Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
UUI Alm.del Bilag 117
Offentligt
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LANDERAPPORT
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT (COI)
February 2019
Syria
Security Situation in Damascus
Province and Issues Regarding
Return to Syria
Report based on interviews between 16
to 27 November 2018 in Beirut and
Damascus
newtodenmark.dk
 UUI, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 117: Udlændingestyrelsens Fact-finding landerapport vedrørende Syrien, fra udlændinge- og integrationsministeren
© 2018 The Danish Immigration Service
The Danish Immigration Service
Ryesgade 53
2100 Copenhagen
Denmark
Phone: +45 35 36 66 00
newtodenmark.dk
February 2019
Alle rettigheder tilhører Udlændingestyrelsen.
Udgivelsen kan frit hentes på nyidanmark.dk
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Content
Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction and methodology ............................................................................................................... 4
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 7
1.
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria............................................. 8
1.1.
2.
Incidents in government-controlled areas in Syria ........................................................................... 9
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and Yarmouk .......... 11
2.1. Development of the general security situation in Damascus province since May 2018...................... 11
2.2. Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City ............................................ 12
2.3. Freedom of movement in Damascus Province ..................................................................................... 12
3. Issues regarding return to Syria......................................................................................................... 19
3.1. Possible consequences of having left Syria during the war.................................................................. 19
3.2. Possible consequences of illegal exit .................................................................................................... 19
3.3. Possible consequences of having applied for asylum in other countries upon return to Syria ........... 20
3.4. Procedure for return............................................................................................................................. 20
3.5. Persons recently returned .................................................................................................................... 21
3.6. Entry via Damascus International Airport ............................................................................................ 26
3.7. Issues regarding military service........................................................................................................... 27
Consulted sources ................................................................................................................................ 32
Oral sources ................................................................................................................................................. 32
Written sources ........................................................................................................................................... 32
Appendix 1: Meeting minutes............................................................................................................... 34
Meeting with a Damascus-based lawyer ..................................................................................................... 34
Meeting with a humanitarian organisation ................................................................................................. 37
Meeting with an international humanitarian organisation in Syria ............................................................ 39
Meeting with an international organisation in Syria ................................................................................... 40
Meeting with an international security organisation (1)............................................................................. 43
Meeting with an international security organisation (2)............................................................................. 46
Meeting with Dr. Bente Scheller, the Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBS)...................................................... 48
Skype Meeting with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW)............................................ 50
Meeting with COAR Global .......................................................................................................................... 56
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Meeting with Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), Director, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
(SOHR).......................................................................................................................................................... 60
Meeting with Sara Kayyali, Syria Researcher, Human Rights Watch (HRW) ............................................... 64
Meeting with General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department .............................. 67
Appendix 2: Terms of Reference ........................................................................................................... 70
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Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology.
1
The report is based on
approved minutes from meetings with carefully selected sources. Statements from sources are
used in the report and all statements are referenced.
This report is not, and does not purport to be a detailed or comprehensive survey of all aspects of
the issues addressed in the report and should be weighed against other available country of origin
information on the security situation in Damascus province and the situation for returnees,
including entry via Damascus International Airport.
The report at hand does not include any policy recommendations or analysis. The information in
the report does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Danish Immigration Service or the Danish
Refugee Council.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim
to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular
legal position.
1
European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information report methodology, 10 July 2012.
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffc33d32.html
[accessed 18 June 2018]
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Introduction and methodology
The report at hand focuses on the security situation in Damascus province in Syria, including the
security situation in Damascus City and Yarmouk as well as freedom of movement in those areas.
Additionally, the report contains information on a number of issues regarding return to Syria, for
instance amnesty to draft evaders and deserters, possible consequences of illegal exit, recent
returns from Syria’s neighbouring countries, entry into Syria via Damascus International Airport
etc.
The report is the product of a joint mission conducted by the Asylum Department at the Head
Quarters of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the Country of Origin Information Division,
Danish Immigration Service (DIS) to Damascus, Syria, and Beirut, Lebanon from 16 to 27 November
2018. Generally, the mission was a follow-up to a similar joint mission conducted by DIS and DRC
in spring 2018, which mainly looked into the security situation in Damascus Province.
2
In the planning phase of the mission, contacts were established with relevant sources who
confirmed their availability on the given dates of our mission. The delegation also consulted one
source in person in Birmingham, UK, and one source in Washington DC, USA via Skype.
The purpose of the mission was to collect updated information on issues recurring in cases
regarding Syrian asylum seekers in Denmark. The terms of reference (ToR) for the mission were
drawn up jointly by DIS and DRC, in consultation with the Danish Refugee Appeals Board as well as
an advisory group on COI (‘Referencegruppen’)
.
3
The terms of reference are included at the end of
the report (Appendix 2).
In the scope of compiling this report, the delegation consulted 12 interlocutors, comprising
international organisations, international non-governmental organisations, humanitarian
organisations, analysts, a governmental authority as well as a lawyer. The sources interviewed
were selected by the delegation based on the expertise, merit and role of each source relevant to
the mission.
4
Some of the sources consulted have a presence inside Syria, others travel regularly to Syria and
others follow the situation from outside of Syria through information from a wide range of sources
and contacts.
2
Danish Immigration Service and Danish Refugee Council,
SYRIA, Security Situation in Damascus City and Yarmouk,
August 2018,
accessible at:
https://nyidanmark.dk/-/media/Files/US/Landerapporter/Rapport-Syrien-august-2018docx-
2.pdf?la=da&hash=6910DB37A4E4E5F394D850B297095E793FD98480
3
The group consists of the Danish Refugee Council, Amnesty International in Denmark, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Dignity,
representatives of two Christian organisations (“Europa Missionen” and “Åbne Døre”), the National Commissioner of Police and the
Danish Bar and Law Society (representing asylum lawyers).
4
In addition to the twelve sources mentioned above, the delegation also met with representatives from UNHCR offices in Amman
(Skype meeting on 19 November) and Damascus (meeting 21 November), who both stated that they did not have information on
return to Syria, including treatment upon return, as UNHCR did not monitor returns to Syria. Due to the same reason, the UNHCR
office in Geneva replied to the delegation’s request for a meeting that they were not able to provide any information on return to
Syria either.
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The sources were asked how reference might be made to them in the report. Six out of twelve
sources requested varying degrees of anonymity for the sake of discretion and upholding tolerable
working conditions, as well as for personal safety. All sources are referenced in the report
according to their own request. Two sources have requested to be referenced the same way (an
international security organisation),
which is the reason why they have been given number (1) and
(2) in order to recognise them from each other.
The sources consulted were informed about the purpose of the mission and that their statements
would be included in a public report. The minutes from the meetings with the sources were
forwarded to them for approval, giving them a chance to amend, comment or correct their
statements. Eleven sources approved their statements. The minutes from the meeting with the
Immigration and Passports Department was not sent to the source for approval, as the delegation
had previously been informed that the statements given during the meeting with the source are
public statements and thus do not need approval.
The report is a synthesis of the sources’ statements and does thus not include all details and
nuances of each statement. In the report, care has been taken to present the views of the sources
as accurately and transparently as possible. The statements of all sources are found in their full
extent in Appendix 1 of this report.
During the interviews, the sources highlighted issues that are not addressed in ToR. Since these
issues could be relevant to refugee status determination, they are included in the meeting notes in
Appendix 1, but they are not addressed in the report.
For the sake of reader-friendliness, transparency and accuracy, paragraphs in the meeting minutes
in Appendix 1 have been given consecutive numbers, which are used in the report when referring
to the statements of the sources in the footnotes. The intention hereby is to make it easier to find
the exact place of a statement in the meeting minutes.
The information collected on some of the issues regarding return to Syria is limited, particularly
about returns from Western countries. This is mainly due to the fact that returns to Syria are not
monitored by any international organisation, and also because there have not been as many
returns from Europe as from Syria’s neighbouring countries. Information on return via Damascus
International Airport is also limited, as sources informed that most Syrians use land borders
(particularly the border with Lebanon) to enter or leave Syria.
Finally, attention should be called to the changeable and unstable situation in Syria and the fact
that the information provided may quickly become out-dated. Therefore, the issues addressed in
this report should be monitored periodically and be brought up to date accordingly.
The Danish Embassy in Beirut provided valuable assistance in the planning and execution phases
of the mission.
The research and editing of this report was finalised by 31 January 2019.
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The report is available on the websites of
DIS
and
DRC
, thus available to all stakeholders in the
refugee status determination process as well as to the general public.
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Abbreviations
COI
DIS
DRC
EASO
GAPAR
HRW
HBS
IED
IS
ISW
NDF
NGO
SOHR
ToR
UNHCR
UNRWA
Country of Origin Information
Danish Immigration Service
Danish Refugee Council
European Asylum Support Office
The General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees
Human Rights Watch
The Heinrich Boell Foundation
Improvised explosive device
The Islamic State
Institute for the Study of War
National Defence Forces
Non-governmental organisation
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
Terms of reference
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
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1. The general security situation in government-
controlled areas in Syria
During the spring and summer of 2018, the Syrian government took control of major opposition
strongholds as well as of large areas of territory in south Syria, including Yarmouk, Eastern Ghouta and
Der’aa.
5
At present the government is controlling most areas in Syria.
6
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which mainly consists of Kurdish forces, control areas in North and
West Syria. Idlib is the only province that opposition groups are controlling, while Turkish forces still control
areas along the Syrian-Turkish border and areas in the Idlib province. Until November 2018 the Islamic
State (IS) controlled the Safaa hills, a rural area in Eastern Suwayda. However, at the end of November the
5
BBC,
Deraa, birthplace of Syria uprising, retaken by government forces,
12 July 2018, accessible at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44806045;
Al-Jazeera,
Syria's war: Who controls what? A map of the Syrian war
showing who controls what after seven years of fighting.
19 Dec 2018, accessible at:
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-150529144229467.html
6
According to Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) the Syrian government has control with 61 percent of Syria, Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):
202.
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Syrian government announced its control over this IS-pocket in the area.
7
There are still small IS-pockets in
Deir ez-Zor
8
and Homs,
9
and there is a remaining presence of an estimated 100 IS fighters or IS supporting
elements in Eastern Suwayda.
10
1.1. Incidents in government-controlled areas in Syria
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria, including major cities, such as
Latakia, Homs, Hama, Tartous and Damascus, has improved significantly since May 2018.
11
Overall, there
has been a significant decrease of military confrontations and a major reduction in the number of security
incidents, including direct fire such as shelling, in government-controlled areas,
12
compared to the number
of security incidents before July 2018.
13
However, the situation remained tense in some areas, such as eastern side of Latakia, western part of
Aleppo and the northern part of Hama.
14
In Aleppo, Homs and areas bordering Idlib security incidents
continued to take place.
15
Regarding prevalence of specific types of incidents, sources mentioned the
following:
1.1.1.
Shelling
The areas bordering Idlib province have been most exposed to shelling exchange between opposition
groups and government forces. These include Aleppo, north-eastern Latakia, areas in north and east of
Hama and in north and east of Homs.
16
In October 2018 al-Nusra shelled Western Aleppo causing three
civilian casualties.
17
In the north-eastern Latakia the shelling incidents occured in more mountainous and
less populated areas.
18
In Deir ez-Zor and Homs, the Syrian government is actively fighting against IS.
19
Deir ez-Zor and Eastern
Suwayda are military zones with minimal civilian presence.
20
1.1.2.
Insurgent-style attacks
Since IS conducted one major suicide attack in Suwayda in July 2018, which resulted in many civilian
casualties,
21
no major insurgent-style attacks had been reported in government-controlled areas.
22
A Damascus-based lawyer: 2; An international organisation in Syria: 52; An international security organisation (1): 72; An
international security organisation (2): 95
8
Christopher Kozak (ISW)): 136; An international security organisation (2): 91; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 207
9
An international security organisation (2): 91
10
An international security organisation (1): 72
11
An international security organisation (2): 94; Christopher Kozak (ISW)): 128; A Damascus-based lawyer: 1; An international
humanitarian organisation in Syria: 50; An international security organisation (2): 90; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 128
12
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 50; An international security organisation (2): 90
13
An international security organisation (1): 70
14
An international security organization (2): 90, 92, 93
15
A Damascus-based lawyer: 1; An international organization in Syria: 50; An international security organization (2): 92, 93;
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 130-133, COAR Global: 177-178; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):206
16 A
Damascus-based lawyer: 1; An international organisation in Syria: 50; An international security organisation (2): 92, 93;
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 130, 131, 133; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):206, 207
17
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):207
18
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 132
19
A Damascus-based lawyer: 1; An international security organisation (2): 91; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 136.
20
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 136
21
A Damascus-based lawyer: 2; An International organisation in Syria: 52; An international security organisation (1): 72; Rami
Abdurrahman (SOHR):205
7
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An international security organisation (2) assessed that it is highly likely that there will be a shift in the
conflict from symmetric confrontation and warfare to asymmetric confrontation conducted by small
sleeping cells.
23
An international organisation in Syria assessed that it is too early to say whether armed
opposition groups will start insurgent-style attacks in big cities. However, he assessed that major cities
other than Damascus, are more exposed to such attacks, as Damascus is intensively protected.
24
1.1.3.
Unexploded ordnance
Christopher Kozak (ISW) noted that there had been several reports of unexploded ordnance detonations
during the last few months (autumn 2018). Such incidents had taken place in Eastern Aleppo City, Eastern
Ghouta and Eastern Hama.
25
COAR Global also said that there had been incidents involving unexploded
ordinance, particularly in Eastern Ghouta.
26
The government forces were conducting demining activities in
Der’aa, where unexploded ordnance detonations had caused many civilian casualties.
27
1.1.4.
Clashes
Since the government does not have the capacity to manage all areas under its control, it uses different
militia groups to control some areas and checkpoints in Aleppo, Latakia,
28
Tartous, Hama, Homs and Deir
ez-Zor.
29
There were reports of clashes between pro-government militia groups and government forces in
some areas while in other areas these groups had fought against each other due to conflicting agendas and
economic interests. In some areas such as Homs, Hama and Aleppo, these clashes had escalated into the
use of heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and caused civilian casualties.
30
Contrarily, three sources stated that there had not been clashes between pro-government militia groups.
31
According to a Damascus-based lawyer, what has happened is rather criminality conducted by militia
groups but the Syrian government has almost taken control over these groups.
32
An international
humanitarian organisation in Syria said that the clashes between militia groups were rather personal fights
among members of such groups.
33
1.1.5.
Kidnapping
The lack of centralized governance in the areas controlled by militias had led to an increase in criminality,
including kidnappings. There were reports of kidnapping, mostly in Aleppo and Suwayda conducted by
gangs for financial purposes.
34
A Damascus-based lawyer:2; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):205
An international security organisation (1): 90
24
An international organisation in Syria: 51
25
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 138, 142
26
COAR Global: 179
27
An international security organisation (2): 96
28
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):201, 202
29
COAR Global: 174
30
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 203; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 134-135; COAR Global: 176-177
31
A Damascus-based lawyer: 3; An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 53; An international security organisation (2):
97
32
A Damascus-based lawyer: 3
33
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 53
34
An international security organisation (1): 72; COAR Global: 173, 176; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):202
23
22
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2. The general security situation in Damascus Province,
including Damascus City and Yarmouk
2.1. Development of the general security situation in Damascus province
since May 2018
Since the Syrian government asserted full control of Damascus Province in May 2018, the security situation
in Damascus and rural Damascus has improved significantly.
35 36
No security incidents, such as shelling,
clashes, and insurgent style attacks, had occurred in the province by the time of the mission except for the
Israeli bombardments of areas targeting military instalments close to Damascus Airport.
37
Since the meetings with the sources, two explosions have occurred in Damascus City. The first blast took
place on 20 January 2019 close to a military intelligence office in the southern part of the city resulting in a
number of casualties. It was unclear whether the explosion was the result of a planted bomb or a suicide
attack.
38
The second blast was a car bomb which went off on Thursday 24 January 2019 in a northeastern
neighborhood of Damascus close to the Russian Embassy causing material damages and injuries.
39
So far
(i.e. 31 January 2019) there have been no reports on any group taking the responsibility for the blasts.
Since May 2018, there have been incidents caused by unexploded ordnances in areas that had experienced
heavy combats such as Jobar,
40
Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk.
41
There have been casualties from
unexploded ordnances in Eastern Ghouta, but the sources did not have knowledge or seen reports of
civilian casualties due to unexploded ordnances in Damascus.
42
Two sources said that the Syrian government had initiated the clearing of unexploded devices in Yarmouk.
43
According to an international security organisation (1), the scale of the task is huge, and the resources do
not follow.
44
A humanitarian organisation said that the government had commenced rubble removal from
the main streets, however, the rubbles have been pushed aside along with potential unexploded
ordnances.
45
35
A Damascus-based lawyer: 4; An international organisation in Syria: 54; An international security organisation (1): 74; An
international security organisation: 98; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 139; COAR Global: 179; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 208
36
For information on security incidents in Damascus Province before May 2018, see: Danish Immigration Service and Danish
Refugee Council,
SYRIA, Security Situation in Damascus City and Yarmouk,
August 2018, accessible at:
https://nyidanmark.dk/-
/media/Files/US/Landerapporter/Rapport-Syrien-august-2018docx-
2.pdf?la=da&hash=6910DB37A4E4E5F394D850B297095E793FD98480
37
An international organisation in Syria: 54; An international security organisation (2): 99.
38
The National,
Fatalities reported after 'huge explosion' in Damascus, 20 January 2019,
accessible at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/fatalities-reported-after-huge-explosion-in-damascus-1.815495
39
The Times of Israel,
Car bomb explodes near Russian embassy in Damascus,
24 January 2019, accessible at:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/car-bomb-explodes-near-russian-embassy-in-damascus/
40
An international security organisation in Damascus: 101
41
Christopher Kozak (ISW):142; COAR Global: 179; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 208
42
Christopher Kozak (ISW):142; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 208
43
A Damascus-based lawyer: 5; An international security organisation (1): 75
44
An international security organisation (1): 75
45
A humanitarian organisation: 25
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According to Christopher Kozak (ISW), very low-level incidents had happened in former opposition-
controlled areas in the outskirts of Damascus during the past few months (autumn 2018) such as individuals
shooting at checkpoints run by the government, or a soldier being stabbed to death outside Damascus,
which led to a security crackdown.
46
An international security organisation (2) said that in the beginning of November 2018 the government
forces arrested persons who were about to carry out suicide attacks in the outskirts of Damascus. The
source assessed that there was a potential risk of insurgent style attacks that could be conducted by
opposition groups in future.
47
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria assessed, however, that
insurgent-style attacks would be less probable to happen in Damascus than other major cities as the capital
is heavily protected by security forces.
48
2.2. Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City
There have been no security incidents on the road connecting Damascus International Airport to Damascus
City since May 2018.
49
The only incident that occurred close to the airport was the Israeli bombardment of
military facilities around the airport.
50
There were Israeli air strikes on 5 May, 9 May and 15 September
2018, and since the meetings with the sources, there have been four strikes, the last one on 21 January
2019.
51
The main nexus of violence previously stemmed from either IS in South Damascus or opposition-
held districts in Eastern Ghouta, however, both of those areas have been fully controlled by the Syrian
government since spring 2018. Accordingly, any prior restrictions on the road between the airport and
Damascus city have been lifted.
52
Two sources mentioned that there were checkpoints on the road.
53
One of the sources specified that there
was one checkpoint at the entrance to the city and one when you reach the airport.
54
2.3. Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
According to COAR Global, in general, movement in Damascus province has become smoother since May
2018, it has become easier to move around, and traffic is flowing easier.
55
An international organisation in
Syria said that the improvement of the security situation in Damascus is reflected in daily life in different
46
47
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 139
An international security organisation (2): 100
48
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 51
49
A Damascus-based lawyer: 6; An international organisation in Syria: 57; An international security organisation (1): 74; An
international security organisation: 104; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 143; COAR Global: 180; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 209.
50
An international organisation in Syria:54, 57
51
Reuters,
Syria says downs 'hostile targets' in suspected Israeli attack,
29 November 2018 accessible at:
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-strike/syria-says-downs-hostile-targets-in-suspected-israeli-attack-
idUKKCN1NY2L6,
and BBC,
Russia condemns 'Israeli' air strikes on Syria,
26 December 2018, accessible at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46682666;
BBC,
Syria war: Israeli jets target Iranian positions around Damascus,
21
January 2019, accessible at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46941717;
Report: IDF strikes Iranian, Hezbollah
targets near Damascus,
The Jerusalem Post 12 January 2019, accessible at:
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Syrian-
reports-Israeli-planes-attacked-targets-in-Syrias-Damascus-577082;
52
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 143
53
COAR Global: 180; An international organisation in Syria: 57
54
An international organisation in Syria: 57
55
COAR Global: 181-182
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ways in Damascus: removal of checkpoints, less strict procedures for checking at checkpoints as well as
waving security clearance requirement with regard to renting a property in Damascus.
56
2.3.1. Prevalence and locations of checkpoint
The number of checkpoints has significantly been reduced in Damascus province and specifically in
Damascus city since May 2018,
57
as the security situation has become more stable and because the
checkpoints were affecting the normal activity in the city.
58
According to a Damascus-based lawyer,
checkpoints inside Damascus city have been reduced down to one-fifth or even less.
59
An international
organisation in Syria said that 90% of checkpoints inside Damascus city had been removed.
60
The checkpoints within Damascus are reportedly concentrated around the central Old City and Mezzeh
District.
61
There are still checkpoints, including multiple checkpoints, at the entrances to the city and
around the city, though at a reduced number.
62
Christopher Kozak (ISW) said that checkpoints had
reportedly been pulled from some of the smaller neighbourhood roads and instead focused at the
entrances to Damascus, i.e. the highways coming into Damascus from Lebanon, Damascus International
Airport, and the M5 Highway headed towards Homs.
63
According to COAR Global, checkpoints are kept in
place at main areas
64
, and according to an international security organisation (2) checkpoints are reinforced
in areas where government officials are working and living.
65
The number of checkpoints in former opposition-held areas in South Damascus has increased, as the
government is suspicious of the residents in those areas and in order to prevent security incidents.
66
There were still occasional flying checkpoints established by pro-government forces, particularly as part of
raids to search for conscripts and draft evaders.
67
However, according to Christopher Kozak (ISW) this
practice is most frequently taking place in former opposition-held areas, such as Eastern Ghouta.
68
2.3.2. Control of checkpoints
Checkpoints in different areas in Damascus province are controlled by different security services.
69
According to a Damascus-based lawyer, some checkpoints are run by the Internal Security (al-Amn
al-
Dakheli),
which is a part of the State Security (Amn
al-Dawla),
whilst others are run by the Military Security
(al-Amn
al-Askari).
70
Christopher Kozak (ISW) said government checkpoints are still being run by a wide
An international organisation in Syria:55
A Damascus-based lawyer: 7; An international organisation in Syria: 58; An international security organisation (2): 102; COAR
Global: 182; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 211
58
An international security organisation (2): 102
59
A Damascus-based lawyer: 7
60
An international organisation in Syria: 58
61
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 146
62
An international security organisation (1): 77; COAR Global: 182; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 211
63
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 146
64
COAR Global: 182
65
An international security organisation (2): 102
66
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 211
67
An international security organisation (1): 79; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 149; COAR Global: 186
68
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 149
69
A Damascus-based lawyer: 8; An international organisation in Syria: 62; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 151; COAR Global: 183; Rami
Abdurrahman (SOHR): 212
70
A Damascus-based lawyer: 8
57
56
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array of forces, particularly the main branches of the state’s intelligence services, i.e. Air Force Intelligence,
Military Intelligence Directorate, and State Security Directorates as well as regular units of the Syrian Arab
Army, particularly the 4th Armoured Division and the Republican Guard, which are units endemically based
in Damascus. Since May 2018, the Air Force Intelligence has increasingly consolidated its control over
checkpoints in Damascus. Christopher Kozak (ISW) added that the Air Force Intelligence does not hold
exclusive control over checkpoints, but it has acquired more of the relative security portfolio in Damascus,
particularly in Northern and Western Damascus near Mezzeh Airbase and the Damascus-Beirut Highway.
71
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) also mentioned that the Fourth Armoured Division and the Republican Guard
are controlling checkpoints outside Damascus city. Inside Damascus city, the Syrian Intelligence Services are
controlling the checkpoints. The source noted, however, that the Fourth Armoured Division and the
Republican Guard also control checkpoints near military areas in Damascus city, and Hezbollah and Syrian
Shia militias run the checkpoints at Sayida Zainab area.
72
COAR Global said that the State Security Directorate has increasingly become more powerful in its presence
in the city. COAR Global added that the government is hereby entering into the next phase of strengthening
its governance and control of the city.
73
2.3.3. Procedures at checkpoints
Checks conducted at checkpoints within Damascus city are often very cursory,
74
and ID and cars of passing
people are not checked unless there is a security alert.
75
Two sources pointed out that checks at checkpoints located at entrances and in areas outside the city are
more thorough than inside the city.
76
COAR Global mentioned that inside as well as at the entrance of Damascus City, individuals passing
checkpoints are controlled rigorously.
77
The checking procedures and the thoroughness of checks in Damascus province depends on which branch
of the security service is manning the checkpoints.
78
An international security organisation (1) and
Christopher Kozak (ISW) advised that the Air Force Intelligence Directorate is considered the strictest of all
branches.
79
According to Christopher Kozak (ISW), the Air Force Intelligence is more likely to make
individuals step out and physically search the vehicle, whilst, other pro-government forces might be fine
with a simple paper-check and cursory inspection of the vehicle.
80
The area in which a checkpoint is located and the officer in charge were also mentioned by sources as
factors determining the thoroughness and the type of checks at checkpoints.
81
71
72
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 151, 153
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 212
73
COAR Global: 183
74
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9; An international organisation in Syria: 59; An international security organisation (2): 103
75
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9; An international organisation in Syria: 59
76
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9; An international organisation in Syria: 60-61
77
COAR Global: 184
78
An international security organisation (1): 84; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 152-154; COAR Global: 188
79
An international security organisation (1): 84; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 152-154;
80
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 152
81
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 145; COAR Global: 184, 188; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 213
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At fixed checkpoints at entrances and in areas in Damascus province outside the city authorities are looking
for wanted people, conscripts and evaders from military service.
82
A Damascus-based lawyer mentioned that before May 2018, the authorities were actively searching for
conscripts and evaders from military service, but they do not search actively for them anymore.
Nevertheless, if the government finds a conscript or evader at checkpoints, that person will be sent directly
to training camp for six months and afterwards to military service.
83
On the other hand, an international
security organisation (1) noted that the authorities have, among others, focused on searching for conscripts
since May 2018, whereas the focus before May 2018 was to check for weapons and car bombs.
84
Christopher Kozak noted that the primary purpose of checkpoints is controlling the flow of individuals
entering and exiting Damascus, particularly people considered ‘undesirable’, i.e. former residents of
Eastern Ghouta and other opposition-held districts outside of Damascus. There is also a focus on
conscription drives and on the identification of wanted individuals. The source has not received any recent
reports of intercepted explosives at government checkpoints in Damascus.
85
Sources pointed out that people’s names are checked against wanted lists at checkpoints although it is not
always the case.
86
Each security branch of the security services of the Syrian regime has its own wanted list
and the different branches do not coordinate their lists.
87
Someone who has had his name cleared from a
list of one branch of the security services can, thus, not be certain that he is cleared from lists of other
branches.
88
Generally, it is difficult for people to know what their status is with the Syrian government. However, it is
possible for people who have money and good connections with the authorities or influential people to
obtain information on whether their names are on wanted lists. However, accessing this information may
expose them (or those that are checking for them) to the system and it is not a guarantee that they would
not be facing difficulties, including risk of arrest, when they try to access this information.
89
2.3.4. Treatment at checkpoints
Sources mentioned that the profiles outlined below risk encountering problems at checkpoints. One source
mentioned that in general, very few people face difficulties when approaching a checkpoint.
90
2.3.4.1. Impact of place of origin
People originating from former opposition-held areas and people who had residence in such areas are
subject to scrutiny or problems when approaching checkpoints.
91
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9; An international organisation in Syria: 60-61; An international security organisation (1): 78;
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 149, 150; COAR Global: 185, 187; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 234
83
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9
84
An international security organisation (1): 78
85
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 150
86
An international organisation in Syria: 60-61; An international security organisation (1): 78; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 213,
214; COAR Global: 184
87
An international organisation in Syria: 62; COAR Global: 188; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 214
88
An international organisation in Syria: 62; COAR Global: 188
89
An international security organisation (1): 80
90
An international organisation in Syria: 61
91
An international security organisation (1): 81; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 150, 155, 156, 158; COAR Global: 187, 189; Rami
Abdurrahman (SOHR): 215, 217; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 231-233, 236
82
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An international security organisation (1) mentioned that people from former opposition-held areas are
generally not specifically targeted at checkpoints. However, there is some level of scrutiny towards people
from these areas, and they are asked more questions than people from other areas. There are examples of
men from former opposition-held areas being arrested at checkpoints for security reasons or
conscription.
92
According to COAR Global, former residents from Eastern Ghouta experience a high level of scrutiny when
passing checkpoints into Damascus City. There have been instances where men, who are not of
conscription age and who do not have any affiliation or connection to unwanted entities, have still been
withheld at checkpoints and asked to give thorough accounts of why and where they are going. Some are
allowed to leave after one hour of investigation whereas others might be kept for up to three days.
93
Based on her research about the situation of people from Daraya, Zabadani and Qaboun, it was Sara
Kayyali’s (HRW) understanding that in certain cases persons from former opposition-held areas have had to
leave their documents at the checkpoints when going inside Damascus City and until they leave the city
again.
94
Contrarily, a Damascus-based lawyer stated that for the time being, no person faces difficulties at
checkpoints due to his or her area of origin. Thus, persons from previously opposition-controlled areas in
Syria do not experience additional scrutiny or other problems when approaching checkpoints.
95
Christopher Kozak (ISW) said that there have been examples of government crackdown on Palestinians in
Damascus due to many Palestinians having previously been residing in areas held by opposition groups or IS
in Southern Damascus.
96
2.3.4.2. Impact of affiliation with opposition groups
Affiliation or connection to opposition groups has an impact on treatment at checkpoints, which includes
treatment ranging from additional scrutiny, facing difficulties and risk of being withheld or detained.
97
Christopher Kozak (ISW) and Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) mentioned that people were subject to additional
scrutiny at checkpoints if they are suspected to be affiliated to opposition groups.
98
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) stated that family members to people originating from former opposition-held
areas may risk facing difficulties when approaching checkpoints, including risk of being detained.
99
According to Christopher Kozak (ISW), family connections with individuals living in opposition-held areas in
Northern Syria are clearly seen as a suspect marker in the eyes of the government and that has led to
arrests in some cases.
100
92
93
An international security organisation (1): 81
COAR Global: 189
94
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 233.
95
A Damascus-based lawyer: 11
96
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 158
97
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 155; COAR Global: 187; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 215; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 215
98
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 155
99
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 215
100
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 157
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According to an international organisation in Syria, in general, very few people face difficulties when
approaching a checkpoint. Usually, when the authorities check people’s IDs at checkpoints against wanted
lists, they are looking for persons who are affiliated with armed opposition groups, i.e. those who have
carried weapons and those who have made any activity directly against the government. Low-profile
political activists, e.g. those who have written something critical against the government on Facebook, have
been able to pass checkpoints without facing any difficulty.
101
According to COAR Global, anyone with any relation to political actors (both secular and islamists), and
individuals from large and famous families who are known to be in opposition to the government will face
scrutiny when passing checkpoints.
102
An international security organisation (1) said that former opposition people, who have now reconciled
with the government, also face scrutiny at checkpoints. The source noted that such scrutiny can lead to
arrests, however, not necessarily due to their opposition activities, but for other reasons including alleged
previous criminal activities.
103
Contrarily, a Damascus-based lawyer said that reconciled former opposition groups do not face difficulties
at checkpoints. He added that in coordination with Iranians and Russians, the authorities have made a list
of reconciled former opposition fighters which is accessible at checkpoints. If a former opposition fighter
approaches a checkpoint and his name is on the list, they would let him go through.
104
Two sources mentioned that evidence that a person has communicated with people inside opposition-held
areas, can lead to arrest at checkpoints.
105
After meeting with the delegation on 20 November 2018, an
international security organisation (1) stated that 20 people were arrested in December 2018 by Air Force
Intelligence in Rural Damascus, because they were suspected of communicating with people inside
opposition-controlled areas.
106
2.3.4.3. Military service
According to two sources, men in the obligatory military age (18-42) face the most difficulties when passing
checkpoints.
107
One of the sources said that young men are at most risk when passing checkpoints, as they
will have to clarify their status, for instance, whether they are temporarily exempted by an amnesty or are
currently exempted from military service because they are students.
108
The Damascus-based lawyer highlighted that if the government finds a conscript or evader at checkpoints,
that person will be sent directly to a training camp for six months and afterwards to military service.
109
2.3.4.4. Impact of similarity of name
According to COAR Global, individuals who have similar names to wanted people will face scrutiny when
passing checkpoints.
110
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) noted that there have been cases of people being
101
102
An international organisation in Syria:61
COAR Global: 187
103
An international security organisation (1): 82; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 141, 156.
104
A Damascus-based lawyer: 10
105
An international security organisation (1): 83; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 157
106
An international security organisation (1): 83
107
An international security organisation (1): 79; COAR Global: 185
108
An international security organisation (1): 79
109
A Damascus-based lawyer: 9
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detained due to similarity of their names to some persons on wanted lists. Those with good connections to
the authorities usually get released afterwards.
111
2.3.3. Freedom of movement in Yarmouk
The Syrian government took full control of Yarmouk in May 2018 after heavy combats against armed
opposition groups. 70% of the buildings in Yarmouk camp are estimated to have been destroyed and the
area around the camp area has been completely destroyed during the combats.
112
Yarmouk Camp is still considered a military zone, which means severe restrictions on entry and exit.
113
Former Yarmouk residents must apply for permits to enter both Damascus and Yarmouk. Security services
screen applicants as well as their families.
114
Citizens who want to return back to Yarmouk will need to go
through an official process that includes the registration of their names in order to obtain a security
clearance.
115
The source added that previously when it was necessary to obtain a security clearance for
moving to certain areas, Palestinians not registered with GAPAR could not obtain such security
clearance
.
116
However, the security clearance request has been waived.
117 118
A humanitarian organisation said that the Syrian government has issued a public statement that Palestinian
refugees will be allowed to return back to Yarmouk camp, however, until now, no concrete mechanism has
been stipulated by the government to regulate this return.
119
From the beginning of November 2018, the government permitted people to go into the area to check their
houses.
120
According to a humanitarian organisation, lots of people have entered the area and visited their
homes.
121
A Damascus-based lawyer said that the government had stopped permitting this in order to
finish the clearing of unexploded devices.
122
There are reportedly 50-100 families who are staying in
Yarmouk unofficially.
123
With regards to the treatment of Palestinians at checkpoints, a humanitarian organisation noted that there
is no indication that ethnic or religious background has an impact on freedom of movement. Palestinians’
freedom of movement is not known to be restricted in Damascus Province just by virtue of them being
Palestinians and they do not face known difficulties at checkpoints solely due to their Palestinian
background.
124
110
111
COAR Global: 187;
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 215
112
A humanitarian organisation: 25; COAR Global: 179
113
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 158
114
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 158
115
A humanitarian organisation: 30
116
A humanitarian organisation: 35
117
An international organisaton in Syria: 56
118
According to Syrian Law Journal, ”the Ministry of Interior is no longer requiring security clearance approvals to be obtained as a
precondition for leases to be registered with municipalities.”, Syrian Law Journal, 29 January 2019, accessed at:
https://twitter.com/syrian_law/status/1090257282170990597
119
A humanitarian organisation: 33
120
A Damascus-based lawyer: 5; A humanitarian organisation: 31; An international security organisation (1): 76
121
A humanitarian organisation: 31
122
A Damascus-based lawyer: 5
123
A humanitarian organisation: 31
124
A humanitarian organisation: 29
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3. Issues regarding return to Syria
3.1. Possible consequences of having left Syria during the war
COAR Global noted that the mere fact that someone has stayed abroad during the Syrian civil war is not an
issue upon return.
125
Sara Kayyali (HRW) noted that before the beginning of 2018, Syrians used to be afraid that having left the
country during the conflict (after 2011) might have consequences for them upon return, due to the then
existing perception of those leaving as being affiliated with anti-government sentiments. But as far as she
had been informed by the Syrians who she was in contact with, since the beginning of 2018 it seems that
having left the country during the conflict does not have an impact anymore. The source specified that she
was talking about persons who mostly have applied for asylum in Western countries such as Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden as well as Turkey. Part of this change in 2018 was, according to the source, due to
a change in rhetoric, which although not matched by a change in policies, at least resolves the prima facie
concerns. The other reason behind the change was that there were activists who had been approached by
the Syrian government and asked to come back to Syria.
126
3.2. Possible consequences of illegal exit
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department, stated that people who have left
Syria illegally during the Syrian war will not face any issue with the Syrian authorities as a consequence of
their illegal exit. Previously, illegal exit from Syria would lead to judicial prosecution. Now, the punishment
has been waived as the government is aware that many people fled the country illegally due to the
conflict.
127
According to a Damascus-based lawyer, illegal exit from Syria still entails punishment. However, according
to an administrative circular, which has been sent to all Syrian embassies abroad, if a person has left the
country illegally, he can go to a Syrian embassy in the country where he stays and apply for a declaration
from the embassy by which he can return to Syria without facing punishment. In order to obtain such
declaration, the applicant should provide evidence, for instance a residence permit, that supports that he
has stayed in the host country since he left Syria in order to prove that he has not been in Israel or been
fighting against the regime.
128
At the embassy they ask the person questions about the reason for leaving Syria illegally, the source of
income in the host country, the basis of the persons’ residency in that country etc. However, the embassy
does not pay much attention to the reason for illegal exit asserted by the applicant as most applicants
would say that they had left Syria due to the general security situation or economic reasons. Instead, the
embassy checks the person’s name against wanted lists and it can also make inquiries about the person via
security agencies present in the person’s area of origin in Syria. The agencies have collected comprehensive
125
126
COAR Global: 193
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 248
127
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 252
128
A Damascus-based lawyer: 17
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information on those who have been involved in opposition activities from detained opposition fighters in
Syria.
129
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) noted that low-profile persons, who have left Syria illegally, would not face
difficulties upon return to Syria. Corruption is widespread among the different security branches, so unless
you are a high-profile person, you can clear your issues with the authorities by paying bribe to the security
services. However, the price is high and one must pay at least 5.000 USD to clear his or her issue.
130
A humanitarian organisation noted that those who had left Syria and stayed in Lebanon without relevant
visas often had to return to Syria through irregular means as they may face difficulties with both Lebanese
(arrest, deportation, bans from re-entry to Lebanon and fines) and Syrian authorities at the border due to
their irregular exit and lack of residence in Lebanon.
131
3.3. Possible consequences of having applied for asylum in other countries
upon return to Syria
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department said that the Syrian government
would not prosecute or arrest people for obtaining asylum in neighbouring countries or other countries,
including Western countries as the government understands that they have fled from the war and from
groups fighting against the government in the country.
132
A Damascus-based lawyer noted that having applied for asylum in other countries does not entail
punishment upon return.
133
The same source added that well-known political or military opponents would
not return to Syria as they know that they would be arrested immediately. These individuals will be under
suspicion until proven otherwise and the security services are prepared to arrest such persons if they
return.
134
3.4. Procedure for return
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department described the procedure for return of
refugees to Syria as follows:
Syrians who wish to return back to Syria will have to apply for return at the nearest Syrian representation,
i.e. embassy or consulate, in the foreign country in which they are residing. At the embassy, the applicant is
among others asked to inform about the reason why and how he or she left Syria, what the person has
done during his stay in the host country and what his source of income has been.
The embassy will then send the information about the applicant to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The ministry will conduct security checks of the applicants and also verify their identities as Syrian
nationals. This procedure has two purposes: 1) to ensure that only Syrian nationals enter the country. Since
the beginning of the war, people with other nationalities have tried to get asylum in Western countries by
providing fake Syrian documents obtained mainly in Turkey. 2) to ensure that people, who want to return
129
130
A Damascus-based lawyer: 18
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 225
131
A humanitarian organisation: 38
132
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 257
133
A Damascus-based lawyer: 19
134
A Damascus-based lawyer: 20
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back to Syria, will be informed on whether there are criminal charges against them. People whom there are
criminal charges against will face problems upon return unless they settle their issues with the Syrian
government before they return back to the country.
People who left Syria illegally and do not have Syrian documents, can go to the nearest Syrian
representation in the country in which they are residing, in order to have new documents issued. When the
Syrian identity of the applicant is confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Syria, either through
relatives or a legal representative, the applicant will receive the Syrian document which she or he has
applied for.
135
3.5. Persons recently returned
Referring to information from UNHCR, an international humanitarian organisation in Syria noted that
42.000 Syrians are estimated to have returned back to their area of origin from abroad during 2018.
136
Most returns have taken place from Lebanon,
137
and there have been no large-scale returns from European
countries.
138
A humanitarian organisation stated that since July 2018, there had been a significant increase in the
number of Palestinian refugees returning to Syria from Lebanon and Jordan.
139
There have been more
Palestinian refugees coming back from Lebanon than from Jordan. Most of those coming back from
Lebanon reside in greater Damascus area, especially rural Damascus.
140
3.5.1. Reasons and concerns for return and profile of returnees
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria noted that it has not been easy to monitor returns,
which is one of the reasons why there is not much information about the reasons for or profile of those
returning.
141
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) advised that returns from Lebanon and Turkey have been voluntary.
142
According to COAR Global, those returning voluntarily to Syria are generally individuals who do not have
any problems or outstanding issues with the government.
143
As the main reason why some Syrian refugees have returned to Syria, two sources mentioned difficult living
conditions and a lack of perspective with their current situation in neighbouring host countries.
144
Bente
Scheller (HBS) mentioned that there were some refugees who had returned to Idlib because they could not
bear that their families were stuck in Idlib while they themselves were safe in Lebanon.
145
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 253-255
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 39, The source referred to:
Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees,
UNHCR November/December
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67359
137
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria:39; An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 42
138
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 221
139
A humanitarian organisation: 37
140
A humanitarian organisation: 38
141
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 45
142
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 223
143
COAR Global: 195
144
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):223; Bente Scheller (HBS): 120
145
Bente Scheller (HBS): 119
136
135
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An international security organisation (2) mentioned a number of concerns among Syrian refugees abroad,
which make them reluctant to return to Syria, including concerns about high level of damages to their
properties and limited resources to fix them, limited provision of basic services, lack of job opportunities,
lack of civil documentation (for instance birth or marriage certificates) and conscription to military
service.
146
In addition to some of these factors, an international security organisation (2) also pointed at
consequences of political affiliation upon return as a source of concern among refugees.
147
The fact that
people do not know what awaits them upon return, a general distrust regarding the information coming
out of Syria as well as concerns about local mafia and militias not adhering to the formal mechanisms were
also mentioned as other reasons why some Syrians did not return to Syria.
148
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR)
noted that young people in the military service age did not come back to Syria for fear of being
conscripted.
149
According to Bente Scheller (HBS), many potential returnees are waiting in Lebanon and assessing the
current change in the security situation. Many are reluctant to return out of fear that if they return and the
security situation in Syria will deteriorate again, they will be unable to return to Lebanon.
150
Two sources mentioned that it is common practice that Syrians considering returning to Syria check with
sources inside Syria whether there is an arrest warrant on their name.
151
Bente Scheller (HBS) noted that if
different security branches have issued different warrants for a person, he will be in a more complicated
situation as he has to have lifted more than one warrant. Some Syrians have been asked for sums up to
USD 5.000 for single entry, others for several hundred dollars to have arrest warrants against them lifted.
152
According to an international humanitarian organisation in Syria, the Russian Federation has been
supportive of and encouraging returns. They are facilitating the process and have developed a logistics
plan. They have called for donor support for refugee returns. Until now, the returns have mainly been
spontaneous.
153
COAR Global said that there is currently a narrative about returns to Syria being nothing
but hassle-free and unproblematic. The narrative is being pushed in a political play mainly by the Russians
to have as many Syrians to return as possible in order to unlock reconstruction funds from the European
countries.
154
3.5.2. Return from Lebanon
Many Syrian refugees in Lebanon are from areas close to the Lebanese border,
155
and most of the refugees,
who have returned from Lebanon in 2018, originated from the border areas, including Qalamoun, Homs
146
147
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 41
An international security organisation (2): 105
148
Bente Scheller (HBS): 115
149
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):220
150
Bente Scheller (HBS): 118
151
Bente Scheller (HBS): 116; COAR Global: 200
152
Bente Scheller (HBS): 116
153
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 46
154
COAR Global: 196
155
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 42
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and Zabadani, where they also went back to.
156
There have only been few returns to Damascus City,
according to Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR).
157
Bente Scheller (HBS) noted that there were many people returning on an individual basis. The number of
those returning via planned group return has been limited. In 2017, there were two larger transfers of
returnees from Lebanon to Syria. In 2018, there were several announcements of planned transfers, but
following the vetting process of the returnees, only 40 out of 3000 were accepted.
158
According to Bente Scheller (HBS), the returns from Lebanon take place outside of the UN framework, and
thus are not monitored. As these returns are mainly conducted through collaboration between Hezbollah,
the Lebanese authorities and the Syrian authorities, collecting information on returns is difficult.
159
People, who have returned from Lebanon to Syria in recent semi-organised returns, had to go through a
security clearance procedure and obtain an approval from the Syrian authorities prior to their return,
regardless of where in Syria they wanted to return to. The Lebanese General Security sends a list of
applicants to Syrian security services for security clearance, and when the clearance is obtained people can
return.
160
Those who pass the security screening and obtain the approval will have freedom of movement
to go back to their areas.
161
According to General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department, Damascus, Syrian
authorities coordinate return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon with the Department of General Security in
Lebanon. The Russians also cooperate with the Syrian government with regard to return of Syrians.
162
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) noted that Hezbollah and Russians were also involved when the names of
applicants were sent to the Syrian authorities.
163
Sara Kayyali (HRW) had heard that Russians and Hezbollah
were involved in organising returns from Lebanon, but she did not have information about their roles with
regard to the General Security in Lebanon and the Syrian authorities.
164
COAR Global mentioned that there
was a Russian centre for returns in Lebanon. Individuals interested in returning to Syria apply at the centre
and their names will be passed on to the security office in Syria who will vet the names and let the
individual know whether they are cleared for return or not.
165
According to COAR Global, people’s Facebook profiles and other social media activities, their area of origin
(down to the specific neighbourhood) and the way they have left the country are all checked during the
security screening by the Syrian authorities.
166
An international organisation in Syria: 65; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 222, 223; A Damascus-based lawyer: 21; Bente Scheller
(HBS): 112
157
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 222
158
Bente Scheller (HBS): 111
159
Bente Scheller (HBS): 123
160
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 242; An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 47; An international organisation in Syria: 65
161
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 47
162
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department, Damascus: 259
163
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 224
164
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 243
165
COAR Global: 197
166
COAR Global: 198
156
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Sources noted that a number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon were denied security approval and could not
return.
167
An international organisation in Syria assumed that those who were not allowed to return were
those whose names were on wanted lists. They were not allowed to return to Syria as the government
wanted to send a message that those affiliated with armed opposition groups are not welcome in Syria.
168
The Damascus-based lawyer mentioned that those who had not been able to provide documentation for
where they had been living were rejected to return by the Syrian authorities.
169
Sara Kayyali (HRW) did not have information about the criteria by which the security clearance was
conducted. However, Kayyali knew of cases where individuals were denied the approval, and when they
inquired about the reason, they were told that the Syrian authorities knew who the rejected returnees,
were and what they had done.
170
COAR Global referred to information from the Lebanese General Security, according to which out of 450
names, all from one community, that were sent for clearance with the Syrian government, only 150 names
were accepted. COAR Global considered that one reason for not accepting some of those people was the
fact that their place of origin they would be returning to was completely destroyed and impossible to live
in. Another reason was that certain individuals were considered unwanted by the Syrian government.
Finally, the source found that the lack of capacity to absorb too many returnees at one time was also a
reason that some Syrians were not allowed to return.
171
3.5.3. Return from Turkey
According to Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR), during 2017 and 2018, over 50.000 people returned to Syria from
Turkey. These refugees, who had left Syria due to the war and the security situation in their home areas,
did generally not face difficulties with authorities upon return. Many returnees from Turkey are from
Aleppo.
172
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria noted that there had been some short term returns
from Turkey, but to a lesser extent compared to Lebanon.
173
Bente Scheller (HBS) advised that many Syrians
living in Turkey were reluctant to return to Idlib as they were afraid that they would not be allowed to re-
enter Turkey again if need be.
174
It is easier to return to Syria from Turkey, both through official borders and unofficially, according to Sara
Kayyali (HRW). The returnees that Kayyali had spoken to did not have to go through a security clearance
prior to return from Turkey, but the source added that a security clearance may be necessary upon return
to get access to areas of origin inside Syria. The only thing that returnees from Turkey have to do is to be
permitted to enter at the border checkpoints which are either controlled by the Turkish army or the
opposition groups. However, there are regular mass deportation by the Turkish authorities of Syrians, who
167
An international organisation in Syria: 65; A Damascus-based lawyer: 22; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 242; COAR Global: 199; An
international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 47
168
An international organisation in Syria: 65
169
A Damascus-based lawyer: 22
170
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 242
171
COAR Global: 199
172
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 220
173
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 43
174
Bente Scheller (HBS): 122
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have tried to smuggle themselves into Turkey. The deportations take place on an almost weekly basis. The
source’s understanding is that the number of voluntary returns from Turkey is less than those deported.
175
3.5.4. Return from Jordan
There have been returns from Jordan
176
, but the number has not been very high as the border with Jordan
only reopened in October 2018.
177 178
An international organisation in Syria noted that it was not clear
where returning refugees from Jordan, who mostly came from Dara’a, went to and settled down upon
return.
179
Bente Scheller (HBS) mentioned that she did not have information about returnees from Jordan
as HBS did not have access to Dar’aa where most of those returning from Jordan originated from.
180
According to Sara Kayyali (HRW), previously there were cases of people being deported from Jordan, but
the number of such deportations has decreased significantly since October 2017. The source had not heard
of any pressure or policy by the Jordanian government to put pressure on people to return from Jordan
since the border reopened. Only those from the opposition groups, who were wounded in the battle in
Dar’aa in 2018 and who were taken into Jordan for treatment, will be deported to Syria.
181
3.5.5. Treatment upon return
According to Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR), Syrians, who do not have outstanding issues with the authorities,
do not face problem upon return from Turkey and Arab countries like Lebanon and Egypt. However, if
someone has falsely accused the returnee in his or her absence of being affiliated to the IS, the returnee
will be in trouble upon return.
182
The source added that as the Syrian regime does not have a clear strategy
on return, treatment upon return of Syrians who have lived abroad, for instance in Denmark or the UK,
during the war, depends on the officer in charge. For instance, if the officer in charge is very pro-
government, he may take someone’s absence during the war very personally.
183
The same source noted that between 10-15 % of the Syrians who had returned from Lebanon were
detained for one hour and up to some days where the Syrian authorities asked questions about their
activities and affiliation to opposition groups. The majority of these returnees were released, but the
source knew of 38 men who were still detained.
184
An international security organisation (2) also mentioned that there were anecdotal reports that the Syrian
authorities had arrested returnees upon return and then released them over night. However, the source
was not able to verify these reports. With regards to returnees who may face issues upon return, the
175
176
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 246
A humanitarian organisation: 37; An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 44; an international organisation in Syria:
68; An international security organisation (2): 106; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 247
177
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria: 44; An international security organisation (2): 105; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 247
178
Reuters,
Jordan and Syria reopen Nassib border crossing,
15 October 2018, accessible at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-syria-jordan/jordan-and-syria-reopen-nassib-border-crossing-idUSKCN1MP0L4 accessed 8 January 2019
179
An international organisation in Syria: 68
180
Bente Scheller (HBS): 121
181
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 247
182
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 218
183
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) 219
184
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 222
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source added that the Syrian government was focused on the issue of military conscription as well as
making sure that those who return did not have any affiliation to armed opposition groups.
185
Bente Scheller (HBS) knew of one case where an individual, originally from Deir ez-Zor, returned to Syria
after the Syrian government had retaken the area from IS. Following his return, he was arrested and
tortured for two days and accused of being a traitor because his family had fled the area under IS rule in
Deir ez-Zor. He was released after two days by paying a few hundred dollars by which his name also was
cleared.
186
COAR Global did not engage in collecting data about what happens to persons recently returned. There
have been cases of individuals being detained upon return. The source did not have the number of
detainees as acquiring these would be nearly impossible and would require a lot of resources to obtain, but
the source knew that it was a sizable number (more than several hundreds). Generally, detentions have
been for conscription purposes; however, individuals have also been detained for being activists or part of
local civil society organisations. The source’s information on this issue largely comes from local sources and
local media.
187
Sara Kayyali (HRW), who had looked into cases of two communities who have returned from Lebanon to
Daraya, noted that security clearance was required to be able to reside in their area of origin and register
their property. HRW has documented at least three cases of individuals whose property issues had to be
resolved with the security services.
188
Sara Kayyali (HRW) considered that following factors may have an impact on the treatment a person
receives upon return: 1) the status of military service 2) involvement of the returnee or a family member
(also non-immediate family members) in anti-government activities (protest or any other dissident
activities), 3) similarity of the returnee’s name to that of an opposition person, 4) being a part of an NGO
inside or outside Syria (humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs, media NGOs etc., particularly those that
operated in non-government held Syria), 5) travelling back and forth to Syria from abroad, for instance
leaving Syria and residing in Germany in 2011 and then coming back and residing in Syria in 2015 and then
leaving Syria again, may entail risk of additional scrutiny upon return.
189
According to Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR), there have been cases of returnees from Turkey who have been
conscripted to the army upon return.
190
According to Bente Scheller (HBS), Syrians who had returned to Syria or travelled back and forth between
Lebanon and Syria had reported back that they had been subjected to extortion of money at checkpoints.
191
3.6. Entry via Damascus International Airport
According to the Damascus-based lawyer, people returning from foreign countries enter Syria through the
Lebanese land border, however, the number of people using the airport for travelling has increased. The
185
186
An international security organisation (2): 106-107
Bente Scheller (HBS): 124
187
COAR Global: 194
188
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 244
189
Sara Kayyali (HRW): 249
190
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 220
191
Bente Scheller (HBS): 125
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airport is particularly used for travelling to other Arabic countries, including North African countries, Iran
and Russia.
192
The international security organisation (2) noted that the airport was partially operational. Sham Airlines
has started operating. Egyptian and Jordanian airlines will start to operate soon.
193
COAR Global mentioned that Damascus International Airport is used by Syrians living abroad to return to
Syria. However, the largest majority of refugees from Syria, who live in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan etc., are
not returning through the airport. Anecdotally, individuals returning through the airport are generally
middle class Syrians.
194
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria said that inside the airport, things are running very
slowly because the airport has not been used by many during the seven years of conflict.
195
3.7. Issues regarding military service
3.7.1. Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees, and risk of being
called up as reservist despite having paid the fee
According to Presidential Decree No. 30/2007, Syrian young men, including registered Palestinians from
Syria, can pay a fee (‘Badal
al-Naqdi’)
to be exempted from compulsory military service and not be called
up again. Since 2007 this decree has been amended several times, latest in 2014 and 2017.
196
Article 1a of Decree No.5/2014 stipulates that men in the military service age (18-42) that have been
residing outside Syria (in an Arab as well as a non-Arab country) for not less than four years can pay an
amount of 8.000 USD to be exempted from military service.
197
The deadline for the conscript to pay the fee
is three months after being called up for conscription. The deadline can be extended by two more days if
the conscript has been residing outside Syria up to five years. But in this case he will have to pay the
exemption fee plus 25.000 SYP (about 50 USD). Conscripts, who have lived abroad for more than five years
192
193
A Damascus-based lawyer: 23-24
An international security organisation (2): 108
194
COAR Global: 200
195
An international organisation in Syria: 57
196
The former decree issued in 2013 about exemption fee, stipulated that men in military age who had resided outside Syria in no
less than five years had to pay 15.000 USD to be exempted. Men who were born outside Syria and resided there until they turned
18 had to pay 500 USD; Youm Al-Sabi (Arabic),
The Syrian Regime Reduces the Exemption Fee for Exemption from Military Service by
46%,
7 August 2018, accessible at:
https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/8/7/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%B6-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%89-
%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89/1807938
197
Youm Al-Sabi (Arabic),
The Syrian Regime Reduces the Exemption Fee for Exemption from Military Service by 46%,
7 August 2018,
accessible at:
https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/8/7/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%B6-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%89-
%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89/1807938
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and who want to avoid military service, will have to pay 50.000 SYP (about 100 USD) more for every year
that has exceeded the five years.
198
In addition, article 1b of Decree No.5/2014 stipulates that men in the compulsory military service age who
were born in an Arab or non-Arab country and have been residing there until they have turned 18 years can
pay an exemption fee of 2.500 USD until they have turned 25 years. For every year that exceeds the 18
years, they will have to pay 50.000 SYP (about 100 USD) plus the exemption fee. Men who have exceeded
the age of 25 will have to pay 8.000 USD to be exempted from military service.
199
According to an amendment of article 97a of Decree no.30 issued in November 2017, men who have not
been exempted from military service and who have exceeded the military service age (42 years) are obliged
to pay an exemption fee of 8.000 USD (‘badal
fawat alkhedma’)
within three months of turning 42 years.
Men who do not pay the fee within the specified period will be imprisoned for a year and obliged to pay
additional 200 USD for every year exceeding the deadline provided that the fees paid do not exceed 2.000
USD in total. Any delay in payment in part of the year shall be considered a full year. In addition, those who
have exceeded the military service age and have not paid 8000 USD will have their property confiscated
temporarily until they have paid the outstanding fee.
200
Sources consulted during the mission advised that by paying the 8.000 USD fee it is possible in practice to
be exempted from military service and not be called up again.
201
Previously, this law did not apply to
Syrians who resided in Lebanon, but now it does.
202
Sources knew of individuals who had been exempted
from military service by paying the fee.
203
Two sources mentioned that no one among those, whom they
knew and who had paid the fee and been exempted, had been called up for military service later on.
204
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) knew cases of young men, who fled to the Gulf States during the Syrian crisis,
who were exempted by paying the fee and did not face any problem with the regime upon return.
205
A conscript, who wants to be exempted by paying the fee, is required to provide evidence that he has
resided legally outside Syria for at least four continuous years.
206
Additionally, it requires that the person
has left Syria legally. To prove legal residence, the person has to show a certified document which all Syrian
Syrian Arab Republic,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (Arabic),
Military Service Exemption Fee,
accessible at:
http://www.mofa.gov.sy/ar/pages151/لا
-تاوـ -لدـ
199
Ibid.
200
Syria News (Arabic),
Syrian parliament approves a number of laws specifying exemption fee with regard to military service and
punishment for violation hereof,
8 November 2017, accessible at:
http://syria.news/24237fcf-08111712.html.
On the official
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the wording of this amendment is less detailed than what was issued
from the Syrian parliament on 8 November 2017. On the website it is stated that a person who has exceeded 42 years and not paid
an exemption fee will be imprisoned until he has paid or until the authorities have collected it in accordance with the law of the
Collection of Public Funds; Syrian Arab Republic,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (Arabic),
Military Service Exemption Fee,
accessible at:
http://www.mofa.gov.sy/ar/pages151/لدـ -تاوـ -
د ا
201
A Damascus-based lawyer:15; An international organisation in Syria:64; An international security organisation (1):89; Bente
Scheller (HBS): 109; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 163; COAR Global;191; Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR):226-227; General Naji Numeir,
Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 261
202
A Damascus-based lawyer: 15
203
An international organisation in Syria:64; An international security organisation (1): 89; Bente Scheller (HBS): 109; COAR: 191;
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 227
204
An international organisation in Syria: 64; Bente Scheller (HBS): 109
205
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 227
206
A Damascus-based lawyer:15; Christopher Kozak (ISW): 163; COAR: 191; General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and
Passports Department: 261
198
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men in military service age (18-42) residing in a foreign country should obtain for each year at the Syrian
embassy/consulate in the country of residence.
207
According to General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department, both people who left
legally and illegally can be exempted from military service.
208
Based on experience with previous decrees, laws and reconciliation agreements, two sources questioned
the effectiveness and the durability of the law regarding exemption by paying fee.
209
An international
security organisation (1) considered such arrangements as being ad-hoc depending upon the particular
circumstances which in no way guarantee exemption for arrest for conscription. The source’s
understanding was that the only real exemption was to either be out of military service age (17 – 42)
210
or
to have completed military service although even those persons could be called up (again) during the
conflict.
211
3.7.2. Enforcement of Presidential Decree No. 18/2018
The Presidential Decree No. 18 of 9 October 2018 grants amnesty for all Syrian men inside and outside Syria
who have evaded the military service or have deserted the army, provided that they report for duty within
four months (if they reside inside Syria) and six months (if they reside abroad).
212 213
The decree does not
eliminate their obligation to perform compulsory military service, and the pardoned evaders and deserters,
thus, still have to conduct their military service upon reporting.
214
According to an international
organisation in Syria, the pardoned individuals can obtain all civil documents, including passport when they
have had their status cleared, however, they will not be allowed to occupy positions within the
government.
215
On 28 October 2018
,
a circular was issued by the Ministry of Defence and then passed to the Ministry of the
Interior and the Military Police. According to the circular, which is a document to implement Presidential
Decree 18/2018, the arrest of reservists who have evaded the military service is prohibited and names of
reservists wanted for active duty are dropped.
216 217
However, those reservists, whose names are dropped,
A Damascus-based lawyer: 15
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 262
209
An international security organisation (1): 89; Sara Kayyali (HRW):240-241
210
According to Finnish Immigration Service, “[t]he legal framework for the official military service sets
the service age from 18 to 42.”, see Finish Immigration Service,
SYRIA: FACT-FINDING MISSION TO
BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS,
April 2018, 14 December 2018, accessible at:
https://migri.fi/documents/5202425/5914056/Syria_Fact-
finding+mission+to+Beirut+and+Damascus%2C+April+2018.pdf
And according to the Norwegian Landinfo, “ Syrian men must attend for registration in compulsory military service at their local
recruitment office (maktab
at-tajnid)
in the year they reach 18, or by the age of 19 at the latest.” See Landinfo,
Report
Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders,
3 January 2018, accessible at:
https://www.cgra.be/sites/default/files/rapporten/landinfo_report_syria._reactions_against_deserters_and_draft_evaders.pdf
211
An international security organisation (1): 89
212
A Damascus-based lawyer:12; An international organisation in Syria:63; General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports
Department: 260
213
Presidential decree granting general amnesty for military deserters inside and outside country,
Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)
9 October 2018, accessible at:
https://www.sana.sy/en/?p=148449
; The Nation,
Syrian military clears men wanted for extra
military service,
3 October 2018, accessible at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-military-clears-men-wanted-for-
extra-military-service-1.786501
214
A Damascus-based lawyer:12; Christopher Kozak (ISW):166; COAR: 192
215
An international organisation in Syria: 63
216
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 169; a Damascus-based lawyer: 12
208
207
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can still be called up again in the event of war or a state of emergency
.
218
Some estimates that the decision
to drop the names of reservists will affect up to 800.000 individuals who have either left the country or
remain hidden inside of Syria.
219
In the formal statements, the government made a point to emphasize that
this circular was sent to border authorities in order to assure refugees that they will not be detained upon
return to Syria if they were previously wanted for reservist service in the Syrian Arab Army.
220
It was COAR’s assessment that very few individuals would be interested in capitalizing on the general
amnesty granted through Decree 18. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the amnesty does not free
one from the conscription obligation, but only from the consequences attached of having dodged or
deserted one’s duty, i.e. payment of a fine and jail time. Secondly, decrees in Syria are never published with
executive guidance on their applicability and scope, which leaves them open for interpretation. There are
currently ongoing discussions between different ministries regarding the scope of the decree and it seems
that there is not yet a clear understanding about which groups are eligible for the amnesty. A clear
understanding and an established practice regarding the scope of such decrees will often first be seen after
at least a year has passed, which is why such decrees initially are met with reluctance by most individuals.
Thirdly, there is still an inherent resistance to be conscripted among young men as the conscription
obligation is viewed as a risk of being involved and killed in the conflict. Finally, the salary paid by the Syrian
government to the soldiers amounts to a mere 40 USD a month, which is not a sufficient amount for those
wanting to be able to support their families.
221
Two sources mentioned that since prior decrees and reconciliation agreements had proved to be
ineffective and not respected by the government, and that there was scepticism among Syrians regarding
the enforcement of Decree no. 18/2018.
222
An international security organisation (1) expressed scepticism
on implementation of Decree 18 by referring to previous decrees on amnesty from military service, which
according to the source, had only offered temporary respite. The source considered that the extent to
which the government respected such decrees would depend on its need for man-power.
223
An international organisation in Syria noted that so far there had not been any signs of the authorities not
respecting the decree, but nobody knows what will happen in the future. The government may call up
those who have completed their military service again if needed, for instance in the event of an offensive in
Idlib.
224
Christopher Kozak (ISW) assessed that those who had already served and had only dodged reserve
service would likely not be returned to military service given the current demobilization efforts.
225
The Nation,
Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service,
3 October 2018, accessible
at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-military-clears-men-wanted-for-extra-military-service-1.786501
218
The Nation,
Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service,
3 October 2018, accessible
at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-military-clears-men-wanted-for-extra-military-service-1.786501
219
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 169; The Nation,
Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service,
3 October 2018,
accessible at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-military-clears-men-wanted-for-extra-military-service-1.786501
220
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 169
221
COAR Global: 192
222
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 165; Sara Kayyali (HRW): 238
223
An international security organisation (1): 88
224
An international organisation in Syria: 63
225
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 167
217
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Whilst Christopher Kozak (ISW) noted that there had not been any notable movements by populations
capitalizing on the general amnesty,
226
a Damascus-based lawyer advised that since October 2018, when
the decree was issued, a number of Syrians, who had fled to Lebanon due to military service, had returned
to Syria.
227
With regard to the enforcement of the Presidential Amnesty Decree no.18 of 9 October 2018, General Naji
Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department stated that a crucial number of both deserters and
draft evaders had handed themselves in to the authorities. Deserters and evaders who report within the
deadlines announced by the government will not be punished for escaping the conscription, and they will
be taken to conscription afterwards.
228
According to a Damascus-based lawyer, it is also possible for evaders and deserters, who have exited Syria
illegally and stayed abroad for at least four years, and who are pardoned for their evasion and desertion
according to Decree No. 18/2018, to pay the exemption fee of 8.000 USD and be exempted from military
service. This requires that they settle their issues regarding their illegal exit at the Syrian embassy in the
country of residence (see section 3.2. for further information) and that they provide evidence for legal stay
in the foreign country in question for at least four continuous years, for instance by providing educational
certificates. However, the source emphasized that the Syrian Embassy’s accept of the provided proof of
legal residence and hence the possibility of being exempted by paying fee in such cases would depend on a
case-by-case assessment.
229
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR) personally knew eight persons who were exempted from military service by
paying the exemption fee of 8000 USD after being pardoned through Decree No.18/2018.
230
226
227
Christopher Kozak (ISW): 168
A Damascus-based lawyer: 14
228
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department: 260
229
A Damascus-based lawyer: 16
230
Rami Abdurrahman (SOHR): 229
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Consulted sources
Oral sources
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A Damascus-based lawyer
An international humanitarian organisation
An international humanitarian organisation in Syria
An international organisation in Syria
An international security organisation (1)
An international security organisation (2)
Bente Scheller, the Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBS)
Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW)
COAR Global
Rami Abdurrahman, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)
Sara Kayyali, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports Department
Written sources
-
Al-Jazeera,
Syria's war: Who controls what? A map of the Syrian war showing who controls what
after seven years of fighting,
19 December 2018, accessible at:
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-
150529144229467.html
BBC,
Deraa, birthplace of Syria uprising, retaken by government forces,
12 July 2018, accessible at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44806045;
BBC,
Russia condemns 'Israeli' air strikes on Syria,
26 December 2018, accessible at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46682666
BBC,
Syria war: Israeli jets target Iranian positions around Damascus,
21 January 2019, accessible
at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46941717
Danish Immigration Service and Danish Refugee Council,
SYRIA, Security Situation in Damascus City
and Yarmouk,
August 2018, accessible at:
https://nyidanmark.dk/-
/media/Files/US/Landerapporter/Rapport-Syrien-august-2018docx-
2.pdf?la=da&hash=6910DB37A4E4E5F394D850B297095E793FD98480
The Jerusalem Post,
Report: IDF strikes Iranian, Hezbollah targets near Damascus,
12 January 2019,
accessible at:
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Syrian-reports-Israeli-planes-attacked-
targets-in-Syrias-Damascus-577082
The Nation,
Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service,
3 October 2018, accessible
at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-military-clears-men-wanted-for-extra-military-
service-1.786501
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
The National,
Fatalities reported after 'huge explosion' in Damascus, 20 January 2019,
accessible at:
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/fatalities-reported-after-huge-explosion-in-damascus-
1.815495
Reuters,
Syria says downs 'hostile targets' in suspected Israeli attack,
29 November 2018, accessible
at:
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-strike/syria-says-downs-hostile-targets-in-
suspected-israeli-attack-idUKKCN1NY2L6
Reuters,
Jordan and Syria reopen Nassib border crossing,
15 October 2018, accessible at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-jordan/jordan-and-syria-reopen-nassib-
border-crossing-idUSKCN1MP0L4 accessed 8 January 2019
Sputnik,
Over 14,500 Syrian Deserters Granted Pardon by Assad's Decree - Russian MoD,
4
December 2018, accessible at:
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201812041070358508-syria-
assad-decree-amnesty/
Sputnik (Arabic),
Around 24.000 Syrian deserters granted amnesty,
9 January 2019, accessible at:
https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_world/201901091038125168-
%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%81%D9%88/
Syrian Arab Republic,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates
(Arabic),
Military Service
Exemption Fee,
accessible at:
http://www.mofa.gov.sy/ar/pages151/لا-تاوـ
-لدـ
Syria News (Arabic),
Syrian parliament approves a number of laws specifying exemption fee with
regard to military service and punishment for violation hereof,
8 November 2017, accessible at:
http://syria.news/24237fcf-08111712.html
The Times of Israel,
Car bomb explodes near Russian embassy in Damascus,
24 January 2019,
accessible at:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/car-bomb-explodes-near-russian-embassy-in-
damascus/
Youm Al-Sabi (Arabic),
The Syrian regime reduces the exemption fee for exemption from military
service by 46%,
7 August 2018, accessible at:
https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/8/7/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%81%D8%B6-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%89-
%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89/1807938
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Appendix 1: Meeting minutes
Meeting with a Damascus-based lawyer, Damascus, 22 November 2018
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
1.
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria has improved within the last six
months. There have been shelling and rockets fired in to Aleppo and in other areas bordering Idlib
province, including north-eastern part of Latakia and Hama. In Deir ez-Zor, IS is attacked by Western
allies and government forces. Apart from these, no major security incidents have been reported in
recent months.
Since the I suicide attack in Suwayda in July 2018, no insurgent-style attacks have been reported in
government-controlled areas. Two days ago, in rural areas East of Suwayda, the Fourth Division of the
Syrian army succeeded in clearing the area of the IS fighters.
There have not been clashes between pro-regime militias, but some of these militias have tried to use
the money they have earned during the conflict to organise criminal gangs. However, the
government’s presence is strong in all areas under its control and the intelligence services, police and
Ministry of Interior are all very active, which is why the government has almost succeeded in taking
control over those pro-regime militias by using all its security services and police force to push back
against their activities.
2.
3.
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and
Yarmouk
4.
Since May 2018, no security incidents of any kind – i.e. shelling, clashes, insurgent style attacks etc. -
have taken place in Damascus province. There are criminal activities, but it is not different from any
other major city in the world, and the police and the internal security have taken full control over the
city.
Yarmouk is now empty of inhabitants. Two weeks ago, the government started clearing Yarmouk for
unexploded devices in order to let people come back and reside or restore their homes depending on
the level of destruction. Immediately after the government had taken full control over Yarmouk, they
let people come into the area and visit their homes, but they stopped permitting this and told people
to wait until the cleaning was finished. In the beginning, Palestinians were afraid that the government
would not allow them to come back to Yarmouk in order to change the demographic pattern of the
area. UNRWA has made a deal with the government that UNRWA will take the responsibility of
rebuilding and running schools and hospitals.
5.
Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City
6. There have not been any security incidents on the road connecting Damascus International Airport to
the city.
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Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
7. The number of checkpoints in Damascus City has been significantly reduced (down to one-fifth or even
less) since May 2018. Most checkpoints inside Damascus have been removed and it is only at the
entrances to the city that checkpoints have remained.
8.
Checkpoints are controlled by different security services: some by the Internal Security (al-Amn
al-
Dakheli),
which is a part of the State Security (Amn
al-Dawla),
others by the Military Security (al-Amn
al-Askari).
Checking at checkpoints has become less thorough since May 2018. Now, they only check people
thoroughly if they are looking for a certain person or if there is a security alert. Previously, the
authorities were actively searching for conscripts and evaders from military service, but they do not
search actively for them anymore. However, if the government finds a conscript or evader at
checkpoints, that person will be sent directly to a training camp for six months and afterwards to
military service. ID-documents of passing people are primarily checked at entrances to Damascus, and
not inside the city.
9.
10. Reconciled former opposition groups do not face difficulties at checkpoints. In coordination with
Iranians and Russians, the authorities have made a list of reconciled former opposition fighters which
is accessible at checkpoints. If a former opposition fighter approaches a checkpoint and his name is on
the list, they would let him go through.
11. For the time being, no person faces difficulties at checkpoints due to his or her area of origin. Persons
from previously opposition-controlled areas in Syria do, thus, not experience additional scrutiny or
other problems when approaching checkpoints.
Issues regarding return to Syria
Enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18 of 9 October 2018
12. The government has started enforcing Decree 18. In addition to dropping penalties against evaders
and deserters, all reservists, who were called up for military service, are discharged according to the
decree. Conscripts, who have never served in the military, are still obligated to serve but will not face
penalties for having evaded. Those who have evaded the reserve service will not be punished for their
evasion either.
13. Reservists can leave the country provided that they obtain a permission which should be renewed
after one year. Previously, the permission should be renewed every three months. However, the
source underlines that this possibility had nothing to do with Decree 18, and it existed according to
another law even before Decree 18 was issued.
14. Since October when the decree was issued, a number of Syrians, who had fled to Lebanon due to
military service, have returned to Syria.
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Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees
15. You can still pay a fee of 8000 USD and get exempted from the military service and not called up again
if you can provide evidence that you have lived abroad for at least four continuous years, and that you
have left Syria legally. To prove legal residence, the person has to show a certified document which all
Syrian men in military service age (18-42) residing in a foreign country should each year obtain at the
Syrian embassy/consulate in the country of residence. Previously, this law did not apply to Syrians who
resided in Lebanon, but now if you have stayed in Lebanon for at least four years and you pay the fee,
you can be exempted. The source personally knows several persons who had paid the fee and were
exempted.
16. It is possible for evaders and deserters, who have exited Syria illegally and stayed abroad for at least
four years, and who are pardoned for their evasion and desertion according to Decree 18 of 9 October
2018, to pay the exemption fee of 8.000 USD and be exempted from military service. This requires
that they have settled their issues regarding their illegal exit at the Syrian embassy in the country of
residence and that they provide evidence for legal stay in the foreign country in question for at least
four continuous years, for instance by providing educational certificates (as they have not been in
contact with a Syrian embassy during their stay abroad due to their evasion/desertion). However, the
source emphasizes that the Syrian embassy’s accept of the provided proof of legal stay and hence the
possibility of being exempted by paying fee in such cases would depend on a case-by-case
assessment.
Possible consequences of illegal exit from Syria
17. Illegal exit from Syria still entails punishment. However, according to an administrative circular to all
Syrian embassies abroad, if a person has left the country illegally, he can go to a Syrian embassy in the
country where he stays and apply for a declaration from the embassy by which he can return to Syria
without facing punishment. In order to obtain the declaration, the applicant should provide evidence,
for instance a residence permit, that supports that he has stayed in the host country since he left Syria
in order to prove that he has not been in Israel or fighting against the regime.
18. At the embassy, they ask the person questions about his reason to leave Syria illegally, the source of
income in the host country, the basis of the persons’ residency in that country etc. However, the
embassy does not pay much attention to the reason for illegal exit asserted by the applicant as most
applicants would say that they had left Syria due to the general security situation or economic
reasons. Instead, the embassy checks the person’s name against wanted lists and it can also make
enquiries about the person via security agencies present in the person’s area of origin in Syria as the
Syrian government has been able to collect comprehensive data on those who have been involved in
opposition activities from detained opposition fighters in Syria.
Possible consequences of having applied for asylum in other countries
19. Having applied for asylum in other countries does not entail punishment upon return.
20. Well-known political or military opponents will not return to Syria as they know they would
immediately be arrested. These individuals will be under suspicion until proven otherwise and the
security services are prepared to arrest such persons if they return.
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Returnees from Lebanon
21. A large number of people, who have recently returned to Syria from Lebanon, are from border areas
such as Homs and Zabadani.
22. People who have applied to return to Syria, but who have not been able to provide documentation for
where they have been living have been rejected by the Syrian authorities to return.
Entry procedures at Damascus airport
23. People returning from foreign countries enter Syria through the Lebanese land border.
24. There are more people who use the airport for travelling compared to before. The airport is
particularly used for travelling to other Arabic countries, including North African countries, Iran and
Russia.
Meeting with a humanitarian organisation, Damascus, 25 November 2018
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and
Yarmouk
25. The level of destruction in and around Yarmouk is high. There is a plan for rubble removing and
reconstruction of infrastructure. Rubble removal was commenced, however is currently on hold. No
works have begun in relation to infrastructure. The main streets of the camp have been cleared of
rubbles, but much of the rubbles has been pushed aside together with potential unexploded
munitions and remains a risk to civilians who return.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
26. Most Palestinian IDPs (internally displaced people) from Yarmouk are dispersed and integrated into
Damascus area. Some have left the country. 32.000 are estimated to live in Lebanon, many of whom
are from Yarmouk.
231
27. Up to 20.000 Palestinians are estimated to have moved through reconciliation processes to Idlib from
other areas such as areas in South Damascus.
232
28. During the last military operation in Yarmouk in the spring, an estimated 10.000 people were
displaced from Yarmouk of whom 6000 moved to the neighbouring area of Yalda.
233
These IDPs’
freedom of movement into Damascus is heavily restricted. It is a general trend that when the
231
‘
PRS in Lebanon’,
UNRWA
https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon
and ‘Syria
Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal 2018’,
Reliefweb 30
January 2018
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-regional-crisis-emergency-appeal-2018
232
‘Syria:
UNRWA - Humanitarian Snapshot, August 2018’,
UNRWA 27 September 2017
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-unrwa-humanitarian-snapshot-august-2018
233
‘Lack
of UNRWA Funding Exacerbates Housing Crisis for Palestine Refugees Displaced from Yarmouk’,
UNRWA 30 June 2018
https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/lack-unrwa-funding-exacerbates-housing-crisis-palestine-refugees-displaced
and ‘Almost
all UNRWA installations in Yarmouk and Der’aa camp in Syria severely damaged or destroyed’,
UNRWA 1 December
2018
https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/almost-all-unrwa-installations-yarmouk-and-dera%E2%80%99-camp-syria-
severely-damaged
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government has regained control of an area, a reconciliation process is often put in place, and at
times, the government restricts freedom of movement of persons to and from the area in order to
screen the people living there on a case by case basis, particularly men in the military service age.
Around the end of November, when the reconciliation process in Yalda is anticipated to end, an ease
of freedom of movement is expected to be seen in the area. A similar process has also been seen in
East Ghouta.
29. There is no indication that ethnic or religious background has an impact on freedom of movement.
Palestinians’ freedom of movement is not known to be restricted in Damascus Province just by virtue
of them being Palestinians (with the exception of Yalda) and they do not face known difficulties at
checkpoints due to their Palestinian background.
30. Citizens who are interested in returning to Yarmouk will likely need to go through an official process
that includes the registration of their names with the Syrian authorities and awaiting clearance and
permission to access the area.
31. To date (25 November 2018) there have not been many people who have permanently returned to
Yarmouk. Lots of people have entered the area and visited their homes, but not many have
overnighted there. There are reportedly only 50-100 families who are staying there unofficially.
32. UNRWA obtained official access to the area for the first time in October 2018 where it entered the
camp to make a damage assessment.
234
33.
A public statement has been issued by the Syrian Government that Palestinian refugees will be
allowed to return to Yarmouk camp,
235
nevertheless, until now, no concrete mechanism was
stipulated by the government to regulate this return.
34. UNRWA will assess re-initiating services in Yarmouk based on damage assessments and needs only
after the Government has secured basic infrastructure (electricity etc.).
236
35. Palestinians who are not registered with GAPAR do not enjoy the same rights as GAPAR registered
Palestinians. For instance, when it was necessary to obtain a security clearance for moving to certain
areas, unregistered Palestinians could not obtain such security clearance.
‘Almost
all UNRWA installations in Yarmouk and Der’aa camp in Syria severely damaged or destroyed’,
UNRWA 1 December
2018
https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/almost-all-unrwa-installations-yarmouk-and-dera%E2%80%99-camp-syria-
severely-damaged
and ‘Syria:
UNRWA - Humanitarian Snapshot, October 2018’,
UNRWA 29 November 2018
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-unrwa-humanitarian-snapshot-october-2018
235
‘Palestinian
refugees in Syria hope to return to Yarmouk’,
Al-Monitor 23 November 2018
http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/11/syrian-regime-decision-yarmouk-return-palestinian-refugees.html#ixzz5a2geWTuc
236
‘Almost
all UNRWA installations in Yarmouk and Der’aa camp in Syria severely damaged or destroyed’,
UNRWA 1 December
2018
https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/almost-all-unrwa-installations-yarmouk-and-dera%E2%80%99-camp-syria-
severely-damaged
234
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Issues regarding return to Syria
Issues regarding military service
36. Although registered Palestinians are subject to the same military service law as Syrians, in practice
they have not been called up for reserve service during the conflict.
Persons recently returned
37. Since July 2018, there has been a significant increase in the number of Palestinian refugees returning
to Syria from Lebanon and Jordan.
38. Those who left Syria and stayed in Lebanon without relevant visas often have to return to Syria
through irregular means as they may face difficulties with both Lebanese (arrest, deportation, bans
from re-entry to Lebanon and fines) and Syrian authorities at the border due to their irregular exit and
lack of residence in Lebanon. There have been more Palestinian refugees coming back from Lebanon
than from Jordan. Most of those coming back from Lebanon reside in greater Damascus area,
especially rural Damascus.
Meeting with an international humanitarian organisation in Syria,
Damascus, 21 November 2018
Issues regarding return to Syria
39. 48.000 Syrians are estimated to have returned back from abroad to their area of origin.
237
Most of
them have returned from Lebanon, where there are more than one million Syrian refugees.
40. The issues that IDPs face in Syria when they return are often similar to those issues faced by refugees
upon return to their area.
41. Concerns among Syrian returnees continue to be an obstacle to return, including concerns about: 1)
the high level of destruction caused by the conflict and damage to people’s homes, which leads to
urgent need for shelters, 2) Limited provision of basic services such as sanitation facilities, water and
electricity supply etc. due to damaged infrastructure, 3) Lack of job opportunities, 4) Lack of civil
documentation (e.g. birth and marriage certificates) as well as documents proving ownership of
property, 5) Limited resources to fix the damages to properties. Conscription to the military is also a
concern.
42. Most Syrian refugees who have returned back to Syria are from Lebanon. Many Syrian refugees in
Lebanon are from areas close to the Lebanese border. In addition, the Lebanese government
encourages people to return back to their homes.
237
The source referred to:
Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees,
UNHCR
November/December
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67359
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43. There have also been some short term returns from Turkey, but to a lesser extent compared to
Lebanon.
44. There have been returns from Jordan, but the number is not very high as the border with Jordan was
reopened only one month ago.
45. It has not been easy to monitor returns which is one of the reasons why there is not much information
about the reasons for or profiles of those returning.
46. The Russian Federation has been supportive of and encouraging returns. They are facilitating the
process and have developed a logistics plan. They have called for donor support for refugee returns.
Until now, the returns have mainly been spontaneous.
47. People who want to return to Syria from Lebanon have to go through a security screening and obtain
an approval from the Syrian authorities. The source has no information about the procedure and
screening of people who want to return back. There have been media reports that some people were
denied such approval. Those who pass the security screening and obtain the approval will have
freedom to go back to their areas.
48. UNRWA still takes care of Palestine refugees in Syria. Two weeks ago, the Syrian government allowed
people from Yarmouk to return back to the camp. The Syrian government has facilitated UNRWA’s
access to the camp, but the source does not have information on whether UNRWA is able to resume
its work.
49. The majority of IDPs from Eastern Ghouta returned back to this area. However, the level of
destruction has been high in the area. There are many humanitarian challenges, for instance, people
are still living in damaged shelters and depending on water trucking. The same has been the case in
other locations affected by the crisis, such as Zabadani.
Meeting with an international organisation in Syria, Damascus, 22
November 2018
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
50. The general security situation in government-controlled areas has improved although there have been
exchange of shelling with opposition groups in Aleppo, Homs and areas bordering Idlib province. But
apart from these, there have been no major security incidents in government-controlled areas in
general within the last months.
51. It is too early to say whether armed opposition groups will start insurgent-style attacks in big cities.
The current security situation is new and one has to wait a couple of years to assess the probability of
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such attacks. However, the source’s assessment is that such attacks would be more probable to
happen in other major cities than Damascus as the capital is heavily protected by security forces.
52. When the IS was defeated in southern parts of Damascus, including Yarmouk, they were moved to
rural areas east of Suwayda where they conducted three-four suicide attacks in July 2018, resulting in
many civilian casualties. Two days ago, the government took full control over the last remaining IS-
pocket in the area.
53. There have not been clashes between pro-government militias in government-controlled areas, but
rather personal fights among members of such groups.
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and
Yarmouk
54. No security incidents (neither shelling, IED or suicide attacks) have occurred in Damascus or rural
Damascus since the government asserted full control in May, except the Israeli bombardments of
areas close to the airport South Damascus on 5 May, 9 May and 15 September.
55. The improvement of the security situation in Damascus is reflected in daily life in different ways in
Damascus: removal of checkpoints, less strict procedures for checking at checkpoints as well as waving
security clearance requirement with regard to renting a property in Damascus.
56. Previously, if you came from outside Damascus and wanted to rent an apartment in Damascus, you
had to go through a security clearance. The security clearance process could take between two weeks
and up to three months depending on the area the apartment was located in. It was not only the
tenant, but also the landlord who should go through such security check. The security clearance
requirement was waived three-four days ago (18-19 November 2018).
Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City
57. There have been no security incidents on the road connecting Damascus International Airport to
Damascus City since May 2018. The only incident occurring close to the airport was the Israeli
bombardment of military facilities around the airport. The last bombardment took place in September
2018. Previously, an opposition group had positions 300 meters from the road to the airport, but the
group is no longer present in the area. There are two checkpoints on the road: one at the entrance to
the city and one when you reach the airport. Inside the airport, things are running very slowly because
the airport has not been used by many during the seven years of conflict.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
58. 90 percent of checkpoints have been removed inside Damascus City.
59. It has become very easy to pass through checkpoints inside the city and the authorities do not check
the cars or the people’s ID anymore unless something happens that triggers a security alert, which will
then in turn lead to more rigorous checks at checkpoints.
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60. At checkpoints at the entrances to the city, they check people’s IDs and they may also search for
wanted persons or for military service conscripts, but not inside the city. However, at the checkpoints
at the entrances to the city, the check has become less strict compared to before.
61. In general, very few people face difficulties when approaching a checkpoint. Usually, when the
authorities check people’s IDs at checkpoints against wanted lists, they are looking for persons who
are affiliated with armed opposition groups, i.e. those who have carried weapons and those who have
made any activity directly against the government. Low-profile political activists, e.g. those who have
written something critical against the government on Facebook, have been able to pass checkpoints
without facing any difficulty.
62. Different security branches control checkpoints in different areas. A person, who is wanted by one
branch of the security services, may not necessarily be wanted by another security branch or vice
versa. Also, someone who has had his name cleared from one branch of the security services cannot
be certain that he is cleared from other security service branches’ lists as wanted lists are not
coordinated among different branches.
Issues regarding return to Syria
Issues regarding military service
63. The government has started enforcing Decree no. 18. According to the decree, those who have
evaded or deserted military service will not be punished if they report within the announced
deadlines, and they can obtain all civil documents, including passport, when they have had their status
cleared. However, evaders and deserters will not be allowed to occupy positions within the
government. Until now, there have been no signs of the authorities not respecting the decree, but
nobody knows what will happen in the future. Due to the current stable security situation, the
government is trying to find a way to discharge those who have been in the army for seven years, but
if the government for instance launches an offensive in Idlib in the future, they may call up those
people again to join the army.
64. The source has not heard of cases, where people have been called up for military service despite
having paid the fee of 8000 USD. When you pay the fee, you are exempted for military service and will
not be called up again. One of the source’s colleagues, who had been living in Lebanon for several
years, paid the fee 7-8 months ago, and has been able to come to Syria without facing any problems.
Returnees from Lebanon
65. Most of the refugees, who have returned from Lebanon within the last year, originated from the
Qalamoun area near the border to Lebanon, where they also went back to upon return to Syria. As far
as the source knows from following up on the situation of returnees from Lebanon through news
websites and media reports, there is a clear agreement between the Syrian and the Lebanese
authorities regarding how the return of these people should be handled. According to the agreement,
the General Security in Lebanon should deliver a list of Syrians, who are interested in returning to
Syria, to Syrian security authorities who then decide who can return and who cannot. The source
assumes that those, who have not been allowed to return, are those whose names are on wanted
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lists. They are not allowed to return to Syria as the government wants to send a message that those
affiliated with armed opposition groups are not welcome in Syria.
66. The source has not heard of cases where returnees from Lebanon have been detained upon return.
The source assumes that those Syrians who know they are wanted by the Syrian government will not
decide to return. The source assesses that if something happened to returnees, it would undoubtedly
be reported by a large number of websites and social media that are opposed to the Syrian regime
and tend to report such incidents.
67. The source emphasizes that his information on returnees from Lebanon stems from news and media
reports, and he does not have first-hand knowledge on this issue.
68. There have been returnees from Jordan. However, it is not clear where these refugees, who mostly
came from Dar’aa, have gone to and settled down upon return.
69. In most areas that were previously controlled by opposition groups, such as Duma and Harasta, people
have been allowed to come back to their areas. However, there are areas with close proximity to
Damascus city, e.g. Yarmouk and areas in Eastern Ghouta, where the government has not allowed
people to return due to the large extent of destruction and remaining unexploded ammunitions which
must be removed first before people are allowed to return.
Meeting with an international security organisation (1), Beirut, 20
November 2018
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
70. There has been a major reduction in the number of security related incidents, including direct fire such
as shelling, in government-controlled areas since July 2018.
71. There is not much crime reported in Damascus, but in cities there is a lack of economic opportunity
that could lead to increases in criminal behaviour. The source underlines that his information is mainly
based on reports on criminality and does not therefore cover the whole potential scope of criminal
activities.
72. Since May 2018, there has been an increase in attacks against Syrian forces in Der’aa. In Safaa hills,
which border Suwayda in southern Syria, IS targeted the Druze community in a terrorist attack in July
2018. In Suwayda there have also been kidnappings for financial motivations. This area had
experienced kidnapping before the beginning of the Syrian war. While it seems that IS has left Safaa
Hills with their main body of men due to the recent government offensive in the area and that the
main part of the fighting is over, there are reports of remaining presence of an estimated 100 IS
fighters or IS supporting elements there to the northwest and the west. Criminality and social tensions
are reported in the area.
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The general security situation in Damascus province, including Damascus city and
Yarmouk
73. There have been no security incidents in Damascus since July 2018. All levels of violence have
decreased and freedom of movement is increasing, anecdotal accounts suggest. The source underlines
though that his information is mainly based on reports as access to many places is restricted.
74. There have been no incidents on the road between Damascus and the airport, reported, but as access
is limited this may well not give an indication of total events.
75. There has been an increase in mine clearing operations inside Damascus province and particularly in
Yarmouk and other areas that were the scene of heavy combat. The government’s priority has been
demining of roads and destroying tunnels. However, the scale of the task is huge, and the resources
do not follow. Urban demining is more complicated than demining operations in green field sites. The
Russians have also provided limited assistance to the Syrian government with demining work.
76. Three weeks ago, people were allowed to return to Yarmouk to check on their former homes. The
area has been heavily damaged, especially around the edges of the area that were the former front-
line. Local NGO’s have tried to clear the streets, and there are ongoing negotiations on when people
should be allowed to return to the area.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
77. There are still checkpoints at the main entrances to Damascus City and there are still multiple check
points in and around the city, though at a reduced number. The number of checkpoints increases as
you approach Damascus City from all directions.
78. Before May 2018 the authorities at the checkpoints were looking for weapons and car bombs. Since
May 2018 the focus has been on checking for wanted people and conscripts. People’s IDs will often be
checked against lists of names of wanted people or those wanted for conscription.
79. Young men are generally at most risk when passing checkpoints, as they will have to clarify their
status, for instance whether they are temporarily exempted by an amnesty or are currently exempted
from military service because they are students. There are instances of temporary checkpoints in
specific areas, where all males are subjected to ID-checks.
80. Generally, it is difficult for people to know what their status is with the Syrian government. However,
it is possible for people who have money and good connections with the authorities or influential
people to obtain information on whether their names are on wanted lists. However, accessing this
information may expose them (or those that are checking for them) to the system and it is not a
guarantee that they would not be facing difficulties, including risk of arrest, when they try to access
this information.
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81. People from former opposition-held areas are generally not specifically targeted at checkpoints.
However, there is some level of scrutiny towards people from these areas, and they are asked more
questions than people from other areas. There are examples of males from former opposition-held
areas that have been arrested at checkpoints for security reasons or for conscription, despite
amnesties granted by the government in reconciliation agreements that they would not be
conscripted for a certain period (usually 6 months).
82. Former opposition leaders, who have now reconciled with the government, also face scrutiny at
checkpoints. Such scrutiny can lead to arrests, not necessarily due to their opposition activities, but for
other reasons including alleged previous criminal activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that if the
government wants to arrest someone, then there are a range of reasons available and guarantees
granted through reconciliation agreement are not binding in these situations.
83. When checking people at checkpoints, if the authorities find evidence that a person has
communicated with people inside opposition-held pockets, it can lead to arrest. The latest example
was in December with 20 people arrested by Air Force Intelligence in Rural Damascus.
84. The thoroughness of checks also depends on which branch of the security service that is manning the
checkpoints. The Air Force Intelligence Directorate is considered the strictest of all branches.
85. The Syrian government has undertaken arrest operations in Damascus and in Rural Damascus suburbs.
The government has been arresting a lot of people from the al-Tal area that is close to Damascus city,
where IDPs from different areas in Syria reside. Such arrests are common and take place almost on a
daily basis.
Issues regarding return to Syria
Persons recently returned
86. There are anecdotal reports that buildings and houses are being destroyed as a part of demining
operations as are some areas of illegitimate buildings.
87. The Russians were instrumental in negotiating reconciliation agreements, but it is unclear what will
happen when these agreements expire. Previous examples of reconciliation agreements have led to
posting of thousands of males’ names wanted for conscription purposes when the agreements have
expired (after 4-6 months).
Enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18 of 9 October 2018
88. Since the previous decrees on amnesty from military service offer only temporary respite, the source
does not expect that decree no. 18, will be extended beyond four months for those inside of Syria, or
six months for those outside of Syria. The source considers that the extent to which the government
respects such decrees reflects its continuing need for man-power.
Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees
89. The exemption from military service by paying a fee is an opportunity that some young Syrian men
have used. However, based on experience with previous decrees and laws, the source considers such
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arrangements as being ad-hoc depending upon the particular circumstances and does in no way
absolutely guarantee exemption for arrest for conscription. The source’s understanding is that the
only real exemption is either to be out of military service age (17 – 42) or to have completed military
service (however during periods of conflict this can extend upwards of 5 years plus, and if still during a
‘state of war’, previous conscripts could still be called up to serve again).
Meeting with an international security organisation (2), Damascus, 22
November 2018
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
90. The Syrian conflict is approaching its final phase and a majority of areas are experiencing decreased
military activity. There has been a significant decrease of military operations and confrontations.
However, the situation remains tense in some areas, and it is highly likely that there will be a shift in
the conflict from symmetric confrontation and warfare to asymmetric confrontation conducted by
small sleeping cells.
91. There are still small pockets of IS, for example in Deir ez-Zor and Homs, where IS is showing an
extraordinary resistance and causing the Syrian government a headache.
92. In the western border of Aleppo there is daily confrontation with elevated rates of artillery, rockets,
mortars and sniper fire by armed opposition groups from Idlib impacting the western edges of Aleppo
city causing civilian casualties. This confrontation is happening as some armed opposition groups have
rejected the agreement to create a demilitarization zone.
93. The eastern side of Latakia and the northern part of Hama remain tense as armed opposition groups in
Idlib are targeting the area with shelling with the government retaliating.
94. The cities of Latakia and Tartous remain calm and stable.
95. South Dara’a and Suwayda are mostly stable so far. Until recently, the one remaining hotspot in the
area was in Safa hills where the government forces were fighting IS. Two days ago the Syrian Arab
Army announced total control of Safa hills by pushing back IS fighters, who have now moved to
unknown locations.
96. The army is currently undertaking demining activity in Der’aa, where there are lots of unexploded
ordinances that have caused a lot of civilian casualties.
97. There have been no reports on clashes between pro-government militia groups.
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The general security situation in Damascus province, including Damascus city and
Yarmouk
98. Since the end of the Syrian governments offensive on Eastern Ghouta the situation in Damascus has
become stable and calm.
99. There have been Israeli air strikes targeting military installments in the capital.
100. It is the source’s assessment that in future, there is a potential risk of asymmetric attacks, i.e.
insurgent style attacks, by armed opposition groups from former opposition-held areas. The source
refers to an incident that happened two weeks ago where persons carrying three wests packed with
explosives were arrested on their way to carry out suicide attacks in the outskirts of Damascus.
101. There have been security incidents in former opposition-held areas, such as Jobar, in the form of
explosion of landmines.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
102. The government has removed most checkpoints in Damascus city as the situation became more stable
and because the checkpoints were affecting normal activity in the city. At the same time the
government has reinforced checkpoints in areas where government officials are working and living.
103. The checks done at checkpoints within the city are often very cursory.
104. The road to the airport is open, and there have not been any security incidents on the road to the
airport since summer.
Issues regarding return to Syria
105. The Nassib border crossing between Jordan and Syria has re-opened which will allow a number of
Syrians to return to their villages. Syrians that are considering to return have different concerns, for
instance consequence of political affiliations, the extent of damage to the infrastructure in their area
and to their houses, i.e. the possibility to resume normal life upon return.
106. There have been reported returns to Syria from Lebanon and from Jordan. There have been anecdotal
reports that the Syrian authorities have arrested returnees upon return and then released them over
night. However, the source is not able to verify these reports.
107. With regards to returnees who may face issues upon return, the Syrian government is focused on the
issue of military conscription as well as making sure that those who return do not have any affiliation
to armed opposition groups.
Entry via Damascus International Airport
108. The airport is partially operational. Sham Airlines has started operating. Egyptian and Jordanian
airlines will start to operate soon.
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Meeting with Dr. Bente Scheller, the Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBS),
Beirut, 20 November 2018
About the source
The Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBS) is a non-governmental organisation with close ties to the German
Green Party. The Foundation is part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner
projects in approximately 60 countries and with currently 30 international offices.
The Beirut office is mainly involved with political education, advocacy and the production of documentaries
inside and outside of Syria. Furthermore, the office is involved in supporting local lawyers and research
papers. The Foundation has recently published a study that explores the concerns, expectations, and
conditions for return for former citizens of the city of Daraya.
238
Another area of focus for the Foundation is
the Kurdish areas and women’s rights in those areas.
Issues regarding military service
109. The possibility to pay a fee of 8000 USD and be exempted from military service works, and the source
has personal knowledge of many individuals who work hard to be able to pay the fee. The source has
not heard of cases of people being called up for military service despite paying the fee.
110. Regarding the enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18, it is the source’s assessment that the decree
will not be widely applied for three reasons. Firstly, the decree mirrors similar amnesty decrees issued
in 2012 and 2013 that were never implemented. Secondly, the fact that the reconciliation deals made
with the government in Moadamiya and East Ghouta have not been respected, serves as a deterrent
for many individuals considering making use of this amnesty. Thirdly, this decree differentiates
between those who have and those who have not joined opposition forces. It will be difficult to
provide evidence that you have not joined the opposition groups in the event the authorities suspect
you to be affiliated with the opposition.
Issues regarding return to Syria
111. There are many people who return on individual basis. The number of those returning via planned
group return has been limited. Last year there were two larger transfers of returnees from Lebanon to
Syria. This year, there have been several announcements of planned transfers, but following the
vetting process of the returnees, only 40 out of 3000 were accepted.
112. Several Syrians have returned to east Qalamoun, close to the border with Lebanon.
113. There is not a single profile among returnees. While most people fled Syria because of the Syrian
regime, the general security situation in their area, the dominance of extremist groups as well as the
authoritarian practices in Kurdish areas have been reasons to flee too.
The source referred to: Haid Haid,
Where is Home for the Permanently Displaced? Citizens of Daraya,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
Beirut 25 October 2018
https://lb.boell.org/en/2018/10/25/where-home-permanently-displaced-citizens-daraya
accessed 14
December 2018
238
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114. There are several obstacles for return to Syria. The Syrian government is reluctant to take back those
who are considered to have been with the opposition and those who do not have any financial means
as they are perceived as an additional burden on an economically strained and war-tired economy.
The source has this information from sources who have attended meetings on return issues between
Syrian and Lebanese authorities. In addition, the Syrian government is not interested in people who
are considered to have been with the opposition returning to Syria.
115. Another reason that some Syrians do not return or are reluctant to return is that people do not know
what awaits them upon return, and there is generally a lot of distrust regarding the information
coming out of Syria. Furthermore, the formal mechanisms in Syria can be difficult to rely on for many
considering returning to Syria, since local mafia and militias operating inside the country do not always
adhere to those mechanisms.
116. It is common practice that anyone considering returning to Syria will check with sources inside Syria
whether there is an arrest warrant on their name. Given the number of competing security branches
in Syria, if there are different warrants it is more complicated to lift them all compared to when there
is only one warrant. Some Syrians have been asked for sums up to USD 5.000 for single entry back,
others for several hundred dollars to have arrest warrants against them lifted.
117. Another obstacle for return is lack of official documents, for instance, parents who do not have birth
certificates for their children.
118. Many returnees are waiting in Lebanon and assessing the current change in the security situation.
Many are reluctant to return out of fear that if they return and the security situation in Syria will
deteriorate again, they will be unable to return to Lebanon.
119. Some of those returning to Idlib are returning because they cannot bear that their families are stuck in
Idlib while they themselves are safe in Lebanon.
120. Some are returning due to a lack of perspective with their current situation in neighbouring host
countries.
121. Regarding returns from Jordan, the source has no information regarding this since they do not have
access to Daraa where most of those returning from Jordan are originally from.
122. Many Syrians living in Turkey are reluctant to return to Idlib as they are afraid that they would not be
allowed to re-enter Turkey again if need be.
123. The source has restricted access to information about those who return as the returns are not
monitored. Returns are taking place outside of the UN framework, mainly through collaboration
between Hezbollah, the Lebanese authorities and the Syrian authorities, making information collecting
difficult.
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124. However, the source knows of one case where an individual, originally from Deir ez-Zor, returned to
Syria after the Syrian government had retaken the area from IS. Following his return, he was arrested
and tortured for two days and accused of being a traitor because his family had fled the area under IS
rule in Deir ez-Zor. He was released after two days by paying a few hundred dollars by which his name
also was cleared.
125. Those Syrians who have returned or who travel back and forth between Lebanon and Syria have also
reported back that they have been subjected to extortion of money at the check points.
126. Men who are between 18-42 years old need a specific paper and must pay 120 dollars every three
months to be able to leave the country. In theory, this applies only to those who have not gotten an
exemption from military service; however, in practice it has been applied to people not eligible for
military service as well.
127. The source does not have knowledge of anyone who has exited Syria illegally for Lebanon after 2013.
Most of those who have exited illegally after 2013 have exited mainly to Turkey where the border
control was less strict.
Skype Meeting with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW),
6 November 2018
About the source
Christopher Kozak
is the Editor and Senior Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War where he focuses on
Syria with an emphasis on the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its foreign supporters,
including Russia and Iran. Kozak is the author of
An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria
and has published numerous articles on the Syrian Civil War. He has also been invited to provide briefings
to political leaders, military officers and intelligence officials from the U.S. and its foreign allies. He studied
Arabic at the University of Amman in Jordan and received a B.S. in Political Science and International
Studies (Global Security) from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2014.
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
128. The security situation is generally stable across government-held areas including major cities such as
Latakia, Homs, Hama, Tartous and Damascus.
129. In terms of instability across government-held Syria, there are three main trends: 1) the stable-yet-
unstable De-Escalation Zone in Northern Syria 2) internal violence among pro-government
paramilitary groups inside government-held areas and 3) the presence of IS in Southeastern Syria.
130. Regarding the situation in Northern Syria, the conflict is mainly low-level with impact for government-
controlled populations along the frontlines of the De-Escalation Zone in Greater Idlib Province. There
is continued shelling between opposition-held and government-held areas.
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131. Currently, Hama and Aleppo Provinces are most exposed to shelling from opposition-held Greater Idlib
Province. There have been regular shelling incidents in Northern Hama Province, Aleppo City, and
Northern Latakia Province.
132. Unidentified opposition groups (likely affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or other Al-Qaeda-affiliated
elements) regularly launch mortars and rockets into government-held Aleppo City. In Northern Hama
there is currently a higher rate of violence due to the concentration in the area of some of the more
hardline opposition groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which tend to be more active in violating the
ceasefire. In Northern Latakia Province there have also been more recent clashes than typical but
these incidents occur in more mountainous and less populated areas. Security incidents behind the
frontlines have been rare in the last few months.
133. Most reported civilian casualties in government-held areas have stemmed from opposition shelling on
the western districts of Aleppo City. The intensity of the shelling is at a much smaller scale than the
shelling on Damascus from Eastern Ghouta prior to May 2018.
134. The other main security challenge stems from a lack of control within pro-government paramilitary
groups. There have been two incidents of note in the past few months. In mid-October 2018 there
were clashes between two different paramilitary groups inside Aleppo City that reportedly escalated
into the use of heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The clashes forced the
government to intervene to reestablish order and reshuffle of the security apparatus in Aleppo City.
135. Similar clashes between paramilitary groups have also taken place near Masyaf in Western Hama
Province. This region has previously been a flashpoint for similar clashes.
136. The government is actively fighting IS in Southeast Syria (Suwayda and Deir ez-Zor Provinces) with
some of the heaviest fighting taking place in Eastern Suwayda Province. There have been reports that
pro-government fighters may have suffered as many as two hundred fatalities in Eastern Suwayda
during the last few months. However, both areas are military zones with minimal civilian presence.
137. There have not been any major insurgent attacks inside of government-held cities during the past few
months. There was one attack against a pro-government checkpoint claimed by the Abu Amara
Brigades in Northern Hama Province in early October 2018.
138. There have been several reports of unexploded ordinance detonations during the last few months.
They have mainly happened in the eastern parts of Aleppo City, Eastern Ghouta outside Damascus,
and Eastern Hama Province (where an IED killed at least five pro-regime officers).
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and
Yarmouk
139. There have not been any major incidents in Damascus during the past few months. There have been
minor incidents in former opposition-held areas on the outskirts of Damascus. These incidents are
very low-level events such as individuals shooting at checkpoints run by pro-government soldiers. In
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the past week an unidentified attacker stabbed to death a soldier in a former opposition-held area
outside Damascus, which led to a security crackdown. There have not been any major attacks with
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
140. Most security activity is focused on social control in terms of pro-government forces continuing their
arrest and conscription campaigns, particularly in Eastern Ghouta and increasingly in the past few
months targeting Palestinians from the southern suburbs of Damascus.
141. Over the past few months, the government has reportedly detained numerous former opposition
fighters and activists despite the normalization status given to them through reconciliation deals. The
government has used clever legal tools to target individuals ostensibly given amnesty by the
government. Many are detained and held liable when citizens or the state sue them for involvement in
specific crimes, such as the murder of a relative. The government is thereby circumventing the terms
of the reconciliation arrangements by bringing individual tailored charges against former opposition
members via criminal and terrorism courts. This trend has particularly been noted with regards to
former opposition commanders and activists in Southern Syria and Eastern Ghouta.
142. The source has not seen reports of civilian casualties in Damascus besides casualties from unexploded
ordinance in Eastern Ghouta.
Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City
143. There have not been any incidents on the highway between Damascus International Airport and
Damascus during the past few months. The source characterizes the situation as quiet. The main
nexus of violence previously stemmed from either IS in Southern Damascus or opposition-held
districts in Eastern Ghouta. Both of those areas are pacified for right now and any prior restrictions on
the road appear to have been lifted.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province, including impact of ethnic/religious background, place of origin,
affiliation with opposition groups and being on wanted lists
144. The government has generally attempted to reduce the total number of checkpoints and concentrate
them on major roads to help restore a sense of normalcy to Damascus. However, implementation has
been mixed. There are reports about some secondary checkpoints being dismantled but there are still
complaints about restrictions circulating in pro-government media. The current situation does not
paralyze daily life but there are enough checkpoints to be seen as a public transit problem.
145. A few weeks ago, the government started employing electronic explosive ‘sniffer’ devices at some of
the checkpoints. The initial implementation led to major gridlock and complaints but the government
has been trying to regularize and concentrate these devices at larger checkpoints.
146. Checkpoints have reportedly been pulled from some of the smaller neighbourhood roads and instead
focused at the entrances to Damascus, i.e. the highways coming into Damascus from Lebanon,
Damascus International Airport, and the M5 Highway headed towards Homs. The checkpoints within
Damascus are reportedly concentrated around the central Old City and Mezzeh District.
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147. The current location of checkpoints mirrors the previous pattern, i.e. the government is falling back to
the major long-standing checkpoints while cutting down on the smaller secondary checkpoints.
148. During the past few months there have not been any reports about further dismantling of
checkpoints. The source does not expect dramatic changes to the current situation in the near future.
149. There are still occasional flying checkpoints established by pro-government forces, particularly as part
of raids to search for conscripts and draft-evaders. However, this practice is most frequently taking
place in former opposition-held areas such as Eastern Ghouta.
150. The primary purpose of checkpoints is social control and the identification of wanted individuals. The
source has not received any recent reports of intercepted explosives at government checkpoints in
Damascus. The focus at the checkpoints is on controlling the flow of individuals entering and exiting
Damascus, particularly populations considered ‘undesirable’, i.e. former residents of Eastern Ghouta
and other opposition-held districts outside of Damascus. There is also a focus on conscription drives,
especially as the government demobilizes in other areas.
151. Government checkpoints are still being run by a wide array of forces, particularly the main branches of
the state’s intelligence services, i.e. Air Force Intelligence, Military Intelligence Directorate, and State
Security Directorates as well as regular units of the Syrian Arab Army (particularly the from 4
th
Armored Division and the Republican Guard, which are units endemically based in Damascus).
152. The strictest checkpoints are still (and always have been) run by Air Force Intelligence, which is
notorious for being more stringent and time-consuming in their checks. Other pro-government forces
might be fine with a simple paper-check and cursory inspection of the vehicle. Air Force Intelligence is
more likely to make individuals step out and physically search the vehicle.
153. Since May 2018, Air Force Intelligence has been consolidating more control over checkpoints in
Damascus. Air Force Intelligence does not hold exclusive control but it has acquired more of the
relative security portfolio in Damascus, particularly in Northern and Western Damascus near Mezzeh
Airbase and the Damascus-Beirut Highway.
154. The Air Force Intelligence has the reputation of being more stringent vis-à-vis corruption and more
reluctant to accept bribes. This reputation does not mean that its operatives will not accept bribes but
instead that overall they are known to be stricter than other government entities.
155. When people are subject to additional scrutiny at checkpoints, it is primarily based on their place of
origin, former residency in opposition-held areas, and/or suspected affiliation to opposition groups.
156. Overall, residents of former opposition-held areas - both areas in the outskirts of Damascus such as
Eastern Ghouta as well as other parts of Syria - are subject to additional scrutiny.
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157. Family connections with individuals living in opposition-held areas in Northern Syria are clearly seen as
a suspect marker in the eyes of the government that has led to arrests in some cases. There have
been instances in which individuals from Eastern Ghouta are detained on charges of maintaining
contact with relatives that have evacuated to Greater Idlib Province in Northern Syria.
158. There have also been examples of government crackdown on Palestinians in Damascus. For one, many
Palestinians had previously been residing areas held by opposition groups or IS in Southern Damascus.
Palestinians are also dispersed from their prior controlled camps in Damascus. Yarmouk Camp is
currently still considered a military zone, which means that severe restrictions on entry and exit. There
is only one functioning checkpoint connecting Damascus to Yarmouk Camp and Southern Damascus
via Babila. Despite reconciliation deals with the government, travel restrictions remain very high.
Former residents must apply for permits to enter both Damascus and Yarmouk. Security services
screen applicants as well as their families. Local residents also in many cases lack housing permits due
to their displacement from Yarmouk. The government has been clamping down on displaced
Palestinians and evicting them from houses in Southern Damascus.
159. Finally, there have been arrest campaigns in Eastern Ghouta focused on medical or humanitarian
personnel as well as other individuals that are affiliated with opposition governance efforts - not just
individuals affiliated with armed opposition groups in former opposition-held areas.
160. There are reports that some people who are detained in these arrest campaigns or stopped at
checkpoints are detained, interrogated, and then released while others face arbitrary arrest and
disappearance in the prison system. There are also some reports of beatings, extortion and other
forms of abuse by security services.
161. In Eastern Ghouta, many government services have not yet been reestablished six months after the
area was retaken by the government. Residents of Eastern Ghouta are still heavily restricted in their
access to Damascus. These restrictions also apply to residents of other former opposition-held areas.
162. Government officials have discussed opening some courthouses and other government offices in
Eastern Ghouta but many individuals - including university students and individuals who require
formal documentation such as birth certificates or other official documents - still need to access
Damascus in order to have any contact with the state.
Issues regarding military service
163. Individuals are required to have been living outside of Syria for at least four years to be eligible for
exemption from military service by the payment of exemption fees.
164. The government recently released three measures related to military service: 1) Presidential Decree
18/2018
239
issued by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on 9 October 2018; 2) Circular on Reservist
239
The source referred to an Arabic article from SANA dated 10 October 2018 regarding Decree 18 SANA:
https://sana.sy/?p=826281
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Service issued by Syrian Minister of Defence Gen. Ali Ayyub on 29 October 2018
240
; and 3)
Demobilization Decree
241
issued by the Syria Director of the General Conscription Department on 4
November 2018.
165. There has been much scepticism from opposition-affiliated sources regarding the enforcement of
Presidential Decree no. 18/2018 of 9 October 2018 given the fact that prior reconciliation deals
between the government and former opposition-held areas have been eroded and violated.
166. Presidential Decree no. 18/2018 grants individuals amnesty for the consequences of their decision to
defect, draft-dodge, or otherwise evade military service but does not eliminate their obligation to
perform compulsory military service.
167. The source assesses that individuals who avoided conscription service will still be obliged to serve in
the military despite the amnesty. However, those who already served and dodged reservist service will
likely not be returned to military service given the current demobilization efforts.
168. There have not been any notable movements by populations capitalize on the general amnesty.
169. The Circular on Reservist Service that was issued on 29 October 2018 was issued by the Ministry of
Defence and then passed to the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Police. The circular, which is a
document to implement Presidential Decree 18/2018, prohibits the arrest of individuals who were
called up for reservist military service but does not apply to individuals who avoided initial
conscription. Some estimates claim that the decision will affect up to 800.000 individuals that have
either left the country or remain hidden inside of Syria. In the formal statements, the government
made a point to emphasize that this circular was sent to border authorities in order to assure refugees
that they will not be detained upon return to Syria if they were previously wanted for reservist service
in the Syrian Arab Army.
170. On 4 November 2018 the Syrian Arab Army issued a Demobilization Decree demobilizing all soldiers
conscripted at or before Class 247 of July 2013 (i.e. individuals who served compulsory military service
for more than five years). The Syrian Arab Army demobilized Class 102 (i.e. individuals who served
compulsory military service since 2010) in May 2018.
171. The government is working on measures to grant preferred access to government positions for
individuals who have stayed in the country and fulfilled their military service obligations.
240
The source referred to:
http://alwatan.sy/archives/171844
;
https://www.sana.sy/?p=836440
;
https://twitter.com/syrian_law/status/1056947265175277574; https://twitter.com/syrian_law/status/1056969841217822721
241
The source referred to
http://www.ortas.gov.sy/News/index.php?d=100451&id=252334
;
https://twitter.com/syrian_law/status/1059247070140420097
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Return to Syria
172. The source does not have information about returnees. He mentions a recent statement by the
Lebanese State Minister for Refugees claiming that an estimated 55.000 Syrians have returned to
Syria. The source considers that the statement may be politically motivated. The Lebanese Minister for
Refugees also noted claims of a refugee family killed by a pro-government officer upon return to
Hama Province. However, the source cannot confirm whether the incident occurred and does not
know of other sources confirming this incident.
Meeting with COAR Global, Beirut 17 November 2018
About the source
The COAR is an independent social enterprise that directly supports practitioners, policy-makers, and
donors by facilitating humanitarian and development interventions in complex, fragile, and high-risk
environments. COAR delivers neutral and objective research and analysis, which identifies - but does not
influence - local stakeholders, relationships, interests, and analyzes broader political, economic, social and
security dynamics and trends. COAR research leverages social media, personal networks, field research
teams and local experts in order to map and translate the local human context; COAR analysis synthesizes
and studies this data in order to inform both programmatic and strategic decision-making, reduce security
and conflict sensitivity risks, and increase the impact of humanitarian, development, stabilization, peace-
building, and peacekeeping initiatives. See:
http://coar-global.org/
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
173. While Damascus is a priority for the Syrian government and thus heavily secured, the situation is
different in other government-controlled areas. The further away one gets from Damascus, the more
decentralized is the government’s control of that area and the higher the number of security incidents
such as car bombs and kidnappings.
174. Since the government still does not have the capacity to manage and control every area that is
currently under its control, 15-20 different pro-government militias are allowed to run and control
cities such as Aleppo, Latakia, Tartous, Hama, Homs and Deir ez-Zor.
175. The militias are run by different pro-government entities such as the Iranians, Russians, local
businessmen, former reconciled opposition fighters and some are simply criminal gangs.
176. The militias engage regularly in heavily weaponized clashes due to conflicting agendas and economic
interests. In Homs and Aleppo there have recently been clashes between different militias and the
clashes escalated into the use of heavy machine guns, mortars and tanks. Deir ez-Zor is heavily and
regularly affected by clashes between militias. The instability that is caused by a lack of centralized
governance has led to a situation where there has been an increase of kidnappings and gang activity
targeting especially middle-class families, who are perceived to have the means to pay ransoms of up
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to 5000 dollars. The highest incidents of kidnappings are in Aleppo and Suwayda. In Suwayda alone
there have been 35 kidnappings this month (November 2018).
177. In areas such as Homs, Hama and Aleppo, car bombs are prevalent. The government accuses IS to be
behind these attacks, when in reality the car bombs are due to militias bombing each other’s
businesses due to conflicting economic interests.
178. Major cities such as Aleppo and Homs experience the highest number of civilian casualties compared
to other cities.
The general security situation in Damascus province, including Damascus city and
Yarmouk
179. The security situation has improved significantly and there have not been any security incidents inside
Damascus city since May 2018. There have been incidents involving unexploded ordinance,
particularly in Eastern Ghouta as the government has not yet started the process of combing the area
for mines and unexploded ordinance. The area around Yarmouk camp has been completely flattened
following the government’s offensive in the area and an estimate of 70 % of Yarmouk camp’s housing
has been destroyed.
180. There are no security incidents on the road connecting the airport to Damascus city. The government
has checkpoints in place on the route from the airport to the city.
Freedom of movement in Damascus province, including Damascus city and Yarmouk
181. In general movement in Damascus province is smoother than before May 2018.
182. The government has removed around 120 checkpoints in Damascus but checkpoints at main areas are
kept in place. It has become easier to move around, and traffic is flowing easier.
183. Checkpoints are being run by different intelligence service branches. However, recently there has
been a change in so far as the government has restructured the power balance between the State
Security Directorate and the Military Intelligence Directorate by making the State Security Directorate
increasingly more powerful in its presence in the city. The government is hereby entering into the next
phase of strengthening its governance and control of the city.
184. The type of check that is being conducted at checkpoints in Damascus city and suburbs depends on
the area in question. Inside as well as at the entrance of Damascus City, there are checkpoints that are
equipped with laptops with long lists of names of wanted people. Individuals who are passing by are
controlled rigorously.
185. Generally, men between the ages of 18-42 face the most difficulties when passing checkpoints.
Conscription is still a priority for the government.
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186. There are still occasionally mobile checkpoints, especially in major cities, where the security services
show up in restaurants, bars and other areas where young men typically gather to check their
conscription status.
187. The following profiles will face scrutiny when passing checkpoints: Individuals who originate from
reconciled areas, former opposition activists, individuals wanted for conscription, anyone with any
relation to political actors (both secular and islamists), individuals from large and famous families who
are known to be in opposition to the government, and individuals who have similar names to wanted
people.
188. There is not a systematic follow-up on what happens to people who face scrutiny at checkpoints. The
source has anecdotal knowledge that it will often depend on the officer in charge and/or on the type
of the security branch that is controlling the check point. Sometimes people are released the same day
and other times it may take up to three days to have one’s situation cleared. If an individual succeeds
in clearing his name from one security branch, that does not guarantee that he has succeeded in
clearing his name from all lists because there is not one unified wanted lists among the different
security branches. There is an internal competition among the different security service branches and
therefore they do not always coordinate or communicate amongst each other.
189. Former residents from Eastern Ghouta experience a high level of scrutiny when passing checkpoints
into Damascus City. There have been instances where men, who are not of conscription age and who
do not have any affiliation or connection to unwanted entities, have still been withheld at checkpoints
and asked to give thorough accounts of why and where they are going, especially for those who travel
during the night. Some are allowed to leave after an hour of investigation whereas others might be
kept for three days.
190. Residents from Eastern Ghouta are also heavily restricted in their access in and out of Damascus city.
The whole family needs a sponsorship as well as a security approval to be allowed to enter into
Damascus. Those former residents of Eastern Ghouta who are exempted from these measures are
mainly those who have a connection to the government or who have been working inside Damascus.
These restrictions have resulted in many former residents of Eastern Ghouta being stranded in IDP-
camps just outside of Damascus under extremely difficult conditions.
Issues regarding return to Syria
Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees
191. The possibility to be exempted from military service by paying an exemption fee of 8000 dollars has
existed even before the war and has been used by many individuals, who have the means to pay the
fee. Furthermore, it is a requirement that those wanting to make use of this possibility have lived
abroad for at least four years. After the war there have been people who have paid the exemption fee
and have been freed of the conscription obligations and will not be called up for the reserve. The
source personally knows people who have paid the exemption fee and have not faced any problem
regarding conscription afterwards.
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Enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18 of 9 October 2018
192. It is the source’s assessment that very few individuals will be interested in capitalizing on the general
amnesty granted through Decree 18. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the amnesty does not
free one from the conscription obligation, but only from the consequences attached to having dodged
or deserted one’s duty, i.e. payment of a fine and jail time. Secondly, decrees in Syria are never
published with executive guidance on their applicability and scope, which leaves them open for
interpretation. There are currently ongoing discussions between different ministries regarding the
scope of the decree and it seems that there is not yet a clear understanding about which groups are
eligible for the amnesty. A clear understanding and an established practice regarding the scope of
such decrees will often first be seen after at least a year has passed, which is why such decrees initially
are met by reluctance by most individuals. Thirdly, there is still an inherent resistance to be
conscripted among young men as the conscription obligation is viewed as a risk of being involved and
killed in the conflict. Finally, the salary paid by the Syrian government amounts to a mere 40 dollar a
month, which is not a sufficient amount for those wanting to be able to support their families.
Possible consequences of having stayed abroad during the war
193. The mere fact that someone has stayed abroad during the Syrian civil war is not an issue upon return.
Persons recently returned
194. The source does not engage in collecting data about what happens to persons recently returned.
There have been cases of individuals being detained upon return. The source does not have number of
detainees as acquiring these would be nearly impossible, and would require a lot of resources to
obtain, but the source knows that it is a sizable number (more than several hundreds). Generally,
detentions have been for conscription purposes; however, individuals have also been detained for
being activists or part of local civil society organisations. The source’s information on this issue largely
comes from local sources and local media.
195. Generally, those returning voluntarily to Syria are individuals who do not have any problems or
outstanding issues with the government.
196. There is currently a narrative about returns to Syria being nothing but hassle-free and unproblematic.
The narrative is being pushed in a political play mainly by the Russians to have as many Syrians to
return as possible in order to unlock reconstruction funds from the European countries.
197. Regarding the procedures for return from Lebanon, there is a Russian center for returns. Individuals
interested in returning to Syria apply at the centre, and their names will be passed on to the security
office in Syria who will vet the names and let the individual know whether they are cleared for return
or not.
198. When an individual applies for return, they will undergo a screening process and the government will
check their Facebook profile as well as other social media activities. The individual’s area of origin
(down to the specific neighbourhood) is investigated as there are certain communities that can never
be trusted in the eyes of the government. How he left the country is also taken into consideration.
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199. A great number of those applying to return from Lebanon are rejected, which is an indication that the
Syrian government is not interested in certain groups Syrians returning to Syria. According to the
Lebanese General Security, out of 450 names, all from one community, that were sent for clearance
with the Syrian government, only 150 names were accepted. One reason for not accepting some of
those people is the fact that their place of origin they will be returning to is completely destroyed and
impossible to live in. Another reason is that certain individuals are considered as unwanted by the
Syrian government. Finally, the source finds that the lack of capacity to absorb too many returnees at
one time is also a reason that some Syrians are not allowed to return. According to local sources, the
Lebanese Minister of Refugee Affairs has also confirmed these reasons.
Entry through Damascus International Airport
200. Damascus International Airport is used by Syrians living abroad to return to Syria. However, the largest
majority of refugees from Syria, who live in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan etc., are not returning through
the airport. In general, anecdotally individuals returning through the airport are middle class Syrians.
They check their status before they buy their ticket to return. Nobody returns without checking if they
are able to.
Meeting with Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), Director, the Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), UK, 5 November 2018
About the source
SOHR was founded in May 2006. From its base in UK, it documents human rights situation in Syria. Based
on information collected from 236 sources throughout Syria, SOHR reports on human rights violations
committed by the
Syrian government as well as the opposition groups.
The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
201. Since May 2018, there have not been major clashes in government-controlled areas or major clashes
between the opposition and the Syrian government in government-controlled areas. The Syrian
government uses militias to control some areas in Syria. For example, Abu Kamal in the east is
controlled by pro-regime Iraqi militias. Militias also control checkpoints in some areas of Aleppo,
Latakia and in the areas between Aleppo and Damascus.
202. The Syrian government has control with 61 percent of Syria. However, it has still not asserted control
over all of the areas it has regained. There have been cases of people disappearing or being kidnapped
where you do not know about their whereabouts or who has kidnapped them unless you pay or are
connected to security services. From the beginning of 2018, 279 persons have been kidnapped by
militias and released against ransoms in Aleppo. The regime has no information about the groups that
are responsible for the kidnappings. SOHR has not documented cases of Iranian militias kidnapping
people. Syrian Shia-militias from Nepol and al-Zahra’ near Damascus also kidnap people against
ransom.
203. There have been clashes between pro-regime militia groups and government forces in Latakia and
Aleppo. For example, in Aleppo last week, a police officer was killed by a Shiite militia,
Liwa’ al-Baker,
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when he tried to prevent them from kidnapping a woman. The government wants to show that it is
determined to stop criminal activities conducted by some militias, but it sometimes overestimates its
power to do so.
204. Men from different ethnic and ideological backgrounds join different Iranian and Russian militias in
order to earn a monthly wage. For example, Sunni men from Aleppo, Der’aa and South Damascus,
who previously fought with the Free Syrian Army, have joined Iranian militias to earn money. More
than 50.000 Syrians are being paid to fight for the Iranians.
205. Except from one suicide attack by jihadist groups in a Druze village in Suwayda on July 25, 2018
242
causing civilian casualties, no other major suicide attacks had been reported in 2018.
206. Eastern part of Latakia was hit by shelling on October 2018, fired by the opposition from the Idlib-
Latakia border.
207. IS has sleeping cells in East of Syria and is able to attack at any time. Within the last few months IS
shelled once on Deir ez-Zor against Iranian and Russian forces and twice on Ismaili and Alawite villages
in deserted areas in East of Hama and East of Homs. Four people from these villages were also
kidnapped but no information about their fate. Three civilians died of the shelling on West of Aleppo
City by al-Nusra last week.
The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and
Yarmouk
208. Since May 2018 no suicide attacks or shelling have taken place in Damascus Province. In East Ghouta,
Yarmouk and some other areas previously controlled by opposition groups, there have been incidents
caused by remaining ammunition. The source does not have information regarding civilian casualties.
209. The security situation on the road between Damascus Airport and Damascus city is stable as no
incidents have occurred.
Freedom of movement in Damascus Province
210. Since May 2018, the way people are being checked has been lessened and it is possible to get
information from Syrian authorities on the location of the arrested persons.
211. Since May 2018 the number of checkpoints in the Damascus Province has generally decreased, and
some checkpoints have been removed. In former opposition-held areas in South of Damascus the
number of checkpoints has increased because the government is suspicious of the residents in those
areas and in order to prevent security incidents.
212. Inside Damascus City, the Syrian Intelligence services are controlling the checkpoints. In Sayida Zainab
area the checkpoints are run by Hezbollah and Syrian Shia militias. The Fourth Armoured Division and
242
The Guardian,
Surprise Isis attacks leave more than 200 dead in south-west Syria,
25 July 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/25/dozens-dead-suicide-attack-syria-sweida-isis
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the Republican Guard are controlling checkpoints outside Damascus City and checkpoints near military
areas in Damascus City.
213. At checkpoints, it is usually people’s names and their place of origin that is checked. The extent and
type of check at checkpoints depends on the person in charge. Sometimes they check everyone who is
crossing the checkpoints, other times no one is checked.
214. Each branch of the security services of the Syrian regime has its own wanted list and the different
branches do not coordinate their lists mainly because these branches compete on power and
influence. People’s names are, however, not always checked against wanted lists at checkpoints.
215. Persons affiliated or suspected of being affiliated to the opposition and their family members as well
as people originating from former opposition-held areas may risk facing difficulties when approaching
checkpoints, including risk of being detained. There have been cases of people being detained due to
similarity of their names to those on wanted lists, but those with good connections to the authorities
usually get released afterwards. The source mentioned two examples of family members of wanted
persons detained when passing check points. Apart from these profiles, no other group faces
difficulties when going through checkpoints inside Damascus City.
216. Harsh treatment can occur when people are detained at checkpoints. Paying bribe or using
connections may help people be released.
217. On November 5, 2018, 26 persons originating from Tadamoun near Yarmouk camp and Hajar al-Aswad
were arrested at checkpoints because they were suspected of preparing an operation. Last week there
were also people from Eastern Ghouta who were arrested at checkpoints inside Damascus city.
Issues regarding return to Syria
218. Syrians who do not have outstanding issues with the authorities do not face problem upon return
from Turkey and Arab countries like Lebanon and Egypt. However, if your neighbour has falsely
accused you in your absence of being affiliated to the IS, you will be in trouble upon return.
Possible consequences of having left Syria during the war/after 2011
219. Syrians who have lived abroad, for instance in Denmark or the UK, during the war may or may not face
difficulties upon return depending on the officer in charge as the regime does not have a clear strategy
on return. If for instance the officer in charge is very pro-government and thus take someone’s
absence during the war very personally.
Treatment of persons recently returned
220. During 2017 and 2018, over 50.000 people have returned to Syria from Turkey. These refugees, who
had left Syria due to the war and the security situation in their home areas, have generally not faced
difficulties with authorities upon return. However, there have been cases of returnees from Turkey
who have been conscripted to the army upon return. The source underlined that young people in
military service age have not come back to Syria for fear of being conscripted. Many returnees from
Turkey are from Aleppo.
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221. There has been no large-scale return from European countries.
222. Between 10-15 % of the Syrians who have returned from Lebanon have been detained for one hour
and up to some days as the Syrian authorities ask questions about their activities and affiliation to
opposition groups, however, the majority has been released. The source has information about 38
men who are still detained. The source confirms that the Syrian government has not killed any
returnee from Lebanon. The incident of killing returnees in Tal Kalakh that the Lebanese minister
mentioned in November 2018 appeared to be due to a personal conflict about a land issue. Most of
the Syrians that have returned from Lebanon reside in Qalamoun from where they originate. There
have only been few returns to Damascus City.
223. Returns from Lebanon and Turkey have been voluntary. Some Syrians have returned due to the
difficult conditions that they had been living under in Lebanon. Most of those, who have already
returned from Lebanon are people with Sunni background, who have returned to their home areas in
to Qalamoun.
224. The names of the returnees are sent by mainly Hezbollah, Russia and the General Security in Lebanon,
to the Syrian authorities that will conduct a screening of names.
Possible consequences of illegal exit
225. Low-profile persons, who have left Syria illegally, would not face difficulties upon return to Syria,
particularly if they pay bribe. Corruption is widespread among the different security branches, so
unless you are a high-profile person, you can clear your issues with the authorities by paying bribe to
the security services. However, the price is high and you must pay at least 5.000 USD to clear your
issue.
Exemption from military service by paying fee
226. People who pay the fee to be exempted from military service will not be called up for the service at a
later point.
227. There have been cases of young men, who fled to the Gulf states during the Syrian crisis, who have
returned back to Syria after paying a fee of 8.000 USD and thereby being exempted from military
service. These people have not faced any problem with the regime upon return. The source himself
knows 15-18 persons who have availed themselves of this opportunity.
228. The Decree No.18 has partly been implemented. Some deserters and evaders have been pardoned
where others have been taken to military service by mistake because the different security services
have been confused about the implementation of the amnesty.
229. The source personally knows 8 people who have avoided military service by paying the exemption fee
of 8000 USD after being pardoned through Decree no.18.
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Entry via Damascus International Airport, including treatment upon return
230. The source has no information on return through Damascus International Airport.
Meeting with Sara Kayyali, Syria Researcher, Human Rights Watch (HRW),
Beirut, 19 November 2018
About the source
As regards Syria, HRW works on housing, land and property rights and how it relates to return, demolitions
and their relation to reconstruction projects in government-controlled areas and redistribution of
humanitarian aid in areas retaken by the government. It monitors detentions and other obstacles to return,
including military conscription. It also monitors human rights situation in areas controlled by the opposition
such as Idlib.
Security situation in Damascus
Freedom of movement in Damascus City
231. In order to move to Damascus City from areas previously controlled by opposition groups, you have to
formally pay a fee (500-1000 SYP) to be able to cross the checkpoint. The source’s information on this
issue is based on her research about the situation of people from Daraya, Zabadani and Qaboun. The
source’s understanding is that security clearance is required for renting a home or proving ownership.
Asked whether security clearance is still required for renting a house in Damascus, the source replied
that as far as she is informed, this is still a requirement and there has been no official announcement
regarding repeal of this. Security clearance is also required for groups returning to Syria as a whole.
232. Checkpoints are a way to control who comes into Damascus City and even into certain areas
previously controlled by the opposition such as Daraya, Qaboon and Zabadani. Those wanting to enter
Damascus will have to put their name on a list for security approval, and put the reason for wanting to
travel, for instance for medical.
233. In certain cases, persons from former opposition-held areas have had to leave their documents at the
checkpoints when going inside Damascus City until they leave the city again.
234. The source knows five documented cases (two women and three men) where persons have been
detained or taken to military service at checkpoints. In these cases, those who were detained were
living in displacement shelters, and they were taken in when trying to return to their areas of origin.
They were told by the authorities that they could not leave their shelters.
235. The source does not have information about the development since May 2018 with regard to the
number or location of checkpoints in Damascus City.
236. The source’s understanding is that entering areas in Damascus province, where the government has
recently retaken control, is not smooth, neither for humanitarian organisations who are required a
permission to enter and operate in these areas, nor for regular citizens. Place of origin has an impact
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on who among regular citizens are allowed to enter an area, although the policy on this issue is not
clear. For instance in Zabadani and Qaboon, people can return, but there are certain neighbourhoods
where people cannot. People can return to Harasta, but they for example cannot enter Hamourieh.
237. The source has heard anecdotally that freedom of movement inside Damascus City has been easier
since May 2018, but she is not able to verify the information.
Issues regarding return to Syria
Enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18 of 9 October 2018
238. None of the Syrians, who the source has talked to, believes in Decree no. 18, because previous
decrees from 2015 and 2016 have not been effective. Neither has the government respected
reconciliation agreements with opposition groups according to which men between 18 and 42 in areas
retaken by the government were given six months to report for military service. There have been
documented cases of individuals in these areas being called up to military service before the six
months passed.
239. A couple of weeks earlier, the source heard that the government had announced the names of those
who would benefit from the amnesty according to Decree no. 18. The source is not sure whether this
information is true, but if it is the case, the source considers it a further step compared to previous
decrees.
Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees
240. The source does not know any Syrian who can afford paying the 8.000 USD fee. She knew a case of a
person who in 2011 intended to go back to Syria and pay the fee. However, the person faced
difficulties at the first checkpoint on his way back which made him turn back abroad for fear of being
detained. Thus, he never got the opportunity to pay the fee. The source does not have information on
what exactly happened at the checkpoints which made him turn back.
241. Based on experience from previous decrees and the reconciliation process mentioned above, the
source is not sure whether people would in practice be exempted from conducting military service
despite paying the fee. However, the source underlines that it is an assumption and she does not have
information on how exemption from military service by paying fee in practice works.
Treatment of persons recently returned
242. People who have returned from Lebanon to Syria in recent semi-organised returns, had to go through
a security clearance procedure, regardless of where in Syria they wanted to return to. The Lebanese
General Security sends a list of returnees to Syrian security services for security clearance, and when
the clearance is obtained, people can return. The source does not have information on the criteria by
which the security clearance is conducted. However, the source know of cases where individuals have
been denied the approval, and when they inquired about the reason, they were told that the Syrian
authorities know who they, i.e. the rejected returnees, were and what they had done.
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243. The source has heard that Russians and Hezbollah are involved in organising returns from Lebanon,
but the source does not have information what their roles are with regard to the General Security in
Lebanon and the Syrian authorities.
244. HRW has looked into cases of two communities who have returned from Lebanon. The first group
were those who were allowed to return to and stay in their home area in Zabadani, but since 80-90
percent of their houses were destroyed during the conflict and the government did not keep its
promises regarding rebuilding these, some of them returned back to Lebanon. HRW also followed
returnees to Daraya (either from Lebanon or other areas in Syria) who in the beginning were denied
access to their home area, but later were allowed to enter but not to remain inside Daraya. Security
clearance was also required for that. As far as the source is informed, some individuals were able to
register their properties in Daraya. However, the source mentioned a documented case of a woman
who had to go through security check by the security service, who was responsible for her home area,
as she was told that it was the security service, who had her property files. This happened despite the
fact that she had provided all ID documents necessary to register her property. HRW has documented
at least three cases of individuals whose property issues had to be resolved with the security services.
245. There have been cases of IDPs who have returned and stayed for a while and then been taken to the
army despite guarantees that they would not be called up. The source does not have information
about number of these cases. Most of these people had signed reconciliation agreements indicating
that they would have a period of six months to settle their affairs, but this did not happen.
246. It is easier to return to Syria from Turkey, both through official borders and unofficially. People that
the source had spoken to who did return did not have to go through a security clearance prior to
return from Turkey, but may need the clearance upon return to areas of origin inside Syria. The only
thing that returnees from Turkey have to do is to be permitted to enter at the border checkpoints
which are either controlled by the Turkish army or the opposition groups. However, there are regular
mass deportation by the Turkish authorities of Syrians, who have tried to smuggle themselves into
Turkey. The deportations take place on an almost weekly basis. The source’s understanding is that the
number of voluntary return from Turkey is less than those deported.
247. Previously, there were cases of people being deported from Jordan, but the number of such
deportations has decreased significantly since October 2017. Since the Nassib crossing between
Jordan and Syria has reopened, there have been voluntary returns from Jordan, but their number is
not high. The source has not heard of any pressure or policy by the Jordanian government to put
pressure on people to return from Jordan since the border has reopened. Only those from the
opposition groups, who were wounded in the battle in Dara’a this year and who were taken into
Jordan for treatment, will be deported to Syria.
Possible consequences of having left Syria during the war/after 2011
248. Before the beginning of 2018, Syrian used to be afraid that having left the country during the conflict
(after 2011) might have consequences for them upon return, due to an existing perception of those
leaving being affiliated with anti-government sentiments. But as far as the source has been informed
by the Syrians who the source has been in contact with, since the beginning of 2018, it seems that
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having left the country during the conflict does not have an impact anymore. The source specifies that
she is talking about persons who mostly have applied for asylum in Western countries such as
Germany, Switzerland and Sweden as well as Turkey. Part of this change in 2018 is due to a change in
rhetoric, which although not matched by a change in policies, at least resolves the prima facie
concerns. The other part is because there are activists who have been approached by the Syrian
government to come back.
Possible consequences for other categories/profiles upon return
249. The sources considers that following factors may have an impact on the treatment a person receives
upon return: 1) the status of military service 2) involvement of the returnee or a family member (also
non-immediate family members) in anti-government activities (protest or any other dissident
activities), 3) similarity of the returnee’s name to that of an opposition person, 4) being a part of an
NGO inside or outside of Syria (humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs, media NGOs etc., particularly
those that operated in non-government held Syria), 5) travelling back and forth to Syria from abroad,
for instance leaving Syria and residing in Germany in 2011 and then coming back and residing in Syria
in 2015 and then leaving Syria again, which may entail risk of additional scrutiny upon return.
Entry via Damascus International Airport, including treatment upon return
250. Returnees from Western countries tend to return to Syria via Beirut and the land border between
Lebanon and Syria.
251. In general, returnees use the land border to Lebanon to come back to Syria, and do not use Damascus
International Airport, as there are not many flights to/from the airport.
Meeting with General Naji Numeir, Chief of Immigration and Passports
Department, Damascus, 21 November 2018
Issues regarding return to Syria
252. People who have left Syria illegally during the Syrian war will not face any issue with the Syrian
authorities as a consequence of their illegal exit. Previously, illegal exit from Syria would lead to
judicial prosecution. Now, the punishment has been waived as the government is aware that many
people fled the country illegally to save their lives from the war and from “terrorists”, who took
control of cities such as Idlib, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo.
253. Those who wish to return back to Syria will have to apply for return at the nearest Syrian
representation, i.e. embassy or consulate, in the foreign country in which they are residing. At the
embassy, the applicant is among others asked to inform about the reason why the person left Syria,
how he or she left the country, what the person has done during his stay in the host country and what
his source of income has been.
254. The embassy will then send the information about the applicant to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The ministry will conduct security checks of applicants and also verify their identities as Syrian
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nationals. This procedure has two purposes: One, to ensure that only Syrian nationals enter the
country. Since the beginning of the war people with other nationalities have tried to get asylum in
Western countries in an easy way by pretending to be Syrians through providing fake Syrian
documents obtained mainly in Turkey. Two, to ensure that people, who want to return back to Syria,
will be informed on whether there are criminal charges against them. People whom there are criminal
charges against will face problems upon return unless they settle their issues with the Syrian
government before they return back to the country.
255. People who left Syria illegally and do not have Syrian documents, can go to the nearest Syrian
representation in the country in which they are residing, in order to have new documents issued.
When the Syrian identity of the applicant is confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Syria, either
through relatives or a legal representative, the applicant will receive the Syrian document which she
or he has applied for.
256. All Syrians in and outside Syria can get a passport valid for five years. Even those with security issues,
deserters, draft evaders, or people who are in the opposition and those who have illegally left their
official work, will be able to get a passport as no Syrian will be denied their nationality. However, their
passports will be valid for two years only.
257. The Syrian government does not prosecute or arrest people who fled and obtained asylum in
neighbouring countries or other countries, including Western countries. The government understands
that they applied for asylum because they fled from the war and from groups fighting against the
government in the country.
258. A large number of Syrians have returned back from Lebanon to Syria, and there are a lot of Syrians in
both Lebanon and Jordan who are wishing to get back, especially because many of them live under
bad conditions in these two countries.
259. Syrian authorities coordinate with the Department of General Security in Lebanon to facilitate return
for those, who wish to get back to Syria. The Russians also cooperate with the Syrian government with
regard to return of Syrians. Thousands of Syrians have returned from Lebanon and the Syrian
authorities have transported those returnees to the closest point to their homes.
260. With regard to the enforcement of the Presidential Amnesty Decree no.18 of 9 October 2018, a crucial
number of both deserters and draft evaders have handed themselves in to the authorities. Deserters
and evaders who report within the deadlines announced by the government will not be punished for
escaping the conscription, and they will be taken to conscription afterwards.
261. Conscripts who have lived abroad for at least four years can be exempted from military service, in
accordance with the law of exemption from military service, by paying a fee. This law was issued
before the Syrian war. During the war the fee has increased to 8000 dollars. A great number of
conscripts who reside in neighbouring-, Arabic or foreign countries, have availed themselves of this
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opportunity to be exempted by paying the fee. According to this law, paying the fee means permanent
exemption from military service.
262. Both people who left legally and illegally can be exempted from military service in accordance with
this law.
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Appendix 2: Terms of Reference
1. The general security situation in government-controlled areas in Syria
1.1. Prevalence of security incidents and the extent and type of casualties
2. The general security situation in Damascus Province, including Damascus City and Yarmouk
2.1. Development of the general security situation in Damascus province since May 2018
2.2. Prevalence of security incidents and the extent and type of casualties
2.3. Security situation on the road connecting the airport to Damascus City
2.4. Freedom of movement in Damascus Province, including impact of ethnic/religious background,
place of origin, affiliation with opposition groups and being on wanted lists
3.
Issues regarding return to Syria
3.1. Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees, and risk of being called up as
reservist despite having paid the fee
3.2. Enforcement of Presidential Decree no. 18 of 9 October 2018
3.3. Possible consequences of having left Syria during the war/after 2011
3.4. Possible consequences of illegal exit
3.5. Possible consequences of having applied for asylum in other countries upon return to Syria
3.6. Possible consequences for other categories/profiles upon return?
3.7. Treatment of persons recently returned
3.8. Entry via Damascus International Airport, including treatment upon return
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