Erhvervsudvalget 2019-20
ERU Alm.del Bilag 64
Offentligt
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Collective Redress
Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective
Interests of Consumers
As governments around the world withdraw from welfare provision and
promote long-term savings by households through the financial markets, the
protection of retail investors has become critically important.
July 2019
ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 64: Henvendelse af 28/10-19 fra Better Finance, vedrørende forslag til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets Direktiv om adgang til indbringelse af sager til varetagelse af forbrugernes kollektive interesser
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About us
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the European-
level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors, savers and other
financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
BETTER FINANCE has long advocated for an EU-wide collective redress mechanism for
all financial services users, including small and individual shareholders or employee
shareholders, and provided support to consumer organisations in collective redress
schemes in the field of financial services (such as
Fortis, Volkswagen AG).
BETTER FINANCE
welcomes the European Commission s EC proposal for a Directive on
collective redress actions for consumers
Collective Redress Directive
but warns on
several amendments that will diminish the scope and effectiveness of these provisions.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create
a mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer protection (Art. 38 and 47 of
Charter of Fundamental Rights), equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 of
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) for the entire spectrum of
consumers in the EU, including investors and financial services users.
Contact
Stefan VOICU,
[email protected]
Aleksandra MACZYNSKA,
[email protected]
Christiane HÖLZ,
[email protected]
Guillaume PRACHE,
[email protected]
The most relevant sector concerning observed mass claims/issues is
the financial services sector
.
1
The quote on the cover page is from Niamh Moloney,
How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC
and UK
(2010) Cambridge University Press
.
1
See infra, p. 35.
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Contents
I. Collective Redress: 1-pager presentation ............................................................................ 3
II. Position Paper on the Collective Redress Directive ............................................................. 4
III. Differences between US and EU collective redress ...........................................................17
IV. Working Paper 1: Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Directive ....................................................18
V. Working Paper 2: Article 2 of the Directive ........................................................................22
VI. Working Paper 3: Aligning the opt-out system with compensation claims ........................25
VII. Working Paper 4: Definition of consumers ......................................................................32
VIII. Working Paper 5: Private International Law applicable to Collective Redress cases .........37
IX. Working Paper 6: Consumer Protection provisions in key EU Financial law .......................42
X. Collective Redress Slide Presentation ................................................................................49
XI. EU Competence, Legal Basis and Subsidiarity ...................................................................53
The contents and views expressed in this Booklet have been endorsed by
the BETTER FINANCE Legal Committee.
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I. Collective Redress: 1-pager presentation
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II. Position Paper on the Collective Redress Directive
POSITION PAPER
on the Collective Redress Directive
Ref.:
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on representative actions for
the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC (SWD(2018)
96 final)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
BETTER FINANCE welcomes
the European Commission s EC
proposal for a Directive on collective redress actions for consumers
Collective Redress
Directive
but warns on several amendments that will diminish the scope and effectiveness of
these provisions. This position paper highlights and justifies the main objections BETTER
FINANCE brings to the proposed version of the text.
The
key issues
concern:
The closed-list determining the scope of the Directive
does not cover direct individual investors
(share- and bondholders), leaving them less protected than indirect investors (e.g. fundholders).
It is paramount to add the Market Abuse Directive (MAD2), Regulation (MAR) and PEPP
Regulation in Annex I of the Directive.
A. The
scope of the Directive
(Article 2.1) discriminates EU citizens who save in directly in
shares and bonds vs. packaged investment
products
The default opt-out approach is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the procedure not only
at national level, but
most importantly
cross-border. Requiring consumers from another
Member State to explicitly give their mandate for the class action would defeat the purpose of the
Directive and contradicts the essential principle of the internal market.
In addition, in order to ensure harmonisation and equal protection for all harmed consumers
across the EU, Member States must be required
not to
demand the mandate of the individual
consumers concerned. This is referred to as an opt-out system.
B. The
opt-in system
and the
cross-border dimension of the opt-out system
is
detrimental to consumers
Representative associations should expressly be allowed to settle the dispute out-of-court (ADR),
also allowing the possibility to revert to mandatory jurisdiction should the settlement mechanism
fail. BETTER FINANCE suggests adding a new action to Article 5(2).
Recent case law shows that collective actions for investors or financial services users were
initiated by foundations established ad hoc. Limiting the possibility for experienced and well-
established representative organisations of consumers, savers and individual investors to create
spontaneously an organisation for collective redress procedures severely limits the scope and
effectiveness of the provisions of the Collective Redress Directive.
C.
ADR settlements and recourse to judicial review
(Article 5(2)) and the
weakening of
representative organisations
limits consumers legal protection
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This position paper is elaborated by
BETTER FINANCE,
The European Federation of Investors and
Financial Services Users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the
financial industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities
are supported by the European Union since 2012.
There is a strong need for Union intervention, on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, in order to ensure
both access to justice and sound administration of justice as it will reduce the costs and burden
entailed by individual actions
- (Amendment 2, JURI Committee).
Modernising the existing provisions under the Injunctions Directive (Directive 2009/22/EU) is
considerably needed, in particular in the field of financial services. Globalisation and increased
interconnectedness of capital markets leave an increased number of investors and financial
services users exposed to acts harming their rights and interests. In 2017, BETTER FINANCE
highlighted the numerous
cases of misselling of financial products
that affected shareholders or
investors on a cross-border basis.
Many other cases
where negligence or misconduct of the
financial industry has led to mass harm situations have occurred, such as the Swiss franc loans
(Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Croatia to name a few) or the "unit-linked" scandals.
Some very few were able to be dealt with under the Unfair Terms Directive,
2
but with no common
provisions for cross-border action or compensatory claims. For the rest, it was and still is up to
national civil procedure laws to determine whether two or more cases stemming from the same
infringement of EU law can be joined together. Only five EU Member States enable citizens to
effectively use collective redress systems, while the rest have none or seriously flawed
procedures.
3
Providing EU consumers with an efficient and sophisticated procedure to obtain redress
collectively is of major importance. Given the lack of expertise, trust, time or resources, individuals
rarely pursue their rights or legitimate interests in court to seek for injunctive relief or
compensatory redress. However, when offered the possibility to act together, 79% of EU citizens
would be more willing to defend their rights.
4
These are some of the reasons for which the Collective Redress Directive must set up a robust,
flexible, and efficient collective redress mechanism for all EU citizens. With some of the
amendments proposed by the JURI Committee, the Directive will be rendered practically
inefficient.
2
3
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29–34.
See BEUC, Myths a d Realities o Colle ti e Redress
https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-
048_myths_and_realities_on_collective_redress.pdf.
4
Ibid.
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1. Scope of the Collective Redress Directive
The EC s approach to determining the scope of this harmonised procedure was to include in an
annex all Union law that, if breached, would trigger the application of the Directive. According to
Article 2(1), representative actions under this Directive can be brought only against
infringements
[…]
of the Union law listed in Annex I
.
Why discriminate EU citizens who save directly into EU capital markets?
This closed list approach is, first, inflexible. Should new developments
(infringements of already
existing or new legislation) occur, it requires amending the Directive (level 1 - using the same
legislative procedure) in order to bring the cases under the scope of the Collective Redress
Directive.
Second, either by mistake or intentionally, leaving out an EU legislative act means leaving out all
its addressees and beneficiaries. As is currently the case, the closed list approach completely
excludes direct investors into capital markets (securities holders) since neither of the acts
enumerated thereof concern this category of consumers. Moreover, the new PEPP Regulation,
which entered into force one year after this proposal was published, is not included either in the
list of Annex I.
While for indirect investors - in deposits, investment funds, insurance policyholders
there is
already a set of financial safeguards (Solvency II, the Capital Requirements Directive and
Regulation, National Deposit Guarantee Schemes), there are no comparable for direct investors,
such as shareholders and bondholders. Excluding shareholders from the scope of this Directive
means that small individual investors suffering damage by the same issuer will not be able to join
their claims together into one single action in all Member States and, by that, they would be
unjustifiably worse off that users of other (financial) services or goods. Thus, all the more reason
to include in the list Union law acts that protect direct individual investors from infringements of
EU financial regulation.
Since the Market Abuse Directive (MAD2)
5
and the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)
6
are the only
pieces of EU legislation that provide sanctions for breaches of obligations of issuers towards
securities holder,
BETTER FINANCE strongly asks
the European Parliament and the Council of
the EU to endorse an additional amendment
including these three acts in Annex I of the
Collective Redress Directive.
Not only that the most affected retail category since the 2008 crisis has been the shareholder
s
class (Fortis, Dexia, Bankia, Natixis, Banca MPs, Volkswagen), but one of the central actions of the
CMU Action Plan was to increase retail investors direct participation into capital markets and
investor confidence.
5
Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse
(market abuse directive), OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 179–189.
6
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse
regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives
2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 1–61.
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2. The opt-in system and the cross-border dimension
The opt-in system is harmful to consumers and limits the beneficial effects of the Directive
Evidence brought in public consultations, NGOs research papers, and the EC s Flash
Eurobarometer show that consumers are more willing to defend their rights as part of a collective
action rather than individually. However, there are two possible ways to design a collective
redress procedure:
2.1 Opt-in system
From a consumer perspective, the
opt-in system
contains several
disadvantages.
In most cases,
consumers display a passive behaviour on the background of a lack of knowledge, experience,
resources (information or financial) or incentive.
Case law in financial scandals shows
striking
differences between opt-in and opt-out enforcement files.
First, an empirical observation is the participation rate: while in opt-out cases very few wish to be
excluded from the effects of a judgment (achieving, thus, a close to 100% enforcement rate), in
opt-in cases very few take the active step to participate. The coverage rate of opt-in systems can
be as low as 1.5% (Deutsche
Telekom)
and generally varies depending on how many consumer
organisations are involved.
either by way of an opt-in system, where the power of representation must be expressly
demonstrated from all concerned consumers, or
either by establishing an opt-out system, where all consumers are represented as long as they do
not explicit object to be part of the procedure.
Second, we have observed that opt-in cases feature predominantly active individual members of
consumer protection NGOs. On the other hand, opt-out cases have much higher enforcement
numbers (NCC
Closet Indexing).
What happens with passive consumers is that they are often not
aware that a collective redress procedure has been initiated and that they are required to take an
active step and sign in to become an eligible party. It gets worse where the collective redress
procedure is launched in a Member State other than their home country.
Consumer passiveness is all the more understandable as being a consumer is not a full-time job.
However, it should not be used as a means to exclude them from participating to
injunction/collective redress procedures against traders infringing EU law. Sanctioning illegal
practices and mandating compensation to all those affected also is a prerequisite for loyal
competition between traders in the economy.
However, some consumers may wish to be excluded due to several reasons, such as: they disagree
with the claims, the pleas in law, the chances of success, damages etc. However, at this moment is
very difficult to tell whether the very large pools of consumers that do not actively take part in
collective enforcement procedures are just passive or wish to pursue their rights on their own.
The
opt-out system
has the
advantage
of discerning between passive consumers and consumers
who wish to proceed differently. First, as the opt-out frame is usually at a later stage of the
procedure, it offers more time for consumers to become aware of the case, make up their minds
or take an informed decision. Second, the active behaviour of requiring exclusion from a collective
redress file is undisputed evidence that the consumer is not merely passive.
From a legal perspective, the opt-out system contains the same
constitutional safeguards
as the
opt-in system. The right to private party autonomy and the right to disposition
the prerogatives
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If
the EC s proposal
and Amendment 60 of the JURI Committee at least leave open the discussion
on the opt-out system, Amendment 61 of the JURI committee definitely closes it for cases with a
transnational element.
2.2 Cross-border dimension
Therefore, BETTER FINANCE
strongly advises
the European Parliament and Council of the EU
to
change the wording
of the precited subparagraph
and indicate
that Member States
may not
require the mandate of the individual consumers
concerned…
.
The EC s
initial wording of Article 6(1)(1) offered Member States the possibility to institute such
a regime under the Collective Redress Directive. What we assume to be a brave attempt to
stimulate opt-out systems across the EU, after the failed
recommendations
of 2013,
8
it still falls
short of what EU citizens are in dire need as consumers for reasons of legal effectiveness and
certainty. Merely offering the possibility to allow for an opt-out system would lead to divergent
implementation of the law, different standards of access to justice and forum shopping in the EU.
to choose whether to be part of a procedure or not
are and can still be exercised by the individual
consumer. The opt-out merely inverses the effects of the active and express manifestation of will
and consent from inclusion to exclusion.
7
Where a Member State does implement the opt-out system, subparagraph 1a obliges it to require
proof of the
explicit mandate to join the representative action within the applicable time limit
of
harmed consumers that are not habitual residents in that jurisdiction. This new addition creates
a severe barrier to cross-border engagement and legal protection of consumers, contradicting the
essential principle of the internal market and infringing Article 26(2) TFEU
9
and Article 38 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
A robust and effective pan-EU collective redress mechanism must grant the same rights to affected
consumers in all other jurisdictions as in the Member State where the class action takes place.
Therefore, BETTER FINANCE
strongly advises the co-legislators
to delete Amendment 61 of the
JURI Committee and impose the opt-out system across the EU for the purpose of this Directive.
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution Settlements, recourse to judicial review
and the weakening of representative organisations
Effective settlement mechanisms and representation must be ensured
3.1 ADR mechanisms
Due to administrative burdens and disadvantages mandatory jurisdictions pose (e.g. length of the
procedure) eligible entities should be expressly allowed to choose, first, to settle the dispute
through out-of-court mediation, either privately or via alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
bodies. These may present the advantage of appointing specialised arbiters, avoiding procedural
obstacles, reducing the cost of litigation, among other.
7
See also Csongor
Ist a Nagy, The Europea Colle ti e Redress De ate After the Europea Co
issio s
Recommendation:
O e Step For ard, T o Steps Ba k?
22 MJ 4 (2015), 530-552, 536.
8
Europea
Co
issio , Co
issio Re o
e datio of
Ju e
o
o
o pri iples for i ju ti e a d
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law
(2013/396/EU), OJ L 201/60 of 26.7.2013.
9
Treaty on the Functioning the European Union.
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However, in case a settlement is not reached following the procedure, after a reasonable time
period, eligible entities should be expressly allowed to address the case to national courts via one
of the representative actions mentioned in Article 5(2). In order to ensure equal access to redress
mechanism across EU legal orders, this ADR settlement mechanism should be expressly provided
as a representative action in Article 5(2), through a new subparagraph c).
A good example of a practice of this kind is the Dutch WCAM statute.
10
The model is based on a
collective settlement which is therefore completely dependent on the other party s willingness to
settle. As the case of Volkswagen has shown, it is a useless instrument if the issuer rejects any kind
of settlement. The Dutch system could be fundamentally improved if, in case a settlement is out of
reach, the procedure could be automatically reversed into a court action. Moreover, the Dexia case
has shown that settlement procedures can also be very costly for the plaintiff s association
and
only large ones will manage to bear them, thus all the more reason to allow claimants to revert to
mandatory jurisdictions.
3.2 Weakening of representative organisations
Under the proposed version of the text (Article 4(2)
Amendment 49), such ad hoc created
associations would not benefit from the provisions under this Directive. On the contrary,
representative organisations are required to be established on a permanent basis and specialized
particularly in this type of litigation, creating a new class of consumer associations having the
unique purpose of initiating class action when acts of mass harm take place.
11
The majority of collective redress proceedings brought against infringements of investors and
financial services users interests since
have been initiated by experienced and well-
established associations representing the interests of consumers, savers and individual investors.
These organisations created spontaneously (ad hoc) another organisation to represent the
interests of consumers in a certain case. A practical example is that of
Stichting Volkswagen
Investor Claims,
established to represent the collective interests of individual shareholders of
Volkswagen AG that suffered losses as a consequence of the diesel scandal.
First, this contradicts all arguments (Recitals (4), (25) and Article 1) for laying down safeguards
against abusive litigation. If an eligible entity must prove its main purpose that of protecting the
collective interests of consumers and must function continuously, on a permanent basis, it will not
be long before class action turns into a regular activity to ensure the survivorship of these entities.
Second, the essence of collective redress is spontaneity. The Collective Redress Directive must
allow consumers to join their claims under one representative organisation when an act of mass
harm occurs. As such, a collective redress procedure is spontaneously initiated and fulfils its
Dr. Hele e a Lith, The Dut h Colle ti e Settle e ts A t a d Pri ate I ter atio al La
Eras us S hool of La ,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/saw_annex_en.pdf.
The WCAM came into force on
27 July 2005. It provides for collective redress in mass damages on the basis of a settlement agreement concluded between
one or more representative organisations and one or more allegedly liable parties for the benefit of a group of affected persons
to whom damage was allegedly caused. Once such a collective settlement is concluded, the parties may jointly request the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare it binding. If the Court grants the request, the agreement binds all persons covered by
its terms and represented by the representative organization, except for any person who has expressly elected to opt out
within a specific period. Any person having opted out retains his right to initiate individual proceedings against the defendant.
While the proceedings regarding the binding declaration are pending, any other proceedings concerning claims in respect of
which the agreement provides for compensation are suspended at the request of the alleged liable party.
11
Article 4(1) of the Collective Redress Directive read in conjunction with Article 5(1) and with the proposed definition of
consumer organisation (Amendment 37) and with the deletion of paragraph (2) of Article 4 (Amendment 49).
10
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Last but not least, this
and especially read together with amendments 37 and 44 of the JURI
Committee
will make the Directive become an instrument that can only be used by large state-
subsidised consumer representative organisations.
Hence, BETTER FINANCE
strongly advises to keep subparagraph 2 of Article 4
in the final
version of the Collective Redress Directive as proposed by the Commission.
Since, at the time of writing still, the only publicly available amendments to the Directive s text are
those voted by the European Parliament (JURI/IMCO/TRANS committees), the other key issues
analysed below will concern the amendments voted in the plenary session of 26 March 2019.
purpose once a final decision is awarded. The proposed version of the text turns around this
mechanism and forces representative organisations to outlive their purpose.
4. Other key issues
Amendment 33
addition of
broad consumer impact
to Article
BETTER FINANCE questions this amendment as it will create legal uncertainty and divergent
application of the law since Article 3 does not provide a definition for what
broad consumer impact
represents. Moreover, it would severely limit the scope of collective redress actions for smaller
groups of affected consumers, leaving them out from an important instrument of legal protection.
In addition, it contradicts Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which does not
distinguish between
narrow
and
broad
consumer interests, but requires that Union policy and law
ensures a high level of protection for all EU citizens.
Amendment 38
– addition of
in civil capacity under the rules of civil law
to Article
BETTER FINANCE warns the European Parliament of the detrimental effects this addition will
have not only to the scope of the Directive, but to the uniform application in the EU.
First, there are several legal orders across the EU where private law branch is divided into civil
law and commercial law (France, Belgium, Italy for instance). Requiring a trader to be defined as
a person acting in civil capacity may unintentionally lead to the inapplicability of the Collective
Redress Directive in those jurisdictions where the legislation included in Annex I falls under the
commercial law branch and under the rules of commercial law.
Second, this amendment aims to exclude providers of public services or services of public interest,
thus bringing an unjustified limitation to its scope. The Directive must ensure that consumers
affected by mass harm may be able to benefit from these provisions no matter the source of their
legal relationship, where the legal relationship is defined by one party acting in a professional
capacity and the other acting outside its habitual business or trade, as a consumer (B2C business).
Last, introducing a validity condition for the applicability of this Directive concerning the civil
capacity of the trader will lead to a segregation between Member States where the Directive is
applicable and Member States where the Directive is inapplicable.
Amendment 39
– addition of
data subjects as defined in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data
Protection Regulation
to Article
This amendment represents an implicit extension of the scope of application of the Directive as
defined in Article 2(1). BETTER FINANCE does not oppose the inclusion of the GDPR, but warns
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that the amendment is inconsistent
with the closed-list approach and discriminatory to all other
affected consumers.
The purpose of Article 4 is to shorten the length and decrease the burden of judicial proceedings
examining the procedural standing of representative organisations by establishing an
ex-ante
administrative authorisation procedure for qualified entities. The purpose of the proceedings and
of the competent court should not be extended to examining again the
locus standi
of the already
appointed representative organisation.
Amendment 56
– addition of
the illegal practice
to Article
Amendment 67
addition of paragraph 4b to Article 6
a
Amendment 52
– addition of
Article 4
to Article
BETTER FINANCE believes that this amendment leaves the injunctive procedure devoid of
substance since a practice is considered illegal if an administrative or judicial body
a priori
sanctions it as such, thus entailing a final decision declaring the practice illegal before being able
to institute collective injunctive or compensatory action against that practice.
BETTER FINANCE believes that the second phrase of this new subparagraph attacks the substance
of civil law and civil procedure law by limiting compensatory action only to the actual loss (lucrum
cessans)
and expressly prohibiting compensation of unrealized gains (damnum
emergens)
in a
procedure under the provisions of this Directive.
This constitutes a severe limitation of legal protection for consumers in all cases where national
law allows compensation of the unrealized gains (damnum
emergens)
and will constitute a
deterrent for consumers and representative organisations to use the procedure prescribed under
this Directive for protecting their rights and interests.
Amendment 98
addition of paragraph 2a to Article 16
BETTER FINANCE sees the express limitation brought to cross-border representative actions
clearly inconsistent with the principles and rules laid down by EU primary law. The justification
is the same as that for Amendment 61 thereof.
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5. BETTER FINANCE main amendments
Amendments to the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of
consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC
COM/2018/0184 final
2018/089 (COD)
European Commission’s
proposal
BETTER
FINANCE’s proposed
amendments
Amedment 1
Annex I
subparagraph 46 (new)
46) Directive 2014/57/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for
market abuse (market abuse directive).
Amendment 2
Annex I
subparagraph 47 (new)
47) Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
16 April 2014 on market abuse (market
abuse regulation) and repealing Directive
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and Commission
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC
and 2004/72/EC.
Summary justification
ANNEX I
List of
provisions of Union Law
referred to in Article 2(1).
Collective redress for direct investors
Article 2(1) determines the scope of
application of the Directive by referring to
disputes arising from breaches of EU law
listed in Annex I.
none of the EU legislative acts enumerated
in Annex I thereof cover individual direct
investors (such as shareholders, bond
holders, etc);
Direct investors should benefit of the same
legal protection ad indirect investors;
Excluding shareholders from the scope
of the proposal means that small
individual investors suffering damage by
the same issuer;
Moreover, it contradicts the CMU Action
Plan since it will not help regain
investors
trust and boost their confidence; the
purpose was to increase retail investor
direct participation into capital markets.
Weakening
organisations
of
representative
Article 4
Qualified entities
2. Member States may
designate a qualified entity
on an ad hoc basis for a
particular representative
action, at its request, if it
complies with the criteria
referred to in paragraph 1.
Proposal 1
Do not endorse Amendment 49 JURI
The majority of collective redress proceedings
brought against infringements of investors
and financial services users interests since
2008) have been initiated by ad hoc
organisations to represent the interests of
consumers in a certain case:
Under the proposed version of the text
(Amendment 49) such ad hoc created
associations would not benefit from the
provisions under this Directive;
The essence of collective redress is
spontaneity, thus it must allow consumers
to join their claims under one ad hoc
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representative organisation when an act of
mass harm occurs;
This contradicts all arguments (Recitals (4),
(25) and Article 1) for laying down
safeguards against abusive litigation. If an
eligible entity must prove its main purpose
that of protecting the collective interests of
consumers and must function continuously,
on a permanent basis, it will not be long
before class action turns into a regular
activity to ensure the survivorship of these
entities;
This
and especially read together with
amendments 37 and 44 of the JURI
Committee
will make the Directive
become an instrument that can only be used
by large state-subsidised consumer
representative organisations.
Article 5
Representative actions for
the protection of the
collective interests of
consumers
Member States shall ensure
that qualified entities are
entitled
to
bring
representative
actions
seeking
the
following
measures:
(a) an injunction order as
an interim measure for
stopping the practice or, if
the practice has not yet
been carried out but is
imminent, prohibiting the
practice;
(b) an injunction order
establishing
that
the
practice constitutes an
infringement of law, and if
necessary, stopping the
practice or, if the practice
has not yet been carried out
but
is
imminent,
prohibiting the practice.
In order to seek injunction
orders, qualified entities
shall not have to obtain the
mandate of the individual
consumers concerned or
provide proof of actual loss
or damage on the part of
the consumers concerned
Amendment 3
Article 5, paragraph 2, letter c) (new)
c) collective private settlement, through
administrative
dispute
resolution
procedures established according to
Directive 2013/11/EU, by which both
actual damages and unrealised gains can
be compensated, having also the
possibility to reverse to either of the
representative actions listed above in
letters a) and b) or to another procedural
mean according to national law, if within
a reasonable time frame an agreement is
not reached”.
For the purposes of letter c) above, the
appointed dispute resolution arbiter shall
establish, at the beginning of the
procedure, the reasonable time frame,
taking into account both parties’ opinions
and giving due consideration to the scale,
nature and complexity of the case.
In using the representative action under
letter c) above, qualified entities shall not
have to obtain the mandate of the
individual consumers concerned, even
where concerned consumers are not
habitual residents of the home Member
State to the procedure.
In case of injunction orders they shall not
provide proof of actual loss or damage on
ADR settlements as representative actions
Article 5 of the Directive lays down the types
of actions that can be used in collective
redress for injunctive and compensatory
measures.
There are several advantages to alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms,
including reduced time-length, specialised
arbiters, simplified procedure;
Authorised entities should be expressly
allowed to first try to settle the case out-of-
court;
In order to avoid unnecessary delays,
parties should be directed to alternative
dispute resolution as per Directive
2013/11/EU;
The purpose of ADR settlements should not
be to deter representative associations from
entering into negotiations, nor to force for
an unjust settlement;
Thus, the parties subject to an ADR
settlement should have the possibility, if
within a reasonable time frame a resolution
is not reached, to revert the case to national
courts;
In line with the opt-out system,
representative associations should not be
required to obtain the explicit mandate of all
consumers concerned.
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or
of
intention
or
negligence on the part of
the trader.
the part of the consumers concerned or of
intention or negligence on the part of the
trader
.
Amendment 4
Article 6, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1
1. For the purposes of Article 5(3), Member
States shall ensure that qualified entities are
entitled to bring representative actions
seeking a redress order, which obligates the
trader to provide for, inter alia,
compensation, repair, replacement, price
reduction,
contract
termination
or
reimbursement of the price paid, as
appropriate. A Member State
may not
require the mandate of the individual
consumers concerned before a declaratory
decision is made or a redress order is issued.
Opt-in system
Consumers are more willing to defend their
rights as part of a collective action rather than
individually.
Consumers are often not aware that
collective redress has been initiated and
that they are required to take an active
step and sign in to become an eligible
party, especially when it takes place in
another Member State;
Consumers are sometimes passive; this
passiveness should not be used as a means
to exclude them from participating to
collective redress procedures;
EU consumers need an opt-out system,
also for reasons of legal effectiveness and
certainty.
Merely offering the possibility to allow for
an opt-out system would lead to divergent
implementation of the law.
Article 6
Redress measures
1. For the purposes of
Article 5(3), Member States
shall ensure that qualified
entities are entitled to
bring
representative
actions seeking a redress
order, which obligates the
trader to provide for, inter
alia, compensation, repair,
replacement,
price
reduction,
contract
termination
or
reimbursement of the price
paid, as appropriate. A
Member State may require
the mandate of the
individual
consumers
concerned
before
a
declaratory decision is
made or a redress order is
issued.
Article 16
Cross-border representative
actions
Amendment 5
Article 16, subparagraph 2a (new)
2a. Member States must ensure equal
conditions to consumers other than those
habitually resident to access a collective
redress procedure initiated in their
jurisdiction. The provisions of Article 6,
paragraph 1, shall apply mutatis
mutandis
.
Cross-border dimension
The current wording of Article 6(1) allows
Member States to adopt an opt-out system.
If a Member State implements an opt-out
system, it would create discriminatory
conditions to access to justice for residents
of other Member States;
This new addition creates a severe barrier
to cross-border engagement and legal
protection of consumers, contradicting the
essential principle of the internal market
and infringing Article 26(2) TFEU
12
and
Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
12
Treaty on the Functioning the European Union.
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6. Other key amendments
European
Commission’s Proposal
Article 2
Scope
1. This Directive shall
apply to representative
actions brought against
infringements by traders
of provisions of the Union
law listed in Annex I that
harm or may harm the
collective interests of
consumers. It shall apply
to domestic and cross-
border
infringements,
including where those
infringements
have
ceased
before
the
representative action has
started or before the
representative action has
been concluded.
Article 3
Definitions
trader means any
natural person or any
legal person, irrespective
of whether privately or
publicly owned, who is
acting, including through
any other person acting in
their name or on their
behalf, for purposes
relating to their trade,
business,
craft
or
profession;
Article 3
Definitions
collective interests of
consumers
means the
interests of a number of
consumers;
Amendment 33
Article 2
paragraph 1
1. This Directive shall apply to representative
actions brought against infringements
with a
broad consumer impact
by traders of
provisions of the Union law listed in Annex I
that protect
the collective interests of
consumers. It shall apply to domestic and cross-
border infringements, including where those
infringements have ceased before the
representative action has started or before the
representative action has been concluded.
JURI Amendment
BETTER FINANCE Amendment
Endorse EC initial proposal
1. This Directive shall apply to representative
actions brought against infringements by
traders of provisions of the Union law listed in
Annex I that harm or may harm the collective
interests of consumers. It shall apply to
domestic and cross-border infringements,
including where those infringements have
ceased before the representative action has
started or before the representative action has
been concluded.
Amendment 38 -
Article 3
paragraph 1
point 2
trader means any natural person or any
legal person, irrespective of whether privately
or publicly owned, who is acting
in civil
capacity under the rules of civil law,
including
through any other person acting in their name
or on their behalf, for purposes relating to their
trade, business, craft or profession;
(
trader means any natural person or any
legal person, irrespective of whether privately
or publicly owned, who is acting, including
through any other person acting in their name
or on their behalf, for purposes relating to
their trade, business, craft or profession;
Endorse the EC initial proposal
Amendment 39 -
Article 3
paragraph 1
point 3
collective interests of consumers means the
interests of a number of consumers
or of data
subjects
as
defined
in
Regulation(EU)2016/679 (General Data
Protection Regulation);
Amendment 52 -
Article 4
paragraph 5
5. The compliance by a qualified entity with the
criteria referred to in paragraph 1 is without
prejudice to the
duty
of the court or
administrative authority to examine whether
the purpose of the qualified entity justifies its
taking action in a specific case in accordance
with
Article 4 and
Article 5(1).
Endorse EC initial proposal
collective interests of consumers means
the interests of a number of consumers;
Article 5
Representative actions for
the protection of the
collective interests of
consumers
5. The compliance by a
qualified entity with the
criteria referred to in
paragraph 1 is without
Endorse EC initial proposal
5. The compliance by a qualified entity with
the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 is
without prejudice to the
right
of the court or
administrative authority to examine whether
the purpose of the qualified entity justifies its
taking action in a specific case in accordance
with Article 5(1).
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prejudice to the
right
of
the
court
or
administrative authority
to examine whether the
purpose of the qualified
entity justifies its taking
action in a specific case in
accordance with Article
5(1).
Article 5
Representative actions for
the protection of the
collective interests of
consumers
(a) an injunction order as
an interim measure for
stopping the practice or, if
the practice has not yet
been carried out but is
imminent, prohibiting the
practices;
N/A.
Amendment 67 -
Article 6
paragraph 4 b
(new)
4 b. In particular, punitive damages, leading
to overcompensation in favour of the claimant
party of the damage suffered, shall be
prohibited. For instance, the
compensation awarded to consumers harmed
collectively shall not exceed the amount owed
by the trader in accordance with the
applicable national or Union law in order to
cover the actual harm suffered by them
individually.
Endorse EC initial proposal
4 b. In particular, punitive damages, leading
to overcompensation in favour of the
claimant party of the damage suffered, shall
be
prohibited.
For
instance,
the
compensation awarded to consumers
harmed collectively shall not exceed the
amount owed by the trader in accordance
with the applicable national or Union law in
order to cover the actual harm suffered by
them individually.
Amendment 56 -
Article 5
paragraph 2
subparagraph 2
point a
(a) an injunction order as an interim measure
for stopping the
illegal
practice or, if the
practice has not yet been carried out but is
imminent, prohibiting the
illegal
practices;
Endorse EC initial proposal
(a) an injunction order as an interim measure
for stopping the practice or, if the practice has
not yet been carried out but is imminent,
prohibiting the practices;
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III. Differences between US and EU collective redress
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IV. Working Paper 1: Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Directive
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 1
Targeted Provisions on the Proposal for a Directive on
Representative Actions for the Protections of the Collective Interests
of Consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Ref.:
Articles 3 (definitions), 5 (representative actions), 6 (redress measures), and 8
(settlements)
of the Proposed Directive (COM/2018/0184 final)
Date:
11 April 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
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This Working Paper provides a targeted analysis on several provisions of the European
Commission s EC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC,
13
hereinafter Collective Redress Directive or CRD . The approach of this
paper is to scrutinize the initial solution tabled by the EC, the views adopted by the European
Parliament (EP) and shed light on the potential benefits or disadvantages for the Single Market
and the right to access to justice for the European citizen.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create a
mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer (Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights),
equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) for the entire spectrum of consumers in the EU, including investors and financial
services users.
Below we lay down the initial, amended texts and the issues identified in relation to Articles 3, 5,
6 and 8 of the Directive.
1.
Defining a consumer organization
as a group
that seeks to protect consumers' interests from
illegal acts or omissions committed by traders
unneccessarily narrows the scope of eligible
organisations without any benefits to the Directive s aim:
a. it incentivizes litigation as an activity or business model, since the purpose of most
consumer organisations is to represent, advocate and protect the interests of their
constituent group, without a focus on illegal acts;
b. it restricts litigation to illegal acts or omissions committed by traders while the
Directive encompasses any infringements of provisions of Union law listed in
Annex I that harm or may harm the collective interests of consumers , see Article
2 (1);
c. in line with pt. a, it excludes from the scope of the Directive the majority of
consumer organisations, general or specialized; and, as such
Article 3
Definitions
it goes against the two principles of granting an effective tool of private enforcement of
collective rights and avoiding creating consumer litigation as a permanent, self-standing
practice.
2.
Defining a trader
as a natural or legal person who acts
in civil capacity under the rules of
civil law
excludes from the scope of the Directive:
a. all providers of goods or services which, under national law, are not endowed with
a
civil capacity,
regardless of their domain of activity;
b. all consumer-related activities in jurisdictions with a dual system of civil law,
divided between
civil
and
commercial
contracts and counterparties.
3.
Defining the material scope
of the Directive
as
Union and national law adopted to protect
consumers
will lead to:
a. divergent interpretation and application of the law between courts of the same
jurisdiction and between Member States;
13
COM/2018/0184 final - 2018/089 (COD).
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b.
exclude from its scope all obligations of traders which
are not specifically
directed at consumer protection but which, if breached, may lead to significant
mass harm situations;
e.g.: the double-cap equity trading volume limit on unregulated markets (OTC, dark pools) is
aimed at preserving market integrity and stability, but adjacently affects investors since, if
breached, it distorts the mechanism of price formation.
Article 5
Representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of
consumers
1. The addition to paragraph (1) of Article 5, read in conjunction with the deletion of Article
4(2), weakens the position of representative organisations against breaches of Union law by
traders and does not serve the purpose of avoiding abusive litigation or ensuring an effective
tool for harmed consumers:
a.
in the field of financial services, the past
years experiences have shown that it
was either ad-hoc established entities or investor-protection organisations
coupled with ad-hoc established entities that have brought collective redress
actions against mass harm practices;
b. the ad-hoc establishment of representative organisations serves as an additional
proof of the good faith of litigation and true objective of consumer protection since
it can occur only when an actual mass harm results in practice;
c. ad-hoc established organisations have served the purpose of representing classes
of consumers that were not represented by other long-established organisations
in the same case, ensuring an effective and exhaustive remedy for all affected
members of the group;
e.g.:
the Fortis Case Settlement
Stichting Fortis Investor Claims;
the Volkswagen AG shares case
Stichting Volkswagen Investor Claims;
e.g.: in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark
to name a few
there are only shareholder or
insurance policyholders associations, but none
dedicated to retail investors (fund investors).
d. ad-hoc established organisations may serve the purpose of defending the
collective interests of the harmed group in those fields of Member States where an
already-existing representative organization is not established;
2. The deletion of paragraph (4) of Article 5 does not serve any purpose:
a. it does not prevent abusive litigation;
b.
it makes the procedure under this Directive ineffective, lengthy and costly since it
separates injunctive orders (relief) from compensatory orders (redress), forcing
representative organisations to first go through the entire procedure of an
injunctive award and then, separately, ask for compensation of consumers,
which
contravenes to the fundamentals of collective litigation and to the sound
administration of justice.
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Article 6
Redress measures
1. The addition of a new paragraph (1a) creates uneven conditions for access to justice on a
cross-border
basis and stimulates forum shopping :
a. if a Member State chooses to allow, at national level, an opt-out system, but the
Directive imposes the individual mandate of consumers harmed from other
Member States (opt-in), it will prove in practice more difficult and less effective to
cover all consumers harmed;
b. if both Member States A and B allow for an opt-out system at national level, but
the action is initiated in Member State A, consumers affected in Member State B
will have a disadvantageous position compared to the conditions set by their own
Member State, thus the Directive
creates a conflict between the levels of
protection at Member State level;
c. imposing uneven levels of access to justice based on the extraneity element goes
against Article 67(4) and Articles 8, 12, 18, and 26(2) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union and Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
d. for those representative organisations that have a cross-border or pan-EU scope
of coverage or representation, these amendments incentivize forum shopping in
those cases governed by special jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation since
it allows differences between opt-in and opt-out systems at Member State level.
2. The deletion of paragraph (2) eliminates the possibility of due and full compensation of
harmed consumers in those cases where the harm, resulting from a similar legal relationship
with the same counterparty, requires a different analysis of the damages. In fact, it stimulates
representative organisations not to choose the mechanism provided by this Directive and try
enforcing the rights of the harmed group via available national procedures or via individual
claims.
3. The deletion of paragraph (3) eliminates the possibility:
a. to obtain collective redress for small claims, constituting an unjustified
discrimination between affected consumers;
b. for the reasons specified in Recital (3), it renders ineffective and useless consumer
protection rights that do not have a high value.
Article 8 Settlements
BETTER FINANCE proposes to add an ADR solution that would be fit for purpose. Consumers,
through representative organisations, must have be able to choose to settle via an out-of-court
procedure to which
the trader must be bound, and with certain safeguards attached:
the ADR mechanism must also provide for an opt-out system, insofar as affected
consumers that are not satisfied with the settlement reached can individually claim and
enforce their rights;
the Settlement Agreement should be subject to a court of law s validation and approval.
Encompassing the mechanism provided under this Directive with an ADR alternative for
consumers would:
eliminate the risk of forum shopping ;
ensure equal and effective protection
of all members of the harmed group, even with opt-in systems provided for judicial proceedings;
foresee cost-efficient and time-economic settlement of cases; make less burdensome the
enforcement of the award.
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V. Working Paper 2: Article 2 of the Directive
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 2
Targeted Provisions on the Proposal for a Directive on
Representative Actions for the Protections of the Collective Interests
of Consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Ref.:
Article 2,
Material Scope of the Directive
(COM/2018/0184 final)
Date:
6 May 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
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This Working Paper provides a targeted analysis on several provisions of the European
Commission s EC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC,
14
hereinafter Collective Redress Directive or CRD . The approach of this
paper is to scrutinize the initial solution tabled by the EC, the views adopted by the European
Parliament (EP) and shed light on the potential benefits or disadvantages for the Single Market
and the right to access to justice for the European citizen.
Certain rules are key on defining a robust and effective mechanism for consumer redress, while
also striking a fair balance between the diverging interests and avoiding abusive litigation.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create a
mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer (Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights),
equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) for the entire spectrum of consumers in the EU, including investors and financial
services users.
Below we lay down the issues identified in relation to Articles 2 of the Directive.
Article 2
Scope
This closed list approach, as referred to in academic literature, has several disadvantages:
The material scope of the Directive is delimited by the first paragraph of Article 2, which refers to
a set of EU law provisions contained in Annex I:
This Directive shall apply to representative actions
brought against infringements by traders of provisions of the Union law listed in Annex I that harm
or may harm the collective interests of consumers
.
First, it is inflexible and:
o
prevents any new cases that appear, and do not strictly fall under one of the
legislative acts listed in Annex I, to be brought under the scope of the Directive and
of EU law, making the mechanism provided in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8to be practically
effective;
o
in order to (rightfully) extend the scope of application of the Directive, it requires
explicit legislative referral in new Directives and Regulations to the provisions of
this Directive or, even worse, it requires an amendment (Article 289
et seq.
TFEU).
Second, it is incomplete,
as
direct investors
(shareholders, bondholders employee
shareholders) are currently
excluded
from the scope of the Directive:
o
by not expressly including the Market Abuse Directive
15
and Regulation
16
in Annex
I, the legal protection offered to consumers at EU level to collectively enforce their
rights is not accorded to direct investors.
o
it creates an unjustified imbalance with the legal protection offered to other,
indirect investors (in funds, insurances, pensions, structured products, banking
products) and consumers in general.
14
COM/2018/0184 final - 2018/089 (COD).
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse
(market abuse directive), OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 179–189.
16
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse
regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives
2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 1–61.
15
Directive 2014/57/EU
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The Capital Markets Union (CMU) Action Plan
17
states that the EU household is at the core of an
integrated and efficient single market for financial services. The initial CMU Action Plan
mentioned:
An exclusion of direct individual investors is all the more incomprehensible as retail investors,
when buying shares or bonds, are normally
acting for purposes which are outside their trade,
business, craft or profession
and by that fall within the definition of consumer provided in Article
3(1) of the Directive.
This target has not been taken into account by the New Deal for Consumers.
20
On the contrary: a
prominent category of consumers is excluded from the scope of the Directive. An EU collective
redress system covering also individual shareholders is a must. If the EU truly wants to deliver on
the Capital Markets Union it needs to restore individual and public confidence in the financial
services market and to enforce legislation in the area of investor protection.
Albeit these ambitious initiatives of the European Commission with the CMU Action Plan and the
New Deal for Consumers, the mechanism under this Directive falls short from providing a
practically efficient and flexible redress procedure to allow all EU consumers to enforce their
rights, especially since a considerable part of them is
still excluded
from the list of Annex I after
the European Parliament first reading.
retail savings
held
directly
or indirectly through asset managers, life assurance companies
and pension funds
are key to unlocking capital markets
;
18
for retail investors saving for the future, greater investor confidence, transparency,
certainty and choice can help to make the right investments
;
19
Therefore, the Council of the EU should include in Annex I the Market Abuse
Directive (MAD2) and the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in order to cover as well
direct investors, such as equity investors, employee shareowners or bondholders.
Europea Co
issio , Co
u i atio
from The Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
E o o i a d So ial Co
ittee a d the Co
ittee of the Regio s: A tio Pla o Buildi g a Capital Markets U io
COM/
/
fi al , herei after CMU A tio Pla .
18
CMU Action Plan, p. 5, emphasis added.
19
Ibid.
20
Europea Co
issio , Co
u i atio fro the Co
issio to the Europea Parlia e t, the Cou il a d the Europea
E o o i a d So ial Co
ittee: A Ne Deal for Co su ers COM/
/
fi al .
17
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VI. Working Paper 3: Aligning the opt-out system with compensation claims
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 3
Targeted Comments on the Proposal for a Directive on
Representative Actions for the Protections of the Collective Interests
of Consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Ref.: Aligning the opt-out system with compensation claims
Date:
9 May 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
25
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This Working Paper provides a targeted analysis on several provisions of the European
Commission s EC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC,
21
hereinafter Collective Redress Directive or CRD . The approach of this
paper is to scrutinize the initial solution tabled by the EC, the views adopted by the European
Parliament (EP) and shed light on the potential benefits or disadvantages for the Single Market
and the right to access to justice for the European citizen.
Certain rules are key on defining a robust and effective mechanism for consumer redress, while
also striking a fair balance between the diverging interests and avoiding abusive litigation.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create a
mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer (Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights),
equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) for the entire spectrum of consumers in the EU, including investors and financial
services users.
Below we lay arguments on how the
opt-out system
can be aligned with
compensation
calculation and distribution,
and also a text proposal for the Directive.
Opt-out system: judicial and ADR-based redress
The opt-out system is the only way to embed the constitutional right of disposition and the
principle of private autonomy of the parties in a judicial action, having the added value to use the
effects of the
express manifestation of will
of the party to its benefit. This is of particular importance
in consumer cases, where the value of claims may be heavily offset by lengthy and costly individual
court actions, or where the lack of resources, knowledge or information act as strong deterrents
for pursuing a right in court.
Rights which cannot be enforced in practice are worthless
22
The right to choose whether or not to be included in a redress action remains intact for each
member of the group. However, exercising this right would inverse the would have the effect from
inclusion to excludsion from a redress action. Each member is free to actively exercise the right of
disposition, reject the class action and individually pursue his rights in court.
In other words,
a collective redress mechanism should not punish the vulnerable position
of consumers.
The current provision of the Directive on the opt-in/out system at national level lays down
(Article 6.1):
[…]
A Member State may require the mandate of the individual
consumers concerned before a declaratory decision is made or
a redress order is issued.
21
22
COM/2018/0184 final - 2018/089 (COD).
European Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a coherent European approach to
collective redress, SEC(2011) 173 fi nal, para 1.1.
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For cross-border cases, the provisions of Article 6.1 would apply mutatis mutandis. However,
Amendment 61 of the JURI Committee adds:
[…]
If a Member State does not require a mandate of the
individual consumer to join the representative action, this
Member State shall nevertheless allow those individuals
[…]
to
participate
[…]
in the event they gave their explicit mandate to join
the representative action
.
This amendment goes against Articles 38 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
and against Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
In order to be effective and fit-for-purpose,
a collective redress mechanism must include all
members of the harmed group by default and from the beginning,
i.e. without requiring the
active consent from the beginning (opt-out). The opt-out system is put in place with respect to the
constitutional right of disposition by offering one or more
opt-out deadlines.
Moreover, any
member of the group that does not consider itself harmed can also choose to
not submit a
compensation claim.
The opt-out mechanism would be available both for judicial and ADR-based redress.
In the judicial form, the first opt-out deadline should be between the formal writ of summons (or
equivalent, depending on the legal order) is submitted and the first scheduled appearance in
court.
The last type of opt-out deadline should be after a judicial decision becomes definitive, but limited
in time (e.g. 6 months) for reasons of legal certainty.
The same argumentation would be applied for ADR mechanisms, as presented below.
The second opt-out deadline can (and should) be included after the decision of the first instance
is pronounced until the expiry of the deadline for appeal
applying
mutatis mutandis
for all other
judicial challenge actions (extraordinary appeal
recours
revision etc).
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Establishment and calculation of compensation
Opt-out systems do not (and should not) award compensation (damages)
in rem,
but for a
determinate or objectively determinable number of claimants, based on the characteristics of the
case.
The actual universe of beneficiaries of a judicial award or ADR settlement can be
determined using strict, objective and commonly agreed criteria, such as: all contracts concerning
type x of goods/services, concluded between the T
0
and T
1
periods, having a certain provision
included, etc.
Real case example
compensation calculation and distribution
In the Fortis case, the parties to the settlement estimated a maximum number of 220,000 affected
consumers by establishing two classes of claimants (persons having
buyer shares
and
holder
shares
, three periods of share acquisition e.g.
21 September 2007 o.o.b. up to and including 7
November 2007 c.o.b.
and share characteristics; the compensation has been established per
share (e.g.
EUR 0.23 (period 1), EUR 0.51 (period 2) and EUR 0.15 (period 3)
and the
settlement agreement provides for additional compensation for particular situations.
In addition, the parties agreed on the distribution procedure for compensation
the Settlement
Amount will be distributed pursuant to the Settlement Distribution Plan
: first, claimants must
submit a claim compensation form to an agreed Claims Administrator - named by the parties
claimants and defendant :
Eligible Shareholders who do not, or not timely, submit a Claim
Form, or whose Claim Form has not been approved, will not be entitled to any compensation”
which will
“determine
each Eligible Shareholder's pro rata share of the Settlement Amount
based upon each Eligible Shareholder's Claim Form and in accordance with this Settlement
Distribution Plan”.
Real case example
safeguards for parties
Defendants: settlement agreements (through ADR mechanisms) or judicial proceedings in
collective redress actions may impose an opt-out cap , meaning that if
a significant part of the
harmed consumers opt-out within a specific deadline, the binding decision will be null and void
for all parties.
This allows sound administration of justice (avoiding conflicting judicial awards) and alleviates
potential litigation booms for the defendant.
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Moreover, it allows collective redress actions with opt-out systems to have an significantly high
accuracy rate, compared to the EU average
23
in the past 20 years of 10% of compensated
consumers.
Claimants (consumers): the compensation decision or settlement is calculated to cover a
determined damage per each claimant and a determined maximum number of claimants,
estimated by the parties, based on the characteristics of the case.
In case the actual
number of approved consumers is higher, an additional settlement
amount determined by the Court of through ADR will be used by the Claims
Administrator to satisfy the claims;
In case the actual number of approved consumers is lower, the parties can either agree on:
o
Instructing the Claims Administrator to redistribute pro-rata the excess amount;
or
o
Deciding that the excess amount is to be returned to the Defendant;
In case the actual number of approved consumers is significantly lower or higher (never
happened in practice),
the court decision or settlement can be amended.
Ample evidence (judicial and ADR case law in Europe) has shown that opt-out
systems for consumer redress have not led to abuses, blackmailing, or abusive
litigation; moreover, there are no irreconcilable features of an opt-out system with
a compensation action. Therefore, the EU must include the opt-out system in the
Collective Redress Directive.
Below, we provide an example text for the amendments that must be included in the
Directive on representative actions for the protection of collective interests of consumers
in
order to create a mechanism that benefits consumers, the European economy and that is
practically useful.
Article 6
Current text
A Member State may
require the mandate of
the individual consumers
concerned
before
a
declaratory decision is
made or a redress order is
issued.
Redress measures
JURI amendments
A Member State
may or may not
require the mandate of the
individual consumers concerned
before a redress order is issued.
BETTER FINANCE amendments
A Member State shall
allow representative
organisations to represent all harmed
consumers concerned without requiring the
individual mandate
before a declaratory
decision or redress order is issued.
(new) 1a. If a Member State
does not require a mandate of
the individual consumer to join
the representative action, this
Member
State
shall
nevertheless
allow
those
individuals who are not
habitually resident in the
Member State where the action
23
(new) 1.a. On the basis of the declaratory
decision or redress order issued, no
compensation may be awarded to consumers
that explicitly decided to be excluded from the
case or that have not explicitly claimed
compensation within a specific timeframe
subject to conditions laid down by the
Member State.
Only large mis-selling of financial scandals included in the calculations.
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occurs, to participate in the
representative action, in the
event they gave their explicit
mandate
to
join
the
representative action within
the applicable time limit.
(new) 1.b. The European Commission, after
consultation with the Member States, shall
lay down through a delegated regulation the
minimum and maximum criteria for claiming
compensation
in
accordance
with
paragraphs 1 and 1.a. above, which Member
States will have the freedom to implement as
necessary in accordance with national law. In
particular, the European Commission will pay
due attention to the necessity to avoid forum
shopping and to allow sufficient safeguards
for consumers who wish to be excluded from
the case, without unduly burdening the
compensation procedure.
(new) 1.c. Member States shall ensure that,
where a number of affected consumers that
exercised the right to be excluded from the
action exceeds a significant part of the total
minimum number of estimated consumers
affected, established in accordance with
Article 6bis, paragraph (1), the binding
decision of the court shall be subject to
judicial review, if the defendant requests so.
(new) Article 6bis Establishment of compensation
1. Member States shall ensure that the
parties, either through judicial or alternative
dispute resolution actions, establish the
compensation amount based on objective and
commonly accepted criteria, which must be
based on the estimated (minimum and
maximum) number of consumers, clearly
distinguishable characteristics of the legal
relationship bringing together the collective
claims and based on quantifiable sources of
information, which shall be subject to judicial
review, except where the one of the parties
does not object to the latter estimation.
2. Where the actual number of compensation
claims submitted, according to the procedure
laid down in Article 6tertiary, is significantly
higher or lower than the estimated total
minimum or maximum number of affected
consumers, the binding decision will be
reviewed or amended.
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(new) Article 6ter Distribution of compensation
1. The parties shall appoint, or the court shall
name, in case the parties do not agree, a
Claims Administrator in charge of accepting
compensation claims, calculating and
distributing compensation amounts as per
the declaratory decision or redress order
issued pursuant to Article 6.
2. Member States shall ensure the
independence of the Claims Administrator
and shall establish legal safeguards
concerning the compensation amounts.
3. The Claims Administrator shall be
custodian of the compensation amount,
submitted by the defendant in accordance
with the declaratory decision or redress
order issues in accordance with Article 6.
4. Claimants shall be provided with an
adequate and specific deadline for submitting
compensation claims. Exceeding the deadline
will not affect the binding force of the
declaratory decision or redress order
towards a concerned consumer but will
exclude the latter from the right to be
awarded compensation as per the
declaratory decision or redress order issued
in accordance with Article 6.
(new) Article 6tetra Conflict resolution
1. Any conflicts arising from the procedure
established in Article 6ter above, between the
claimants or the defendant and the Claims
Administrator, shall be subject to judicial
review.
2. Member States shall ensure that the
decision issued in accordance with
paragraph 1 herein will be final and binding.
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VII. Working Paper 4: Definition of consumers
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 4
Targeted Comments on the Proposal for a Directive on
Representative Actions for the Protections of the Collective Interests
of Consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Ref.: Definition of consumers
Date:
30 May 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
32
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This Working Paper provides a targeted analysis on several provisions of the European
Commission s EC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC,
24
hereinafter Collective Redress Directive or CRD . Certain rules are key
on defining a robust and effective mechanism for consumer redress, while also striking a fair
balance between the diverging interests and avoiding abusive litigation.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create a
mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer (Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights),
equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) for the entire spectrum of consumers in the EU, including investors and financial
services users.
Below we lay arguments explaining why financial services users are the most vulnerable category
of
consumers.
Financial services users as consumers
Article 3(1)
The purpose of the collective redress mechanism is to serve EU citizens in their capacity as
consumers on a cross-sectorial and cross-border basis. However, there have been debates on
whether financial services users, such as investors, shareowners, bondholders, life insurance
policy holders etc., qualify as consumers or not.
The current text of Directive contains, in Article 3(1), the definition of a consumer, specifying:
(1)
‘consumer’ means any natural person who is acting for purposes
which are outside their trade, business, craft or profession;
This definition follows the line of other EU consumer protection acts
25
and revolves around the
nature and scope of a contract in qualifying a person as a consumer. Albeit the EU financial
framework uses a different, specific, legal terminology for qualifying the non-professional
counterparties
individual investors, life insurance policy holders, retail clients, savers
the
latter are no less consumers than air passengers, for instance.
This finding is based on the (I.)
rationale of consumer protection law,
the (II.)
nature
and (III.)
purpose
of consumer contracts, the (IV.)
characteristics of financial services or products
and the
(V.) need to acknowledge the
equivalence of terminology,
elaborated below.
24
25
COM/2018/0184 final - 2018/089 (COD).
See Article 3(12) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, OJ L345/1; Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32; Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29–34; Article 3(a) Directive 2008/48/CE of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133/66.
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I.
Rationale of consumer protection
The reasoning starts from the premise that consumer protection law has a derogatory nature (lex
specialis)
from common law due to the unequal position of consumers in legal relationships with
traders. The unequal position is in turn explained by several factors affecting consumers: (i) lack
of specific knowledge; (ii) the lack of resources, financial and material; (iii) lack of experience in a
sector of activity; and, many times, (iv) the reduced value (monetary or patrimonial) of the legal
relationships. These factors trigger two practical effects:
First, a significant
imbalance
in the negotiation power
between the consumer and
trader;
Second, but most important,
the consumer s
passive behaviour.
These factors are used to justify the need for extra protection of consumers, the case at hand being
an attractive, flexible and practically efficient redress mechanism. However, the rationale goes
even beyond the need to protect consumers, as the Working Group on Parties of UNIDROIT and
the European Law Institute ELI obliterates the concept of consumer for collective redress and
acknowledges the necessity to assess and adjudicate jointly cases where: such procedure would
make dispute resolution more efficient; all claims arise from the save event or legal relationship;
and the claims are similar.
Notwithstanding the following reasoning, the inclusion of financial services users under the scope
of a pan-EU collective redress mechanism should not, by principle, keep account of whether the
former qualify or not as consumers. Nevertheless, the following reasoning will assume that
collective redress is only possible for consumers.
II.
Nature of a contract
acting outside a trade or profession
EU law qualifies a party to a contract as a consumer based on the context and capacity in which
he or she concludes the contract (nature), finding which was validated by the Court of Justice of
the EU
26
CJEU and by Advocate-General
Tanchev in a recent preliminary reference proceeding
before the CJEU.
27
This explicit criterion leaves small room for interpretation, referring only to the
objective situation
of a person, and is not anchored in his or her behaviour, level of knowledge,
expertise or degree of risks assumed.
28
In other words, the CJEU explained that the nature of the contract must mean that the legal
relationship for the consumer arises
in the course of activities outside of a trade, business or
profession
,
29
since the assessment must take into consideration the objective nature of the
concept of consumer.
30
The CJEU upheld this reasoning in interpreting the same definition of a consumer in different
provisions of EU law relating to consumers or consumer contracts.
31
It is therefore evident that
the construction
acting for purposes outside his trade or profession
creates an absolute
assumption (juris
et de jure)
that a person will qualify as a consumer whenever he or she concludes
Case C-375/13
Harald Kolassa
v
Barclays Bank plc,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:37, para 23.
Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C-208/18
Petruchova
v
FIBO,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:314, para 46.
28
See Ibid, para 47; see also Case C-498/16
Maximillian Schrems
v
Facebook Ireland Ltd,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:37, para 39; Order of
the Court in Case C-74/15
Tarcau
v
Intesa Sanpaolo,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:772, para 23.
29
Case C-74/15
Tarcau
v
Intesa Sanpaolo
(n 5) para 27 ; see also Case C-534/15
Dumitras vs BRD Groupe Societe Generale,
ECLI:EU:2016:700, para 30.
30
Case C-110/14
Horatiu Ovidiu Costea
v
SC Volksbank Romania,
EU:C:2015:538, para 21.
31
Such as the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EC), the Rome I Regulation (1215/2012), or the Brussels I Convention/Regulation
(593/2008)
see also Case C-348/14
Maria Bucura
v
Bancpost,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:447;
27
26
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a contract with a professional or trader in a context that is not related to the person s trade or
profession.
Although, according to the settled case law of the CJEU, the above explanations are sufficient to
determine in abstract when is a party to a contract a consumer, below we refer to additional
arguments
de lege ferenda
to justify why financial services users are consumers and maintain this
status.
III.
Purpose of the contract
obtaining a profit
As per the definition in Article 3(1) of the proposed Directive, one must analyse also the purpose
of consumer contracts. From the traders point of view, the purpose of concluding a contract is
undoubtedly to obtain a profit. Conversely, from a consumer perspective, although the immediate
purpose (causa
proxima)
is that of consumption, on the short- or long-term, depending on the
nature of the product or service, the indirect purpose of a contract (causa
remota)
is also that of
achieving a profit.
This is explained by the general theory of commerce, by which a trade is no
longer rational if a contracting party could procure the good or service on its own account at a
lower cost of resources than that charged by the seller of the good or service.
If one were to make a distinction of contracts by their intended purpose, these would be divided
into gratifications (donations, wills, free leases) and beneficial contracts, where both parties aim
to obtain a patrimonial benefit in exchange of performing an obligation.
In general, gratification contracts are not only subject to different legal branches (such as
inheritance law), but the rationale behind consumer law no longer applies as the consumer is by
default gratified and does not incur the performance of any obligation he or she is not able to
negotiate or assume.
Therefore, it must be concluded at this point that
a consumer always pursues obtaining a profit
as well by concluding a contract with a trader, in addition or adjacently to the purpose of
consumption. As such, in financial services and capital markets,
retail investors must qualify as
consumers
in spite of the fact that they pursue a speculative purpose or not.
IV.
Characteristics of financial products or services
BETTER FINANCE contends that financial services users are one of the most vulnerable categories
of consumers, due to the exceptional nature and characteristics of financial services and products.
We don’t expect people to design and build their own cars.
We do it for them, in a
way that makes the technology so transparent that a 16-year-old can use it. The
same goes for computers and all of the other important instruments of daily life. Why
is saving and dissaving
[…]
so “special” that it requires us to educate
ourselves
and protect ourselves from fraud and misinformation
in a field for which most of
us have no aptitude?
32
Capital markets structures and investment products have grown so much in complexity that
bare mathematical or financial knowledge are by far insufficient as to allow individuals to
Foreword by Laurence B. Siegel for a Research Paper on Financial Education and Consumer Protection, see Research
Fou datio of the CFA I stitute, Life- y le I esti g: Fi a ial Edu atio a d Co su er Prote tio , editors Laure e B. Siegel,
Zvi Bodie, Laura Stanton, (2012), vii,
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/book/rf-publication/2012/rf-v2012-n3-
full-pdf.ashx.
32
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make an informed decision, consider risks and assume obligations on an equal position as
professionals. Therefore, why they not benefit of a special protection as all other consumers?
What is more, surveys researching the level of basic financial literacy of the adult population
in the EU have shown that less than half (49.86%), on average, have the correct answer to at
least three out of four simple questions relating to finance: inflation, numeracy, risk
diversification and compounding.
34
Academic literature even submits that, out of the three categories of consumers
based on the
abstract type of product purchased
financial services users have the weakest position, since
investment products:
Can neither be tested after purchase
experience goods
;
Nor can
they be verified beforehand
searchable goods
.
33
It is even worse, considering that academics and researchers in behavioral finance observed
that retail investors tend to underestimate risks, emphasize positive returns or overestimate
their ability to predict returns, even apply
hyperbolic discounting of future costs
.
35
It follows that it is crucial that retail investors place their confidence in the investment advice
received and in the best execution of financial services providers for the purpose of investing,
36
which they must receive additional protection and accessible conditions for redress than other
investors, in general.
Therefore, the abovementioned considerations all the more strengthen the reasons to qualify
retail financial services users as consumers, irrespective of the specific terminology used to
describe the objective capacity in a contract (creditor, debtor, guarantor, investor, saver,
insured etc).
V.
Equivalence of terminology
The arguments presented above (I-IV) explain why retail financial services users must be
considered a consumer on the basis of its objective and subjective conditions. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid divergent interpretation and application of the law, the EU co-legislators must
acknowledge the equivalence of the specific terminology used in EU consumer protection law and
EU financial regulation. Based on a short query on the CJEU website, 62% of most recent
preliminary references in the category consumer protection concern financial services, capital
markets or financial institutions only.
The issue at stake is
that MiFID II makes a distinction between professional and retail clients of
investment services providers. Although there is no legally binding connection or reference
between what MiFID considers retail and what consumer protection law considers consumers
,
terminology should not impede qualification as the assessment must be made on the
objective
nature and purpose,
not on wording.
33
David Merenda,
Prote tio of Retail I estors De e er
Prague La Worki g Papers Series
/III/ , p. .
O
al ulatio s ased o Leora Klapper, A a aria Lusardi, Peter a Oudeheusde , Fi a ial Litera y Arou d the World:
Insights from the Standard & Poor's Ratings Services -
Glo al Fi a ial Litera y Sur ey
.
35
See Merenda (n 10) p. 4.
36
See Niamh Moloney,
How to Protect Investors
(2010) Cambridge University Press, p. 85.
34
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VIII. Working Paper 5: Private International Law applicable to Collective
Redress cases
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 5
Public International Law applicable to Collective Redress
Actions:
Solutions for Multiple-law Cases
Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of
consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Date:
1 July 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
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INTRODUCTION
Regulation Rome I
37
already
provides the applicable law in legal relationships with a cross-border
(extraneity) element, distinguishing between 5 categories of referral rules:
a) Overriding mandatory provisions
Article 9
b) Public policy of the forum
Article 21
According to Article 9 of the Regulation, provisions of national substantive law safeguarding
public interests derogate from the Regulation and apply to all legal relationships falling under
their scope, eliminating by default the conflict of laws.
Article 21 of the Regulation provides that the applicable law, determined pursuant to the referral
rules under the Regulation, may be set aside if it creates a conflict with other provisions of public
policy (ordre
public
of the laws of the motioned court s Member State.
The parties to a contract can decide the applicable law to their
contractual
relationship. This
possibility is not accorded to disputes arising from tort (responsabilité
civile delictuelle).
d) Absence of choice
Article 4
c) General rule
freedom of choice
Article 3
The referral rules of Article 4 of the Regulation are a residual category, as these would apply the
last if any of the rules in Articles 3, 9, 21, or in the special categories (below) would not be incident.
e) Special categories
Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8
The special categories of referral rules are derogatory only from Article 3 and provide a solution
to conflicts of law arising from carriage, insurance, consumer and individual employment
contracts. Of relevance are those of Article 6 (consumer
contracts)
by which freedom of choice
(Article 3) is still granted, provided that it does not deprive the consumer of mandatory provisions
prescribed by the applicable law in absence of a consensual choice.
LEGAL ISSUE
Regulation Rome I is not applicable for disputes arising from EU or Commission Regulations
(Levels 1 and 2) since these are directly applicable across jurisdictions. In addition, there would
be no conflicts if the court would apply overriding mandatory provisions (Article 9) or the public
policy of the forum (Article 21).
However, when legal relationships would fall under the scope of a Directive
even of maximum
harmonisation
it may be that the motioned court must apply different laws (lato
sensu
Article 12) for the same group of affected consumers and in the same case, in particular for
establishing liability and compensation.
Therefore, BETTER FINANCE proposes principle-based solutions for these potential conflicts
based on the type of diverging provisions
on liability and on compensation
under two guiding
principles.
37
Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to
contractual obligations, OJ L 177/6.
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GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Principle 1. Duty of the representative organisation to act in the best interest of sound
administration of justice
The representative organisation is held to act of such nature as to reduce conflicts of applicable
laws and not unnecessarily burden the court or the defendant by way of forum choice. If possible,
the representative organisation must coordinate its action with the rules of the Rome I Regulation
and that of Brussels Ia Regulation.
If laws of different jurisdictions would apply in the same collective action, the representative
organisation has an additional duty of care and must take all necessary steps to ensure that
divided action would not better serve the purposes of consumers.
In all cases where multiple laws would apply to different sub-groups of consumers in the same
collective redress action, the representative organisation should attempt to settle the case in
agreement with the trader or through alternative dispute resolution. As settlements, in general,
are flexible, they result with less divergencies and conflicts than would arise through judicial
resolution. The representative action must demonstrate it undertook the necessary efforts and
acted in good faith to settle with the trader.
If settlement with the trader cannot be reached, the representative organisation must motion the
court in a jurisdiction whose law would govern the majority of cases, when allowed by virtue of
Brussels Ia Regulation.
Principle 2. Different applicable laws DO NOT IMPEDE collective redress
38
Notwithstanding the principles set out above, BETTER FINANCE firmly suggests clarifying, by
virtue of Recitals or provisions in the Directive, that multiple applicable laws on the substance of
the same collective redress action
do not impede collective redress.
Even in the worst of
scenarios, for example where a motioned court would need to apply 28 different laws of Member
States, it was
intrinsic to the Rome Convention
and to the
Rome I Regulation
that
a judge
appointed
by the laws of a Member State
is fully competent and able
to properly rule and apply any and all
incident laws by virtue of public international law.
This situation can and has already occurred in practice, even where all consumers were residents
of the forum, involving no cross-border element. Therefore, in any way it
should not be a reason
to stay and dismiss collective claims for consumers.
However, in order to alleviate potential difficulties for motioned courts, BETTER FINANCE
proposes several
solutions
for the purpose of this Directive. These rules would be derogatory from
Rome I Regulation and would be strictly interpreted for the scope of the Collective Redress action.
38
See Rule X31 of the UNIDROIT-European Law Institute Working Paper on Transnational Principles to European Rules of Civil
Procedure -
https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Projects/Unidroit_Materials/Trier_2018/WG_Parties_-
_Draft_on_Collective_Redress.pdf.
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SOLUTIONS
Solution 1.
Motioned court’s assessment of the optimal solution
From the outset, the motioned court should rule on its competence and then on the applicable
law(s). If the motioned court should find that the action at hand represents a multiple-law case, it
should have the possibility:
to continue proceedings normally, as it would with an individual claim; or
to decide on the application of one or the other of Solutions 2 and 3.
The principle 2 above
multiple-law cases do not impede collective redress
must have
precedence, therefore Solutions 2 and 3 below must only be applied in exceptional circumstances.
Solution 2. Separation of proceedings into sub-groups before establishment of liability
If the motioned court were to find that consumers would suffer a significant detriment by
continuing proceedings as in a single-law case, pursuant to Solution 1 above, the it must analyse
the diverging laws and decide:
whether the potentially divergent judgments may arise from the conditions to establish
liability, and the degree of it; or
whether the potentially divergent judgment may arise from the conditions to calculate
and distribute compensation (damages).
In assessing this choice, the motioned court must hold account of the best interests of consumers,
which under the scope of this Directive would be that of collective adjudication and enforcement
of claims. Therefore, the judge should proceed with any of Solutions 2 or 3 below only where it
can justify that consumers would suffer a significant detriment by continuing the proceedings as
in a single-law case.
In the first scenario, the court must separate into sub-groups by applicable law from the outset
and continue proceedings. If the second scenario is applicable, the judge must apply Solution 3
below.
Solution 3. Separation of proceedings into sub-groups before establishment of compensation
The purpose of the harmonised mechanism under the Collective Redress Directive is to ensure
that the assessment and adjudication of a legal dispute is, to the largest extent possible, unitary
for all affected consumers in a particular case of mis-selling.
Therefore, the rule should be that, where possible, the case must be heard and resolved jointly as
long as possible. The judge should not be able to decide the division into sub-groups before
establishment of liability in a situation where criteria for the latter are common in all applicable
laws and the solutions do not diverge.
Under Solution 3, the scenario is that the judge can establish the same type and degree of liability
of the trader concerning all consumers based on the different applicable laws pursuant to Rome I
Regulation.
However, where rules on compensation (damages) differ to a sufficient degree that a unitary
judgment would no longer be optimal or serve the purpose of sound administration of justice, the
motioned court should be allowed to stay proceedings and separate into sub-groups by the
applicable law.
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This Solution 3 would be equivalent to
declaratory binding judgments,
by which a court establishes
only the illegal nature of a practice and the liability of the trader, being at the choice of consumers
whether to continue with the same court in assessing damages with the same court or with a
different court.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to find the optimal solutions to make the Collective Redress Directive
work in practice, align it with the different procedural laws of Member States and safeguard
consumer interests, sound administration of justice, whilst also taking into account the diversity
of legal traditions that define an EU for all Europeans.
Therefore, the ultimate purpose is to keep the Directive alive and find the compromises that
would align the different interests of Member States with the purpose of ensuring a collective
redress mechanism for consumers.
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create
a mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer and investor protection (Art. 38
and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), and equal conditions for access to
justice (Art. 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) for the entire
spectrum of consumers in the EU.
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IX. Working Paper 6: Consumer Protection provisions in key EU Financial
law
BETTER FINANCE Working Paper 6
Consumer Protection Provisions in Key EU Financial Legislation
Instruments
(2018/0089 COD)
Ref.: Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective
interests of consumers
Date:
24 June 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
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This Working Paper provides a targeted analysis on all the provisions contained in the EU financial
legislation instruments listed in Annex I of the Directive that refer to consumer protection rights.
The analysed instruments are:
1. Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services (OJ L 271,
9.10.2002, p. 16).
2. Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L 133,
22.5.2008, p. 66).
3. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on
the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302,
17.11.2009, p. 32–96).
4. Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing Regulation
(EC) No 2560/2001 (OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11–18).
5. Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September
2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic
money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing
Directive 2000/46/EC (OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7–17).
6. Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency
II) (OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1–155): Articles 183, 184, 185 and186.
7. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174,
1.7.2011, p. 1–73).
8. Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2013 on European venture capital funds (OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 1–17).
9. Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds (OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 18–38).
10. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive
2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349–496).
11. Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on
the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and
access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214): Articles 3 to
18 and Article 20(2).
12. Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based
investment products (PRIIPs) (OJ L 352, 9.12.2014, p. 1–23).
13. Regulation (EU) 2015/760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015
on European long-term investment funds (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 98
121).
14. Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC,
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing
Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35–127).
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15. Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016
on insurance distribution (recast) (OJ L 26, 2.2.2016, p. 19–59).
16. Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December
2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement
provision (IORPs) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37–85).
17. Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC (OJ L 168,
30.6.2017, p. 12–82).
18. Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2017 on money market funds (OJ L 169, 30.6.2017, p. 8–45).
Consumer protection provisions contained in key EU financial legislation
instruments
The purpose of this paper is to show: first, that almost 40% of the legislative instruments
identified by the Commission in the field of consumer protection concern financial services and,
second, to show precisely which and how many provisions from each of these instruments have
rights addressed or benefiting retail financial services users.
Important note: All the below-listed provisions are addressed directly the relationship between
consumers and traders (horizontal rules). However, it is of utmost importance to note that just
a few of the EU consumer protection provisions are directly addressed to consumers, as the vast
majority are issued through vertical rules (concerning the legal relationship between a national
competent authority and a trader). As such, all those latter rules still have the aim to protect
investors, e.g. minimum capital requirements or organisational obligations to avoid conflicts of
interests, and many of them are to be found in the financial services contract, Prospectus, or
other documents concerning the clients. In addition, most consumer protection rules in capital
markets are enshrined in the subsidiary (level 2) legislation.
Therefore, eve if a provisio does ot e plicitl state that the co su er has the right to… , it
will still have the vocation of protecting the consumer and conferring him indirect rights. As
such, we give a couple of examples in the table below.
EU financial
regulation works through the Lamfalussy process, by which the general
principles and main policy lines are drawn by the co-legislators through Directives and
Regulations Level
legislation –
adopted via Article 289 TFEU), and the acts laying
down the details (delegated or
implementing acts
constitute Level legislation, being
adopted by the EU Commission on the basis of Article 291 TFEU.
Therefore, the main consumer protection rights are listed below. Nevertheless, an entire
scheme of subsequent rights were established and are enforceable by virtue of Level 2
legislation.
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Name of piece of
legislation
Solvency II: Directive
2009/138/EC
Payment accounts
directive: Directive
2014/92/EU
MMF Regulation:
Regulation (EU)
2017/1131
Horizontal rules (industry
consumers)
Article 183 (1)
Article 184 paras (1) to (7)
Article 186(1)
Article 4 paras (1) to (7)
Article 5 paras (1) to (5)
Article 6 (1) and (2)
Article 7 (1) to (4)
Article 8
Article 9
Article 10 (1) to (6)
Article 11 (1) and (2)
Article 12 (1) to (4)
Article 13 (1) to (3)
Article 14 (1) and (2)
Article 15
Article 16 (1) to (4), (6), (7), (9), (10)
Article 17 (1) to (8)
Article 18 (1) to (4)
Article 20
Article 9
Article 6
Article 7
Article 10
Article 27
Article 39
Article 48
Article 50
Article 56
Article 34, paras 1, (a)(i); (b)(i)
Article 36 (1) to (5)
Article 14. (2)
Article 19 (3)
Article 23 (1)
Article 5 (3) (d). (i), (ii) and (iii)
Article 5 (8)
Article 9 (1) to (3)
Article 7 (b), (f), (g)
Article 9, (4)
Article 13 (1)
Art 7 (b), (f)
Article 9 (1)
Article 13 (1), a) to b)
Vertical rules (Member State
industry)
AIFMD: Directive
2011/61/EU on
Alternative Investment
Fund Managers
Credit transfers
regulation: Regulation
(EU) No 260/2012
EuVECA: Regulation (EU)
No 345/2013 European
venturecapital funds
EuSEF: Regulation (EU)
No 346/2013 on
Article 12 (d)
Article 11 (1), (2)
Article 12, para 1, (9)
Article 18 (3)
Article 20 (1)
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European social
entrepreneurship funds
Article 13(2)
Article 14
Article 19
Article 20
Article 22
Article 24
Article 25
Article 30
Article 32
Article 44
Article 45
Article 46
Article 48, para (1), point b)
Para (2), point b)
Para (3), point b)
Article 50
Article 63
Articles 68 to 82
Articles 84 to 89
Article 3(1)
Article 4
Articles 6 to 8
UCITS Directive: Directive
2009/65/EC relating to
undertakings for
collective investment in
transferable securities
(UCITS)
Cross-border payments:
Regulation (EC) No
924/2009 on cross-
border payments in the
Community
E-money Institutions:
Directive 2009/110/EC
on the taking up, pursuit
and prudential
supervision of the
business of electronic
money institutions
MiFID II: Directive
2014/65/EU on markets
in financial instruments
PRIIPs: Regulation (EU)
1286/2014on key
information documents
for packaged retail and
insurance-based
investment products
IDD: Directive (EU)
2016/97 on insurance
distribution (recast)
Prospectus Regulation:
Regulation (EU)
2017/1129 on the
prospectus to be
published when securities
Article 3(3)
Article 6(2)
Main investor protection rules
Article 23
Articles 24-30
Article 5
Article 6 (1), (4)
(6)
Article 7(1)
Article 9
Article 13 (1), (3) and (4)
Article 14 (1), (2)
Article 19
Article 14
Article 15
Articles 17-24
Articles 27-30
Articles 4-9
Article 11
Article 18
Article 21
Article 22
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are offered to the public
or admitted to trading on
a regulated market
Directive concerning the
distance marketing of
consumer financial
services and amending
Council Directive
90/619/EEC and
Directives 97/7/EC and
98/27/EC
Art 4 (2)
Art 6 (1)
Art 7 (2)
Art 8
Art 9
Art 10 (2), (3)
Art 11
Art 12
Art 13
Art 15
Art 17
Art 3
Art 5
Art 7 51), (3), (4)
Art 10 (1), (3)
ELTIF: Regulation
2015/760 on European
long-term investment
funds
Directive 2015/2366 on
payment services in the
internal market
IORP II: Directive (EU)
2016/2341 on the
activities and supervision
of institutions for
occupational retirement
provision
Art 14
Art 18 (2), c, e. (4), (5), (6) a & b
Art 19 (2), (4)
Art 20 (2)
Art 21 (1), (2)
Art 22 (1)
Art 23 (1), (2), (3) c, 4, 6
ART 25 (1), (2)
ART 26 (1)
ART 28
ART 29 (2), (3), (4), (5)
ART 30
Art 46
Art 47
Art 48
Art 56
Art 57
Art 58 (1), (2)
Art 89 (1)
Article 19
Article 20
Article 21
Article 22
Article 23
Article 25
Article 30
Articles 36-44
Art 5 , (1), d & (5), b
Art 24 (2), (3), (4)
Art 45
Art 58 (3)
Art 64 (1)
Art 76 (1), (4)
Art 87 (3)
Art 97
Table source:
BETTER FINANCE own assessment
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Additional information on the three key legislative instruments proposed by BETTER
FINANCE to be included in the material scope of coverage of the collective redress
Directive:
1. Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April
2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), OJ L 173,
12.6.2014,
2. Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014.
3. PEPP Regulation: Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a pan-European personal pension product (PEPP)
2014/0143/COD
Horizontal rules (industry
consumers)
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Articles 4-12
Article 14
Article 15
Articles 17-21
Article 4
Article 10
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19
Article 20
Articles 22-39
Articles 41-60
Name of piece of
legislation
Market Abuse Directive
(II): Directive
2014/57/EU on criminal
sanctions for market
abuse
Market Abuse Regulation:
Regulation (EU)
596/2014 on market
abuse
Vertical rules (Member State
industry)
PEPP Regulation (not
yet
in force)
2017/0143/COD
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X. Collective Redress Slide Presentation
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XI. EU Competence, Legal Basis and Subsidiarity
Accompanying document
EU COMPETENCE, LEGAL BASIS AND SUBSIDIARITY
Ref.: Proposal for a Directive on Representative Actions for the Protections of the
Collective Interests of Consumers
(2018/0089 COD)
Date:
15 May 2019
BETTER FINANCE, the European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users, is the public
interest non-governmental organisation advocating and defending the interests of European citizens
as financial services users at the European level to lawmakers and the public in order to promote
research, information and training on investments, savings and personal finances. It is the one and
only European-level organisation solely dedicated to the representation of individual investors,
savers and other financial services users.
BETTER FINANCE acts as an independent financial expertise and advocacy centre to the direct
benefit of European financial services users. Since the BETTER FINANCE constituency includes
individual and small shareholders, fund and retail investors, savers, pension fund participants, life
insurance policy holders, borrowers, and other stakeholders who are independent from the financial
industry, it has the best interests of all European citizens at heart. As such its activities are supported
by the European Union since 2012.
Contact:
Stefan Voicu,
[email protected]
Christiane Hölz,
[email protected]
Aleksandra Maczynska,
[email protected]
Guillaume Prache,
[email protected]
The most relevant sector concerning observed mass claims/issues is the
financial services sector
.
39
European Commission, Directorate-Ge
eral for Health a d Co su ers, Study Regardi g the Pro le s Fa ed y Co su ers
in Obtaining Redress for Infringements of Consumer Protection Legislation, and the Economic Consequences of such Problems:
Fi al Report , part I
August
, p. .
39
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This paper provides a targeted analysis
on the
choice of legal instrument
of the Commission
the European
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC,
40
hereinafter Collective Redress Directive . Certain rules are key on
defining a robust and effective mechanism for consumer redress, while also striking a fair balance
between diverging interests and avoiding abusive litigation.
and its
compatibility with the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU TFEU regarding
The Collective Redress Directive must reflect the EU innovative approach and create a
mechanism that ensures a high level of consumer (Art. 38 Charter of Fundamental Rights),
equal conditions for access to justice (Art. 67 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) for the entire spectrum of consumers in the EU, including investors and financial
services users.
This paper analyses the issues of (i)
shared competences,
(ii)
harmonization of laws
(Art.
114), and aspects related to (iii) judicial cooperation in civil matters.
Shared competence of the EU and Member States
The EU is competent to legislate in the field of consumer protection by virtue of Article 4.2(f) read
in conjunction with Article 2.2 TFEU and has already exercised this attribute in the sub-field of
consumer protection rights enforcement with the first Injunctions Directive.
41
To obtain competence, the provisions of Article 169.1 TFEU must be observed, according to which
the EU
must contribute
to promote the right of EU citizens to safeguard their interests.
42
This
will be achieved through the harmonization (approximation) of laws instrument provided in
Article 114 TFEU.
Although the European Commission s EC proposal also touches on
judicial procedure aspects,
it is by the objective pursued that an EU action falls within a certain policy area or not,
43
which
will delimit the
EU from Member States exclusive competence.
Objectives
The purpose of the Injunctions Directives and of the Directive on representative actions for the
protection of the collective interests of consumers Collective Redress Directive is to complete
the Internal Market by adding a necessary tool for citizens to enforce their rights, accorded by EU
law, according to the same conditions across the EU.
An Internal Market without barriers to the free movement of citizens, services, goods and capital
encompasses substantive rights and a corresponding coercive attribute for the addressees. Either
through directives or through regulations, consumers benefit of numerous rights in a large sample
COM/2018/0184 final - 2018/089 (COD).
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of
consumers' interests, OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 51–55.
42
Arti le
. TFEU pro ides:
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer
protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to
promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests
.
43
See C-720/112
Pringle v Ireland,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para 53; C-62/17
Gauweiler and others
v
Bundestag,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 46.
41
40
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of fields, including financial services, which must be enforceable since the coercive attribute is
intrinsically tied to the substantive right.
Therefore, even if the Collective Redress Directive is tangent to other areas of law, its core purpose
is to regulate and ensure a high level of consumer protection, which is in line with the mandate
accorded to the Union by the Treaty (TFEU).
According to Article 169.1 TFEU, the EU shall contribute to promoting certain rights to consumers
to ensure that they can organise themselves to safeguard their interests. The CJEU has
consistently endorsed the interpretation that
the existence of a given power implies the existence
of any other power that is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the former
44
throughout its case
law.
45
The meaning of Article
. TFEU, concerning the right of EU consumers
to organise
themselves in order to safeguard their interests
, includes the right to associate
in view of private
enforcement, either through judicial or out-of-court mechanisms.
Subject to the subsidiarity and proportionality test,
the EU is therefore competent to legislate
measures necessary to attain its mandate of
promoting the interests of consumers and ensuring a
high level of consumer protection
, which is also required by virtue of Article
of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU.
Subsidiarity
The EU is competent to take the necessary action in the field of consumer protection however
only where it is demonstrated that, because of the scale and effects of the matter, the objectives
pursued could not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States on their own.
46
Up to now, action at Member State level did not achieve the purpose of ensuring a pan-EU
mechanism for private enforcement of consumer rights, not even do similar systems exist at
national level. The EC notice highly divergent and unequal conditions for consumer redress at
national level as of 2008,
47
which it tried to level through soft law (recommendations) in 2013.
48
However, the 2018 review on the implementation of the recommendations on collective redress
states that only one in four Member States attempted at implementing
the same basic principles ,
and even in those cases the reforms have not always followed the EC s recommendations.
49
What is more, in nine EU jurisdictions there is no form of collective redress at all. Consumers have
to rely on traditional procedural law instruments. Also
the European Parliament s EP report of
Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca,
EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials
(6
th
ed) 2017, 76.
See case 8/55
Federation Charbonniere de Belgique
v
High Authority
[1976] ECR 245; Cases 281, 283-285 and 287/85
Germany
v
Commission
[1987] ECR 3023; Case 176/03
Commission
v
Council
[2005] ECR I-7879; Case T-240/04
French Republic
v
Commission
[2007] ECR II-4035; Case T-143/06
MTZ Polyfilms Ltd
v
Council
[2009] ECR II-4133.
46
Article
. of the Treaty o Europea U io
TEU .
47
Europea Co
issio , Gree Paper o Co su er Colle ti e Redress , Brussels, . .
, COM
fi al, paras
and 12; see also European Commission, Directorate-Ge
eral for Health a d Co su ers, Study
Regarding the Problems Faced
by Consumers in Obtaining Redress for Infringements of Consumer Protection Legislation, and the Economic Consequences of
su h Pro le s: Fi al Report , part I
August
, p. .
48
Europea
Co
issio , Co
issio Re o
e dation
of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law
(2013/396/EU), OJ L 201/60 of 26.7.2013.
49
Europea Co
issio , Report from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic
and Social Committee on the Implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted
u der U io La , Brussels, . .
, COM
fi al; see also Christopher Hodges, Stefaa Voet, Deli eri g Colle ti e
Redress i Markets: Ne Te h ologies
The Fou datio of La
, Justice and Society, Policy Brief, page 7.
45
44
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On injunctive actions, the 2008 and 2018 reports of the EC highlight the high costs and lengthiness
of traditional legal proceedings, which make it difficult and unattractive for consumers to pursue,
especially in scattered or small-claim cases. Moreover, between 2008 and 2012, only 1.2% of
consumer enforcement actions had extraneity elements, which shows the highly deterrent effect
of the Injunctions Directive s provisions on cross-border
cases.
51
In 2008, ten times more cases
had a cross-border element,
52
which shows that in 90% of the cases action is not pursued. In the
context of increasing cross-border activity due to the elimination of barriers to trade within the
single market and expansion of the EU, the aforementioned rates show that it is as if a pan-EU
mechanism does not exist.
On compensatory claims, only 12 out of the 28 Member States provide the possibility to request
damages for infringements of law (incl. EU law) collectively, on behalf of consumers. What is
worse, in four Member States, collective enforcement of consumer rights was not possible due to
the absence of compensatory relief schemes under national law .
53
October 2018
50
stresses
the strong need for a binding European instrument concerning
collective redress for consumer issues.
Considering that the need to harmonize consumer private enforcement rules at EU level has been
recognized by community institutions and Member States at least for 23 years (since February
1996),
54
when the EU had only a half of its actual components,
action is
not only
better placed,
but
absolutely necessary to be taken at EU level,
fulfilling the first requirement set by the
Treaties under the principle of subsidiarity.
The purpose of the EU is to create an integrated single market and to increase cross-border
commerce and consumer engagement. Interconnected trade however also entails interconnected
negative effects of (Union) law infringements. An investment product issued by a provider
domiciled in one Member State may infringe private investors, as consumers, in many other
Member States where the product is (allowed to be) distributed. Although, under the Brussels I
Regulation,
55
a consumer may choose the forum for enforcement actions, law should provide the
possibility to organise and coordinate a redress action for reasons of (i) sound administration of
justice, (ii) effective and equal enforcement of the same rights, (iii) lower costs of litigation, (iv)
lack or reduced resources for the vulnerable party and (v) judicial system relief.
Studies have shown that 79% of EU citizens are willing to pursue their rights in court if collective
action is available,
56
while 76% of consumers are willing to trade cross-border if cross-border
redress would be available.
57
The problems go even deeper if the value of the claim is taken into
Poli y Depart e t for Citize s Rights a d Co stitutio al Affairs, Colle ti e Redress i the Me er States of the Europea
U io , Europea Parlia e t, Dire torate Ge eral for I ter al Poli ies O to er
, PE 608.829, p. 65.
51
Europea Co
issio , Report fro the Co
issio to the Europea Parlia e t a d the Cou il Co er i g the Appli atio
of Dire ti e
/ /EC of the Europea Parlia e t a d of the Cou il o i ju tio s for the prote tio of o su ers
interests, Brussels, 6.11.2012, COM(2012) 635 final.
52
European Commission (n 10), para 15.
53
European Commission (n 12), p. 4.
54
European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on injunctions for the protection of
consumers' interests /* COM/95/0712 FINAL - COD 96/0025 */, OJ C 107, 13/04/1996 P. 0003.
55
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32.
56
Flash Eurobarometer, EU Commission, 2011 -
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_299_sum_en.pdf.
57
Flash Eurobarometer 57.2
2002.
50
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consideration:
% of consumers would not enforce a claim of less than €
individual litigation costs, complexity and lengthiness of procedures.
Another very strong deterrent is accessibility. An individual consumer may not know how to
identify the defendant in another Member State, may experience difficulties in acknowledging or
understanding the legislation or may be faced with a very complex legal issue.
Time and time again it has been shown that financial services is the field with the lowest level of
consumer trust,
58
with the most injunctions started,
59
with the most observed mis-selling
practices
60
and the most difficult to obtain redress.
61
Judging by the largest scandals in financial
services, a BETTER FINANCE research suggests that less than 10% of affected investors actually
pursued their rights into court, most notably due to lack of proper collective redress measures at
national and on cross-border
levels, resulting in an approximatively € million unclaimed
damages.
due to the high
Article . TEU requires that the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties
. BETTER FINANCE strongly claims that the EC
proposal not only
does not exceed
what is necessary, but actually should go even further in order
to achieve its purpose stated in Article 169.1 TFEU.
Proportionality
In order to achieve the purpose of enabling consumers to associate in view of private enforcement
of rights the Directive must go far enough in order to eliminate the challenges faced so far, in
particular:
Areas of Union law covered
Standing for representative organizations;
The opt-out system and measures to inform harmed consumers, including publicity and
national registries; or
Funding solutions for representative organisations.
The EC chose the approximation of laws instruments
Article 114 TFEU, also referred to as the
harmonization clause
62
based on the provisions of Article 169.2(a) TFEU, which require so.
BETTER FINANCE believes that even this instrument, if chosen as legal basis, is still valid from an
EU law point of view.
Harmonization of Laws
First, the need to adopt this Collective Redress Directive is not based on a mere divergence of
national laws,
63
but it must show that inconsistencies of Member States legislation affect the
Europea Co
issio , Co su er Markets S ore oard: Maki g Markets Work for Co su ers –
editio , p. :
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumer-markets-scoreboard-2018_en.pdf.
59
European Commission (n 14), p. 3-4.
60
European Commission (n 1), p. 4.
61
European Commission (n 10), para 8
; see also BETTER FINANCE, A Major E for e e t Issue: The Mis-selling
of Financial
Produ ts: Briefi g Paper April
,
http://bit.do/eStbA.
62
Craig, de Burca (n 6), p. 93.
63
See Case C-376/98
Germany v European Parliament and Council
[2000] ECR I-8419.
58
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attainment or functioning of the internal market.
64
In this case of consumer private enforcement,
it is deeply rooted in the indirect barriers to access to justice (Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights) and effective consumer protection the need to ensure harmonization of the
different judicial systems in EU Member States, where rules on collective redress already exist,
and level up those legal orders where specific provisions on consumer collective action have not
yet been enacted.
Second, with regards to the policy areas in which the approximation instrument can be used, the
adjacent or tangent dimensions (areas of law) are obliterated if the main objective of the
Collective Redress Directive is to improve the establishment and/or functioning of the Internal
Market.
65
Third, the aspects on which the Collective Redress Directive touches upon are not
related to any of the fields expressly precluded in paragraph 2 of Article 114 TFEU, i.e. fiscality,
employment or free movement of persons. Fourth, there is no constraint on the EC on whether
the approximation of laws must have a minimum, maximum
or hybrid nature ,
66
i.e. to leave
arbitrary powers or not to Member States.
Last, by reference to Article 169.1 TFEU, it is the Treaties that clearly determine that the
protection of the health, safety and economic interests, the promotion of the right to information,
education and to organise for safeguarding their interests fall in the ambit of establishment and
functioning of the internal market , in line with Article . TFEU.
Judicial cooperation in civil matters
EU action for the approximation of laws is allowed by the TFEU in civil matters having cross-
border elements to the extent that it is necessary for the proper functioning of the Internal
Market.
67
Considering that the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market also hinges
on the possibility of consumers to exercise their rights and pursue them in court, the latter should
not be hindered or challenged by the
incompatibility and complexity of legal or administrative
systems in EU Member States
.
68
However, this has been precisely the case, as exhibited above, where collective actions, both at
national and cross-border level have been faced with the barrier of the unharmonized, uneven
conditions for access to justice. So far, EU Member States reluctancy
to collective redress actions
in the field of consumer protection lead to an unintentional deconstructivism and have not done
much to improve access to justice, which is essential for the proper functioning of the Internal
64
See Case C-377/98
Netherlands
v
Parliament and Council
[2001] ECR I-7079; Case C-491/01
The Queen
v
Secretary of State
for Health
[2002] ECR I-11453; C-210/03
R
v
Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-11893;
C-270/12
United Kingdom
v
European Parliament and Council,
EU:C:2014:18, after Craig, de Burca (n 6), 76.
65
See C-376/98
Germany
v
Parliament and Council
[2000] ECR I-
, after Rudiger Veil ed , Europea Capital Markets La
nd
edn) Hart Publishing, 2018, p. 34.
(2
66
See Veil (n 28) 55.
67
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 81 TFEU.
68
Europea Parlia e t, Judi ial Cooperatio i Ci il Matters Europarl e site, a essed
May
a aila le at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/154/judicial-cooperation-in-civil-matters.
58
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Market.
69
Moreover, the Collective
Redress Directive can fall both under the aim of
effective
access to justice
70
and
the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings
.
71
Conclusion: same result, different legal basis
The purpose of this Working Paper is to show that the EU is fully competent to enact the Collective
Redress Directive in its entirety, and that the actual choice of legal basis and instrument - either
through Article 289 read in conjunction with Articles 3 or 81 TFEU, or Article 114 read in
conjunction with Article 169 TFEU
does not alter in anyway, in this case and considering the
subject matters to be covered by this proposal, the power of the European Parliament and Council
to legislate.
Concluding, BETTER FINANCE not only believes that the Collective Redress Directive is
rightfully based on Article 114 TFEU, but firmly supports the EU institutions (EC, European
Parliament) to use full powers provided by the Treaties and enact a Directive that is
practically efficient and serves EU consumers and the economy.
Xa dra E. Kra er,
Strengthening Civil Justice Cooperation: The Quest for Model Rules and Common Minimum Standards of
Ci il Pro edure i Europe i Mar o A to io Rodrigues, Her es Za eti Jr. eds , Reper ussões do CPC
-
Pro esso I ter a io al
2018 Editora Juspodivm.
70
Article 81.2(e) TFEU.
71
Article 81.2.(f) TFEU.
69
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Notes
60
ERU, Alm.del - 2019-20 - Bilag 64: Henvendelse af 28/10-19 fra Better Finance, vedrørende forslag til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets Direktiv om adgang til indbringelse af sager til varetagelse af forbrugernes kollektive interesser
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The European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users
76, rue du Lombard, 1000 Brussels - Belgium
Tel. (+32) 02 514 37 77 - Fax. (+32) 02 514 36 66
E-mail: [email protected] - http://www.betterfinance.eu
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