Udenrigsudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
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Policy memo by Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Jonas Parello-Plesner
Stabilizing Raqqa
On December 11, 2017 Hudson Institute convened a closed-door workshop with a distinguished
group of stabilization and Syria experts including current and former administration officials,
diplomats from key IS-Coalition partner countries, and Syrian opposition representatives.
The aim of the workshop was two-fold: to critically examine short-term stabilization as well as
longer term governance challenges in liberated Raqqa, and to cast a prospective look at the
possible proxy conflicts around Raqqa between the US, Syrian regime, Iran, Russia, Turkey and
the Kurds. The end of the counter IS military campaign in Raqqa is exacerbating fault lines
among these key players, some of which have the potential to cause new conflicts in Syria.
Turkey, a NATO-ally and Counter-IS Coalition member, is disgruntled about the Kurdish
influence in Raqqa. Iran and the Assad regime want American forces to leave. Increasingly, also
Russia speaks of the US presence as illegitimate. Yet the continued American military presence
also secures protection for Counter-IS Coalition stabilization activities in and around Raqqa and
for on the ground influence on Syria’s future. Russia has its own outreach to the Syrian Kurds
with the possibility of inserting itself as mediator. In short, winning the peace in Raqqa might
become harder than the military campaign to defeat IS.
Below are some of the key take-aways and recommendations for the US and Counter-IS
Coalition members selected and compiled by Hudson Institute, Senior Fellow, Jonas Parello-
Plesner
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Key Takeaways and Recommendations
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IS in its prior form is military almost defeated
but will not disappear and continue to be a
threat
in insurgency-mode.
Therefore, the total defeat of IS will require continued Counter-
IS Coalition counterterrorism (CT) operations. Stabilizing Raqqa and improving governance
in order to address local grievances, could improve the chances of defeating IS, which
exploits chaos.
Stabilization and governance in Raqqa
and surrounding areas are now, rightly, an
important focus for the Counter-IS Coalition. The city was symbolically important for IS as a
capital. Therefore, it is equally symbolically
important that Raqqa is rendered stable
enough for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return and that the city
doesn’t anew become the breeding ground or refuge for extremism.
The Counter-IS Coalition, through its working group on stabilization (Germany/UAE as co-
leads), should devise a communications strategy to explain to the broader public the need to
pivot to non-kinetic efforts in particular stabilization as a primary focus for Counter-IS
Coalition.
Counter-IS Coalition members, particularly Europeans, should engage more on Raqqa
stabilization
even if risks are high and push-back from Turkey is possible.
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A great thanks to research assistant Katelyn Gough for both working diligently on the workshop and on assistance
in producing this report. The recommendations do not necessarily represent a consensus among participants and
the author takes responsibility for this final product.
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Policy memo by Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Jonas Parello-Plesner
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A major challenge for stabilization in Raqqa is Kurdish military and civilian dominance
through the SDF and the Raqqa Civilian Council (RCC), which creates potential for conflict
with the majority Sunni Arab local population. Suggested measures to mitigate potential
conflict include:
o
Securing local elections to ‘make Sunni Arab majority capable of voting Kurds out
peacefully,’ as one participant expressed. Local elections should be accompanied by
US encouragement to the Syrian Kurds to devolve authority to Arabs and local tribes.
In tandem, these measures
could gradually reduce the geographical expanse of
Kurdish-controlled territory. In addition, it could potentially prevent the YPG from
using the future status of Raqqa as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the
Assad regime and/or Russia.
o
Continuing efforts to include elements of the alternate Raqqa Council based in
Turkey to address Turkey’s concerns.
o
Simultaneously, and more broadly, the US and other C-ISIS partners could engage
PYD on changing party structure and severing links with the PKK, thus creating long-
term options for reconciliation between Turkey and Syrian Kurds. Turkish relations
with the KRG demonstrate that this isn’t impossible.
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Another challenge is that in Syria/Raqqa, there is no reliable government partner
(opposite the case in Iraq/stabilization) and there is no collective UN-led coordination.
Need to think creatively and
employ smaller multilateral settings
such as
Syria Recovery Trust Fund (understandably difficult with Turkey’s
opposition) and a Raqqa donor-consortium through the Counter-IS Coalition.
Gulf partners in the Counter-IS Coalition should increase funding for
stabilization in Raqqa. Such support would also be welcome signaling to
temper Turkey’s opposition.
Pass assistance through civil society and employ a bottom-up approach
including buying materials for stabilization locally to foster economic growth
and bolster local markets.
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Immediate stabilization efforts should focus on the removal of unexploded remnants of
war and mines (ERW/IED)
left primarily by IS. ERW/IED threats make it impossible for
displaced people to return. Again, funding for this needs diversification of donors, also out of
burden sharing with the US, so that there are resources left for the next phase of stabilization.
Long-term stabilization efforts should be multi-faceted and address broader
governance.
There is worry that US and Counter-IS Coalition engagement in Raqqa will be
only address essential services. There is also a need for education — to counter IS
brainwashing of the young generation, and on psycho-social trauma. Finally, property
disputes and health care were mentioned by Syrian participants. Without addressing these,
displaced persons won’t return. There is possibility for general expectation gap with local
population in Raqqa on what stabilization might bring versus reconstruction, where the US
won’t engage inter alia because it is seen as part of nation-building. Raqqa is symbolically so
important to make inhabitable again so there should be some flexibility on the stabilization
vs. reconstruction divide. As the freshly minted National Security Strategy puts it “instability
and weak governance threaten U.S. interests.”
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 URU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 60: Spm. om, fremsendelse af en liste over alle tidligere publikationer produceret af en dansk sekunderet ansat ved Hudson-Institute, til ministeren for udviklingssamarbejde
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Policy memo by Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Jonas Parello-Plesner
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On a broader strategic level, stabilizing Raqqa raises the question of how the city fits into
evolving discussions about Syria’s future and possible new conflict lines. Will Iran and/or the
Syrian regime test US resolve to stay and support local partners in SDF? Will Russia insert
itself as a new mediator with Syrian Kurds? Will Turkey lose patience and attack Kurds in
the north? Many possible negative scenarios abound.
US Syria strategy
is still under internal consideration in administration. There is
acknowledgement that priorities are often contradictory in nature (working with Russia might
not further pushing back on Iran; working with SDF complicates relations with Turkey, and
is withholding Western reconstruction funds enough leverage to get Assad to agree to
transition in the Geneva-framework?).
o
Many participants saw a clear need for the US and Counter-IS Coalition to stay in
Syria also militarily but
warned of substituting general strategy for a pure
counterterrorism focus.
o
President Trump has placed strong priority on defeating IS. This suggests a lesser, not
greater role for US in Syria in the next period. Yet, a
rapid time-conditioned
withdrawal of US troops as IS is militarily defeated could make it more likely for
regime/Iran to test the US militarily in Raqqa and/or for the re-emergence of
ISIS.
o
Cooperating with Russia may not bring results for the US in Syria:
Putin wants to
make Russia great again in the Middle East and beyond. It means coming out on top
of the Syria conflict and diminishing the US. Even if desirable, it would be
impossible to disentangle Russia from Iran, which is the Russian partner on the
ground. And they are strategically united in their desire to push out the US. Thus,
Russia can’t be expected to assist the US in curbing Iran.
o
Stay the ground in IS-liberated areas such as Raqqa– also as leverage for Syria’s
political transition.
And perceive the relations with the Syrian Kurds as continued
US leverage also in Syria’s political transition and not just as a counter ISIS short-
term partner. The alternative would be to leave the mediation to the Russians who
could use Kurds as one among several wedges for long-term influence over NATO-
ally Turkey. Paradoxically, the US
should double down on maintaining relations with
the Syrian Kurds. To be sure, the relationship will be a continued irritant to the Turks.
However, if handled deftly, the Americans could demonstrate to Ankara that having
them as a mediator is far preferable to Putin. The relatively warm relations between
the Turks and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq demonstrate that Kurdish-
Turkish enmity is not set in stone.
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