UUI, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 70: Oversendelse af kopi af brev af 22. december 2017 fra generaldirektøren for Generaldirektoratet for Migration og Indre Anliggender vedrørende DK's opretholdelse af midlertidig grænsekontrol efter 12.11.2017.

Udlændinge- og Integrationsudvalget 2017-18
UUI Alm.del Bilag 70
Offentligt

Permanent Secretary of State for Immigration and Integration

Dear Mr Ruete,

Thank you for your letter of 22 December 2017 in which you request additional

information and clarifications on the Danish notification of 11 October 2017 on

carrying out internal border controls beyond 11 November 2017.

As stated in my letter of 10 November 2017, the

Da ish Gover e t’s decisio to

carry out internal border controls was based on an assessment by the Danish Se-

curity and Intelligence Service (DSIS) of the security situation in Denmark pertain-

ing to international terrorism. Following hereto, the competent authorities found

that in the current circumstances temporarily reintroducing border controls would

be an effective response to the identified threats to the internal security and that

alternative measures such as e.g. intensified police checks in the border areas

would not achieve the same effect.

The threat assessments made by the Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) within the

DSIS are continuous and most often classified. CTA, however, issues an official,

unclassified assessment of the terror threat to Denmark, the most recent issued

on 12 January 2018 as a replacement for the one issued on 7 February 2017. This

assessment under preparation in 2017 formed the basis of the mentioned analysis

from the DSIS.

In it, it is, inter alia, assessed

that the terror threat to Denmark is significant. The threat is primarily posed

by militant Islamism.

that the military pressure on the group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS)

increases the pressure on Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, including on per-

sons from Denmark. This has resulted in more people wanting to return to

Europe, including Denmark.

that individuals who have been with militant Islamist groups like IS have

gained a capability to commit acts of terrorism and can be particularly radical-

ised, brutalised and prone to violence upon their return. This is especially true

of men, but also applies to women.

that even a few returnees may pose a terror threat to Denmark. It may also

increase the threat to Danish interests abroad if such individuals travel to

other countries.

January 22 2018

Asyl og Visum

Slotsholmsgade 10

DK-1216 Copenhagen K

Denmark

Phone

Website

CVR no.

Case no.

Act ID

+45 6198 4000

[email protected]

www.uim.dk

36977191

2017-1973

347811

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UUI, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 70: Oversendelse af kopi af brev af 22. december 2017 fra generaldirektøren for Generaldirektoratet for Migration og Indre Anliggender vedrørende DK's opretholdelse af midlertidig grænsekontrol efter 12.11.2017.

that returnees to other European countries may also pose a threat to Den-

mark.

that the ongoing militant Islamist propaganda, the possibility of more foreign

fighters returning and the lack of areas to which militant Islamists can travel,

have increased the pressure from terrorism on Europe. The number of com-

pleted attacks in the West by militant Islamists was higher in 2017 than in

2016. Attacks are primarily aimed at civilian targets and security authorities.

that attacks in Europe are overwhelmingly committed by lone individuals who

have not been to a conflict zone. The attack in Barcelona in August 2017

showed that there is also capability in Europe to establish attack cells that can

operate without being detected by the authorities.

that in some attacks in Europe, the planning was done in another country.

Attacks that are planned in one country but executed in another can be par-

ticularly difficult to prevent.

that since the autumn of 2015, a number of persons who entered with the

flow of refugees have been involved in attacks, including rejected asylum

seekers. The threat to Denmark may also emanate from refugees and mi-

grants in countries other than Denmark.

The choice of border sections subject to internal border controls is based on con-

tinuous risk assessments by the Danish Police. The number of persons who have

been checked by the police or the number of persons who have been refused

entry is not, in itself, related to this decision. However, the numbers are not insig-

nificant. Since the beginning of 2016, more than 6,400,000 persons have been

checked and more than 5,150 persons (as of 14 January 2018) have been refused

entry to Denmark as a result of the temporary internal border controls.

In my letter of 10 November 2017, I informed you about a case, where the border

controls prevented potential terrorists from getting to Denmark. I can now inform

you that a 30-year-old Syrian male is currently in remand custody until 12 Febru-

ary 2018 for planning a terrorist act in Copenhagen as a supposed accomplice in

the case mentioned.

Whether it will be necessary to extend the border controls to other sections of

the internal borders will be based on assessments of the security threat and oper-

ational recommendations by Danish Police authorities. In this regard, the choice

of frequency, location and time of the selected spot checks is made to ensure

minimum obstacles to the free movement of persons and goods while at the same

time being proportionate to the present terror threat and internal security.

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The implementation of the measures also fully respects fundamental rights.

Yours sincerely,

Uffe Toudal Pedersen

Permanent Secretary of State for Immigration and Integration

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