France, Nuevo Futuro in Espagne, Aiuti all’infanzia in Italie, etc. The Indian CA has

published a guide dedicated to AABs entitled

Special Children for Special Parents: A Guide for Adoption Agencies

giving

several guidelines for preparing PAPs adopting a special needs child. Likewise, Sweden has developed a guide entitled

Special parents for special children

(both guides available in English at ISS/IRC).

ISS/IRC comparative analysis (2015).

The financing of Adoption Accredited Bodies and challenges faced: searching for

promising practices.

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The current reflections regarding the system in Denmark fall within this context: the aim to

find a sustainable structure for its ICA system, whilst maintaining its ethical commitment

to deliver high quality services to children and families. Whilst the Danish adoption system

is evolving to meet the needs of children and families, there is today an urgent need to

address the dilemma of sustainability that its AAB is currently facing.

Historical Legal and Policy Developments

Briefly “until the end of Second World War, adoption in Denmark was domestic and could be

either simple or full. Improvements in the social integration and living conditions for single

mothers in the 1950’s allowed the number of national adoptions to decrease progressively,

from 1’200 in 1949 to 400 in 1959

. The legalisation of abortion in 1972 amplified this

decrease. At this time, there was no State adoption procedure: adoptions were organised by

a private organisation traditionally in charge of domestic adoption. The first State procedure

was created in 1976, which grounded the foundations of the actual adoption system that

allows only full adoptions. In 1999, the adoption of a stepchild was opened to homosexuals

living in a registered partnership. In 2009, these couples were authorised to adopt nationally

and internationally”

In recent years, Denmark has made substantial improvements to its adoption regulations by

way of the 2014 political agreement, which introduced a new adoption system more in line

with international standards. The agreement recognized the impact of developments in ICA

on the Danish system (see above). Proposals were made through this political agreement to

overcome the identified challenges.

Over the years a number of improvements have been made in terms of PAPs assessment,

preparation and post adoption support. As of January 2000, all PAPs must attend a pre-

adoption course, and as of January 2016, they receive individual counselling before and after

adopting the child to ensure the best possible beginning in the new family

. Such a pre-

requisite is an important factor in ensuring that the adoptive family is prepared for unique

adoption experiences as well as favours the reinforcement of the filiation ties to be built.

Specific improvements were also made with respect to accredited adoption bodies (AAB).

This included the combination of the two previous AAB; and increased attention give to the

competency, agency supervision and financial transparency of adoption services. Changes

that were implemented as of 1 January 2016 (see 1.3). To further support these

amendments, the Danish government stated in the 2014 agreement (as referenced above)

that specific allocations of government funds (DKK 14.4 million in 2015; DKK 13.2 million in

2016; DKK 11.5 million in 2017; and thereafter DKK 8.5 million annually from 2018 onwards)

would be used to supervise adoption services.

See “Ready for adoption”, p.41.

Extracts of ISS/IRC (2014).

Approval and Preparation of Prospective Adoptive Parents, Post Adoption Service and openness

in adoptions.

See contribution of Ina Dulanjani Dygaard and the Danish National Social Appeals Boards on “Mandatory, continuous and

accessible pre-adoption and post-adoption support in Denmark: strengthening the skills of adoptees, adopters, and the

social environment of the adoptive families” in Jeannin, C. (Ed.) (2018).

Towards a greater capacity: Learning from

intercountry adoption breakdowns.

Geneva: Switzerland. International Social Service (pages 141-143).

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Following the 2014 political agreement, within the annual State budget for adoption the DKK

8,5 million amount is allocated as follows

• 5.2 million DKK to Danish CA for the approval of matching proposals and increased supervision of the AAB;

• 1.3 million DKK (above regular funding) to providing Post Adoption Services (PAS) and counselling for the

PAPs shortly before and after the child has arrived in the family (Phase 4); and

• 2.0 million DKK to the AAB (N.B. In 2015 the AAB received an additional 9 million DKK. This amount was to

cover the deficit generated by one the former AABs, which had merged with the other AAB, to create the

current AAB. It also covered all other expenses related to the merger and establishing the new AAB).

Historical Practical Developments by way of statistics

Since 1970, more than 15,000 children have been adopted by Danish parents through ICA

with significantly less children adopted domestically. The following table provides the

available statistics for the last nine years in terms of domestic adoption and ICA

Year

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Domestic Adoptions

Intercountry Adoptions

497

419

338

219

176

124

Intercountry adoptions:

Since 2014 the ICA scene has changed significantly. The number of ICAs has fallen from 124

adoptions in 2014, to 64 adoptions in 2018. This represents a 47% drop in ICAs over four

years. This change can to some extent be explained by the fact that the waiting time

between approval and the child’s arrival has tended to increase, particularly with regard to

applicants approved in the period between 2012-2014. However for new applicants after

this period, DIA has explained that the waiting time has decreased markedly due to the

decline in the number of new ICA applicants that are approved. DIA notes for example that

the estimated waiting time for adoption from South Korea has in recent years fallen from

approx. five years to under one year. From South Africa, the waiting time has fallen from

between three and five years down to between two and three years, and from Taiwan the

wait has fallen from approximately five years to less than half a year.

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC –1 March 2019

See: http://www.statsforvaltningen.dk/site.aspx?p=6406.

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 15 February 2019

Information received from DIA 1 May 2019

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Moreover children are arriving at an older age, than in previous years. According to statistics

provided by the National Board of Adoption (NBA) between 2011 and 2013, the adoptions of

children aged less than one year have decreased from 31% to 19%, while adoptions of

children aged 2 years old have increased from 15% to 25%.

Likewise the number of new families approved to adopt internationally has fallen from 85

families in 2014 to 48 families in 2018.

DIA notes that this drop in numbers has meant that

DIA now lacks enough families on almost of all its waiting lists. DIA is of the view that the

reason for this trend is due to increasing fees creating obstacles even for the most well-off

families, as well as the negative image linked to adoptions in the media. In addition PAPs are

becoming more realistic about their capacities to adopt the children who are now in need of

ICA – as reflected by the general frame of adoption (see section 2.2.3 and further discussions

below).

Further research might be helpful to explore the reasons behind such trends, given

that it seems for example, that the Danish CA is of the view that fees have not increased

significantly since 2015.

Whilst there are no global statistics on the number of PAPs, certain receiving countries do

publish national statistics. For example in France, the number of PAPs approved as of 31

December 2016 was 14,070, which was 13% less than in the same period in 2015

. In Spain

the number of PAPs has continued to decrease significantly over recent years

It is not clear what the trend is in Nordic countries. The Danish CA notes that

“official

statistics” from the Nordic countries might be helpful for comparative purposes as

alternative information seems to indicate that in Norway the number of approved PAPs

has declined almost to the same degree as in Denmark.

Whereas DIA believe that in

countries such as Norway and Sweden, statistics indicate that the situation has remained

quite stable.

Furthermore there is a general tendency for Danish PAPs to be older than previous years.

Their average age in 2013 was 36 and 38 years old.

In other countries such as Australia

and France

the average age is over 40 years old.

Domestic adoptions

The number of domestic adoptions varies a great deal from year to year, however since 2005

the number has not exceeded 25. For example there were 21 adoptions in 2017 and 9 in

2018.

Extracts of Terms of reference for a study of the future structure for international adoption mediation, January 2019.

Information received from Danish CA, 1 May 2019.

https://www.onpe.gouv.fr/system/files/publication/synthese_enquete_pupilles_31dec2016_2018.pdf

Boletín de datos estadísticos de medidas de protección. Boletín numero 20. Datos 2017.

Information received from Danish CA, 1 May 2019.

Meeting held in its Birkerød office, 11 March 2019.

https://ast.dk/naevn/adoptionsnaevnet/udgivelser-fra-adoptionsnaevnet/arsberetninger-og-statistik

https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/adoptions/adoptions-australia-2016-17/contents/table-of-content

https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/final.12.02.19_cle845e9a-1.pdf

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Section 1: Current adoption system

1.1 Legal framework and policies

Denmark ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 19 July 1991. Subsequently,

Denmark acceded to the Hague Convention 1993 (which entered into force on 1 November

1997); the 1996 Hague Convention (which entered into force on 1 November 2011); and the

European Convention on the Adoption of Children of 1967 revised in 2008.

At domestic level, the following framework is operating: The Danish Adoption Consolidation

Act of 2004 amended in 2015; The Executive Order on Adoption n°1863 of 23 December

2015; Executive Order on Approval of Adopters (2009) and Terms of accreditation for DIA

January 2016-31

December 2020). The Danish CA notes that Denmark does not have a

national action plan related to children

as there is no tradition for developing such plans.

Instead, policies are reflected and implemented in legislation. Child protection in Denmark is

addressed across a number of different pieces of legislation, such as the Social Services Act,

the Adoption Act and the Act of Parental Responsibility.

As the ISS/IRC mandate is to focus on the potential roles of four adoption actors in the three

models identified by the Danish CA (see 1.2 and 1.3) – noting others exist - discussion is

limited to these actors. The specific roles they take part in different parts of the adoption

procedure are explored in section 2. A brief overview of actors and their involvement in

adoption procedures is summarised provided below.

Actors involved

(sections 1.2 - 1.3)

National Social Appeals Board

Danish CA

DIA

Danish CA, NBA and AFL

Danish CA and DIA

Danish CA and DIA – with NBA if

outside of general frame

AFL and DIA with Danish CA for

appeals

Danish CA, AFL and DIA

Danish CA and DIA

Ad hoc involvement of all four

Adoption procedure

(section 2)

Overall supervision of adoptions – national and ICA (1.2.2)

Mandated to supervise ICA under 1993 HC (2.2.1) including

activities of accredited adoption body (1.3)

Preparation of PAPs – first opportunity (2.2.2)

Approval of PAPs through four phases of adoption including

appeals (2.2.3)

Completion of adoption procedure in CO (2.2.4)

Matching and probationary period (2.2.5)

Adoption decision and storage (2.2.6)

Post adoption service (2.2.7)

Fees and sanctions (2.2.8 and 2.2.9)

Illicit practices (2.2.10)

Adoption breakdowns (2.2.11)

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC –1 March 2019

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1.2 Government actors

1.2.1 The Minister of Social Affairs and the Interior

The Minister of Social Affairs and the Interior (The Minister) appoints the Central Adoption

Authority in accordance with the 1993 Hague Convention, and is formally responsible for

accrediting the AAB and grants authorisation to the AAB to cooperate in the States of Origin.

The Minister is responsible for laying down the rules.

1.2.2 Division of Family Affairs, National Social Appeals Board, Danish Central

Adoption Authority

The Division is part of the National Social Appeals Board under the auspices of the Ministry

of Social Affairs and the Interior. It is the principle authority in the field of adoption in

Denmark, appointed as the CA in regard with the 1993 Hague Convention.

The CA provides the mandatory Preparation Course for PAPs (phase 2 – see 2.2.3) and

provides the relevant information for the Minister to grant authorisation to the Danish

accredited body DIA. This accreditation and supervision role takes up a significant amount of

time given the new procedures in place (see 1.3.2 and followings)

. The CA likewise

provides PAS counselling as well as the mandatory counselling shortly before and after the

child arrives in the family (phase 4 – see 2.2.3).

The CA likewise plays a role in the matching process (see 2.2.4).

The CA supervises and provide guidance to the AAB regarding financial, organisational and

professional matters in Denmark and in the countries of origin (see 1.3).

1.2.3 National Board of Adoption

The NBA was set up in 1976 in order to,

inter alia,

supervise the cases handled by the Joint

Council and act as a board of appeal. Appeals can relate to a decision of the Joint Council

regarding the approval of PAPs (see 2.2.3) or the ICA matching decisions (see 2.2.5). It should

be noted that the matching decisions of the CA cannot be appealed, as both the CA and NBA

are involved in this process.

The NBA consists of approximately 10 members with different professional backgrounds,

one of them being the Head of the Division of Family Affairs. The chairman is a Judge, and

multiple medical professionals assist with various duties. Further, the NBA controls whether

the AFL acts in accordance with the rules, when approving the PAPs.

The NBA’s duties include:

•

Supervising the work of the Joint Council and their secretariats,

•

Observing the national and international development in adoption matters,

See Terms of accreditation for DIA (1st January 2016-31st December 2020)

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 15 February 2019. See also contribution of Ina Dulanjani Dygaard and the Danish

National Social Appeals Boards on “Mandatory, continuous and accessible pre-adoption and post-adoption support in

Denmark: strengthening the skills of adoptees, adopters, and the social environment of the adoptive families” in Jeannin, C.

(Ed.) (2018).

Towards a greater capacity: Learning from intercountry adoption breakdowns.

Geneva: Switzerland.

International Social Service (pages 141-143).

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•

Collecting information concerning adoption,

Identifying paediatricians who can advise PAPs on health issues,

Conducting information awareness activities, and

Assisting the CA in the assessment of the adoption case prior to the issuance of the art.

17c-declaration.

The NBA deals with all domestic adoption cases (see 2.1). In such cases, it is funded on a case

by case basis, making it cost effective for the State. The NBA undertakes the matching by

examining the entire list of national PAPs, which has the advantage for the child that the

most adequate family is selected as opposed to being matched to the next family on the list,

as occurs in ICA cases (see 2.1).

In terms of ICAs, as of 1 January 2016 the NBA does not supervise the AAB – all

responsibilities in regard to the supervision of the AAB are under the CA (see 1.2.2 and

1.3.2). However in terms of supervision, the NBA can hear appeals of cases where the Joint

Council does not approve a PAP application. As part of this work, the NBA has undertaken a

broader analysis of all appeals, analysing the extent of successful appeals and the reasons for

such (see 1.2.4). For example, when there have been improvements in treatment of medical

conditions as deemed by the medical professionals working within their team, there is more

openness to approve a PAP with certain cancers. Moreover there are more opportunities for

the NBA to observe improvements in PAP applications, as the PAPs will have six months to

improve conditions for which their application was refused before being heard by the NBA.

In terms of supervision of the AAB, the Danish CA will consult with the NBA in matters

regarding the children’s health and psychosocial condition (see 2.2.5)

The Board likewise assists with adoption breakdowns, attempting to find a new family for

the child among its domestic PAP waiting list (see 2.1). In practice, this is undertaken on a

case by case basis.

ISS/IRC commends the quality of the independent matching committee, with its multi-

disciplinary approach, which seems to be extremely cost effective

considering the high

quality services delivered. ISS/IRC encourages the NBA's practice of using its website to

publish information regarding improving the adoption process and on disseminating appeal

decisions.

ISS/IRC recommends wider dissemination of its decisions and practices through

regular joint training with all Danish Adoption Actors, perhaps annually, which could help

further improve the Danish adoption system.

Lastly, the key role the NBA plays in

responding to adoption breakdowns should be clearly identified in any future model.

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 15 February 2019

Meeting with the chairman and the Secretary of the NBA, 12 March 2019

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1.2.4 Agency of Family Law (previously named Regional State Administration’s) and

Joint Council

The Regional State Administration - called the Agency of Family Law (AFL) since

1 April 2019

is the local authority in the field of adoption. The new name follows structural changes made

regarding processing cases, mainly under the Parental Responsibility Act. Before July 2012,

there were 5 AFL based in the different regions of Denmark. The AFL is now based in

Ringkøbing and has ten social workers dealing with adoption, five based in Copenhagen and

five covering other parts of Denmark.

In matters of adoption, the AFL performs tasks such as:

- Gathering information needed from PAPs to apply and gain approval,

- Preparing follow-up reports, and

- Providing families with guidance in the context of Post-adoptive Services.

- Recognizing the adoption carried out abroad

- Issuing the adoption decision when the adoption is carried out in Denmark

The AFL collaborates with the Joint Council, originally set up by the Ministry of Justice,

regarding the approval process for PAPs. The Joint Council is composed of a social worker,

lawyer and physician, one being an employee of the AFL. The lawyer is the chairman of the

Joint Council. The AFL is the secretariat of the Joint Council.

The Joint Council has decision-making power regarding phases 1 and 3 of the Approval

process (see 2.2.3). They have the authority to refuse or to accept the extension of a PAP’s

approval. The Joint Council is the competent authority for decision-making regarding the

approval of PAPs. The AFL prepares the case/home report for the Joint Council.

The Joint Council approves the matching proposals and issues the article 17 c agreement, if

the specific needs of a child are not compatible with the PAP’s general frame of approval,

and the PAPs wish to apply for an expanded frame of approval for the child on question. The

Joint Council decides whether or not the PAPs have the required resources to adopt the

proposed child.

The ISS/IRC commends the work of the AFL and its social workers, in preparing extensive

PAPs reports. The quality of their work can be seen in the limited number of successful of

appeals to the NBA, which for the most part, succeeded only to due to changes that

occurred since the time of approval (i.e. in the family situation or medical field).

The ISS/IRC is, however, concerned by the long waiting lists to access AFL services, which

we were told is about six months and the continual reduction in State support. To this end,

if there is a political decision to support adoptions – both domestic and intercountry –

more broadly, further State resources should be invested into AFL so that they are able to

absorb the demand.

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1.3 Adoption accredited body

DIA is currently the only body in Denmark accredited by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs

and the Interior to act as an intermediary accredited body for ICAs in accordance with the

1993 Hague Convention.

For ICA, all PAPs must pass through an AAB – DIA – for the

adoption to be approved in Denmark, with the exception of intra-familial adoptions.

Therefore to our knowledge, there are no private and independent adoptions, which is to

be commended as compliant with international standards. It should be noted that it is not

compulsory to have an AAB, a condition that the CA has capacity to ensure that the 1993

Hague Convention and all other relevant standards have been complied with).

According to the GGP1 “The decision whether to allow accredited bodies or approved (non-

accredited) persons to perform child protection or adoption functions in their State is a policy

matter for each individual State. (…) The role and functions of Central Authorities in relation

to individual adoptions are addressed in Chapter 7 (of GGP1). If a State of origin prefers to

conduct adoptions only through the Central Authority of a receiving State, the State of origin

must be satisfied that the Central Authority has the powers and resources to perform all the

necessary functions for the adoption procedure.” Further, the GGP2 specifies that “The

Convention permits the Contracting States to call upon accredited bodies to perform some of

the functions of Central Authorities, but does not require any State to appoint accredited

bodies or use them. However, some receiving States and States of origin do require by law

the use of accredited bodies to mediate intercountry adoptions.”

ISS/IRC recalls that according to arts. 9 and 22 of the 1993 Hague Convention, a CA may

delegate its obligations and responsibilities of general nature to AABs. Minimum standards

regarding AAB’s activities, set out by the 1993 Hague Convention and further developed

by the Guide to Good Practice n° 2

and the Explanatory Report on The 1993 Hague

Convention

, are:

Principle of professionalism and ethics in adoption

Principle of non-profit objectives

Principle of preventing improper financial gain

Principle of demonstrating and evaluating competence using criteria for

accreditation and authorisation

Principle of accountability of accredited bodies

Principle of using representatives with an ethical approach

Principle of adequate powers and resources for authorities

The 1993 Hague Convention does not specify on how and by whom these delegated

functions shall be financed. Each CA decides on the specific cooperation with its AAB’s,

reason why there exists a wide range of different systems.

As stated in the ISS/IRC

Manifesto

, “(…) specific regulations must be in place and set clear criteria regarding the

nature of the organisation, its mission and objectives, how it operates and its financial

transparency, in addition to its regular supervision by an independent authority.”

The National Social Appeals Board. Division of Family Affairs.

An introduction to the Danish legislation in the field of

intercountry adoption.

Available in English upon request.

Hague Conference on Private International Law (2012).

Accreditation and Adoption Accredited Bodies: Guide to good

practice Guide No. 2.

Available at: https://assets.hcch.net/upload/adoguide2en.pdf.

Available at: https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl33e.pdf

Available at: https://www.iss-ssi.org/images/Publications_ISS/ENG/ISS_Manifesto_ANG.pdf.

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According to ISS/IRC, it is crucial to remember that AABs are fulfilling delegated public

functions according to the standards set out in international standards and must therefore

receive the adequate public support, including financial assistance and follow up support

at all levels (ethical, professional and practical).

1.3.1 Legal and ethical framework

DIA established in 1964, is governed by a Board with operational responsibility for the

organisation. The DIA is statutorily required to have a manager; be staffed by persons who

have an educational background, or professional profile/expertise that relates to children;

have at least one employee with a master’s degree in Law; and at least one employee with

education and experience in business and accountancy.

In accordance with international standards (see 1.3.4a)

, DIA is obliged to protect and give

priority to the best interests of the child. The organisation is required to work in an ethically

and professionally responsible basis, and without seeking financial gain; and to ensure that

ICAs are only carried out when it is possible to complete the adoption in a legal, ethical and

professionally responsible way

The support the DIA provides includes establishing a connection between PAPs residing in

Denmark and children from other countries with a view to adoption (instruction support)

(see 2.2.4); facilitating the completion of the adoption procedure (completion support) (see

2.2.5); and PAS for families after the child has been taken home (see 2.2.7).

DIA’s adoption assistance activities are governed by, and must be in accordance with:

International Standards; the adoption legislation in the countries with which DIA cooperates;

and the Danish legislation on adoption (see 1.1). This latter includes the Terms of

accreditation as agreed between the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior and

DIA for the period 1

January 2016- 31

December 2020 (as described in more detail below).

The DIA holds extensive knowledge of both relevant legislation and founding principles in

the area of adoption in Denmark, and the States that the DIA works with.

This knowledge

has been gained due to the lengthy working relationships with the same 12 countries of

origin, gaining in depth knowledge of the country in some cases over 50 years. As the newest

country of origin is at least ten years old, relationships and trust have been maturely

developed between DIA staff and the country of origin. Over the last ten years, the DIA has

not initiated new agreements with any countries of origin.

Any future model should give

significant consideration to this wealth of knowledge and how to preserve it.

Chapter 2, 2.5 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

The 1993 Hague Convention, arts.9 and 11; GGP2.

Chapter 2, 2.3 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

Chapter 2, 2.6 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

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1.3.2 Supervision

The Danish CA is responsible for supervising and monitoring the fulfilment of the terms and

conditions required for DIA’s accreditation with regard to both its activities in Denmark and

abroad. This includes general oversight of DIA’s administrative and economic activities:

•

Substantial organisational changes, such as changes in employees and partners in the

country of origin

;

Ensuring continuing professional education for DIA employees in Denmark and abroad

on regulations and principles in the area of adoption (in Denmark and abroad)

;

General supervision, including of cooperation programs with countries of origin;

reviewing all matching cases and ad hoc hearings when new information becomes

available; and

Review of Organisation’s economic schedule as well as ongoing reporting including

payments for development aid (contributions and donations)

•

1.3.3 Supervision and education

The CA is responsible for providing

educational training

to the DIA (see 1.3.2). As part of this

responsibility, since 2016 ad hoc training regarding handling of matching cases, the

conclusions from the Financial Aspects Working Group and PAS has been provided. However

it seems that centralised (regular) training appears not to have occurred. This has the

associated consequence that there are few opportunities to open dialogue between the

different adoption actors, resulting in a feeling of working in silos

In order to improve internal collaboration, ISS/IRC recommends that efforts be made to

organise centralised training and information sharing for all Danish adoption actors, at

least annually. Such training could involve external trainers with experience in alternative

care, and adoption actors. Information sharing should involve measures that allow

representatives of each Danish adoption actor to share their expertise and exchange

information on their daily working practice.

1.3.4 Supervision of general activities

DIA’s general activities are subject to the general supervision and approval of the CA, and

they cannot act outside that approval. For example, the DIA may only mediate an ICA from

country partners where DIA has the Danish CA’s approval for that cooperation. The approval

is given for a defined period of time (two years).

The 2016 changes notably, resulted in improvements in the Danish CA’s monitoring of DIA.

In practice this can mean that the Danish CA may send multiple questions to DIA about

cooperation programs, ad hoc hearings and individual cases. For example, they are now

more insistent when crucial documents or information is missing (e.g. principle of

subsidiarity and background information related to siblings) or when new information

Chapter 2, 2.5 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

Chapter 2, 2.6 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

Chapter 4, 4.1 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

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becomes available necessitating an ad hoc hearing (e.g. refunds that biological mothers may

receive according to South African laws and clarification about DIA’s practice in this regard).

The Danish CA has the primary obligation to ensure that adoptions are Hague Compliant,

and it has the final responsibility for understanding and approving of how countries of origin

operate. In providing supervision, and meeting this obligation, the fact that DIA has

longstanding relationships with countries of origin, whilst having many benefits, poses

challenges for the Danish CA (see 1.3.1).

For example, DIA has been working with authorities in Burkina Faso with a representative in

the country for 22 years, since 1997. Whilst this arrangement has resulted in a good level of

trust between DIA and the Burkinabe CA facilitating the adoption process, it can also have a

downside when potential questions arise due to changes in practices. In this regard, the CA

has noted a certain level of reluctance on DIA’s behalf to examine their practices in Burkina

Faso, as it may jeopardise the existing relationship with the Burkinabe CA.

From the perspective of DIA, some of this perceived reluctance surrounding matters of

longstanding cooperation can be explained. Whilst most requests are ‘legitimate’ especially

with respect to cases, other responses are part of the existing knowledge of different

practices gained from working in the country; and thus in their view do not require requests

for extra information from the CO. For example, culturally it is acceptable in South Korea to

have the name of the child written in different formats, accordingly questions regarding this

practice do not necessarily need further explanations. Additionally, such requests are seen

as a burden for DIA absorbing their limited resources.

ISS/IRC recommends that for questions that may typically arise about cultural practices of

the 12 countries that they work with, that the DIA prepare a standard brief of questions

and answers. Such a brief can act as a gatekeeping mechanism so that only essential

questions are directed to DIA. Such harmonisation should likewise be part of any future

model that is to be considered.

For ‘legitimate’ requests, DIA explained that they are willing to ask further questions, but are

sometimes challenged by the short timeframes given in which to respond. Further, DIA often

felt uncomfortable sending a list of questions to the CAs of countries of origin, without

context or explanation behind why the questions were being asked – despite having worked

in these countries for long periods without any issues arising. Regarding questions related to

cooperation, it was explained that the CAs in countries of origin did not necessarily have the

mandate for certain aspects of the child protection system and therefore lacked the

competency to provide information. Accordingly, when DIA insists on asking the same

questions repetitively, it can jeopardise their longstanding relationship with CAs of countries

of origin - who feel it is like an interrogation in court proceedings, as opposed to an open

discussion to understand their system. In such situations, it seems that there may be a lack

of appreciation by some CAs of countries of origin regarding their obligations under the 1993

Hague Convention. It is important to note that such obligations are primarily the

responsibility of State actors, and arguably should be part of their cooperation agreements.

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Even in cases where a country of origin has not ratified the 1993 Hague Convention, the

responsibility falls upon the Receiving country to ensure full compliance

In other cases, DIA explained their preference of having the opportunity to obtain answers

to the questions during their next visit to the country, where it would be easier have a direct

dialogue with the authorities.

ISS/IRC recommends for questions by the Danish CA related to the general child protection

framework, that they rely on information from existing reliable sources such as the HCCH

country profiles, UNICEF country reports, ISS/IRC country situations and reports to the

various UN treaty bodies such as the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. If additional

information is required, then ISS through its network can be mandated to furnish this

information.

ISS/IRC recommends that for questions by the Danish CA related to individual cases, that

DIA be equipped to provide the necessary responses in collaboration with the authorities

in the countries of origin. In cases, where the latter do not have existing capacity to furnish

such information (e.g. social worker system does not exist, lack of understanding of

principle of subsidiarity), ISS/IRC recommends that the Danish CA work with other

receiving countries to provide technical assistance to build the capacity of local actors.

Such assistance should ideally be provided by a neutral organisation with experience in

alternative care and/or adoption such as the HCCH the intercountry adoption technical

assistance programme (ICATAP), ISS and UNICEF.

1.3.5 Supervision of general economic activities

ISS/IRC recalls that the 1993 Hague Convention contains specific provisions on financial

aspects of ICA, such as framework, control and monitoring. Fees and costs related to the

work of AAB’s is, in principle, regulated by countries: they shall not charge unreasonably

high fees in relation to their rendered services, and are obliged to ensure the transparency

of costs to avoid “improper financial or other gain”. In the current complex environment -

where AABs must adapt to the notable decrease in ICA, the profiles of children are

evolving, supplementary criteria for PAPs is required by countries of origin, and there is an

increased demand for specialised services by CAs, PAPs, adoptive families or local partners

in the country of origin - the issue of how AAB’s are financed and supported is of extreme

importance

As part of their annual accounts

, DIA is required provide an information note outlining the

spread of their expenses regarding specific countries. This is written in according to the

following subgroups:

See Conclusions and recommendations n°1 and 36 of the Special Commission of 2010.

The 1993 Hague Convention, arts.8 and 32; See Factsheet n°2 on Financial Aspects of ICA for the 2015 Special

Commission meeting, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/factsheet_finasp_en.pdf.

Chapter 4, 4.1.2 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

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•

Case specific costs

in Denmark which are given for each of the following items:

Translation, legalisation, postage, paediatrician fees, travel Insurance and follow-up.

Case specific costs abroad

which are for each of the following items: tests, medical

examinations, care and board for child, legal support, translation, visa(s) and passport(s).

General costs abroad

which are given for each of the following items (and which are not

connected to the individual child): fixed ongoing costs/running costs with individual

institutions, wages for the organisation’s staff in the relevant State(s) (calculated per

employee/function) and the organisation’s general administration costs in that State.

Travel activities

which are given for each of the following items: trips to (and in) the

relevant State, trips from the relevant State, outreach and consolidation work in the

relevant State.

Donations and supportive work that is given for each of the following:

support for aid

projects, support/donations to individual institutions from the DIA and further donations

negotiated for private individuals after the child has been taken home.

In addition to this annual report, DIA must produce quarterly and half-year reports.

The

Danish CA has appointed an external auditor for ongoing review of the DIA’s finance and

accounting for use in supervision. DIA supply accountancy staff and managers every half year

at the agreed times in relation to the external financial auditing.

DIA has explained that this reporting is onerous and easily consumes the entire 2.million DKK

that is received for this purpose (see introduction).

At the same time, the supervision of

financial accounts is part of the obligation of the CA under 1993 Hague Convention, who in

turn receive 5.2 million DKK for this task. Given this international obligation, the CA has

chosen to employ an external auditor to fulfil this function, which likewise has cost

implications.

There is a challenge of identifying the right balance in supervision of financial and

administrative activities of the AAB, as required by international standards, yet at the

same time ensuring that the AAB is not over burdened by such requirements. When such

obligations are too burdensome, there is less time for DIA to invest in its work with PAPs

and children. However, this must be balanced with the fact that such supervision is

essential in preventing illicit adoption practices and possible breakdowns. Finding this

balance is essential in determining the feasibility of any model proposed in this report (see

section 3). ISS/IRC recommends that the Danish authorities consider using the HCCH model

form

for reporting of financial accounts to streamline the reporting. Moreover, the

Danish CA should be in a position to not only assess the transparency and reasonableness

of costs, but also whether they are ethical. The first step would necessitate a change in the

law, repealing the necessity to link technical aid to the adoption process (see 1.3.5b).

Chapter 4, 4.1 Terms for Accreditation applicable for DIA, Valid from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2020

Internal communication with DIA, 4 March 2019

Available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/intercountry-adoption.

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1.3.5b Supervision of economic activities related to development aid and

contributions

Fees that are paid by PAPs may only be used to cover costs that are directly related to the

running of the organisation’s adoption business in Denmark and abroad, including expenses

for children’s aid work that is connected to adoption. Travelling and accommodation costs in

the country of origin are excluded. DIA approximates that adoption fees are approximately

215 000 DKK for each PAP. Once the adoption is finalised, adoptive families may apply for a

subsidy of 55 000 DKK from the Danish authorities.

Fees paid, directly or indirectly, may be used for project work or other work in the nature of

humanitarian aid work with a connection to adoption assistance.

In addition, contributions

from PAPs are seemingly permitted only after the adoption is finalised, without a maximum

threshold. Such contributions must be centralised by DIA and cannot be paid directly to

actors in the country of origin. It is noted that due to the lack of a legislative mandate,

supervision of contributions by PAPs by the Danish CA is only through a post adoption (and

non-compulsory) survey (see 2.2.7). In practice the Danish CA is involved when DIA has

doubts regarding the legitimacy of the contribution. Based on a survey regarding payments

and gifts in Madagascar, Ethiopia and Vietnam, the Danish CA has also proactively taken a

role. In the latter cases the Danish CA has asked DIA about the payments and how they guide

the PAPs about good practice in this regard.

Since 2016, DIA notes that there has not been any proofs of connection with the number of

adoptions and the provision of adoption-related relief work. It is DIA's view that there is

great transparency in the support provided by them to improve children's living conditions

and the subsidiarity principle.

Accordingly, DIA expressed their desire to preserve the

possibility that the organization can continue to provide adoption-related support. DIA notes

that if a separation between humanitarian aid and adoption work is desired, it could be

countered by less intrusive restriction, for example that DIA can only provide humanitarian

work not related to adoption in those countries where DIA does not actively have a

cooperation regarding adoption.

As to this suggestion, ISS/IRC notes that there could be a

risk for such humanitarian aid to be part of a scoping mission for future countries of origin to

work and build relationship.

It should be noted that any development aid of more than 50 000 DKK needs to be approved

by the Danish CA. DIA indicated that some of their development aid expenditure has

included developing a manual for adoptions in Burkina Faso, direct support to residential

care institutions, and education programs for parents in South Africa.

ISS/IRC recalls that international standards

place extensive safeguards on contributions -

as they entail risks and may undermine the integrity of a safe adoption procedure

Article 30(b) Adoption (Consolidation) Act 2015

Information received from Danish CA, 1 May 2019.

Information received from DIA, 1 May 2019.

Special Commissions of 2010 (recommendation n°14), 2005 (Report and conclusions, n°125) and 2000 (recommendation

N°10); GGP2, Chapter 9.

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Contributions may have the effect of ICA being prioritised over national solutions and

therefore, may result in insufficient support being provided to the birth family and an

absence of, or deficient, investigations undertaken into the adoptability of the child and / or

the availability of a domestic alternative care solutions (i.e., the subsidiarity principle may

not be respected).

Contributions may likewise create a dependency on the part of States of origin on the funds

provided through these sources and raise expectations that they will continue to receive

them. States wanting to ensure a steady flow of external funds to support child protection

efforts may feel obliged to ensure that children are supplied for intercountry adoption.

Contributions can also create competition between receiving States and AABs, whereby

whoever provides the greatest amount receives the greater number of children.

Furthermore, in UNICEF’s view,

these types of funds should not be the way in which support

is provided from other countries for the development of child protection services and

alternative care services in States of origin. When contributions to such funds are mandatory

in order for intercountry adoptions to be carried out, the contributor may have little or no

influence over the kind of projects financed and, in particular, may have no information

concerning whether or not the projects conform to internationally approved policy guidelines

in this sphere. Consequently, contributions of this nature cannot automatically be considered

as a desirable form of 'development aid'.

To this end, ISS/IRC strongly recommends that contributions should be avoided, in line

with international standards. If, despite these standards, a political decision is made to

allow contributions, then these should be closely tracked and supervised by the Danish CA.

There must be transparency in the contributions of all actors, including DIA and PAPs.

Inspiration may be gleaned from the Flemish CA who have a system in place for

monitoring PAPs contributions.

It is further recommended, and considered vital, that the Danish legislation be modified to

ensure that any development aid is not linked to adoption. Additionally, in the spirit of

cooperation promoted by the 1993 Hague Convention, if Danish authorities are

considering delivering development aid then initiatives should be promoted that do not

create any incentive to undertake adoptions. For example, Danish authorities could

consider centralising funds in an independent body working in the country of origin, such

as AUSAID, DANIDA, NORAD and SIDA, or a reputable local NGO working on the child

protection system without any links to adoption.

If however a political decision is made to insist on a link to adoption, then it should not be

a private arrangement but rather between Central Authorities. For example it could be in

the form of technical assistance from Danish Authorities to the Authorities in the countries

of origin, including through impartial organisations such as HCCH, ISS and UNICEF.

Capacity development plan for family support, foster care and adoption in Cambodia 2018-2023". Available at:

https://www.iss-ssi.org/images/Publications_ISS/ENG/Capacity_Development_FamilySupport_Cambodia.pdf.

Note on Financial Aspects of Intercountry Adoption, HCCH, 2014, para. 134.

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1.4 Other actors

Whilst ISS/IRC acknowledges that there are many other important actors working on

adoption in Denmark, such as adoption associations, professionals, etc. at this stage of this

study (see preface), exploring the views of these actors was outside of the mandate. The

team were informed that the views of such actors would be included at a later stage.

Section 2: Procedural framework

2.1 Domestic adoption

As the Danish law clearly defines that the resolution of any matter involving a child is to be

determined in the child’s best interests, the Executive Order on Adoption of 2015 merely

delineates the specific procedures necessary for an ethical and legal adoption to occur. The

NBA conducts a thorough assessment to ensure that the child is adoptable domestically. A

discussion about ICA is not included, as the NBA always find a domestic family for adoption.

The CA notes

that domestic adoptions that do not involve relative and stepchild adoptions,

are processed by the AFL and the NBA. The process varies if the adoption is carried out with

or without the consent of the biological mother or father. All the costs are absorbed by the

State and national PAPs are not expected to fund any part of process, which is a quite

different approach to the fees that are paid by ICA PAPs (see 2.2.8). National PAPs have

access to preparation and PAS offered by the Danish CA (phases 2 and 4 of the approval

procedure, see 2.2.3) in the same way as ICA PAPs.

In practice, the numbers of domestic adoptions (see introduction) are rather limited, with

the number of PAPs exceeding the limited numbers of adoptable children. It seems that

waiting times are quite lengthy, no doubt due to the fact that the process is free of charge

and limited numbers of adoptable children.

2.1a Domestic adoption with the consent of biological family

For PAPs who wish to adopt domestically in Denmark they must follow the same approval

process as PAPs, who wish to adopt from another country. After the pre-adoption

counselling course (the 2nd Phase in the approval process, see 2.2.3) they must register

either with DIA or inform the NBA of their wish to adopt domestically before they can

proceed to the 3rd Phase (see 2.2.3). The PAPs cannot be registered for both ICA and

domestic adoption, although they can freely switch between lists. When the PAPs are

approved, they are added to the waiting list for domestic adoption, administered by the

NBA.

When a biological parent decides to give his or her child away for adoption, it is the AFL who

are responsible for counselling the biological parents about the legal effect of an adoption,

to ensure that the biological parents are capable to fully comprehend the total sum of the

consequences of a consent to adoption, and to inform and guide the biological parents

about the alternatives to adoption. If the biological parents uphold their decision, they give a

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 15 February 2019

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC –1 March 2019

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written consent to adoption to the State Administration. A consent can be given at its

earliest three months after the child is born.

After the consent, the child’s file is forwarded from the AFL to the NBA, who is responsible

for the matching of the child. The NBA selects the most suitable PAPs from the waiting list

(based on the needs of the child and with attention to other factors – for example,

geography and the biological parents’ wishes). The names of the selected PAPs are

forwarded to the AFL, who then presents the matching proposal to the selected PAPs.

2.1b Domestic adoption without the consent of biological family

Whilst most domestic adoptions in Denmark are processed with consent of the biological

parents, there are a few cases where this is not the case. For example, in some instances

children may be left in public places. In these cases, the child is first under protection of

Social Services in the municipality, until the police investigation finishes. There are also some

cases where the child's parents are known and do not consent to an adoption, however an

adoption is pursued in any event. These cases are initiated by Social Services and the

Municipality.

2.2 Intercountry adoption

2.2.1 Cooperation with COs

The Danish CA decides which countries of origin it will cooperate with through the

Minister.

Formally, the Minister decides which countries the AAB is authorised to

cooperate with, whilst the Danish CA can decide which concrete organisations in the specific

country the AAB is allowed to cooperate with.

Currently the Minister makes decisions based on the general criteria for the AAB’s

cooperation defined in the Terms of Accreditation, chapter 5.

As from 1 January 2016, DIA

has not applied for authorisation to cooperate in new States of origin or with new

organisations, but the Danish CA has re-authorized the AAB to cooperate with all their

existing partners. Every cooperation agreement is re-authorised every second year provided

that the cooperation complies with Danish regulations and policy, the rules abroad and the

principles in the 1993 Hague Convention.

A notable improvement on the pre-2016 system is a requirement for the Danish CA to

undertake regular follow up after having authorized the AABs to cooperate with specific

countries of origin or foreign organisations. Previously, such follow up only occurred if the

Danish CA received information from, for example, the AABs, adoptive parents, the medias,

other receiving states or international organisations (i.e. ISS/IRC) that implied irregularities

or misconduct, and then the specific cooperation would be reassessed.

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 15 February 2019

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With the 2016 changes to the system, the Danish CA undertook its first round of re-

authorisations in 2016 and 2017. The Danish CA approached each cooperation as a “new”

country of origin/organisation, with the purpose of independently evaluating to what extent

the legislation and the adoption system in the countries of origin were compliant with

international standards. The second round of re-authorisation began in 2018, where the

main focus is how the principle of subsidiarity is implemented - not only in the rules and

regulations in the specific country of origin, but also in practice - and how this can be

documented and properly ensured in specific adoption cases. Additionally, the Danish CA

focus on how the country of origin handles adoption of siblings (is it a priority to adopt the

children into the same adoptive family, or are other considerations taken into account); rules

and procedures for ICA of children where the biological parents are not citizens in the

country of origin; possibilities for a search of origins for the adoptees; and preparation of the

children and the PAPs before they meet.

ISS/IRC commends the Danish CA in its efforts in this regard, as it now more aligned with

their responsibilities as CA under the 1993 Hague Convention. The Danish CA itself

acknowledges the benefits that this procedure has brought, as it has generated greater

knowledge both within the AAB and the Danish CA. For example, it helped the Danish CA

better understand their responsibility to ask DIA to gather additional information in

concrete matching cases in order to ensure the principle of subsidiarity is followed (see

1.3.2 and 2.2.4). Nonetheless, whilst this treatment of countries of origin as “new”

partners was clearly advantageous, it also had the disadvantage of giving the impression of

a lack of trust despite having worked in these countries for over a decade

(see 1.3.1 and

1.3.2). However, ISS/IRC believes it was a necessary readjustment in order for the Danish

CA to fully comply with the responsibilities of a CA of a receiving country. This situation

could be further improved with more regular joint Danish CA/DIA in country visits.

ISS/IRC sees the fruit of the new accreditation system, in the decisions made by the Danish

CA and DIA regarding which countries to cooperate with.

For example, the Danish CA has

withdrawn the authorisation to cooperate with Ethiopia following conclusions that the

protective measures that had been established for the AABs were insufficient to ensure that

the principles in the 1993 Hague convention were respected. Moreover, DIA made a decision

to withdraw from Vietnam in November 2017 after the Danish CA raised concerns in

December 2016.

Donations and contributions

The CA must approve any donations in countries of origin which exceed 6 500 euros (see

1.3.5).

Development aid

Meeting held in its Birkerød office, the 11 March 2019.

Danish CA communication to ISS/IRC – 21 January 2019

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The Danish Adoption Act states that DIA may only perform cooperation projects related to

adoption assistance activities, and accredited bodies are not statutorily authorized to

perform development aid (see 1.3.5).

2.2.2 Preparation of the PAPs – first opportunity

DIA offers general awareness raising sessions to any interested PAPs prior to the lodgement

of an official application (see section 2.2.3). This service is funded by PAPs fees. This can be

compared with the practice in other receiving countries. For example, in Switzerland this

general awareness raising is provided by the CA and PAPs do not have to pay a fee; whilst in

Australia, this activity is provided by the CA but is paid by the PAPs.

Whilst this course is not

compulsory in Denmark, ISS/IRC believes that it is extremely important for an introduction

to adoptions and dispelling any existing myths.

2.2.3 Approval of the PAPs

An application for adoption or for approval must be filed with the AFL and comply with the

requisite legal requirements

. An adoption order may only be granted to an individual who

has attained the age of 25. Residents of Denmark may adopt only under the provisions of the

Danish Adoption Consolidation Act. Residents of a foreign country may only adopt, if the PAP

and his or her spouse/partner is a Danish national and adoption is not possible in the PAP’s

country of residence, as well as if a Danish adoption order is valid in the country of

residence.

An application approval in a non-relative adoption cannot be filed until a minimum of six

months have passed since the most recent addition to the family. Before approval is

granted, Danish authorities perform a thorough investigation of all PAPs, which is divided

into four phases.

- The first phase investigates whether the PAP fulfils the

general conditions for approval

as a

PAP including: the age difference between the PAP and child does not exceed 42 years; PAP

seeking to adopt a child jointly must have lived together for at least 2.5 years; the physical

and psychological conditions of the PAP must be in accordance with the best interests of the

child; the PAP’s home must be adequate to raise a child; the PAP must show proper financial

conditions; and the PAP cannot have a criminal record

. AFL social workers undertake this

investigation (see 1.2.4).

The ISS/IRC commends the independent nature of AFL’s work in this field, as there is no

risk that approvals are linked to adoption fees, but rather are based on an objective

assessment of PAPs qualifications.

Executive order of adoption, Part 5.

Executive Order on Adoption, Arts. 20, 21, 22.

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- The second phase covers a

pre-adoption counselling course

which is mandatory to all PAPs

who have not previously adopted a child. The course is provided by the Danish CA

, in

addition to the awareness raising activities initially provided by DIA (see 2.2.3).

- The third phase consists of one or more interviews with the AFL, whereby authorities

investigate whether the PAP possess the

sufficient individual resources

necessary to adopt a

child, followed by a home study report that is conducted and submitted to the Joint Council -

who then make the final decision on whether or not to approve the PAP(s)

. A PAP who is

married, or has a cohabitating partner, may only be approved as an adopter if his or her

spouse/partner is also approved.

Approval is valid for four years.

The ISS/IRC commends the independent nature of AFL’s work in phase three, as there is

little risk that approvals are linked to adoption fees but to an assessment of PAPs

individual qualifications. There may be a minimal risk if annual State funding is based on

numbers of approvals, instead of needs of social workers to carry out their responsibilities,

often dealing with complex issues.

General frame of approval

The Danish CA recognizes the importance of selecting PAPs who are the most suitable to fit

the needs of the child. The Government Agreement of 2014 proposed a reform of the

approval system, whereby the approval framework becomes just one approval and will

include older children and children with special needs.

As of January 2016, a PAP may be approved to adopt a child within the age frame of 0-48

months who has common physical and mental development potential, with the possibility

for limited use of support. There is a discretion to expand a given approval frame to include

an actual child not within the PAP’s existing approval frame.

As an example of children considered within the new frame of approval – based on an

individual assessment – approval can be given to adopt a well-treated HIV positive child, as

well as pre-mature child, if there is a common development potential, possibly with a limited

use of support at the time of the assessment

. The purpose of changing the frame approval

has been to adapt the frame to accommodate the children who are in need of ICA today.

According to DIA, this general approval criteria may reduce the flexibility of PAPs in exploring

their own resources and limits

. Indeed PAPs may feel obliged to accept the general

See

Information on the mandatory pre-adoption preparation course and the post adoption services provided in Denmark

p.2;