UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
UUI Alm.del Bilag 18
Offentligt

Country Report

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI)

7 / 2018

Ethiopia

Political situation and

treatment of opposition

September 2018

Report based on interviews in Ethiopia

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

The Danish Immigration Service

Ryesgade 53

2100 Copenhagen

Denmark

Phone: +45 35 36 66 00

newtodenmark.dk

September 2018

Alle rettigheder tilhører Udlændingestyrelsen.

Udgivelsen kan frit hentes på nyidanmark.dk

Udlændingestyrelsens udgivelser kan frit citeres med tydelig kildegengivelse

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Content

Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 2

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 3

Executive summary ................................................................................................................................ 4

Introduction and methodology ............................................................................................................... 5

Background..................................................................................................................................... 7

State(s) of Emergency ..................................................................................................................... 8

Human rights situation .................................................................................................................... 9

Situation of political prisoners ....................................................................................................... 12

Treatment of opposition groups .................................................................................................... 13

Political youth organisations ......................................................................................................... 15

Situation of student organisations ................................................................................................. 15

Forced recruitment ....................................................................................................................... 16

Situation of the diaspora ............................................................................................................... 17

Appendix A: meeting notes .................................................................................................................. 18

International researcher .............................................................................................................................. 18

National researcher ..................................................................................................................................... 20

British Embassy ............................................................................................................................................ 26

EU ................................................................................................................................................................. 32

U.S. Embassy ................................................................................................................................................ 35

International NGO ....................................................................................................................................... 39

Danish Refugee Council ............................................................................................................................... 45

The Fortune, national newspaper ............................................................................................................... 48

Blogger ......................................................................................................................................................... 51

Human Rights Commission .......................................................................................................................... 56

Appendix B: Sources consulted ............................................................................................................. 58

Appendix C: Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 59

Appendix E: Terms of reference ............................................................................................................ 61

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Disclaimer

This report was written in accordance with the European Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) Country of Origin

Information (COI) report methodology

.The report is based on approved notes from meetings with carefully

selected interlocutors.

This report is not a detailed or comprehensive survey of all aspects of the issues covered in the terms of

reference and should be considered alongside other available country of origin information on the General

political situation and treatment of opposition.

The information contained in this report has been gathered and presented with utmost care.

The report does not include any policy recommendations or analysis. The information in the report does

not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service (DIS).

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim for

protection, which will need to be considered on its individual facts. Terminology used should not be

regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2012). EASO Country of Origin Information report

methodology

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Abbreviations

ARRA

AVR

CRRF

CSO

DIS

DRC

ENDF

EPRDF

IDP

IOM

INGO

NGO

MFA

OCHA

ODF

OFC

OLF

ONLF

OPDO

TOR

TPLF

UNDP

UNHCR

VERA

VPN

Administration for Refugee & Returnee Affairs

Assisted Voluntary Return

Comprehensive Refugees Response Framework

Civil Society Organisation

Danish Immigration Service

Danish Refugee Council

Ethiopian National Defence Force

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

Internally displaced person

International Organization for Migration

International Non-governmental organisation

Non-governmental organisation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Oromo Democratic Front

Oromo Federalist Congress

Oromo Liberation Front

Ogaden National Liberation Front

Oromo People Democratic Organisation

The Onion Router

Tigrayan People's Liberation Front

United Nations

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Vital Events Registration Agency

Virtual private network

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Executive summary

In February 2018 the Government of Ethiopia proclaimed a six months State of Emergency; only six months

after the previous one had ended. This State of Emergency was supposed to remain in force until mid-

August but was lifted in June 2018 at the initiative of the newly elected Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

Whereas the previous State of Emergency was characterised by civil unrest in the regional states of Oromia,

Amhara and Somali and by the arrest of numerous civilians, there were fewer violent riots and security

incidents across the country during the last State of Emergency. It was imposed with less use of violence

although there still had been instances where the authorities had shown force in the handling of

protesters.

Immediately after his nomination Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the incoming administration had

signaled a reformist policy. This was followed by the release of political prisoners, the closing of the

Maekelawi prison, officially known as the Federal Police Crime Investigation and Forensic Sector, and the

removal of three opposition groups from the national list of terrorist organisations. The new administration

also decided to unblock a number of websites, blogs and radio and TV-stations – including two diaspora TV

stations – which were previously unavailable to the population. These decisions had widened the political

space in Ethiopia and could lead to an improvement in the human rights situation, including for members of

the opposition. This development had inspired a cautious optimism among observers of the political

situation in Ethiopia as the new administration had announced that it will take human rights more

seriously. However, at the same time violence, ethnic clashes and abuses may continue at local level.

The overall situation for opposition parties has improved following the nomination of Prime Minister Abiy

Ahmed. This relative improvement also included the youth branches of those opposition parties. The

oppositions groups OLF, ONLF and Ginbot 7 had been removed from the national list of terrorist

organisations and their leadership had been invited to return to participate in political discussions. OLF and

Ginbot 7 leaders had accepted the invitation and returned to Ethiopia. Both the OLF and the ONLF had

been weakened over the past three years and lost political and military influence.

Since January 2018 the number of mass demonstrations in which students had been shot at and detained

by the authorities had decreased and the overall situation for students who were active in student

organisations had improved.

The Ethiopian diaspora’s activities are monitored by the authorities. This includes their activities on

Facebook, YouTube and personal blogs. Ethiopian citizen who participate in anti-government

demonstrations in Europe or in the US were likely to be video-taped and thereby having their participation

in such events documented; this surveillance would also extend to Ethiopians who had obtained a new

nationality. After the nomination of the new Prime Minister, the situation for the diaspora is less

threatening. Members of the diaspora who decide to return to Ethiopia are allowed to reintegrate into

society as citizens, and open private businesses.

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Introduction and methodology

This report is based on interviews with sources in Ethiopia conducted by the COI Division, DIS in Addis

Ababa, from 17 - 23 May 2018. The purpose of the mission was to collect up to date information on the

general political situation as well as on the treatment of members of the opposition, on documents and on

issues of citizenship. In addition to the visit to the capital a short visit to the Hitsats refugee camps in Shire

with the purpose of being informed about the context and procedures of relevance for the issuance of legal

documents about vital events. All findings regarding documents and citizenships are reported in a separate

report.

The present report focuses on the political situation in Ethiopia and the ways different opposition groups as

well as people related to members of these groups are treated. A few weeks after our visit, the political

situation in Ethiopia changed –the State of Emergency was lifted early and contact with the leadership of

Eritrea was resumed. To reflect this development, all interlocutors who had been interviewed about the

political situation in the country were invited by email to comment on the new situation and share their

assessment of the implications for the human rights situation, especially for members of different

opposition groups.

The terms of reference for the mission were drawn up by DIS in consultation with the Danish Refugee

Appeals Board Secretariat as well as a Danish advisory group on COI

. The terms of reference are included

at Appendix C to this report. The report draws on methodological guidance from the European Asylum

Support Office (EASO) Country of Origin Information report methodology

In the process of compiling this report, the delegation interviewed ten sources, comprising representatives

from Western embassies, academia, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), national authorities as well

as a human rights blogger who had first hand-experience with opposition to the regime. The Danish

Embassy in Addis Ababa provided valuable assistance in identifying some of the interlocutors relevant to

the terms of reference. The Danish Embassy also offered logistical and technical assistance throughout the

mission. The sources interviewed were selected by the delegation based on their expertise, merit and

experience relevant to the mission. In addition to the empirical data material gathered from the interviews,

the report is also based on available reports as well as academic articles of relevance for the terms of

reference.

The sources consulted are listed in Appendix B. The interviews were conducted in English. In some, but not

all, of the interviews the DIS delegation were joined by two staff members from the Danish National ID

Centre who collected background information on the topic of issuance procedures of documents in

Ethiopia.

The group consists of Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International in Denmark, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Dignity,

representatives of Danish European Mission and Open Doors, the National Commissioner of Police and the Danish Bar and Law

Society (representing asylum lawyers)

European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2012). EASO Country of Origin Information report methodology

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Prior to the interviews all interlocutors were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the mission and the

fact that their statements would be included in a report to be made publically available.

The interlocutors were asked how they wished to be introduced and quoted, and all sources are introduced

and quoted according to their own wishes. Some sources are referred by the name of their organisation; in

accordance with their own request on this matter. Four sources preferred anonymity.

The meeting notes were validated by the sources. All notes were forwarded to the interlocutors for their

approval and amendment, allowing the opportunity to offer corrections or make comment on their

statements. All sources but the blogger responded and approved their statements. This source was

contacted by email and informed that the delegation would include the note in the report if no response

was received by the deadline. The delegation never received any response.

The report is a synthesis of the sources' statements supplemented with key publications of relevance for

the topics of this report. Care has been taken to present the views of the interlocutors as accurately and

transparently as possible and reference is made by number to the specific paragraphs in the meeting notes

in foot notes in the report. All sources’ approved statements are found in their full extent in Appendix A of

this report. Based on a manual retrieval of the complete set of meeting notes, a thematic analysis has been

conducted and the findings are presented in the following chapters of this report.

The report was finalised in September 2018 and is available on the websites of DIS

www.newtodenmark.dk

. This means that it is equally available to all stakeholders in the refugee status

determination process as well as to the general public.

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

1. Background

A short history of political violence

1.1. Ethiopia has a well-documented history of political driven violence: civil unrest and violent

repression have accompanied the transition of a multi-ethnic former empire into a modern nation-

state

. Successive regimes – from the imperial administration (spanning from 1890 – 1974) to the

socialist development state, the

Derg,

(1974 – 1991) and up to today’s

democratic developmental

state

led by the Marxist inspired Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

– has

consistently used rough violence against individual citizens and opposition groups

. According to a

political scientist who has observed the political history of Ethiopia, the continuity in the use of

violence is a key factor in understanding how governance has been exercised in Ethiopia

throughout time

. The same researcher stated that in Ethiopia political change has always

happened as a result of the use of violent confrontation rather than as a result of compromise

between those with power and those without power.

1.2. Central to this history of violence in Ethiopia are interregional confrontations over political

representation and resources. Many of these confrontations are acted out as localised inter-

communal violence between different ethnic groups: Ethiopia is a linguistically and culturally

diverse country of more than 80 ethnicities/nationalities

. In order to keep the country together

Ethiopia’s new administrative structure has been built on the principle of ethnic federalism. The

core of these principles is that the nine regional states of Ethiopia to a certain extent have self-

rule, have the right to elect their leadership and use their own language

. According to several

interlocutors, ethnicity remains an engine for political conflict

. According to an international NGO

this was increasingly the case: ethnic competition and mistrust can be felt at all levels of society,

including in organisations where much efforts have been invested in creating a workplace free of

ethno-nationalist sentiments. To illustrate this phenomenon the representative of an international

NGO referred to an example of a staff member of Tigrinya descent who expressed fear of being

physically abused and attached by the mob if they travelled to Oromia where people of Tigrinya

ethnicity are intensely disliked

1.3. The regional states where most violent tensions and mass protests have taken place over time are

Amhara, Oromia, which surrounds the capital, and Somalia Region, also known as Ogaden

. Even

though the claims raised by protesters from Amhara, Oromia and Ogaden are far from uniform

they all challenge the unity of the country and they contest how political representation and

Verhoeven, H. (2016). Behind the Violence in Ethiopia, Landinfo (2014). Ethiopia: Studentprotester fram til 2014

Hagmann T. and Korf B. (2012). Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali frontier

International researcher: 3

In Ethiopia the terms ‘ethnicities’ and ‘nationalities’ are used interchangeably (British Embassy: 44). This is based on

a marxist understanding of nationality and ethnic identity

Hagmann T. and Korf B. (2012). Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali frontier

National researcher: 30, British Embassy: 44, US Embassy: 83

International NGO: 107

British Embassy: 44, Hagmann T. and Korf B. (2012). Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and sovereignty in the

Ethiopian-Somali

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

economic growth have benefitted the Tigrayans, a minority ethnic group

disproportionally over

other population groups

1.4. According to the international researcher, it is the revolutionary past of the EPRDF that is key to

understanding how the party gains legitimacy and how the EPRDF dominated regime operates

when it is confronted with civil unrest and interregional confrontation. Since it defeated the

military dictatorship back in 1991, EPRDF and its satellite parties in the regional states has fought

hard to prevent the federal state from disintegrating, especially since Eritrea left Ethiopia following

the referendum in 1993

, and to maintain state sovereignty in the federal states. EPRDF is

composed of four political parties but it has been dominated by the founding ethnic group, the

Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), representing the Tigrayans

. The means to do so have

included use of violence against opposition, ethnic federalism and state led-development. Ethiopia

has been praised by the international community for the government’s ability to attract

investments and development projects that has fostered economic growth

. However, it has also

been pointed out that this economic growth of up to 10 percent per year has not benefitted the

population equally: the uneven distribution of economic progress has created a growing social

stratification and increased frustration in the population

. Further to the unequal distribution of

wealth, the Government has also failed to create enough jobs. Ethiopia has a very young

population –the median age is 18 – which means that an additional two million young people

enter the labour market every year, many after having graduated from university. However, there

are enough jobs to absorb this labour supply, and the jobs, which are created, are factory or sweat

shop jobs, not jobs that can fulfil the expectations of a well-educated young workforce

2. State(s) of Emergency

2.1. States of emergency are far from an exception in Ethiopia. On 9 October 2016 the then

government proclaimed a six months State of Emergency, which was lifted only ten months later

in August 2017

. This occurred in a situation of intense civil unrest and mass protest in Oromia,

Somali and Amhara regional states where demonstrators called for political reforms. Many

protesters and activists were arrested and charged under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation

. Six

months later followed another state of emergency, which was declared by the Council of Ministers

The Tigrayans are a minority group which represents about six percent of the population

British Embassy: 44

After decades of civil war, a UN monitored independence referendum was held 23-25 April 1993. There were

1,173,706 registered voters and almost 100% voted for independence from Ethiopia. See African Elections Database

(undated). Eritrea: 23-25 April 1993 Independence Referendum

International researcher: 4

Verhoeven, H. (2016). Behind the Violence in Ethiopia

International researcher: 6

British Embassy: 38

Human Rights Watch (2016). Ethiopia: State of Emergency Risks New Abuses, Human Rights Watch (2017). State of

Emergency Ends in Ethiopia

Amnesty International (2018). Annex : Commentary on Ethiopian State of Emergency

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

on 16 February, 2018 and adopted by the country’s federal parliament

. It was supposed to

remain in force until mid-August, 2018 but this State of Emergency was lifted in June 2018 – two

month earlier than expected. This happened at the initiative of the newly elected Prime Minister

Abiy Ahmed after a law had been passed saying that law and order had been restored in the

country

2.2. The majority of the interlocutors agreed that the State of Emergency, which had been imposed

across Ethiopia in February 2018 had been implemented with ‘a softer hand’ than the previous

State of Emergency

. The national researcher stated that the Government had shown ‘relative

tolerance and restrain in its use of force against peaceful demonstrators’

. The number of violent

riots and security incidents across the country had been reduced although both NGO-

representatives underlined that there still had been instances where the authorities had ‘shown

force’ in the handling of protesters

. It was commonly agreed that the incoming Prime Minister

Abiy Ahmed had sharply broken with the policy of the past by reaching out to the opposition and

shown signs of reformist policy

3. Human rights situation

3.1. General

3.1.1. All of those interlocutors, who commented on the situation after the delegation had left

Ethiopia, confirmed that the State of Emergency had been lifted and that this constituted a

significant development

. Furthermore, one source emphasised that the changing of the

head of the military

and the head of the intelligence demonstrated the new Prime

Minister’s authority and willingness to live up to the promises he had made after his

nomination

. Whereas some observers noted that the lifting of the State of emergency could

lead to an improvement in the human rights situation

, the well informed diplomatic source

representing the British Embassy called for caution by stating that the premature lifting of the

State of Emergency did not per se have any clear impact (neither negative nor positive) on the

current human rights situation, including for members of the opposition

. A recurrent

expression to describe the situation even before the State of Emergency was lifted was that

of ‘cautious optimism’ and hope

Amnesty International (2018). Annex : Commentary on Ethiopian State of Emergency

CNN (2018). Ethiopia lifts state of emergency two months early

EU: 63, 72, national researcher: 14, British Embassy: 41, 42, Danish Refugee Council: 118, blogger: 147

National researcher: 11

Danish Refugee Council: 118, international NGO: 100

International researcher: 1, British Embassy: 42, US Embassy: 79, 80, international NGO: 95

International researcher: 1, national researcher: 12, British Embassy: 36, EU: 63, international NGO: 95

The Guardian (2018). These changes are unprecedented': how Abiy is upending Ethiopian politics

International NGO: 95

International researcher: 2, national researcher: 13, the Fortune: 135

British embassy: 36

US Embassy: 79, international NGO: 100, 101, the Fortune : 135

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

3.1.2. The international NGO representative stated that new forms of ethnically driven violence had

emerged as a result of the changed power balance within the leadership of the EPDRF. The

new Prime Minister is of both Christian and Muslim background and he is the first Oromo

speaking prime minister. The novelty in this allowed for many people to read hope into the

figure of the new prime minister

. The Oromos, who are Ethiopia’s largest population group,

were pleased by the fact that ‘one of their ethnicity had reached the top level of decision

making power. Also the Amharas (the second largest population group in Ethiopia) were

content with the prime minister. However, Abiy Ahmed was elected within the EPRDF

coalition by united votes from Oromia and Amhara – that is against the two other parts of the

coalition, namely the Tigrayan and the Southerners. According to the representative of the

international NGO, these two groups were far from content with the current situation and as

a result of their frustrations violence and ethnic clashes had reoccurred. The interlocutor

found it likely that some elements from the South wished to throw out the Oromo. To

illustrate this, the NGO representative mentioned the situation in the mixed town of Hawassa

in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region. This region is the locus of large

industrial parks, some which are Chinese built, and the region has over an extended period of

time been the goal for job seeking people of various ethnic backgrounds from across the

country. They come together in the factories as workers but there has been civil unrest and

social tensions with violent protests, clashes, vandalism (burn of property and cars), which

has led to an additional 16,000 internally displaced persons since mid-June 2018

. According

to a report issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA and

the National Disaster Risk Management Commission in June 2018

, more than one million

people had been internally displaced as a result of conflict and in dire need of humanitarian

assistance, as per mid-April 2018

. The international researcher concurred that even though

the new government had announced that it will take human rights more seriously human

rights violations and abuses are likely to continue for some time at local level

3.2.

Human rights situation in refugee camps

3.2.1.The US Embassy representatives emphasised that the human rights situation has not

improved in the refugee camps: here the situation was precarious and the security situation

volatile: revenge killings occur with impunity inside the camps

. Danish Refugee Council

added – with specific reference to the situation in Hitsats refugee camp in Shire near the

border to Eritrea – that the material conditions of and the social rehabilitation activities in the

camps have improved significantly, especially for the unaccompanied minors and separated

children who now benefited from better shelters and social rehabilitation activities. These

improvements had had an immediate positive effect on the living conditions for people in

these camps. However, the same source also added that for people in the refugees camps the

long term perspectives were still not good as there were no job prospects or living

International NGO: 96, 108, Danish Refugee Council: 119

International NGO: 97

OCHA (2018). Ethiopia: Oromio-Somali Conflict –Induced displacement

International NGO: 97

International researcher: 2

US Embassy: 84, 85

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

opportunities for people residing in the camps. Also, there was no electricity in the camps and

they lacked running water

3.3.

Freedom of speech

3.3.1. Following the lifting of the State of Emergency in June 2018, the Government decided to

unblock a number of websites, blogs and radio and TV-stations, which were previously

unavailable to the population, at least through legal channels

. According to the national

researcher, this included the two diaspora based TV stations ESAT and OMN

. This decision

was seen as important

. Both researchers found that the political space in Ethiopia had been

widened as a consequence of this decision

. The fact that the new government had

announced that it wishes to take human rights more seriously, was seen by the international

researcher as ‘a very promising sign’. However, he also emphasised that even though the

development at national level was positive, at local level, rights violations and abuses are

likely to continue for some time. It was, in his opinion, too early to say whether the federal

reform agenda will translate into new realities on the ground

3.4. Human rights Commission

3.4.1. Ethiopia has a Human Rights Commission established by the Parliament and equipped with a

mandate to monitor the human rights violations in Ethiopia

. The commission may

investigate complaints raised by or on behalf of any person who has been sent to prison or

detained by the police. The Commission will only investigate individual cases and operates

through eight branch offices and offers legal advice through a hotline telephone service for

free. The representative of the Human Rights Commission noted that the Commission

received more than 2,000 complaints (cases) per year. The Commission has four staff

members dedicated to the Commission’s hotline where they offer advice, and they can bring

cases before the commissioners. The amount of complaints submitted to the Commission had

been constant over the past two and a half years. In 2017 it was 2,000 and in 2016 the

Commission received 2,500 Complaints. These, however, do not include complaints and

advices from the hotlines

3.4.2. According to a human rights activist from civil society, the Human Rights Commission

contributed to minimalise and justify human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian

authorities. He elaborated that the Commission would typically conduct a report that

described how the police had used proportionate power to stop violence. However, this was

seldom the case. For example the source had written to the Commission about five cases

where the police had used disproportionate power, but the Commission rejected the cases.

Danish Refugee Council: 129

RSF – Reporters Sans Frontières (2018). Ethiopian government unblocks 264 websites and blogs

National researcher: 13

International researcher: 2, national researcher: 13, British Embassy: 37, international NGO: 100

International researcher: 2, national researcher: 11

International researcher: 2

Human Rights Commission: 172

Human Rights Commission: 179

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

This occurred back in 2016

. The same source pointed to the limited capacity and outreach of

the Commission: it was underfunded and the reports issued by the Commission would reach

only a very limited audience. Thus these reports were not serving the purpose of informing

policy making

4. Situation of political prisoners

4.1. Prime Minister Abiy had soon after his nomination announced the release of people who had been

arbitrarily detained in prison. The majority of the interlocutors confirmed that an unspecified

number – but at least several thousands and up to 10,000 according to Amnesty International

–

had been released from prison after Prime Minister Abiy’s entry into office

. The released include

journalists, human rights activists and prominent politicians. The EU source estimated the number

of people being detained to approximately 30,000 out of which approximately 10,000 had been

released by the new administration

. The US Embassy emphasised that the new administration

had still not lived up to its promise of liberating all political prisoners and opposition leaders and

the national researcher explained that a number of detainees had simply ‘been forgotten’ and

remained in prison

4.2. According to the national researcher, the parliament passed a Bill of Amnesty in June 2018

that

annuls the charges against all individuals, at home and abroad, except those who are charged with

murder and rape

. Effective immediately, the Bill requires these individuals to report to the

Attorney General within six months to be eligible for the “certificate of amnesty”, which will serve

as a guarantee for their freedom upon their return to the community. This bill has far reaching

significance as it literally frees many of those who fled the country since the mid-1970s until 8 June

2018

4.3. The EU representative underlined the contradictory elements of the new situation: whereas

10,000 of political prisoners had been released, others were still arrested by the police on political

grounds. As another example, the source referred to an incident where one opposition leader was

released from prison and was going to address his people in his home town. He was subsequently

detained by the federal police, who stated that he was not allowed to address his people.

Blogger: 170

Blogger: 171

Amnesty International (2018). Ethiopia 2017/18

International researcher: 1, national researcher : 15, British Embassy: 47, EU: 73, international NGO: 110, Danish

Refugee Council: 120

EU: 73

National researcher: 15, US Embassy: 81

The Addis Standard (2018). Ethiopian Parliament Passes Amnesty Bill Into Law. 28 June 2018

National researcher: 18

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However, the regional police did not agree with the federal position, which resulted in a stand-off

between federal and regional police

4.4. According to the majority of the sources interviewed, the Maekelawi prison in Addis Ababa – also

known as the Federal Police Crime Investigation and Forensic Sector– had been closed by the

authorities

. This was perceived as an important symbolic gesture because of the brutal history of

the incarceration facility. However, the national researcher also indicated that a new prison

outside of the capital had been constructed and that detainees were being transferred to this

facility. One source noted that the employees who had used torture to punish detainees in

Maekelawi still worked for the government

5. Treatment of

opposition groups

5.1. Recent situation

5.1.1.The overall situation for opposition groups has improved following the nomination of Prime

Minister Abiy, according to the majority of the interviewed sources

. According to media

reports, charges against opposition leaders were dropped in May and subsequently the

Parliament voted in favour of a law, which removed three important opposition groups –OLF,

ONLF and Ginbot 7 – from the national list of terrorist organisations

and that was confirmed

by sources

. According to the British Embassy, it is indicative of a new political climate that

the Prime Minister, in addition to having lifted terrorism charges against opposition groups,

also has invited them to return to Ethiopia to participate in political discussions. Both OLF

(Jawar Mohammed, US Diaspora) and Patriotic Ginbot 7 (Andargachew Tsege, British

Diaspora, who until recently was serving a life sentence in Ethiopia, and was cleared of

crimes) have returned to Ethiopia

5.2. Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

5.2.1. The OLF is active in the struggle for the liberation of Oromia region, the most populous

region of Ethiopia with approximately 35 percent of the population

. Two sources stated that

the OLF was not active as a political party any more in Ethiopia: over the past three years

people had distanced themselves from the party out of fear of repercussions and that the

leadership of the party had exiled to Eritrea

. Previously, several sources concurred, it was

connected to great risk for a person to be affiliated with the OLF, perceived or real affiliation,

and this risk would also extend to family members of any person perceived to be an OLF

EU: 75

National researcher: 19, EU: 74, blogger: 151

National researcher: 19

International researcher: 1, national researcher: 12, British Embassy: 48, EU: 78, Danish Refugee Council: 121, the

Fortune: 138, blogger: 167

Africa News (2018).

Ethiopia removes 'terrorist' label from OLF, ONLF and Ginbot 7 opposition groups

National researcher: 22

British Embassy: 36

UK Home Office (2017). Country Policy and Guidance Note Ethiopia: Oromos including the ‘Oromo Protests’

National researcher: 20, 21, 23, blogger: 152

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activist

. ‘Involvement’ could be as little as receiving a suspicious email or phone call

During the previous State of Emergency which was declared in February 2018, the authorities

arrested ‘a very high amount of people’ suspected of being involved with activities of one of

the organisations on the national list of terrorist organisations

. The goal seemed to be to

enforce the law through the arrest of ‘as many as possible’ and therefore it has historically

been impossible to determine whether a detainee was in reality member of an opposition

group, a sympathiser or without any connection according to the representative of the British

Embassy

. With the arrival of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the situation seemed to have

changed in that he had expressed a desire to include dissenting voices in politics and had

invited leaders from OLF to Addis Ababa. Jawar Mohammed, based in the US diaspora, had

accepted this invitation

5.3. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

5.3.1.The ONLF has since the mid-1990s been engaged in conflicts against Ethiopian troops in the

Somali Region located in the periphery of Ethiopia

. As a political entity, the ONLF has been

weakened over the past years although not to the same extent as the OLF according to the

national researcher

. He further elaborated that in terms of military power, ONLF has also

been weakened lately in that its military outreach capacity has diminished. This weakening

follows a combination of political, economic, and military strategies adopted by the

Government following the attack on a Chinese oilfield in 2007, and which led to the death of

65 Ethiopians and seven Chinese

. This attack had serious repercussions in the Ethiopian

Somali region and the counter-insurgency campaign by the security forces led to a ‘close

down’ of the regional state. This effectively took the sting out of the ONLF manoeuvring

capacity and the organisation also lost important sanctuaries in Somalia and Kenya

5.3.2. According to the national researcher, the risk of persecution by the authorities for a person

who is associated with ONLF would entail a high risk. This risk extends to a person outside of

Ethiopia – or at least in a ‘friendly country’. To illustrate this risk, the interlocutor mentioned

the case of a medical doctor, residing in the Somali region, who had been arrested by the

police. The reason behind this arrest was apparently his affiliation with an uncle, who resided

in Minnesota and was a prominent and active member of the Diaspora community there. This

uncle was engaged in organising anti-government protests over the internet. This affiliation

apparently led to the arrest of the medical doctor back in the Somali region

. Another source,

confirmed that at the point of time of the interview (May 2018) a member of the ONLF would

National researcher: 21, British Embassy: 48, the Fortune: 138

The Fortune: 138

National researcher: 21

British Embassy: 48

British Embassy: 36, the Guardian (2018). Jawar Mohammed's red-carpet return signals Ethiopia's political sea

change

UK Home Office (2017). Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Opposition to the government

National researcher: 24

See also Hagmann and Korf 2012:209

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26.

The Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) has a youth branch and its leader, Prof Merera Gudina

who is also a leader of the opposition coalition, was arrested in 2015-2016, accused of

initiation of anti-government demonstrations. He has now been released with others.

27.

Asked about the risk that a known member of a political youth organisation from the

opposition might be exposed to as a consequence of their political engagement, the source

said that it was uncertain. With the new Prime Minister things were up in the open and the

Government seemed undecided on which measures to use against youth organisations and

their members. The rhetoric of the Prime Minister invites people to express themselves freely

and that a difference of opinion is not a problem in itself but it is still too early to tell how this

will be acted out in reality.

Liuy Police

28.

The interlocutor was only knowledgeable about the functioning and actions by the Liuy police

by information gathered from social media and diaspora websites. It is a regional special

paramilitary force, which has been established by the federal government to fight counter-

insurgency against the ONLF and it is known to be composed of former ONLF fighters among

others. The researcher did not believe that forced recruitment to the Liuy police took place;

he believed men were recruited by offering them money and power.

29.

Asked about forced recruitment to the Ethiopian army, the source stated that it does not

exist.

Treatment of pupils and university students

30.

According to the interlocutor, the majority of university students who participate in mass

demonstrations were not motivated by a profound political conviction when they go on the

streets; rather they are young people who join a movement for multiple reasons without

devoting much critical awareness to the cause of the demonstration. Most of the students

were being mobilised via the social media, in particular Facebook, and via text messages, and

the researcher found that in reality there was a thin line between a social and a political

gathering and the motivations behind their participation would then often converge. Students

often gathered in social events to discuss the misery of the country and their own situation

but these discussions have increasingly taken an ethnic turn and political issues are being

ethnicised.

31.

Concerning the risk of university students for being victims of harassment by the authorities,

the source opined that the risk seemed to have decreased over the past four months. Many of

the 20,000 prisoners who have been released by the Government over the past years were

probably student activists.

32.

The ruling party is active in the universities and opposition within the university and many

university students have previously been detained, arrested and maltreated. Until recently,

the ruling party has been engaged in recruiting university students as members. Many join the

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various factions of the ruling party (depending on their ethnic background) willingly as it used

to ease their employment opportunities after graduation. This practice has been a source of

occasional conflicts and tensions among university students. The source noted that the ruling

party was engaged in recruitment while prohibiting/preventing opposition

parties/organisations doing so in universities and schools.

The Diaspora

33.

The interlocutor noted that the Government monitors the Diaspora ‘every single day’, and is

very active in this regard, because that is the only field of resistance that where Ethiopian law

cannot be enforced by the Ethiopian authorities, since they cannot physically go there. The

Diaspora community is composed of a certain number of ‘hardliners’ with no room for any

‘middle ground’. Their extremist positions might be explained by the fact that some of them

have been victims of torture and persecution in Ethiopia and forced to leave the country.

34.

It is now possible in Ethiopia to access all YouTube channels and TV programs issued by

members of the Diaspora community. This also includes their websites. What happens is that

if a person frequently uses the same VPN address, that VPN will be blocked. Thus, people

have become creative in using multiple VPNs. Even Voice of America has sponsored a VPN

connection. Now it is also possible to use TOR to access websites.

35.

The discussion about political topics as well as about corruptive practices is freer and ordinary

people are more willingly engage in political discussions. At least, this is the situation in Addis

Ababa where the atmosphere is a little bit more relaxed than in the Somali region or in

Oromia, at least in the major cities. Outside the major cities people would be more careful

about discussing politics. As there is no boundary between the Government and the ruling

party any critical discussion of certain political actions would be perceived as a criticism of the

party.

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British Embassy

Following the initial interview two additional questions were answered by July 2018:

Could you please comment on the fact that the State of Emergency which was imposed in February has

been lifted two month early (in June 2018)? To which extent does this decision affect the human rights

situation in the country, especially for members of the opposition?

36. The State of Emergency being lifted early is an indicator (along with the changing of both the

head of the military and intelligence) that the current Prime Minister has significantly more

authority that the previous one. Many political commentators did not feel the latest State of

Emergency was really necessary, and I think the Prime Minister’s confidence to lift early also

supports that theory. I do not think it has any clear impact (positive or negative) on the

Human Rights situation, including for members of the oppositions. However, the Prime

Minister has been lifted terrorism charges against “opposition groups” and has invited them

to return to Ethiopia – at this point members of both OLF (Jawar Mohammed, US Diaspora)

and Patriotic Ginbot 7 (Andargachew Tsege, British Diaspora, who until recently was serving a

life sentence in Ethiopia, and was cleared of crimes) have returned.

In your opinion, what does the fact that the Ethiopian Government has unblocked a number of websites,

blogs as well as radio and TV stations mean for the political situation in the country? To which extent does

this decision affect the human rights situation, for members of the opposition?

37. The unblocking of websites suggests the current Prime Minister has a genuine desire to

include dissenting voices in politics, and is making a best attempt at bring dissent from the

streets, civil unrest and violence and into the parliament. This is admirable; yet allowing

dissenting voices into parliament may not be enough to stop civil unrest – particularly if the

new voices are not perceived to represent those committing acts of violence. Overall I expect

a much more open environment for opposition members within Ethiopia, but this is balanced

by the likely increase in civil unrest and the potential for an increase in ethnic violence.

Addis Ababa, 17 May 2018

State of emergency

38. This interview took place in the midst of the State of emergency, which was imposed across

Ethiopia in February 2018 and gathered three participants from immigration, consular and

political unit of the embassy. The interlocutors noted that the present State of emergency had

to be evaluated in connection with the previous State of emergency, which had been lifted in

August 2017. The grievances that led to protests, which then led to the proclamation of the

previous State of Emergency, were in essence legitimate. Lack of jobs and fear for the future

was one of them. People of Ethiopia are concerned about the possibility for their children to

create a future. Ethiopia has a very young population – the median age is 18 – which means

that an additional 2 million young people enter the labour market every year, many after

having graduated from university. However, there has not been created enough jobs to

absorb this labour supply, and the jobs, which are created, does not match the qualifications

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of people with tertiary education but are rather factory or sweat shop jobs. Albeit the

Government has initiated the establishment of business parks the jobs created there only

amount to a fraction of what is needed and at a very low salary; thus parents and young

people are worried about the future. This fear fuels a general level of frustration in the

country, which contributed to mass demonstrations.

39. The interlocutors emphasised that the authorities were treating any person who might be

involved in perceived anti-government activities during and after the previous State of

emergency roughly. The authorities committed human rights abuses in the regional prisons

across all regions and there were reports of torture from the detention centres but the level

and amount of abuse varied from centre to centre. Whereas the harshness varied from place

to place, there was no region, which stood out as tangibly harsher than the other.

40. The human rights abuse occurred as a result of widespread autonomy within the local

administration eager to stop roadblocks and other anti-government activities. It did not

happen with a mandate from the Government to ‘crack-down’ on human rights. The sources

suggested, however, that the situation had changed after the nomination of Prime Minister

Abiy Ahmed. This time, the security forces have not taken steps to arrest a high number of

political activists or citizens.

41. Whereas the previous State of emergency was proclaimed as a reaction to the unrest and

security situation in Ethiopia, followed by crack-down on human rights; the second State of

emergency was, in the analysis of the interlocutors from the British embassy, driven by a wish

to take pre-emptive steps to avoid political instability. The situation has been relatively calm

since the State of Emergency was imposed across the country and the roads have, as a result

of this, been opened again. There has not been a wave of arrests, this time, rather the

opposite: People have been released.

42. The proclamation of the current State of emergency has been followed by a number of public

declarations made by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in which he promises political reforms. It

remains, however, to be seen whether the Prime Minister can deliver on the promises made.

The interlocutors emphasised that whereas the constitution does mandate reforms, the

required amount of technical capacity to carry out political and economic reform does not

seem to be available in the present pool of civil servants.

Political and human rights situation

43. Asked about the current political situation in Ethiopia, the interlocutors noted that the arrival

of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had significantly changed the situation.

44. The two main ethnic groups that have expressed grievances the loudest are the Oromos and

the Amharas. For the Oromos this was fuelled by a perception of Tigran dominance. This

perception has been around since 1991 and is to a certain extent reflective of reality,

especially during and after the revolutionary days. The Oromo people have for a long time felt

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that the Oromo People Democratic Organisation (OPDO)

was being used as a token party by

the regime. Ethiopia is an ethnic diverse country composed of over 80

ethnicities/nationalities

and this multitude constitutes a real challenge in a situation where

all of the intelligence and all important posts, including the one of prime minister, have been

held by one ethnicity: the Tigrayans. Even in cases where a top post was not occupied by a

Tigran, the perception, which was possibly true, was that the Tigran elite are right behind that

person.

45. In Amhara the perception is that Amharas want to turn the country back to the feudal system

and the Amharas feel they have been marginalised because of that kind of perception. In

addition to that, the Amharas express that they feel pushed out of their own region by the

Tigrayans. There is no census to document the current demographic situation really is.

46. At this point of time, it is unclear whether any genuine political reforms are taking place. So

far it is a matter of public declarations and announcements. The constitution is sound and the

policies are in the right direction, but it remains a question of implementation and of capacity

to deliver on promises.

Liberation of political prisoners

47. According to the participants in this meeting, many individuals who were politicians have

previously been arrested and then incarcerated based on various accusations other than

political convictions. The accusations range from terrorism to violence. The Government calls

these people politicians who are being arrested whereas the international community refers

to them as political prisoners who have been arrested because they criticised the

Government. ‘A great number’ of these imprisoned politicians have now been released as

promised by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This is being referred to by the Government as a

part of the political reforms whereas it is not, according to these interlocutors, in any way a

reform to undo something, which was never legitimate.

Treatment of opposition groups

48. The participants in this interview emphasised that the situation had changed significantly with

the arrival of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Before his nomination, it was not necessary to have

a very strong connection to Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) or the Oromo Liberation

Front (OLF) both groups, which remain on the national list of designated terrorist groups, to

be harassed by the authorities. During the previous State of emergency, the Government

arrested a very high number of people who were perceived to have any connection to

opposition groups. This might be explained by two factors: first, the Government suspected

that a very high amount of people might be involved in subversive activities; secondly, the

authorities took a law enforcement perspective from which the goal was to arrest as many as

possible, including people who might not be directly involved with anti-government activities,

The political party in the coalition of four parties which represents their interests

According to the source, the terms ethnicity and nationality are used interchangeably in Ethiopia – the full name for

Southern Nations State is Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State – and ethnicities is also used.

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simply because the authorities would rather arrest too many than too few. Therefore, it has

historically been impossible to prove whether an individual who has been arrested was in

reality member of an opposition group, who were a sympathiser and who had no connection.

49. However, the interlocutors concurred that the Government, via the security forces, would

have ‘a pretty good idea’ of who was engaged with a political organisation from the

opposition. This knowledge would derive from information provided through the so-called “1

to 5” groups in Ethiopia – a fine granular system of groups, which constitute a network of

intelligence gathering in Ethiopia. The most recent general protest was just two weeks ago

(May 2018); local security forces are not very well trained in crowed control and they will

shoot at the crowd to disperse the crowd; it causes fatalities, which then causes a bigger

crowd the following day. There is a real need for capacity building that the national level is

reluctant to offer because it is a quite sensitive topic.

50. In the current situation, it is very difficult to say anything with certainty. The Prime Minister

has invited all political groups to join the conversation about the future of Ethiopia but time

will tell whether this invitation will be followed up by real action. According to sources within

the opposition that the interlocutors had spoken with recently, there is ‘more political space’

now in Ethiopia but still ‘not enough’ space; people with assumed connection to opposition

groups are not being arrested anymore and most political prisoners are being released.

Treatment of members of youth organisations

51. It is impossible to know whether the Government had or had had a policy of harassing young

people who were involved in youth organisations of one of the opposition parties. It seems to

be less relevant now because the Prime Minister has made an effort of saying that any legal

or illegal organisation, be it domestic or abroad should be welcomed at the table now.

52. Asked whether a person with an engagement in a youth organisation of one of the political

parties from the opposition would be exposed to risk and repercussions from the authorities,

the participants in this interview answered that this was difficult to know with any reasonable

certainty. They mentioned that the Prime Minister had said that ‘everybody’ from the

opposition now has ‘a seat at the table’ as long as they are not engaged in terrorist or other

violent activities. Again, this could change and must be followed closely in the future.

Treatment of pupils and students

53. Asked about how the Government reacts to pupils and university students who are engaged

in anti-government activities, the informants said that historically the threshold for actions,

which would lead to repercussions was low and students did not have to be ‘that involved’ to

be on the Government’s radar. Now it was different and it would need to be actions, which

were violent for the authorities to take measures to arrest the individual. ‘Violent behaviour’

could be defined as participating in a demonstration or cracking windows.

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54. At the Ambo University, which one of the interlocutors visited recently there had been

student strikes recently where the students refused to come to the university. Then the

students were told that they had to go to the university.

Treatment of members of the diaspora

55. The participants in this meeting with insights into the political situation had been informed by

human rights organisations based in Nairobi that members of the diaspora are now, for the

first time in 20 years, returning to Ethiopia. According to these sources, the diaspora

members are less worried today than before. In the analysis of these interlocutors that was a

really strong sign of change in political environment in Ethiopia.

56. Members of the diaspora who decide to return to Ethiopia are allowed to reintegrate into

society as citizens, and open private businesses, which many choose to do with quite some

success.

57. The interlocutor expects that the Government ‘definitely’ is monitoring the activity of the

diaspora, especially their social media activity, from Minnesota in the US to the UK. However,

only activity, which was really into hatred and violence is likely be flagged in Ethiopia whereas

political rhetoric such as ‘the Government needs to change’ or ‘the opposition should be

heard’ would be monitored but not likely to lead to repercussions.

Corruptive practices

58. The members of the UK delegation at this meeting concurred that the level of corruption

remains low compared to neighbouring countries where corruptive practices remains

consistently high and systemic. Corruption in Ethiopia can be characterised as relatively low,

but also unpredictable.

59. However, the interlocutors also noted that corruptive practices have increased at two levels

over the past years in Ethiopia. First, at the top level of political life and there is now a

generalised expectation among observers of Ethiopian politics that the newly nominated

Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, will take steps to investigate suspicions of official corruption and

to have bank accounts of members of parliaments inspected. Secondly, corruption has also

increased at the ground level of society and remains a problem at all administrative instances.

To illustrate this point, the example of the issuance of a driving license was mentioned. The

Government has announced a ‘crack-down’ on corruption related to the solicitation of bribes

from people who need a driving license. The efficiency of such an initiative remains, however,

to be seen as the Government has replaced experienced staff in the administration with staff

without the same amount of experience.

Liyu Police

60. The interlocutors had no knowledge of whether forced recruitment to the Liyu police takes

place.

61.

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Following the interview two additional questions were answered by July 2018:

Could you please comment on the fact that the State of Emergency which was imposed in February has

been lifted two month early (in June 2018)? To which extent does this decision affect the human rights

situation in the country, especially for members of the opposition?

63. Though the latest State of Emergency was implemented with a softer hand than the previous one,

it is positive it was lifted before the expired time. This reflects a more forthcoming approach by the

new Government towards opposition parties (Prime Minister Abiy started dialogue with all of

them). It will be interesting to observe the new Government's approach towards the still

complicated security situation in some regions (including Oromia).

In your opinion, what does the fact that the Ethiopian Government has unblocked a number of websites,

blogs as well as radio and TV stations mean for the political situation in the country? To which extent does

this decision affect the human rights situation, for members of the opposition?

64. The reopening of internet network and release of the grip on media was of outmost importance.

News is now circulating more and people are connected. This includes easier

communication/outreach for member of the opposition, and quicker signalling of possible human

rights abuses. The press is, however, generally favourable to the new Prime Minister, it will be

interesting to observe the Government’s reaction in case of more critical press approach in the

future.

Addis Ababa, 23 May 2018

Political situation

65. The source described the current political situation in Ethiopia as a big chance for the

Government to be successful. There has been a peaceful change of prime minister, which in

itself was something extraordinary in Ethiopia. The previous leaders of the country died, got

exiled or as the emperor got killed. The source noted that this was the first time when Ethiopia

in modern time had a normal change of prime minister. The fact that the previous prime

minister resigned and that pass-over of power took place as per constitution was seen as very

positive. It was still extremely difficult to get information out of the inner circle. The

resignation, however, did not come as a surprise, as a consequence of the protracted protests

that swept throughout the country before he resigned.

66. According to the interlocutor, the EPRDF, the ruling coalition, has a very solid party line, the

only going out to the public. Despite that criticism towards the Prime Minister leaked,

suggesting a possible change of the Prime Minister. The timing, however, was surprisingly

sudden and created an uncertain moment. The authorities stressed with the international

community that they went by the constitution by getting a new prime minister and a new

government.

67. The source noted that the new Prime Minister promised changes are going in the right

direction. While he might not have had direct control of social media and the protests in the

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fields, he used them to his own advantage. Furthermore, the Tigrayan party

100

miscalculated or

was overconfident during the elections for prime minister, which saw Abiy successful.

68. The new Prime Minister is 42 years old with a background in the political establishment, he was

in the army, and uses innovative talking – the change people was calling for. Whether he will be

able to deliver on his promises has to be seen. The interlocutor advised that in general the new

Prime Minister managed to calm down the situation. First he went out to the regions and

talked to the people, and then he went to the Middle East talked to Saudi leaders and his next

visit would be to Uganda and Egypt.

69. According to the source, the TPLF

101

represented six percent of the population; nevertheless

they controlled the establishment and large part of the economy: big parastatal companies, the

army, the security service, etc. Although the new Prime Minister did not start a purge of the old

guard, he put Amhara and Oromo people in key positions. The fact that the new Prime minister

himself was from Oromia defused the demonstrations in Oromia somewhat, which would have

been more difficult if the EPRDF had chosen someone else as prime minister. Therefore in

terms of political change, the source was optimistic. The source was more sceptical in regard to

the economy and employment. The source advised that there were very few options for

graduates in Ethiopia, which created frustration among young people. The source opined that if

a graduate had no real options for employment in the formal sector, they would be more

inclined to try to change things themselves.

State of Emergency

70. According to the source, the clashes between Somali and Oromo people had been ongoing for

a long time. The Somali police target ethnic Oromos on their own territory and vice versa. They

forced them to move to the other state. What was even worse, the interlocutor stated that

many Somalians from Oromia could not speak Somali, which in itself constituted a problem,

when they were relocated.

71. The source noted that the international community (including EU) had called for lifting of the

first imposed State of emergency, and the authorities abided to that in order to appease the

international community and show that Ethiopia's security situation was under control.

However, 2-3 months after the prime minister resigned the Government re-introduced the

state of emergency.

72. The interlocutor opined that the second state of emergency was less heavy handed. Some

people were still getting arrested, but the extent of arrests was not comparable to the previous

state of emergency. The source noted that there should now be ground to have the state of

emergency lifted. The interlocutor also believed that if things got out of hand, it would be a

huge problem for the Prime Minister. In this respect, the source referred to the internal clashes

in the Somali region.

100

101

Tigrayan People's Liberation Front is part of the ruling coalition Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

Tigrayan People's Liberation Front

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Release of prisoners and the closure of Maekelawi center

73. According to the source, the authorities had started to release prisoners including opposition

leaders. The authorities imprisoned political around 2015/2016. The source estimated that

there were approximately 30,000 persons imprisoned all in all. The source informed that the

authorities started to release 10,000 including prominent opposition party leaders. While the

Government is releasing prisoners, there are still others that are being arrested.

74. Regarding the Maekelawi detention centre, the source advised that it had been closed down.

The source added that the closure should be seen as a symbolic gesture by the Government,

since a number of people were detained and tortured there. However, the authorities had

constructed a new centre outside of the city, but in a symbolic way the source opined that the

closure was a good thing.

75. According to the interlocutor, the new political environment bears a range of contradictory

elements. As an example the source referred to a situation, where one opposition leader was

released from prison and was going to address his people in his home town. He was

subsequently detained by the federal police, who stated that he was not allowed to address his

people. However, the regional police did not agree with the federal position, which resulted in

a stand-off between federal and regional police.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

76. The source advised that Ethiopia had a substantial amount of IDPs, which was caused by

primarily clashes and drought. Nevertheless around 60 percent of all IDPs are conflict

generated. The source opined that there were around 1.66 million IDPs in Ethiopia.

77. Regarding refugees, the source advised that Ethiopia had almost one million refugees. The

source elaborated that in Ethiopia the conditions for refugees were better than for IDPs. The

whole refugee system experienced a good collaboration between the Government and UNHCR.

However, the UN in general tries to play the poor conditions down for refugees, because they

want to be on good ground with the Government.

The situation for the opposition

78. In general it was the opinion of the source that the conditions for the opposition had improved,

although, there were exceptions. The source mentioned a case where a number of persons had

been released from prison and wished to celebrate. They were immediately arrested.

Furthermore, there had been a number of rearrests of journalists, social media bloggers and

activists. The interlocutor opined that this area was more sensitive than others. Even though

there was a liberalisation of the media, the control/censorship was still there and arrests still

occurred, although in a smaller scale than before. The source also opined that students got less

targeted now than before, which also was due to the lack of willingness to demonstrate for the

time being.

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U.S. Embassy

Addis Ababa, 18 May 2018

State of Emergency

79. The point of departure for the discussion at this meeting was the current State of emergency

which the regime had declared mid-February 2018, and which was supposed to be lifted by

August 2018. The State of emergency was imposed just after the resignation of the former

Prime Minister (Hailemariam Desalgn), who was replaced by Dr Abiy Ahmed as new Prime

Minister. This nomination was unanimously perceived as a sign of Ethiopian People’s

Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) –the ruling party’s– decision to open up for a certain level of

controlled change in the country. According to the interlocutors, the new Prime Minister had

in his declarations in a number of public appearances consistently demonstrated willingness to

‘doing the right thing’ as well as a dedication to induce political reforms. In the views of the

participants at this meeting, the nomination of a new Prime Minister with the willingness to

address a number of sensitive issues should be interpreted as a window of opportunity for an

improvement in the human rights situation in Ethiopia because his willingness to lead a change

process stood out as genuine. Thus, the current sentiment among Ethiopians including that of

international observers at the western embassies was a generalised feeling of ‘cautious

optimism’.

80. The interlocutors noted that the Prime Minister’s readiness to steer a political reform process

has an inbuilt risk of firing back on him – if it turns out that he will be unable to pass the

announced reforms through parliament. Dr Abiy Ahmed had at numerous public occasions

made declarations in which he promised to address the Oromo and Amhara communities’ calls

for political inclusion and economic equality. The risk of disappointing these expectations was a

real threat to the survival of the Prime Minister’s own political project.

Liberation of political prisoners

81. Regardless of the announced political reforms, the newly nominated Prime Minister had yet

not delivered on the promises made regarding deliverance of all political prisoners and

opposition leaders detained with or without a trial in prison.

82. The interlocutors were not knowledgeable about the status of the closing of the Maekelawi

detention centre in Addis Ababa (also known as the Federal Police Crime Investigation and

Forensic Sector).

Political and human rights situation

83. Ethiopia is still characterised by a high level of arbitrary violence which affects the general

population in urban as well as rural parts of the country. The nature of the violence is partly

ethnical and it was emphasised that to be caught in the fight between two opposing ethnic

groups could be a real risk for foreigners traveling in Ethiopia. The regime does not maintain

total control over security forces in all of the federal republic’s nine regions. To illustrate the

fact that the regional security forces at times act independently of the federal government, the

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example of Somali Region

102

was mentioned; a region where the paramilitary force, the Liuy

Police operates. However, the overall assessment was that the human rights situation in

Ethiopia moved in the right direction currently.

84. Previously the regime denied the fact that the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia was so severe

that a high number of citizens have been forced to leave their place of habitual residence for a

number of reasons including conflict and drought; and often so in the most precarious

conditions. Whereas ‘IDP’ (internally displaced person) used to be a forbidden word, the

existence of ‘an IDP issue’ is now fully recognised as a fact by the authorities and the level of

cooperation from the Government in providing assistance to this vulnerable group has

improved. However, the interlocutors noted that the Government still occasionally puts

restrictions on the deliverance of humanitarian aid to certain IDP groups for political reasons;

as an example the case of Somali Region where constraints on the delivery of food aid had

been recurrent. It is in particular difficult to transport humanitarian help to remote areas and

areas where the security situation is dangerous such as at the Kenyan border.

85. The human rights and security situation in the refugee camps is precarious; the interlocutors

noted that revenge killings occur with impunity inside the camps.

86. According to the interlocutors at this meeting, there have been no amendments to the list of

designated terrorist organisations made in 2011 and adopted by the Ethiopian Parliament; a list

naming five organisations including Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo

Liberation Front (OLF).

Treatment of pupils and students

87. The regime is known for accepting widespread use of excessive violence by the security forces

against pupils and university students who participate in anti-government mass

demonstrations. As an example of this, the interlocutors referred to a recent event where the

authorities shot at the crowd of non-armed student demonstrators and caused the death of

nine peaceful demonstrators who were killed at this occasion.

Treatment of members of the diaspora

88. The situation of members of the diaspora is ruled by its own internal dynamic, which are not

obvious to external observers. The Government conducts internet surveillance, monitors the

activities of diaspora members who are active on YouTube canals or otherwise engaged in

internet based communication. This surveillance also includes those diaspora members who

are of a low profile and who are less vocal in their anti-government agitation. It is well know

102

Also known as Ogaden.

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that the Ethiopian government periodically closes down the internet – also known as ‘internet

blackouts’ – blocks certain websites, which are critical towards the Government and actively

seeks to restrict freedom of expression domestically: to illustrate this practice examples were

given of how the authorities had contacted foreign governments, hosting large diaspora

communities, and requested a foreign government to take action in order to close down TV

programs or YouTube channels which were run by the diaspora communities.

89. The interlocutors noted that in the past recent years a growing number of people from the

diaspora community had chosen to return to Ethiopia. The explanation for this, offered by the

interlocutors was that members of the diaspora might find that there is now a chance for

influencing the political development in the direction that they desire.

Fair trials

90. The judicial system in Ethiopia is weak because it suffers from lack of staff, lack of technical

capacity and scarce resources. Although trial procedures under the constitution are in place,

these procedures are not followed systematically.

Function of Vital Events Registration Agency (VERA)

91. The members of the US embassy delegation were not convinced of the effectiveness of VERA to

participants at the meetings concurred that they did not fully trust the procedures installed by

this agency to prevent rigging of ID documents. The interlocutors agreed that a high number of

ID documents containing inaccurate information about the document holder are in circulation.

92. The interlocutors emphasised that the fact that a document contains inaccurate information

does not necessarily imply that the document in itself is fraudulent. For multiple reasons,

including practical and geographical reasons, people might avoid to demand documents

through the official channels and instead seek to obtain ID documents through unofficial

channels.

93. Corruptive practices are widespread at all levels of society in Ethiopia, according to our

interlocutors. This means that it is possible and in no way exceptional for people to acquire

new, genuine ID documents with inaccurate information. Bribes are being used as a means to

negotiate the issuances of ID documents where the document holder is represented as younger

than they are in reality. As an effect of this, the embassy has made a decision to fact check all

the breeder documents at the issuing office by themselves in order to check their validity. The

consular department at this particular embassy estimates that they see approximately five

fraudulent ID documents per month. Passports are rarely fraudulent as it is fairly easily possible

to obtain breeder documents with inaccurate information that can be used for the demand of a

new passport.

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Situation of Eritreans in Ethiopia

94. Ethiopia is currently the second largest recipient country of refugees in sub-Saharan Africa. The

participants in this meeting recognised that the Ethiopian government hosts a large and

growing number of refugees and that the authorities has managed, in collaboration with

UNHCR, to offer shelter, food and basic services to these very diverse groups of refugees. The

situation has been particularly critical since the government of Saudi Arabia has cracked down

on the illegal workers in the country, which has led to a high number of returnees to Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian government willingly welcomes Eritreans who seek protection in Ethiopia in

order to embarrass the Eritrean government. The authorities do not issue documents to

Eritrean refugees but offer them refugee status.

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International NGO

Following the interview two additional questions were answered by July 2018:

Could you please comment on the fact that the State of Emergency which was imposed in February has

been lifted two month early (in June 2018)? To which extent does this decision affect the human rights

situation in the country, especially for members of the opposition?

95. Yes, the State of emergency was lifted earlier. This is very much in line with the general political

signals originating from Dr Abiy. Ethiopia's new Prime Minister Dr. Abiy has announced a lot

of reforms to reshape the nation but implementing them is harder.

Most important and most recently the Prime Minister:

•

shook up the security services – removed Ethiopia's intelligence and military chiefs along with the

national security advisor

Ended the State of Emergency before expected

Freed long-time political prisoners

Announced plans to liberalise the economy – selling shares in EthioTelecom and Ethiopian Air

try to resolve a 20 year old conflict with Eritrea – Ethiopia will respect a 2002 UN commission ruling

that demarcated the country's border with Eritrea

96. But there are signs of cracks in the unity within the ruling coalition EPRDF that has otherwise

been in unchecked control of Ethiopia since 1991. You will recall that Abiy is the first Oromo

speaking PM ever. That makes the biggest population group the Oromos very satisfied and

they continue to praise him and whatever he does. Also Amaras (second largest) are still very

happy. And Abiy has travelled extensively within Ethiopia and seem to be genuinely listening to

the grievance of the people, wherever he appears.

97. Abiy was elected within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

coalition by united votes from Oromia and Amhara – that meant against the two other parts of

the coalition, namely the Tigrayan and the Southerners. They are not happy and we see again

violence and nasty ethnic clashes. Like before is it likely “government sponsored riots” – some

elements from the South want to kick out Oromos. In the mixed town of Hawassa in south

where all the big industrial parks are with various ethnic groups coming together as labours, we

have seen since mid-June violent protests, clash, vandalism (burn property and cars) and

another 16,000 internal displaced persons. According to OCHA

103

more than a million people

has been internally displaced and in dire need of humanitarian assistance. On the issue of the

IDPs, there is no obvious plan for them to return. And not returning is a silent acceptance of

displacement based on ethnicity.

103

The source made reference to OCHA (2018). Ethiopia: Oromio-Somali Conflict –Induced displacement.

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98. Also, Abiy's plans for the economy may also run into resistance, as ERPDF elites are entrenched

in the state-run industries at the heart of the country's economy. And finally there were also

protest against Abiy´s announcement on Eritrea by residents of territory. The decision may be

popular in the international community but approx. 70,000 Ethiopians lost their lives in that

war (over a sandy dessert) and some are asking now for what were all those lives lost.

99. So in conclusion, it is too early to say whether there will be genuine improvement on the

human rights situation for the opposition. While there were welcomed changes on the

leadership in central security apparatus, it is also obvious that the security apparatus remain

rather loyal to those formerly in power. For example a small grenade was tossed at the recent

pro-Abiy rally in Addis on Meskel Square in Addison 30 June. The event attracted several

100,000s of Ethiopians. Speculations are that as there has never been any such attack on those

in power before, this could only happened because certain elements within the police allowed

it to happen. Later the Addis Ababa chief of police was arrested.

In your opinion, what does the fact that the Ethiopian Government has unblocked a number of websites,

blogs as well as radio and TV stations mean for the political situation in the country? To which extent does

this decision affect the human rights situation, for members of the opposition?

100. Dr. Abiy continues to take measures in support of more freedom of expression and the un-

blocking of media and websites are welcomed changes. Dr Abiy enjoys wide support from the

population across various ethnic groups and regions, but his actions are no doubt also causing

resentment within the government coalition. See above on government sponsored riots -

these continue in areas of southern Oromia, Benishangul Gumuz and North Gonder in Amhara.

Therefore we are only cautiously optimistic on the human rights situation.

Addis Ababa, 16 May, 2018

State of emergency

101. The interview took place four months into the state of emergency which was declared on 16

February 2018. This state of emergency was different compared to the previous one which had

been declared on 9 October 2016 and then lifted by the Government in August 2017, according

to the interlocutor. The difference was a certain sense of trust in the future which had

emerged; a trust which seemed to be inspired by the nomination of the new Prime Minister, Dr

Abiy Ahmed. The interlocutor noted that people, e.g. staff members of this NGO and others,

expressed more hope in the future now. This level of hope seemed to be fuelled by the

declarations made by the new Prime Minister in the early days of his mandate although

nothing of substance had changed in terms of the locus of control over the country. Ethiopia is

still a one-party system and EPRDF maintains full power over the rule of the country regardless

of change of prime minister.

102. There has been a significant reduction in violent riots and public protests after the

proclamation of the current state of emergency according to this interlocutor. Up to its entry

into force, the situation across the country was characterised by instability and numerous

security incidents. There were clashes on the Oromo-Somali Region border and many roads

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were being blocked frequently. This has changed and the situation was notably calmer by then.

The new Prime Minister had made a number of public statements, including his inaugural

address, which in the views of this interlocutor had been interpreted by the general population

as a new beginning. However, the informant noted that the Prime Minister had yet to address

the media to advise whether the issue of political prisoners would be solved. This has later

been directly addressed. Previously illegal Oromo media outlets are no longer illegal, and

recently more than 200 websites run primarily by opposition and diaspora Ethiopians have

been unblocked.

103. The Proclamation of the state of emergency prohibits all assembling or other kinds of moving

in groups regardless of purpose as well as it puts restrictions on the freedom of association and

of peaceful assembly. This has a direct consequence for civil society organisations, including

international development NGOs with a global mandate to carry out advocacy and other kinds

of awareness raising activities. It is important to note that it is prohibited for INGOs to engage

in any gender, advocacy and right related issues.

104. According to the CSO law INGOSs can engage in:

•

Prevention or alleviation or relief of poverty or disaster

•

Advancement of economy and social developments and environmental protection

•

Advancement of health or saving lives

•

Overall services provisions

But cannot engage in:

•

Advancement of human and democratic rights

Promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender and religion

Promotion of rights of disabled and children’s rights

Promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation

Promotion of efficiency of justice & law enforcement service

105. Any NGO activity which requires that people gather in groups needs approval beforehand by

the authorities as a consequence of the State of emergency. This is a limitation in the freedom

to carry out development activities aiming at raising awareness about civil rights or even any

technical awareness on for instance good agronomic practices or the like. This requires civil

society organisations to carefully monitor which language they use when they make references

to rights based approaches, women’s empowerment, political awareness raising, etc.

106. A number of directives under the state of emergency wield power to regulate public life.

According to these directives it is prohibited to communicate about security issues including

access and road safety, etc. This causes trouble for civil society organisations with operations

across the country as these organisations need to exchange information among staff members

who travel across different regions of the country, including those regions where the security

situation is volatile. Security threats include the blocking of roads as well as stone-throwing but

also the danger of getting caught in gun fire when security forces have intervened to disburse

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crowds. It has in particularly been in Oromia State where there have been many security

incidents.

Political and human rights situation

107. Noting that Ethiopia’s administrative structure is built on the principles of ethnic federalism,

the interlocutor emphasised that ethnic division has been and still remains a source of

instability over the years. Ethnicity as an engine of political conflict still dominates, and

increasingly so, Ethiopia’s political life. This is fuelled by the Ethiopian federal government,

which uses ‘ethnification’ actively as a key strategy to keep the Oromia and the Somalis

engaged in local conflicts at the regional level thereby preventing the Oromos from fully

engaging in the competition for influence at the national level. According to the interlocutor,

ethnic competition and mistrust can be felt at all levels of society, including in organisations

where much efforts have been invested in creating a workplace free of ethno-nationalist

sentiments. To illustrate this phenomenon the interlocutor referred to an example of a staff

member of Tigrinya descent who expressed fear of being physically abused and attached by the

mob if they travelled to Oromia where people of Tigrinya ethnicity are intensely disliked.

However, the interlocutor noted that there were indications of a certain reduction in the level

of ethnical based animosity in the country, although it was still too early to assess whether

these improvements were sustainable beyond the immediate reaction.

108. The new Prime Minister, who is of Oromo and Amhara descent with a Muslim father and a

Christian mother, has called for national reconciliation and dialogue among the federal regions

of Ethiopia; the interlocutor emphasised that the Prime Minister has called for a peaceful

solution to the ongoing unrest in Oromia. The fact that the regime has nominated a Prime

Minister of Oromo descent has altered the ethnic composition of political life and has inspired

hope in a more fair ethnic balanced representation at national level and in more willingness to

enter into real dialogue with opposition parties. As an indicator of this level of optimism that

now prevails among people of Oromo descent, the interlocutor referred to anecdotal evidence

of new-borns being given names such as ‘We won’ or ‘At that time’.

109. Albeit the level of corruption in Ethiopia might be lower than in the neighbouring countries,

corruption remains a problem according to the interlocutor. Examples of this were numerous

including misuse in the judicial system. Also, land concessions sold to foreign investors is highly

contested.

Situation of political prisoners

110. The Prime Minister has publically announced the release of an unspecified number of

prisoners. According to the interlocutor a significant number of prisoners, in particular

prominent politicians, activists and human rights advocates and political “bloggers”, have been

released during this state of emergency. However, besides a few well known public figures, it is

not clear who have been released out of the many who have been detained over the years.

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Thus it remains to be established how many have in reality been released and how many

remain in prison.

Treatment of members of opposition groups

111. The interlocutor was unaware of whether there had been significant changes in the way the

government is responding to anti-government protests organised by the Oromo Liberation

Front (OLF) or the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). However, the interlocutor knew of

at least one recent example of interethnic violent conflict in 2018 in the town of Moyale near

the Kenyan border and, on the Ethiopian side of the border, split between the Oromia Region

on the West and the Somali region

104

) in the east. At this occasion, the police fired shots at the

crowd and several demonstrators were killed. The interlocutor explained that this incident has

been followed by calls for an investigation into the use of what appears to be excessive force by

the police against demonstrators.

Situation of pupils and students

112. Ethiopia has a history of politically motivated mass protests by university students in all

regions. The national and regional security forces are known for having limited ‘crowd control

skills’ and student participants in demonstrations have been shot at, killed or arbitrarily

detained regardless of their role in these demonstrations. Students who have been arrested

have most often been detained without being charged with any crime; many have been

released without ever having been formally presented for a judge. Especially at the event in

Bishoftu in Oromia in October 2016, where a Oromo cultural festival escalated into anti-

government protest and turned violent and some 700 allegedly died

105

. There were many

arrests and whereabouts of the arrested are still unknown or contested.

Treatment of person who have previously been detained and then released

113. Persons, who have previously been arrested, detained and then released with or without a

trial, might still be exposed to increased surveillance by the authorities.

Liyu police

114. According to the interlocutor, it is well established that the Somali Regional Special Policy,

also known as Liyu Police, is using excessive force against citizens. The interlocutor was not

knowledgeable about whether forced recruitment to the Liyu Police took place.

Situation of the diaspora

115. The level of surveillance inside Ethiopia is high and, according to the interlocutor, there is ‘no

doubt’ that this surveillance extends to people who belong to the diaspora. The activities and

utterances of those members of the diaspora who are active on social media such as YouTube

are most possibly being followed closely by the secret service.

Also known as Ogaden.

The source made reference to Human Rights Watch (2017). “Fuel on the Fire: Security Forces Response to the 2016

Ireecha Cultural Festival. September 19, 2017

105

104

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116. The internet and telecommunication sector in Ethiopia is highly controlled by the state.

There are numerous examples of how the federal government has decided to shut down the

internet to restrict citizens’ communication. The Government also blocks certain websites, in

particular those of diaspora groups. In Ethiopia it is against the law to access the internet via a

VPN connection. In practice the law does not, however, prevent ordinary people from using

VPN connections. For individuals who are not on the radar of the security service it is possible

to use VPN connections to access the internet.

Situation of Eritreans in Ethiopia

117. In many ways Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia benefit from a privileged status compared to

refugees of other nationalities, according to this interlocutor. By contrast to other refugees,

Eritreans can benefit from the out-of-camp policy which allows them to take residence out of

the designated refugee camps. They can study at national institutions, but they cannot yet get

a license to open a shop nor can they apply for jobs at the formal labour market. However, the

Government of Ethiopia’s “9 pledges” made in line with the

New York Declaration for

Refugees and Migrants in September 2016 and

the subsequent regional policy framework of

the CRRF (Comprehensive Refugees Response Framework) has the intension of allowing for full

integration of the one million refugees into Ethiopia including access to all basic services.

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Danish Refugee Council

Addis Ababa, 22 May 2018

State of emergency

118. The interview began by a juxtaposition of the two states of emergency, which have been

imposed in Ethiopia over the past years. Whereas the first one, which was declared in

September 2016 and only lifted in August 2017 was very ‘heavy handed’ and characterised by a

high level of securitisation in direct response to the public anti-government protest, the second

one, which was declared only six month later in February 2018 had been less heavy handed by

the security forces. There have been instances where the Government has shown force but not

nearly as much as in the previous State of emergency. The declaration of the last State of

emergency had in reality put a lot of things in motion and has, probably as an unintended

diffuse side effect, made space for some progress. According to the interlocutor, there was

currently a generalised feeling of movement, of hope and that ‘things were possible now’, a

consequence, which might be counter to what the leaders of the ruling party intended when

they declared this State of emergency. It is notable that there has not been a large scale violent

reaction to the proclamation of this State of emergency, as might have been expected. The

nomination of a new prime minister has also fuelled hope among people. The resignation of

the former Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn in February, happened in recognition by the

ruling party of the fact that it was no longer ‘tenably’ for him to be in that position giving the

level of protest. According to the interlocutor, ‘this is a time of hope and optimism’ after a

vacuum left by the resignation of the previous prime minister. Both the Oromo and the Amhara

people had been increasingly marginalised over the past years and this has contributed to the

level of frustration in Ethiopia and a generalised feeling of desperation and ‘we have nothing to

lose’. This desperation was not only enacted as participation in mass demonstrations but also in

shop-owners’ reluctance to open their stores, etc.

119. Regardless of ethnicity, Ethiopians can be described as ‘quite nationalistic’ and concerned

about the unity of the country. They want their country to be peaceful and this means that they

are willing to be patient with the newly nominated prime minister if only for the fact that he

represents a replacement of the leadership, which has frustrated people for many years. The

three weeks intermezzo between the resignation of the previous Prime Minister and the

nomination of Dr Abiy Ahmed was at the same time intense and relaxed; speculations and arm

chair analysis were made but there were no major security incidents. Had the choice been

made for a different kind of leadership, the situation would have been very different. The

choice of a prime minister of Christian and Muslim background, of Oromo ethnicity allows for

people to read different things into his person, which makes him an appealing choice. To which

extent he will be able to maintain this level of support by the people depends on who will be

perceived as the losers and the winners of his politics, especially regarding how he intends to

address the border conflict between Somalia and Oromia, including the huge amount of

displace people there.

Release of political prisoners

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120. Prior to the proclamation of the State of Emergency, the government has already released a

number of political prisoners, probably 10,000s over time as per public records.

Treatment of opposition groups

121. According to this interlocutor, it has become much more difficult to assess the level of risk

and the nature of this risk that a person who is engaged in an opposition party would be

exposed to today because things have changed with the new situation and the nomination of

the new Prime Minister.

122. Based on his experience from his Ethiopian colleagues as well as from interactions with

members of the international community in Addis Ababa, the interlocutor noted especially

during the previous State of Emergency people feared being associated in any way with

opposition parties. This was in particular but not restricted to people engaged in journalism.

During the previous State of Emergency there was a significant threat against Ethiopian

nationals who sat in on any forum discussing questions related to the security situation of the

country, so it was a management decision in this particular NGO to disallow that. When people

discussed at the work place or in the local community they were very cautious: They fear that

any slip of the tongue would be interpreted as questioning the Government’s authority and

could lead to detainment. It is well documented that there were 8-10,000 people who were

detained as a result of this.

123. The interlocutor had first-hand knowledge of people who avoided participating in a

discussion among NGO staff or even texting with NGO staff because they knew that the

authorities were hostile towards civil society organisations.

124. As of now, there are no reports that the security forces, under the State of Emergency, which

was declared in February 2018, have detained people under suspicion of being connected to

opposition parties. However, as the interview took place in the early days of the State of

Emergency, it was still too early to tell how it would developed and by precaution, people

seemed to still restrain from making statements which could be perceived as radically

challenging the Government.

125. According to the assessment of this interlocutor, there was a wider room for freedom of

expression and critical discussions of the Government’s actions for intellectuals as there was

for people outside of academia. For university students, the room for expression would be

more restrained.

Situation of youth organisations within the political parties from the opposition

126. In general, the interlocutor found the youth organisations of the opposition parties to be

very well organised and very well controlled. Whether a member of a political youth opposition

group would be at risk of detainment would depend on the specific situation. It is violence and

violent actions, which are criminalised rather than membership by itself. However, it is the

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authorities who have the ultimate power to define what would be perceived as violence and

thereby of politicising collective and individual actions.

The situation of refugees in Ethiopia

127. The interlocutor began by recognising the complexity of the refugee situation in Ethiopia.

There are not just one refugee crisis in Ethiopia but multiple including refugees from South

Sudan, refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia and refugees and asylum seekers from

Eritrea; not one uniform approach can be used on all of these situations.

128. Regarding the situation of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia they are in a privileged position

compared to other nationalities. Provided that they have a sponsor, or can otherwise sustain

themselves, they have the possibility of residing outside of the designated refugee camps. They

are also allowed to apply for enrolment at university but not to apply for a job within the

formal labour market. This is a part of the out-of-camp scheme that is implemented by the

Ethiopian Government and UNHCR in Ethiopia. In principle this could be a possibility for any

refugee, but in reality it is only used by Eritreans and Somalis.

129. The situation for Eritreans who reside in the refugee camps in Hitsats in Shire is without

opportunities for creating a dignified future. Albeit the camps have improved significantly,

especially for the unaccompanied minors and separated children who now benefit from better

shelters and social rehabilitation activities, there are no job prospects or living opportunities for

people there. There is no electricity in the camps and they lack running water.

130. The phenomenon of Ethiopian nationals posing as Eritrean refugees is not an unknown

phenomenon but we lack solid data about how widespread it is.

The situation of internally displace persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia

131. The issue of IDPs has been a highly politicised topic in Ethiopia and very difficult to discuss on

an evidence based manner. For years, it was impossible to suggest that there was a group of

people in Ethiopia that had been forced to relocate. However, this is no longer the case and

now the authorities recognise that there is a problem with IDPs in Ethiopia. It is in particularly

droughts, which have contributed to pushing people out of their habitual place of residence but

also the conflicts in the Oromia-Somali regions.

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The Fortune, national newspaper

Addis Ababa, 23 May 2018

The Fortune is a part of Ethiopia’s rapidly growing media and communication sector. It is a weekly print and

digital news media with a focus on business, economic development but also on national politics. The

Fortune has been published since May 2000 and for the past 13 years also on the internet. It has about 50-

55 staff members. Mr. Giorgis is the Managing Editor of the Addis Fortune.

The State of emergency

132.

The interview took place in the midst of the State of emergency which was imposed across

the country in February 2018. According to Mr. Giorgis the purpose of the State of Emergency was

to equip the law enforcement with a legal mandate to exercise command over the situation across

all nine regional states. The police in the regional states are accountable to the regional

governments only, not to the federal government and the regime found that the security situation

had ‘gotten out of control’ and therefore proclaimed a State of emergency in order to wield wide

powers to prevent public protest and prohibit the occurrence of demonstrations.

Political and human rights situation

133.

The interview began by Mr. Giorgis describing his view on freedom of expression in Ethiopia

as well as his own experience with the Government’s efforts to control the media. He had been

arrested, imprisoned, accused and convicted for violation of the press law. He was punished with a

fine of the equivalent to 3,000 US dollars, which at that point of time was the highest amount that

one could be fined for violating the press law. This episode occurred in 1995-96. He noted that as

an editor in Ethiopia you encounter problems and harassment on a daily basis, ranging from

readers and business people to ministers. In the opinion of Mr. Giorgis the situation of the free

media in Ethiopia could be characterised as ‘not as bad as the international community might think;

not as good as the Government tries to make it look like’.

134.

The political life in Ethiopia is controlled by the elites and highly centralised. The emergence

of social media has challenged the elite’s monopoly on information. Although radio remains the

preferred media of the Ethiopian population, especially in rural areas, social media has enabled a

new flow of information. This has created grounds for competing elites and for elites who can

compete over the attention of people through the use of the media.

135.

This interlocutor expressed that the current political development in Ethiopia inspired

‘cautious optimism’ because of the announcement made by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. He would,

however, need to deliver on the promises made on economic progress to stay in office. The

congress of the ruling party will be held in July 2018 and would tell whether Abiy Ahmed would be

re-elected as chairman of the party; and the 2020 elections would be decisive for his political

project.

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Release of political prisoners

136.

When asked about whether the Government had lived up to promises made regarding the

release of political prisoners, Mr. Giorgis noted that there was a substantial gap between what is

stipulated in the Constitution and the regime’s willingness to deliver on the rights in the

Constitution. This interviewee found that in reality, Ethiopia has a very liberal Constitution but a

rather illiberal government.

Treatment of opposition groups

137.

Mr. Giorgis emphasised that currently there is a multitude of opposition groups in Ethiopia;

in reality up to 94 groups. However, many of them remain rather uncoordinated and people are not

paying much attention to them.

138.

According to Mr. Giorgis, people who were affiliated with either OLF or ONLF had been at

high risk of being arrested for terrorism; the mere fact of receiving an email or a phone call from a

member of OLF or ONLF could lead to repercussions. Phone calls would be transcribed and held

against the receiver of the call. Having any form of relationship with a political organisation on the

national list of terrorist groups is being followed by the authorities. However, Mr. Giorgis noted

that the situation seemed to have sobered out a bit now and the future would tell whether the

treatment of members of opposition parties would be more relaxed in the future. To illustrate the

fact that the situation was less tense now, Mr. Giorgis mentioned that the leadership of the Oromo

Democratic Front (ODF) has been allowed to enter Addis Ababa for political talks with the new

Prime Minister.

Treatment of university students

139. Asked whether affiliation with a student organisation would expose a person to repercussions by

the authorities, the editor noted that the environment was less intimidating than it used to be and

that people, including students were more vocal than they used to be. The Prime Minister has

publicly addressed the needs to involve university students and this has inspired some optimism.

Diaspora

140. The source stated that members of the diaspora community were, ‘without doubt’ monitored

closely by the government, wherever they might reside. This is, according to the interlocutor, no

secret, and that outreach includes people from the diaspora who might reside in Denmark.

141. The editor noted that if Ethiopians participate in demonstrations against the Ethiopian regime in a

foreign country, be it in Europe or in the USA, would be video-taped to document their activity. This

would also be the case if members of the diaspora had gotten foreign nationality. Thus they would

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fear that they were to return to Ethiopia then something might happen to them upon return. As

examples of what might occur, Mr. Giorgis mentioned that they could run the risk of being

detained in the airport or jailed. He emphasised that this fear was in particularly high during 2017,

although with the nomination of the new Prime Minister, the situation seemed to be a bit more

relaxed.

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Blogger

Addis Ababa, 23 May 2018

State of emergency

142.

According to the interlocutor, the first state of emergency was imposed as a response to the

nationwide protests in the streets, which at the time caused public unrest and security incidents,

especially during the time of the Erecha festival

106

. Both Christians and Muslims join this festival for

political purposes. During these rallies the Police fired teargas into the crowd, which caused panic

and ended in several casualties. The Government itself admitted to have killed 50 protesters.

143.

After the episode at the Erecha festival, people around Addis Ababa started to protest

heavily. Although the mass protests during and after the Erecha festival were peaceful, the police

did not tolerate them, and subsequently cracked down on them.

144.

The source noted that at the time of the first state of emergency there were many protesters

in the biggest three regions in Ethiopia and the government officials were united to stop all

protesters, journalists, opposition politicians etc.

145.

The first state of emergency was frightening, according to the interlocutor, because one had

to be home before six and people were scared of what would might happen to them. The police

would stop a random person on the street, search him and confiscate what he had on him.

Furthermore, if the police found anything like a political picture on a person’s Twitter account,

Facebook etc., they would immediately arrest the person.

146.

The source advised that he himself had been detained, because he had been giving a number

of interviews to different media. The police explained, that the source had criticised the state of

emergency on the Radio “Voice of America” and therefore was detained. The source was kept in

detention for 40 days and was never taken to court to be presented for a judge.

147.

The interlocutor noted that the state of emergency, which was declared on February 2018,

did not target the general public: Now the authorities do not target protesters or even activists. The

source added that there were many public protests that took place peacefully now, even in

Oromia. The interlocutor elaborated that there was more political space now. However, in Amhara

region where there also had been protests previously, the authorities still did not tolerate

protesters and cracked down on them.

148.

The source opined that the reason why the authorities had introduced a new state of

emergency was because the ruling party coalition and especially the TPLF

107

feared that the

election of a new prime minister would spur massive protesters. The authorities were therefore

preparing for coming protests, but there had been no protests of that kind. On this ground the

106

107

Erecha festival is an Oromo traditional indigenous festival equivalent to thanksgiving.

The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front

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interlocutor found that it was strange that the authorities had not lifted the state of emergency

already.

149.

According to the interlocutor, the Prime minister has good intentions. However, the

intentions must be institutionalised. The source explained that for now there had been no legal or

institutional reforms. Therefor the optimism that exists now very much depends on the

Governments will and/or capability to implement real reforms.

Release of prisoners and the closure of Maekelawi center

150.

Asked if there has been any release of political prisoners, as promised by the Government,

the source replied that there had been prisoner releases in February 2018. Although the authorities

had released many prisoners, many still remained imprisoned.

151.

As for the Maekelawi centre, the source advised that there was no one detained at the

centre anymore. The prisoners there had been transferred to another centre. However, the total

number of (political) prisoners has decreased during the second state of emergency.

OLF

152.

When asked to the view on the opposition groups ONLF/OLF, the source advised that OLF did

not exist in Ethiopia anymore as an active party and there would be very few active members left in

the country. Even though, the Oromos are not members of OLF, the Oromo people regard the OLF

as liberators, and therefore they do not see OLF as a problem. The source advised that the OLF had

become a part of the Oromo history; a shared national consciousness. Since the OLF leadership

exiled, there had been many other political groups in Oromia such as the OFC

108

party, which is now

led by Dr. Merera Gudina.

153.

According to the source, the OLF was still considered a terrorist group in Ethiopia by the

authorities. After OLF’s 50 years of struggle the group had redefined their struggle in Ethiopia.

Previous the goal of OLF was Oromo independence from Ethiopia, but now the major founders of

OLF had redefined their goals. The interlocutor noted that today there were three OLF groups and

each of them had exile members. The most vocal of them – the ODF

109

was not fighting for

independence anymore. The ODF had created a more positive environment where it was possible

to take part in talks with the Government. The source added that five of the ODF leaders (previous

OLF members) just arrived to Addis Ababa to take part in discussions with the Government.

The Youth group – Qeero group

154.

According to the source, most of the protesters during the public mass protests were

associated with the Qeero group

110

. The federal police were vowing to close the group down.

However, the new Prime minister came out on the street two months later and thanked the Qeero

group on his visit to Ambo town that had been the very centre of protests. At this occasion the

108

109

The Oromo Federalist Congress

Oromo Democratic Front

110

Qeero means bachelor in Amharic – young men, but it also means tiger.

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Prime minister thanked the group for fighting for their rights and described the Qeero group as the

backbone of Ethiopia.

ONLF

155.

Regarding ONLF, the source advised that Somali politics in many years had been in the

periphery of politics in Ethiopia. In the centre would be politics in Oromia, in Amhara and in Tigray.

However, the Somali ethnic group is the third largest group in Ethiopia next to Oromo and Amhara

and thus is getting closer to the centre of politics, according to the interlocutor.

156.

The source noted that ONLF was still on the national terrorist list, and added that ONLF’s

military capacity had been reduced. This reduction happen as a consequence of the crackdown on

ONLF initiated by the president of the Somali region Abdi Mohammed Omar’s. According to the

source, the Somali president had used special forces to successful remove ONLF from the region.

The source advised that a member of ONLF in Ethiopia would be perceived as a terrorist and would

definitely be arrested and dealt with accordingly by the authorities.

157.

The president of the Somali region was perceived by the source as a dictator who ruled the

region as his own state. The interlocutor elaborated that detainees in the prisons of the Somali

region accused of being a terrorist would face torture, which would be extremely hard to survive.

158.

When asked if ONLF member’s family or relatives would be at risk of being targeted by the

authorities, the source opined that this was not necessarily the case. However, the source

emphasised that there were times when that would happen, especially when the ONLF was

stronger. But it would not necessarily happen today. However, the source had no detailed

information on this matter.

159.

If one were to flee the Somali region, the source opined that they would be more protected

in Addis Ababa, where the torture was less dire. However, the authorities in Addis Ababa were

working together with the authorities in the Somalia region, and could trace the person of interest

down in Addis Ababa. The source added that the Somali authorities were very harsh, and thus

before they transfer detainees to the federal authorities, they would break their ankles to make

sure that the detainees would not run away.

160.

The interlocutor mentioned that he himself had experienced torture in the Maekelawi

centre, where the police were careful not to inflict any scars on his body. The police did so to make

sure that the torture would not be visible when presented in front of a judge. Other bloggers

reported on everything that happened in the courts, so it made a difference whether torture was

visible at trial. The blogger community reported on court trials for one year and six months and the

interlocutor was one of the first persons who got acquitted at a trial. The source noted that

although there were only a few independent media in Ethiopia, they were all reporting on such

court trials. The police typically said that the accused were working with the diaspora community

and neoliberal communities.

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161.

According to the source, the treatment of detainees in Tigray was harsh. The detainees

would not even be taken to court and the police would beat them and torture them to force them

to confess. At some point the detainee would give in and confess to anything. The police would

afterwards transfer the detainee to the federal authorities.

Forced recruitment to the Liyu police

162.

The source had no information on forced recruitment. The source mentioned a book written

by a Swede, who was detained in the Somali Region. The book contained detailed information on

the Liyu police.

Forced recruitment to the army

163.

According to the interlocutor, there had been forced recruitment during the Ethiopia-

Eritrean war 20 years ago. However, the source had not heart of any recent forced recruitment to

the army.

The situation for students

164.

The source advised that the situation was more promising now than ever before. The

intimidation, harassment and arbitrary arrests had temporarily stopped. However, it was difficult to

know for how long. Even though there had been a number of protests, the arrests had dramatically

decreased. The source advised that the police had not interfered since October last year. The

interlocutor also emphasised that currently a student engaged in protests would be safe for now.

165.

The source explained that he had been arrested four times and he had never been as relaxed

as now. The source told the delegation that he was arrested for attending a welcome home party.

He was detained for 11 days, and then he was released without any charges. Officially he was

arrested for using the wrong flag –the flag they had used at the party did not contain the Emblem

of Ethiopia. Although, the fine for using a wrong flag was only 500 birr, the police kept him for 11

days in detention.

166.

The source mentioned that the police were scared, because of the new political situation.

Political discussions were becoming more common, and the Government had promised reforms

and political space.

167.

The interlocutor summarised the new situation as an opportunity for a new development for

Ethiopia, because the political prisoners were being released day by day. This fed into a feeling that

one could speak their mind. Every radio station was discussing political issues now; new television

stations were discussing politics. Furthermore, arrests of journalist had decreased. The source also

noticed that there was a positive development in the media regarding censorship as well.

Diaspora

168.

It was the opinion of the source that the strong resistance to the Government came from the

diaspora – especially from the USA. The relationship between the diaspora and the Government

was not good.

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169.

The source opined that the Government monitored the diaspora closely. The authorities

were very active in monitoring Social Media. As an example the source pointed at police

commissioners and even judges that read the source’s Facebook page. The source had met with a

number of officials in evenings and at conferences where they had told the source, that they had all

read his blogs – even the judges. The source had been to court many times, where he had got a lot

of comments from the officials; sometimes the officials even appreciated that information the

interlocutor brought to court.

Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Council

170.

According to the source, the Human Rights Commission contributed to minimalise and justify

human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian authorities. He elaborated that the

Commission would typically conduct a report that described how the police had used proportionate

power to stop violence. However, this was seldom the case. For example the source had written to

the Commission about five cases where the police had used disproportionate power, but the

Commission rejected the cases. This occurred back in 2016.

171.

On the other hand, the Human Rights Council was doing a good job, according to the

interlocutor: They were independent, although they had limitations in their capacity. Their reports

did not reach the public or the media and the reports were not used to influence policy making.

Furthermore, the council could only raise 10 percent in external financial assistance due to

Ethiopian rules on NGOs. The source would usually go to the council to give them information.

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Human Rights Commission

Mandate

172.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission was established by the Parliament with a mandate

to monitor the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Commissioners are appointed by the parliament

as per the establishment proclamation no. 210/2000. The mandate is wide and there are no

aspects of state action that the Commission is restricted from monitoring. The commission may

investigate complaints raised by or on behalf of any person who has been sent to prison or

detained by the police. The Commission will only investigate individual cases and has no mandate

to monitor incidents related to the State of emergency.

General working procedures

173.

The Commission may examine complaints raised by citizens, as well as initiate investigations

on its own initiation based on various sources of information. The commission published annual

reports, which are submitted to the parliament and other stakeholders. The Commission has also

started cooperating with donors such as UNDP and UN Women.

174.

The source noted that cases brought to the attention of the Commission typically would

come from a person who had experienced some incident of injustice where minimum standards in

fair justice were not fulfilled by the authorities, e.g. if a detained person would not be presented

before a judge within 48 hours. The Commission would then inquire into situations in police

stations. The monitoring part indicates if the minimum standards have been respected or not.

175.

Typical topics of concern regarding prison conditions would include food rations, sanitary

conditions, basic health services, and incarceration conditions for mothers with young children, etc.

Furthermore, the Commission also takes up problems of harmful traditional practices such as

underage brides and bride theft. The source advised that the Commission also worked with stigma

and discrimination against people with disabilities and elderly persons.

176.

The Commission may provide free legal aid to persons who do not have sufficient means to

pay for a lawyer to represent them in court. The source gave an example where a woman and her

three children had addressed the Commission. She was deprived of her children and property by

her husband and could not go to court. The Commission then intervened and provided her a

representative through a legal aid centre to defend her rights at court. The trial was successful and

she was awarded custody of her children.

177.

Regarding evidence in court, the source advised that when it is criminal cases, one has to

provide three eye witnesses, and when it is a civil case, one typically needs to provide documents.

Evidence could span from eye witness to medical documents depending on the specific

circumstances.

178.

The Commission has eight branch offices and has also hotline telephone service for free

(888-8), where people can call and get advice. The source noted that the Commission received

more than 2,000 complaints (cases) per year. The Commission has four staff members dedicated to

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the Commission’s hotline where they offer advice, and they can bring cases before the

commissioners. The Commission can also give legal advice on the phone.

179.

According to the source, the amount of complaints submitted to the Commission had been

constant over the past two and a half years. In 2017 it was 2,000 and in 2016 the Commission

received 2,500 Complaints. These, however, do not include complaint and advices from the

hotlines.

180.

The interlocutor further advised that the Commission also received both group complaints

and individual complaints where groups primarily complained about violations of land property

rights.

181.

The source confirmed that the Maekelawi detention centre in Addis Ababa

111

had been

closed.

182.

The source noted that only 11 cases were not resolved last year.

111

Also known as the Federal Police Crime Investigation and Forensic Sector

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Appendix B: Sources consulted

10.

International researcher

National researcher

British Embassy

U.S. Embassy

International NGO

Danish Refugee Council

The Fortune, national newspaper

Blogger

Human Rights Commission

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Appendix C: Bibliography

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05/07.

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7-opposition-groups/

African Elections Database (undated). Eritrea: 23-25 April 1993 Independence Referendum.

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Amnesty International (AI) (2018). Annex: Commentary on Ethiopian State of Emergency.

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- (2018). Ethiopia 2017/18.

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CNN (2018). Ethiopia lifts state of emergency two months early. 5 June, 2018.

https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/05/africa/ethiopia-lifts-state-of-emergency/index.html

European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2012). EASO Country of Origin Information report

methodology, 10 July 2012.

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support-office/coireportmethodologyfinallayout_en.pdf

Guardian, the (2018). These changes are unprecedented': how Abiy is upending Ethiopian politics. 08/07 2018

https://www.theguardian.

com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics

- (2018). Jawar Mohammed's red-carpet return signals Ethiopia's political sea change. 20 August, 2018.

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/aug/20/jawar-mohammed-return-ethiopia-political-

change-oromo

Hagmann, T. and Korf B. (2012). Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali

frontier in

Political Geography

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Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016). Ethiopia: State of Emergency Risks New Abuses: Directive Codifies

Vague, Overbroad Restrictions. 31/10/2016.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/31/ethiopia-state-

emergency-risks-new-abuses

- (2017). State of Emergency Ends in Ethiopia: Government Should Use Reform, Not Force, to Avoid More

Protests. 7 August, 2017. 07/08/2017

https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/07/state-emergency-ends-

ethiopia

- (2017). “Fuel on the Fire: Security Forces Response to the 2016 Ireecha Cultural Festival. September 19,

2017.

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festival

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content/uploads/2018/03/Etiopia-Studentprotester-fram-til-2014.pdf

Migration Policy Institute (2014). The Ethiopian Diaspora in the US. July 2014. Prepared for the Rocefeller

Fundation-Aspen Institute Diaspora Program (RAD)

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

OCHA (2018). Ethiopia: Oromio-Somali Conflict –Induced displacement.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ethiopia_-

_oromia_somali_conflict_induced_displacement_june_2018c.pdf

RSF – Reporters Sans Frontières (2018). Ethiopian government unblocks 264 websites and blogs, 26 June

2018.

https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1436596.html

UK Home Office (2017). Country Policy and Guidance Note Ethiopia: Oromos including the ‘Oromo Protests’

November 2017.

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1419377/1226_1512568013_cpin-eth-oromo-and-

oromo-protests-v2-0.pdf

UK Home Office (2017). Country Policy and Information Note Ethiopia: Opposition to the government. October 2017.

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1411254/1226_1507713108_ethiopia-opp-to-the-government.pdf

Verhoeven, H. (2016). Behind the Violence in Ethiopia in

Foreign Affairs

August 29, 2016

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ethiopia/2016-08-29/behind-violence-ethiopia

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

Appendix E: Terms of reference

General political situation and treatment of opposition

1.1.

Changes in situation since the state of emergency, and the accompanying regulations, was ended in August

2017 in terms of demands for political reforms;

1.2.

Government response to Oromia, Amhara and Ethiopian Somali protests, especially related to treatment of:

1.2.1.

members of opposition parties, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) or the Ogaden National Liberation

Front (ONLF);

1.2.2.

university student activists; and

1.2.3.

people involved in protests against the government;

1.3.

Status of plans announced by the prime minister to release imprisoned politicians and political activists and

to close the Maekelawi detention centre in Addis Ababa;

1.4.

Extent to which the authorities monitor diaspora activities.

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet

UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 18: Fact finding-rapport vedr. den politiske situation og forholdene for medlemmer af oppositionen i Etiopien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeriet