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Post-ISIS Challenges for

Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the

U.S. Approach

Jonas Parello-Plesner

July

2018

Report

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Post-ISIS Challenges for

Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the

U.S. Approach

Jonas Parello-Plesner

For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications,

please visit Hudson’s website, www.hudson.org.

ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Post-Conflict Stabilization in Iraq

From Stabilization to Reconstruction: A Huge Task Ahead

IDPs Return, but Many Remain

Is Funding for Reconstruction Sufficient?

Mixed Results from the February 2018 Iraq Reconstruction Conference

Reconciliation: Ensuring against an ISIS Resurgence

Iranian Influence throughout the Iraqi Security and Intelligence Apparatus

Don’t Leave the Kurdish Question Unanswered

Post-Conflict Stabilization in Syria

Trump’s Syria Strategy in the Making

Impact of a U.S. Withdrawal on Stabilization, and Other Consequences

The Stabilization Freeze, the “Saudi Deal,” and Options for

Passing the U.S. Stabilization Baton to Others

Stabilization as a Bargaining Chip for Syria’s Future

Next Steps?

Appendix A: Author Biographies

Appendix B: Acknowledgements

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Executive Summary

By Jonas Parello-Plesner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

he fight in Iraq and Syria against the brutal terrorist organization Islamic State

(ISIS) has been led by an unprecedented international coalition, with the U.S. as

the galvanizing diplomatic and military component. ISIS was defeated militarily in

Iraq at the end of last year, but even today small pockets remain as a fighting force in

Syria.

As the war is won, peace must be secured. Key to that effort is post-conflict stabilization

through restoration of essential services and a gradual return of governance. As the U.S.

National Security Strategy puts it, “instability and weak governance threaten U.S.

interests.” In Iraq and Syria, reasserting stability is vital so that terrorist organizations do

not find fertile ground again.

This report draws some lessons from Iraq and Syria on stabilization efforts and the path

forward. The backdrop is the evolving U.S. approach to stabilization under the Trump

administration. On June 19, 2018, the administration published the final version of the

Stabilization Assistance Review report, which provides an inter-agency definition of

stabilization, including a more hard-nosed approach to sharing the burden with partners

in accordance with President Trump’s priorities. The review also draws demarcation lines

between humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and reconstruction. Stabilization is

short-term and transitional, and thus also limits the time frame for U.S. engagement.

However, the U.S. no longer provides public funding for reconstruction to avoid nation-

building, which the administration has declared to be off limits.

In Iraq, initial post-conflict stabilization was relatively successful. The UN, led by the

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), directed the efforts in tight

coordination with the anti-ISIS coalition. The coalition’s military efforts in Mosul were

adjusted to identify how many internally displaced persons (IDPs) could be

accommodated in a day, which was typically no more than 10,000.

Another way of

measuring UNAMI’s stabilization accomplishment is in the rate of return of displaced

persons, which has been relatively high, with over 3.2 million by the start of 2018. UNAMI

also managed to successfully pool donor resources through the Funding Facility for

Stabilization (FFS), which employs local workers and thus provides community growth

as well.

Yet even though post-conflict stabilization is still taking place in Iraq, the next phases

loom. Stabilization is generally a bridge to longer-term political reconstruction and

reconciliation. The “by, with, and through” approach of the anti-ISIS coalition created the

foundation for an Iraqi-owned victory over Da’esh. The resulting local pride and unity can

at best serve as a new foundation for reconstructing and reconciling Iraq.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

At worst, the many divisions in Iraq—from the political exclusion of Sunnis, which helped

give rise to ISIS in Iraq, to the restoration of the minorities of the Nineveh plains, who

face enduring challenges—will recreate fault lines. The U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) is now dispersing assistance directly to these groups, including

Christians, to restore communities. Moreover, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is equally

tense, requiring sustainable compromises. Kirkuk, the disputed city, is one priority within

the Kurdish question, particularly given that the Iraqi constitution envisions a governance

process for the city. For the U.S., the level of continuing Iranian influence is likely to affect

the U.S. engagement and conversely affect how willing the Iraqi government will be to

continue security cooperation with the U.S. including accepting U.S. soldiers on Iraqi soil.

The Iraqi government has moved into the reconstruction phase through the Kuwait

Reconstruction Conference for Iraq, held in February 2018, at which the U.S.

administration’s novel approach to burden-sharing was put into practice.

The U.S. did

not provide public money for Iraqis and instead nudged other countries to contribute

more, including European and Gulf partners. Still, the U.S. has continued generous

contributions to humanitarian aid and stabilization.

For donor countries to sustain influence, reconstruction funding should be tied to

government reforms and, more importantly, to tangible progress on reconciliation and

political accommodation efforts.

In Syria, post-conflict stabilization has been political and fraught from its inception, since

the U.S. and its anti-ISIS coalition partners do not want to engage and work with Bashar

al-Assad’s central government. The same approach of “by, with, and through” has been

applied—but in Syria there have been greater challenges. This is because the local partner

of necessity, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is closely tied to the Syrian Kurdish

People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group that Turkey perceives as a direct extension of

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization. For the

U.S. and other Western allies, military and stabilization collaboration with the SDF in

Raqqa has complicated relations with Turkey. The dynamic has also contributed to

Turkey’s own incursion into Afrin, as it establishes its version of “stabilization” in these

areas.

On the other hand, for the U.S., it was the 2016 defeat of ISIS in Manbij, where no post-

conflict stabilization plan had been drawn up, which prompted stabilization preparation

for Raqqa and the surrounding areas. Prior to Raqqa’s downfall, State Department and

USAID officials set up camp near Tabqa and tested nimble, small-scale operations to

prepare for restoration of essential services and mine clearing.

There is no doubt about the necessity of post-conflict stabilization in Raqqa. The city was

symbolically important for ISIS as its capital. Therefore, it is equally symbolically

important to render Raqqa stable enough for refugees and IDPs to return and for the city

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

not to become a breeding ground or refuge for extremism again. Around 100,000 people

have returned to Raqqa, but ongoing demining and the lack of essential services continue

to make conditions perilous. The question is whether political will can last long enough

to sustain stabilization funding, and whether partners can step up to improve the burden-

sharing as the U.S. continues its pivot away from reconstruction (and partly from

stabilization).

Additionally, stabilization is intrinsically linked to the broader question of political

transition and governance, which remains unresolved in Syria. It was part of then

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s Syria strategy in January to combine these priorities.

The fact that forces friendly to the U.S. hold up to 30 percent of Syria’s territory was seen

as leverage for political talks. This approach seems more uncertain now with Trump’s

April announcement of a U.S. military withdrawal from Syria, even if it is not carried out

immediately, combined with his focus on working with Russia in Syria, which seems

uninterested in any genuine political transition. Russia’s lack of commitment to the

southwest de-escalation zone, even though agreed between Trump and President Putin,

seems a good litmus test of how much—or little—the U.S. can get out of cooperating with

Russia in Syria. The Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki was also vague on specifics

regarding Syria.

The press release for the Stabilization Assistance Review report specifically highlights

“aligning stabilization efforts toward supporting defined political outcomes.”

Thus,

stabilization efforts in Raqqa might not be sustainable if divorced from a larger political

and diplomatic strategy.

Another major challenge for stabilization in Raqqa is Kurdish military and civilian

dominance through the SDF and the Raqqa Civilian Council (RCC), which creates the

potential for conflict with the majority Sunni Arab local population. There are already

reports of such local clashes. One way to mitigate conflict would be to hold local elections

to guarantee better inclusion of Sunnis. The U.S. could also encourage the Syrian Kurds

to devolve authority to Arabs and local tribes. These measures

could gradually reduce the

geographical expanse of Kurdish-controlled territory. In addition, they could potentially

prevent the YPG from using the future status of Raqqa as a bargaining chip in negotiations

with the Assad regime and Russia. Pursuing such a strategy would obviously present a

new challenge for the U.S. in getting Kurdish buy-in.

Simultaneously, and more broadly, the U.S. and other anti-ISIS coalition partners could

engage the

Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)

and its armed wing, the YPG, on

changing the party’s structure and irreversibly severing links with the PKK, thus creating

long-term options for reconciliation between Turkey and these groups of Syrian Kurds.

Turkish by now well-established relations with the Iraqi Kurds (the Kurdistan Regional

Government, or KRG) demonstrate that enmity between Turks and Kurds is not

inevitable.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

All such moves demand a certain element of predictability and U.S. staying power. It was

somewhat surprising, then, that President Trump announced in April that the U.S.

military should depart Syria. That decision has been put on hold, particularly since the

military fight against ISIS is not over. A hasty U.S. withdrawal would make it very difficult

to achieve aims associated with stabilization.

Trump froze a portion of stabilization funding for Syria, perceiving it as nation-building,

which he deems unnecessary and believes that other countries should pay for. Ultimately,

this makes it harder to get the displaced back into their homes.

In conclusion, in both Iraq and Syria, post-conflict stabilization has continued to be part

of the U.S. policy response. The report of the Stabilization Assistance Review codifies this

through a narrower approach to stabilization and acknowledges that there is “no appetite

to repeat large-scale reconstruction efforts.” Yet it also states that stabilization is

inherently political.

This is evident in Iraq, where successful stabilization still must show that it can translate

into successful reconciliation and reconstruction, considering regional and national

political dynamics.

This is evident in Syria, where the end state of the country emerging from war is still

uncertain, making it hard to know if stabilization will translate into long-term advances.

And it is evident inside the U.S. administration, where President Trump’s willingness to

go a step further and freeze stabilization funding in Syria calls into question the

framework and distinctions that the review was erecting as U.S. policy.

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Post-Conflict Stabilization in Iraq

raq has militarily defeated the terrorist organization ISIS. This is the good news,

which was also underlined at the meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, held

in Kuwait on February 13, 2018, in conjunction with the Kuwait Reconstruction

Conference for Iraq.

Yet the task ahead is as daunting as any military campaign. Now Iraq needs to rebuild and

to heal its communities to foster an inclusive national identity. Challenges remain, from

funding of continuing stabilization efforts to the even larger resources needed for

reconstruction over the coming years.

According to announcements made at the reconstruction conference, donors have

pledged a decent sum, around $30 billion, although the Iraqi government touted $88

billion as the desired amount. The Gulf countries and Turkey are becoming new large

donors. The private sector has also showed significant interest, although corruption is still

a major concern, which the Iraqi government seeks to address.

Continued stabilization is making it possible and desirable for internally displaced

persons (IDPs) to return to their homes. Over 3 million Iraqis have returned, but more

await in camps or temporary accommodations.

Equally important is reconciliation. The UN is working with the Iraqi government to

implement this at the national level. Baghdad and Erbil should pursue continued dialogue

and concrete steps forward, including on the thorny issue of Kirkuk, in accordance with

the Iraqi Constitution. Inclusiveness for Sunnis is important, both during reconstruction

and before and after elections, as their disenfranchisement helped produce fertile soil for

ISIS. Yet reconciliation should not be only top-down, and local community efforts

undertaken by Iraqi civil society organizations are essential. Reconstruction funding

should be tied to government reforms and more importantly, to tangible progress on

reconciliation and political accommodation efforts.

A novel aspect of the conference was the U.S. administration’s new approach to burden-

sharing in the aftermath of the ISIS presence in Iraq. President Trump wants to build

infrastructure at home and has tweeted dismissively about the $7 trillion the U.S. has

already spent in the Middle East. The United States will not disburse public funding for

reconstruction, which it sees as nation-building, although it remains among the top

contributors to humanitarian and stabilization assistance and will provide loans to private

companies. Yet even such investments could pose additional risk for American companies

because of sanctions against Iran, whose economic presence is felt in several important

sectors.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Instead, the U.S. encouraged international institutions and others to step up, and Saudi

Arabia, for example, contributed $1.5 billion. Leading up to the conference, the U.S.

facilitated a diplomatic reconciliation process between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for

outstanding debts to Riyadh.

From Stabilization to Reconstruction: A Huge Task Ahead

By the time Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declared victory in Mosul in July 2017, the

campaign to retake the city from ISIS had being going on since October 2016. Structural

damage was, and remains, extensive—both from ISIS and from the airstrike-heavy battle

to defeat ISIS.

This damage to Mosul was catastrophic, and the cost and effort required for stabilization

are more extensive than many initially anticipated.

Early cost estimates for Mosul alone

(primarily the western half of the city) are more than $1 billion dollars for rebuilding basic

infrastructure.

But Mosul is just one territory (albeit a significant one) in a series of places across seven

provinces liberated from ISIS. Following Mosul, the counter-ISIS campaign continued to

cities remaining under terrorist control, including Hawija and Tal Afar, and smaller towns

in between. The cost of direct damage is estimated by the World Bank and the Iraqi

government to be $45.7 billion; the total price to rebuild from the conflict will be more

than $88 billion. In the short term, $23 billion is needed for basic stabilization and

rebuilding, with $65 billion needed over the medium term.

IDPs Return, but Many Remain

Funding for stabilization and reconstruction is essential not only to Iraq’s recovery

broadly, but particularly to aid those displaced and those wishing to return. December

2017 figures indicate that 3.2 million displaced Iraqis who escaped the conflict have

returned to their homes, while 2.6 million remain displaced.

At the time of victory in

Mosul, nearly 700,000 west Mosul residents were still displaced.

The pace of return has

been slow due to the destruction of homes and basic infrastructure and the cessation of

essential public services. Remaining IEDs (improvised explosive devices), including those

hidden by ISIS prior to its retreat,

as well as ERW (explosive remnants of war) continue

to make civilian areas unsafe and add to mounting casualties for those who do attempt to

return.

The return of IDPs is further complicated by factors such as tribal tensions (pre-existing,

and exacerbated during the ISIS conflict) and multiple military forces: Iraqi security

forces, Iranian-linked Hash’d al Shaabi militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, and coalition forces.

These may stoke community divisions, introduce formal or informal obstacles to

returning, or ignite fear (justified or unjustified) and keep IDPs from returning. Physical

destruction, insecurity (such as fear of reprisals, including along sectarian lines), limited

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

basic service delivery, and/or poor economic opportunities may also prolong

displacement.

Is Funding for Reconstruction Sufficient?

Iraq cannot repay the $88 billion cost of rebuilding the country on its own. Ongoing

stabilization efforts still need additional funding before the Herculean task of

reconstruction is begun. The United States, which has had a lengthy presence in Iraq and

has taken the lead in supporting Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIS, has clearly stated

that it does not wish to provide public funding for reconstruction, which it sees as nation-

building.

Instead, it has launched efforts to garner reconstruction support from allies, among them

NATO countries, the Gulf states, and the private sector (including 2,300 companies that

attended the Kuwait donor conference, discussed below). It has placed a particular

emphasis on Saudi Arabia and facilitated Saudi-Iraqi discussions and a thaw after years

of cool diplomatic relations.

Saudi Arabia also has a strategic regional interest in

solidifying its influence. The Saudis announced publicly that they support a “united

nonsectarian Iraq,” meaning an Iraq where Iran does not dominate the political scene.

Yet the Saudis will now use a new tool, reconstruction funding, to gain influence over

Iraq’s future trajectory.

The World Bank also stepped in during fall 2017, approving $400 million for recovery

and reconstruction of priority infrastructure for service delivery in Mosul and other

recently liberated areas. This was in addition to the $350 million dispersed earlier for

emergency development funding.

February 2018 saw the bank approve $300 million for

the Social Fund for Development (SFD) in Iraq, aimed at reducing poverty more broadly

across the country but affecting areas from which ISIS had been removed. As of mid-

February, the World Bank had committed $4.7 billion for various reconstruction and

recovery programs in Iraq.

UN efforts in Iraq have also been multifold. The UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI)

has served as the central point of UN engagement in the country and has led on issuing a

UN funding request of $482 million for the first year of the Iraq Recovery and Resilience

Programme (RRP) in February 2017.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq

houses the Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS), which in the weeks leading up to the

donor conference in Kuwait received contributions of $75 million from USAID, $58.96

million from the European Union, $21.4 million from Denmark, and $12 million from

Sweden.

With the involvement of other UN agencies, including the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Organization for Migration

(IOM), along with international and national nongovernmental organizations (I/NGOs),

proliferation of efforts is clear, and duplication of efforts is a risk.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Mixed Results from the February 2018 Iraq Reconstruction Conference

The February 2018 conference on rebuilding Iraq saw donor countries, the private sector,

and international financial institutions convene to discuss financing for the post-ISIS

reconstruction phase. The conference highlighted priorities shared by the international

community and the Iraqi government and downplayed differences.

The conference had two themes: one, an Iraq in need of deep healing and two, a very

positive post-ISIS united Iraq ready for investment and ready to play a key role in the

region. The “united Iraq” narrative does not yet fully correspond to the situation on the

ground.

UNAMI and other NGOs emphasized the humanitarian and reconstruction needs in

Sunni areas ravaged by ISIS and by military operations to liberate ISIS-controlled areas,

while Dr. Sami al-Araji, chairman of the Iraqi government’s National Investment

Commission (NIC), promoted a post-ISIS “high risk, high reward” investment

opportunity in Iraq’s oil, telecommunications, transportation, manufacturing, and

construction sectors—the same sectors where Iran is playing.

The Iraqi government may believe it has successfully outsourced reconstruction in Sunni

areas to UNAMI, UNDP, and other NGO funding sources, and that it can focus its

resources elsewhere. Yet such a strategy can also play into local and sectarian politics. For

example, during the conference, Marwan al-Jibara, a spokesman for the Council of Tribal

Sheikhs in Salahuddin Province, told the

New York Times

that in terms of the number of

projects planned in their area, “we are sorely underrepresented.”

The UN is working with the Iraqi government to implement reconciliation at the national

level through the Iraqi National Reconciliation Commission. However, at the

reconstruction conference there was little to no talk of conditioning international

investment on Baghdad’s willingness to promote reconciliation and political

accommodation with its disenfranchised Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations.

The question of funding is not simply whether buildings will be rebuilt and homes will

once again be inhabitable. Funding for rebuilding is essential for the country to maintain

stability moving forward. Baghdad’s position is that if there is investment in post-ISIS

Iraq, stability will result. Given that donor funds are not tied to reconciliation initiatives

and political inclusion by Baghdad, however, there seems to be little emphasis on fixing

what led to the rise of ISIS to begin with: disenfranchised Sunnis distrustful of Baghdad.

Tangible initiatives toward reconciliation and political accommodation are critical pillars

in holding on to gains against ISIS and ensuring that the organization does not reemerge.

Furthermore, amid deep-rooted divisions in the country, there is a growing wave of anti-

Iranian fervor in the Sunni areas that will require reconciliation, if not a shift in strategic

and regional relations to counter Iranian influence.

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Reconciliation: Ensuring against an ISIS Resurgence

Should the intent and early efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq fail or fall short, ISIS could

just as easily resurrect itself as it did prior to 2014, when it emerged from al Qaeda’s

remnants. Iraq itself—specifically Mosul—was the stage for Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s

announcement of his attempt at a caliphate. Iraq remains vulnerable to the threat that

ISIS will go underground before resurging.

Reconciliation in the counter-ISIS context will need to address sectarian divisions, ethnic

divisions, tribal divisions, and other causes of community tensions. For example, the Shia

may be wary or mistrusting of Sunnis, whom they may associate with the rise of ISIS and

its atrocities. Liberated populations more broadly may hold grievances against the non-

local Shia forces who liberated Sunni areas, specifically where they abused their positions

in doing so, particularly where ethno-sectarianism was rampant.

Tribal relations may

be strained or there may be a risk of reprisals between tribes, while ethnic minorities,

such as the wronged Yazidis and Christians, could harbor grievances and mistrust toward

Sunnis or Arabs more generally.

There are reconciliation efforts underway. UNAMI, for example, is training women in

preparation for national reconciliation negotiations

and reconciliation-focused

meetings, including in the Najaf governorate.

Other UN agencies are also involved, such

as IOM, with its program on community policing,

and UNESCO, the United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, which in partnership with France, is

promoting reconciliation efforts through community media.

Another example is the

United States Institute for Peace (USIP), which is supporting Iraqi-led community

dialogues in areas such as Mosul, Tal Afar, Tikrit, Hawija, and Nineveh.

In early 2017,

UNDP helped set up Support for Integrated Reconciliation in Iraq (SIRI). This project

focused in part on locally led reconciliation committees, support to victims of violence

(including women), and efforts to increase public awareness of civic participation in

political processes and engage with minorities, including youth and women.

Previously,

in February 2017, the World Bank attached some of its funding to reconciliation, arguing

that this would ensure the sustainability of reconstruction efforts, and launched a parallel

track within the effort to address the social side of recovery efforts.

The bank’s Iraq

Country Partnership Framework for 2018-22 was also built on consultations whose

priority was partly “rebuilding the social contract and state legitimacy,” and which again

tied reconciliation aims to broader bank support.

Iraqi government- and citizen-led

efforts are also underway to rebuild the country’s social fabric. There are reports,

however, of challenges from officials’ failure to learn from previous lessons about

reconciliation.

One element of reconciliation is justice for groups that were abused by ISIS or by

liberating forces. Rapid trials of suspected ISIS fighters took place in Iraq as territory fell

to Iraqi forces. However, there is international anxiety that the trials may not conform

with international norms and international law, and in any case, they will not be sufficient

Jonas Parello-Plesner

to address ISIS atrocities.

Justice for minorities, such as the Yazidis, is unlikely to be

served with local trials of suspected ISIS fighters and will likely require international

proceedings.

The issue comes down to who decides. Sunni military-aged males are often

called ISIS “collaborators” and may then meet the same fate as ISIS fighters.

There are

too many examples of sectarian actors in Baghdad’s security apparatus failing to

distinguish between a Sunni military-aged male and an ISIS fighter.

Addressing divisions, tensions, grievances, and calls for justice is not just crucial to

fortifying retaken areas against an ISIS resurgence, but will also be important following

the parliamentary elections. Most Sunni Iraqi voters are emerging from as much as three

years of ISIS control, and many live in areas that were ungoverned to begin with. There

are Sunni grievances from the Iraq war in the early 2000s that remain unaddressed.

Allowing these older grievances to be added to the new grievances could lead to a

resurgence of ISIS and the factors that led to its rise several years ago. This reconciliation

could also make or break candidates who seek to woo the Sunni electorate to gain an edge,

which Shia hardliners will have a harder time acquiring. The Sunnis need more space in

the country’s political life and in Iraqi life generally. On the security front, during

parliamentary elections, questions will likely arise about the future role of U.S. forces.

Iranian Influence throughout the Iraqi Security and

Intelligence Apparatus

The question of Iran’s role in Iraq and relationship to it is central not just to reconciliation,

but to the parliamentary elections more broadly. For the U.S. administration, reducing

Iran’s regional footprint is an important component of policy. The Hash’d al Shaabi were

a relatively significant part of the force combatting ISIS in Iraq, though with a reduced

role at the tail end of the campaign.

This militia came together in 2014 when Iraq’s grand

ayatollah al Sistani issued a fatwa calling to defend Iraq against ISIS. While not all Hash’d

al Shaabi units or troops are loyal to Iran—some are Iraq-aligned Shia units

—Iran’s

influence in the command and control structure and the senior ranks is reportedly

strong.

Given that the Hash’d al Shaabi were formed to counter the ISIS threat, which has since

been defeated, the question arises whether their units will be demobilized and disbanded.

Iran’s influence in the Hash’d al Shaabi militias, which have in part been supported by

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),

and the degree to which Iran has

cemented that influence, may make disbanding complicated if not unlikely, at least in the

near term. As the IRGC Quds Force—the IRGC’s expeditionary terrorist force —seeks to

expand and cement its influence in Iraq, the Hash’d al Shaabi may be one of the more

pragmatic vehicles for doing so.

In areas liberated from ISIS, the forces holding the territory should reflect the ethnic

makeup of the local population—both to stabilize liberated areas and prevent a

resurgence, and to begin to address grievances and avoid future escalations. Questions

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

about whether security forces, who are 90 percent Shia, will be able to maintain security

gains while branding Sunnis as collaborators and further disenfranchising them will

undermine reconciliation and recovery and likely lead to “security backslide.” The central

government should empower local Sunni forces to defend liberated Sunni-majority areas

rather than leaving the task to Shia-dominated Iraqi forces or the Hash’d al Shaabi.

More broadly, Iran has arguably integrated itself effectively into the fabric of Iraqi politics.

Iranian influence beyond militias was a significant factor in the May 2018 elections. Some

Iraqi parties are reportedly pursuing a more moderate approach, tempering relations with

Iran through a foreign policy reevaluation and engaging the Sunni and other non-Shia

minority blocs.

Don’t Leave the Kurdish Question Unanswered

In the aftermath of the unrecognized Kurdish independence referendum in September

2017, Baghdad cut off aid and humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish Regional

Government (KRG). This trapped significant IDP populations, as the Kurdish region

hosts a significant number of Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees, and added to the strain on

Kurdish resources. Highlighted at the Kuwait donor conference was Baghdad’s lack of

plans to use donor funds in Kurdish areas.

The current return of control over the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, from

Kurdish Peshmerga to the Iraqi government does not resolve their permanent status. This

needs to be worked out in dialogue, and regarding Kirkuk, in accordance with Iraqi

constitutional procedures.

Furthermore, the main issue is addressing the Kurdish share of the federal budget, as

Kurds have less direct income from direct oil revenue. The planned oil pipeline from

Kirkuk to Turkey could further limit income for the KRG.

For the U.S., the KRG’s future orientation is also to be watched, since disappointment

over the lack of international and U.S. support in the independence referendum last year

has led to a growing turn toward Iran.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Post-Conflict Stabilization in Syria

n April, President Trump announced his wish to pull U.S. troops out of Syria, and in

conjunction, froze $200 million in stabilization funds for the country. Though this

appeals to his domestic political base and is in keeping with his campaign promises

to avoid doling out American taxpayers’ money for unnecessary wars and reconstruction

in the Middle East, many in his administration and beyond harbor reservations about a

too-hasty withdrawal.

First of all, the military job of defeating ISIS is not over. Turkey’s incursion from the north

has made the endgame harder because many of the Syrian Kurdish SDF fighters, who

fought ISIS valiantly, have redeployed there. And in the long run, both U.S. civilian

advisors and advisors from allied countries need the U.S. military umbrella to continue

stabilization work.

Trump insists that allies and partners should pay more. But the much-touted Saudi-led

forces and funding for Syria have not materialized. The UN could gradually do more, but

it will need the consent of Bashar al-Assad and of Russia. And although European allies

have stepped up contributions, particularly on demining, this will not alleviate the

shortfall if the U.S. continues the stabilization freeze.

In Iraq, it seemed that a Trumpian equilibrium had been reached, with a distinction made

between stabilization, which is not considered nation-building, and reconstruction, which

is. Yet Trump has abandoned that distinction in Syria by freezing stabilization funds,

which are also used for demining Raqqa, the former ISIS capital, to make it somewhat

safe for refugees to return.

Stabilization in Syria is not only a necessity for returning refugees, but is also often seen

as a bulwark against a quick return of ISIS. By pulling out too soon, the U.S. would lose

options to curb Iran and to influence a political solution in Syria. There are longer-term

consequences to watch out for, as there were for President Obama when he pulled out of

Iraq. Stabilization is also one step that paves the way for other important efforts around

reconciliation, development, and sustainability in defeating ISIS and its ideology in areas

it previously held. All are integral to lasting stabilization and national security priorities

for the U.S. and its partners. There is much at stake in Trump’s decision over the coming

period.

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Trump’s Syria Strategy in the Making

On April 3, President Trump surprised many—including his military leaders—when he

announced a new Syria policy, stating that “I want to get out. I want to bring our troops

back home.” He added that the U.S. had gotten “nothing out of $7 trillion [spent] in the

Middle East over the last 17 years,” and he put the brakes on $200 million in U.S.

stabilization funding in Syria.

That same day, CENTCOM commander General Joseph Votel (responsible for the

military campaign against ISIS), State Department envoy to the coalition Brett McGurk,

and USAID administrator Mark Green were at USIP describing plans for a continued U.S.

presence in Syria, both to finish the job militarily and to build resilience through post-

conflict stabilization against an ISIS resurgence.

Votel told the audience that “the hard

part, I think, is in front of us ... and that is stabilizing these areas, consolidating our gains,

getting people back to their homes ... There is a military role in this.”

4243

The divergence

in views between Trump and others in his administration was glaring.

Trump’s approach to Syria is consistent with his worldview. He thinks the United States

has wasted money in the Middle East on unsuccessful nation-building and that regional

partners do and pay too little. As early as 2013,

during the heated discussion about

Obama’s expected military retaliation for Assad’s use of chemical weapons,

Trump

tweeted, “Do

NOT attack Syria, fix U.S.A.” He knows his political constituency does not

wish to see the U.S. in another ground war in the Middle East, and he prefers to fix U.S.

infrastructure rather than pay for other countries’ reconstruction with American

taxpayers’ money. Likewise, his insistence on burden-sharing remains a consistent

theme. Foreshadowing the current debate, Trump tweeted about Syria in 2013, “Why are

these rich Arab countries not paying us?”

Fast forward to 2018, and Trump is announcing plans for troop withdrawal and arguing

that Saudi Arabia and others should pick up the tab in Syria. In short, his statements

ought not to have come as a total surprise to the main players at the Defense Department,

State, and USAID, who support a continued U.S. military and stabilization role in Syria.

Inside the administration, there has been an effort to fence off stabilization from

reconstruction

to move it away from Trump’s “no nation-building” restriction. That effort

was evident, as Mark Green explained at USIP, that “stabilization programs are more than

just manifestations of American generosity. They are, instead, key components of our

national security planning.”

Trump’s decision to freeze stabilization funding indicates

that he does not care much about that distinction.

In mid-April, Trump re-engaged in Syria—although briefly—by carrying out a retaliatory

strike with France and the UK after Assad used chemical weapons in Douma. Once again,

as in 2017, the president wished to demonstrate that unlike Obama, who vacillated about

responding to Assad’s 2013 use of chemical weapons, which breaches international

Jonas Parello-Plesner

norms, Trump would act. But Trump’s retaliatory targeted strikes in 2017 and 2018 were

not part of a broader strategy to take the U.S. further into Syria’s civil war or against

Assad, which explains why afterward, he tweeted in good faith: “Mission accomplished.”

The question of when and how the U.S. leaves Syria remains an open one. After meeting

with Trump in Washington in late April, French president Macron boasted that “we

convinced him it was necessary to stay for the long term.” But such optimism

could prove

short-lived.

Currently, the administration’s debate on departure is safely ensconced in the internal

bureaucratic process. But it is more than likely that once the U.S. military can report

success against ISIS in its two remaining pockets in eastern Syria, Trump will again raise

the prospect of pulling the military out.

The campaign against ISIS in Syria has slowed down considerably because the Kurdish

elements of the

SDF are

redeploying to counter Turkey in the north. During the Turkish

incursion into Afrin, the Kurds felt abandoned by the U.S. Adding to that, the top-level

public message about U.S. military withdrawal has had a chilling effect on the SDF’s

willingness to return to continue the fight against ISIS. As a substitute, the U.S. and its

allies have begun a targeted air campaign against the last two areas under ISIS control, as

illustrated by the pink areas on the map below.

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Presidential Envoy for the Global

Coalition to Defeat ISIS

At the same time, the U.S. military has continuously nudged the SDF to return and finish

the battle against ISIS. In early May, the SDF announced that it would continue fighting,

yet given the

current

situation, it could have a strategic self-interest in slowing down the

fight to delay the expected U.S. withdrawal. This could explain a statement by Saleh

Muslim, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), who said that the fight

against ISIS “will take a long time, maybe years and years … Daesh can move between

Iraq and Syria. They are not going to be finished so easily.”

Impact of a U.S. Withdrawal on Stabilization, and Other Consequences

A U.S. withdrawal from Syria would clearly have serious consequences. A diminished or

non-existent U.S. role on the ground would enable Iran to expand its presence through

Syria, to the detriment of Israel’s security.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Withdrawal would be equally detrimental to American leverage in finding a political

solution to Syria’s war, in which Assad is sustained by Russia and Iran. Assad continues

to pursue offensives and retake territory held by the opposition; the regime’s June 2018

escalation in the southwest showed not only its continued aggression to retake territory,

but the geopolitical realities at stake. These are clear when we consider that this is an

offensive by forces enjoying Russian and Iranian support, into an area of strategic concern

for the U.S., Israel, and Jordan.

French president Macron has pushed for a continued U.S. presence in Syria to help curb

Iran’s regional influence. Granted, U.S. bargaining power is already somewhat reduced,

with the bargaining table over Syria’s future increasingly populated by Russia and Iran

via the Astana format, which bypasses the Geneva format for a political solution, led by

the UN and preferred by the United States.

For the Kurdish-led SDF, which has valiantly led the local battles against ISIS in Syria, a

withdrawal would mean an even more uncertain future. If the Syrian Kurds were

completely abandoned, they would likely reorient themselves toward accommodation

with Russia and the Assad regime, further reinforcing Russian and Iranian chokeholds on

Syria’s future. For American military advisors who have been working alongside the SDF

for years, it would feel like a betrayal of a trusted and capable partner.

If the U.S. withdraws, the Assad regime, aided by Iran and Russia, would undoubtedly

test the resolve of local U.S. partners. In fact, this happened in Deir e Zour in February,

when pro-Assad forces tried to retake ground previously captured by the SDF. The U.S.

responded militarily, killing hundreds of Russian military contractors, so-called “little

green men,”

which Secretary of State–designate Mike Pompeo confirmed publicly in his

congressional hearing.

Without a U.S. presence, the “green men” and Iranian militia

would seize the day.

On the flip side, U.S. abandonment of the SDF and the Syrian Kurds might lead to

improved relations with Turkey, which perceives U.S. collaboration with the Syrian Kurds

as support for the terrorist-designated PKK. Such thinking is behind the attempt to find

a compromise between Turkey and local forces in contested Manbij. But there is no

assurance that such moves by the U.S. would be sufficient to placate Turkey and restore

U.S.-Turkey relations to the status quo ante. Generally, Turkey has become a much more

recalcitrant ally inside and outside of NATO. And Russia stands ready to play the Kurdish

card to gain leverage over Ankara, to the long-term detriment of the United States in the

region.

As for stabilization efforts in the SDF-liberated areas, a military withdrawal would create

difficulties. It is definitely possible that existing partners would increase their

contributions and thus burden-sharing, or that new partners would step up. But the U.S.

presence has an impact beyond the stabilization money handed out. Without this military

presence, stabilization efforts would be hard for both U.S. civilian agencies and partners

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

to sustain. These agencies, and others, depend heavily on the military presence for

protection.

The Stabilization Freeze, the “Saudi Deal,” and Options for Passing the U.S.

Stabilization Baton to Others

President Trump has emphasized that Saudi Arabia should make a greater contribution.

According to a

Washington Post

article, Trump said after a phone call with King Salman

that he had struck a deal securing $4 billion, which could make it possible for the U.S. to

pull out of Syria.

In the same spirit, there are stories about a possible multinational

Arab military presence sponsored by the Saudis. None of this, however, has yet come to

fruition.

Tellingly, at the EU Syria donor conference in April, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million

vs. Germany’s euro 1 billion, raising further doubts about Saudi generosity. The idea of a

stronger Saudi presence, including a military presence, has been floating around for a

long time without materializing. As one administration official put it to me, “Let us see it

before we believe it.” Furthermore, a Saudi presence in Syria is not the same as an

American presence, since the military presence of an Arab country could inflame rather

than calm already strong sectarian tensions among Syria’s warring factions. In contrast,

the current U.S. military presence benefits from a friendly and welcoming local attitude

in SDF-controlled areas. As General Votel cautioned, “It would be difficult for someone

to immediately step in and replace us,” although he added that given time, the U.S.

military could hand the baton to other forces.

Another way forward would be to push other allies in the Coalition against ISIS members

to step up their contributions. This is already underway. France has increased

stabilization efforts in Raqqa and SDF-controlled areas, to the point that Turkish

president Erdogan has harshly objected. In April, when France hosted an SDF delegation

for conversations about stabilization, Erdogan asserted that France was “abetting

terrorism” and warned that France “will not be able to rid [itself] of this terror burden …

As long as the West nurtures these terrorists, [it] will sink.”

The UK contributes directly

to civil society organizations and early recovery efforts in the Raqqa area; in this manner

it deftly dodges the thorny issue of direct support to the Raqqa Civilian Council, which

Turkey has singled out as an illegitimate Kurdish front organization.

Additionally, Europeans are contributing to the current—and essential—demining in

Raqqa. The EU contributed $12 million to Mines Advisory Group, while Germany

provided $12 million and Denmark $7.5 million to Tetra Tech, both demining contracting

companies present in Syria and Latvia and Kosovo made smaller contributions. The Syria

Recovery and Trust Fund (SRTF), which counts members such as Germany, France,

Denmark, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, is also expected to start operating soon in

northeastern Syria. All these efforts are examples of burden-sharing at its best.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Still, the current, fast-paced demining effort by Tetra Tech is estimated to cost $5 million

a month. If U.S. funding grinds to an early halt, there is a risk that partner pledges will

not fill the gap quickly enough to continue the operation. As the late Raqqa Civil Council

member Omar Alloush said in warning of a loss of U.S. influence, “The people will choose

the person that will fix their house for them.”

What about transferring stabilization to the UN? The UN has recently received Syrian

government approval to enter Raqqa and has started delivering humanitarian assistance

through Jordan. The UN estimates that around 100,000 people have returned to the city,

a third of the pre-war population, although many returnees are injured or die from

uncleared mines.

Bringing the UN in with full-scale UNDP-style stabilization would

require the consent of both the Assad regime and Russia. Thus, letting the UN lead

stabilization efforts would undoubtedly facilitate a return of authority to Assad in the

ISIS-liberated areas. Besides, the current UN appeal for humanitarian assistance in Syria

is underfunded, suggesting that donors would be unlikely to step up for a more political

stabilization effort.

Another, more speculative, option, is using oil revenues for stabilization, since the

territories currently controlled by the SDF hold the bulk of Syria’s oil. Potentially, a

revenue-sharing mechanism could be established to transfer a certain amount to

stabilization efforts. The morally ambiguous issue with the oil revenues is that the Kurds

sell mainly to the Assad regime, although some barrels find their way to the black market

in Turkey.

The bottom line is this: There is increasing burden-sharing, but it is not happening very

fast or on a very large scale (the Saudi option). Thus, a U.S. stabilization freeze and

possible quick withdrawal would leave important towns such as Raqqa nothing more than

piles of rubble.

Stabilization as a Bargaining Chip for Syria’s Future

“Stabilization is political,” according to the newly minted report of the Stabilization

Assistance Review, which the State Department, Department of Defense, and USAID

jointly published in April.

This is true, and even more so in Syria, where American-led

stabilization efforts serve as a bulwark against ISIS returning, make cities livable again

for refugees, and serve as a U.S. bid—although timid—for a future Syria outside of Assad’s

control. In other words, stabilization is political leverage for Syria’s future. Then-secretary

of state Tillerson made that link in his January strategy for Syria, stating that “our

diplomatic efforts will be characterized by stabilization initiatives and a new emphasis on

the political solution to the Syrian conflict.”

How his successor, Mike Pompeo, will connect these dots remains to be seen. Pompeo has

been tough on Iran, but to what degree that could impact Syria strategy is still unknown.

Any change in military mission must initially pass though Defense Secretary Mattis—who,

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

though tough on Iran, is unlikely to see an expansion of the military mission as desirable.

Such an expansion also runs counter to Trump’s priority of bringing troops home and not

into another Middle Eastern conflict, even with Iran. Congress is also increasingly set to

rein in any expansion of military goals in Syria, possibly through a revamped

Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), which Senators Corker and Kaine have been

working on.

Yet it is important to recognize that other actors in Syria also use post-conflict

stabilization as a tool for political leverage. Turkey’s Euphrates Shield mission is one

example. Turkey’s incursion into Afrin mirrored U.S. efforts with stabilization funding

and establishment of local councils. In reality, these missions are cover for an ethnic

dislocation program, with Kurds fleeing the area and local militia loyal to Turkey taking

over. The result will be a Turkish-style safe zone—and Turkey’s bargaining chip to ensure

that Syria’s future does not include an autonomous Kurdish region.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Next Steps?

ational Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo, and Defense

Secretary Mattis will be the team to bring this issue forward. The new arrivals are

finely attuned to the Trumpian logic and will carry out the balancing act of

translating his instincts into policy.

The strongest argument for staying on, aligned with Trumpian logic, would likely be to

avoid repeating Obama’s errors. Trump faulted Obama for leaving Iraq in 2011 too hastily,

leading to instability and the subsequent growth of ISIS, and has clearly stated that he

does not want to make the same mistake. With this line of reasoning, Trump can probably

be convinced to stay on a bit longer in Syria, bolstered by the facts on the ground, where

the military battle is not over—as ISIS demonstrated with its latest message encouraging

its followers and fighters.

The next-best argument would be Iran. Without a U.S. military presence in Syria, Iran

would have an even greater opportunity to expand its influence. As Trump said during

Macron’s visit, “We don’t want to give Iran open season to the Mediterranean.”

If such calculations convinced Trump to stay on for a time and unfreeze the stabilization

funds, there would be some breathing room for further stabilization work and a gradual

increase in contributions from other donors. Still, the question remains whether such

work would be futile if the U.S. pulls out militarily and Assad/Russia takes control of the

ISIS-liberated areas, by force or through a deal with the Kurds. Unfortunately, the

president’s current signals about withdrawing are already having a chilling effect on local

partners on the ground, which will be difficult to reverse. Withdrawing too soon could

lead to a worst-case scenario in which the United States is continuously held responsible

for Syria’s never-ending civil war but does not have enough investment to influence

outcomes.

Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Appendix A: Author Biographies

Jonas Parello-Plesner is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, where he leads a project on

Middle East politics and the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq and Syria financed

by a grant from

DANIDA,

the Danish International Development Agency.

Before joining Hudson, Parello-Plesner was responsible for the Embassy of Denmark’s

Department of Security and Foreign Policy in Washington, where he helped devise

policies related to coalition efforts against ISIS. He has long-standing experience in the

Danish Foreign Service and served in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs while

studying at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration in Paris.

From 2010-13, Parello-Plesner was also a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council

on Foreign Relations (ECFR) with a focus on European-Chinese relations. He served as

Senior Advisor on China and North-East Asia to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

from 2005-09 and has provided testimony on Chinese investments in Europe to the U.S.

Congress and the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Committees. His co-authored book,

China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets

Abroad,

was published in 2015 by IISS/Routledge and launched at the annual Shangri-

La Dialogue in Singapore.

Parello-Plesner has published widely on geopolitics, China, and European affairs. He has

written op-eds for or been quoted in

The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Le

Monde, ElPais, International Herald Tribune, Frankfurter Rundschau, Foreign

Policy, EUobserver, Asia Times,

and

East Asia Forum.

In addition, he has made

appearances on Fox News, CNN, Bloomberg, FRANCE24, Channel 4, and Danish

Broadcast. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, Copenhagen University,

and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration in Paris.

Jonas Parello-Plesner

Appendix B: Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank Katelyn Gough for excellent research assistance

on this project on stabilization in Syria and Iraq, and my colleagues Mike Doran, Mike

Pregent, Eric Brown, and Peter Rough—who is also my co-author on Trump’s new

burden-sharing approach in Iraq—for great intellectual and practical sparring through

the year.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone who has provided me with their insights formally

and informally, and the Hudson Public Affairs team for editorial assistance. All errors and

lack of clarity remain my own.

This is part of a Hudson Institute project on post-conflict stabilization funded by the

government of Denmark.

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Sharing,”

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Christian

Science Monitor,

September 12, 2017, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2017/0912/In-

push-for-post-ISIS-reconciliation-Iraqi-leaders-still-a-sticking-point.

Tamer El-Ghobashy and Mustafa Salim, “Iraq’s Rapid-Fire Trials Send Alleged ISIS Members—

Including Foreigners—To the Gallows,” December 28, 2017,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/world/iraqs-rapid-fire-trials-send-alleged-isis-members--

including-foreigners--to-the-gallows/2017/12/22/b65d903a-e598-11e7-9ec2-518810e7d44d_story.html.

Nadia Murad, “Outraged by the Attacks on Yazidis? It Is Time to Help,”

New York Times,

February 10,

2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/opinion/sunday/yazidis-islamic-state-rape-genocide.html.

Elise Knutsen, “On the Ground in Iraq, the War against ISIS Is Just Getting Started,” September 18,

2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/18/16309558/isis-iraq-kurds-trump-us-mosul-syria-war-

terrorism; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “These Judges Decide the Fate of Islamic State Fighters and

Collaborators,”

Los Angeles Times,

December 29, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-

fg-isis-judge-2016-story.html.

Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar,

The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,

Carnegie

Middle East Center, April 2017,

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf.

Jack Watling, “The Shia Militias of Iraq,”

Atlantic,

December 22, 2016,

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/shia-militias-iraq-isis/510938/.

Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen,

The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State,

Middle East Research Institute, March 2017, http://www.meri-k.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/03/PMF-Report-0.1.pdf.

Hudson Institute, “Michael Pregent Testifies Before the House Oversight Committee,” January 17,

2018, https://www.hudson.org/research/14113-michael-pregent-testifies-before-the-house-oversight-

committee.

Renad Mansour, “The Popularity of the Hashd in Iraq,”

Diwan,

Carnegie Middle East Center, February

1, 2016, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62638.

Hudson Institute, “Michael Pregent Testifies Before the House Oversight Committee,” January 17,

2018, https://www.hudson.org/research/14113-michael-pregent-testifies-before-the-house-oversight-

committee.

This is a revised essay based on the paper published prior to the event held at the Hudson Institute on

May 8, 2018, “Syria: Should I Stay or Should I Go Now?”

Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “As Trump Talks of Leaving Syria, His Top Commander in the Middle

East Emphasizes the Need to Stay,”

Washington Post,

April 4, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-trump-talks-of-leaving-syria-his-top-

commander-in-the-middle-east-emphasizes-the-need-to-stay/2018/04/03/2ccdcff8-3753-11e8-8fd2-

49fe3c675a89_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9fda3902e276.

Stabilization is a term used about the quick fixes after conflict such as demining, removing rubble, and

getting electricity and water flowing again. For an ISIS ghost town such as Raqqa, the former capital of the

terror regime, such stabilization is essential for enabling refugees to return.

Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “As Trump Talks of Leaving Syria, His Top Commander in the Middle

East Emphasizes the Need to Stay,”

Washington Post,

April 4, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-trump-talks-of-leaving-syria-his-top-

commander-in-the-middle-east-emphasizes-the-need-to-stay/2018/04/03/2ccdcff8-3753-11e8-8fd2-

49fe3c675a89_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9fda3902e276.

Kyle Rempfer, “Trump Wants Troops Out of Syria, but His Generals May Resist,”

Military Times,

April

4, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2018/04/04/trump-wants-troops-out-of-syria-but-his-

generals-may-resist/.

Nicholas Fandos, “Trump’s View of Syria: How It Evolved, in 19 Tweets,”

New York Times,

April 7,

2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/donald-trump-syria-twitter.html.

Teresa Welsh, “USAID, State, and DOD to Release First-Ever Stabilization Assistance Review,”

Devex,

April 16, 2018, https://www.devex.com/news/usaid-state-and-dod-to-release-first-ever-stabilization-

assistance-review-92535.

Reuters, “France’s Macron Says He Persuaded Trump to Keep Troops in Syria,” April 15, 2018,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-macron/frances-macron-says-he-persuaded-

trump-to-keep-troops-in-syria-idUSKBN1HM0X4.

Liz Sly and Zakaria, “With ISIS Striking Back in Syria, a U.S. Withdrawal Would Be a ‘Disaster,’ Kurds

Warn,”

Washington Post,

April 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-kurds-warn-of-

a-disaster-if-us-troops-leave/2018/04/05/0b5619e0-386e-11e8-af3c-

2123715f78df_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4cade19dfd7b.

Tod Lindberg, “A U.S. Battlefield Victory against Russia’s ‘Little Green Men,’”

Wall Street Journal,

April 3, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-u-s-battlefield-victory-against-russias-little-green-men-

1522792572.

Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef, “Mike Pompeo Promises Not to Be a ‘Yes Man,’”

Wall Street

Journal,

April 12, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-to-hear-from-pompeo-mattis-in-

midst-of-syria-crisis-1523525400.

In the same article, the $200 million U.S. stabilization funding is referred to as a donation. Background

talks with people in the administration reveal that the term might have been the spark that made Trump

put a hold on the stabilization funding. Paul Sonne and Karen DeYoung, “Trump Wants to Get the U.S.

Out of Syria’s War, So He Asked the Saudi King for $4 Billion,”

Washington Post,

March 16, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-wants-to-get-the-us-out-of-syrias-

war-so-he-asked-the-saudi-king-for-4billion/2018/03/16/756bac90-2870-11e8-bc72-

077aa4dab9ef_story.html?utm_term=.ae91e4870bc7.

Paul Sonne and Missy Ryan, “Mattis: U.S. Would Regret Delegating Security in Syria to a Force with No

American Involvement,”

Washington Post,

April 26, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/mattis-us-would-regret-delegating-security-

in-syria-to-a-force-with-no-american-involvement/2018/04/26/527a3b86-4966-11e8-ad53-

d5751c8f243f_story.html?utm_term=.8fd4feda1e67.

Reuters, “Turkey’s Erdogan Says France is Abetting Terrorists,” April 7, 2018,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-france/turkeys-erdogan-says-france-is-abetting-terrorists-

idUSKBN1HE0KP.

Tamer El-Ghobashy, “How American Neglect Imperils the Victory over ISIS,”

New York Times,

April

19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/syria/raqqa-residents-abandoned-

and-forgotten/?utm_term=.fc52699ec394.

ReliefWeb,

Syria Crisis: Northeast Syria, Situation Report No. 23,

report of the UN Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 15, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-

republic/syria-crisis-northeast-syria-situation-report-no-23-15-march-15-april.

Stabilization Assistance Review,

A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government

Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,

2018,

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283589.pdf.

U.S. Embassy in Syria, “Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria,” U.S.

Embassy in Syria, January 17, 2018, https://sy.usembassy.gov/remarks-way-forward-united-states-

regarding-syria-2/.

Karoun Demirjian, “Senators Release Bipartisan Proposal to Reauthorize Use of Force against Non-

State Groups,”

Washington Post,

April 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senators-

release-bipartisan-proposal-to-reauthorize-use-of-force-against-non-state-

groups/2018/04/16/31396e64-41ce-11e8-bba2-

0976a82b05a2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b55f02853f64.

Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “As Trump Talks of Leaving Syria, His Top Commander in the Middle

East Emphasizes the Need to Stay,”

Washington Post,

April 4, 2018,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-trump-talks-of-leaving-syria-his-top-

commander-in-the-middle-east-emphasizes-the-need-to-stay/2018/04/03/2ccdcff8-3753-11e8-8fd2-

49fe3c675a89_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9fda3902e276.

Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and

global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future.

Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges

conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future

through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics,

health care, technology, culture, and law.

Hudson seeks to guide public policy makers and global leaders in government

and business through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy

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