OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

OSCEs Parlamentariske Forsamling 2017-18
OSCE Alm.del Bilag 23
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AS (18) RP 1 E

Original: English

REPORT

FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE ON

POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY

Implementing OSCE Commitments:

The Role of Parliaments

RAPPORTEUR

Mr. Kristian Vigenin

Bulgaria

BERLIN, 7

–

11 JULY 2018

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

REPORT FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY

Rapporteur: Mr. Kristian Vigenin (Bulgaria)

Introduction

Given the current political landscape, it is now more crucial than ever for the OSCE to pursue

the successful and complete implementation of its principles, which are expressed through the

Organization's core documents and the commitment made by participating States to uphold

these. Hindrances to the implementation of OSCE commitments exist, not least due to the

current geopolitical tensions in the OSCE region. These tensions revolve around various

matters, such as the division within Europe resulting from the situation in and around Ukraine,

the persistent issue of protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, as well as continuing tensions in

the Western Balkans, rising extremist and terrorist threats and the topic of migration. Further

developments straining the OSCE region can be seen in the decline in confidence in non-

proliferation- and arms-reduction agreements.

It is only by upholding the values and commitments of the Organization that the OSCE space

can be made more secure. OSCE participating States have agreed to a comprehensive set of

commitments in the politico-military sphere to ensure security in the region, which include a

variety of confidence- and security-building measures, such as regular information exchanges,

means for verification and compliance, and various forms of military co-operation. These

procedures aim to increase trust among OSCE participating States and contribute to greater

openness and transparency in the field of military planning and activities. Various forums exist

within the Organization to support participating States' efforts to stay in keeping with OSCE

principles.

This report will be structured in two parts. The first part will address central commitments

made by participating States and the channels through which the OSCE facilitates their

implementation, as well as forums that exist to facilitate dialogue and reform. The second part

will touch upon five main points: non-proliferation, protracted conflicts, the crisis in and

around Ukraine, cyber-security, and counter-terrorism.

OSCE Commitments in the Politico-Military Sphere

In the first dimension of the OSCE's work, core commitments address arms control,

disarmament, and non-proliferation, as well as democratic control of armed forces. These

commitments are deepened and expressed through a set of (military) confidence- and security-

building measures (CSBMs), meaning primarily agreements to exchange military information.

Newer commitments have been made on a voluntary basis in the field of cyber-security. In this

field confidence-building measures foster transparency and co-operation between States on

cyber- and ICT security matters. Many of these commitments are interrelated, together

establishing the overall security regime which applies to the OSCE area. Together they enhance

predictability, transparency, and military stability and reduce the risk of major conflict in

Europe.

The Vienna Document

is one of the most important tools the OSCE has to ensure reliable

information exchange. First adopted in 1990, and updated several times since then, it is one of

the most sophisticated CSBMs the Organization possesses. Building on the Helsinki Final Act's

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

provisions for early notification of military exercises,

this politically binding agreement

requires its signatories to annually provide each other with information about their military

forces, notify each other ahead of time about major military exercises, accept inspection and

evaluation visits, invite other States to observe certain activities, and to consult and co-operate

in case of unusual military activity or increasing tensions

Another central commitment in the politico-military sphere is expressed in the

OSCE

Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

(SALW). Adopted in 2000, it provides

guidelines on dealing with threats such weapons can pose, as well as providing assistance upon

request in securing stockpiles, disposing of small arms, and enhancing border controls to reduce

illicit arms trafficking. By promoting common norms, principles, and tools for its participating

States on SALW issues, the OSCE encourages a shared understanding of the key principles to

counter the spread and accumulation of illicit small arms and light weapons. Hindering illicit

trafficking and promoting demilitarization and defence transformation projects is enabled

through various forums of the OSCE, including the recently adopted OSCE Best Practice Guide

on Deactivation of SALW.

Finally, a landmark document in security sector governance,

the Code of Conduct on Politico-

Military Aspects of Security,

deserves particular emphasis when considering the

commitments made by national governments in the political and security dimension of the

OSCE. Adopted in 1994, the Code of Conduct regulates how States control armed forces within

their constitutional framework, ensuring that the military, paramilitary and security forces,

intelligence services, and the police are at all times subject to civilian control and the authority

of a democratically elected body. This direct involvement of national parliaments must be seen

as especially relevant to the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in its efforts to implement

first dimension commitments.

The Code of Conduct deepens and codifies the important principles of the Helsinki Final Act

that guide relations between States, particularly concerning the non-use of force, but goes

beyond this conventional framework by adding unique norms of politico-military conduct

within States. Both the scope of the Code of Conduct, as well as its politically binding nature,

leave it unparalleled in any other organization.

Implementation of OSCE Commitments

Implementation of the Code of Conduct is enabled through various channels, such as the

Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct, through the organization of

awareness and outreach conferences, as well as through workshops and seminars, which are

held for participating States and other interested States and Partners for Co-operation to address

issues surrounding the Code of Conduct.

Another tool relating to the Code of Conduct is the Code of Conduct Questionnaire. Beginning

in 1999, participating States have annually exchanged information on their implementation of

the Code of Conduct by making use of the Questionnaire. Newer versions have since been

introduced that added a number of sub-questions, for instance on anti-terrorism efforts. As the

Code of Conduct takes a comprehensive approach to security and addresses issues that go far

beyond the boundaries and competencies of politico-military establishments, its ultimate

implementation requires the participation of parliamentarians and civil society.

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

National parliaments play a central role in facilitating effective oversight of the private and

public security sectors. When active political support is given, parliaments greatly increase the

Code of Conduct's legitimacy and relevance, which improves oversight and control of their

national intelligence services and ensures respect for the human rights of service members. The

OSCE PA has issued comprehensive resolutions on the Code of Conduct that urge all

participating States to acknowledge and agree to its instruments, in particular regarding

parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Among these OSCE PA resolutions are the 1992

Budapest Declaration, which states that elected parliaments must have the ultimate authority

and responsibility for the activities of the military forces.

Implementation of OSCE commitments is assessed by various forums. The

Forum for

Security Co-Operation (FSC)

is an autonomous decision-making body where representatives

of participating States meet weekly to consult on military stability and security. Its main tasks

include regular consultations and intensive co-operation on military security matters. Aside

from developing norms and providing practical assistance, the FSC further facilitates annual

exchanges of military information (AEMI), an Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC),

various seminars, workshops, and politico-military retreats, as well as Annual Implementation

Assessment Meetings (AIAM). Another source for assessing implementation is offered by the

Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC),

which issues a monthly report on major implementation

activities. The CPC supports the work of the FSC and enables exchange of information through

the OSCE communications network.

Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting

At the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), participating States discuss the

present and future implementation of agreed upon confidence- and security-building measures.

During the 2018 AIAM, the working sessions addressed the implementation of the Global

Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), as well as specific chapters of the Vienna

Document related to the annual exchange of military information (AEMI), defence planning,

risk reduction, as well as compliance and verification issues.

The final working session pointed to three concrete improvements to the implementation and

modernization of the Vienna Document. Firstly, it was contended that this could be achieved

by utilizing a variety of other military-to-military contacts and collaborations besides classic

inspection and evaluation activities. Secondly, it was suggested that there is a need for a greater

level of analysis of the information provided. A more thorough analysis of the data at hand

could enhance the confidence- and security-building effect of the already existing amount of

exchanged information, adding a qualitative overview to the quantitative assessment provided

by the Conflict Prevention Centre.

Finally, it was stressed that the AIAM itself could be made better use of by, for example,

enhancing the flow of information between the AIAM and the Heads of Verification Centres

(HoV), which both provide platforms to discuss present and future implementation of agreed

upon CSBMs but are arguably not being used to their full potential. Improving how these

meetings interrelate with each other may contribute to a more effective use of these platforms.

OSCE Structured Dialogue

An important process for informal dialogue in the politico-military sphere of the OSCE's work

can be seen in the

Structured Dialogue (SD).

Launched under Germany's 2016 OSCE

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

Chairmanship, continued by Austria's 2017 Chairmanship, and considered a priority of the

current Italian Chairmanship, the Structured Dialogue includes discussions on threat

perceptions, security concerns and challenges to the European rules-based security order, as

well as mapping of military trends. It emphasizes the role of military communication in de-

escalation and risk reduction and allows for in-depth analyses of force postures and military

exercises. By providing participating States with access to official and reliable sources, the

Structured Dialogue furthermore increases transparency and seeks to foster understanding and

find common ground to reverse the negative trends in the arms control architecture and to

revitalize co-operative security in Europe. The informal working group on the Structured

Dialogue has set out to solidify the SD as a state-driven process that in the coming year will

emphasize stronger dialogue and greater exchange among military experts.

Security Sector Governance and Reform

Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) is recognized by the OSCE and its

participating States as playing an essential role in conflict prevention, early warning, crisis

management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Although Security Sector Governance and

Reform is a relatively new concept, it goes hand in hand with the OSCE's comprehensive

understanding of security, fostering transparency and accountability. Through its institutions

and field operations, the Organization has provided expertise to participating States on many

important aspects of SSG/R, co-ordinating with external partners while respecting national

ownership of SSG/R. Important areas of SSG/R include police reform, border management and

security, and counter-terrorism. Other central aspects of SSG/R are reforms aiming at ensuring

gender sensitivity and creating greater inclusivity for women in the military, as stipulated in

the UN Security Council's Resolution 1325.

In order to enable implementation of OSCE-led SSG/R, in 2016 the OSCE released a set of

guidelines that support OSCE executive structures and their staff in their pursuit of a coherent

and co-ordinated approach to supporting nationally led SSG/R processes. It furthermore

released a guidebook on intelligence-led policing to assist with national efforts at police reform.

Practical activities in the area of reform and co-operation in the security sector include

legislation reform, downsizing and conversion of armies, and training personnel on the rights

of servicemen and servicewomen. These activities are conducted by OSCE field operations,

the OSCE Secretariat, and a number of other OSCE institutions, such as the OSCE Office for

democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Conflict Prevention Centre.

Non-Proliferation

The OSCE region is increasingly affected by a decline in confidence in and adherence to

nuclear non-proliferation agreements, as support for commitments to nuclear non-proliferation

and disarmament have lessened on a global scale. Coinciding with this trend of declining

confidence in nuclear weapons reduction agreements is a heightened confrontational rhetoric

of world leaders, which contributes to and exacerbates the decline in nuclear security.

Given these circumstances, the importance and necessity of implementing non-proliferation

treaties such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on preventing the

proliferation of nuclear weapons (UNSCR 1540) are of greatest importance and fully supported

by the OSCE. This also applies to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), of

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

which all OSCE participating States are signatories.

Comprehensive tracking of nuclear

activities is enabled through the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-

Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which makes sure that no nuclear explosion goes

undetected through the International Monitoring System (IMS). The OSCE PA, as a facilitator

with direct links to civil society, has a strong potential to support the CTBT. The importance

and necessity of these resolutions and treaties is particularly relevant in the light of today's

volatile and unpredictable nuclear environment.

Despite these heightened tensions, some progress is being made. The 2017 Treaty on the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons stands out as the first legally binding international agreement

to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, with the goal of their total elimination. As of the

April 2018, fifty-eight States have signed the Treaty.

Protracted Conflicts

The lack of progress towards the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the

numerous violations of the ceasefire on the Line of Contact in recent years are cause for

concern. A return to the negotiation table by all parties is needed to avoid further military

confrontation and to de-escalate the situation. The High Level Planning Group was established

for this purpose within the framework of the OSCE with a mandate issued in 1995 aimed at the

preparation of a future peacekeeping operation in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The OSCE should utilize the full potential of its conflict resolution mechanisms, through the

work of the Minsk Group, as well as through the Parliamentary Assembly, to stabilize the

situation and work toward a comprehensive peace agreement.

The Transdniestrian conflict, which was a priority of the 2017 Austrian OSCE Chairmanship,

remains high on the agenda of the work of the OSCE. In 2016, under the German OSCE

Chairmanship and with the help of mediators and observers, the Transdniestrian Settlement

Process resumed its "5+2 format", with a commitment from both sides to produce results. It

remains essential to reach a comprehensive, peaceful, and sustainable settlement of this conflict

based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. Parliamentarians

play a key role in reaching a long-lasting settlement, and the OSCE PA encourages the

resumption of formal contact between the legislative bodies on both sides, without

preconditions and in good faith, to ensure political support for the solutions identified in the

talks.

In relation to the conflict in Georgia, the Russian Federation should implement the EU-

brokered Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008 that ended the conflicts in

Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia nearly ten years ago. The Russian

Federation should also refrain from using and withdraw its military forces in order to create

conditions for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Parliamentary diplomacy should enhance

confidence-building between both sides and create an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual

trust. The OSCE PA rejects the holding of parliamentary elections in Abkhazia and the

approval of a military deal between South Ossetia and the Russian Federation, as well as

unilateral decisions such as changing the name of the South Ossetia region.

Of these, all but the United States of America have ratified the Treaty.

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

Ukraine

The OSCE PA has been clear that the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian

Federation was illegal and illegitimate. At the same time the OSCE PA continues to promote

dialogue and a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in and around Ukraine, organizing some of

the only contacts between Russian and Ukrainian parliamentarians since the conflict began.

The crisis can only be resolved through constructive and inclusive dialogue. The Assembly has

held debates on the situation and parliamentarians have led the OSCE's short-term election

observation activities in Ukraine.

The implementation of all provisions of the Minsk II agreement of 11 February 2015 by all

sides remains the key for a comprehensive peace agreement in the Donbas. Despite setbacks,

the goals set forth in these agreements are still achievable and remain the best path forward for

Ukraine and the region. The Italian Chairmanship is dedicated to ensuring that full political

support will be given to the efforts to seek a solution to the Ukraine crisis on the basis of the

Minsk agreements and in the Normandy format.

Cyber-Security

Central risks posed by cyber-attacks pertain to States' critical infrastructure such as water

supply systems, power grids and transport networks. Given the importance of critical

infrastructure to national security and the rapid expansion of the cyber space, it has become

more likely that tensions will arise between States over Information Communication

Technologies (ICTs) incidents involving critical infrastructure. Consequently, efforts to

enhance cyber stability between States, which can prevent tensions and even conflicts,

increasingly focus on effectively protecting critical infrastructure from cyber- and ICT security

threats.

A key focus is on the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) between

participating States to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs. The OSCE

has adopted two sets of CBMs aimed at reducing the risk of conflict stemming from the use of

ICTs. The first set of transparency measures established official contact points and

communication lines to prevent possible tensions resulting from cyber activities. The second

set is focused on further enhancing co-operation between participating States

—

including, for

example, to effectively mitigate cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure that could affect more

than one participating State.

In addition to the cyber- and ICT security CBMs, the OSCE and its institutions also focus on

tackling cyber- and ICT security threats from non-state actors, such as organized criminals and

terrorists. The OSCE therefore addresses various cyber threats, including cybercrimes and the

use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, by promoting adequate and timely responses by

national authorities to these evolving threats, ranging from better forensics to innovative

approaches to prevent ICTs from becoming tactical facilitators for terrorists.

Counter-Terrorism

The OSCE promotes a co-operative and co-ordinated approach to countering terrorism at all

levels, including co-ordination among national authorities, co-operation among States, co-

operation with relevant international and regional organizations and, where appropriate,

establishment of public-private partnerships between state authorities, the private sector, civil

OSCE, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 23: Praktik og procedurer i forbindelse med den årlige session i Berlin fra 7. til 11. juli 2018

society and the media. The increasing threat to domestic security posed by the radicalization

of mainly young people and resulting in terrorism represents an imminent risk to the entire

OSCE area and was a major focus of the 2017 Austrian OSCE Chairmanship.

Strategic focus areas of the OSCE in countering terrorism include promoting the

implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and enhancing

international legal co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism, countering violent

extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, and preventing and suppressing the

financing of terrorism. Countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, strengthening

travel document security, and promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental

freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures are further areas in which the OSCE is

active.

Relevant activities are carried out by OSCE executive structures within their mandates,

particularly the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT), which was established by

the OSCE PA's Standing Committee at the 26

Annual Session in Minsk and sets out to assess

terrorism trends in the OSCE region to identify priority areas of engagement for the PA, aiming

to advance its efforts in the field of countering terrorism.