OSCE, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 7: The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

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OSCE Alm.del Bilag 7
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CSS Analyses

in Security Policy

No. 237, December 2018, Editor: Fabien Merz

CSS

ETH Zurich

The OSCE’s Military Pillar:

The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

In January 2019, Switzerland will take over the rotating chairmanship

of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). The FSC is a little-known,

integral decision-making body of the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Every week in Vienna, the FSC discusses

and negotiates measures to strengthen security in Europe.

By Christian Nünlist

In January 2019, Switzerland will assume

the chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for

Security Co-operation (FSC) in Vienna

for four months. Following the Swiss

Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2014,

which was praised at home and abroad and

was dominated by the management of the

Ukraine Crisis, Switzerland will once again

assume a visible role in the OSCE to pro-

mote peace and security in Europe.

In principle, the task is a routine matter, but

since the outbreak of the Ukraine Crisis,

nothing in the OSCE has been routine. The

FSC has also suffered from the harsher po-

litical climate between Russia and the West.

Nevertheless, especially in times of crisis,

the FSC offers the opportunity for contacts

between Russia and the West, especially

military-to-military contacts. The FSC

deals with politico-military issues. Among

its most important tasks are the negotiation

and adoption of politically binding deci-

sions in the area of arms control and confi-

dence- and security-building measures

(CSBMs), as well as ensuring compliance

with the commitments entered into in this

area by the OSCE participating States.

Promoting the effectiveness of the OSCE

has traditionally been one of the priorities

of Swiss foreign policy. With its approach

of co-operative and comprehensive security

and its commitment to inclusive dialogue,

At the 881st meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security-Cooperation, CSS Senior Researcher Christian

Nünlist (r.) presents new ideas for arms control (25 April 2018).

Micky Kroell / OSCE

the OSCE reflects essential elements of

Switzerland’s foreign policy strategy. Since

July 2017, Swiss Ambassador Thomas Gr-

eminger has headed the organization as

OSCE Secretary General. His election can

be seen as a sign of appreciation within the

OSCE for Switzerland’s constructive role

in the world’s largest regional security or-

ganization and its 57 participating States,

including the US and Russia.

Switzerland sees itself as a bridge-builder

in the struggle between Russia and the

West over the future European order. Swit-

zerland supports both the OSCE’s crisis

management in the Ukraine Crisis and a

dialogue on core issues of European secu-

rity, including an eventual re-launch of

conventional arms control in Europe. Swit-

zerland is also committed to better imple-

mentation of the OSCE’s existing arms

control acquis and a modernization of CS-

BMs. These were agreed in the Vienna

Document and include the exchange of in-

formation on armed forces, defense plan-

ning and expenditure, prior notification

about major military exercises, and onsite

verification.

OSCE, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 7: The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

CSS Analyses

in Security Policy

No. 237, December 2018

How the FSC Works

Since 1992, the FSC has consisted of the

Vienna-accredited delegations of the

OSCE participating States, represented by

diplomats and/or military advisers. Swit-

zerland has already held the FSC Chair-

manship four times, most recently in

2001 – 02, when it was still rotated in

monthly intervals. The current four-month

rotation principle was only introduced in

February 2002 and allows the setting of

priorities. In 2019, Switzerland will assume

the modern, longer FSC Chairmanship for

the first time. Switzerland now wants to

skillfully set priorities and strengthen coor-

dination with subsequent chairs.

In the FSC, as in all OSCE forums, all 57

participating States have equal rights. Deci-

sions are always taken by consensus, giving

every OSCE participating State a veto

right. This often makes the decision-mak-

ing process difficult and time-consuming,

but consensual decisions, once taken, have

great legitimacy. The work of the chairman-

ship is supported by the “FSC Troika”, con-

sisting of the current FSC chair, the prede-

cessor, and the successor. Switzerland will

therefore be engaged in the FSC for a full

year. The Troika sets the agenda and ensures

the continued work of the FSC through

joint coordination. For its part, the Troika is

supported by the OSCE Secretariat.

Which country will take over the chair

from Switzerland in April 2019 is current-

ly still open. It would be Tajikistan’s turn,

followed by the Czech Republic, Turkmen-

istan, and Turkey. Tajikistan has not yet

made a definitive statement on whether it

OSCE Participating States and OSCE Partner States (2018)

for the CSCE/OSCE. After the end of the

Cold War, pan-European ideas of inclu-

sive, cooperative security with Russia in-

vigorated the CSCE. The semi-permanent

conference marathon was re-established as

an organization at the end of 1994 – the

OSCE.

Five negotiated normative basic documents

stand out in the 25-year history of the

FSC.

Firstly,

a “Code of Conduct on Polit-

ico-Military Aspects of Security” was ad-

opted in December 1994. It is regarded as

one of the OSCE’s landmark documents.

The Code of Conduct deals with the de-

fense policy of the participating States even

in peacetime and obliges them to cooperate

in security policy, to establish and maintain

democratic control of the armed forces and

to observe obligations under in-

ternational law (such as the

proportionality of the use of

force to the fulfilment of inter-

nal security tasks). Despite hav-

ing solemnly subscribed to the

Code of Conduct in Budapest

in December 1994, Russia’s deployment of

its armed forces in Chechnya massively vi-

olated the Code just a few days later. This

shows that it is very difficult for the OSCE

to enforce CSMBs against major powers.

Secondly,

the “Catalogue of Stabilizing

Measures for Localized Crisis Situations”

adopted in 1993 has been recalled more

frequently in OSCE circles in recent years,

as the document offers an interesting start-

ing point for “status-neutral arms control”

(i.e., mechanisms that can be applied even

in controversial territories such as Crimea).

Regarding potential conflict parties, the

document states: “If these parties are not

states, their status will not be affected by

their identification and subsequent partici-

pation in the prevention, management

and/or resolution of the crisis”. The docu-

ment is not very well known, but actually

contains useful confidence-building ideas

for current conflicts, even though the cata-

log has so far never been used in practice.

The document also covers irregular forces,

non-state actors, and intra-state conflicts –

and is therefore potentially suitable for

modern, hybrid wars. States and non-state

conflict parties, regardless of their status,

could partner in arms control measures if

all sides agree.

Thirdly,

after the Dayton Agreement, dis-

cussions on regional arms control under

the auspices of the FSC in January 1996

led to the “Agreement on Confidence

Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. As a

result, a large number of weapons systems

were destroyed, and confidence was re-

stored through arms control measures in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. A verification proto-

col was inspired by the Treaty on Conven-

tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and

in some cases even went beyond it. The

treaty established a military balance of

power between the countries and set upper

limits for heavy weapons. The OSCE thus

positioned itself at the regional level as a

successful arms control agency. It might be

possible to build on this model today in the

Baltic States or the Black Sea – two regions

that have been at the center of rearmament

and military maneuvers since 2014 and

could therefore benefit from CSBMs and

regional arms control.

Fourth,

an OSCE Document on Small

Arms and Light Weapons (2000) and an

Switzerland supports

a dialogue on core issues

of European security.

plans to carry out this task. This is rather an

exception, because the vast majority of

states, including small states, normally do

so. The Czech Republic is working with

two scenarios: Either it will assume the

chairmanship in April 2019 directly after

Switzerland, or it will do so later in the fall

of 2019. Since Turkmenistan has not yet is-

sued an official statement either, Turkey

could assume the chairmanship as early as

autumn 2019.

Innovative Ideas

The FSC began its work in Vienna on

22 September 1992 as an integral part of

the CSCE. The 1990s were dynamic years

OSCE, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 7: The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

CSS Analyses

in Security Policy

No. 237, December 2018

OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Con-

ventional Ammunition (2003) were adopt-

ed. Small arms, light weapons, and surplus

conventional ammunition – mostly relics

from the Cold War – pose a significant

threat to the population, infrastructure,

and environment. Among other things,

these documents have helped to destroy

stocks of

mélange,

a highly toxic rocket fuel,

in Albania and Ukraine.

Fifth,

the regular modernizations of the

Vienna Document – in 1992, 1994, 1999,

and lastly in 2011 – were also highlights of

the FSC’s history. The 1990 Vienna Docu-

ment is the most important CSBM in the

OSCE area. The politically binding agree-

ment provides for the exchange and verifi-

cation of information on armed forces and

military activities.

This brief overview shows that the FSC ex-

perienced its most dynamic phase in the

first ten years after its establishment. Since

2004, similar highlights have failed to ma-

terialize. The importance of arms control

diminished dramatically in the 21st centu-

ry until the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis

in 2014.

War of Words in Vienna

One of the greatest problems is the delib-

erate political linking of arms control with

totally unrelated issues. Individual OSCE

participating States can thus abuse the

consensus principle and the de-facto right

of veto of any delegation to hijack issues

such as the modernization of existing re-

gimes. Since 1999, territorial conflicts in

the Southern Caucasus have blocked the

adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new reali-

ties, such as NATO’s admission of former

Warsaw Pact states.

This pattern has been repeated since the

outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis, including

in the FSC. The US, Canada, the UK, and

other transatlantic-oriented OSCE partic-

ipating States as well as Ukraine are basi-

cally unwilling to enter into any substantial

negotiations with Russia until Moscow re-

verses the annexation of the Crimea and

withdraws militarily from Eastern Ukraine.

Paradoxically, however, the Ukrainian Cri-

sis has also highlighted the need to adapt

Cold War regimes to the conflicts of the

21st century. Since 2014, military issues

such as doctrine developments, percep-

tions, and the need for verifiable transpar-

ency have been raised more frequently in

the FSC and since 2017 in the OSCE’s

“Structured Dialogue” on core issues of

European security.

In general, the Ukraine Crisis is both a

“curse and a blessing” for the OSCE, as

Thomas Greminger noted back in 2014.

On the one hand, the war in Ukraine has

led to a “war of words” in the OSCE fo-

rums. The tone has intensified and the dis-

cussions within the “OSCE family” are in-

creasingly tough and uncompromising. The

fronts are clearly defined. Every Wednes-

day, the FSC discusses the Ukrainian con-

flict. The debates have become a ritual.

First, the Ukrainian representative presents

in detail all recent military incidents for

which Kiev holds Russia responsible. Then

the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU take

the floor and signal their support for Kiev

and demand that Russia should comply

with the Minsk agreements, return the

Crimea, and withdraw from the Donbass.

The Russian representative then explains

the Russian view of the conflict. This is far

from the constructive dialogue the FSC

experienced in the 1990s. The fronts are

hardened, and it has become extremely dif-

ficult to build consensus. But the OSCE

still remains the best multilateral frame-

work for finding political solutions, where

necessary. Contacts are maintained in the

corridors of the

Hofburg,

and informal dis-

cussions are held during breaks.

On the other hand, the FSC has also expe-

rienced a kind of comeback since 2014. The

variability of the FSK and the states’ inter-

est in the forum have increased significant-

ly. However, the OSCE – like its predeces-

sor, the CSCE – was originally more a

community of interests than values. Differ-

ent values and worldviews have always

clashed, and the great achievement of the

OSCE has always been to find common,

sustainable solutions to pressing security

policy challenges in Europe by consensus.

Swiss Chairmanship 2019

16.01.2019

Opening session

23.01.2019

Private military and security

companies

30.01.2019

Small Arms and Light Weapons /

Conventional Ammunition I

06.02.2019

Aspects of modern warfare

13.02.2019

Vienna Document 2011

20.02.2019

European Security

27.02.2019

Annual Implementation

Assessment Meeting (AIAM)

06.03.2019

Regional CSBMs

13.03.2019

SALW / SAC II

20.03.2019

Security Sector Governance and

Reform

27.03.2019

Women, Peace, Security

03.04.2019

Code of Conduct

10.04.2019

Closing session

ternational legal obligations of PMSC in

armed conflicts. The topic is now to be dis-

cussed more prominently in the OSCE

and existing commitments, including the

1994 Code of Conduct, are to be better

implemented.

Secondly,

Switzerland is organizing two

meetings on small arms and light weapons

(SALW) and conventional ammunition –

one of the few dynamic areas in the

OSCE’s politico-military dimension that

continues to function even in a tense geo-

political environment. The OSCE supports

participating states with financial or tech-

nical assistance and expertise and imple-

ments between 10 and 20 projects each

year, mostly in cooperation with OSCE

field missions in Southeastern Europe,

Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and in the

Southern Caucasus.

Thirdly,

a security dialogue will address the

issue of “modern warfare aspects”. Rapidly

evolving technology and the resulting con-

stantly changing doctrines of armed forces

and security forces also call into question

the applicability of OSCE instruments.

Furthermore, the topic will be examined

from an international law perspective.

Fourthly,

a joint meeting of the FSC and

the Permanent Council of OSCE Ambas-

sadors was originally planned for the

“Structured Dialogue” (SD) on politico-

military issues launched in 2016/17. An

initiative by the then German foreign min-

ister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to revitalize

conventional arms control in Europe had,

contrary to expectations and despite great

skepticism on the part of both the US and

Swiss Priorities for 2019

Switzerland is tasked with chairing 13 of-

ficial meetings of the FSC between 16 Jan-

uary and 10 April 2019, every Wednesday

morning, and to find the most constructive

aspects possible on classic FSC issues (see

box). Switzerland plans to use the Chair-

manship to focus on six themes.

First,

it devotes a security dialogue to the

issue of outsourcing parts of the state mo-

nopoly on the use of force to private sector

actors and related challenges. To address

the growing influence of private military

security companies (PMSC), Switzerland,

together with the ICRC, launched an ini-

tiative in 2006 that led to the Montreux

Document (2008), the first international

document to provide an overview of the in-

OSCE, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 7: The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

CSS Analyses

in Security Policy

No. 237, December 2018