Færøudvalget 2018-19 (1. samling)
FÆU Alm.del Bilag 10
Offentligt
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SUB-SOVEREIGN
CREDIT OPINION
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands
Update to credit analysis
Summary
The credit profile of the
Government of Faroe Islands (Aa3, stable)
reflects its fiscal
autonomy resulting in a high level of revenue and expense flexibility combined with a track
record of prudent budgeting. The stable and historical relationship with the
Government of
Denmark (Aaa, stable),
with joint matters clearly defined under the 1948 Home Rule Act,
is also credit positive. While the Faroese economy has a high dependence on the fishing
industry, this is somewhat offset by regular fish stock control and a push to diversify the
country's trade partners. The rating also takes into account the government's very strong
liquidity buffer, which mitigates refinancing risk. Debt metrics are on a moderate level but
declining.
Exhibit 1
RATINGS
Faroe Islands, Government of
Domicile
Long Term Rating
Type
Outlook
Denmark
Aa3
LT Issuer Rating - Fgn
Curr
Stable
Please see the
ratings section
at the end of this report
for more information. The ratings and outlook shown
reflect information as of the publication date.
Financial surplus to be reported
Contacts
Harald Sperlein
+49.69.7073.0906
VP-Senior Analyst
[email protected]
Joe Griffin
+44.207.772.1098
Associate Analyst
[email protected]
Sebastien Hay
+34.91.768.8222
Senior Vice President/Manager
[email protected]
CLIENT SERVICES
Americas
Asia Pacific
Japan
EMEA
1-212-553-1653
852-3551-3077
81-3-5408-4100
44-20-7772-5454
Gross operating balance and financing result (in DKK million)
Gross operating balance (in DKK mn.)
1500
Financing result (surplus or deficit) (in DKK mn.)
1000
500
0
-500
-1000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018p
2019b
Note: 2018 is preliminary data (Moody's adjusted); 2019 shows budget data
Source: Gjaldstovan; Moody's Investors Service,
Credit strengths
»
»
»
Fiscal autonomy and flexibility allow for reform implementation
Stable relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark
Financing surpluses and large liquidity buffer
Credit challenges
»
»
»
Faroese economy's dependence on fishing and fish farming sector
Moderate debt levels and some off-balance liabilities
Some refinancing risk due to debt structure
FÆU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 10: Indberetning nr. 2/2019 fra Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, inkl. rapport fra det økonomiske analyseinstitut Moody’s.
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Rating outlook
The outlook is stable. This reflects the successful implementation of a long term deficit reduction plan, improved macroeconomic
metrics and a stable relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark.
Factors that could lead to an upgrade
A combination of the following could have positive rating implications: 1) a return to long-term structurally balanced budgets; 2) a
steady reduction in debt to pre-recession levels; or 3) a reduced reliance on short-term borrowing.
Factors that could lead to a downgrade
One or a combination of the following could have negative rating implications: 1) a weakening of the Faroe Islands' relationship with
Denmark; 2) an adverse shock impacting the Faroese fishing industry; and 3) a materially increased debt level or guarantees above
current projections.
Key indicators
Exhibit 2
Faroe Islands, Government of
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018p
Net direct and indirect debt / operating revenue (%)
Gross interest expenses / operating revenue (%)
Gross operating balance / operating revenue (%)
Cash financing surplus (requirement) / total revenue (%)
Intergovernmental revenues / total revenue (%)
104.6%
1.8%
1.4%
-3.8%
12.7%
107.2%
1.6%
4.1%
-1.2%
14.0%
99.8%
0.9%
6.4%
2.8%
14.5%
97.9%
1.1%
11.4%
7.3%
10.0%
89.7%
0.3%
8.5%
2.6%
9.5%
Note: 2018 is preliminary data.
Source: Issuer, Moody's Investors Service; Moody's adjusted figures
Detailed credit considerations
The credit profile of the Faroe Islands, as expressed in an Aa3 stable rating, combines (1) a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of a2, and
(2) a strong likelihood of extraordinary support coming from the Government of Denmark (Aaa, stable) in the event that the entity
faced acute liquidity stress.
Baseline credit assessment
Fiscal autonomy and flexibility allow for reform implementation
The Faroe Islands consist of 18 islands located in the Atlantic Ocean, between Scotland and Iceland with a population of slightly above
51,000 inhabitants. While part of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands are governed by the Home Rule Act, which gives the
Faroese government full powers and flexibility to set its tax rates and fees. This broad control over revenue supports Faroese financial
flexibility; approximately 90% of the Faroese government's operating revenues are derived from sources under its control. The Kingdom
of Denmark provides an annual block grant of around DKK 0.7 billion which accounts for about 10% of the Faroes' operating revenues.
This grant is for “Joint Matters” that have not been transferred to Faroese control. The grant is intended and indeed is spent on social
welfare, schools and health sectors, though the Faroese government does maintain freedom over how the grant is used. The Faroese
government has in the past implemented substantial cuts in spending when required. Unemployment in the Faroe Islands is currently
very low at well below 2%, edging below the Danish national average since the end of 2013. The choice of expansionary spending was
effective at stimulating the Faroese economy. More recently, as the Faroese economy has entered a stage of recovery with dynamic
real GDP growth
1
of favorable 5% in 2017. GDP per capita has improved substantially and has surpassed the Danish GDP per capita in
2017 (see Exhibit 3) and is expected to have done so in 2018.
This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on
www.moodys.com for the most updated credit rating action information and rating history.
2
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
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Exhibit 3
Faroese GDP per capita exceeded Danish GDP per capita since 2016
Nominal GDP per capita in DKK thousands, by year
500
Denmark
400
300
200
Faroe Islands
100
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
GDP per capita for the Faroe Islands for 2014-2017 are estimates
Source: Statistics Denmark, Hagstova Foroya (Statistics Faroe Islands)
The government has pledged to deliver certain reforms, including fishing and pension reforms that will enhance and sustain the
government's long term public finances.
The fishing reform was recently implemented, with the Act on the Management of Marine Resources, which was approved by
parliament on 18th December 2017, aiming to foster sustainable management of fisheries, including legal and administrative
frameworks to promote equal rights and wider access to the fish stock while increasing government revenue (see also:
Fishing Policy
Reform - Issuer In-Depth Report, published October 2018).
In addition, pension reforms aim to control public pension liabilities in the medium and long run. All citizens have to pay a certain
percentage of their income into a pension scheme. Contributions will increase every year by 1% until 2026. This means that by 2026,
all citizens will pay at least 12% of their income into a pension scheme
2
, helping reduce the public pension liability. The government's
pension reform also includes an increase to the retirement age (up to 68 in 2030) as well (currently at 67 years). Beyond 2030,
retirement age is planned to further increase with life expectancy, up to the retirement age of 70 years in 2050.
The Faroe Islands are discussing tax reform and are considering municipal reforms. The islands' 29 municipalities vary widely in terms
of size, from fewer than 50 inhabitants to approximately 20,000. Municipalities vary also widely in terms of financial strength, with
stronger ones including Klaksvikar and Torshavnar. Tax reform and a financial equalisation system similar to that seen in other Nordic
countries could be credit positive
3
.
Stable relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark
Although there were discussions about a referendum, we do not see that the current government will put this forward. We understand
that based on what has been discussed so far, there is not a concern about a material change in the relationship with Denmark. The last
general elections held in September 2015 resulted in a Social Democrat led coalition, which sees the link with Denmark as favourable
and public debate surrounding the topic has slowed down. The next election is in August 2019.
The Faroese relationship with Denmark is stable. In 1948, the Faroe Islands were granted Home Rule, and in 2005 it gained further
authority over matters described below. The Faroese control “Special Matters” covering the economy, finances (independence to raise
taxes), industry, foreign trade, mineral rights, and the education system
4
. “Joint Matters” are administered by the Danish government
according to the laws of the Kingdom of Denmark, although some may be wholly or partly assigned to the Faroe Islands, or undertaken
by Danish and Faroese authorities jointly. Currently, matters under the Danish realm comprise the police force, judicial system and
banking supervision.The Faroe Islands elect their own parliament (Lagtinget) and the islands are governed by the Faroese government
(Landsstyret), which is responsible for their own finances. In addition, the Faroe Islands have two seats in the Danish parliament, which
historically have had some influence in Danish politics, particularly in parliaments with thin majorities.
3
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
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Financing surpluses and large liquidity buffer
Based on preliminary figures, the Faroe Islands have reported a favorable gross operating surplus of DKK613 million in 2018, compared
to DKK834 million in 2017. This operating balance amounts to roughly 10% relative to operating revenues, a positive development of
results and considerable improvement from a few years earlier. Given strong operating performance, the government could easily cover
capital expenses and finally report considerable financial surplusses. In 2018, we expect a financing surplus of DKK192 million, which
is DKK500 million lower than the government reported surplus. This is explained by an adjustment made to capital expenses, which
included the write-off of a loan granted by the Danish government. The 2017 financing surplus was DKK537 million (see Exhibit 1).
The rapid improvement of financial performance was the result of dynamic tax revenue growth but also some measures on the
expenditure side of the budget. Meanwhile, the government seeks to cut capital expenditures, following the end of its 2011-2016 fiscal
deficit reduction programme. For 2019, government budget foresees an outcome at slightly above 2018, which we view as realistic (see
Exhibit 1).
The Faroe Islands have a large liquidity reserve, amounting to DKK3.7 billion as of end December 2018 (compared to DKK3.4 billion
in Dec. 2017), which is well above the internal minimum liquidity threshold of DKK2.8 billion. According to internal best practice, this
reserve is only to be used during times of heightened market stress - if the reserve is drawn upon and drops below 15% of GDP, it is
expected to be addressed and again reach internal limits during the next borrowing round. The 2018 liquidity reserve represented
nearly 20% of Faroese GDP. The reserve amount exceeds necessary borrowing requirements in any single year and this mitigates the
refinancing risk associated with their reliance on short term borrowing (see section below). The liquidity pool is sufficient to cover
scheduled debt repayments for the next two years. We expect the government to use its excess liquidity (i.e. above 15%-threshold) to
pay down a part of the DKK1.1 bn. maturing bond in 2019 an only refinance the remaining amount. The fund is invested in a portfolio of
highly rated securities with investments being spread across various assets classes with defined limits in order to maximise the returns.
At least 70% of the total liquidity pool is invested in Aaa-rated securities.
Faroese economy's dependence on fishing and fish farming sector
The Faroese economy continues to rely on the fishing industry with fishing accounting for around 20% of national GDP and for around
95% of total export values of goods. This high exposure introduces economic volatility as the economy is susceptible to exogenous
factors. The variability in fish prices, factor inputs such as oil prices, and the risks of stock depletion would have a direct impact on the
Faroese economy. Over the last years, a combination of high global demand and low oil prices has benefited the Faroese fishing sector,
and indirectly government receipts. In recent years, this has particularly been true for the pelagic and fish farming industries which have
grown substantially and have contributed to the economic growth of the country. However most recently, pelagic fishing quotas are
slightly lower.
On the other hand, the traditional demersal fishing industry (cod, haddock, etc.) has remained stagnant due to low stock levels. Most
recent indicators show however that cod and haddock catches are trending upwards, potentially a result of increasing stocks according
to experts.
To reduce dependencies, the Faroe Islands have also increased trade with non-EU countries, from around one third ten years ago to
more than 50% now. We view the diversification in both fish species and trade partners as a partial mitigant to the concentration risk
as it reduces exposure to species-specific shocks and potential trade sanctions.
Moderate debt levels and some off-balance liabilities
The Faroese government's expansionary fiscal policy following the global financial crisis (2008/2009) has resulted in increased debt
levels. The government largely issued debt to finance large scale infrastructure projects, spending an average of DKK274 million per
year on fixed capital construction between 2012-2017, around 50% higher than the pre-crisis average annual spend of DKK179 million
between 2003-2007. As a result of ongoing financing deficits from 2008 to 2015, net direct and indirect debt as a percentage of
operating revenue was above 100% of operating revenues from 2011 to 2015, but is now on a declining trend.
4
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
FÆU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 10: Indberetning nr. 2/2019 fra Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, inkl. rapport fra det økonomiske analyseinstitut Moody’s.
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Exhibit 4
The Faroese Government's total (direct and indirect) debt portfolio of DKK8.6 billion is made up primarily of direct debt
Total direct and indirect debt in DKK million, 2017
Tunnel debt (indirect debt)
DKK 435
5%
Direct debt: short-term
DKK 833
10%
Municipal debt (self-supporting)
DKK 1,109
13%
Unfunded pension liability
(indirect debt)
DKK 1,038
12%
Direct debt: long-term
DKK 5,144
60%
Note: Tunnel debt and municipal debt is considered self-supporting.
Source: Moody's Investors Service; Issuer
The Faroese government has guaranteed an unfunded pension liability of approximately DKK1 billion under Foroya Livstrygging (LIV)
and this is therefore included in our indirect debt calculations. The previously outlined pension reforms are not expected to impact this
government exposure, which was fully self-funded up to 2008. Since the onset of the financial crisis and the subsequent low interest
rate environment, LIV’s self-funding ratio has fallen below 100%. We will continue to monitor the progress of this off balance sheet
scheme, as it impacts the government's total debt metrics over the long run.
Municipal debt is considered self-supporting as the government does not provide a guarantee on their debt and they may only incur a
total debt burden up to their level of total tax income in any one year.
The Faroese government has provided a minimum revenue guarantee, which exposes the government to construction and operational
risk by underwriting the major infrastructure project that involves two sub-sea tunnels, Eysturoy and Sandoy. The tunnels represent the
biggest infrastructure deal in the history of the Faroe Islands with an expected cost of approximately DKK2.64 billion. (see:
FAQs About
the Sub-Sea Tunnel Plans, Minimum Traffic Guarantee, published 6th March 2017).
The drilling of the Eysturoy tunnel is expected to be
completed in May 2019, which will reduce construction risk.
Despite taking into account the risk of this project during the construction phase, our debt projections now foresee a declining debt
level over the next five years. We treat the debt associated with the tunnel as indirect debt given the government-owned tunnel-
project company and the minimum revenue guarantee. We note the difference in financial viability between the tunnels, with the
future earnings from the Eysturoy tunnel expected to cover the majority of the debt service requirements. The Sandoy tunnel remains
financially non-viable on a standalone basis and once operational will only contribute approximately 10% of total combined income
over the next 40 years.
Some refinancing risk due to debt structure
The Faroe Islands historically had a relatively high share of short-term borrowing. In 2017, the Faroe Islands refinanced at very low
interest rate (on average below 1%) a maturing DKK1 billion loan with long-term new loans
5
, which we consider to be credit positive, as
it reduces the exposure to interest risk. The government also has rolling short-term creditor debt that is repaid each year.
The Faroe Islands' average maturity of its outstanding debt is relatively low, at a level we consider exposes the Faroes to have some
refinancing risk. However, this has allowed the Faroe Islands to benefit from the low interest rate environment in the recent past.
Current interest rates are still very low. Mitigating the refinancing risk is the Faroe Islands' liquidity buffer currently at DKK3.7 billion or
close to 20% of GDP, which could cover the scheduled repayments coming due over the next few years. We expect the government to
use its excess liquidity (i.e. above 15%-threshold) to pay down a part of the DKK1.1 bn. maturing bond in 2019 and only refinance the
remaining amount.
5
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
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Extraordinary support considerations
We consider Faroe Islands to have a strong likelihood of extraordinary support from the Kingdom of Denmark. This reflects our
assessment that the current relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark is unlikely to change in the medium-term and the intensive
extraordinary support provided to the islands in response to the financial crisis of the 1990s.
While Denmark has no formal obligation to provide extraordinary support to the Faroe Islands, it has historically supported the Faroese
government on a number of occasions. In the 1990s, the Faroese government borrowed - largely from Denmark, given the scale of
the crisis - in order to fund the nationalisation of Føroya Banki and Sjovinnubankin and to bridge the deficits of the recovery plan were
established, the Faroese began standalone borrowing, ultimately using these and other reforms' funds to repay Denmark. In 2010,
Denmark (through Finansiel Stabilitet) also assumed control over EiK, a failing bank with operations in both the Faroes and the Danish
mainland. This action is consistent with Denmark being responsible for financial regulation (the banking sector). The relationship with
Denmark remains important as a likely source of liquidity support, were independent financing to be tested.
Rating methodology and scorecard factors
The matrix-generated BCA of aa3 reflects (1) an idiosyncratic risk score of 4 (presented below) on a 1 to 9 scale, where 1 represents
the strongest relative credit quality and 9 the weakest; and (2) a systemic risk score of Aaa, as reflected in the Denmark's Aaa stable
sovereign bond rating.
The assigned baseline credit assessment (BCA) of a2 is below the matrix-generated suggested BCA and the two-notch differential
includes an additional factor. This includes the Faroese industry's concentration on the fishing sector and the islands' small population
size limiting revenue generation.
For details about our rating approach, please refer to
Rating Methodology: Regional and Local Governments,
16 January 2018.
Exhibit 5
Government of Faroe Islands
Faroe Islands
Baseline Credit Assessment
Value
Sub-Factor
Score
Sub-Factor
Weighting
Sub-Factor
Total
Factor Weight
Total
Factor 1: Economic Fundamentals
Economic strength
Economic volatility
Factor 2: Institutional Framework
Legislative background
Financial flexibility
Factor 3: Financial Performance and Debt Profile
Gross operating balance / operating revenues (%)
Interest payments / operating revenues (%)
Liquidity
Net direct and indirect debt / operating revenues (%)
Short-term direct debt / total direct debt (%)
Factor 4: Governance and Management
Risk controls and financial management
Investment and debt management
Transparency and disclosure
Idiosyncratic Risk Assessment
Systemic Risk Assessment
Suggested BCA
1
5
1
4.14 (4)
Aaa
aa3
5
30%
1.50
97.9
32.3
8.9
1.1
3
3
1
5
7
12.5%
12.5%
25%
25%
25%
4.0
30%
1.20
1
1
50%
50%
1.0
20%
0.20
99.5
5
9
70%
30%
6.2
20%
1.24
Note: based on 2017 data.
Source: Moody's Investors Service
6
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Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
FÆU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 10: Indberetning nr. 2/2019 fra Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, inkl. rapport fra det økonomiske analyseinstitut Moody’s.
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MOODY'S PUBLIC SECTOR EUROPE
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Ratings
Exhibit 6
Category
FAROE ISLANDS, GOVERNMENT OF
Moody's Rating
Outlook
Issuer Rating
Source: Moody's Investors Service
Stable
Aa3
Endnotes
1
The Faroe Islands do not have a GDP deflator. Instead, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the Faroe Islands is used to calculate real GDP.
2
Those persons who already pay 15% or more of their income into a pension scheme will not be required to pay more than what they already do.
3
See
Nordic Local Governments: Credit quality boosted by support expectation and inherent strengths,
published May 2016.
4
For more information on the division of tasks, see
Delivery of Faroe Islands' Fiscal Plan Supports Creditworthiness,
published July 2015
5
for information on outstanding government bonds, see
http://www.landsbanki.fo/en-gb/liquidity-and-debt/debt/national-treasury-bonds
7
28 February 2019
Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
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Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis
FÆU, Alm.del - 2018-19 (1. samling) - Bilag 10: Indberetning nr. 2/2019 fra Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, inkl. rapport fra det økonomiske analyseinstitut Moody’s.
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Government of Faroe Islands: Update to credit analysis