FOU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 46: Materiale til brug for foretræde 22/1-19 om våbeneksport, fra Oxfam IBIS

Forsvarsudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
FOU Alm.del Bilag 46
Offentligt

JANUARY 2019

OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE

EFFECTIVE DANISH ENGAGEMENT

Foretræde for FOU, Oxfam IBIS

Oxfam IBIS seeks to provide a foretræde briefing on the topic of “Oppor-

tunities for more effective Danish engagement in conflict and fragile

stings”.

The

briefing

will

have

two

focus

areas.

1) Examining comparative approaches to military export control and op-

portunities for strengthening Parliamentary and Ministerial oversight in

this regard. Such options include strengthening end-user documentation

and approval, establishing a list of countries eligible to receive Danish

military exports, transferring decision-making power and licensing author-

ity to Ministerial level, and strengthening Parliamentary oversight and

review of transfers and policy. The document in Annex 1 provides further

details. This will also examine areas where existing Danish law can be

further strengthened in line with the EU Common Positions on Military

Exports.

2) Ways in which Denmark can more effectively and coherently engage

in conflict and fragile settings, including through greater emphasis and

support to civilian-led peacebuilding. This portion of the briefing will pre-

sent empirical argument highlighting the cost-effectiveness and sustaina-

bility of such approaches, as opposed to sole focus on military-led re-

sponses to stabilization. This portion of the briefing will draw attention to

the changing nature of conflict, while also highlighting practical steps that

be taken by Denmark to adapt its existing foreign policy instruments to be

able to effectively address the underlying causes of conflict. The docu-

ment in Annex 2 provides further details.

Contact Information:

Alex Shoebridge

Peacebuilding Advisor, Oxfam IBIS

[email protected]

91526562

www.oxfamibis.dk

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ANNEX 1: ARMS CONTROL IN

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Based on a comparison of European countries policies and practices on

military exports, the following options could be appropriate to pursue in

the Danish context:

1. Strengthening end-user documentation and approval:

As a general rule, license applications to export Danish products to EU

and NATO countries do not require information on re-export. With regard

to licenses to export to other countries (not EU nor NATO member

states), the permission is assessed on a case-by-case basis. In Sweden,

an end-user certificate or an own production declaration should normally

be presented in connection with exports of military equipment, regardless

of destination. In situations where end-user re-exports are unauthorized,

ongoing trade with such partners is considered ineligible.

Denmark follows a different licensing procedure depending on whether

exports are intended for other EU member states, for seven countries

closely related to Denmark, or for other countries. At present, the Ministe-

rial decision regarding sales to KSA and UAE appears to only relate to

direct sales, and not those whereby technology provided by Danish com-

panies is integrated into other military products or technologies and then

sold on to KSA and UAE by a third country/ company. This loophole

would need to be addressed if the decision is to have any meaningful

impact. The Weapons and Explosives Act does not list the conditions for

an export license to be granted or any particular set of countries to which

Danish products may or may not be exported. There had been a practice

not to grant to countries involved in armed conflicts or to areas with such

a level of unrest and instability, but this is not written into law.

The fact that end user documentation is not required is a gap which al-

lows Danish companies to have export deals with EU and NATO-based

manufacturers regardless of whether those same companies will inte-

grate Danish company components into products subsequently exported

to countries in violation of Danish law (and the EU Common Position). At

present, there is no requirement for companies to document their value-

chain (either in terms of procurement nor in terms of onward sales), de-

spite the fact that this information is maintained by companies them-

selves. Comprehensive assessment of the situation in the recipient coun-

try or region but also in terms of previous license applications for the

same end-user or destination in different product categories should be

conducted. In addition, there should be greater transparency and docu-

mentation around end-user and re-export. In Sweden, licenses have

been revoked on the basis of details emerging regarding diversion to

end-users that have violated human rights. Under Danish law it is possi-

ble to revoke already granted licenses but this is rarely done. This should

also consider the business conducted by subsidiary companies to Danish

firms which may be registered outside of Denmark.

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3. Transferring decision-making power to the Ministerial level:

In Norway, particularly sensitive cases are presented to the Secretary of

State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the final decision about an ex-

port. In Denmark, several Government units and agencies are involved in

military exports. The Ministry of Justice administers the export control

legislation in relation to arms and war material, and is also the main li-

censing authority.

Permission for export of weapons and related equipment falling under the

Arms Act is to be requested from the Ministry of Justice. The final deci-

sion to approve or deny a license is taken by the Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs after considering relevant foreign and security factors and taking into

account Denmark’s international commitments. In general, few denials

are issued, largely due to pre-authorization consultations.

Erhvervsstyrelsens is the authority in charge of the administration of the

international export control on dual-use products and works in close co-

ordination with MoJ and MFA on matters related to exports of military

equipment. The current system is quite informal and, given the nature of

the relationships between the MoJ, MoD, and Danish military export

companies, results in a lack of transparency and allows the Ministries

involved to defer or deflect in situations where questions are raised.

4. Strengthening Parliamentary oversight:

There are different options for strengthening parliamentary involved in

reviewing and influencing arms trade policy and practice. This includes

establishing dedicated parliamentary bodies either to approve (or con-

tribute to the approval process) such deals, or to review already ap-

proved deals. Sweden’s system revolves around the pre-approval

stage,

with the Parliament holding regular briefings on export controls, and there

is a practice of consulting it in cases that have specific foreign policy or

principal importance. The Swedish Government also provides support to

the independent oversight agency in the form of a parliamentary over-

sight body called the Export Control Council, set up in the 1980s to in-

crease transparency and consultation on matters relating to exports of

military equipment. All political parties are represented and it is chaired

by the ISP Director-General. However, it has never recommended to

refuse a license, the independent agency is in fact partly funded by the

arms industry, and the highly confidential nature of the Committee’s pre-

approval process ultimately silences any public debate.

Conversely, the UK’s joint committee (the Committees on Arms Export

Controls, or CAEC) undertakes review of transfers and policy. It is com-

prised of members form the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International De-

velopment and International Trade Select Committees. It launches en-

quiries, takes written and oral evidence (from us, and also from govern-

ment ministers) and produces reports, the conclusions and recommenda-

tion of which the government is obliged to give substantive written an-

swers. It has no executive power; it cannot compel the government to

act, and is very much dependent on the individuals involved in driving the

agenda forward.

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ANNEX 2: PEACEBUILDING POLICY

PRIORITIES FOR OXFAM IBIS

This note presents the rationale and policy priorities for Denmark’s en-

gagement on peacebuilding from the perspective of Oxfam IBIS. Through

the Strategic Partnership with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Oxfam IBIS is currently engaged in peacebuilding efforts in a number of

fragile and conflict-affected contexts, ranging from South Sudan to the

Sahel, as well as the Middle East and North Africa. Oxfam IBIS peace-

building work spans both policy and advocacy initiatives, as well as more

programmatic activities centered on increasing the meaningful engage-

ment of women and young people in peacemaking and peacebuilding

processes at regional, national, and local levels. As stated in Oxfam IBIS

strategy for 2019 to 2021, we will address causes of conflict in fragile and

conflict affected contexts and promote right and inclusion of particularly

women and youth. We focus primarily on inequality - and here it applies

to all inequality dimensions - political, economic and social inequality

(gender, youth, ethnic, social, religious groups, etc.). In this way, we draw

on the work of Oxfam IBIS and the broader confederation on issues re-

lated to inequality, while seeking to ensure that all we do is geared to-

wards addressing various inequalities as structural causes of violence.

Policy Priorities

Critically Reassessing Denmark’s stabilization approach:

Reduc-

ing violence does not lead to long-term peace, nor do security and mili-

tary-led responses create the conditions for sustainable development

and the fulfilment of human rights. For example, research from UNDP

and International Alert suggests that abuse by state security forces is

one of the primary drivers for individuals joining non-state armed

groups in the Sahel. On the contrary, there is little evidence to suggest

that military and security led approaches are successful in ensuring

longer-term stability and peace. This is also the case regarding Den-

mark’s engagement

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and, more recently, in the

Sahel. With the resources allocated for global peacebuilding dwarfed

in comparison and with current security-focused stabilization respons-

es seemingly found wanting as the number and extent of conflicts spi-

rals, one could reasonably ask whether it is time to shift the balance,

and to bolster peacebuilding efforts both in their own right and as a

complement to stabilization instruments. Danish military expenditure

has increased both in real and proportional terms and Denmark is up-

ping its engagement in the G5 in the Sahel despite limited material and

sustained impact. As such, there is an important and timely opportunity

to critically reflect on Denmark’s stabilization approach as it has been

adopted over the past two decades.

Aligning Humanitarian and Development Policy with the ‘Sustain-

ing Peace’ agenda:

The UN’s engagement in fragile and conflict-

affected countries is increasingly geared towards ‘sustaining peace’

leveraging its various humanitarian and development efforts in a way

FOU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 46: Materiale til brug for foretræde 22/1-19 om våbeneksport, fra Oxfam IBIS

that tries to address the structural causes of conflict/ fragility. This ap-

proach notes that while humanitarian assistance remains critical in

many contexts, we must go beyond

‘band aid’ solutions. Sweden has

complement to stabilization instruments. Danish military expenditure

has increased both in real and proportional terms and Denmark is up-

ping its engagement in the G5 in the Sahel despite limited material and

sustained impact. As such, there is an important and timely opportunity

to critically reflect on Denmark’s stabilization approach as it has been

adopted over the past two decades.

3. Gearing Danish Embassies to engage and support local peace-

building efforts:

Many Danish Embassies possess funding envelopes

which can be directed to various humanitarian and development activi-

ties, upon the Embassy’s discretion. In fragile and conflict-affected

con-

texts, this support is rarely directed towards supporting local peacebuild-

ing efforts. Instead, local actors with peacebuilding expertise are too of-

ten asked to adapt their work to fit into a “preventing/countering violent

extremism” framing, which has proven to present more risks than oppor-

tunities. In an effort to address this gap, Danish Embassies in fragile and

conflict-affected

contexts could be mandated to ensure a “peacebuilding

funding window”

in any country-level

administered funding mechanism.

Conflict trends

฀

There is growing correlation between poverty and conflict. By 2030,

90 percent of global poverty will be concentrated in fragile and con-

flict-affected contexts;

60 percent of violent conflicts take place in countries who have previ-

ously experienced civil conflict, with a growing proportion of conflict

taking place in Middle Income Countries;

The average length of a civil conflict is now 15 years. This has result-

ed in over 65 million displaced persons, the vast majority of whom

can be linked to the same 10 conflicts since 1991. The majority of

displaced persons are consistently hosted by the same 15 countries,

those neighboring conflict-affected countries;

At present there is the highest number of “spillover” and proxy con-

flicts since World War 2;

80 percent of humanitarian crises relate to conflict, with 60 percent of

acute hunger primarily driven by conflict;

Inequality spikes during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict,

deeply tied to issues such as state/elite capture, corruption, and the

war economy. With 60 percent of conflicts taking place in countries

that have already experienced violent conflict, this suggests that mul-

tiple episodes of conflict may also lead to compounding and increas-

ing inequalities over time. Inequality is not just an economic term, but

can relate to broader manifestations of marginalization. Here again,

there is a direct link to conflict and instability;

฀

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฀

While a very small percentage of young people are directly engaged

or mobilized in violence, youth in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

experience many types of marginalization and inequality. More than

600 million youth live in fragile and conflict-affected countries and ter-

ritories

. More than half of the world’s 25.4 million refugees are under

the age of 18. Only a third of secondary school ages refugees are en-

rolled in school, and less than 1 percent of refugee youth have ac-

cess to post-secondary education. In conflict-affected contexts a

young person’s opportunities to access education and prospect for

livelihoods and engagement across social, political, cultural, and

economic life are drastically reduced. Young girls and women are

more likely to face situations of early and forced marriage.

Peacebuilding is cost-effective:

฀

A growing body of research points to the cost-effectiveness of

peacebuilding when compared to the economic costs of conflict. The

Institute for Economics and Peace finds that the cost-effectiveness

ratio of peacebuilding is 1:16, meaning that for every $1 spent on

peacebuilding, $16 is saved in the costs of post-conflict recovery or

GDP lost during a conflict. The UN and World bank have estimated

that investing in prevention and peacebuilding can save at least USD

5 billion in a pessimistic scenario (where the costs of peacebuilding

are high, and the costs of damage low) which goes up to USD 70 bil-

lion in a more optimistic scenario;

At the same time, the costs of conflict globally are extremely high.

The International Peace Institute estimates global economic losses in

2016 to amount to USD 1.4 trillion. In the same year, world military

spending reached USD 1.69 trillion, accounting for 2.2 percent of

global GDP and marking an increase by 0.4 percent from 2015

. In

comparison, only USD 21.6 billion was allocated to peacekeeping

and peacebuilding activities during that year (with USD 8.3 billion go-

ing to peacekeeping alone)

. In this context, it is clear that the domi-

nant response to violent conflict is to further bolster military expendi-

tures.

฀

Peacebuilding works when there is a long-term commitment to ad-

dressing root causes:

฀

Security-focused approaches are not only ineffective, they are coun-

terproductive especially in contexts where security actors have lim-

ited credibility amongst local populations and have themselves been

responsible for committing human rights violations. A recent study

from UNDP shows that exposure to police abuse or injustice is

among the key factors in spurring individuals to join extremist groups.

SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-

military-spending/military-expenditure

Institute for International Peace,

https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/07/peacebuilding-

expenditure-united-nations-sustaining-peace/

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฀

Research by the UN and the World Bank identifies three key charac-

teristics of successful prevention and peacebuilding efforts, including:

i) nationally led and addressing underlying causes of violent conflict

(which in many cases relates to various horizontal inequalities); ii)

there were targeted efforts to address issues related to power, ser-

vices, security, and resources; and iii) sustained peace does not nec-

essarily follow from economic and income growth alone.

Of the many existing inequalities exacerbated by conflict, access to

education is particularly affected. In conflict-affected contexts, young

people’s literacy rates are significantly

lower, government spending

on education is reduced, and school completion is more than 20 per-

cent less than in stable contexts. With education serving as a key

‘equalizer’ within a society, research has shown that greater inequali-

ty in educational attainment increases the likelihood of violent conflict.

The prospects for women and girls in accessing and completing edu-

cation are often particularly affected in such contexts.

฀