Udenrigsudvalget 2017-18
URU Alm.del Bilag 19
Offentligt
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SPAIN’S
MISUSE OF THE JUDICIARY AS REGARDS CATALONIA
For years, the Spanish Government has repeatedly avoided any dialogue on
Catalonia’s political demands on the grounds of legalistic arguments. The
Spanish
Government’s
ideological misinterpretation and misuse of the legal system it claims to
uphold has become blatantly patent in in its actions against the Catalan Government in
the run-up to and the wake of the 1
st
October referendum.
1.
Biased interpretation of the Constitution to negate a referendum
The Spanish Government deliberately ignores the fact that the Spanish Constitution
does not prohibit a referendum or a popular consultation. Articles 92 and 149.1.32, for
instance, allow for a referendum to be organised by the Spanish Government or for the
competence to do to be transferred to a regional Government. The Spanish
Government’s restricted interpretation of the Constitution is reinforced by the
staggering politicization of the Spanish Constitutional Court. To illustrate this point, it is
worth noting that Mr Andrés Ollero Tassara, the Judge in charge of the ruling on the
Catalan Law on the Referendum had been a member of parliament of the Popular
Party for 17 years, prior to his appointment to the Court in 2012.
2.
Judicial prosecution and petitions of jail for activities which are not a crime
To call, organise and hold a referendum is not a crime in Spain. The
Spain’s parliament
expressly legalised the matter by means of the Organic Law 2/2005, which modified
the Criminal Code in order to remove those articles (506 bis, 521 bis and 576 bis),
which had previously considered this matter a crime. In spite of this, the Spanish
authorities arrested 14 senior Catalan government officials for alleged collusion with
the organisation of
Catalonia’s
1 Oct. referendum, and ordered some 800 Catalan
mayors to appear before Court. Moreover, this order came from the Spanish Attorney
General, instead of the Catalan High Court of Justice, which is the competent authority.
3.
Spain’s
Attorney General opens an investigation on crimes of sedition
As established in Article 544 of the Criminal Code, peaceful and orderly
demonstrations do not constitute a crime of sedition, which entails a sentence of
between four and fifteen years of jail. Furthermore, pursuant to the Organic Law 6/1985
on the Judiciary and the Spanish Criminal Code, the National Court (Audiencia
Nacional)
does not have the authority to judge this type of crime. Nevertheless, on
Monday 16
th
October, a Judge sent the president of the ANC (Catalan National
Assembly), Jordi Sànchez, and the president of Òmnium Cultural, Jordi Cuixart, to
prison without bail, as petitioned by the prosecution.
4.
Deployment of Spanish police and military police (Guardia Civil) in Catalonia
The deployment of more than 10,000 members, since mid-September,
of Spain’s
police and Guardia Civil to Catalonia goes against the principles of proportionality,
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 URU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 19: Henvendelse af 23. oktober 2017 fra Cataloniens regerings delegation i Danmark og de nordiske lande om situationen i Catalonien
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opportunity and congruence established in Organic Law 2/1986 covering security
forces. Beyond that, Articles 38 and 42 of this Law
–invoked
by the Spanish Ministry of
Interior to defend these police measures- are not applicable in Catalonia since the
entry into force of the amended Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006, as they
contravene the provisions of Article 164.
5.
Appointment of a Coronel serving in the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs to
direct the Catalan police (Mossos
d’Esquadra)
In the run-up to the 1
st
October referendum, several attempts took place to assume
direct control of the Catalan police by the Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs. The
supreme command of the Mossos d’Esquadra belongs to the Government of Catalonia,
as established by the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which is -in terms of rank and
nature- an Organic Law passed by both the Spanish Parliament and Senate and part of
the constitutional framework itself. A prosecutor cannot go against its provisions and
decide how the police or security forces should be organised.
6.
Intervention in the Government of Catalonia without following the proper
constitutional procedures
The actions of the Spanish Government directed at attempting to control of the Catalan
police as well as blocking Catalonia’s access to its own resources must be interpreted
as an undeclared intervention of the Catalan self-government outside the legal
procedures established by Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution. The use of this
article, however, must be approved by the overall majority of the Senate.
Another example of how constitutional procedures have not been respected in regards
to Catalonia’s self-government can be found in the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional
Court in 2010 that voided the reformed Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006 of all
its meaning, thus becoming the basis for the current situation. That ruling altered the
content of a text adopted in accordance with all constitutional procedures (it was
passed by the Catalan Parliament, approved by an absolute majority in both the
Spanish Parliament and Senate, and ratified afterwards by the people of Catalonia in a
referendum). As a result, the citizens of Catalonia have been, since 2010, the only
people in Spain ruled by a Statute they did not vote (hence contrary to the established
procedures and therefore unconstitutional).
7.
Search and opening of private postal correspondence without judicial order
From 19
th
September to 1
st
October, the Civil Guard opened private letters addressed
to thousands of citizens, searched government offices and private companies, and
intercepted the postal delivery of subscription magazines in an attempt to seize all
materials related to the vote. These activities constitute a violation of the right to
privacy and the secrecy of communications recognised in Article 18 of the Spanish
Constitution.
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 URU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 19: Henvendelse af 23. oktober 2017 fra Cataloniens regerings delegation i Danmark og de nordiske lande om situationen i Catalonien
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8.
Closure of websites, threats to media and seizure of electoral materials
The Spanish police searched Catalan media establishments as well as the premises of
printing companies, while identifying journalists covering political gatherings as well as
police actions. Spanish police forces also shut down hundreds of websites and
confiscated electoral materials and propaganda. These actions contravene Article 20 of
the Spanish Constitution, which protects the rights to freedom of expression and
freedom of information.
9.
Banning and cancellation of public events
During the weeks prior to the holding of the referendum several public events were
banned in Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Vitoria. Such bans violate the rights of
assembly and demonstration protected by Article 21 of the Spanish Constitution and
governed by Organic Law 9/1983, as well as the right to political participation as
outlined in Article 23 of the Spanish Constitution.
10. Misuse of the mandate and powers of the Constitutional Court
The Spanish Constitutional Court has made an excessive use of the powers it received
in
the “ad
casum”
reform
of 2015, and which the Venice Commission already
questioned in its Opinion 827/2015 of 13
th
March 2017.
The Venice Commission stated that the fines provided for in the reform were so
high that they could be considered criminal sanctions, especially if applied
recurrently. However, in its use of this power in the Catalan context, the
Constitutional Court set daily fines of
€6,000-€12,000
to Catalan public officials.
Given the criminal nature of these measures, the Venice Commission stated
that the imposition of fines should be accompanied of the guarantees provided
for in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This has not been
the case in the Constitutional Court’s measures against Catalan officials:
o
Art. 6(1) ECHR states the need for an independent and impartial Court.
However, in this case, the Court adopting the enforcement measures
and the Court having issued the initial ruling were one and the same.
Art. 6(3) ECHR, provides for the right to have time and the necessary
facilities for the preparation of a defence. However, in the recent cases
in Catalonia, fines were imposed without the possibility of prior defence.
o
11. Political interferences in the proper functioning of the judiciary.
As shown by the
EU Justice Scoreboard
published by the European Commission in
April 2017, only 30% of Spaniards believe in the independence of justice in Spain. In
the same vein, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
reported in June 2017, that Spain had only partially
implemented 25% of the Group’s
previous recommendations regarding judicial independence, while completely ignoring
the remaining 75%.
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 URU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 19: Henvendelse af 23. oktober 2017 fra Cataloniens regerings delegation i Danmark og de nordiske lande om situationen i Catalonien
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12. Failure to respect unfavourable rulings
The Spanish
State’s zeal when it comes to recentralizing powers through the
Constitutional Court, contrasts with its reluctance to comply with court rulings when
these are unfavourable to its interests. There are currently 34 rulings by Spanish
Courts in favour of Catalonia, which the Spanish Government simply ignores (3 on
education, 24 on social services, 3 on environmental matters and 4 on culture).
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