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IZA DP No. 7096
PAPER
Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
Annabelle Krause
Ulf Rinne
Klaus F. Zimmermann
DISCUSSION
December 2012
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
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Anonymous Job Applications
in Europe
Annabelle Krause
IZA
Ulf Rinne
IZA
Klaus F. Zimmermann
IZA and University of Bonn
Discussion Paper No. 7096
December 2012
IZA
P.O. Box 7240
53072 Bonn
Germany
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Fax: +49-228-3894-180
E-mail: [email protected]
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IZA Discussion Paper No. 7096
December 2012
ABSTRACT
Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
*
Numerous empirical studies find a substantial extent of discrimination in hiring decisions.
Anonymous job applications have gained attention and popularity to identify and combat this
form of discrimination. To test whether their intended effects result in practice, in several
European countries such as Sweden, France and the Netherlands field experiments were
recently conducted. Also in Germany, a large field experiment has examined the practicability
and potentials of this approach. Against the background of the recent German findings as
novel evidence, this paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this new policy
proposal.
JEL Classification:
Keywords:
M51, J71, J78
anonymous job applications, discrimination, hiring
Corresponding author:
Ulf Rinne
IZA
P.O. Box 7240
53072 Bonn
Germany
E-mail:
[email protected]
*
The results of the German experiment have been reported in Krause et al. (2012b). We would like to
thank Martin Kahanec and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
Furthermore, we are grateful to the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, KOWA in Frankfurt/Oder, and
participating organizations for an excellent cooperation during the German experiment. We thank in
particular Ramona Alt, Ferda Ataman, Sebastian Bickerich, Ines Böschen, Jens Büttner, and Christine
Lüders. All remaining errors are our own.
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Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann: Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
1
Introduction
Discrimination is present in many markets around the world. It has, for example,
been documented in a broad range of consumer markets (Yinger, 1998). However,
labor market discrimination has received the most attention, both in the academic
literature as well as in the policy debate. The main focus is on characteristics such as
gender, race and ethnicity, and differences in employment patterns and earnings by
these characteristics that cannot be attributed to other (observable) characteristics.
More recently, an emerging strand of the literature explores the role of “beauty” in
determining labor market outcomes. Attributes such as weight, size or
attractiveness appear to matter for a broad range of labor market outcomes,
including earnings, and are also able to explain sorting behavior into different
occupations (see, e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998).
A crucial dimension of labor market discrimination is the access to jobs. Unequal
access to employment opportunities across population groups has important
implications for the short- and long-term labor market outcomes of individuals who
are affected. Indeed, a large number of empirical studies document a substantial
extent of discrimination in hiring decisions. Examples for such studies that typically
use correspondence tests include Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the United
States, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) for Sweden, and Kaas and Manger (2012) for
Germany. Discrimination in recruitment decisions is a market failure because it
should be in the employers’ own interest to hire the most productive workers—
irrespective of their gender, race or ethnicity.
Anonymous job applications gain attention and popularity as an attractive
policy intervention to reduce or even eliminate discrimination in hiring.
Discrimination becomes impossible if applicants’ characteristics which employers
may discriminate against are unknown and it is not possible to deduce these
characteristics indirectly. However, the concept is not a fundamentally new idea.
Anonymous or “blind” procedures have already been used in other areas. For
example, Blank (1991) analyzes the effects of double-blind and single-blind
reviewing processes at an economic journal. Goldin and Rouse (2000) investigate the
impacts of blind auditions to select members of symphony orchestras. These
experiences show that it is generally possible to decide anonymously.
However, anonymity appears in stark contrast to the zeitgeist. Millions of
individuals increasingly use virtual social networks and similar pages on the internet,
where they provide extensive information about themselves—which is moreover
often publicly available. The amount of information goes even beyond the amount
that is included in very comprehensive application documents. Similarly, in Asian
countries such as South Korea, providing very detailed and extensive information in
application forms is the standard. On the other hand, there are countries like the
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United States where applications include much less information than what is
typically the case in European countries. Hence, any discussion about anonymous
job applications is also related to the question of the optimal amount of information
included in application documents.
This paper contributes to the ongoing and lively debate about anonymous job
applications. Can this instrument prevent employers from hiring discrimination? And
if so, what are the related costs? We first summarize the main findings of
experiments with anonymous job applications in Europe in Section 2 and present
novel empirical results from the recent German experiment in Section 3. Against this
background, we then comprehensively discuss and analyze the potentials and limits
of anonymous job applications in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2
Recent Experiments in European Countries
What are the effects of anonymous job applications on the callback rates of minority
applicants? To answer this question, a number of field experiments have recently
been conducted in European countries, including relatively large-scale experiments
in France, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The French government initiated an experiment in 2010 and 2011 which was
implemented by the French public employment service. It involved about 1,000
firms in eight local labor markets and it lasted in total for about ten months
(Behaghel et al., 2011). The experiments’ main findings can be summarized as
follows. First, women benefit from higher callback rates with anonymous job
applications—at least if they compete with male applicants for a job. However, for
roughly half of the vacancies included in the experiment only female candidates or
only male candidates applied. Second, migrants and residents of deprived
neighborhoods suffer from anonymous job applications. Their callback rates are
lower with anonymous job applications than with standard applications. Third,
recruiters who tend to invite candidates with similar characteristics to them are not
able to continue to do so. This conscious or unconscious behavior of “homophily” is
therefore prevented with anonymous job applications, importantly with persistent
effects in later stages of the recruitment process.
In the Netherlands, two experiments took place in the public administration of
one major Dutch city in 2006 and 2007. The experiments focus on ethnic minorities.
More specifically, a distinction is made between applicants with and without foreign
(i.e., non-Western) sounding names. Bøg and Kranendonk (2011) emphasize in their
study the lower callback rates for minority candidates with standard applications,
but their analysis also reveals that these differences disappear with anonymous job
applications. With regards to job offers, however, the authors do not detect any
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differences between minority and majority candidates—irrespective of whether or
not their resumes are treated anonymously. This indicates that even with standard
applications, discrimination against minorities in interview invitations disappears at
the job offer stage.
Åslund and Nordström Skans (2012) analyze an experiment conducted in parts
of the local administration in the Swedish city of Gothenburg between 2004 and
2006. Based on a difference-in-differences approach, the authors find that
anonymous job applications increase the chances of an interview invitation for both
women and applicants of non-Western origin when compared to standard
applications. These increased chances for minority candidates in the first stage also
translate into a higher job offer arrival rate for women, but not for migrants.
Next to these relatively large-scale experiments, a smaller-scale experiment
provides additional insights on the effects of anonymous job applications. Krause et
al. (2012a) analyze a randomized experiment at a European economic research
institution. Data on interview invitations is empirically analyzed for a particular labor
market of economists who apply for post-doctoral positions. Results indicate that
anonymous job applications are in general not associated with a different invitation
probability. However, whereas female applicants have a higher probability to receive
an invitation than male applicants with standard applications, this difference
disappears with anonymous job applications. The underrepresented gender is thus
hurt by anonymous job applications. Small-scale applications of anonymous job
applications can also be found in other countries such as Switzerland and Belgium.
However, these applications have in common that no rigorous empirical evaluations
are available (yet).
The results on the effects of anonymous job applications from experiments in
Europe are therefore in general encouraging. In most cases, anonymous job
applications lead to the desired effect of increasing the interview invitation
probabilities of disadvantaged groups. However, some results point into the
direction that anonymity prevents employers from favoring minority applicants
when credentials are equal—at least in the initial stage of the hiring process.
1
Results from a recent experiment in Germany provide additional insights. Effects
may be different since in Germany, application documents contain a lot of
information of the applicant. These documents typically include a cover letter and a
CV, usually covering personal characteristics such as the name, contact details, date
and place of birth as well as a picture of the applicant.
If, for example, gender or ethnicity were a signal of labor costs, higher callback rates may
be resulting from an employers’ perception of cheaper labor costs for minority workers. In
this case, higher callback rates of minority workers in the initial situation may be due to
lower expected wages, and not due to affirmative action. Although it appears unlikely that
such a mechanism is present, we cannot rule out that it is the case.
1
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3
The German Experiment
In early 2010, the publication of a correspondence testing study for Germany (Kaas
and Manger, 2012) triggered a lively public debate about discrimination in the hiring
decisions of German firms. The study finds that applicants with a Turkish-sounding
name are on average 14 percentage points less likely to receive an invitation for a
job interview than applicants with a German-sounding name who are otherwise
similar. In small- and medium-sized firms, this difference is even larger and amounts
to 24 percentage points. Against this background and inspired by experiments in
other European countries, the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency initiated a field
experiment with anonymous job applications in Germany to investigate their
potential in combating hiring discrimination.
3.1 Project Setup and Evaluation Design
The German experiment officially commenced in November 2010 and lasted for
twelve months in each of the participating organizations (Krause et al., 2012b). In
total, eight organizations
voluntarily
joined the experiment. Among those
organizations were four international companies, one medium-sized firm, and three
public administrations. These organizations committed themselves to review
anonymous job applications in specific departments for different types of jobs. The
vacant jobs included apprentices, students, specialists as well as management
positions. The characteristics that were made anonymous include the applicant’s
name and contact details, gender, nationality, date and place of birth, disability,
marital status and the applicant’s picture. Additionally, any information about
professional experience should only indicate the duration of employment spells and
not their actual start date or end date.
2
Importantly, applications were treated
anonymously only in the first stage the recruitment process, i.e., when recruiters
decide about which candidates to invite for a job interview. However, as soon as the
interview invitations had been sent out, the candidates’ identity was revealed.
The goal of this project was twofold. First, a qualitative evaluation should shed
light on the practicability of anonymous job applications. For this purpose,
structured interviews with the respective recruiters and a survey among the
applicants were conducted. The practicability of four different methods was
examined which are in principal suited to make sensitive information anonymous:
a) standardized application forms in which sensitive information is not included;
b) refinements of existing online application forms such that sensitive information is
disabled; c) copying applicant’s non-sensitive information into another document;
2
This procedure should ensure that the risk of deducing minority group membership status
(and age) from other characteristics is minimized in the experiment.
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and d) blackening sensitive information in the original application documents.
Results on practicability are reported in Section 3.2.
As a second goal of the experiment, the effects of anonymous job applications
on interview invitation probabilities should be empirically investigated. The
necessary data on applicants was collected by the participating organizations during
the project. To empirically investigate the effects of anonymous job applications on
interview invitation probabilities, we conduct a two-step analysis. In both steps, we
apply linear probability models.
First, using data on anonymous job applications only, we analyze whether
interview invitation probabilities systematically differ by gender and migration
background when these characteristics are unknown to the recruiters. Our
hypothesis is that, if the anonymization is effective, the applicants’ anonymous
characteristics cannot determine the interview invitation probability. Such influence
could only be present in two cases. One possibility is that recruiters are able to
deduce minority group membership status from other characteristics. Another
possibility is that minority group membership status is correlated with other
characteristics such as, for example, educational attainment or professional
experience.
Second, to detect possible effects of introducing anonymous job applications,
we compare the situation of anonymous job applications with a counterfactual
situation, i.e., a comparable situation with standard job applications. Theoretically,
three different effects are possible if we assume that anonymous job applications
eliminate any differential treatment of minority groups. First, anonymous job
applications may cause the interview invitation probabilities of minority groups to
increase and to equalize with those of majority groups. In this situation, minority
groups are discriminated against with standard applications. Second, if
discrimination is not present with standard applications, anonymous job applications
have no effect on interview invitation probabilities. Third, if instruments such as
affirmative action are applied through which minority groups actually benefit from
higher interview invitation probabilities with standard applications, the introduction
of anonymous job applications may cause interview invitation probabilities of
minority groups to decrease. Given that the hiring processes are very heterogeneous
(sometimes even within the same organization) with respect to the type of vacancy,
the method that is used to make sensitive information anonymous and the number
of applicants, we conduct our analysis separately for each hiring process. Results on
the effects of anonymous job applications are for one example recruitment process
reported in Section 3.3, and for all processes in Section 3.4.
An overview of all hiring processes is given in Table 1. For nine processes are
data on the anonymous job applications available. Additionally, the organizations
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provided data on control groups for seven out of nine processes. The number of
applications range from 27 to over 800 per hiring process which provides some
indication for the heterogeneity between the different processes. Copying non-
sensitive information into another document is used only once as method of
anonymization, whereas blackening is the most frequent method. Certain
descriptive statistics of processes 1, 4, 8 and 9 stand out. 93 percent of the
applicants in process 1 are female, whereas this applies to only to 2 percent of the
applicants in process 4. Migrants usually make up at least 17 percent of the
applicants. However, in process 8 this number is only 3 percent. Finally, the callback
rate in process 9 is 93 percent, which is unusually high. The organization explains
this number with a surprisingly high incidence of refusals by the candidates, a
generally rather less qualified cohort of applicants and a slow progression of the
recruitment process. Most control groups come either from recruitment processes
of similar vacancies in the past (e.g., from the preceding year) or from hiring
processes for similar vacancies, which take place simultaneously to the anonymous
hiring process. Process 7 is an exception in this regard, as in this organization the
applicants were reviewed in the standard way without anonymization which led to
interview invitations. These same applications were subsequently anonymously
reviewed by other recruiters, which are similar in demographic characteristics and
experience to the first recruiter team according to the organization. This second
review represents the control group for this process, although it did not lead to any
interview invitation, but was entirely fictitious. This situation is difficult, given that
the recruiters knew about their fictitious review, and needs to be taken into account
in the empirical analysis.
3.2 Results on Practicability
The results of the qualitative evaluation can be summarized as follows.
3
Both,
recruiters and applicants do not report major practical problems in implementing
anonymous job applications. In particular, the use of a standardized application form
appears as a very efficient method—at least, once such a form is developed. As a
non-negligible side effect, a standardized application form increases comparability
between the applicants. Organizations which used this method even consider
continuing with anonymous job applications after the experiment. In contrast, in
particular the method of blackening the applications is a very time-consuming and
error-prone technique. Irrespective of the implementation method, most recruiters
appreciate being forced to reconsider their own recruitment practices as well as the
3
The qualitative evaluation was conducted by the
Kooperationsstelle Wissenschaft und
Arbeitswelt an der Europa-Universität Viadrina
(KOWA). Krause et al. (2012b) discuss the
results in more detail.
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stronger focus on qualifications and skills that results with anonymous job
applications. Recruiters regard particularly the removal of the applicant’s picture as
a positive development, since pictures often lead to misleading first impressions in
the reviewing process. Moreover, when hiring anonymously, the organizations can
present themselves as open-minded employers that aim at objective selection
processes. Several recruiters rate this as a benefit for their corporate image.
All applicants who applied via an anonymous standardized application form
were asked to answer a short survey about their experiences with this application
method. As only the candidates who were reviewed with this method actively take
notice of the anonymous job applications, this survey population displays a selection
out of all applicants that were part of the experiment. About 41 percent of the
applicants self-evaluate their chances to receive an interview invitation as higher
with anonymous job applications and about 33 percent rate their chances to be
equal between anonymous and non-anonymous hiring methods. About 48 percent
of the respondents generally prefer anonymous job applications over standard ones,
whereas 31 percent prefer the opposite. Moreover, a majority of 44 percent do not
rate the time spent for the application process as being different between
anonymous and standard applications, whereas 31 percent claim to need more time
for standard applications. In addition, more than half of the applicants (54 percent)
declare that the potential to present themselves is higher with anonymous job
applications or that it is at least not different from that with standard applications.
3.3 Quantitative Effects: Example Recruitment Process
We first describe the effects of anonymous job applications for one specific
recruitment process in detail (see Table 1, process 8). We select this process as an
example because of a relatively large sample size and because data on two different
control groups are available. We have information about 809 applicants whose
applications were anonymously reviewed during the experiment. About half of these
applicants are female, about 3 percent have a migration background and their
average age is 20 years. The applicants have on average less than one year of work
experience, report less than one previous employer, and completed two internships.
About one third receives an interview invitation as the outcome of the first stage in
this hiring process.
Table 2 shows the analysis of the determinants of the interview invitation
probability with anonymous job applications in this example. In this first step, we
only consider those candidates whose applications were anonymously reviewed.
Both potentially disadvantaged groups of female applicants and applicants with a
migration background have a slightly higher probability to be invited for interview
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compared to men and natives, respectively.
4
However, these differences are not
statistically significant in column (1). When controlling for additional characteristics
of the applicants such as age, educational attainment and number of internships in
column (2), the coefficient of the female dummy drops and becomes virtually zero.
The coefficient of the migrant dummy slightly increases, but remains statistically
insignificant. In this example, it thus appears that female applicants and applicants
with a migration background do not face systematically different interview invitation
probabilities when their applications are anonymously reviewed.
In the second part of our empirical analysis we analyze the effects of
introducing anonymous job applications. To compare the situation of anonymous
job applications with the counterfactual situation of standard applications, data for
two potential control groups is available in the example of this specific recruitment
process. The first potential control group consists of applicants who applied for the
same vacancy in the previous year using standard applications. This group would
represent an appropriate control group if no other changes had occurred between
the two years besides the fact that applications were anonymously reviewed in
2011. The group of applicants in 2010 consists of 1,357 individuals and is therefore
by about 500 applicants larger than in 2011 when applications were anonymously
reviewed. However, there are no significant differences in the shares of female or
migrant applicants, or in the applicants’ average age. In both groups, equal shares of
applicants have completed the general qualification for university entrance or the
qualification for technical college entrance. Only the number of internships is
significantly different as candidates in 2010 report on average only one internship.
Table 3 displays the results of the comparison between the two recruitment
processes in 2010 and 2011. Results in the first row of columns (1) and (2) indicate
that the interview invitation probability is about 6 to 8 percentage points higher for
applicants who are anonymously treated. However, this difference might be related
to the different number of applicants. Fewer individuals applied in 2011 when
applications were anonymously reviewed, which could result in a higher overall
share of interview invitations. Results in columns (1) and (2) moreover show that
female applicants are significantly more likely to be invited for an interview—
irrespective of whether they belong to the treatment or control group. Results in
column (3) include, in addition to the treatment dummy and the dummy variables
for the two demographic groups, two interaction terms between these variables.
The coefficient on the interaction term between women and anonymous job
applications indicates that female applicants are about 9 percentage points less
likely to receive an interview invitation when their applications are anonymously
4
Since the variation in the applicants’ age is relatively small within the hiring processes in the
experiment, our analysis solely focuses on effects by gender and migration background.
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reviewed. To estimate the causal effect of anonymous job applications on the
interview invitation probability for female applicants compared to female applicants
who were recruited with standard applications, we calculate the sum of the
treatment dummy and the interaction term. This overall effect of anonymous job
applications for female applicants is not statistically significant, and hence we do not
find a systematic effect of anonymous job applications for this group. Applicants
with a migration background are more likely to receive an interview invitation with
anonymous job applications as indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term
for migrants. Although this difference is not statistically significant, there is a
positive significant overall effect of anonymous job applications for applicants with a
migration background. With about 30 percentage points this effect is moreover
quite substantial. Therefore, the comparison with this control group reveals no
effect of anonymous job applications for women, but migrants benefit from higher
interview invitation rates when applications are anonymously reviewed.
The second potential control group consists of applicants which are part of the
same cohort of applicants as the treatment group, with the only difference that their
applications were not anonymously reviewed. The treatment group was made
artificially smaller since the organization started to anonymously review applications
only after the recruitment process had already started. This first part of the cohort
of applicants in 2011 thus constitutes a second potential control group. It includes
129 individuals and is therefore substantially smaller than the treatment group.
However, applicants’ characteristics are similar in both groups and do not
significantly differ. The only exception is the share of individuals with a migration
background, which is 7 percent in the control group and thus exceeds the respective
share in the treatment group by about 4 percentage points.
Table 4 displays the results of the comparison in interview invitation rates
between these two groups. Columns (1) and (2) show that interview invitation
probabilities do not significantly differ by treatment status, gender and migration
background. When additionally including interaction terms in column (3), we find
that female applicants are more likely to receive an interview invitation with
standard applications. Female applicants’ advantage, however, disappears with
anonymous job applications. Our analysis moreover reveals a negative overall effect
of anonymous job applications for women. More precisely, the chances of female
applicants to be invited for an interview decrease with anonymous job applications
by about 14 percentage points when compared to standard applications. In contrast
to the results from the analysis with the first control group, we do not detect any
significant effects of anonymous job applications for migrants. This could, however,
be due to the smaller sample size of this control group.
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The effects of anonymous job applications in this organization can therefore be
summarized as follows. First, female applicants and individuals with a migration
background have the same chances to receive an interview invitation with
anonymous job applications. Second, the effects of introducing anonymous job
applications differ for female applicants and applicants with a migration background.
The latter group seems to benefit from anonymous job applications. The interview
invitation probability of migrants is significantly higher when their applications are
anonymously reviewed, at least based on the comparison with the previous year’s
recruitment process. This result could be interpreted as the first type of a causal
effect, namely that previously existing discrimination is eliminated. However, our
results indicate the opposite effect for female applicants. At least when we use the
second potential control group in this example, women are significantly less likely to
receive an interview invitation with anonymous job applications than with standard
applications. This could indicate that previous affirmative action to promote the
chances of female applicants is not possible anymore when the applicant’s gender is
unknown. The effects of anonymous job applications therefore depend by and large
on the initial situation.
3.4 Quantitative Effects: Overview
Including the example of the previously discussed specific recruitment process in
one organization, data are available for a total of nine different recruitment
processes that were part of the German experiment. For most of these processes,
data on potential control groups are also available. Tables 5 and 6 display the results
for these recruitment processes obtained from the same two-step empirical analysis
as in case of the previously discussed specific recruitment process.
Accordingly, Table 5 displays the analysis of interview invitation probabilities
only for those applicants that were anonymously treated in these recruitment
processes. Next to dummy variables indicating gender and migration background,
the regressions include additional control variables depending on data availability.
Assuming that sensitive information was effectively removed from the applications
and that we control for relevant qualifications and skills in our regressions, we
expect no significant differences in the interview invitation probabilities for minority
groups. And indeed, this is the case for nearly all recruitment procedures. Exceptions
are three procedures, where female applicants have higher chances to receive an
interview invitation and one case where migrants are less likely to be invited for an
interview. There are, however, plausible explanations for these results. For example,
the share of female applicants in recruitment process 1 is about 93 percent and
therefore any results regarding the applicants’ gender should be interpreted with
caution. The positive effect for female applicants in procedure 3 could be due to
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omitted variables, i.e., variables that the recruiters observe, but we do not have
information about—such as grades in high school diplomas. These grades might be
on average higher for females than for males in Germany (see, e.g., BMFSFJ, 2004).
A similar argument holds for the negative effect for migrants, since recruiters might
have information about the qualification of the applicants that we do not have,
which can lead to a seemingly lower interview invitation probability.
Table 6 displays the results of the effects of introducing anonymous job
applications. The data on potential control groups stem from either past or
simultaneous recruitment processes for vacancies that are comparable to the
vacancies for which the organizations anonymously recruited. The results of the
empirical analysis can be categorized into the previously discussed three different
effects: a) elimination of discrimination, b) no effect because no discrimination was
present initially, and c) elimination of affirmative action. For instance, the results for
recruitment processes 5 and 6 may be viewed as examples for the elimination of
discrimination against female applicants. Interestingly, the applicants’ average work
experience in these recruitment processes is between 6 and 8 years, which could be
a crucial period in a women’s typical working life. Recruiters might anticipate a
possible desire to have children, which could have a negative effect on their
invitation probability if gender is known. Process 8a may also be viewed as an
example for this type of effect of anonymous job applications, but in this case for
individuals with a migration background. In contrast, the recruitment processes 1
and 7 may be viewed as examples for the second type of effects (“no effect because
no discrimination was present initially”). Finally, the recruitment processes 2 and 8b
may be viewed as examples for the last category of causal effects, i.e., a situation in
which affirmative action is no longer possible. This seems to be the case for migrant
applicants in the former recruitment process and for female applicants in the latter
recruitment process. Special cases in our analysis are the recruitment processes 9a
and 9b since in both cases, the interview invitation probability with anonymous job
applications amounts to 93 percent. Hence, virtually
all
applicants are invited which
makes the interpretation of any effects basically impossible.
We find for most recruitment processes statistically significant differences in the
interview invitation probabilities between anonymous and standard applications for
all
applicants. However, the direction of the effect is not consistent. The interview
invitation probability is higher when applicants are anonymously reviewed in some
cases, and it is lower in other cases. These differences are unexpected and it is not
clear why such differences should exist. Possible explanations include a certain lack
of familiarity with the new method, which should disappear after some time. Other
factors that may serve as explanations include a different number of applicants or a
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Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann: Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
different number of vacant jobs that are to be filled in the recruitment processes
underlying our treatment and control groups.
Altogether, we find that once applicants are anonymously reviewed, the
interview invitation probability is in general not influenced by gender and by
migration background. This confirms our initial hypothesis that when information
about minority group membership is unknown, minority applicants
cannot
face
systematically different interview invitation probabilities. It furthermore appears
that the introduction of anonymous job applications can lead to a reduction of
discrimination—if discrimination is present in the initial situation. Anonymous job
application can also have no effects if no discrimination is present initially, and they
can stop measures such as affirmative action that may have been present before. In
any case, the effects of anonymous job applications depend on the initial situation.
5
There are, however, certain limitations to the analysis of the German
experiment that should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical results.
First, the participating organizations voluntarily joined the experiment and appear as
a positive and non-representative selection of German firms and administrations.
Most of them had already applied measures such as affirmative action to promote
minority groups before joining the experiment. Second, it was not possible to design
the experiment as a truly randomized experiment. Hence, our evaluation relies on
non-experimental evidence from a comparison with potential control groups. Third,
data on these potential control groups were of relatively poor quality and doubts
remain whether they adequately approximate the counterfactual situation. Fourth,
we restrict our analysis on the effects of anonymous job applications on the
interview invitation probabilities for female applicants and applicants with a
migration background. Given the number of observations in the experiment, it is not
possible to investigate effects on job offer rates, and also not if effects result in
terms of other characteristics employers may discriminate against (e.g., age). Due to
these limitations our results should be interpreted with caution and should be
viewed as indications of possible effects.
Nevertheless, the German experiment shows that anonymous job applications
can be practically implemented without excessive costs. Additionally, they can lead
to equal opportunities for minority groups of applicants. Because the participating
organizations are a positive selection of German firms, it seems moreover plausible
to assume that the effects of anonymous job applications would be even larger in a
representative sample of German firms.
5
We do not detect any systematic pattern in our results regarding the different methods of
anonymization.
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4
Potentials and Limits of Anonymous Job Applications
Anonymous job applications are based on a very straightforward intuition: Removing
information about characteristics employers may discriminate against should reduce
or even eliminate discrimination. Making a decision about who should be invited for
an interview based on unknown information about minority group membership
status becomes impossible. Discrimination is thus prevented, at least in the initial
stage of the recruitment process.
6
Both, the results of the various European experiments and of the German
experiment predominantly show that anonymous job applications can lead to the
desired effect of increasing the interview invitation probabilities of disadvantaged
groups. However, there are indications for exactly the opposite effect, namely that
anonymity prevents employers from
favoring
minority applicants. In particular, our
analysis of the heterogeneous data from the German experiment shows that the
initial situation is crucial. Three different conditions can initially exist: discrimination,
affirmative action, and equality of opportunity. Not surprisingly, the effects of
anonymous job applications are as heterogeneous as the initial situation to be
changed. This result is in line with findings from the various European experiments.
It often appears that the introduction of anonymous job applications is beneficial for
a particular minority group in a given experiment, whereas another minority group
does not benefit to the same extent—although the setting is the same.
4.1 The Limited Scope of Anonymous Job Applications
Any discussion about the potentials and limits of anonymous job applications should
therefore start by asking what their goal and purposes should exactly be. The
answer which is most often given is that anonymous job applications aim at reducing
discrimination of disadvantaged groups in the hiring process, which is sometimes
connected with the objective to increase diversity at the workplace. This goal relies
on the assumption that discrimination is present in the initial situation, and that it is
based on characteristics which are not included in anonymous job applications.
Another goal which is often mentioned is that firms should hire the most productive
workers irrespective of personal information and preferences. This goal also relies
on the assumption of discrimination, but in this case it can arise from two directions
as no applicant should either be discriminated or favored, but solely reviewed and
assessed according to his or her skills and qualifications. Although the two different
goals can overlap, they are not necessarily the same.
6
It may also be the case that applications are not completely anonymous, e.g., if certain
information such as episodes of maternity leave or military service allow drawing indirect
conclusions on minority group membership. Although this risk has been minimized in the
German experiment, one should in general be aware of this possibility.
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An example can illustrate this argument. Assume that a firm wants to hire the
most qualified workers and, at the same time, aims at increasing diversity among its
employees. This goal cannot be accomplished if any structural differences exist
before
individuals enter the labor market or in their previous labor market
experience. For example, is there equal access for individuals from minority groups
to education? How would such differences that are due to the education system
translate into differences in previous labor market experience, which is one main
source of information about productivity that is included in application documents?
Firms cannot hire the most qualified workers
and
simultaneously increase diversity if
minority groups have on average lower education outcomes. This example illustrates
the limited scope of anonymous job applications. Anonymous job applications
cannot eliminate any form of discrimination. They target at hiring decisions and shift
the focus towards the applicants’ skills and qualifications. However, if discrimination
in other instances leads to differences in this regard, solving this problem is beyond
the scope of anonymous job applications.
4.2 Employers’ Incentives to Hire Anonymously
With anonymous job applications, applicants are reviewed only based on objective
criteria. Firms can thus be confident to hire the most productive workers, and they
can credibly signal to do so. Once an efficient method of making applications
anonymous is developed and firms use for example a standardized application form,
comparability between applicants increases and, hence, recruiters spent less time
with the reviewing process. Another advantage of anonymous job applications from
the employers’ perspective is that the number and diversity of applicants may
increase. Some individuals, in particular those that are members of minority groups,
could be encouraged to apply because they anticipate to be anonymously reviewed.
With standard applications, they might not apply because they fear to be
discriminated against. Finally, if anonymous job applications reach their intended
goal and eliminate discrimination in hiring, this may increase diversity among
employees, which can in turn enhance productivity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Hoogendoorn and van Praag, 2012).
However, the method of how applications are made anonymous is crucial,
especially from the employers’ perspective. A suboptimal implementation can be
very costly, time-consuming and error-prone. But even in the case of an optimal
implementation, firms have to change their established hiring routines. This
obviously involves a certain amount of investment. However, these investments can
at the same time lead to benefits such as a more efficient and less time-consuming
reviewing process. Firms that are committed to incorporate affirmative action are
prevented from doing so with anonymous job applications. This argument, however,
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only holds for the first stage of the hiring process. Firms can still favor applicants
from minority groups in the interviewing stage—given that these applicants reach
this second stage.
Opponents of anonymous job applications often argue that discrimination is not
eliminated, but only postponed to later stages in the hiring process. This might be
true if employers consciously discriminate. Anonymous job applications’ potential
would then indeed be limited to the initial stage. However, it appears that
discrimination is mostly due to implicit and unconscious behavior (Ziegert and
Hanges, 2005). Discrimination is moreover found to be the strongest in the first
stage of the recruitment process, i.e., when employers decide about interview
invitations (Cediey and Foroni, 2008). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that
once candidates reach the second stage and a personal interview takes place,
discrimination will not be as relevant anymore. Exposure to prejudiced groups
seems to reduce thinking in stereotypes (Beaman et al., 2009), from which minority
applicants should benefit in the interview stage. Anonymous job applications could
thus have important effects beyond the first stage, e.g., on job offer rates.
4.3 The Optimal Context for Anonymous Job Applications
Considering the future perspective of anonymous job applications naturally leads to
the following questions: When do anonymous job applications work? And when do
they not work? It is generally true that the instrument of anonymous job
applications only has potential if there is a relevant initial size of discrimination.
Additionally, as mentioned before, one should keep in mind that anonymity shifts
the focus towards skills and qualifications. However, do minority groups have equal
access to those? Anonymous job applications are clearly not a universal remedy to
any type of discrimination related to the professional life.
As the method of how applications are made anonymous is crucial, the
implementation of anonymous job applications may be easier—and less costly—in
countries where applications include less information. International differences in
this respect are substantial. For example, Shackleton and Newell (1994) investigate
management selection methods in several European countries and conclude that a
country’s culture, tradition and habits influence the methods of selection in a given
company. This suggests first, that (national) recruitment cultures exist, and second,
that it might be difficult to reform these historically developed cultures. One crucial
factor in this regard is the amount of information in applications that is usually
provided by the candidates and the amount of information that is required by firms.
On the one hand, for example in Germany, application documents contain a lot of
information of the applicant. These documents typically include a cover letter and a
CV, usually covering personal characteristics such as the name, contact details, date
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and place of birth as well as a picture of the applicant. In particular, including a
picture in the application seems to be culturally determined and, for example,
specific to German recruitment habits. Moreover, it can consciously or
unconsciously lead to good or bad impressions of the applicant, which in turn do not
necessarily reflect a correct assessment of the applicant. It may therefore come as
no surprise that removing the picture from the applications during the German
experiment led to positive assessments of the recruiters. Besides a cover letter and a
CV, applicants also include copies of the most important certificates and references.
Whereas this practice provides a rather comprehensive impression of the applicant,
standards are different in other countries. For example, the information that is
provided by applicants in the United States is rather limited. Due to a fear of getting
sued for discrimination, most firms do not even ask for detailed personal
characteristics. Suing employers for discrimination is rather common in the United
States and it can thus be seen as part of the recruitment culture. Explicitly asking for
a certain race or gender has been illegal since the 1960s (Darity and Mason, 1998).
Two examples of completely different approaches can be found in Asia. Kuhn
and Shen (2009) study gender discrimination in internet job advertisements in
China. They find that job posts are explicitly targeted at women or men, where the
incidence of targeting at one of the two genders is almost equally likely. Moreover,
in line with the findings of hiring discrimination being less prevalent in high-skilled
occupations, gender-targeted job advertisements in China are also much less
prevalent in jobs requiring more skills. This might be connected to the desire to find
the best candidate for these jobs, which might get more difficult when skill
requirements rise and the pool of potential candidates becomes smaller. However,
gender preferences and required skills for a specific job do not seem to be related to
each other—which is the case for other characteristics such as age, height and
beauty. For example, when young, tall and attractive workers should be hired, job
advertisements are usually targeted at women. Preferences for older workers lead
to job advertisements that are targeted at male applicants. Also in South Korea,
application forms can include very personal questions, such as having relatives living
in North Korea, health status, smoking and drinking habits, height and weight,
eyesight, blood type, financial status and homeownership (Hlasny, 2011). These
examples show that recruitment practices can differ greatly between countries. An
introduction of anonymous job applications would therefore present either a small
and incremental change or a large and fundamental reform of current recruitment
practices. It also implies that proponents and opponents of anonymous job
applications are differently powerful in a discussion about a possible
implementation in different countries.
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4.4 A Mandatory Introduction of Anonymous Job Applications?
The previous discussion leads us to two follow-up questions. Does a mandatory
country-wide implementation of anonymous job applications make sense? And are
specific laws or amendments of existing laws needed? The first question is obviously
related to our previous discussion of discrimination being not a uniform
phenomenon. For example, discrimination appears lower in high-skilled and more
competitive labor markets (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007; Krause et al., 2012a) and in
larger firms (Kaas and Manger, 2012), and thus the effects of anonymous job
applications are limited in such markets. Hence, a mandatory country-wide
implementation of anonymous job applications does not seem desirable. It could
nevertheless make sense to introduce anonymous job applications in specific
sectors, industries, firms or occupations. But even then, for certain jobs and
professions, anonymous hiring does not appear as a feasible solution. This includes,
for example, jobs in the worlds of sports, arts and letters, as well as business
leaders. More generally, recruitment processes in such “superstars jobs” (Rosen,
1981) work differently. It does not appear realistic that any firm would hire its future
CEO based on an anonymous job application. In addition, the degree of competition
in a particular labor market plays an important role for whether anonymous job
application can unfold their full potential. For example, if the number of applicants
for a vacant job is relatively low and virtually every applicant is invited for an
interview, an anonymous reviewing process is clearly not needed.
So far and to the best of our knowledge, no mandatory legislation enforcing
anonymous job applications on a country-wide level has been introduced. One
noticeable exception is a law that has been passed in France in 2006 which made
anonymous job applications mandatory for firms with more than 50 employees—at
least in principle. As the law lacks more detailed conditions for its range of coverage
and no sanctions are applied in case of noncompliance, the legislation has basically
no practical importance (Behaghel et al., 2011). It is nevertheless interesting that
from time to time laws are proposed that would introduce anonymous job
applications, even in countries where applications already include only a relatively
small amount of personal information. For example, Hausman (2012) proposes
anonymous hiring to be introduced in the United States. His concrete policy
proposal goes even beyond the standard approach as selection interviews should
also be eliminated. Interestingly, rather than applying sanctions in case of
noncompliance, incentives for firms to hire anonymously shall be provided. These
incentives could take, for example, the form of reduced liability insurance
premiums. Another proposal of an amendment regarding anonymous resumes was
made by the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom in 2009. However, the
proposal was rejected by the parliament.
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5
Conclusions and Outlook
Anonymous job applications appear as an attractive policy instrument to combat
hiring discrimination. Nevertheless, they are very controversially discussed in the
public debate. Our paper backs this discussion by reconsidering the available
empirical evidence from field experiments testing anonymous job applications in
Europe. Against this background, we discuss the potentials and limits of this
approach. We particularly focus on novel evidence from an experiment organized by
the German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency. Results show that anonymous job
applications can be practically implemented, but they also show that the method of
implementation is crucial. Standardized application forms which are completed by
the applicants appear as the most effective and efficient way to make applications
anonymous. Results show moreover that with anonymous job applications, all
applicant groups have the expected equal chances to receive an interview invitation
in nearly all recruitment processes. When analyzing the effects of introducing
anonymous job applications, we find that anonymous hiring can reduce
discrimination—if discrimination is present beforehand. Anonymous hiring can also
have no effects if no discrimination exists initially, and it can even prevent the
employer from applying measures such as affirmative action, at least in the first
stage of the hiring process.
Any discussion about anonymous job application should therefore be based on
the premise that their effects crucially depend on the initial situation in the
respective organization. Policymakers, recruiters and applicants should bear in mind
that anonymous hiring could make sense in a specific sector or in a certain job,
whereas it might not be appropriate in another. Moreover, anonymous job
applications specifically target at the initial stage of the recruitment process. Any
preexisting structural differences, and discrimination that is based on such
differences, can therefore
not
be overcome. Besides, context-specific information
may be interpreted differently if information about the identity of the candidate is
not available—and this can result in disadvantages for the applicant. For example, if
recruiters are not aware of the applicant’s family situation, migration background or
disadvantaged neighborhood, this information cannot be taken into account to
explain, e.g., below-average education outcomes, labor market experience or
language skills.
Anonymous job applications may, however, eliminate important productivity
potentials for companies and society. The more standardized application forms will
be, the less chances creative individuals will have to expose their productive
credentials. Avoided is also potential economically productive discrimination that
would rely on the power of the positively discriminated factor. If diversity of workers
leads to innovations and larger productivity, the creation of those external effects
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should be wanted. At the end, any hiring is discrimination, e.g., selecting the good
instead of the poor candidate.
The debate about anonymous job applications also shows an interesting trend
in the policy approach towards it. Many European countries have conducted field
experiments to thoroughly evaluate their actual effects. This new approach towards
evidence-based policymaking should be used more often, also with respect to other
possible reforms or amendments of existing laws. Nevertheless, its potentials with
respect to anonymous hiring have not yet been completely utilized. For example,
the empirical evidence on effects on job offer rates is still relatively scarce. Until
now, to the best of our knowledge no reform or law exists which makes anonymous
job applications mandatory with all necessary conditions. However, from our point
of view this step is not necessary. It should be in the firms’ own interest to hire
discrimination-free, and with anonymous job applications, firms could credibly
commit themselves to do so. For example, some organizations of the German
experiment voluntarily continue to hire anonymously after the experiment ended.
What is the long-term perspective of anonymous job applications? This question
leads to several related questions. For example, when labor markets continue to
become more integrated and global, do application cultures inevitably converge?
And if so, does a “globalized application culture” automatically move towards the
United States’ equilibrium with applications that contain little personal information?
The current debate about anonymous job applications could initiate a change, or at
least reconsideration, of existing recruitment practices. Whether or not this process
will ultimately result in the introduction of anonymous job applications is not clear.
It may be the case that applications will be designed that focus more strongly on the
applicants’ skills and qualifications. In any case, with an increasing global
competition for talents and skilled workers, discrimination may automatically
become less severe in the future. Reconsidering established recruitment cultures
may nevertheless help achieving the goal of discrimination-free hiring even sooner.
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Table 1: Overview of Anonymous Job Applications in German Experiment
Process
1
# Applications
27
Anonymization
Standardized
Application Form
Basic Descriptives
93 Percent Female
25 Percent Migrant
25 Percent Callback Rate
46 Percent Female
2
593
Blackening
29 Percent Migrant
14 Percent Callback Rate
64 Percent Female
3
719
Blackening
Copying
non-sensitive
information in
other document
Standardized
Application Form
17 Percent Migrant
60 Percent Callback Rate
2 Percent Female
45 Percent Migrant
29 Percent Callback Rate
60 Percent Female
17 Percent Migrant
17 Percent Callback Rate
80 Percent Female
18 Percent Migrant
28 Percent Callback Rate
76 Percent Female
6a
505
Blackening
33 Percent Migrant
14 Percent Callback Rate
71 Percent Female
6b
179
Blackening
30 Percent Migrant
17 Percent Callback Rate
21 Percent Female
7
248
Blackening
34 Percent Migrant
22 Percent Callback Rate
Refinement of
Online
Application
Refinement of
Online
Application
53 Percent Female
3 Percent Migrant
32 Percent Callback Rate
27 Percent Female
46 Percent Migrant
93 Percent Callback Rate
a) Past Recruitment
b) Same Vacancy,
but Non-Anonymized
Applications
a) Past Recruitment
b) Other Region
(Simultaneous
Recruitment)
Fictitious Review
Simultaneous Vacancy
Simultaneous Vacancy
Past Recruitment
Past Recruitment
–
–
Control Group(s)
Subsequent
Recruitment
a) Past Recruitment
b) Other Region
(Simultaneous
Recruitment)
4
128
5a
318
5b
89
Standardized
Application Form
8
809
9
92
– 21 –
 LIU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 47: Spm. om hvilke erfaringer andre EU-lande har, f.eks. Tyskland, med anonymiserede ansøgninger, til beskæftigelsesministeren
1896180_0025.png
Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann: Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
Table 2: Interview Invitation Probability with Anonymous Job Applications
(1)
0.017
(0.033)
0.089
(0.100)
No
0.001
809
(2)
0.008
(0.033)
0.109
(0.101)
Yes
0.016
809
Female
Migrant
Control Variables
2
R
Number of Observations
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specification (2) are
age, age squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
Table 3: Comparison with Standard Applications from Past Recruitment
(1)
0.057***
(0.020)
0.063***
(0.019)
–0.013
(0.056)
(2)
0.075**
(0.035)
0.060***
(0.019)
–0.003
(0.057)
(3)
0.112***
(0.041)
0.093***
(0.024)
–0.084
(0.064)
–0.086**
(0.041)
0.192
(0.119)
Yes
0.026
(0.041)
0.305**
(0.121)
0.020
2,166
(a) Anonymous
(b) Female
(c) Migrant
(d) Anonymous x Female
(e) Anonymous x Migrant
Control Variables
∆:
Sum (a) + (d)
∆:
Sum (a) + (e)
R
Number of Observations
2
No
Yes
0.009
2,166
0.017
2,166
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specifications (2) and
(3) are age, age squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
– 22 –
 LIU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 47: Spm. om hvilke erfaringer andre EU-lande har, f.eks. Tyskland, med anonymiserede ansøgninger, til beskæftigelsesministeren
1896180_0026.png
Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann: Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
Table 4: Comparison with Standard Applications from Present Recruitment
(1)
–0.075
(0.046)
0.039
(0.031)
0.115
(0.086)
(2)
–0.071
(0.046)
0.028
(0.031)
0.119
(0.087)
(3)
0.005
(0.064)
0.156*
(0.085)
0.160
(0.161)
–0.148
(0.091)
–0.051
(0.190)
Yes
–0.144**
(0.067)
–0.046
(0.189)
0.021
938
(a) Anonymous
(b) Female
(c) Migrant
(d) Anonymous x Female
(e) Anonymous x Migrant
Control Variables
∆:
Sum (a) + (d)
∆:
Sum (a) + (e)
R
Number of Observations
2
No
Yes
0.007
938
0.018
938
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Further control variables in specifications (2) and
(3) are age, age squared, educational attainment and number of internships.
Table 5: Interview Invitation Probability Anonymous Job Applications
Female Dummy
Process 1
Process 2
Process 3
Process 4
Process 5
Process 6
Process 7
Process 8
Process 9
0.410***
(0.137)
0.030
(0.029)
0.114***
(0.040)
–0.016
(0.332)
0.168
(0.102)
–0.007
(0.066)
–0.006
(0.069)
0.008
(0.033)
0.063*
(0.037)
Migrant Dummy
–0.012
(0.150)
–0.051*
(0.029)
–0.083
(0.053)
–0.006
(0.086)
0.016
(0.122)
–0.009
(0.062)
–0.014
(0.062)
0.109
(0.101)
–0.054
(0.052)
# Observations
27
593
719
128
89
179
248
809
92
Source:
Data provided by organizations taking part in German experiment.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a female dummy, a migrant
dummy and control variables, including (if available) age, age squared, educational and vocational attainment,
number of previous employers, experience (in years) and number of internships.
– 23 –
 LIU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 47: Spm. om hvilke erfaringer andre EU-lande har, f.eks. Tyskland, med anonymiserede ansøgninger, til beskæftigelsesministeren
1896180_0027.png
Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann: Anonymous Job Applications in Europe
Table 6: Interview Invitation Probabilities in Comparison
Process 1
(a) Anonymous
(b) Female
(c) Migrant
(d) Anonymous x Female
(e) Anonymous x Migrant
∆:
Sum (a) + (d)
∆:
Sum (a) + (e)
R
# Observations
2
Process 2a
–0.090***
(0.030)
–0.034
(0.025)
–0.039
(0.028)
0.066*
(0.038)
–0.013
(0.040)
–0.024
(0.034)
–0.102**
(0.041)
0.0383
1.545
Process 2b
–0.275***
(0.046)
–0.058
(0.048)
–0.122**
(0.050)
0.099*
(0.056)
0.072
(0.058)
–0.176***
(0.046)
–0.204***
(0.060)
0.1138
920
Process 5
–0.016
(0.091)
0.013
(0.035)
–0.056***
(0.021)
0.156
(0.101)
0.118
(0.118)
0.140*
(0.072)
0.102
(0.121)
0.1802
238
Process 6
0.147*
(0.079)
0.044
(0.055)
0.013
(0.062)
–0.056
(0.083)
–0.046
(0.085)
0.091*
(0.050)
0.101
(0.087)
0.0449
340
Process 7
–0.049
(0.049)
0.082
(0.071)
–0.043
(0.059)
–0.064
(0.097)
0.039
(0.081)
–0.113
(0.093)
–0.009
(0.070)
0.0490
496
Process 8a
0.112***
(0.041)
0.093***
(0.024)
–0.084
(0.064)
–0.086**
(0.041)
0.192
(0.119)
0.026
(0.041)
0.305**
(0.121)
0.0201
2.166
Process 8b
0.005
(0.064)
0.156*
(0.085)
0.160
(0.161)
–0.148
(0.091)
–0.051
(0.190)
–0.144**
(0.067)
–0.046
(0.189)
0.0206
938
Process 9a
0.457***
(0.101)
0.096
(0.111)
–0.088
(0.105)
–0.022
(0.118)
0.019
(0.120)
0.436***
(0.114)
0.476***
(0.103)
0.2772
190
Process 9b
0.407***
(0.102)
0.029
(0.117)
0.091
(0.112)
0.048
(0.126)
–0.155
(0.124)
0.455***
(0.126)
0.252**
(0.112)
0.2855
155
–0.757
(0.503)
–0.200
(0.500)
0.118
(0.286)
0.570
(0.526)
–0.152
(0.326)
–0.187
(0.178)
–0.909
(0.589)
0.3149
48
Source:
Data provided by organizations taking part in German experiment.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specification (1) includes a dummy for anonymous application, a female dummy, a migrant dummy and control variables and
specification (2) includes a dummy for anonymous application, a female dummy, a migrant dummy, control variables and two interaction terms between anonymous and the female dummy as
well as anonymous and the migrant dummy. Control variables include (if available) age, age squared, schooling degree, vocational degree, number of previous employers, work experience (in
years) and number of internships. Processes 2a/b, 8a/b, 9a/b display analyses of the same treatment group with two different control groups. No data on control groups were available for
processes 3 and 4.
– 24 –