Forsvarsudvalget 2017-18
FOU Alm.del Bilag 75
Offentligt
1869425_0001.png
United Nations
S
/2018/171
Distr.: General
5 March 2018
Original: English
Security Council
Note by the President of the Security Council
In paragraph 2 of resolution
2345 (2017),
the Security Council requested the
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009)
to provide a final
report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel
of Experts (see annex).
18-01593 (E)
*1801593*
150318
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0002.png
S/2018/171
Annex
Letter dated 1 March 2018 from the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009)
addressed to the President of
the Security Council
The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009)
has the
honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution
2345
(2017),
the final report on its work.
The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee establishe d
pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006)
on 1 February 2018 and was considered by the
Committee on 21 February 2018.
The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its enclosure were brought
to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of
the Council.
(Signed) Hugh
Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution
1874 (2009)
(Signed) Benoit
Camguilhem
Expert
(Signed) Dmitry
Kiku
Expert
(Signed) Stephanie
Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert
(Signed) Maiko
Takeuchi
Expert
(Signed) Neil
Watts
Expert
(Signed) Jong Kwon
Youn
Expert
(Signed) Jiahu
Zong
Expert
2/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0003.png
S/2018/171
Enclosure
Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009)
addressed to the
Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution
1718 (2006)
The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution
1874
(2009)
has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of
Security Council resolution
2345 (2017),
the final report on its work.
The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought
to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006).
(Signed) Hugh
Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution
1874 (2009)
(Signed) Benoit
Camguilhem
Expert
(Signed) Dmitry
Kiku
Expert
(Signed) Stephanie
Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert
(Signed) Maiko
Takeuchi
Expert
(Signed) Neil
Watts
Expert
(Signed) Jong Kwon
Youn
Expert
(Signed) Jiahu
Zong
Expert
18-01593
3/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0004.png
S/2018/171
Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution
1874 (2009)
Summary
In 2017, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea intensified its advanced
nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities through the largest nuclear test to date,
flight tests of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and an intermediate -range ballistic
missile and a threat to conduct an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific Ocean. The
Security Council adopted four resolutions, by which it strengthened existing sanctions
and introduced new measures, including petroleum sanctions and a crude oil cap . In
addition to ongoing violations and increasingly sophisticated evasion practices, the
Panel’s latest investigations show that the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea is
already flouting the most recent resolutions by exploiting global oil supply chai ns,
complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking
system.
The Panel investigated illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum comprising a
multi-million-dollar business that is driving an international network of brokers and
ship charterers as well as unwitting global commodity trading companies and oil
suppliers. In tandem, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to export
almost all the commodities prohibited in the resolutions, generating nearly
$200 million in revenue between January and September 2017. In continuing its illicit
coal exports, the country combined deceptive navigation patterns, signals
manipulation, trans-shipment and fraudulent documentation to obscure the origin of
the coal. While the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006)
has designated seven vessels for coal and petroleum transfers, a
coordinated effort by Member States is crucial to curb these r ampant illicit activities.
At the same time, the heightened sanctions have created lucrative markets for
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-backed traders seeking to procure petroleum
while exporting the country’s natural resources. The profit margins involved, coupled
with the offshore nature of much of the affected oil, maritime and finance sectors,
necessitate far greater private sector due diligence, information -sharing and self-
policing.
The Panel investigated a wide array of prohibited military cooperation projects
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stretching from Africa to the Asia -
Pacific region, including ongoing ballistic missile cooperation with the Syrian Arab
Republic and Myanmar, widespread conventional arms deals and cyberoper ations to
steal military secrets. The Panel’s investigations show that diplomats of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to play a key role in the country’s
prohibited programmes, in particular trade representatives and missions which provide
logistical support for arms transfers, military technicians and intelligence operations,
acting as fronts for designated entities and individuals and engaging in commercial
activities that violate the resolutions and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is accessing the global financial
system through deceptive practices combined with critical deficiencies in the
implementation of financial sanctions. Financial institutions of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain more than
30 overseas representatives who live and move freely across borders in the Middle
East and Asia, where they control bank accounts, facilitate transactions and deal in
bulk cash. Corporate service providers present a key vulnerability in the
implementation of financial sanctions, allowing the Democratic People ’s Republic of
4/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0005.png
S/2018/171
Korea to easily create front companies offshore and in Asian financial centres, where
they leverage the assistance of non-nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and use the firms to open and maintain accounts to move money worldwide.
Joint ventures with foreign companies have further generated hard currency through
overseas companies with no overt links to designated entities or interests of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Financial investigations highlight the activity
of intelligence agents and other individuals acting on behalf of designated entities,
operating bank accounts in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region and using diplomatic
passports and diplomatic-plated cars to cross land and air borders with less scrutiny.
The international community has responded to the unprecedented nuclear and
ballistic missile activities of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea in 2017 by
introducing an array of new measures that seek to change the country’s behaviour and
direction in 2018. However, this expansion of the regime is yet to be matched by the
requisite political will, international coordination, prioritization and resource
allocation necessary to drive effective implementation. The year 2018 could represent
a critical window of opportunity before a potential miscalculation with disastrous
implications for international peace and security.
The present report offers a series of recommendations for designation and other
practical measures to assist Member States and the Security Council in addressing
challenges and shortcomings.
Contents
Page
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Introduction
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programmes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sectoral sanctions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Embargoes, designated entities and individuals
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finance
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unintended impact of sanctions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
7
15
36
59
78
80
Annexes*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal
editing.
18-01593
5/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0006.png
S/2018/171
I. Introduction
1.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea undertook its sixth nuclear test, on
3 September 2017, and conducted 20 ballistic missile launches, including
3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, in defiance of the resolutions and in line with its
intent to accelerate the completion of its nuclear forces as stated in Kim Jong Un ’s
2017 New Year’s address.
1
After the launch of the new intercontinental ballistic
missile Hwasong-15 on 29 November 2017, Kim made a declaration on “completing
the State nuclear force”.
2
In his 2018 New Year’s address, he further stated that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had accomplished the “cause of perfecting
the national nuclear forces” and attributed this to “simultaneously conducting
economic construction and building up our nuclear forces (
Byongjin),
and its idea of
prioritizing science”.
3
2.
Domestically, Kim Jong Un further consolidated his power base by
strengthening the party’s control over the military and the executive. In 2017, the
Workers’ Party of Korea conducted its first political audit of the General Political
Bureau of the Korean People’s Army in 20 years.
4
Kim used the Presidium of the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers ’ Party of Korea of
3 September 2017 to make an official decision to conduct the sixth nuclear test.
During the second plenum of the seventh Central Committee of the Workers ’ Party of
Korea, on 7 October 2017, Kim selected new members of the Political Bureau o f the
Workers’ Party and reaffirmed his adherence to the
Byongjin
policy, while
re-emphasizing the “independence and self-reliance” against sanctions.
5
3.
The continued violations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the
resolutions further deepened its diplomatic and economic isolation. In 2017, several
Member States expelled ambassadors of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
and reduced the number of accredited diplomats, and some severed or reduced their
commercial ties, often in protest of the country’s continued pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction programmes and other illicit activities. However, even after the visit
of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the country in December 2017
and the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue to discuss participation in the 2018
Olympic Winter Games, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated that the
“nuclear force of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not a bargaining chip
for political purpose and business” and the country “should continue to bolster up the
nuclear force”.
6
4.
Through the nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic missile tests conducted in
2017, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea appears to have achieved a number
of important technical milestones in its weapons of mass destruction capability. There
are no indications that such activities will cease, and the stated goals of achieving
denuclearization and a peaceful solution to the situation seem increasingly remote.
The country also continued to condemn actions by the United Nations on its human
rights record, including the adoption of General Assembly resolution
72/188
of
19 December 2017, in which the Assembly encouraged the continuation o f the
__________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
“Kim Jong Un reviews achievements made last year”, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA),
1 January 2017.
“DPRK Government statement on successful test-fire of new-type ICBM”, KCNA, 29 November
2017.
“Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address”, Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 2018.
“North Korea carries out first political audit of army in 20 years ”,
Hankyoreh,
21 November
2017.
“Second Plenum of Seventh WPK Central Committee”, KCNA, 8 October 2017.
“DPRK’s nuclear deterrent guarantees peace”, Rodong Sinmun, 12 January 2018.
18-01593
6/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0007.png
S/2018/171
Security Council’s consideration of and discussion on the human rights situation in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
5.
The Panel continues to be targeted by a sophisticated hacking campaign, first
noted in its 2017 midterm report.
7
While this campaign has continued up through the
time of writing, the Panel is investigating another attack. Microsoft confirmed that
this attack was conducted by a “nation-State-associated” threat actor group
8
(see
annex 1), and the United Nations concluded that the attacks discovered in October
2017 “can be linked to an earlier incident in May 2017 and demonstrate the persistent
nature of the attacks and the level of determination by the adversary” (see annex 2).
The Panel is investigating these cases and is of the view that the strategic nature of
the phishing, the emails selected for forwarding and the disruptive nature of the
campaign amount to sanctions evasion.
Recommendation
6.
In line with the requests in the most recent resolutions to provide the Panel
with additional resources, the Panel recommends that the Security Council request
the Secretary-General to take specific measures to reinforce both the physical and
information security, administrative support and other relevant resources.
II. Ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction programmes
Launches
7.
Between August 2017 and January 2018, the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea launched two Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (over Japan)
and one Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (table 1). After the latter, Kim
Jong Un declared that “the State nuclear force had been completed”.
9
However, it is
more likely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is yet to validate the
capacity of a nuclear payload to survive re-entry in the atmosphere for its
intercontinental ballistic missile.
Table 1
Launches of ballistic missiles, August 2017 to January 2018
Date
Type
Number
Reported launch
location
Reported flown
distance (km)
Remark
26 August
29 August
15 September
29 November
Scud or Scud variant
Hwasong-12
Hwasong-12
Hwasong-15
3
1
1
1
Kittaeryong
Sunan
Sunan
Pyongsong
250
2 700
3 700
950
1 or 2 reported
failures
Over Japan
Over Japan
4 475 km apogee
8.
The designated Strategic Force of the Korean People ’s Army was responsible
for the two intermediate-range ballistic missile launches (figure I), which were
supervised by Kim Jong Un, who stated that they were aimed at confirming “the actual
__________________
7
8
9
This campaign has been ongoing for several years (see
S/2017/742,
footnote 1).
See annex 1 (Microsoft report, 20 November 2017).
“Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of Hwasong-15”, KCNA, 29 November 2017.
7/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0008.png
S/2018/171
war capacity of the intermediate- and long-range strategic ballistic rocket”.
10
Following the second test, he asserted that “the combat efficiency and reliability of
Hwasong-12 were thoroughly verified”.
11
Figure I
Hwasong-12 launches on 29 August (left) and 15 September (right)
Source:
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
9.
In a major milestone for its ballistic missile programme, on 29 November 2017,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully launched a new
intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15. Similar to that of the two Hwasong-
14 launches in July, this launch was on a steeply lofted trajectory. The missile travelled
approximately 53 minutes before falling into the exclusive economic z one of Japan.
12
10. The Hwasong-15 is a two-stage liquid-fuel ballistic missile featuring a twin engine
on its first stage. It was transported on a nine-axle truck never observed before. The
Hwasong-15 appears to be the longest-range ballistic missile ever tested by the country
(figure II).
13
Despite the claim by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the
Hwasong-15 “is capable of carrying super-heavy nuclear warhead and attacking the
whole mainland of the United States”,
14
the Panel is still gathering information on its
exact capabilities.
15
__________________
10
11
12
13
14
15
“Kim Jong Un guides strategic ballistic rocket launching drill of KPA strategic force”, KCNA,
30 August 2017.
“Kim Jong Un guides Hwasong-12 launching drill again”, KCNA, 16 September 2017.
Ministry of Defence of Japan, “North Korea missile launch (2nd)”, press release, 29 November
2017.
Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) analysis based on KCNA images
assessed the diameter to be approximately 2.5 m and length around 20.5 m.
“Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of Hwasong-15”, Korean Central News Agency, 29 November
2017.
According to the Republic of Korea Defence Ministry’s 1 December 2017 statement “in the case
it was fired at a normal angle, it would be capable of flying over 13,000 km”. Regarding the
range, it is not known whether the payload used for the test launch of 29 November 2017 had a
mass similar to that of an operational payload.
18-01593
8/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0009.png
S/2018/171
Figure II
Hwasong-15 launch on 29 November 2017
Source:
KCNA.
11. Regarding the capacity of intercontinental ballistic missile payloads to re -enter
the atmosphere, according to a Member State, the success of the first intercontinental
ballistic missile test (launch of the Hwasong-14 on 4 July 2017) is unclear, while it is
believed that the re-entry vehicle of the second intercontinental ballistic missile test
disintegrated (launch of the Hwasong-14 on 28 July 2017). The re-entry vehicle of
the 29 November 2017 launch also reportedly failed. With regard to the re -entry
technology, the Panel notes the statement by the Ministry of National Defence of the
Republic of Korea regarding the 29 November 2017 test declaring that the launch
“didn’t provide the capabilities of atmospheric re-entry, precise guidance or the
operation of a nuclear warhead”.
16
Test site activities
12. The Hwasong-12 and the first stage of the Hwasong-14 appear to be powered
by the same liquid-fuel engine with four auxiliary engines tested on 18 March 2017
at the Sohae engine test pad (figure III). Kim Jong Un again supervised the test, which
was described as that of a new “high-thrust engine”.
17
13. Given the unreliability of the Hwasong-10 engine, this new engine was a step-
change in allowing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to rapidly achieve a
reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile and intercontinental ballistic missile
capability.
__________________
16
17
Ibid.
“Kim Jong Un watches ground jet test of newly developed high-thrust engine”, Korean Central
News Agency, 19 March 2017.
9/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0010.png
S/2018/171
Figure III
Hwasong-14 engine (left), Hwasong-12 engine (right) and new engine tested on
18 March 2017 (bottom)
Source:
KCNA.
14. According to a Member State, this engine could have been derived from the
Soviet-era RD-250, a twin-combustion chamber engine (figure IV). The RD-250 was
designed by the “Scientific and Production Association Energomash” (now in the
Russian Federation), which in 1965 transferred the design documentation required for
serial production to the Yuzhnoye State Design Office and the Yuzhmash Productio n
Association (both now in Ukraine). Ukraine confirmed to the Panel that it was highly
likely that the engine of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea contained
separate components of this engine and used the same propellant components
(nitrogen tetroxide or NTO and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine or UDMH).
According to information provided to the Panel by the United States of America, “the
U.S. Intelligence Community has publicly stated that ‘We have intelligence to suggest
that North Korea is not reliant on imports of engines. Instead we judge they have the
ability to produce the engines themselves.’”
15. Ukraine informed the Panel that all RD-250 engines suitable for flight use were
delivered to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the U nion of Soviet
Socialist Republics and, later, the Russian Federation as part of missiles or launch
vehicles. The production of RD-250 engines ceased in 1991 and the production line
was dismantled in 1994. Ukraine stated that Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash had “never
undertaken attempts, signed contracts or entered into relationship with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Ukraine also informed the Panel that
“design, manufacturing and other documentation for production of missile technology
and components is reliably stored in specially equipped premises”.
10/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0011.png
S/2018/171
Figure IV
Comparison between the RD-250 engine (left) and the engine of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (right)
Source:
The Panel.
16. According to Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash experts, it is “impossible to modernize
or create a new engine based on the existing one within two years without design and
technological support”. Franz Klintzevich, first Deputy Chair of the Defence and
Security Committee of the Federation Council, Federal Assembl y of the Russian
Federation, asserted that “the cooperation between the Ukrainian specialists and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been ongoing for years”.
18
The Panel
contacted the Russian Federation to request support for this claim along wit h the
names and passport information of the individuals involved, but did not receive a
reply. For its part, Ukraine informed the Panel that “it was continuously tracking
employees of aerospace industry companies travelling abroad”.
Recent nuclear-related activities
3 September 2017 nuclear test
17. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
stated on 3 September 2017 that the country had “successfully carried out a test of
H-bomb for ICBM”.
19
The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) detected “an unusual seismic event” near the
previous location (at Punggye-ri) (figure V).
20
The 6.07 magnitude makes it the
largest test yet.
21
Two Member States estimated the yield at above 100 kilotons,
although the type of device has yet to be confirmed.
22
Consistent with this higher
yield, several aftershocks occurred, suggesting additional damage to the test site.
However, excavation work continued after the test, ostensibly to mainta in the
readiness of the site.
__________________
18
19
20
21
22
Federal News Agency article dated 16 August 2017.
“DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute on Successful Test of H-bomb for ICBM”, KCNA,
3 September 2017.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization(CTBTO), “CTBTO Executive Secretary
Lassina Zerbo on the unusual seismic event detected in the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea”, press release, 3 September 2017.
Magnitude of past tests (CTBTO): 5.10 (September 2016), 4.82 (January 20 16), 4.92 (2013),
4.51 (2009) and 4.08 (2006).
Japan estimated a 160 kiloton yield (Defense Minister Onodera, 6 September 2017), while
France reported to the Panel an estimated yield of above 100 kilotons. Japan also noted that the
possibility of an H-bomb “could not be ruled out”.
11/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0012.png
S/2018/171
Figure V
Test location estimates for 2006 (green), 2009 (yellow), 2013 (blue),
January 2016 (orange), September 2016 (pink) and 2017 (red)
Source:
CTBTO.
Continuing activities and infrastructure expansion
18. According to KCNA, on 3 September 2017, Kim Jong Un provided “guidance
to nuclear weaponization” showcasing a metal object and device (figure VI). A
Member State assessed that the object appeared to be a nuclear device model with
external characteristics associated with a thermonuclear device.
Figure VI
Object inspected by Kim Jong Un with the image of a missile warhead in
the background
Source:
KCNA.
12/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0013.png
S/2018/171
19. In its report of August 2017, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
stated that there were indicators of the operation of the 5 MW (e) reactor.
23
In
addition, a Member State informed the Panel that the reactor operated constantly
throughout 2017 except for two short periods in May and September. IAEA also
observed mining and milling and concentration activities at the Pyongsan uranium
mine and concentration plant.
24
20. Further construction and refurbishment activities also continued at the
Yongbyon nuclear complex, including at the light water reactor.
25
A Member State
detected a probable temperature rise in the water discharge area in May and
September 2017 and assessed that the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea might
have conducted tests on each occasion.
Nuclear Weapons Institute
21. The primary role of the Nuclear Weapons Institute in nuclear development is
evidenced through its announcement of the last two nuclear tests.
26
According to two
Member States, it is subordinate to the designated Munitions Industry Department
27
and its head is Ri Hong-Sop, who has already been designated as the former director
of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.
Recommendation
22.
The Panel recommends that the Committee update the existing list of
designated individuals and entities as follows:
(a)
Ri Hong-Sop (KPi.004)
Designation: Head of Nuclear Weapons Institute
(b)
Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028)
Other information:
The Munitions Industry Department oversees the nuclear programme of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Nuclear Weapons Institute
is subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.
(c)
Designate the following as being engaged in the nuclear-related
programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:
Name: Nuclear Weapons Institute
A.k.a.: na
Address: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Other information:
The Nuclear Weapons Institute is engaged in the nuclear programme of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is led by Ri Hong-Sop. It is
subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.
__________________
23
24
25
26
27
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Application of safeguards in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea”, document GOV/2017/36-GC(61)/21.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See
S/2017/150,
para. 17.
See
S/2017/150,
para. 50.
13/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0014.png
S/2018/171
Other weapons of mass destruction programmes
23. The Kim Jong Nam
28
assassination trial began on 1 October 2017 at Shah Alam
High Court in Malaysia and is ongoing at the time of writing. During the open court
proceedings, one of the doctors who conducted the autopsy o f Kim testified that the
cause of death was “acute nerve agent VX poisoning”.
29
The court heard testimonies
and examined evidence relating to two female suspects in custody who, according to
the Malaysian police investigation, applied the VX precursors to t he face of the
victim, and the four male suspects from the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
who remain at large.
30
24. The lead case investigator from the Malaysian police testified that Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea Embassy official Hyon Kwang Song and Air Koryo
representative Kim Uk Il met three of the four suspects from the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea at Kuala Lumpur International Airport within an hour of the attack.
He further stated that the Air Koryo representative
31
assisted the three suspects at the
airport check-in counter in addition to arranging a flight on a different airline for the
fourth suspect to exit Malaysia.
32
Court testimony also revealed the involvement of a
fifth suspect from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Ri Ji U” (a.k.a.
“James”, see annex 3).
25. The General Assembly, by its resolution
72/43
of 4 December 2017, reiterated
the grave concern expressed by the Executive Council of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its decision EC-84/DEC.8 of 9 March 2017 that,
according to statements by the Government of Malaysia, a chemical weapon — the
Schedule 1 nerve agent VX — was used “in a fatal incident on 13 February 2017 at
Kuala Lumpur International Airport 2”. The Panel has requested all relevant
information from Malaysia, but has yet to receive a reply. The investigation continues.
Sodium cyanide patent application
26. The Panel launched an investigation following media report ing that the website
of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) hosted a patent application
by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entitled “Process for the production
of sodium cyanide” (see annex 3-1). Sodium cyanide is a chemical weapons precursor
(including of the nerve agent, tabun) that has been designated by the Security Council
(see
S/2006/853,
p. 4, No. 143-33-9). Additionally, in its resolution
2270 (2016),
the
Council stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall abandon all
chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programmes and called upon
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to accede to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction.
27. The Panel requested from WIPO detailed information about the patent
application by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the listed inventors and
the entities with which they are affiliated. While WIPO provided a description of the
__________________
28
29
30
31
32
On 8 October 2017, Fuji TV reported that Kim Yu Song, a Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea Embassy official in Malaysia, acknowledged that the murder victim was Kim Jong Nam
(Putrajaya Hospital, 13 February 2017).
“Doctor: Kim Jong Nam’s underwear soiled, pupils contracted”, Associated Press, 27 November
2017.
Ri, Jae Nam; Hong, Song Hac; Ri, Ji Hyon; and O, Jong Gil (S/2017/742, annex 6).
In its August 2016 national implementation report, Malaysia stated that the last flight of Air Koryo
to Kuala Lumpur was on 8 June 2014 and has denied all flights’ overflight since then. The Panel
has requested of Malaysia information on the Air Koryo representative’s activities in Kuala Lumpur.
“Airport video shows North Korean embassy official with Kim Jong Nam murder suspects ”,
Reuters, 6 November 2017.
18-01593
14/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0015.png
S/2018/171
patent application process, it could not provide information on the inventors ’
affiliations, given that that information is not required in the patent application form.
The Panel notes that this makes it impossible to determine whether the inventors from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were affiliated with any designated
entities.
28. The Panel informed WIPO that, although the organization had acted in
accordance with the Patent Cooperation Treaty in receiving and processing the
application, the Panel considered that pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council
resolution
2087 (2013),
WIPO should have contacted the Committee to ensure that
processing a patent application by the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
relating to the production of a substance banned by the Council was consistent with
the provisions of the resolutions. The Panel recommended that WIPO inform the
Committee of future patent applications by the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea relating to any items, substances or technologies prohibited under the
resolutions.
29. In addition to its standard procedure of checking the names appearing in patent
application forms against United Nations sanctions lists, the Panel also recommended
that WIPO introduce in the application form a mandatory field for the affiliation of
the inventors from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the relevant
addresses, telephone and fax numbers and government ministry or agency under
which they fall.
30. WIPO informed the Panel that the Mansudae Art Studio, an entity designated in
2017, had applied for a patent in 2008 (see annex 3 -2). Because entities designated
by the Security Council could file patent applications directly with a national or
regional patent office, the Panel recommends that Member States have their patent
office check whether any of the listed applicants and inve ntors are designated to
ensure that the fees received for the patent application process do not violate the
relevant financial provisions of the resolutions.
III. Sectoral sanctions
31. To monitor exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under
paragraph 30 of resolution
2270 (2106),
paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution
2321
(2016),
paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution
2371 (2017)
and paragraphs 13, 14 and
15 of resolution
2375 (2017),
the Panel analysed Member State customs data as
reported to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)
and the Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) or obtained through
commercial global trade databases, according to the HS codes listed in annex 4.
33
According to those statistics, during the period from January t o September 2017, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to export prohibited commodities
to generate at least $177 million in revenue. That number does not, however, include
imports of banned commodities from the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea that
were undetected or unreported by Member States to UN Comtrade, global databases
__________________
33
While the Security Council has adopted three new resolutions on sectoral sanctions since
September 2016, it does not specify the HS codes corresponding to the listed minerals.
Therefore, using the same methodology as for its two most recent reports, the Panel co nsulted
with the World Customs Organization to update its working list of HS codes to include the newly
sanctions items in resolutions
2371 (2017)
and
2375 (2017).
Because the Panel is reporting for
the annual period from January to September 2017, some of the data presented in the tables
below featured in the midterm report. The Panel’s monitoring of these commodities was
complicated by multiple reporting errors involving imports from the Republic of Korea being
mislabelled as coming from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
15/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0016.png
S/2018/171
or the Committee or wittingly or unwittingly falsely reported as imports from third
countries other than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Those exports would
add at least $19 million dollars to the country’s revenue from coal.
32. The Panel investigated more than 30 cases of exports of coal from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to at least four Member States in South-East
Asia, including several cases that involved the trans-shipment of coal via Russian Far
Eastern ports. In so doing, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made use of a
combination of multiple evasion techniques, routes and deceptive shipping tactics,
including manipulation of the Automatic Identification System, loitering, voyage
deviations and fraudulent documentation.
33. The Panel also investigated cases of ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products
in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution
2375 (2017)
and found that the
network behind the vessels was primarily based in Taiwan Province of China while
the affiliated companies were registered in the Marshall Islands and the British Virgin
Islands, with ships flagged in Dominica, Hong Kong, China, Panama and Sierra
Leone. The Panel is also investigating several multinational oil companies for their
roles in the supply chain of petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea.
Data from global trade databases
Iron and iron and steel products
Table 2
States importing iron and steel (HS 72) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
January to September 2017
(United States dollars)
Importing State
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
Total
Barbados
Bolivia
(Plurinational
State of)
Chile
China
Costa Rica
El Salvador
India
a
Ireland
Mexico
Pakistan
Philippines
Russian
Federation
b
Total
36 762
249 493
220 285
17 280
317 365
317 365
40 277
35 027
106 468
89 264
30 453
112 380
11 792
1 414 610 1 697 461 1 739 059
1 062 947
994 948
248 000
167 953
21 975
108 011
2 560
79 562
24 573
51 091
6 965
69 577
11 411
281 000
487 000
40 277
35 027
232 494
315 892
1 408 906
17 280
43 330
4 851 130
2 305 895
167 953
4 808 558 5 304 064 5 195 531 6 432 072 8 116 003 6 645 224 6 700 016 6 947 599 2 300 199 52 449 266
6 746 988 7 437 150 7 166 687 7 665 282 9 252 673 7 119 233 6 769 593 7 240 010 2 787 199 62 184 815
Source:
UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.
Note:
Where the data for the same month differed between the two sources, the Panel used the lower of the two figures. The Panel
has written to all relevant Member States requesting additional information.
a
Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 (S/2017/742, annex 36).
b
The Russian Federation informed the Panel that the transaction was exempted under paragraph 26 (c) of resolution
2321 (2016).
16/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0017.png
S/2018/171
34. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $62,184,815 in
iron and steel (HS code 72) between January and September 2017 to the following
countries: Barbados, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, China, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, India, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Russian
Federation. All exports after 4 September 2017 violated paragraph 8 of resolution
2371 (2017),
while those before 4 September 2017 violated paragraph 2 6 of resolution
2321 (2016)
unless an exemption was made under paragraph 26 (c) of the same
resolution.
Table 3
States importing iron and steel products (HS 73) from the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, January to September 2017
(United States dollars)
Importing State
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
Total
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ghana
India
a
Mexico
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Philippines
Russian
Federation
b
Thailand
Total
363 654
9 748
10 942
15 105
17 173
240
29 232
189 159
19 809
6 646
2 000
6 381
16 297
6 208
16
18 827
6 677
3 855
118 502
4 859
21 320
11 685
13 042
907 698
145 795
45 190
64 216
5 000
420
64 826
65 232
189 395
7 389 889
966 318 5 810 890
4 227
11 890
95 047
9 585
59 868
63 384
17 924
17 000
19 526
633 956
21 000
234 759
91 349
19 000
1 561 180
152 176
192 554
176 257
3 454
363 407
19 987
50 021 1 196 722
5 380
139 312
10 520
45 549
384 344 1 014 713 5 915 762
275 732
665 896 10 005 909
Source:
UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.
a
Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 (S/2017/742, annex 36).
b
The Russian Federation informed the Panel that the transactions were exempted under paragraph 26 (c) of resolution
2321 (2016).
35. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $10,005,909 in
iron and steel products (HS code 73) to China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, India,
Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Philippines, the Russian Federation and
Thailand between January and September 2017. All exports prior to 4 September 2017
constituted a violation of paragraph 26 of resolution
2321 (2016)
unless an exemption
was made under paragraph 26 (c). All exports thereafte r constituted violations of
paragraph 8 of resolution
2371 (2017).
18-01593
17/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0018.png
S/2018/171
Iron ore
Table 4
Iron ore imports (HS 2601) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (kg)
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
Total
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
10 770 987
10 865 501
19 153 140
20 260 043
13 391 114
11 512 741
9 194 639
8 195 365
54 638
103 398 168
168 266 111
165 743 540
259 477 204
285 490 000
233 507 851
1 112 484 706
Source:
Global Trade Atlas.
36. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $103,398,168
and 1,112,484,706 kg of iron ore (HS code 2601) to China between January and
September 2017. Exports before 4 September 2017 constituted a violation of
paragraph 26 of resolution
2321 (2016)
unless an exemption was made under
paragraph 26 (c) of the same resolution. Any exports that took place after 4 September
2017 constituted violations of paragraph 8 of resolution
2371 (2017).
Silver
Table 5
Imports of silver ores and concentrates (HS 261610) from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (kg)
January
February
March
April–September
Total
China
China
China
43 560
57 136
24 488
0
125 184
109 627
128 730
61 149
0
299 506
Source:
Global Trade Atlas.
37. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $125,184 and
299,506 kg of silver ores and concentrates between January and March 2017 to China
in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321 (2016).
No imports were reported
between April and September 2017.
18/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0019.png
S/2018/171
Copper and copper ores and concentrates
Table 6
Copper imports (HS 74) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (kg)
April
May
June
July
August
September
Total
Mexico
India
Mexico
India
Mexico
India
Mexico
India
6 592
6 021
1 268
37 976
13 990
47 000
109 079
152 000
373 926
–
Source:
UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.
38. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $373,926 in
copper (HS code 74) to India and Mexico between January and September 2017 in
violation of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321 (2016).
Table 7
Imports of copper ores and concentrates (HS 2603) from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (kg)
January
February
March–September
Total
China
China
97 826
2 371
0
100 197
500 882
44 860
0
545 742
Source:
Global Trade Atlas.
39. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported $100,197 and 545,742 kg
of copper, including copper ores and concentrates (2,603) in January and February
2017 to China in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321 (2016).
No imports
were reported between March and September 2017.
18-01593
19/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0020.png
S/2018/171
Table 8
Zinc and articles thereof imported (HS 79) from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (metric tons)
January
February–September
Total
India
a
526 018
0
526 018
–
Source:
UN Comtrade and Global Trade Atlas.
a
Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 (S/2017/742, annex 36).
40. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $526,018 in zinc
(HS 79) to India in January 2017 in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321
(2016).
No imports were reported between Februar y and September 2017.
Table 9
Zinc ore imports (HS 2608) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (metric tons)
January
February
March
April–September
Total
China
China
China
65 653
590 469
24 575
0
680 697
173
2 193
49
0
2 415
Source:
Global Trade Atlas.
41. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $680,697 and
2,415 metric tons of zinc ore to China between January and March 2017 in violation
of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321 (2016).
No imports were reported between April
and September 2017.
Table 10
Nickel imports (HS 75) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
January to September 2017
Month
Importing State
Value
(United States dollars)
Quantity (metric tons)
January
February–September
Total
China
42 000
0
42 000
4
0
4
Source:
Global Trade Atlas.
42. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $42,000 in
nickel in January 2017 to China in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution
2321
(2016).
No imports were reported between February and September 2017.
20/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0021.png
S/2018/171
Coal imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reported
tothe Committee
Coal
Table 11
Coal imports (HS 2701) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
reported to the Committee by Member States, January to September 2017
Month
Value (United States dollars)
Quantity (kg)
January
February
March
August
September
Total
126 390 037.84
104 590 640
575 219.40
138 000 000
a
44 000 000
b
413 555 897.24
c
1 441 985.60
1 232 000
6 342
1 637 000
511 000
4 828 327.60
Source:
Member State reporting to the Committee.
a
The Committee decided to use the price provided by China to calculate the values listed for
August 2017. The Panel’s calculation of the average (mean) was $ 97.95 for August 2017,
which would have amounted to a total value of $ 160,344,150.
b
The Committee used the price provided by China to calculate the values listed for September
2017. The Panel’s calculation of the average (mean) price was $ 102.04 for September 2017,
which would have amounted to a total value of $ 52,142,440.
c
The total value for January and February transactions was calculated by the Panel using the
average mean price, whereas the total value for August and September transactions was based
on the price provided to the Committee by China.
43. According to Member State reports to the Committee, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea exported a total of $ 413,555,897.24 in coal (HS code 2701)
between January and September 2017, which exceeded by $12,685,879.24 the cap of
$400,870,018 specified in paragraph 26 (b) of resolution
2321 (2016).
However, the
section below includes at least 15 cases of deliveries of coal from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea prior to 5 August 2017 that were not reported to the
Committee as required by the resolutions.
Exports of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prior to
5 August 2017 unreported to the Committee
44. In addition to the above, the Panel investigated more than 30 shipments of coal
from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea between January and November
2017 to ports, including in China, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation and Viet Nam. Detailed information on all of the shipments is contained
in two tables (see annex 5-1). The tables are broken down into the coal shipments
delivered between January and 4 August 2017 and those delivered after 5 August
2017, the date on which resolution
2371 (2017),
which introduced a full coal ban, was
adopted (see annex 5-2).
45. With regard to the table of shipments to China, Malaysia, the Russian Federation
and Viet Nam prior to 5 August 2017, the contents of only one shipment were reported
to the Committee, by Malaysia.
34
All of the other shipments violated paragraph 26 of
resolution
2321 (2016)
requiring Member States to report them. In the majority of
__________________
34
In a note verbale dated 1 May 2017 (ref. HA 59/17), Malaysia reported to the Committee on an
import of 6,342 metric tons of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in March
2017. This amount corresponds to media reporting on the amount of coal discharged by the Kum
Ya in Penang on 24 March 2017 (see table 11 above for more details).
21/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0022.png
S/2018/171
cases, this was due to the fact that falsified paperwork accompanying the coal claimed
its origin as countries other than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. For that
reason, the above calculations of coal from the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea, which has been exported in excess of the cap, do not present a complete
picture.
Exports of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea following the
full ban in resolution
2371 (2017)
46. All of the shipments listed in the table as having been delivered after the
adoption of resolution 2371 (2017) to China, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, the
Russian Federation and Viet Nam would constitute a violation of the resolutions, if
confirmed. While the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also attempted to make
a delivery to Thailand in March, the contract was cancelled a nd the vessel
Tai An
subsequently rerouted to Vung Tau, Viet Nam.
35
In multiple cases, accompanying
paperwork indicated origins other than the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
including the Russian Federation and China (see annexes 5 -1 and 5-2). The following
two sections explore the trading networks behind the prohibited transfers and the
evasion patterns used to circumvent the sanctions.
Networks
47. The network of foreign traders responsible for violations of the coal ban
operates through numerous front companies registered in multiple jurisdictions, some
of which the Panel has previously investigated. Front companies are registered in
Australia, the British Virgin Islands, the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, the
Marshall Islands, Samoa, Seychelles and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, while they are physically based in different countries and areas,
including Australia, the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan Province of China
and Singapore.
48. Maison Trading Ltd, which shipped at least four consignments using vessels
listed in annex 5, is a front company for Dandong Chengtai Trading Co., Ltd (a.k.a.
Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd), prosecuted by a Member State for
money-laundering (see annex 6-1).
36
Brigt Australia, an Australian-registered
property developer, was contracted to ship coal from the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea to Viet Nam. While the shipping documents claimed Nakhodka as
the origin, the vessel never docked there (confirmed by the Russian Federation) (see
annex 6-2). According to Australia, it is investigating the company and its director,
Livia Wang. Another shipper of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
to Viet Nam, a Swedish company, falsely listed the Russian Federation as the origin.
The origin was also falsely certified by a company based in Taiwan Province of China
(see annex 6-3).
__________________
35
36
The ship’s documents stated the coal’s origin as Tianjin, when it had been loaded in Nampo
between 5 and 7 March 2017. A Thai company had contracted with a Thai importer for 8,000
metric tons of anthracite but another importer, Star Bravo, represented by a national of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, intended to import 26,265 metric tons for delivery to
Koh Si Chang between 20 and 30 March 2017.
United States of America v. $4,083,935.00 of funds associated with Dandong Chengtai Trading
Limited et al.
of 22 August 2017. The Marshall Islands informed the Panel that the registration of
Maison Trading Ltd was revoked on 30 October 2017 (registered on 20 September 2016) and
used a Chinese bank account. China informed the Panel that Maison Trading is not registered in
China.
18-01593
22/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0023.png
S/2018/171
Evasion patterns by coal vessels
49. In investigating the above-mentioned coal shipments, the Panel found extensive
use of a combination of multiple evasion tactics, including indirect routes, detours,
loitering, false documentation, trans-shipment through third countries and
manipulation of Automatic Identification System signals and destinations/estimated
times of arrival, as well as changes to the class, length and draft of the vessels. These
are used to obfuscate actual routes, conceal port calls and give the impression that the
coal was loaded in ports other than in the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
The consistency and similarity of the tactics suggest that they are part of a centralized
strategy on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade the
commodities ban, especially given that they were also employed in the case of the
designated
Jie Shun.
37
Voyage irregularities
50. Route detours almost always involved manipulating Automatic Identification
System transmissions
38
while loading coal in ports of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea before rejoining the original route and reactivating the Automatic
Identification System in time for delivery.
39
For example, the Fijian-flagged
Zhi Kun 7
deviated from its stated destination, Posyet, Russian Federation, on 9 April
2017, turning off its Automatic Identification System to load coal in Wonsan, then
rejoining its original voyage, reactivating the Automatic Identification System and
entering Nakhodka port on 14 April (figure VII). While in Nakhodka until 17 May,
the vessel changed its identity on 11 May 2017 before discharging its coal on
19 May.
40
On its return voyage, the vessel loaded again in Chongjin on 28 May, using
the same route deviation tactic, delivering the coal to Nanjing on 7 June 2017.
__________________
37
38
39
40
The
Jie Shun,
which carried illicit iron ore and weapons to Egypt on 11 August 2016, used
similar tactics such as feigning port calls, using manipulation of the Automatic Identification
System and making use of draft and class changes.
Jie Shun
was designated on 3 October 2017.
See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials/list-of-designated-vessels.
A violation of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as
amended: The Automatic Identification System to be fitted and maintained in operation at all
times for vessels of 300 gross tonnage and upwards.
Such incidents involve lengthy time periods used to cover the distance between transmissions,
often accompanied by draft changes with the first transmission, reflecting that the vessel has
been loaded, a fact that must be reported prior to port entry.
The
Zhi Kun 7
was renamed the
Orient Lidu
and registered to Mongolia on 11 May 2017, moving
to Panama on 17 July 2017.
23/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0024.png
S/2018/171
Figure VII
Zhi Kun 7:
deviation and loading of coal in Wonsan
Source:
Windward (left) and Member State (right).
51. An example of an almost two-week voyage deviation was the delivery of coal
by the
Petrel 8
to Bayuquan, with a Nakhodka decoy port visit.
41
On 19 July 2017, as
it was sailing east out of Bayuquan, it indicated a Nakhodka destinat ion. En route, it
switched off its Automatic Identification System and made a deviation to load coal in
Taean (near Nampo)
42
on 26 July. Then it rejoined its voyage on 27 July, switched on
its Automatic Identification System, sailing on to Nakhodka, docking for a day
without discharging its coal, ostensibly to create the impression that the coal ’s origin
was the Russian Federation. It then sailed back to Bayuquan to unload the coal
(figure VIII).
__________________
41
42
The
Petrel 8
was designated on 3 October 2017. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/
materials/list-of-designated-vessels.
Changing its draft to indicate a loaded condition (leaving Bayuquan empty).
18-01593
24/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0025.png
S/2018/171
Figure VIII
Voyage of the
Petrel 8
showing deviation decoy voyage
Source:
Windward.
52. While deviating to Songnim (near Nampo) to load coal on 7 August 2017, the
Orient Shenyu
switched off its Automatic Identification System for eight days before
sailing to Lianyungang, where it loitered near the port to claim Chinese origin (see
figure IX and annex 7) prior to heading to Cam Pha, Viet Nam, to unload on
26 August.
18-01593
25/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0026.png
S/2018/171
Figure IX
Orient Shenyu:
deviation and imagery of loading in Songnim
Source:
Member State.
Loitering
53. The
Cheng Hong
falsely declared a port call in Penglai, from which it claimed
the coal originated, whereas it was actually loaded in Nampo on 16 June 2017
(figure X). The vessel then loitered off Penglai and used a false draft change to feign
having loaded coal before unloading it in Cam Pha.
54. The
Hua Fu
loitered off Penglai and Shidao, before delivering coal to Cam Pha
on 14 September. It then again loaded coal on 23 September in Najin, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, and attempted to deliver it to Cam Pha, claiming its
origin as Nakhodka, despite not having visited any Russian ports for over a year (see
annex 8). After Viet Nam refused the coal, the
Hua Fu
attempted to deliver it to Fang
Cheng, China.
Figure X
Cheng Hong
loading in Nampo, then loitering for a false port call in Penglai
Source:
Member State (left) and Windward (centre, right).
55. Vessels also changed their identities mid-route by adopting new names, flags
and call signs. The
Xin Guang Hai
transmitted a false International Maritime
Organization (IMO) number and altered name while carrying coal from Songnim on
31 August 2017 for delivery in Hai Phong, Viet Nam, on 19 September 2017. The
vessel also transmitted a false draft change to feign loading in Hong Kong and
26/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0027.png
S/2018/171
changed its IMO number and name en route.
43
The
Hua Fu
shipped coal from Nampo
to Cam Pha and also often changed call signs, and the
Xin Sheng Hai
and the
Glory
Hope 6
frequently changed length and class. The
East Glory 7
changed its class from
“cargo” to “fishing” prior to discharging coal from Nampo in Guangzhou on
16 August 2017.
Document falsification
56. The Panel’s investigations showed extensive evidence of false cargo
documentation. Although authentic verification documents and stamps accompanied
numerous contracts, bills of lading, certificates and warranties of origin, many vessels
never visited the ports in question. For example, while the
Kai Xiang
documents
indicated loading in Vladivostok on 28 July and Nakhodka on 31 August 2017, the
vessel never visited that port. Furthermore, satellite imagery shows it loading in
Nampo on 31 August 2017.
44
57. Similarly, the
Hua Fu
documents claimed the origin as Lianyungang, China;
however, the vessel never visited that port on 6 September 2017, having loaded the
coal in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea while its Automatic Identification
system was off from 2 to 7 September. The
Bai Mei 8
crew list shows the crew joining
in Nampo where the coal was loaded and not Nakhodka as claimed (see annex 9).
58. Details of the Panel’s investigations of coal shipments delivered between
January and 4 August 2017 are contained in two tables (see annex 5 -1). These include
weights and values, evasion tactics and suppliers/exporters, where documented.
Trans-shipment
59. In addition to the
Great Spring
trans-shipment of coal from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea discharged by the
Sun Union
on 28 June 2017 in
Nakhodka, the Panel noted the adoption by the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea of a new route to a port rarely visited previously, Kholmsk, Russian Federation,
following the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017). Tracking data show at least four
vessels, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged
Ul Ji Bong 6,
Rung Ra 2
and
Un Bong 2
and the Togo-flagged
Yu Yuan,
calling at Kholmsk
(table 12). According to a Member State, they were transporting coal from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel noted several vessels arriving at
the same berth at the coal terminal within a few days based on data available on
maritime databases, often indicating an increase in draft upon departure.
45
60. Shortly after this coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was
discharged, some vessels berthed at the same terminal, suggesting that, as was the
case with the
Great Spring
and the
Hua Fu,
the coal might have been trans-shipped
using false origin documents. According to open sources, authorities at Rizhao port
and Qingdao port in China announced bans in early August 2017 on all imports of
Russian coal based on concerns that coal from the Democratic People ’s Republic of
__________________
43
44
45
From 28 July to 2 August 2017 and on 8 August 2017, the vessel used the IMO10 053276 (instead
of 9004700) and the name
Xin Guang Hah
(instead of
Xin Guang Hai).
When the ship
reactivated its Automatic Identification System on 5 September, its draft of 0.0 showed that it
was not loaded with cargo. After loitering off Hong Kong on 18 September 2017, it transmitted a
false draft increase to feign that it had loaded coal in Hong Kong, before unloading in Hai
Phong, Viet Nam, on 19 September.
The bills of lading for the
Kai Xiang
show a Swedish company claiming the coal to be of Russian
origin (see annex 6-3), along with a warranty, a Taiwan Province of China company, registered in
Hong Kong.
Two other vessels loaded scrap-iron at the terminal.
27/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0028.png
S/2018/171
Korea was being mixed with Russian cargoes.
46
The Panel is awaiting replies to its
enquiries in that regard (table 13).
Table 12
Vessels discharging coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Kholmsk,
Russian Federation, 2017
Port in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea at which coal
was loaded
Vessel name
IMO No.
Flag
Date of discharge in Kholmsk
Rung Ra 2
9020534
Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea
Nampo, 24 July
Wonsan, 22 August
Wonsan, 7 September
3–7 August
29 August–2 September
12–14 September (annex 10)
9 August (annexes 10–12)
22-25 August/16 October (annex
10)
5 September (annexes 11–12)
Ul Ji Bong 6
Un Bong 2
Yu Yuan
9114555
8913186
9358694
Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea
Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea
Togo
Wonsan, 26 August 7
Chongjin
Wonsan, 12 August
Source:
Member States and Windward.
Table 13
Vessels at the same berth in Kholmsk, Russian Federation
Vessel name
IMO No.
Flag
Date of loading, 2017
Remarks
Sky Lady
a
9168441
Panama
9–10 August (3 hours)
b
10 August
Origin on bill of lading: Shakhtersk,
Russian Federation
3 280 metric tons
Exporter: Solntsevsky Coal Mine
LLC(annex 13)
Sky Angel
a
9168441
Panama
21 September
b
Origin on bill of lading: Kholmsk
Exporter: Amet Venture Ltd, United
Kingdom
4 156 metric tons (annex 14)
__________________
46
Argus, “China port bans Russian anthracite on N Korea concerns ”, 7 August 2017, available
from argusmedia.com; and Meitanwang, “Analysis of Shandong port restrictions on relief of
Russia coal carrier” (in Chinese), 3 August 2017, available from
www.meitanwang.com.
18-01593
28/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0029.png
S/2018/171
Vessel name
IMO No.
Flag
Date of loading, 2017
Remarks
Rich Glory
8649905
Sierra Leone
5–6 October
b
Origin on bill of lading: Kholmsk
Shipper: Hong Kong Coal Energy Ltd
5 000 metric tons (annex 15)
Source:
Member States.
a
Operated by the same company.
b
Outstanding replies to Panel enquiries.
Ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products
61. The Panel investigated four ships involved in the violation of paragraphs 11 and
14 of resolution 2375 (2017). While their network is primarily based in Taiwan
Province of China, their companies have been registered in multiple jurisdictions,
including the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, the Marshall Islands, Samoa and
Seychelles, with ships flagged in Dominica, Hong Kong, Panama and Sierra Leone.
62. According to a Member State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
been using at least three areas for ship-to-ship transfers: waters off the port of
Wonsan; Nampo; and international waters between the Yellow Sea and the East Chin a
Sea.
63. The first two tankers that the Panel investigated, the Hong Kong -flagged
Lighthouse Winmore
and the Panama-flagged
Billions No. 18,
transferred marine
diesel
47
to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, the
Sam Jong
2
and the
Rye Song Gang 1,
respectively, on 19 October 2017.
48
Both tankers sailed
from Yeosu, Republic of Korea, and switched off their Automatic Identification
System a few days before and after the transfers, in a pattern described above with
regard to vessels picking up coal from the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
Both vessels sailed southwards for transfers, but not to the port of Taichung, Taiwan
Province of China, the stated port of destination, instead returning to Yeosu. The
Republic of Korea detained the
Lighthouse Winmore
for investigation on
24 November 2017.
Figure XI
Ship-to-ship transfer between the
Lighthouse Winmore
and the
Sam Jong 2
Source:
Member State.
64. A third case involved the ship-to-ship transfer by the Sierra Leone-flagged
tanker
Jin Hye
(IMO No. 8518572) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-
__________________
47
48
500ppm sulphur content marine gas oil (Gasoil).
Billions No. 18,
designated together with
Rye Song Gang 1,
on 28 December 2017, was renamed
Kingsway
under the Palau flag in December 2017.
29/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0030.png
S/2018/171
flagged tanker
Chon Ma San
(IMO No. 8660313) in the East China Sea on or about
5 December 2017. The
Chon Ma San
disguised its identity by painting the names
“Whale” and “Freetown
(Sierra Leone)”
over the original name and port of
registration and changing the “3”s to “8”s in the IMO number on the superstructure
(8660313 to 8660818). The flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the
funnel was also painted over with white paint.
Figure XII
Ship-to-ship transfer between the
Jin Hye
and the
Chon Ma San
Source:
Member State
.
65. A fourth vessel involved in a ship-to-ship transfer with a tanker from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the Panama-flagged tanker
Koti
(IMO
No. 9417115), also currently detained by the Republic of Korea for investigation. In
a pattern very similar to the transfers by the
Lighthouse Winmore
and the
Billions
No. 18
on 19 October 2017, the
Koti
departed Yeosu and selectively used its
Automatic Identification System for four days and again for five days from
30 November 2017.
66. On 20 January 2018, another ship-to-ship transfer took place between the
designated tanker of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Rye Song Gang 1
and the Dominica-flagged
Yuk Tung
(IMO No. 9030591) in the high seas of the East
China Sea. The vessel’s Automatic Identification System had been switched off since
its departure from Keelung, Taiwan Province of China, on 2 January. Its owner is Yuk
Tung Energy Inc., registered in the Cook Islands, its operator Yuk Tung Energy Pte
Ltd, based in Singapore, and its primary business crude oil wholesale.
49
__________________
49
Address: 80 Raffles place, #17-22, UOB Plaza, Singapore 048624 (Unique Entity
No. 201710754R).
18-01593
30/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0031.png
S/2018/171
Figure XIII
Transfer at night
Source:
Member State.
67. The fact that this transfer took place in the dark shows that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea is adapting its evasion tactics (figure XIII). Subsequent
to its designation, the tanker disguised its identity, repainting its funnel and mast and
changing its name to “Song
Hae”
(figure XIV).
18-01593
31/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0032.png
S/2018/171
Figure XIV
Comparison of
Rye Song Gang 1
before and after its designation (both during
ship-to-ship transfers)
Source:
Member States.
Networks
68. The
Lighthouse Winmore
was chartered the month before the ship-to-ship
transfers by the Marshall Islands company Oceanic Enterprise Ltd via a Singapore -
based broker.
50
Its sole director and shareholder is Shih-Hsien Chen (also known as
“Sunny Chen”), a national of Taiwan Province of China (annex 16).
51
The Yingjen
Fishery Company
52
communicated administrative and logistical arrangements to the
owner via the broker, while the Billions Bunker Group Corporation issued operational
instructions to the captain (see annex 17).
53
The intention to use the vessel for ship-
to-ship transfers was evidenced in the charterer’s procurement of three large fenders
for the duration of the charter. Chen also embedded a company representative with
the vessel’s crew.
54
69. Shih-Hsien Chen is the sole shareholder, owner and operator of two ships and
the companies that own them, the tanker
Billions No. 18
and Bunker’s Taiwan Group
Corporation (British Virgin Islands), as well as the tanker
Billions No. 88
and the
Billions Bunker Group Corporation (Marshall Islands), which has also engaged in
ship-to-ship transfer to an as yet unidentified tanker.
55
The Panel notes that the
owner/operator of the
Lighthouse Winmore,
Lighthouse Ship Management (also
involved in ship-to-ship transfers), was previously known as the similar-sounding
__________________
50
51
52
53
54
55
Registered owner: Win More Shipping Ltd. (永嘉船務有限公司), Hong Kong: registered
operator: Lighthouse Ship Management Ltd. (方向海運管理有限公司), Hong Kong but based in
Guangzhou. Owner of both companies resides in Guangzhou.
Taiwan Province of China identity No. 308222135, Date of birth (DOB): 11 December 1965.
Chin Tse Chien, a.k.a. “Money Chien”, [email protected],
[email protected]. Shih-Hsien Chen used [email protected].
Miguel Shiao (蕭錫理) via [email protected].
Jiang Bing.
The
Billions No. 88
was renamed
Twins Bull
and the flag changed from Panama to Palau, and
ownership was switched in December to another of Chen’s companies, Pacific Bunker Co. Ltd.
The Marshall Islands informed the Panel that it had deleted Chen’s companies from its register
on 23 January 2018.
18-01593
32/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0033.png
S/2018/171
Billion Great International Group Ltd (see annex 18), suggesting a link to Chen’s
companies. In addition, two of Chen’s tankers, the
Lighthouse Winmore
and the
Golden Rich,
utilize the same document of compliance holder and International
Safety Management manager, Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co.
Ltd, which is the owner and operator of the other tanker engaging in ship -to-ship
transfers, the
Jin Hye
(figure XV). The Panel continues to investigate Shih-Hsien
Chen’s central role in transfers of petroleum products to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, which shows the continuation of its reliance on trusted foreign
nationals in its illicit activities.
Figure XV
Tankers engaged in illicit transfers linked to Shih-Hsien Chen
70. The ownership and leasing of the fourth tanker,
Koti,
follows the pattern
described above, with both the owner and the companies in Taiwan Province of C hina
but registered elsewhere:
56
(a) The tanker’s owner, M.T. Koti Corporation (registered in Panama), leased
the vessel to Auria Resource Co., Ltd
57
(registered in Samoa);
(b) Auria Resource claimed that it had leased the vessel to Sailing
Petrochemical Incorp., Taiwan Province of China, on a time -charter just prior to the
ship-to-ship transfer;
58
(c) Harmonized Resources Shipping Management Co., Ltd, registered in
Hong Kong and based in Dalian, was the vessel’s operator. While M.T. Koti
Corporation claimed that the registration of Harmonized Resources as operator was
an error (which it subsequently “corrected” by registering itself as the operator),
correspondence shows that Harmonized Resources had registered the IMO company
__________________
56
57
58
7F, No. 85, Sec. 2, Chenggong Rd.,Taoyon District, Taoyuan City. The company’s three directors
are: Chien-Ting Chang, Chien-Huan Chang (also known as “Norris Chang”) and Shih-Chuan
Kao.
6F-2, No. 51 Hengyang Rd., Taipei.
Sailing’s payments came from Firstec Maritime Ltd. and Xin Miao Co. Ltd. accounts.
33/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0034.png
S/2018/171
numbers for both the owner and the International Safety Management manager of the
Koti.
The company’s point of contact, Lu Tiehe (
吕铁和
), was previously involved with
the
Light
incident and an associate of Fan Mintian linked to both the
Light
and the
Jie
Shun
interdiction.
59
Petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
71. The bills of lading for the petroleum products embarked by both the
Lighthouse
Winmore
(14, 094 metric tons of marine gasoil (gasoil)) and the
Billions No. 18
(7,954
metric tons of gasoil (diesel)) prior to the transfer on 1 9 October 2017 show the
multinational company, Trafigura Pte. Ltd,
60
as the shipper (see annex 19), Global
Commodities Consultants Ltd as the consignee and the port of Taichung as the
destination (which was fabricated; see annex 20). Global Commodities is registered
in Hong Kong, but the registered address (12B Wilkinson Road, Singapore, 436759)
matches that of the Singaporean company, Global SGP Pte Ltd. (Unique Entity
No. 201222231W), both of which share the same director and sole shareholder.
Further, all email communications for shipments onboard Shih -Hsien Chen’s vessels
came from Global SGP and not Global Commodities Consultants (see annexes 21 –
22). The Panel continues to investigate other multinational oil companies for their
possible roles in the supply chain of petroleum products transferred to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.
72. Oceanic Enterprise prepaid Global SGP for the two shipments delivered free
onboard (FOB) to the vessels ($4,564,942.80 and $8,510,097.75) through bank
transfers to the supplier, with which it had a contract. In addition to the se two transfers
by the
Billions No. 18
and the
Lighthouse Winmore,
Oceanic had planned another nine
shipments with the same two vessels plus another of Shih-Hsien Chen’s vessels, the
Sky Ace 1
(as part of the contract) (figure XVI), which according to the plan for the
shipments (see annexes 22–25) totalled 95,000 metric tons (with an estimated value
of about $65 million according to the rate used for the first two transfers to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). In addition, Chen requested green dye
supplement for the fuel, a common practice for supplies for fishing vessels. Singapore
informed the Panel that its authorities were checking the companies related to the
transactions.
__________________
59
60
Directors of Sea Star Ship Co. Ltd., see
S/2017/150,
para. 66; and
S/2014/147,
paras. 135–137.
Lu Tiehe (who still uses the Sea Star Ship email address) denied having any contact with Fan
Mintian.
Trafigura is legally registered in the Netherlands and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland with
its oil and petroleum operations based in Singapore.
18-01593
34/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0035.png
S/2018/171
Figure XVI
Oil transfers using the tankers of Shih-Hsien Chen
73. According to a Member State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
thus far relied on two oil companies for the import of petroleum: First Oil Center
(a.k.a. First Oil JV Co. Ltd) and Korea Kumgang Petroleum. The First Oil Center is
affiliated with the First Credit Bank of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
(Cheil Credit Bank,
제일신용은행
), which is also under Panel investigation for
violations of financial sanctions. Korea Kumgang Petroleum was established in
January 2015 under the Korea Kumgang Group,
61
which is affiliated with the
designated Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. A list of tankers from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea is contained in annex 26.
Recommendations
74.
The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future
sectoral sanctions measures, include the relevant HS codes, as it did in resolution
2397 (2017).
75.
The Panel recommends that Member States exercise heightened vigilance
over their companies to ensure the prohibition of the transfer of the items listed
in resolutions
2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017)
and
2397 (2017),
including
all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles.
76.
Given that the same key individuals continue to feature in Panel reports for
a growing number of different types of violations, the Panel calls upon Member
States to take the appropriate action to ensure that those individuals cease their
prohibited activities.
77.
The Panel recommends that any Member State receiving coal shipments for
delivery or trans-shipment take enhanced measures to validate the
documentation accompanying those shipments. To assist the efforts by Member
State, the Panel recommends the establishment of a regional cooperative
mechanism to share information on whether the relevant vessels actually docked
and loaded coal from the ports claimed in their documents of origin. At a
minimum, Member States should establish a point of contact for that purpose.
__________________
61
Korean:
조선금강그룹
or
금강�½제개발총회사.
35/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0036.png
S/2018/171
The Panel will continue to serve as a resource for Member States seeking
information.
78.
Member States must be vigilant regarding vessel movements in the typical
areas for ship-to-ship transfers and report such transfers to the Committee.
79.
The Panel recommends that the Committee designate (deny port entry for)
all vessels and their captains involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
80.
The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following
individuals for violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution
2375 (2017):
Shih-Hsien Chen, Boby Julian Akbari
62
and Wang Songchang.
63
81.
The Panel recommends that Member States strictly implement resolutions
pertaining to prohibited ship-to-ship transfers, including by enacting enabling
legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels and their captains
found to be conducting them, as well as actions against vessels such as port entry
denial (in force for at least six months, with all costs borne by the owners or
charterers). In addition, flag States should deregister all vessels reported as
involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. Member States should ensure that
all contracts by petroleum industry companies registered or based in their
jurisdictions include a clause stipulating that all transfers involving violations of
the resolutions, in particular including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and
petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
be voided.
82.
Member States hosting petroleum suppliers, brokers, importers and tanker
companies dealing in oil and petroleum products must heighten their vigilance
of the relevant entities to ensure that these are not redirected to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in violation of the resolutions. Countries serving as
trans-shipment hubs for petroleum products must undertake similar enhanced
due diligence to validate the origin and intended destination.
83.
The Panel further recommends that maritime protection and indemnity
insurers include a clause in all contracts, stipulating that all transfers involving
violations of the resolutions, in particular prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and
petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
be voided.
IV. Embargoes, designated entities and individuals
Angola
84. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of the Mansudae
Overseas Project Group of Companies (Mansudae) in Angola.
64
Angola reported that,
pursuant to resolution
2371 (2017)
and a presidential order dated 13 November, all of
the activities, contracts and work visas of Mansudae had been terminated and its
management, staff and employees instructed to leave the country. The presidential
order was in response to the Panel’s letter of 10 August 2017, and subsequently, 152
nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea departed Angola on
18 October 2017, including Yon Jong Gi, Managing Director of the Mansudae Angola
Group. Angola assisted by providing detailed information on the activities of
__________________
62
63
64
Captain of the
Billions No. 18:
Seaman’s Book No. B2380031, DOB 30 July 1985.
Captain of the
Lighthouse Winmore:
Seaman’s Book No. G50001538, DOB 7 August 1973.
See
S/2017/150,
para. 116.
18-01593
36/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0037.png
S/2018/171
Mansudae as well as supporting documents relating to the expulsion of nationals of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from Angola.
65
85. The Panel also investigated diplomats of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea accredited in Angola working on behalf of a designated entity, Green Pine
Corporation, including Kim Hyok Chan and Jon Chol Young, who had previously
engaged in prohibited arms-related activities.
66
Angola reported to the Panel that Kim
Hyok Chan and his family members had been expelled from Angola on the
instructions of President João Lourenço on 29 November 2017, providing
immigration documentation. Jon Chol Young’s visa expires on 17 March 2018, and
he remains at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Luanda.
Angola also considers the presence of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea in
Luanda “to be in excessive numbers, taking into account the state of cooperation with
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and will work with that country to
gradually reduce it”.
86. The Panel also investigated advisers of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea training the Angolan presidential guard and other units.
67
According to a
Member State, an 80-member military advisory mission of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea was based in Angola until the departure of the advisers in January
2017. The Panel requested the names, ranks and Korean People ’s Army unit
affiliations of the military advisory mission, together with details on its activit ies in
Angola and third countries but has yet to receive a reply.
Australia
87. On 16 December 2017, the Australian Federal Police arrested and charged its
citizen, Chan Han Choi.
68
It is believed that Choi is an established economic agent of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. His role was to conduct brokering
activities to facilitate the trade of various commodities to or from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, including coal, graphite, copper ore, gold and crude oil,
as well as missiles and missile-related technology.
88. Choi used the alias “Solomon Choi” and conducted his activities from his residence
while using his Australian companies as intermediaries, including Auskor Engineering
Pty Ltd, Above Engineering Pty Ltd, Above Energy Pty Ltd, LWM Engineering Pty Ltd
and Morning World Pty Ltd. Choi has also used offshore bank accounts.
China
Overseas showrooms of the Mansudae Art Studio in Beijing
89. The Mansudae Art Studio utilizes a gallery in China located in the 798 Art
District, a renowned art exhibition area in Beijing. The gallery was selling Mansudae
works of art in 2017 after the designation of that entity. The Panel notes that the name
of the gallery includes the identical Chinese transcription of the Korean name for the
Mansudae Art Studio, and a billboard on the building advertises an exhibition jointly
hosted by “ Mansudae Art Studio Museum of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea” and Beijingyuan Mansudae Cultural Company Ltd (北京元万寿台文化有限
公司)
entitled “Art exhibition of artists of the Mansudae Art Studio of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea” (figure XVII). Furthermore, the Panel considers that this
collaborative activity with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is prohibited
__________________
65
66
67
68
Including information on the expulsion of the 152 nationals of the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea, their names, passport numbers and visa details.
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 103, 207 and 208.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 23; and
S/2017/150,
para. 120.
Choi acquired Australian citizenship in 2001.
37/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0038.png
S/2018/171
according to paragraph 18 of resolution
2375 (2017).
However, Ji Zhengtai, the
director of Beijingyuan Mansudae, has publicly stated that sanctions do not apply and
have not affected his business. China informed the Panel that it could not confirm that
this was a branch of the designated entity. However, given that Beijingyuan Mansudae
is a joint venture with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it was closed by
9 January 2018 in accordance with Ministry of Commerce announce ment No. 55.
Figure XVII
Gallery utilized by the Mansudae Art Studio in Beijing
Egypt
90. The Panel continued its investigation into the shipment by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea of 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades and components
seized by Egyptian authorities from the
Jie Shun
in August 2016.
69
The Panel’s onsite
inspection of the vessel and port revealed that the large crates containing the rocket -
propelled grenades were prominently marked “Al-Sakr Cairo” followed by an address
identical to that on the shipping documentation, which listed the consignee as Al -Sakr
Factory for Developed Industries, which manufactures rocket-propelled grenades.
70
The Panel also notes that the Al-Sakr factory and its parent company have reportedly
had a long-standing relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
including in the field of ballistic missiles. The replies of the company and of Egypt
to the Panel did not answer the Panel’s requests for the identity of the exporters of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, any financial information or any
correspondence with entities violating the arms embargo provisions.
__________________
69
70
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 61–71.
The Panel was prohibited from taking its own photographs during the inspection and Egypt
declined to provide permission for the Panel to reproduce image s and documents submitted.
18-01593
38/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0039.png
S/2018/171
Eritrea
91. The Panel continued its investigation into “Eritech”, the Eritrean recipient of an
interdicted shipment of arms and related materiel from the company of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Glocom.
71
The Panel notes that “Eritech”
was identified by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as based at the “Asha
Golgol Military Technical Centre” and that this facility is “operated by the Eritrean
Defence Forces that serves as a central workshop for the production, modification and
repair of civilian and military and paramilitary equipment ”.
72
The Panel requested
from Eritrea information on the current status of “Eritech”, also known as “E-tech”,
and on whether it is an entity operating under the authority or at the direction of the
Eritrean Defence Forces. Eritrea continues to fail to provide substantive information
to the Panel’s enquiries on this case, which forms part of established arms-related
cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritrea.
73
Italy
Western Representative of the Mansudae Art Studio
92. The Panel investigated an individual claiming to be “the Western Representative
of Mansudae Art Studio”,
74
Pier Luigi Cecioni, after the Mansudae Art Studio was
designated on 5 August 2017. On 26 September, the Panel visited the office address
named “Mansudae Art Studio” in Florence, Italy (figure XVIII). The Panel
interviewed Cecioni, who acknowledged his past cooperation with Mansudae Art
Studio personnel in Pyongyang, including an attempt to organize a Mansudae Art
Studio exhibition after the designation of that entity. In his reply of 27 November,
Cecioni stated that his website description of his role as “Western Representative of
Mansudae Art Studio” was “misleading”. The Panel views Pier Luigi Cecioni’s entity
and that of the Mansudae Art Studio in Pyongyang as a cooperative entity prohibited
under paragraph 18 of resolution
2375 (2017).
In December 2017, the Mansudae Art
Studio website was renamed “North Korea Art Gallery” and mention of Cecioni’s
position as “Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio” was removed. As at
28 January 2018, the website address remained www.mansudaeartstudio.com. As a
result of the investigation, the Panel obtained additional information on the Mansudae
Art Studio in Pyongyang, including the name of the Vice -Director, Kim Song Min.
The Italian authorities informed the Panel that “no evidence has been found,
subsequent to July 2016, of imports from North Korea on the part of Mr. Cecioni ”
and “currently there does not appear to be any basis on which to determine that
Mr. Cecioni violated the sanctions regime nor is there evidence of activity by
Mr. Cecioni on behalf of the listed entity, Mansudae Art Studio. Instead, Mr. Cecioni
seems to have used the name of this entity on his website of his own initiative and for
own, exclusive benefit … The authorities are trying to determine whether this website
may constitute a violation of the sanctions regime, particularly with reference to the
prohibition on joint ventures and cooperative entities, in paragraph 18 of resolution
2375 (2017)
and 15 of resolution
2270 (2016).”.
__________________
71
72
73
74
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 72–87.
See
S/2017/925,
para. 21.
See
S/2017/150.
paras. 72–87;
S/2016/157,
paras. 94–95;
S/2015/131,
para. 89; and
S/2014/147,
paras. 94–97.
The website named “Mansudae Art Studio” (www.mansudaeartstudio.com) was accessed by the
Panel in August and September 2017, at which time the website and associated Internet
registration and advertising portrayed Cecioni as the Western Re presentative of the Mansudae
Art Studio (see annex 27).
39/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0040.png
S/2018/171
Figure XVIII
Mansudae Art Studio address and interior, Florence, Italy, 26 September 2017
Source:
The Panel.
Japan
Crane loading Hwasong-12 missile
93. The Panel investigated a foreign-manufactured crane seen in the Korean Central
Television (KCTV) broadcast of 14 May 2017 loading the Hwasong-12 missile, which
highlights the use of commercial cranes in ballistic miss ile-related activities (figure
XIX). The crane was likely produced by a Japanese company, which acknowledged
to the Panel that two units had been exported in 1992 to the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea, while it was also possible that the crane had b een procured on the
second-hand market.
75
The crane is now prohibited under paragraph 7 of resolution
2397 (2017)
banning the sale of items under HS code 84 and paragraph 27 of
resolution
2270 (2016).
__________________
75
This model was produced between 1990 and 2002.
18-01593
40/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0041.png
S/2018/171
Figure XIX
Crane loading Hwasong-12
Source:
KCTV.
Mozambique
Military cooperation
94. The Panel investigated military cooperation between the Korea Haegumgang
Trading Corporation and the Mozambique company “Monte Binga” in respect of a
$6 million contract that included surface-to-air missiles, P-12 air defence radar, tank
refurbishment and man-portable air defence systems. The Panel obtained documents,
including letters of invitation for visits to Mozambique in October 2015 of radar
technicians organized by the Economic and Trade Representative Mission of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Mozambique (see annex 28). According
to a Member State, this trade mission is staffed by representatives of Haegumgang,
which falls under the Military Cooperation General Bureau of the designated Ministry
of People’s Armed Forces. Ri Chang Su (Passport No. 927310139, Date of birth:
29 April 1967), Third Economic and Commercial Secretary accredited to the
Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in South Africa (see
annex 28), has been responsible for the military cooperation projects between the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Mozambique since at least 2017.
95. While the Panel requested all information, including contracts, bills of lading
and financial transfers between Monte Binga and the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea, the one undated invoice for a list of goods provided (see annex 28) was
inconsistent with information provided by a Member State. The Member State
reported at least 13 separate shipments from the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea to Mozambique, including six tons of air cargo in 2015 and seven shipments
following the adoption of resolution
2270 (2016).
In response to the Panel’s request
for financial information relating to the $6 million contract, the Chief Executive
Officer stated that “Monte Binga SA does not keep any funding for military
cooperation.”. However, the Panel notes that Monte Binga has accessed funding and
paid for arms-related cooperation projects, including at least in one case involving
more than $24.9 million as payment for a loan on behalf of a related compan y,
18-01593
41/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0042.png
S/2018/171
ProIndicus,
76
for the procurement of maritime patrol vessels in 2015. The Panel notes
that since October 2017, the new Government has cooperated with the Panel.
Designated entity representatives in Mozambique
96. The new Government provided the Panel information on travel between 2012
and 2017 to and within Mozambique by five nationals of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea working on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading
Corporation (KOMID) and the Green Pine Associated Corporation, a s well as other
designated entities, including those reported as involved in conventional arms trade
in other African countries. These included Kim Hyok Chan, Kim Song Chol, Ri Won
Ho, Kim Sok Chol and Kim Jung Jong. The investigation continues.
Prohibited fishing activities
97. A Member State informed the Panel in late 2017 that the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea was violating paragraph 9 of resolution
2371 (2017)
through a
commercial fishing joint venture, EMKIP, which employed approximately 40
nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as fishermen and three
vessels, including the
Susan 1
and the
Susan 2
(IMO No. 8672299). The vessels were
photographed in a Mozambique port with flags of the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea and displaying political slogans (see annex 28).
98. The vessels, which were crewed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
caught shrimp, which was then sold to a South African company, Supa Packers Fish
Processors Pty. Ltd, for processing before onward transfer to a company in Shenyang,
China. Supa Packers has not replied to the Panel’s enquiries. Mozambique informed
the Panel that “practical steps taken so far include the dissolution of the EMKIP
company and preparations for subsequent steps” and provided supporting
documentation. The Panel continues to monitor the vessels and their attempts to
re-establish operations in other countries.
Mansudae
99. According to detailed information provided by Mozambique to the Panel,
Mansudae “is not registered in Mozambique, thus it does not have any branches or
subsidiaries in the country and there are no entities or individuals a ssociated with this
company”. It further stated that the statue of a former President of Mozambique was
undertaken by Mansudae’s Namibian company. In the contract for the statue signed
in Pyongyang in June 2011 with Mansudae Overseas Project Vice -President Sin Kyu
Sop, the quote was $170,000, not including an additional planned seven statues for
an estimated $1,360,000.
Cooperation with the Panel
100. Mozambique started working closely with the Panel in October 2017, after
which it “established a Ministerial Task Force to oversee the implementation of all
relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council pertaining to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Regarding the Monte Binga case,
Mozambique noted that the three technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea who arrived in 2015 “provided support to Mozambican technicians in the repair
and renovation of the one P-18 early warning radar and of fifteen T-55 tanks”. The
Panel also notes a letter of September 2016 from the Ministry of Defence to the
__________________
76
Independent audit related to loans contracted by ProIndicus S.A., EMATUM S.A. and
Mozambique Asset Management S.A. Report prepared for the Office o f the Public Prosecutor of
Mozambique, Kroll Associates, 22 June 2017, p. 20.
18-01593
42/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0043.png
S/2018/171
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which stated that, owing to an impending
Panel visit to Mozambique, the Ministry had decided to “temporarily suspend with
immediate effect, all the activities under the Bilateral Cooperation Ag reement reached
upon between our two Ministries” (see annex 28). On 4 January 2018, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mozambique further signalled its willingness
to pursue further cooperation with the Panel.
Myanmar
101. The Panel requested information from Myanmar after receiving Member State
notification that the country had an ongoing arms relationship with KOMID run
principally through its Directorate for Defence Industries and was expecting future
shipments from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Member State
further notified the Panel of evidence of the receipt by Myanmar of ballistic missile
systems from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in addition to a range of
conventional weapons, including multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-air
missiles; and that KOMID had hosted military technicians from Myanmar in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and personnel of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea had been dispatched to Directorate for Defence Industries-operated
facilities in Myanmar.
102. The Member State informed the Panel that the Myanmar Directorate for Defence
Industries maintains a sophisticated global procurement network and that its Director,
Tun Hlaing, had reportedly been involved in overseas procurements and was
associated with at least two Singapore-based firms, Excellence Metal Casting and
STE Global Trading Pte Ltd. It further indicated that Tun Hlaing may have previously
been associated with Myanmar’s Excellence Mineral Manufacturing Co. Ltd,
previously designated by a Member State for working with officials of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, to import materiel for military weapons programmes.
The Member State added that the Directorate for Defence Industries was seeking
equipment from overseas suppliers for its Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea-
linked missile programme and that the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea-
contracted Directorate for Defence Industries procurement activities included seeking
items subject to controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Member State also informed
the Panel that the Myanmar-based Ye Min Hein Co. Ltd was likely involved in the
procurement of sensitive equipment and also likely a front for the Directorate for
Defence Industries. The company had previously operated under the name Soe Min
Htike Co. Ltd, also designated by a Member State from 2013 to 2016 for working
with officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to import materiel for
military weapon programmes.
103. The Panel previously concluded that Soe Min Htike was the consignee in the
attempted transfer of prohibited nuclear-related items in 2012. In its reply of 15 June
2015 to the Panel on Myanmar’s involvement with the prohibited ballistic missile and
conventional arms programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its
relationships with KOMID, Myanmar stated that “the government of Myanmar has
no substantive bilateral relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
other than those related to normal diplomatic ties”. Nevertheless, on 26 July 2017,
Myanmar informed the Panel of the expulsion on 9 June 2017 of Kim Chol Nam, an
accredited diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for acting on
behalf or at the direction of KOMID. On 24 January 2018, Myanmar added that it was
investigating the Panel’s latest request for information.
18-01593
43/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0044.png
S/2018/171
Namibia
104. On 17 November 2017, Namibia cooperated with the Panel by providing a 350-
page response to multiple Panel enquiries since 2016. Regarding the designation of
Mansudae, the country provided an interministerial committee technical evaluation
on the repatriation of 242 nationals of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
from Namibia in response to the Panel’s communication of 10 August 2017. Namibia
stated that “all workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have left the
country”
77
and supplied supporting documentation.
105. Namibia also provided company registration details on the entity “Mansudae
Overseas Project Architectural and Technical Services (Proprietary) Ltd ”, active in
Namibia in 2017. Namibia also supplied project cancellation orders, including the
letter of 9 August 2017 from the Ministry of Defence-controlled August 26 Holding
Company (PTY) Ltd to Mansudae, annulling their subcontract on the extension of the
Leopard Valley military base.
78
The second Mansudae project, the “Keetmanshoop
Farm project” involving the August 26 Company was cancelled on 9 August 2017.
106. Namibia also supplied documentation on a third Mansudae project, “Office
Space Creation Project”, for the Office of the President of Namibia. This project
appears to have been terminated on 9 December 2016. According to Namibia,
Qingdao Construction (Namibia) replaced Mansudae as the main contractor on
6 February 2017 in a contract worth approximately $4.4 million.
79
On 1 September
2017, the First National Bank of Namibia wrote to the Financial Intelligence Centre
at the Bank of Namibia stating that it had terminated business relations with Qingdao
Construction and Kim Tong Chol and related parties “due to internal group policies
and assessed risk of possible international sanctions violations ” involving
Mansudae.
80
On 6 November 2017, the Namibian Business and Intellectual Property
Authority noted that the Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural and Technical
Services Company was on their integrated companies registration system under a new
name “TRITONIA HOLDINGSG NAMIBIA (PROPRIETARY LIMITED”(sic).
81
107. Namibia did not provide any information relating to payments to Mansudae for
the above-mentioned cancelled projects despite its relationship with the designated
KOMID.
82
Nor did Namibia provide any information on the freezing of spec ific bank
accounts after the designation of Mansudae.
108. Namibia further provided a list dated 27 October 2017 of 24 vehicles registered
and licensed to Mansudae and stated that it had placed “high-level administrative
marks on the company”, noting that the administrative mark “prevents the company
from conducting any business on the system”. In a letter to Namibia, the Panel
__________________
77
78
79
80
81
82
Namibia letter to the Panel dated 17 November 2017.
See
S/2017/150,
para. 113.
A contract dated 31 March 2017 between the Office of the President of Namibia and Qingdao
Construction stated that the total value of the project was 62,506,125 Namibian dollars.
According to a signed addendum “the amount certified under MOP Architectural and Technical
Services amounts to N$ 25,501, 626.97”. The amount “to be certified under Qindao Construction
cc would amount to N$ 37,004,498.08”.
Qingdao and Kim Tong Chol were designated 10 days earlier by the United States of America.
See United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury targets Chinese and Russian entities and
individuals supporting the North Korean regime: OFAC Designates 16 for Activities Related to
Support of North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, Energy Trade, Labor Exports,
and Sanctions Evasion”, press release, 22 August 2017. Available from www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/sm0148.aspx.
BIPA, email to National Bank, 6 November 2017.
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 110–112.
18-01593
44/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0045.png
S/2018/171
indicated that these vehicles should be frozen together with related assets and bank
accounts. The investigation continues.
Poland
109. The Panel investigated the reported involvement of overseas workers of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the construction of a Danish warship at
Polish shipyards, which would violate the arms embargo in paragraph 9 of resolution
1874 (2009).
110. Denmark informed the Panel that its Defence Acquisition and Logistics
Organization had signed a contract in March 2014 with a Danish shipyard for the
construction of an Arctic patrol vessel, the
Lauge Koch.
This shipyard, in turn,
contracted with the Polish shipyard Crist S.A. to produce the hull, which was
subsequently constructed in Poland between May 2014 and April 2015 under project
number “NB 428” (figure XX).
Figure XX
Danish warship hull at Polish shipyard (Crist)
Source:
The Panel.
111. According to a document obtained by the Panel, Crist contracted with another
Polish company, Armex Sp. z o. o., to employ a “Group of Koreans” from 1 July 2014
to 31 December 2014 on several projects, including NB 428 (see annex 29). The Panel
had already established that since at least 2012, Armex had employed workers of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea contracted under an agreement with an entity
of that country, Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation (see annex 30). The
Panel documented the involvement of Rungrado in a high-profile sanctions violation
through the sale of Scud ballistic missile spare parts to an Egyptian entity in 2013.
112. Crist provided a statement denying any involvement of workers of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in project NB 428. The statement also
asserted that NB 428 was built “as a universal multipurpose vessel based on standard
shipbuilding solutions without any linkage to services or assistance related to the
provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of prohibited arms or related material ”.
No supporting documentation was provided, while the Panel obtained evidence
showing that Crist was fully aware that the hull (project NB 428) was constr ucted as
part of a warship given the specifications accompanying the contract, according to
which foundations had to be “arranged for weapon systems” including “ammunition
store”, “torpedo”, “salute canon”, “light machine gun” and “heavy machine gun” with
a drawing clearly showing a naval gun (see annex 31).
83
113. Additionally, according to the Polish National Labour Inspectorate, 19 workers
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were employed at the shipyard
__________________
83
Crist replied to the Panel’s opportunity of reply letter (see annex 32).
45/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0046.png
S/2018/171
Nauta S.A. which, inter alia, provides “services in the area of repair, modifications
and building of the naval vessels for the Polish and foreign navies ” (see annex 33).
The workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were hired through the
company Alson Sp. Z o.o., which appears to be run by the same individuals as Armex.
Poland informed the Panel that Armex was currently under liquidation.
114. In paragraph 8 of its resolution
2397 (2017),
the Security Council obligated
Member States to repatriate all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea earning income in their jurisdiction immediately but no later than 24 months
from 22 December 2017. In the meantime, this case also shows the importance for
Member States still hosting overseas labour from the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea of scrutinizing both the workers’ affiliations and activities to avoid sanctions
violations.
Pyongyang International Trade Fair
Participation of designated entities
115. The Korea International Exhibition Corporation, affiliated with the Ministry of
External Economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, continued to
organize the Pyongyang International Trade Fair in May and September 2017.
84
The
Panel previously recommended the Korea International Exhibition Corporation for
designation, given its role in assisting designated entities by providing a platform to
transfer, sell or supply prohibited items to or from the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea.
116. The Panel notes that the two Pyongyang International Trade Fairs in 2017
included designated entities and aliases thereof, including the Natural Resources
Development and Investment Corporation (alias of the Green Pine Associated
Corporation) and the Kangbong Trading Corporation. Furthermore, the Kuryonggang
Trading Company appears to be an alias of the Korea Kuryonggang Trading
Company, itself an alias of the Korean Tangun Trading Corporation.
117. In addition, the list of exhibitors (see annex 34) included entities design ated by
Member States for trading prohibited commodities including coal, the Songi Trading
Corporation and the Wonbong Trading Corporation. The Royal Team Corporation
from Taiwan Province of China, which had been previously investigated by the Panel,
also continued its participation.
85
Six-axle vehicle brochures
118. A Chinese company exhibited brochures that included six- and seven-axle
vehicles, which are prohibited for transfer to the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea (see annex 35). China investigated and informed the Panel that the company
had not signed any agreements or contracts with any entity or individual of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Republic of Korea
Unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage retrieved in 2017
119. According to information provided by a Member State, flight data analysis from
the 2017 unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage indicated that it took off from Kumgang
County, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, on 2 May 2017 before heading
towards a military facility in Seongju, Republic of Korea. On its return to the
__________________
84
85
The 20th Pyongyang International Trade Fairs (Spring), 22–25 May 2017, and the 13th
Pyongyang International Trade Fairs (Autumn), 25–28 September 2017.
See
S/2016/157,
paras. 182–186.
18-01593
46/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0047.png
S/2018/171
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it crashed in Inje County, Republic of Korea,
owing to engine malfunction. Its camera had taken 555 photographs, including 19 of
the Seongju facility, showing that the unmanned aerial vehicle was engaged in
reconnaissance. The unmanned aerial vehicle was similar to the one that crashed on
Baengneyong-do Island, Republic of Korea, in 2014 but had been improved to
undertake reconnaissance missions deeper into the territory of the Republic of Korea.
120. The unmanned aerial vehicle also contained foreign-made items similar to those
retrieved in the 2014 Baengneyong-do Island crash. In particular, the engine and
autopilot were manufactured by the same companies. However, this time, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had erased the serial number in an attempt to
obfuscate the origin and therefore the procurement route. The Panel used the
opportunity presented by this new unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage to se nd a
follow-up letter to China requesting information about the individuals who had served
as intermediaries in the procurement of the 2014 Baengneyong -do Island unmanned
aerial vehicle and has yet to receive a reply.
Cybertheft of military technology
121. According to the public records of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea hacked one of its major shipbuilding companies in April
2016.
86
This incident involved the theft of confidential information on warships and
submarines, including “cold launch” technology, which could be used for the
submarine-launched ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea. The Panel views such activity as constituting evasion of the arms
embargo, given that such technological information could directly contribute to the
development of the operational capabilities of the armed forces of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.
Sudan
122. The Panel investigated military cooperation projects between the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and the Sudan and the presence and activities of KOMID
representatives in the Sudan. In multiple letters sent between 2016 and 2018, the Panel
requested clarification and documentation to substantiate reported statements made in
November 2016 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan: “Sudan has
completely cut off its military cooperation with North Korea.” and “Sudan is thoroughly
implementing United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions on North
Korea.”.
87
While the Sudan has yet to respond to the Panel, a Member State indicated
that since February 2017, cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has continued, noting that “NPN Electronics Company (
미래전자회사
)” sent technicians
to the Sudan in September 2016 and that two KOMID operatives deported from Egypt
in April 2016, Kim Song Chol and Son Jong Hyok, are the centre of the new connection
between the Sudan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Another Member
State informed the Panel in November 2017 that “KOMID continues to engage with the
Sudanese State-controlled Military Industrial Corporation (MIC)”. The Panel is also
investigating a number of air and sea shipments from the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea to the Sudan related to KOMID.
__________________
86
87
During its report to the National Assembly in October 2017, the Ministry of National Defense of
the Republic of Korea acknowledged that the hacking involved the theft of 40,000 docu ments,
including 60 classified military files from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marin Engineering Co. Ltd.
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, 1 November 2016.
47/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0048.png
S/2018/171
Syrian Arab Republic
123. The Panel continued multiple investigations into the prohibited ballistic missile,
conventional arms-related and dual-use goods transfers to and projects within the
Syrian Arab Republic, including:
•
Activities of multiple groups of ballistic missile technicians and designated
entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab
Republic
•
More than 40 previously unreported shipments from the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic between 2012 and 2017 by
entities designated by Member States as front companies for the Scientific
Studies Research Centre of the Syrian Arab Republic
88
124. Seizure by Member States of goods believed to be part of a KOMID
89
contract
in the Syrian Arab Republic, which were destined for Scientific Studies Research
Centre front companies. The investigations revealed substantial new evidence
regarding long-standing and ongoing prohibited programmes and designated entity
activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well as innovative evasion
techniques, including the use of a parallel system to send maritime shipment
documentation with authentic documents containing actual consignee information
sent via air.
90
Ballistic missile cooperation and technician exchanges
125. A Member State informed the Panel that the Ryonhap-2 Corporation of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was involved in the Syrian manoeuvrable
re-entry vehicle Scud D project in 2008, in additio n to the transit of a Syrian Arab
Republic-bound delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through
Beijing in February 2011 and its return on 14 March 2017.
126. Another Member State informed the Panel of a visit to the Syrian Arab Republic
in November 2016 by a group of ballistic missile technicians affiliated with the
designated Academy of National Defence Science. The group transited through
Beijing and Dubai airports on the way to Damascus aboard a Syrian Arab Airlines
passenger flight. The trip was preceded by the visit of a technical delegation of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2016,
which involved the transfer to the Syrian Arab Republic of special resistance valves
and thermometers known for use in chemical weapons programmes (in addition, 60
types of items were reportedly also discussed for procurement). A third group of
missile technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that had travelled
to Damascus in April 2016 reportedly resided at Syrian military facilities.
91
The
Member State reported that technicians of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
__________________
88
89
90
91
The United States designated the Scientific Studies Research Centre (Executive Order 13382) for
suspected implication in Syrian weapons of mass destruction programmes, by European Council
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 and identified by Japan as an entity of proliferation concern in its
“foreign end-user list”. See United States, Department of Treasury, “Three entities targeted by
Treasury for supporting Syria WMD proliferation”, press release HP-216, 4 January 2007.
No supporting documentation was provided.
Panel reports on prohibited shipments to the Syrian Arab Republi c, including Scientific Studies
Research Centre front companies:
S/2010/571,
paras. 50, 62, and recommendation 9;
S/2012/422,
paras. 57, 60–61 and 65–67;
S/2013/337,
paras. 44–46 and 86–89;
S/2014/147,
paras. 51–54;
S/2016/157,
paras. 62–70, 169–170 and 174;
S/2017/150,
para. 99 and table 8;
S/2017/742,
para. 28.
The April 2016 delegation’s luggage was sent to the Mazzah air force base (near Damascus), a
major logistics and intelligence centre, which, according to Syrian media, has been subject to
repeated foreign air attacks. The Member State believes that this delegation resided at the base.
18-01593
48/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0049.png
S/2018/171
continued to operate at chemical weapons and missile facilities at Barzah, Adra and
Hama. The Syrian Arab Republic replied to the Panel that “there are no technical
companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Syria and the only
presence of some individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are
confined in the field of sports under private individual contracts for training athletics
and gymnastics” (see annex 36). The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its request for
supporting documentation for these claims and a list of all nationals of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea who have travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic and is
continuing its investigation.
Activities of Syrian representatives of designated entities of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea
127. The Panel continued its investigations into the activities of designated Ryu Jin,
senior KOMID official in the Syrian Arab Republic, and of other KOMID officials in
the Syrian Arab Republic and their successors. In an official proposal to Major
General Ali Salim of the Army Supply Bureau of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces for
an air defence command and control system, Ryu Jin listed his rank as Major General
and used letterhead of the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, designated on
22 January 2013 as a KOMID subsidiary.
92
According to the Member State, KOMID
representatives in the Syrian Arab Republic have also been importing military goods
via commercial air cargo services and, in that regard, attempted in July 2016 to import
military communications antennas of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
from Glocom.
93
In addition to those activities, between July 2015 and June 2016, Ryu
Jin shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables to the Syrian Arab Republic and
invited three technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the country.
Ryu Jin earned at least 56,000 euros and 48,000 euros transferred through the Tanchon
Commercial Bank.
128. According to multiple Member States and airline companies, Ryu Jin engaged
in extensive international travel between 2014 and 2016.
94
This included travel on
Syrian Arab Airlines between Damascus and the port city of Latakia, to which
previous KOMID-related shipments were destined. It is believed that Ryu Jin now
travels outside the Syrian Arab Republic using an alias, as did the second KOMID
representative in the Syrian Arab Republic, Kang Ryong.
95
Pak Gwang Il
96
has since
replaced Kang Ryong as the second KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab
Republic. Between August 2015 and January 2017, Pak Gwang Il entered the Syrian
Arab Republic 15 times through the Masna‘ border between the Syrian Arab Republic
and Lebanon.
97
The Panel sent its fifth letter, in July 2017, to the Syrian authorities
requesting information on the activities of the above -mentioned individuals and two
__________________
92
93
94
95
96
97
Tosong was listed on 22 January 2013 “as being engaged in or providing support for, including
through other illicit means, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear-related, other
weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programs.” [KOMID] is the
parent company of the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, acco rding to Tosong’s list entry
on the 1718 sanctions list. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials.
See
S/2017/150,
interdicted Glocom shipment to Eritrea and Glocom’s other activities.
Including to or through China, Lebanon, the Russian Federation, Uganda and the United Arab
Emirates.
On 12 October 2016, Kang Ryong and his family were denied entry attempting to transit Dubai
airport coming from Damascus aboard a Syrian International Airlines flight and before boarding
an Aeroflot flight to Moscow (under the alias of Ri Chun Sik) He later travelled to Pyongyang
via Moscow under the alias Ri Chun Sik with an emergency passport numbered 7640001.
박광일
, DOB: 26 February 1973, passport number PD836310028.
Pak Gwang Il’s movements resemble those of Kang Ryong, who entered and exited the Syrian
Arab Republic 25 times between February and December of 2015. Information contained within
a letter from a Member State to the Panel.
49/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0050.png
S/2018/171
Syrian representatives of the Tanchon Commercial Bank.
98
The Syrian Arab Republic
replied that it “had no interaction with the two entities or individuals whose names
are mentioned in the letter”. It has not replied to another request for information
regarding Pak Gwang Il, the Tanchon Commercial Bank representatives and Ryu Jin,
in particular, as to whether they have been expelled. The investigation continues.
Arms shipments and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and designated
entity front companies (2010–2017)
129. The Panel’s investigations into several cases of hitherto unreported arms
shipments and cooperation with front companies of designated entities between 2010
and 2017 showed further evidence of arms embargo and other violations, including
through the transfer of items with utility in ballistic mi ssile and chemical weapons
programmes. According to a Member State, for many years, the Corst Company of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acted on behalf of the designated Second
Economic Committee
99
to ship items relating to prohibited programmes to entities
acting on behalf of the Scientific Studies Research Centre. The Panel obtained
documentation showing an attempt by the Corst Company in June 2010 to send 16
boxes of weapons production equipment (total 359 kg) to Damascus (figure XXI).
Figure XXI
Attempted weapons production shipment by the Corst Company of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Damascus in 2010
Source:
The Panel.
130. Corst sent goods to the Syrian Arab Republic in July 2017 for use in prohibited
programmes, which were received by a Scientific Studies Research Centre research
staff member. The Panel also received documents showing Corst as the shipper. The
Syrian consignee contact number on the invoice
100
matches the one listed by Member
States and the European Union for the Scientific Studies Research Centre front
__________________
98
99
100
They are Jang Bom Su (DOB: 15 April 1957), a.k.a. Jang Hyon U (DOB: 22 February 1958;
passport No.: 654210151) and Jon Myung Guk, a.k.a. Jon Yong Sang (DOB: 1 January 1976;
passport No. 654210108).
According to the sanctions list, it is involved in key aspects of the missile programme of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversees the country’s production of the ballistic
missiles and directs the activities of KOMID.
Telephone No. 00963 114471081.
18-01593
50/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0051.png
S/2018/171
company, Megatrade.
101
In addition, the same telephone/fax number and address were
being utilized by the Scientific Studies Research Centre for another of its front
companies, Electric Parts Ltd, for a missile-related shipment from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea seized by the Republic of Korea in 2012.
102
131. According to a Member State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also
delivered prohibited materials to the Syrian Arab Republic through Choe Ki Yong
(
최기용
) of Pusong Trading (
부성무역
) (a.k.a. Korea Pusong Corporation), which also
falls under the Second Economic Committee. The materials were delivered to the
Scientific Studies Research Centre through companies acting on its behalf, Elite
Surveying Instruments Co. and Megatrade.
103
Using the airway bill number provided
by the Panel, the transport company corroborated information provided by the
Member State, including that the shipper of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea was “Elite Surveying Instruments Co.” and the consignee, “Mr. Adeeb Kabekli,
Aleppo Street, Building 54, Damascus, Syria, Tel: 00963-11-447-1081”, whose name,
address and number match the July 2017 Corst shipment to Megatrade (see annex 36).
132. KOMID has used innovative evasion techniques in the Syrian Arab Republic. In
contrast with the usual practice of including information on consignee, shipper and
consignor in documentation accompanying the container shipment, in these cases,
documents providing the actual consignee information were sent separately by air.
For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sent by air to Kim Kwang
Chol, a KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic, the actual bill of lading
and cargo list for Mechanical Systems, a Scientific Studies Research Centre front
company, which listed the shipper as a foreign company operating in Pyongyang, the
“China Delixi Group Pyongyang office”, although the contact was a national of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pak Song Il. The consignee listed was the
Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab Republic
(see annex 36). The Panel notes that while a number of international logistics
companies have instituted enhanced screening to inspect all Democratic Peopl e’s
Republic of Korea-related shipments, one exception is “sealed diplomatic
shipments”, which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea often uses to
undertake prohibited activities that involve designated entities. Combined with the
use of a so-called foreign company, these practices are evidence of an attempt to
further obfuscate the timing, routes and content of prohibited shipments. The Panel
has identified 39 shipments from the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea to the
Syrian Arab Republic involving the above-mentioned companies between December
2012 and December 2017. The investigation continues.
133. The Member State also informed the Panel that the national of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Choe Jin Myong,
104
a long-time representative of the
Chilsong Trading Company, which deals in military communications equipment, has
been working with Han Il, the Beijing representative of the designated Daeryonggang
__________________
101
102
103
104
“52. Megatrade, address: Aleppo Street, P.O. Box 5966, Damascus, Syria; fax: 963114471081;
‘Acts as a proxy for the [SSRC], which is listed. Involved in trade in dual use goods prohibited
by EU sanctions for the Syrian government’; 16.10.2012” (see
Official Journal of the European
Union,
L330/9, 30 November 2012).
See
S/2013/337,
para. 46, annex IX which lists the address as “Aleppo Street Damascus” and
Tel. No. 00963 114471081.
In its 2017 final report, the Panel noted that “Elite Surveying Instruments”, an alias of Korea
Pusong Corporation”, had been designated by a Member State and manufactured vehicle-related
machinery parts such as grinders and bearings, further stating that “Elite Surveying Instruments”
had been involved in illicit shipments of dual-use items to an entity in the Syrian Arab Republic
“Megatrade”. See
S/2017/150,
para. 99.
최진명
DOB: 14 October 1962, passport number 472220689.
51/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0052.png
S/2018/171
Trading Corporation,
105
to broker arms-related equipment to a Syrian munitions
company, Yona Star International.
106
The deal was to include broadband
communications equipment and ultra-long distance detection radar, as well as an
explosive ordinance disposal vehicle. Another Member State informed the Panel of
its suspicion that “several tons of conventional armaments were acquired by [Syria]
through the North Korean entity Chonryong Technology Corp. ” The negotiations
between the two sides took place in September 2016 and were related to the
procurement of 30 mm grenade launchers, six-barrelled 7.62 mm machine guns and
six-barrelled 30 mm autocannons.
Interdicted shipments
134. Two Member States interdicted consignments en route to the Syrian Arab
Republic containing identical items and another Member State informed the Panel
that it had reasons to believe the consignments were related to a KOMID contract
107
with Syrian entities known to engage in prohibited activities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in the fields of chemical, ballistic missile or conventional
arms development.
1.
Shipper
135. The bills of lading of the shipments showed a Chinese company, Cheng Tong
Trading Co. Ltd, as shipper in January 2017 (see annex 37). The shipments were part
of a batch of five sent by the same company, with the three others sent between
3 November 2016 and 12 December 2016.
136. The contracts provided by Cheng Tong Trading Co. Ltd showed that the goods
in all five shipments were acquired by the Syrian companies for a total of
approximately $320,000 (see annex 38). The contracts stipulated a 30 per cent
pre-shipping payment, but Cheng Tong failed to provide any payment remittances.
The Panel has requested these documents from China. China responded to the Panel ’s
enquiries on the Cheng Tong Trading Company, noting that “China does not have any
clue or evidence demonstrating that Cheng Tong Trading Co. has business with Korea
Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) or other designated entities or
individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or takes part in activities
violating the Security Council resolutions related to the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea. If the Panel of Experts has any concrete evidence on the
relationship between Cheng Tong Trading Co. and KOMID, please provide to China
to facilitate China’s further investigation.”
2.
Consignee
137. The interdicted shipments were destined for a Damascus-based company,
Metallic Manufacturing Factory (see annex 37) which, according to a Member State,
is acting for or on behalf of the Mechanical Construction Factory,
108
which is itself a
__________________
105
106
107
108
According to the Member State, this alias has been used by the designated Namchongang
Trading Corporation”.
Yona Star International has been designated by another Member State, see United States,
Department of Treasury, “Treasury sanctions networks providing support to the Government of
Syria”, press release, 21 July 2016.
The Panel does not possess a copy of this contract.
United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury sanctions senior Al-Nusrah Front leaders
concurrently with UN designations”, press release, 23 February 2017. Available from
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0011.aspx.
18-01593
52/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0053.png
S/2018/171
front company for the Scientific Studies Research Centre.
109
The Mechanical
Construction Factory was previously investigated by the Panel for acting as consignee
in an interdiction of military-specific items and other items with possible military
uses.
110
138. Another of the shipments sent by the Cheng Tong Trading Company included
one destined to a Damascus-based company named General Company for Cables, a
reported subsidiary of the General Organization for Engineering Industries (see annex
39), another front company for the Scientific Studies Research Centre.
111
3.
Cargo content
139. During its inspection of the interdicted cargo at the invitation of the Member
States, the Panel found its content to be consistent with the bills of lading. The fi rst
shipment consisted of six shipping containers of acid -resistant tiles (bricks). The
second was seven shipping containers of the same acid-resistant tiles along with
adhesive paste and accessories (see figure XXII). The number of tiles would cover
5000 m
2
, an area commensurate to a large-scale industrial project. A technical analysis
of the tiles by a Member State concluded that they were to be used for activities
conducted at high temperatures. Although the Panel determined that the seized items
did not appear on any control lists, another Member State informed the Panel that
they included “materials that can be used to build bricks for the interior walls of [a]
chemical factory.”
Figure XXII
Acid-resistant tiles (bricks) inspected by the Panel
Source:
The Panel.
140. The November and December 2016 shipments contained items consistent with
another large-scale industrial project including valves, welded pipes (23 tons),
stainless steel seamless pipes (27 tons) and cables. The investigation conti nues.
__________________
109
110
111
United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury increases sanctions against Syria”, press
release, 18 July 2012. Available from www.treasury.gov/press -center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1642.aspx. The Scientific Studies Research Centre was described by a Member State as being
responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and missiles to deliver
them (United States, Department of Treasury, “Fact sheet: increasing sanctions against Syria”,
18 July 2012).
See
S/2013/337,
paras 86–89.
United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury increases sanctions against Syria”.
53/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0054.png
S/2018/171
Switzerland
Robotic arm used at military-related machinery plant
141. The Panel investigated a robotic arm produced by a Swiss manufacturer, which
was observed in the KCTV broadcast of 20 December 2015 on the “January 18
General Machinery Plant”, which is known for manufacturing military products (see
figure XXIII).
112
The Panel found that the robotic arm had been indirectly procured
by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea between 2006 and 2015 without the
manufacturer’s knowledge. The Panel notes that robotic arms are now prohibited
under paragraph 7 of resolution
2397 (2017),
in which the Security Council prohibited
the sale of items under HS code 84, and under paragraphs 8 and 27 of r esolution
2270
(2016).
Figure XXIII
Robotic arm used at the January 18 General Machinery Plant
Source:
KCTV.
Uganda
142. The Panel continued its investigation into prohibited military activities in
Uganda and travel to the country by individuals working on behalf of designated
entities. On 6 September 2017, Uganda informed the Panel that all remaining military
cooperation projects with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prohibited
under resolution
1874 (2009)
had expired or been terminated.
113
The first contract
with the military training team of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea expired
on 27 April 2017 and was not renewed. It noted that the other contract involving air
force pilots and technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which was
due to expire on 20 March 2018, was terminated on an unspec ified date in 2017.
114
Uganda cooperated with the Panel by supplying the requested contracts and list of 19
officers ranging in rank from brigadier to major who comprised the air force contract
and three colonels and a major who comprised the military traini ng team and have
now left the country.
115
Uganda, however, is yet to respond to the Panel’s enquiries
__________________
112
113
114
115
See
S/2017/150,
para. 194.
While the Panel recommended that Uganda cease all military cooperation with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in June 2015, more than two years passed until the contract expired
and was not renewed.
The Panel first identified Democratic People’s Republic of Korea air force trainers at a Ugandan
air force base in its letter of 24 July 2015 to Uganda. See
S/2016/157,
para. 114 and figure XXV.
The Panel notes that the salaries of the military training team of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea were to be paid in United States dollars to the Embassy of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in Kampala.
18-01593
54/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0055.png
S/2018/171
into the activities of four senior KOMID officials also active in Libya, the Sudan and
the Syrian Arab Republic and documented as travelling to Uganda.
116
In December
2017, Uganda did report that two diplomats of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea “Mr. Yu Kyong Jin and Mr. Jong Kuk Chol, who were allegedly employees of
an entity sanctioned by the United Nations, the Korea Mining and Development
Trading Corporation, were asked to leave the country in October 2017.”
117
Uganda
has yet to respond to the Panel’s enquiries into attempts by the military attaché’s
office at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Kampala to
provide military services prohibited under the resolutions to third countries.
118
United Republic of Tanzania
143. The Panel continued its investigation into the Haegeumgang Trading
Corporation’s (a.k.a. Haegumgang) €10.49 million contract to repair and upgrade
surface-to-air missile Pechora (S-125) systems and P-12 air defence radar in the
United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania informed the Panel that “in 2014 Tanzania
took a decision to terminate, with immediate effect, the working business relationship
between the Government of Tanzania and the Naegeumgang (sic) Trading Company
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as mentioned in the Panel’s report”.
119
However, according to a Member State, the military contracts were only “temporarily
suspended” in April 2014 and “in July 2016 military cooperation with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea resumed based on the receipt by the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea of a 40 per cent down payment for the contracts ”. The head of the
Haegeumgang Trading Corporation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kim
Kwang Nam,
120
entered the United Republic of Tanzania with electronic warfare
equipment technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in December
2016. The military technicians are residing at a Tanzanian milit ary facility at
Nyumbu, near the town of Kibaha, and have been engaged in the upgrade of the
P-12 radars since February 2017, according to a Member State. The Panel wrote to
the United Republic of Tanzania requesting evidence of the contract cancellation a nd
period of stay of all technicians and Haegeumgang personnel in the country. The Panel
is awaiting a response. The Panel notes that Haegeumgang has been active in
neighbouring Mozambique, upgrading the same type of air defence systems.
121
Zimbabwe
144. The Panel is investigating the reported presence of the Mansudae Overseas
Project Group of Companies
122
and individuals working on behalf of the Green Pine
Associated Corporation and the Reconnaissance General Bureau in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe provided information on two Mansudae companies, “Mansudae Ordinance
Supplies” and “Mansudae Boka Design Company”, stating that the latter is “not a
subsidiary of Mansudae Overseas Project or Mansudae Art Studio ”. It further stated
that Mansudae Ordinance Supplies “is dormant” and that the Mansudae Boka Design
Company “focused on gold and precious metals”, initially as a “jewelry design
company” and is now a “manufacturer for jewelry”.
123
However, the Panel notes that
two of the three directors of the Mansudae Boka Design Compan y, Yun Kyong Chol
__________________
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
See
S/2017/150,
table 8.
See
S/AC.49/2018/11,
annex. Report of Uganda on the implementation of Security Council
resolutions
2321 (2016)
and
2371 (2017),
18 January 2018.
S/2017/150,
para. 122.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 30.
DOB: 27 November 1958, passport No. 836420376.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 26.
Security Council resolution
2371 (2017),
annex II, states that the Mansudae Overseas Project
“has been reported to conduct business” in Zimbabwe.
Letter to Panel received 26 October 2017.
55/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0056.png
S/2018/171
and Kim Kyong Ryop, are nationals of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
Zimbabwe informed the Panel that the company was being dissolved. In response to
the Panel’s letter requesting immigration information on 83 nationals of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their activities on behalf of designated
entities,
124
Zimbabwe informed the Panel that Ri Hak Chol had travelled to Zimbabwe
via air on 18 August 2017 and departed on 23 August 2017. Kim Yong Nam travelled
to Zimbabwe at least two times in 2017 (15 to 23 February and 21 June to
23 August).
125
Ri Hak Chol is the president of Saeing P’il Corporation and has
travelled to Angola, Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran,
126
where arms-related
activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been reported.
127
Kim
Yong Nam is reportedly an officer of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, a
designated entity that oversees the activities of the Green Pine Associated
Corporation. The Panel is continuing its investigation into the activities of these
individuals in Zimbabwe.
Implementation of the luxury goods ban
Wonsan Air Show
145. The Panel investigated the operation of two previously reported aircraft
observed during the Wonsan Air Festival in September 2016.
128
Regarding the P-750
XSTOL aircraft manufactured by Pacific Aerospace Ltd, the Government of New
Zealand informed the Panel that the national Customs Service had investigated the
case further and had prosecuted Pacific Aerospace Ltd for the indirect export of
aircraft parts to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, Pacific
Aerospace Ltd informed the Panel about the adoption of new policies and procedures
to improve its internal export control system.
Bugsae Shop (alternative spelling of Buksae)
146. The Panel investigated the operation in Pyongyang of the Bugsae Shop, linked
to the Singapore-based OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd (figure XXIV) (see paras. 178–188).
Media reports reveal imported luxury goods produced in the European Union and
Japan and distributed by another Singapore-based company, T Specialist International
(Singapore) Pte Ltd. The Panel notes that in accordance with the export and import
regulations of Singapore, a wide range of luxury goods, including wines and spirits,
are prohibited to be exported to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
129
__________________
124
125
126
127
128
129
Panel letter to Zimbabwe, 12 October 2017.
According to the Department of Immigration of Zimbabwe, Ri Hak Chol used Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea passport No. 836220494. Kim Yong Nam used Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea passport No. 836120079.
See
S/2017/150,
table 9.
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 103, 207–209 (Angola); paras. 181–182 (Egypt); press release SC/10633,
2 May 2012 (Islamic Republic of Iran).
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 126–128.
See
S/2015/131,
annex 11.
18-01593
56/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0057.png
S/2018/171
Figure XXIV
Images showing the Bugsae Shop as a member of the OCN Group in Pyongyang in July 2017
Source:
NK Pro.
Pyongyang branch linked to the MINISO retail chain claimed to be based in Japan
147. The Panel investigated the opening in April 2017 of a new brand chain outlet of
MINISO in Pyongyang, advertising itself as a “Japan-based designer brand”
(see annex 40). The MINISO website shows images of items in its stores, such as
cosmetics and earphones, that could be considered luxury goods in accordance with
resolution
1718 (2006)
given that they are covered by Japan’s luxury goods ban. On
18 January 2017, prior to the opening of the Pyongyang branch, MINISO signed a
strategic cooperation agreement with the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
The attendees of the signing ceremony included Nan Chengyi, the chief delegate of
the North Korea Economic Cooperation Council, China Dandong Office, and the
global cofounders of MINISO, Miyake Junya (chief designer) and Ye Guofu (Chief
Executive Officer) (see annex 41). MINISO claimed that its items retailed in
Pyongyang were not produced in Japan and that the MINISO China office was
handling the brand’s overseas franchise, including the Pyongyang branch. After being
contacted by the Panel, the brand deleted its headquarters address in Japan on its
website (see annex 42). Furthermore, the Pyongyang store has changed its retail brand
name in its packaging (see figure XXV). The Panel also addressed its concern about
possible violations of the prohibition on joint ventures in a letter to the company, to
which it has not received a reply.
Figure XXV
Example of retail brand name change in packaging
Source:
NK News.
18-01593
57/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0058.png
S/2018/171
Other cases under the luxury goods ban
148. The Panel investigated exports of luxury goods to the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea from at least five Member States, sending enquiries and compiling
corroborating information.
Jewellery, gems and precious and semi-precious stones (HS code 71)
149. According to UN Comtrade, from January to June 2017, India exported precious
metals and stones worth $578,994 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The
largest commodity exported from January to June 2017 was diamonds (HS code
710239) worth $514,823.
150. The Panel reiterates that the jewellery items listed in paragraph 1 of annex IV
to resolution
2094 (2013)
correspond to HS codes beginning with 71 and calls upon
Member States to exercise vigilance with regard to any exports of goods classified
under that code.
130
151. Annex IV to Council Regulation (EU) No. 2016/682 of 29 April 2016 amending
Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007, which implements resolution
2270 (2016),
contains
tables of HS codes corresponding to the list of prohibited “luxury goods” for transfer
to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Wines (including sparkling wines), spirits and spirituous beverages (HS codes
220410, 220421, 220429, 2205 and 2208)
152. Following the adoption of the Council Regulation, Germany exported wines,
including sparkling wines, and spirits in the amount of $151,840 (between June 2016
and June 2017) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Italy exported $46,992
worth of wine and vermouth between July 2016 and February 2017, and Bulgaria
exported $11,959 worth of wine in April 2017. In their replies to the Panel, all thr ee
countries claimed their transactions to be exempt under the 2016 Council Regulation.
While “wine, vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes” as well as ethyl alcohol were
indeed exempted, if the commodities exported by Germany were of HS code
22041011 (Champagne) and HS code 22041091 (Asti spumante), they would not have
been exempt.
153. In addition, Chile exported wine worth $290,880 between June 2016 and August
2017. The Panel did not receive a reply from Chile as to whether wine was covered
by its domestic luxury goods ban.
Perfumes and cosmetics (HS codes 3303, 3304, 3305 and 3307)
154. Between September 2016 and June 2017, Bulgaria exported perfumes and
cosmetics in the amount of $198,074 to the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
Germany’s exports of the same articles between September 2016 and April 2017
amounted to $62,179. Both countries informed the Panel that their transactions were
exempt under the same Council Regulation.
155. The Panel notes that annex VIII to a new European Union regula tion, Council
Regulation (EU) 2017/2062 of 13 November 2017 amending Regulation (EU)
2017/1509, eliminated the above-mentioned exemptions by introducing a total ban on
those items.
__________________
130
See
S/2016/157,
para. 129.
18-01593
58/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0059.png
S/2018/171
V. Finance
156. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to access the
international financial system because of critical implementation deficiencies, which
resulted in the country’s evasive activities not being duly identified and prevented.
The deceptive practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the lack
of appropriate action by many Member States are systematically undermining the
effectiveness of financial sanctions.
157. Multiple Member States were found to be exerting insufficient scrutiny of the
activities of bank representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
residing in, or moving through, their territory. Many financial institutions of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain a
network of overseas representatives who continue to move fre ely across borders to
undertake transactions in multiple countries and to establish residences abroad. Their
ability to do so points to insufficient monitoring of the activities of these
representatives and the lack of enforcement of the obligation to expe l individuals
working on behalf of or at the direction of banks of the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea, close their branches, subsidiaries and representative offices and freeze all
assets controlled by designated entities or members of the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that are engaged in violating or evading the
provisions of the resolutions.
158. The Panel also investigated the account-opening and transaction patterns of
banks of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their representatives, which
revealed that several foreign financial institutions had deficient vigilance measures
and due diligence processes. While in some cases, the establishment of the accounts
predated designation or the relevant sanctions measure, the Panel found that the
financial institutions had performed inadequate due diligence at the onboarding stage,
had deficient transaction monitoring procedures and largely failed to conduct reviews
of these high-risk accounts. Evasive practices in opening accounts included listing
the accounts in the names of foreign nationals, front companies and family members,
together with provisions for a national of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
authorized to have signing rights and control of accounts. Frequent cash withdrawals
from the accounts investigated by the Panel indicate the importance of bulk cash in
business transactions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
159. The Panel’s financial investigations also highlighted how corporate servic e
providers act as a key vulnerability. Instead of serving as a line of defence against
sanctions evasion, they have often facilitated such evasion, albeit unwittingly. Once
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can register a front company without
overt links to the country through the assistance of foreign nationals, it becomes
significantly easier for its firms to pass rudimentary due diligence checks by financial
institutions and open and maintain accounts. An investigation into a Singaporean
company with ownership ties to financial institutions of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea revealed the use of overseas representatives and front companies,
especially those established in Hong Kong, to ensure that transactions were conducted
in a manner that would not reveal any overt connection to a designated entity or
interest of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
160. The Panel’s investigation into Glocom highlighted similar patterns of evasion,
showing that multiple overseas accounts, especially those established in the name of
front companies with the assistance of trusted local partners, allowed it to
continuously move funds between and in different banks and jurisdictions. The
network’s transactions, whether for purposes of moving mo ney between accounts it
controlled in its own network or for paying suppliers, often involved an array of
18-01593
59/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0060.png
S/2018/171
evasion tactics, including large-scale use of bulk cash, front companies in Hong Kong
and elsewhere, middlemen and a ledger system.
161. The Panel also investigated the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of
Companies(MKP), a network of overseas branches of a major joint venture of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau
and the Mansudae Overseas Group and having ties to financial institutions of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The network benefits heavily from a
decentralized corporate model that helps to distance the Group ’s activities from its
beneficiaries of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on paper and from the
cooperation of non-nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
including prominent political and business figures in the countries in which they
operate. Furthermore, the Panel found that several firms and, in some cases, foreign
governments, have been supporting the efforts of the network to find financing for its
activities, in contravention of provisions in the resolutions prohibiting such activities.
Bank representatives and bank accounts of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea abroad
162. The Panel investigated more than 30 representatives of financial institutions of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operating abroad, including from the
Tanchon Commercial Bank, Korea Kumgang Group Bank, Foreign Trade Bank, Cheil
Credit Bank, Daesong Bank, Ilsim International Bank, Bank of East Land, Daedong
Credit Bank and Ryugyong Commercial Bank, who operated in China, Libya, the
Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates in 2017
(see annexes 43–44). The Panel has previously reported on the use of embassies of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the country’s bank operations in some
of the listed cases.
131
The Panel also notes that many of these representatives continue
to travel internationally. The Foreign Trade Bank representative in Libya, Ku Ja
Hyong, has undertaken multiple trips since the adoption of resolution
2321 (2016),
including to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Panel recalls
that Member States must expel any individual determined to be working on behalf of
or at the direction of a bank of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea, which
violates both paragraph 33 of resolution
2270 (2016)
and paragraph 33 of resolution
2321 (2016).
Overseas bank accounts of individuals and entities acting on behalf of financial
institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
163. The Panel wrote letters to more than 10 Member States in whose jurisdictions
bank accounts had been established by financial institutions and designated entities
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, requesting account documentation and
transaction information. One Member State replied that of the 125 accounts
mentioned in the Panel’s letter, 99 had been identified and closed, with the exception
of one under a name that is not designated.
164. Other Member State replies enabled the Panel to analyse how overseas bank
accounts were established by financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea and their representatives.
132
This information showed various evasion
techniques employed by bank representatives of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea operating abroad, including the use of foreign nationals, front companies and
local embassies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to set up and make use
of accounts where nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had signing
__________________
131
132
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 236, 241, 185 and annex 14–27.
The Panel received replies from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, France, Italy, Latvia, Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and Tunisia.
18-01593
60/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0061.png
S/2018/171
authority. For example, a euro account was opened at the International Arab Bank of
Tunisia on 23 November 2013 by a Chinese passport holder, Jin Huixing (
金辉星
) (see
annex 45), but with a national of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea, Nam
Sok Chan, managing the account. It was frozen by the International Arab Bank of
Tunisia on 7 August 2016, with a balance of $181,730.00. On 27 No vember 2013, a
dollar account at the International Arab Bank of Tunisia was opened by another
Chinese passport holder, Ji Hong Hua (
吉红花
), but with signing authority given to the
same national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The International Arab
Bank of Tunisia froze that account on 24 July 2015, with a balance of $25,869.70.
Documentation relating to the opening of the accounts shows that both Jin Huixing
and Ji Hong Hua listed their addresses for the above-mentioned accounts as “Embassy
of Democratic Korea Tripoli Libya” (see annex 45). Yet another euro account was
opened at the International Arab Bank of Tunisia on 18 July 2012 by Ri Chun Song
in his capacity as “Secretary’s Delegate of the Mission of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to Tripoli”, before being closed on 22 August 2013. Ri Chun Song
serves as the representative of the Foreign Trade Bank in Beijing.
133
He was also
listed, along with Nam Sok Chan, as having signing authority for a United States
dollar account at the Arab Tunisian Bank in the name of the Foreign Trade Bank of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, opened on 2 July 2012 and closed on
11 November 2012. Lastly, the Foreign Trade Bank used the name of a front company,
“Kartos”, to establish another account at the Arab Tunisian Bank on 12 May 1999,
periodically designating multiple nationals of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea as new signatories. The account was closed on 3 March 2012. These cases
demonstrate the need for financial institutions to fa ctor in the involvement of
individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in account control for client
risk assessments. Listing multiple individuals with signing authority allowed the
Foreign Trade Bank to continue to undertake transactions fro m the same accounts
while its representatives travelled between global Foreign Trade Bank offices. The
Panel obtained a 2011 order by the Foreign Trade Bank Libya representative faxed to
the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Vienna for the Foreign
Trade Bank Austria representative for transfers to its euro and United States dollar
accounts at the Arab Tunisian Bank in Tunisia, showing global Foreign Trade Bank
cooperation.
165. With regard to accounts in Austria, its former local Fore ign Trade Bank
representative, Kim Yu Jin, was instrumental in establishing a complex web of
financial relationships, opening accounts in the name of the Foreign Trade Bank in at
least three different financial institutions (including three accounts in one bank) and
opening other accounts in his own name, in the name of the company Korea Ungum
Co. and in the name of the wife of a staff member of the Embassy of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. According to Austria, Kim Yu Jin was himself a member
of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea in Austria who departed when his accreditation expired.
134
As at
26 October 2017, Austrian authorities had closed 12 bank accounts held by persons
affiliated with the Embassy. Austria noted that this action went beyond the
requirements of paragraph 16 of resolution
2321 (2016),
which refers to diplomats
and consular officers only. This interpretation suggests that some Member States may
not consider administrative and technical staff to be included under that provision.
The Panel nevertheless considers paragraph 16 of resolution
2321 (2016)
to be
applicable to all personnel of embassies of the Democratic People’s Republic of
__________________
133
134
China replied to the Panel that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and
Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets.
Another member of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pak Kang Son,
also established accounts in four different banks.
61/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0062.png
S/2018/171
Korea, including trade, administrative, support and technical staff, particularly in the
light of the history of these embassies using such staff to open bank accounts and
perform transactions on behalf of the country’s financial institutions. The Panel also
recalls its previous recommendation that Member States ensure that additional
accounts are not established in the names of family members of diplomats.
135
Documentation relating to the opening of bank accounts
166. An analysis of documents submitted by financial institutions of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and their representatives to open bank accounts showed
insufficient due diligence performed by financial institutions during the onboarding
process. For example, the due diligence conducted by a major European bank for an
application for a euro-denominated account by a representative of the Korea Daesong
Bank showed no independent review or verification of the answers given on the
anti-money-laundering questionnaire. A due diligence checklist indicated that despite
negative public information about applicants (including an entry in the Thomson
Reuters World-Check database), the fact that the bank’s regulator was the Central
Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and that no audited
documentation was available,
136
the bank’s compliance department recommended
that the application be accepted.
167. Singapore provided the Panel with copies of application forms and account
statements from a front company for the Northeast Asia Bank, Great Best Trading
Pte, Ltd. Great Best Trading was co-located with Chinpo Shipping and the Tonghae
Shipping Agency, and the two also shared key management personnel and
shareholders, suggesting links to the Ocean Maritime Management Company.
Although the account was originally established in 1995, there was no evidence that
the bank conducted any account reviews, including when the company first applied
for a “business privilege account”, when a euro account was added through a simple
request by fax or, in 2013, when the account ran an average balance of $995,000 and
showed withdrawals and deposits of large amounts in round numbers. The Panel notes
that Member States are obliged under paragraph 11 of resolution
2094 (2013)
to apply
enhanced monitoring to prevent transactions that could contribute to violations of the
resolutions or to sanctions evasion.
Banks of a European Member State used for sanctions violations
168. From 2009 to 2016, banks in a European Member State were used by foreign
organized crime syndicates to circumvent the sanctions regime, including for the
export of goods and equipment related to the prohibited programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Customers at several banks transferred funds
in a series of complicated transactions involving accounts held by offshore companies
for the benefit of entities of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea. The bank’s
offshore clients did not transact directly with sanctioned entities but used a network
of intermediaries. The Member State whose banks were fined for this behaviour
shared the typologies with the Panel. The typologies show that the banks did not
conduct adequate due diligence and transaction monitoring and did not sufficiently
scrutinize the beneficiaries of transactions. Although the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea was geographically far from the Member State in question, its
financial institutions were used to circumvent sanctions, specifically through the use
of offshore front companies. This violation was discovered through the sharing of
information between Member States. It shows how the evasive practices of the
__________________
135
136
See
S/2017/742,
para. 65.
Nor was any research carried out on the parent company of the bank, Korea Daesong Economic
Group.
18-01593
62/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0063.png
S/2018/171
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea significantly increase the challenges
associated with implementing financial sanctions and highlights the importance of
establishing feasible mechanisms for sharing information between Member States and
banks, whose ability to freely share proprietary information is almost always severely
restricted.
137
Financial operations of the Reconnaissance General Bureau
169. The Panel analysed transaction records supplied by Italy for more than six
accounts at two major financial institutions in the country established by Kim Su-
Gwang, an official of the Reconnaissance General Bureau whose assets were frozen
by France in January 2014 along with those of his father and sister, the latter of whom,
Kim Su Gyong, is an official of the Korean United Development B ank.
138
While Kim
Su-Gwang’s employment at the international organization that had been supplying
him cover was terminated on 23 January 2015, he nevertheless continues to own
property and at least one bank account in Italy and signed two four-year apartment
leases starting in February 2015 and November 2016, respectively, which transaction
records suggest may be sublet to other nationals of the Democratic People ’s Republic
of Korea.
139
Meanwhile, he served as the deputy trade representative of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Belarus from 24 September to
16 December 2017, during which time he and his wife travelled to and made
purchases in neighbouring countries using a car with a diplomatic plate.
170. Kim Su-Gwang opened at least six accounts in Italy in various combinations of
names of his father, sister, wife and mother (Djang Tcheul Hy), the latter of whom
was listed on three accounts despite having never been to the country according to
Italian records. One of his United States dollar accounts (also in the names of his
mother and father) showed regular salary payments from his employer, as well as
pension payments from the other international organization for which his father
worked. These payments continued beyond the January 2014 assets freeze by France.
171. The accounts showed numerous cash withdrawals in Rome as well as Beijing,
Kuala Lumpur, Moscow and Shanghai, often for the maximum amount allowed and
using multiple bank cards within minutes of one another at the same automatic teller
machine (ATM). One card was used to withdraw cash in Shanghai and Kuala Lumpur
in February and March 2014, a period that coincided with the retention of three
Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives in Malaysia (February 2014) on suspicion
of smuggling $450,000 cash out of the country. Cash was also widely used to make
purchases of air tickets and foreign currency. The reliance on cash withdrawals is a
pattern also seen in the banking practices of the Glocom network, discussed further
in the following section. It highlights the need for relevant financial institutions, as
part of a risk-based approach, to conduct thorough due diligence and reviews of
__________________
137
138
139
The sharing of information is restricted for several reasons. In some States, information-sharing
is possible only when there is suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. Some
countries have a legal framework for targeted financial sanctions and are legally able to share
information related to sanctions evasion, but do not include this provision in their implementing
legislation. Most importantly, many States have not considered or prioritized the issue of
mechanisms/channels/points of contact for such international cooperati on.
The Panel previously reported on Kim Su-Gwang’s cooperation with his father, another
Reconnaissance General Bureau agent, Kim Yong Nam, and his sister, Kim Su -Gyong, official of
the Korean United Development Bank, in financial activities in Europe. See
S/2017/742,
paras. 52–53; and
S/2017/150,
paras. 72–87 and 232–241. See also annexes 46–48.
These contracts are in the name of his alias, “Kim Souk Wang”. Monthly rent payments into his
account suggest that he is subletting these apartments to other nationals of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea.
63/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0064.png
S/2018/171
accounts where nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are
signatories or may have indirect account control.
172. All of the accounts have been closed with the exception of at least one account
in the name of the wife of Kim Su-Gwang, Kim Kyong Hui, opened in March 2014
(two months after the French assets freeze) at the address of his employer, whic h
remains on the account despite the termination of his employment on 23 January
2015.
Financial operations of Glocom
173. The Panel continued its investigation into the financing of Glocom, a
Reconnaissance General Bureau-directed network selling prohibited military
communications technology.
140
In addition to its four bank accounts with the Daedong
Credit Bank in Pyongyang, the Glocom network controlled at least 10 accounts in
four other countries between 2012 and 2017, including through Malaysia-based front
companies. Records show that these multiple overseas accounts allowed Glocom to
continuously move funds between accounts it controlled in different banks and
countries in the course of its illicit trade.
Figure XXVI
Accounts controlled by Glocom
174. Kim Chang Hyok, the representative of Glocom in Malaysia, held the sole
signing authority for the accounts of the front companies he directed, International
Golden Services and International Global System. In contrast to other cases reviewed
by the Panel in which nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sought
to conceal their links to the country on official documentation, the onboarding
paperwork shows that the Malaysian bank was fully aware that these accounts were
controlled by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Kim Chang Hyok declared
himself to be a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, indicated that
the country was also the source of the funds and that he intended to open a factory in
Malaysia. These red flags were ignored in a manner similar to during the onboarding
and customer due diligence process by the above-mentioned European financial
institution for entering into a counterparty relationship with Korea Daesong Bank.
__________________
140
Directed by the Pyongyang branch of Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. See
S/2017/742,
paras. 52–53; and
S/2017/150,
paras. 72–87 and 232–241.
18-01593
64/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0065.png
S/2018/171
175. Alongside the front company accounts he controlled, Kim Chang Hyok also
maintained four personal accounts in a Malaysian bank. His day-to-day expenditure
was conducted almost exclusively using his credit card, including frequent maximum
daily cash withdrawals from ATMs. The cash withdrawals were split between his
accounts, further limiting the bank’s view of the nature of his activity.
141
Periodic
bulk cash injections or large in-house cheque deposits replenished the accounts.
176. Glocom’s payments to suppliers and transfers around the network often made
use of a particular pattern combining a variety of tactics commonly used by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade financial sanctions.
142
First, a
national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would make a bulk cash
deposit into one of the Glocom accounts in Pyongyang.
143
This deposit would be
reconciled by ledger with accounts controlled by Kim Chol Sam, the then -
representative of the Daedong Credit Bank in China.
144
On the same or the next day,
Kim Chol Sam would initiate a transfer to the intended recipient in Malaysia or
Singapore for the same amount. To do so, actual funds would flow from the account
where the deposit had been recorded to a Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea-
controlled front company in Hong Kong, less transfer fees and a commission for
middlemen. The front company would then in turn remit funds to the intended
recipient. As a result, the receiving financial institution in Malaysia or Singapore
would see only an incoming payment from the Hong Kong front company, rather than
one from International Global System or Pan Systems — the actual holders of the
accounts with the Daedong Credit Bank. The same is true of correspondent banks
processing the transactions, including those in New York, which would have little
insight into the origin or beneficiaries of the transaction. In addition to paying
suppliers in this fashion, Glocom used the same method to move money within its
own network, specifically between its front company accounts in Pyongyang and
those in Malaysia. An example of such a transaction in which funds were moved
internally within the Glocom network is shown in figure XXVII.
__________________
141
142
143
144
In a period of less than two years between 2013 and 2015, Kim Chang Hyok conducted 63 cash
withdrawals from ATMs, totalling RM 88,000 (approximately $21,000). The vast majority of
these were of the maximum limit allowed. Withdrawals were often done in batches on the same
day or on consecutive days. For example, over a two-day period in August 2014, he made eight
withdrawals totalling RM 9,000 (approximately $2,200).
As revealed in the Panel’s 2017 midterm report, two Glocom front companies — International
Global System and Pan Systems — held accounts with the Daedong Credit Bank. These accounts
were serviced by the bank’s then-representative in China, Kim Chol Sam, who used his own
personal and front company accounts to perform transactions on behalf of the bank ’s Glocom-
linked clients.
Several of these deposits were made by Ryang Su Nyo, a member of the Reconnaisance General
Bureau of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a shareholder of International Global
System, and a key agent in the Glocom network. Ryang was the signatory for Glocom ’s Daedong
Credit Bank accounts and is known to have been instrumental in moving bulk cash related to
Glocom’s activities. She was caught exiting Malaysia with $400,000 in mint United States dollar
notes in 2014.
China replied to the Panel that he returned to the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea on
14 October 2016 and, as with other designated individuals, is blocked from entry to the country.
65/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0066.png
S/2018/171
Figure XXVII
Payment from International Global System to a Singapore supplier
Figure XXVIII
Payment between Glocom front companies
177. The Panel recommends that the relevant Member States expel all bank
representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from their territories
and freeze all bank accounts and other assets owned by them, as well as any
individuals and entities acting on behalf of Pan Systems or Glocom.
66/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0067.png
S/2018/171
Foreign ties to the Ryugyong Commercial Bank and the Daedong Credit Bank
178. The Panel investigated three Singaporean companies, a Chinese individual and
two Chinese entities for business ties to financial institutions of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in violation of paragraph 33 of resolution
2270 (2016),
paragraph 33 of resolution
2321 (2016)
and paragraph 18 of resolution
2375 (2017)
regarding joint ventures, in addition to the sale of luxury goods. In the case of two of
the Singaporean and Chinese companies and a national, the relationships also
involved ownership interests in financial institutions of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea, part of a pattern identified by the Panel in its 2017 final and
midterm reports.
145
Foreign company activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
179. The two main companies under investigation, OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and
T Specialist International (Singapore) Pte Ltd, share the same Singapore address and
director, “Leo” Ng Kheng Wah (see annexes 49 and 55). OCN has been active in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since 1995 and has exported goods to the
country since at least 2006, in particular by supplying the Pyongyang Bugsae
department stores with items for sale, including luxury goods (see para. 146 above).
OCN has employed a Pyongyang office manager, Ri Ik (a.k.a. Li Ik), since 2004 (see
annexes 56–57). He remains under contract with OCN at the time of writing, but has
spent a significant amount of time in Singapore in recent years according to
Singaporean travel records. In response to the Panel’s enquiries, OCN’s lawyers
claimed that it “does not own any office space” in Pyongyang and that in late 2012,
it “stopped the sale of goods into the DPRK”. According to their response, OCN’s
sister company, T Specialist, entered into a “contract for consulting and logistics
services” on 1 January 2013 with Wang Zhi Guo (
王志�½
, see annexes 50–54),
146
the
director of the Hong Kong-registered Pinnacle International Distribution (HK)
Company Ltd, according to which “goods would be shipped by us [T Specialist] to
Dalian as the destination port for distribution in China ”.
180. However, OCN-branded plastic shopping bags continued to be given to shoppers
at the Pyongyang Bugsae stores until July of 2017 (see annexes 60–61). The addresses
on the OCN bags also match the “OCN Pyongyang” address on a Ukrainian
company’s 2017 export documents (see annex 62).
147
Furthermore, T Specialist- and
OCN-branded goods (solely owned and distributed by those companies) continued to
be offered for sale in the Bugsae department stores in Pyongyang until as recently as
July 2017 (see annexes 63–64). OCN’s lawyers wrote to the Panel, “Our clients have
no knowledge of the authenticity of the sale of goods in the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea as included in your letter and no knowledge of how any such goods
ended up in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. However, the Panel has a
__________________
145
146
147
See
S/2017/742,
para. 54; and
S/2017/150,
para. 228.
A Singaporean namesake of the company, “Pinnacle International Pte. Ltd”, which existed from
1993 until 2009, was co-directed by both Wang Zhi Guo and Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”), showing
their close connection. Wang is also listed as a shareholder in Lagun Sari, along with Leo ’s two
daughters, and is also listed as a director for OCN Shipping Hong Kong, with known links to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He used a Chinese address in the registration
documents: No. 17 Jiangjia Hutong Li Gong Lou, Hedong District, Tianjin, China with the
passport number 140254055. (see annexes 53–55). Wang Zhi Guo is a Singaporean permanent
resident.
OCN Pyongyang Office #01-05, Changgwang House, Ryenhwa-Dong, Central district,
Pyongyang, D.P.R.Korea. Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM also lists an address in the
Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24 (see annex 58). In a letter to the Panel, OCN’s
lawyers claimed that the OCN plastic bags ceased to be printed in or about 2012 but that they
were “sold to Mr. Ri Ik, pursuant to his request” and that “after 2012, Mr. Ri Ik printed the OCN
Plastic Bags without our Client’s knowledge, elsewhere.”
67/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0068.png
S/2018/171
2017 reply from an OCN/T Specialist employee to the request from a prospective
client from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for a quote for the purchase
of electronic items to be shipped to Rason, in which OCN agreed to provide a
quotation for shipment of the items to China, showing clear knowledge of the end use
of the items.
181. Further, regarding the continued employment of Ri Ik after the supposed
termination of all OCN sales to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the
company explained that “his assistance was required to ensure collectability of the
accounts receivables from the arrears outstanding as of 2012 for goods sold ”. No
evidence for these claims was provided to the Panel despite its request.
Daedong Credit Bank
182. OCN’s lawyers claimed to the Panel that OCN “did not at all material times,
and do not have any relationships with FTB, Jae-il Shinyong Unhaeng, First Credit
Bank and Daedong Credit Bank (DCB)”. However, OCN was one of the first
customers of the Daedong Credit Bank, opening an account in March 1997 and later
changing the name to T Specialist. The account was managed primarily by OCN
Pyongyang Office Manager Ri Ik. This account was used by both OCN and
T Specialist starting in 2006 to transfer proceeds from items sold in the Bugsae Shop
to T Specialist’s accounts at the Development Bank of Singapore in both euros and
dollars, almost always in even amounts.
183. Between November 2011 and May 2014, transactions valued at more than
$5 million were made through that account to T Specialist as well as to another
Singaporean company, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd for payment for goods sold at the OCN
Pyongyang Bugsae Shop, as well as other expenditures. Of this, more than 25
transactions in even amounts ranging from $100,000 to $350,000 were made to a
T Specialist account at the Development Bank of Singapore. T Specialist claimed to
the Panel that these transfers were “remitted from Hongdae International Ltd (HK) and
not any financial institution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” but the
Panel has previously reported that Hongdae was established by the Daedong Credit
Bank’s representative in Dalian, China, Kim Chol Sam (aka Jin Tiesan,
金铁三
), in order
to undertake financial transactions on behalf of the Daedo ng Credit Bank.
148
T Specialist claimed that the transfers were “for arrears in relation to amounts due and
owing for goods sold” before October 2012, but declined to provide supporting
documentation. The Panel also notes a transfer from Pan Systems, a compa ny that the
Panel has recommended for designation,
149
to T Specialist in July 2011 for
1,157.69 euros. This shows a link between these two Singaporean and Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea entities and networks.
184. With regard to more than 10 transactions ranging from $70,000 to $150,000 made
through this account to the other Singaporean company, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd, at
Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited Singapore, OCN’s lawyers stated,
“SCN Singapore is not an entity related to our clients”. SCN has yet to reply to the
Panel’s enquiries.
185. Further information obtained by the Panel indicates that repeated transfers in
both euros and United States dollars were made to T Specialist from the account at
the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation of the “Party Financial Management
Department” for goods supplied to Changgwang Foreigners’ Dormitory as well as
payments to Chinese companies for various consumer goods, payments for foreign
__________________
148
149
See
S/2017/150,
paras. 228–230.
See
S/2017/742,
paras. 52 and 62;
S/2017/150,
paras. 232–241.
18-01593
68/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0069.png
S/2018/171
vessel port fees, hotel bills and payments for “OCN construction investment” and
cement. OCN/T Specialist claimed to have no knowledge of these transfers.
Ryugyong Commercial Bank and Koryo Commercial Bank
186. The Panel’s investigations also highlighted long-standing close ties between
OCN/T Specialist and the Ryugyong Commercial Bank, including ownership ties. In
2012 and 2013, three transfers of $499,970 each were made into a T Specialist account
in Singapore by Wang Zhi Guo’s Pinnacle International in addition to a transfer from
Mars Rock International for $499,935 (totalling $1,999,845). In addition to the
provision of an ATM, these transactions were for the purchase of shares in the
Ryugyong Commercial Bank, facilitated by Ri Ik. Not only were the transactions sent
to T Specialist’s bank account but a Member State separately informed the Panel that
OCN and the Koryo Commercial Bank formed a joint venture with the Ryugyong
Commercial Bank. The Panel subsequently received information according to which
T Specialist and the Koryo Commercial Bank formed a joint venture with the name
Ryugyong Commercial Bank. OCN nevertheless denied to the Panel its interests in
the Ryugyong Commercial Bank, stating, “it was never our [….] intent to be the
beneficial owner or interested party in the purchase ”. OCN further claimed that its
role was limited to “assist[ing] in the translation between Ri lk and Wang” and that
the shares in the Ryugyong Commercial Bank were being purchas ed from a Chinese
company named TungHye.
150
OCN has not provided the Panel with the requested
documentation supporting these claims and it is implausible that Ri Ik and Wang Zhi
Guo would require translation assistance generally, and from OCN specifically, g iven
their combined extensive international work, travel and residence experiences.
Indeed, over the past four years, Wang Zhi Guo made 25 trips in and out of Singapore,
spending 1,256 days in the country, and Ri Ik made more than 37 trips, with 518 days
in Singapore (see annexes 51 and 57). T Specialist also admitted that it had undertaken
correspondence between 2012 and 2014 with Ri Ho Nam,
151
Ryugyong Commercial
Bank’s general manager and representative in Beijing since at least 2014, and Ri Jong
Ui, Koryo Commercial Bank’s representative, for the Ryugyong Commercial Bank
purchase deal. None of this correspondence was provided when requested.
187. The ties between the Ryugyong Commercial Bank and OCN in Pyongyang are
further demonstrated by the installation of an ATM in a Ryugyong Commercial Bank
in Spring 2017 at the Bugsae Shop, followed by a promotion in 2017 in which
Ryugyong Commercial Bank customers who deposited more than $10,000 dollars for
at least a year received a “VIP” Gold or Silver Card and a 5 per cent discount at the
Bugsae Shop and the Pothonggang Ryugyong Store (see annex 59).
188. These cases show a continued pattern of joint ownership of financial institutions
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by foreign entities and individuals,
directly supporting illicit activity by the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
through access to the international financial and trade systems. They demonstrate how
financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea evade sanctions
through overseas representatives and front companies to ensure that transactions are
conducted in such a manner as to not reveal an overt connection to a designated entity
or interest of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Hong Kong-registered front
companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducting transactions
through Chinese and Singaporean banks may not trigger alerts, showing that banks
that cater more to offshore financial centre customers should ensure adequate know -
your-customer and customer due diligence monitoring, as well as proper transaction
__________________
150
151
In Mandarin, the name could be rendered as Tungha, Tunghai or Donghai.
Ri Ho Nam (DOB: 3 January 1967) has been serving as the Beijing representative of Ryugyong
Commercial Bank since November 2014. For more information, see annex 43.
69/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0070.png
S/2018/171
monitoring and screening. These checks should have raised red flags over the frequent
transfers of large and even amounts over time from a company whose jurisdiction has
shown a pattern registering front companies of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
Korea. Regarding business registry practices, this case also shows the well -known
evasion technique used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of having
individuals of the country represent themselves as nationals of the Republic of Korea
in corporate registry paperwork (seen also in the MKP case referred to in para. 199
below). In compliance with the financial provisions of the resolutions, the Panel
recommends that relevant Member States take all necessary measures to implement
paragraph 33 of resolution
2270 (2016),
paragraph 33 of resolution
2321 (2016)
and
paragraph 18 of resolution
2375 (2017),
including by ensuring that all assets of
entities acting on behalf of designated entities are frozen, that all representatives of
banks of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are expelled and the assets of
those designated are frozen and that joint ventures with entities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea are terminated.
Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies
189. The Panel continued its investigation into the MKP headquarters in Malaysia as
well as the network of its affiliated firms both in Malaysia and around the world.
These investigations have so far revealed evasion and breaches of a wide array of
sanctions provisions as follows:
(a) The involvement of a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (and Reconnaissance General Bureau operative), Han Hun Il, in the
establishment and operation of numerous companies within the MKP Group of
Companies
152
constitutes a violation of the prohibition on joint ventures;
(b) The company’s links to designated entities, including Mansudae Overseas
Projects, the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ocean Maritime Management
Company;
153
(c) Links between MKP and financial institutions of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea, including the designated Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation
154
and possibly the International Consortium Bank in Pyongyang;
(d) Use of diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in
business facilitation;
(e) Potential violations of the prohibition on the provision of public or private
support for trade with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
(f)
Involvement in the provision of security services;
(g) Use by MKP of aliases and trading names that obscure the company’s
identity; its reliance on a semi-devolved corporate model when operating outside of
Malaysia; and its use of foreign facilitators as country directors to create plausible
deniability of the control relationship between Han Hun Il and the Reconnaissance
General Bureau and MKP-linked companies.
__________________
152
153
154
Han established a Mansudae branch in Singapore, M.O.P. (S) Pte. Ltd., on 20 May 1994. which
was struck on 30 September 2009 (see annex 68).
See
S/2017/150,
annexes 14–9 and 15–3; and
S/2017/742,
para. 57.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 57.
18-01593
70/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0071.png
S/2018/171
Background and role of the national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Han Hun Il
190. According to a Member State, Han Hun Il, a.k.a. Edward Han (see annex 65), was
dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 as a representative of the Mansudae Overseas Project
before establishing the MKP Group of Companies jointly with the Malaysian national,
Yong Kok Yeap, in 1996. According to a Member State, when Han’s tenure abroad was
set to expire in 2006, the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea agreed to extend permission for him to remain abroad as a
Reconnaissance General Bureau “operative”.
155
MKP has, at one time or another,
operated at least 13 companies in Malaysia, of which 10 were still listed as “existing”
in corporate registries as at 15 December 2017 (see annexes 66–67). Han Hun Il
remains a director of seven of these companies, although MKP indicated to the Panel
that it intends to remove him. Regarding his geographic location, MK P informed the
Panel on 4 October 2017 that “Edward Han is now not in Malaysia”, yet declined to
provide information on his travel, work visas or copies of passports. A Member State
informed the Panel that Han Hun Il had travelled to other South-East Asian countries
in 2016, including the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in October. At the time of
writing, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic had not responded to the Panel’s
enquiry.
MKP global operations
191. MKP has developed an extensive and sophisticated network spanning several
continents and multiple industry sectors, including information technology,
construction, mining, coal trading, security, transport and construction, with at least
15 affiliated companies in four countries. The Panel was able to document many of
the company’s activities in Africa and Hong Kong, but not those publicly claimed by
MKP on its various websites, which include 18 African countries, 6 Middle Eastern
States and a range of countries representing all regions of the world (see annex 69).
Details of linkages investigated by the Panel between MKP-affiliated entities and
individuals is available in figure XXIX.
__________________
155
According to a Member State, when his tenure abroad was set to expire in 2006, Han Hun Il
bribed officials at the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea to extend permission for him to remain abroad, after which he was given the status of
“operative” in the RGB. His son, Han Kum-Ryong, a.k.a. “Han Song” or “Harvard Han”, joined
the National Defense Commission in 2010 and worked for MKP in Myanmar until 2013.
71/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0072.png
S/2018/171
Figure XXIX
MKP global operations
192. Corporate registry documents for MKP overseas affiliates indicate that the firm
and its directors have devolved some control over those ent ities, while preserving the
use of the MKP brand.
156
These ownership and control patterns indicate that MKP
foreign national partners are given discretion to determine where, how and with whom
MKP deals.
157
In Zambia, where MKP has at least 12 affiliate firms, an Algerian
national, Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, has played the central organizational role, while
a small number of Zambian nationals have served as directors (see annexes 80–85).
While Zambia has not yet replied to the Panel’s letters, in the reply by MKP of
4 October 2017, Yong Kok Yeap claimed that “MKP (Zambia) and the Zambian
operations were/are run by Yazid Merzouk independently of MKP in Malaysia ”. Yet,
Yazid Merzouk appears extensively in MKP marketing materials as well as in
Zambian corporate paperwork alongside several directors of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea, including for MKP Holdings and MKP TMS Hospital (see annexes
74–78 and 80–81). He is also a majority owner of MKP Irehab in Zambia, which Yong
Kok Yeap acknowledges “is affiliated” with MKP Malaysia (see annex 84).
__________________
156
157
Outside of Malaysia, Yong Kok Yeap and Han Hun Il appear on corporate paperwork with
decreasing frequency.
The brand reliance of MKP in its affiliated companies is noteworthy when contrasted with other
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea networks, which tend to use an array of different names
for front companies. This brand dependency is apparent even in the case of MKP South Africa,
which ruptured its relationship with MKP Malaysia, but nevertheless decided to continue to use
the MKP name. It does not appear to have incurred any negative reputational repercussions for
this branding choice.
18-01593
72/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0073.png
S/2018/171
MKP links to financial institutions
193. In 2011, MKP purchased a stake in Commercial Capital Corporation Limited, a
bank in Zambia.
158
According to Yong Kok Yeap, “MKP (Zambia) had a minority
shareholding (about 10-20 per cent) in Commercial Capital Corporation Limited.
While Yong claims that Commercial Capital Corporation Limited has since shut
down, corporate registry documentation suggests that the company remains active
(see annex 85).
159
The MKP website also advertises its involvement with the
Pyongyang-based International Consortium Bank. MKP now denies any involvement
with that institution and claims that any evidence suggesting it, including its own
advertisements for the institution on its official website, is fabricated. These claims
contradict available open-source evidence (see annex 86). Information for Hi-Fund
International Bank, which MKP acknowledges is an alias for the Inter national
Consortium Bank, has been present on the MKP website since at least 2009 under
“services”. The Panel also notes an indirect link between MKP and the Korea
Kwangson Banking Corporation through the purchase of coal from the Democratic
People’s Republic in Korea in Malaysia.
160
194. By his own admission, Yong Kok Yeap directs EKB Building Limitada in
Angola alongside Angola’s former Deputy Attorney General. Lloyd Chingambo, a
shareholder and financier of MKP-Lloyd’s in Zambia, is the Chairman of Zambia’s
National Economic Advisory Council and sits on the board of major national banks
(see annex 83). An MKP Security Systems Zambia shareholder is the former Minister
of Defence of the country. Such relationships help to create new business
opportunities, generate sources of financing and facilitate wider access to local
decision-makers while also potentially deterring host governments from taking
enforcement action.
161
Case study of an MKP overseas operation
195. The way in which MKP established an office in South Africa demonstrates some
of the methods it uses to set up overseas operations, including reliance on embassy
officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to make introductions and
facilitate relationships and the use of falsified docume nts to fulfil partners’ due
diligence requirements. In this case, the latter of these practices led the South African
partner of MKP, Mr. X, to break off all relations with MKP Malaysia.
196. Han Hun II and Yong Kok Yeap were introduced to the local partn er, Mr. X, in
Johannesburg in 2008 by the Ambassador of the Democratic People ’s Republic of
__________________
158
159
160
161
Contrary to this assertion, Yazid Merzouk has claimed that MKP has been involved in
“financing” in Zambia since 2008. See Lam Seng Fatt, “Healing touch of Malaysian firm”, Star
Online, 31 July 2008. Available from www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/20 08/07/31/healing-
touch-of-malaysian-firm/#zD4XqZ7kt2CKIEMw.99.
Yazid Merzouk is not a current director or shareholder. This may be a product of the recent
lawsuit between Merzouk and Commercial Capital Corporation Limited, which reached the
Supreme Court in 2014 (see annex 79). Samson Sakala, a director of MKP Security Systems
Zambia (see annex 84), however, does control a sizable portion of Commercial Capital
Corporation Limited shares. The MKP website, specifically its finance section, also advertises a
money remittance service called “Cash4Africa”. In response to enquiries about the service, Yong
Kok Yeap stated, “this is not a bank or a finance entity, but a product of CCCL. It is a product
providing services similar to, say, Western Union”. The Panel’s investigations concluded that
Cash4Africa is currently defunct.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 57.
At the same time, MKP has also created individual companies that tend to be ‘single-use’ —
created specifically in order to facilitate a particular large contract or to roll out a new
product/service line in partnership with a local firm. “Heritage MKP Builders” in Nigeria, which
was created mainly to build the Heritage City Park, is an example . This model could also help to
contain the impact of any enforcement action to a small corner of a very dispersed network.
73/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0074.png
S/2018/171
Korea to South Africa and the commercial trade attaché. Han Hun Il and Yong Kok
Yeap presented themselves as businessmen in the construction industry and invited
Mr. X to MKP offices in Kuala Lumpur that year, where he was made Chief Executive
Officer of MKP Builders and offered 50 per cent of all future profits. The
“partnership” signed on 17 September 2009 gave him the mandate to execute business
and “forward” project contracts to MKP Malaysia, which would serve as the
construction and financing company.
197. When Mr. X requested full audited company financial statements and an advance
payment guarantee from Han Hun Il and Yong Kok Yeap, MKP sent him the financial
statement of a Hong Kong-based company with which MKP had close relations, WLS
Holdings Limited (HK), and a scanned bank guarantee from a major Malaysian bank
of $5 million dated 28 July 2010. Unable to confirm the guarantee, Mr. X travelled to
Malaysia along with a client from Rwanda to verify the authenticity of the guarantee
at the bank’s headquarters. Interactions with the bank indicated that the documents had
been falsified. As a result, Mr. X severed all ties with MKP Malaysia but continued to
use the company name (with no apparent reputational costs).
198. The Ugandan and Zambian branches of MKP have undertaken numerous
construction projects, many of which are linked to government financing (see annexes
91–92). MKP’s letter to the Panel directly referenced construction or artist contracts
in Angola, Malaysia, Uganda and Zambia. Uganda awarded several contracts to MKP
and, as recently as in September 2017, was soliciting $200 million in investment for
a “MKP Holdings Ltd”
162
project at the Moroto Marble Mine in Kasimeri-Moroto
municipality (see annex 93). Uganda has not responded to the Panel ’s enquiries. The
Panel reiterates that Member States are prohibited from providing public or private
financing for trade activities of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
199. In addition to its mining activities, MKP also owns and operates at least three
companies in Uganda: “MKP Capital Bernard Co. Limited”, “MKP Builders San
Bhd” and “NH-MKP Builders Ltd” (see annexes 88–89). Corporate records show that
MKP Capital’s ownership is split between two Ugandan individuals; and “Edward
Han” and “Young Kyong Kin” are listed on the paperwork only as “Korean”. MKP
Builders San Bhd is likely a branch of one of MKP ’s Malaysian companies by the
same name, owned by Han Hun Il and Yong Kok Yeap. Furthermore, both MKP
Capital and MKP Builders trade in Uganda under the name of “Vidas Engineering
Services Company Limited”, registered as a separate entity in Uganda. Vidas has
received at least four contracts (one complete, thr ee in progress) from the Ugandan
Ministry of Water and Environment to develop the water and sanitation systems in
Ugandan cities (see annexes 91–92), projects that have received funding from
international development agencies, which might constitute a viol ation of the
prohibition on the provision of public or private support for trade with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, regarding a 2011 project that the
Government of Uganda awarded MKP to build housing units, local media reported
that MKP took approximately $5.2 million in advance payment and then abandoned
the project.
163
200. The Panel investigated the activities of Omega MKP Security Systems Zambia,
which provides private security services in the country. Omega stated to the Panel
that the relationship was established after the director of MKP Security Systems
Zambia approached it with a proposal to set up a joint venture. This director stated
__________________
162
163
A company named “MKP Holdings Ltd” is part of the MKP Group of Companies in Malaysia.
No entity by this name is registered in Uganda. Ugandan official advertisements for the mining
project also note that the prospecting work at the mine was done by a Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea entity in the 1990s.
Edris Kiggundu, “Police clears Migereko over Naalya project,”
The Observer,
27 October 2014.
18-01593
74/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0075.png
S/2018/171
that the company was seeking a strategic partner who could “fund and equip” it for
security-related activities, particularly in relation to a project in which MKP Security
Systems had been involved with the Government of Zambia to remotely monitor and
secure the borders.
201. According to Omega, it agreed to establish a new company with the dir ectors of
MKP Security Systems serving in their personal capacities. Omega also stated that it
met Yazid Merzouk only once in 2013. The Panel notes that a photo appearing to show
senior Omega staff with Yazid Merzouk has been on the MKP website since at le ast
3 January 2012 (see annexes 94–97).
202. In its response to the Panel, MKP Malaysia characterized the relationship
differently, noting that Omega MKP is a “joint venture with Omega” and asserting
that Yazid Merzouk manages these activities in Zambia. Discrepancies between the
accounts of these parties point to the utility of the semi-devolved and personality-
driven corporate structure of MKP in reducing transparency and creating plausible
deniability regarding the involvement of the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea
in, and/or benefit from, any part of the business.
Diplomatic property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used for
commercial purposes
203. The Panel investigated the leasing of embassy property of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea for uses other than diplomatic or consular activities in
Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Romania and Pakistan as violations of paragraph 18 of
resolution
2321 (2016).
The Panel notes that continued use of property of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for purposes prohibited by the resolution
constitutes a violation, whether or not the relevant embassies of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea are compensated for use of the leased space.
Bulgaria
204. Two Bulgarian entities, “Terra” and “Technologica”, rent property belonging to
the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Sofia. In February
2017, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and these companies about the restrictions
under resolution
2321 (2016)
and called upon them to cease any relevant activities
and vacate the premises (see annex 98). The Bulgarian authorities confirmed to the
Panel that no payments had been made by the companies to the Embassy ’s only bank
account in Bulgaria since the beginning of 2017. At the time of writing, the Terra
Group’s “Terra Residence” was still publicly advertising the rental of the former
residence of the Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see
annex 99).
205. Technologica indicated to the Panel that in exchange for renovation, it would be
given the free use of the building for 40 months, of which 6 months s till remained.
The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Panel that the situation was
further complicated because of a bilateral agreement with the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea involving reciprocal use by Bulgaria of property belongin g to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Pyongyang. The Panel notes that the
continued use of property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for
commercial activities constitutes a violation by Bulgaria of paragraph 18 of resolution
2321 (2016)
regardless of whether it is done for any specific companies as business
compensation for existing contracts or economic losses.
18-01593
75/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0076.png
S/2018/171
Germany
206. With regard to the rental of Embassy premises of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in Berlin by EGI GmbH (for City Hostel Berlin) for 38,000 euros
per month
164
and ForX Festival for the banquet hall, following the adoption of
European Union Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017
incorporating paragraph 18 of resolution
2321 (2016),
165
the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 16 March
2017 urging it to abide by paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution
2321 (2016).
The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea responded on 21 March 2017 by denying the
validity and legitimacy of resolution
2321 (2016)
and all acts based upon it. On
7 April 2017, the Government of Germany informed the indivi duals leasing the
premises of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of their obligations under
resolution
2321 (2106)
and the European Union implementing regulations. Germany
also amended its Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance on 4 May 2017 to make the
leasing of property from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea an
administrative offence in the country. Simultaneously, it increased its diplomatic
pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, continuing to stress the
Embassy’s obligation to cease using its property for non-diplomatic purposes and
urged it on numerous occasions at all levels to abide by the applicable resolution. As
a result, on 10 August 2017, the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea terminated the leases with the two companies, requesting them to vacate the
premises by 30 September 2017. However, both companies rejected the termination
of their leases and have threatened legal action. On 6 November 2017, the Central
Customs Authority formally opened legal proceedings against the companies
engaging in illicit activities under the above-mentioned legislation.
Poland
207. The Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Warsaw is
currently occupied by at least nine companies, most of which are involved in media,
advertising, real estate and medicine (see annex 100). Others also occupy the space
and act as brokers between the companies and the Embassy in renting it out. Poland
informed the Panel that it first sent a diplomatic note regarding unlawful use of the
property to the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in February
2017, to which the latter responded that the space was not used for commercial
purposes but to maintain the premises. Poland sent another note in November 2017
requesting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return any premises used for
non-diplomatic purposes in accordance with the 1966 bilateral agreement between the
two countries, but has not yet heard back (see annex 101). Only in October 2017 did
Poland instruct the companies to relocate. On 15 January 2018, Poland informed the
Panel that eight companies had terminated their leases, with another soon to do so.
Poland also informed the Panel that it had instructed its corporate registry not to
register any more entities at the Embassy’s address. Dreamsound Sp. z o. o. indicated
to the Panel that it was subletting Embassy space from Digital Beast Estate Sp. z o. o.
__________________
164
165
See
S/2017/742,
para. 58.
According to para. 18 of resolution
2321 (2016),
Member States shall prohibit the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea from using real property for any purpose other than diplomatic
activities. The European Union went beyond this in article 31 b (2) of Council Decision (CFSP)
2017/345 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, in which it is stipulated: “It shall also be
prohibited to lease from the DPRK real property which is situated outside the territory of the
DPRK”. To implement this decision, Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 was amended to
include article 4e, para. 1 (b), in which it is stipulated: “It shall be prohibited to: (...) (b) lease
real property, directly or indirectly, from persons, entities or bodies of the Government of North
Korea”. This provision is directly applicable to all European Union member States.
18-01593
76/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0077.png
S/2018/171
The Panel notes that at the time of writing, Digital Beast Estate Sp. z o. o. was still
advertising the rental of Embassy space (see annex 102).
Romania
208. Romania informed the Panel that Embassy property of the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea in Bucharest had been leased by two companies since 2001 and
2011, respectively, which further sublet the property to at least 27 other persons and
entities. One company, which had been paying $46,000 in monthly rent (not including
expenses), informed the Panel that it had ceased payments to the Embassy on 10 April
and, by December 2017, had moved out of the premises along with three other
companies that had sublet the space from it.
209. Romania informed the Panel that IMA Partners SRL had also ceased all
payments to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from 21 March 2017 but that
the lease and the sublet agreements had not been terminated.
166
Pakistan
210. The Panel was informed by a Member State that the Democratic People ’s
Republic of Korea had used property in Pakistan that it owned or leased for purposes
other than diplomatic or consular activities. In that regard, the Panel wrote several
letters to Pakistan but has yet to receive a reply. In addition, the Panel is investigating
the use of diplomatic premises of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the
smuggling of alcohol.
167
Recommendations
Recommendation 1
The Panel reiterates its recommendations in previous reports for the designation
of Pan Systems.
168
The Panel further recommends the designation of the
following individuals and entities: Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Ri Ho Nam, Ri Ik
(Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo, Pak In Su, Kim Chang-Hyok and Kim Su-Gwang, as well
as International Global System and International Golden Services.
Recommendation 2
The Panel recommends that Member States, as part of their implementation of
the financial provisions of the resolutions, ensure that their financial institutions
implement a risk-based approach to identifying sanctions violations in their
“know-your-customer” and compliance programmes, including by ensuring
more robust scrutiny at the onboarding, transaction monitoring and account
review phases. To that end, Member States should provide their financial
institutions with more detailed and regular information on sanctions evasion
risks.
Recommendation 3
The Panel recommends that Member States include all Embassy personnel
within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution
2321 (2016)
and ensure that
__________________
166
167
168
The Panel also notes that the lease extension between IMA Partners SRL and the Embassy of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was signed on 13 February 2017, i.e. following the
adoption of resolution
2321 (2016)
(see annex 103).
Drazen Jorgic, “In Pakistan, North Korean diplomat’s alcohol stash raises bootlegging
suspicions”, Reuters, 8 November 2017.
See
S/2017/742,
para. 62.
77/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0078.png
S/2018/171
diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family
members or front companies, and that they verify that bank accounts are closed
when a diplomat ends his or her tour in the country.
Recommendation 4
Given the pervasive use of front companies to evade financial sanctions, Member
States should ensure that their domestic corporate service providers implement
effective due diligence measures to capture detailed and accurate information on
clients and beneficial owners and file suspicious action reports in the case of
arrangements suspected of being used for illicit purposes.
Recommendation 5
Member States should take measures to ensure that financial sector supervisors
subject to their jurisdiction prioritize guidance, supervision and enforcement of
controls that support the implementation of the resolutions.
Recommendation 6
Member States with appropriate knowledge and experience should offer
technical assistance to other Member States seeking assistance with their legal
frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the
resolutions.
Recommendation 7
The Panel recommends that Member States, in addition to ensuring an
appropriate legislative framework for combating proliferation financing,
require the establishment of robust information-sharing mechanisms among
financial supervisors, financial intelligence units, customs and strategic trade
control authorities, border control and security and intelligence agencies, a nd
with the private sector.
Recommendation 8
The Panel recommends that the relevant countries take the necessary measures
to ensure that all non-diplomatic activities taking place on Embassy property of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as prohibited by paragraph 18 of
resolution
2321 (2016)
are terminated and all related leases are cancelled.
VI. Unintended impact of sanctions
211. The Panel noted that in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 3 August 2017, it was
stated that the adoption of Security Council resolution
2270 (2016)
and sanctions
towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had had an unintended negative
impact on the humanitarian operations of the United Nations and other actors,
including notably on the transfer of funds through financial institutions into the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, leading to delays in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance or the suspension of some programmatic activities
(A/72/279, para. 70).
78/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0079.png
S/2018/171
212. The Committee issued a press release on 8 December 2017 (SC/13113)
169
in
order to dispel any potential misunderstandings regarding the Security Council
sanctions regime on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to better
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the country. The Committee called
upon Member States to clarify to public and private sector entities within their
jurisdictions in order to raise awareness regarding the humanitarian exemptions
contained in the resolutions, as well as the need to avoid unduly restricting the
delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People ’s Republic of Korea.
213.
The Panel therefore recommends that Member States report, as part of
their national reporting to the Committee, on the incorporation of the
humanitarian exemptions contained in the resolutions into their domestic
legislation.
__________________
169
United Nations, “Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Underlines Humanitarian
Exemptions Pursuant to Paragraph 26 of Security Council Resolution
2375 (2017)”,
press release
SC/13113, 8 December 2017. Available from www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13113.doc. htm.
79/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0080.png
S/2018/171
Annex 1: Letter of notification from Microsoft identifying compromised
accounts
80/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0081.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
81/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0082.png
S/2018/171
82/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0083.png
S/2018/171
Annex 2: UN Incident report: Compromise of email accounts
18-01593
83/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0084.png
S/2018/171
84/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0085.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
85/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0086.png
S/2018/171
86/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0087.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
87/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0088.png
S/2018/171
Source:
United Nations
88/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0089.png
S/2018/171
Annex 3: Image of Ri Ji U (aka “James”)
Source:
YouTube
18-01593
89/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0090.png
S/2018/171
Annex 3-1: Report on the DPRK patent application on the production of Sodium Cyanide
Source:
The Panel
90/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0091.png
S/2018/171
Annex 3-2: Mansudae Art Studio patent application
18-01593
91/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0092.png
S/2018/171
Annex 4: HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2371(2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)
Table 1: HS codes for Sectoral Bans on imports from the DPRK
Item
Coal
Iron Ore
Iron
Iron and Steel
products
Gold
HS Codes
2701
2601
Chapter 72
Chapter 73
261690
7108
710811
710812
710813
710820
2614
2615
2612
2617
2805
2844
Chapter 74
2603
Chapter 79
2608
Chapter 75
2604
2616100
7106, 7107
Description
Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels
manufactured from coal
Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron
pyrites
Iron and steel products (7201-7229)
Iron and steel products (7301-7326)
Gold ores and concentrates
Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured
forms or powder
Gold Powder, Unwrought
Gold in Other Unwrought Forms
Gold in Other Semi-manufactured Forms
Monetary Gold
Titanium ores and concentrates
Vanadium ores and concentrates
Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [261210
and
261220]
ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code
261790
- Other Ores and Concentrates]
alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury
radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.
Copper and articles thereof (7401-7419)
Copper ores and concentrates
Zinc and articles thereof (7901-7907)
Zinc ores and concentrates
Nickel and articles thereof (7501-7508)
Nickel ores and concentrates
Silver ores and concentrates
Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in
powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not
further worked than semi-manufactured
articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths’ wares or parts
thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with
other precious metal
Fish and Crustaceans, Molluscs and other Aquatic
Invertebrates (0301-0308)
Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans,
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)
Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar
substitutes prepared from fish eggs
Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates,
prepared or preserved
Lead and articles thereof (7801-7806)
Resolutions
Para. 8 of
res 2371
(2017)
Para. 30 of
res 2270
(2016)
Titanium
Vanadium
Rare Earth
Minerals
Copper
Zinc
Nickel
Silver
Para. 28 of
res 2321
(2016)
7114
Seafood (incl
fish,
crustaceans,
mollusks, and
other aquatic
invertebrates
in all forms)
Lead
Chapter 3
1603
1604
1605
Chapter 78
Para. 9 of
res 2371
(2017)
92/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0093.png
S/2018/171
Lead ore
2607
Lead ores and concentrates
Condensates
and natural
gas liquids
Refined
petroleum
products
2709
2711
2710
Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous
minerals
Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals,
not
crude;
preparations n.e.c, containing by weight 70% or
more of petroleum oils or oils from bituminous
minerals; these being the basic constituents of the
preparations; waste oils
Petroleum jelly; paraffin wax, micro-crystalline
petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax, peat
wax, other mineral waxes, similar products obtained by
synthesis, other processes; coloured or not.
Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen; other residues of
petroleum oils or oils obtained from bituminous
minerals.
Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous
minerals, crude
Para. 10 of
res 2371
(2017)
Para. 13 of
res 2375
(2017)
Para. 14 of
res 2375
(2017)
2712
2713
Crude Oil
2709
Textiles
(including but
not limited to
fabrics and
partially or
fully
completed
apparel
products)
Chapters 50-
63
50
51
Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof
Wool And Fine Or Coarse Animal Hair, Including
Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof; Horsehair Yarn And
Woven Fabric
Cotton, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof
Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi; Yarns And Woven
Fabrics Of Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi And Paper
Manmade Filaments, Including Yarns And Woven
Fabrics Thereof
Manmade Staple Fibers, Including Yarns And Woven
Fabrics Thereof
Wadding, Felt And Nonwovens; Special Yarns; Twine,
Cordage, Ropes And Cables And Articles Thereof
Carpets And Other Textile Floor Covering
Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics,
lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery
Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or
laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for
industrial use;
Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;
Apparel and clothing accessories;
not
knitted or
crocheted;
Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn
textile articles; rags
Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible
Para. 15 of
res 2375
(2017)
Para. 16 of
res 2375
(2017)
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
61
62
63
Agricultural
products
07
Para. 6 of
res. 2397
(2017)
08
Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons
18-01593
93/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0094.png
S/2018/171
12
Machinery
Electrical
equipment
84
85
Earth and
stone
including
magnesite
and magnesia
Wood
Vessels
25
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains,
seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and
fodder
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical
appliances; parts thereof
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof;
sound recorders and reproducers; television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories
of such articles
Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime
and cement
Para. 6 of
res. 2397
(2017)
44
89
Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal
Ships, boats and floating structures
Table 2: HS Codes for Sectoral Bans on exports to the DPRK according to
paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Item
Industrial
Machinery
HS Codes
84
85
Description
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical
appliances; parts thereof
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof;
sound recorders and reproducers; television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories
of such articles
Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts
thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings
and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-
mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds
Ships, boats and floating structures
Resolutions
Para. 7 of
res. 2397
(2017)
Transportatio
n vehicles
86
Para. 7 of
res. 2397
(2017)
Para. 7 of
res. 2397
(2017)
Iron, steel
and other
metals
89
Chapters 72-
83
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
Iron and steel
Articles of iron or steel
Copper and articles thereof
Nickel and articles thereof
Aluminum and articles thereof
Reserved for possible future use
Lead and articles thereof
Zinc and articles thereof
Tin and articles thereof
Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base
metal; parts thereof of base metal
Miscellaneous articles of base metal
94/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0095.png
S/2018/171
Table 3: Harmonized System codes assigned by WCO and Member States for commodities
listed only in resolutions 2371 (2017) and 2375 (2017)
Commodity
WCO
Member State and regional organization interpretations
Seafood (including fish,
crustaceans, mollusks,
and other aquatic
invertebrates in all
forms)
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs
and other aquatic
invertebrates in all forms
(all codes of chapter 03);
Animal products; of fish or
crustaceans, molluscs or
other aquatic invertebrates;
dead animals of chapter
03, unfit for human
consumption (chapter 05,
heading 0511, subheading
0511.91);
Extracts and juices of
meat, fish or crustaceans,
molluscs or other aquatic
invertebrates; Prepared or
preserved fish; caviar and
caviar substitutes prepared
from fish eggs;
Crustaceans, molluscs and
other aquatic invertebrates,
prepared or preserved
(1603-1605);
Meat and edible meat offal
of aquatic mammals, fresh,
chilled or frozen (chapter
02, heading 0208);
Meat and edible meat
offal; salted, in brine, dried
or smoked; edible flours,
meals of meat or meat
offal of aquatic mammals
(chapter 02, heading 0210,
subheading 0210.92);
Flours, meal and pellets, of
meat or meat offal, of fish
or of crustaceans, molluscs
or other aquatic
invertebrates (chapter 23,
heading 2301)
China
1
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic
invertebrates in all forms (all codes of chapter 03);
Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans,
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; Prepared or
preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepar ed
from fish eggs; Crustaceans, molluscs and other
aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1603 -
1605)
European Union
2
: Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and
other aquatic invertebrates in all forms (all codes of
chapter 03);
Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans,
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; Prepared or
preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared
from fish eggs; Crustaceans, molluscs and other
aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1603 -
1605);
Stuffed pasta, whether or not cooked or otherwise
prepared containing more than 20 % by weight of fish,
crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrate
(1902.20.10);
Soups and broths and preparations therefor;
homogenised composite food preparations, containing
fish, crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates
(2104)
United States of America
3
: Fish, crustaceans,
molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms
(all codes of chapter 03);
Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar
substitutes prepared from fish eggs; Crustaceans,
molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or
preserved (1604-1605)
__________________
Official announcements by China No. 52 of 22 September 2017 and No. 40 of 14 August 2017
regarding the implementation of resolutions 2375 (2017) and 2371 (2017).
2
Council Regulations (EC) No. 2017/1836 of 10 October 2017, No. 2017/1548 of 14 September
2017 and No. 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017.
3
Communication to the Panel from U.S. Department of State of 19 October 2017.
1
18-01593
95/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0096.png
S/2018/171
Commodity
WCO
Member State and regional organization interpretations
Lead and lead ore
Lead ores and concentrates
(2607);
Lead oxides; red lead and
orange lead (chapter 28,
heading 2824);
Tetramethyl lead and
tetraethyl lead (chapter 29,
heading 2931, subheading
2931.10);
Lead and articles thereof
(codes of chapter 78)
China:
Lead ores and concentrates (2607);
Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78)
European Union:
Lead ores and concentrates
(2607);
Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78)
United States of America:
Lead ores and
concentrates (2607);
Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78)
All condensates and
natural gas liquids;
Crude oil
Condensates and natural gas
China:
Condensate oil, excluding crude oil
liquids; refined petroleum
(2709.00.00.00);
products and crude oil
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals,
(2709-2713);
not crude; preparations n.e.c, containing by weight
Biodiesel and mixtures
70% or more of petroleum oils or oils from
thereof; not containing or
bituminous minerals; these being the basic
containing less than 70% by constituents of the preparations; waste oils (2710);
weight of petroleum oils or
Liquefied natural gas (2711.11.00.00);
oils obtained from
bituminous minerals (2826) Petroleum jelly; paraffin wax, micro-crystalline
petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax,
peat wax, other mineral waxes, similar products
obtained by synthesis, other processes; coloured or
not (2712);
Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen; other residues
of petroleum oils or oils obtained from bituminous
minerals (2713)
European Union:
Oils and other products of the
distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar
products in which the weight of the aromatic
constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic
constituents (2707);
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous
minerals, crude; Other than crude; Petroleum gases
and other gaseous hydrocarbons (2709-2711);
Petroleum jelly (2712.10); Paraffin wax containing
by weight less than 0,75 % of oil (2712.20); Other
(2712.90);
Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen and other
residues of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from
bituminous minerals; Bitumen and asphalt, natural;
bituminous or oil-shale and tar sands; asphaltites
96/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0097.png
S/2018/171
Commodity
WCO
Member State and regional organization interpretations
and asphaltic rocks; Bituminous mixtures based on
natural asphalt, on natural bitumen, on petroleum
bitumen, on mineral tar or on mineral tar pitch (for
example, bituminous mastics, cut-backs) (2713-
2715);
Preparations for the treatment of textile materials,
leather, furskins or other materials (3403.11,
3403.91); Other (3403.19, 3403.99);
In the form of a liquid at 20 °C; Other (3824.99.92,
3824.99.93, 3824.99.96); Fatty-acid mono-alkyl
esters, containing by volume 96,5 % or more of
esters (FAMAE); Other (3826.00.10, 3826.00
.90)
United States of America:
Condensates and natural
gas liquids; refined petroleum products and crude
oil (2709-2713);
Textiles (including but
not limited to fabrics
and partially or fully
completed apparel
products)
Woven, knitted or
crocheted fabrics, felt and
nonwovens, impregnated,
coated, covered or
laminated with plastics,
and articles thereof, belong
to chapter 39
Section XI (chapters 50-
63)
China:
Plastics; articles of apparel and clothing
accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts)
(3926.20.11, 3926.20.19 and 3926.20.90);
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories
(including gloves, mittens and mitts), for all purposes,
of vulcanised rubber other than hard rubber (4015
);
Articles
of apparel and clothing accessories, of leather
or of composition leather (4203);
Fur skin articles; apparel and clothing accessories
(4303.10);
Section XI “Textile and textile articles” (select codes
of chapters 50-53 and 55: 5004-5007; 5106-5113;
5204-5212; 5306-5311; 5508-5516; codes 54 and 56-
63)
Select codes of chapter 65 “Headgear and parts
thereof” (6501-6502; 6504-6507).
Select codes of subchapter 7019 “Glass fibres
(including glass wool) and articles thereof (e.g. yarn,
woven
fabrics)”
(7019.11-7019.12;
7019.4;
7019.51.00-7019.52.00; 7019.59.00)
European Union:
Section XI “Textile and textile
articles” (all codes of chapters 50-63)
United States of America:
Section XI “Textile and
textile articles” (all codes of chapters 50-63)
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
97/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0098.png
S/2018/171
Annex 5-1: Panel investigations of coal shipments delivered between January
and 4 August 2017 (shading
indicates transshipment)
Table 1
Port of discharge
and date
Vessel / IMO /
Flag at time
of shipment
(current)
Cheng Hong
(Jia Feng)
9136541
Palau (Togo)
Volume and
Value ($)
Date / Port of
Loading
Remarks
1
Penang, Malaysia
18 March
2
Port Klang,
Malaysia,
15-25 March
Nghi Son, Thanh
Hoa, Vietnam,
15 March
3
New Global
8660521
Kiribati
Jamaica
Kai Xiang
9634359
Panama
(Sierra Leone)
Jian Fu
8306890
Fiji (Palau)
Kum Ya
9004073
DPRK
Tai An
8400529
Panama
(Togo)
Nampo, DPRK
circa 25
January
*claimed port:
Penang,
Malaysia,
18 March
Nampo, DPRK
13 February
AIS off from 11-25 January and 2 -9
March 2017.
AIS off from 30 January to 17 March and
7-14 March 2017
Vessel de-registered by Jamaica
Posted ETA for Nampo, DPRK for 19
February 2017 but AIS off from 18
February 2017 to 9 March 2017.
No port call at Qingdao, China 6 March
2017
AIS off from 23 February to 4 March and
6-14 March 2017.
Only cargo of this list reported to the
1718 Committee by Malaysia
AIS off from 4-11 March. Draft change
6 to 9.7 on 19 March. Thailand cancelled
the import planned for Koh Si Chang 20-
30 March, and the vessel re-routed to
Vung Tao. Vessel broken-up 6 May 2017.
Supplier: Maison Trading Ltd.**, a front
company for Dandong Chengtai Trading
Co., Ltd., also known as Dandong
Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd.
(Annex 6-1)
Supplier: Maison Trading Ltd.**, a front
company for Dandong Chengtai Trading
Co., Ltd., also known as Dandong
Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd.
(Annex 6-1)
AIS off from 12 February to 31 March
2017
Exporter: Maison Trading Ltd. **
(Annexes 6-1 and 9)
20,048 MT
Nampo, DPRK
*claimed:
Qingdao, China
6 March
Nampo, DPRK
26 February
4
Penang, Malaysia,
18 March
Penang, Malaysia,
24 March
Vung Tao, Vietnam,
26 March-14 April
5
6,342 MT
DPRK
2 March
Nampo,
DPRK,
5-7 March
*claimed:
Tianjin and
Penglai, China
Nampo, DPRK
circa 17 Feb
*claimed:
Tianjin, China,
3 March
Nampo, DPRK
circa 17 Feb
*claimed:
Tianjin, China,
15 March
Nampo, DPRK
17 March
6
26,265 MT
7
Cam Pha, Vietnam
16 March
8
Cam Pha, Vietnam
21 March
9
Ho Chi Minh,
Vietnam
21 April
Zhang Hong
No 1
8307894
Taiwan
Province of
China
Zhang Hong
No 1
8307894
Taiwan
Province of
China
Bai Mei 8
9584578
St. Kitts
&Nevis
9,934.06 MT /
$665,582,02
(@ $67/ton)
22,000 MT
/$1,474,000
(@ $67/ton)
31,903 MT
98/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0099.png
S/2018/171
(China)
10 Nakhodka, Russia
25 April
Zhi Kun 7
(Orient Lidu)
9614610
Mongolia
(Panama)
Jian Fu
8306890
Fiji (Palau)
Wonsan, DPRK
12 April
AIS off from 9 to 14 April 2017.
Draft changed from 4.4 to 6.5 on 14
April.
11 Cam Pha, Vietnam,
27 May
20,089MT
12 Nanjing, China,
7 June
13 Cam Pha, Vietnam,
24 June
Zhi Kun 7
(Orient Lidu)
9614610
Mongolia
(Panama)
Cheng Hong
(Jia Feng)
9136541
Panama
(Togo)
Bai Mei 8
9584578
St. Kitts
&Nevis
(China)
Sun Union
(Gold River)
(9098517)
Palau
Nampo, DPRK
*claimed:
Qingdao,
China, 10-19
May
Chongjin,
DPRK
28 May
AIS off from 8 -16 May 2017. At anchor
only 17 to18 May 2017 – no port call at
Qingdao.
Exporter: Maison Trading Ltd. **
(Annex 6-1)
24,140MT
Nampo, DPRK
15 June
*claimed:
Penglai, China
14-18 June
Nampo, DPRK
16 June
*claimed:
Vladivostok,
Russia, 23 June
Wonsan, DPRK
14 June
AIS off from 13-17 June 2017
Loitered 17-18 June 2017 off Penglai –
no port call
14 Ningbo, China
30 June
15 Nakhodka, Russia
28 June
(For transshipment)
AIS switched off 7 June and back on
after rejoining its voyage on 19 June
2017
Satellite image of 16 June 2017 shows
the vessel laoding coal in Nampo,
DPRK.df
AIS off from from 6 to 15 July 2017.
DPRK coal discharged loaded and
transshipped by the
Great Spring
on 11
July 2017. Vessel de-registered by
Jamaica
Loaded DPRK coal discharged by the
Sun Union
on 28 June 2017.
16 Tianjin, China
18 July
Great Spring
(9560326)
Panama
Nakhodka,
Russia
11 July
Sources:
Member States, maritime databases
18-01593
99/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0100.png
S/2018/171
Annex 5-2: Panel investigations of shipments delivered after the comprehensive coal ban on 5
August 2017 (shading indicates transshipment)
Port of discharge
and date
Vessel Name
(IMO #) and
Flag at time of
shipment
(current)
Rung Ra 2
(9020534)
DPRK
Toyo Maru
(9009097)
Palau
Amount and
Value of Coal
Discharged
Actual Port of
Loading and
Date
Remarks
1
Kholmsk, Russia
3-7 August
(For transshipment)
Can Tho, Vietnam
8 August
Wonsan,
DPRK
2
6680 MT
$ 268,536.00
3
Bayuquan, China
8 August
Petrel 8
(9562233)
Comoros
Nampo, DPRK
*claimed port:
Lianyungang,
China
18 July
Taean, DPRK
26 July
First of three calls to the Kholmsk coal
terminal
Designated 28 December 2017
(annexes 10-12)
AIS off from 4 to 17 July. No port call,
only loitering off Lianyungang 18 to 19
July
4
Kholmsk, Russia
9-11 August 2017
(For transshipment)
Ul Ji Bong 6
(9114555)
DPRK
Wonsan,
DPRK
26 August
2017
5
Bayuquan, China
13 August
Xin Sheng Hai
(9485617)
Belize
Nampo, DPRK
26 July
6
Nantong, China
14 August
Hao Fan 6
(8628597)
St Kitts &
Nevis
Nampo, DPRK
29 July
7
Guangzhou, China
16 August
East Glory
(Fast Glory)
(8673114)
Palau (Togo)
Kai Xiang
(9634359)
Panama
(Sierra Leone)
20,090 MT
Nampo, DPRK
25 July
8
Cam Pha, Vietnam
16 August
Nampo on 26
July
*claimed port:
Vladivostok,
Russia
28 July
AIS off from 20 to 27 July. Draft changed
from 4 to 6.9 on 27 July. Designated 3
October 2017
China reply stated …. ″from 8 to 24
August 2017 coal originated Russian
Federation″.
AIS off from 26 July to 2 August.
Unloaded at same terminal where coal
had been discharged by
Rung Ra 2
for
transshipment.
Designated 28 December 2017. (annexes
10-12)
AIS off from 20 to 29 July. Draft changed
from 5 to 8.6 on 29 July.
China reply stated …. ″from 8 to 24
August 2017 coal originated Russian
Federation″.
AIS off from 19 July to 3 August. Draft
changed: from 3.7 to 8 on 3 August.
Designated 3 October 2017
China reply stated …. ″from 8 to 24
August 2017 coal originated Russian
Federation″.
AIS off from 22 to 27 July. Loitered of
Shidao, fake call to Yantai, China.
China reply stated …. ″from 8 to 24
August 2017 coal originated Russian
Federation″.
AIS off from 21 August to 3 September
2017. Draft changed from 6.6 to 9.5 on 3
September.
Russia confirmed no port call
100/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0101.png
S/2018/171
9
Kholmsk, Russia
22-25 August
(For transshipment)
Bayuquan, China
24 August
Un Bong 2
(8913186)
DPRK
Tong San 2
(8937675)
DPRK
Chongjin,
DPRK
Unloaded at same terminal where coal
had been discharged
Rung Ra 2
and
Ul Ji
Bong for.
transshipment.
AIS off froms 22 April to 15 July; 20 July
to 13 August (en route Najin); and 14 to
17 August (en route to Bayuquan).
Designated 3 October 2017
China reply stated cargo caustic calcite
magnesite
AIS off from 3 to 12 August. Loitered off
Lianyungang, China 13 to 15 August.
Draft changed from 5.8 to 10.2 on 13
August. (Annex 7)
Second of three port visits to the
Kholmsk coal terminal for transshipment.
Designated 28 December 2017
(Annex 10)
AIS off from 5 to 14 August. Loitered
off Qingdao, China on 16 August
10
Nampo, DPRK
15 June
11
Cam Pha, Vietnam
26 August
12
13
Kholmsk, Russia
29 August - 1
September
(For transshipment)
Cam Pha, Vietnam
1 September
Orient Shenyu
(8671611)
Panama
(China)
Rung Ra 2
(9020534)
DPRK
Glory Hope 6
(8684527)
Panama
(China)
Ul Ji Bong 6
(9114555)
DPRK
Songnim,
DPRK
7 August
Wonsan,
DPRK
26 August
Nampo, DPRK
6-13 August
14
Kholmsk, Russia
4 -5 September
(For transshipment)
Wonsan,
DPRK
26 August
15
Kholmsk, Russia
1-5 September
(For transshipment)
Kholmsk, Russia
12-17 September
(For transshipment)
Cam Pha, Vietnam
14 September
Yu Yuan
(9358694)
Togo
Rung Ra 2
(9020534)
DPRK
Hua Fu
(9020003)
Panama
Wonsan,
DPRK
12 August
Wonsan,
DPRK
7 September
12,652.52 MT Nampo, DPRK
@$ 65.40/MT *claimed
port:
$ 827,474.81 Lianyungang,
China
6 September
20,180 MT
Nampo, DPRK
31 August
*claimed:
Nahodka, Russia
31 Aug
Songnim,
DPRK
31 August
AIS off from 12 August to 4 September.
Unloaded at same terminal where coal
had been discharged by
Rung Ra 2
and
Un Bong 2
for transshipment.
Designated 28 December 2017
(Annexes 10-12)
Unloaded at same terminal at which coal
had been discharged by
Rung Ra 2, Un
Bong 2, Ul Ji Bong 6.
(Annex 11)
Third of three drop-offs at same berth at
Kholmsk for transshipment.
Designated 28 December 2017
(Annex 10)
Loitered off Shidao 17 August to 2
September. Draft changed from 4.3 to
10.4 on 17 August. AIS off from 2 to 7
September. Loitered off Hong Kong 7
September.
(Annexes 6-2 and 7)
AIS off from 21 August to 3 September
2017. Draft changed from 6.6 to 9.5 on 3
September.
Russia confirmed no port call
AIS off from 31 August to 5 September.
Draft changed from 4.3 to 0 on 4
September. Loitered off Shidao 5 to 8
September. Loitered off Hong Kong 18
September and draught change 0 to 7.
16
17
18
Cam Pha, Vietnam
18 September
Kai Xiang
(9634359)
Panama
(Sierra Leone)
Xin Guang Hai
(9004700)
Panama
(Togo)
19
Hai Phong, Vietnam
19 September
18-01593
101/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0102.png
S/2018/171
20
Cam Pha, Vietnam
27 September
Xin Sheng Hai
(9485617)
Belize
Sky Angel
(9168441)
Panama
(China)
Nampo, DPRK
31 August
AIS off from 24 August to 2 September.
Draft changed from 4.6 to 8.8 on 2
September.
Loaded at same terminal at which coal
had been discharged by
Rung Ra 2, Un
Bong 2, Ul Ji Bong 6, and Yu Yuan.
Same
operator as
Sky Lady
which used the same
berth on 9 August.
China reply stated …. ″coal originated
Russian Federation″.
AIS off from 21 to 27 September. No port
call to Nakhodka.
Russia confirmed no port call
(Annex 8)
21
Incheon, Republic
of Korea
2 October
Kholmsk,
Russia
21 September
(coal terminal)
22
Cam Pha, Vietnam
7 October
Hua Fu
(9020003)
Panama
11,850 MT
@$ 66/MT
$ 770,250
23
Pohang, Republic of
Korea
11 October
Rich Glory
(8649905)
Sierra Leone
5,000 MT
@$ 65/MT
$ 325,000
Wonsan /
Chongjin,
DPRK
*claimed
port:
Nakhodka,
Russia
Kholmsk,
Russia
5-6 October
(coal terminal)
Loaded at same terminal at which coal
had been discharged by
Rung Ra 2, Un
Bong 2, Ul Ji Bong 6,
and
Yu Yuan.
(Annexes 10-12, 15)
Source: Member States, maritime databases
102/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0103.png
S/2018/171
Annex 6-1: Documents showing Maison Trading Ltd. as the exporter of at
least 4 shipments of DPRK coal
Jian Fu
Source:
Member State
18-01593
103/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0104.png
S/2018/171
Extracts of Maison Trading contracts: Zhang Hong 1
Source: Member State
104/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0105.png
S/2018/171
Identification document of the Director of Maison Trading Limited: Sheng Wang
Date of Birth: 20 March 1973
Source:
Member State
Note : Marshall Islands informed the Panel that Maison Trading Ltd.’s registration
was revoked on 30 October 2017. The company had been registered on 20 September
2016.
18-01593
105/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0106.png
S/2018/171
Annex 6-2: Documents showing Brigt Australia as the shipper of DPRK coal claiming Russian origin.
Hua Fu
Source:
Member State
106/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0107.png
S/2018/171
Extracts of a Brigt Australia contract for DPRK coal shipped to Vietnam
Source:
Member State
18-01593
107/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0108.png
S/2018/171
Annex 6-3: Documents for DPRK coal onboard the
Kai Xiang
falsely claiming Russian
origin
Company based in Sweden
Source:
Member State
108/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0109.png
S/2018/171
Warranty of origin for DPRK coal onboard the
Kai Xiang
falsely claiming Russian origin
Source:
Member State
18-01593
109/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0110.png
S/2018/171
Annex 7: The
Orient Shenyu’s
deviation of the vessel loading in Songnim on 7
August 2017
Source:
Windward
110/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0111.png
S/2018/171
Annex 8
Hua Fu’s
voyage showing a second attempt to deliver its DPRK coal
Source:
Windward
18-01593
111/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0112.png
S/2018/171
Annex 9: Crew list of the
Bai Mei 8
showing the crew joining in Nampo,
DPRK confirming the vessel’s call there
Source:
Member State
112/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0113.png
S/2018/171
Annex 10:
Rung Ra 2, Ul Ji Bong 6
and Un Bong 2 at the same coal terminal in
Kholmsk
18-01593
113/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0114.png
S/2018/171
Annex 11: Images of the
Yu Yuan
and
Ul Ji Bong 6
loading coal in Wonsan
114/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0115.png
S/2018/171
Annex 12: Images of the
Yu Yuan
and
Ul Ji Bong 6
discharging DPRK coal in
Kholmsk
18-01593
115/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0116.png
S/2018/171
Annex 13: Certificate of origin for
Sky Lady
showing coal origin as Shakhtersk
Source:
Sky Ocean
116/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0117.png
S/2018/171
Annex 14: Certificate of origin for
Sky Angel
showing coal origin as Kholmsk
Source:
Sky Ocean
18-01593
117/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0118.png
S/2018/171
Annex 15: Shipping document of
Rich Glory
showing coal origin as Kholmsk
Source:
Member State
118/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0119.png
S/2018/171
Annex 16: Business card of Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen as the representative of
Ocean Enterprises Ltd. to charter the
Lighthouse Winmore
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
119/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0120.png
S/2018/171
Identity document of Mr. Shih-Hsien Chen, owner of Oceanic Enterprises, Billions Bunker
Group Corp. and Bunkers Taiwan Group Corp.
Source:
The Panel
120/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0121.png
S/2018/171
Annex 17: Emails from Oceanic Enterprises to the
Lighthouse Winmore
emanating from Billions Bunker Group
Source: The Panel
18-01593
121/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0122.png
S/2018/171
Email to the
Lighthouse Winmore
from Mr Chen’s Billions Bunker Group
Corporation showing his company’s operations management of the
tanker prior to the ship-to-ship transfer on 19 October 2017
Source:
The Panel
122/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0123.png
S/2018/171
Annex 18: Corporate records showing Lighthouse Ship Management Ltd. was
formerly known as Billion Great International Group Ltd.
Source:
hongkongcompanylist.com
18-01593
123/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0124.png
S/2018/171
Annex 19: Bills of lading for the petroleum products embarked on the two
vessels transfered to the DPRK
Lighthouse Winmore
Source:
The Panel
124/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0125.png
S/2018/171
Billions No. 18
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
125/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0126.png
S/2018/171
Annex 20: Communications showing Oceanic’s false destination for the fuel
Source:
The Panel
126/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0127.png
S/2018/171
Annex 21: Communications of Global SGP showing the prepayment arrangements for the
Billions No. 18
and
Lighthouse Winmore
shipments
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
127/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0128.png
S/2018/171
Annex 22: Communications showing the planned shipments using Mr. Chen’s
tankers
Source:
The Panel
128/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0129.png
S/2018/171
Annex 23: Invoice for Ocenic Entreprise Ltd. for pre-payment for the
Lighthouse Winmore
shipment
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
129/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0130.png
S/2018/171
Annex 24: Bank account used by Oceanic Enterprise Ltd. for payments relating to the
Lighthouse Winmore
showing a Kaoshiung City address
Source:
The Panel
130/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0131.png
S/2018/171
Annex 25: Bank account used by Oceanic Enterprise Ltd. for payments
relating to the
Lighthouse Winmore
showing a Marshall Islands
address
Source: The Panel
18-01593
131/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0132.png
S/2018/171
Annex 26: List of DPRK tankers
Name
(Alphabetic)
An San 1
Po Chon (a.k.a. Bochon)
Chong Rim 1
Chong Rim 2 (a.k.a Saebyol)
Chong Rim 3
Chon Ma San
Chon Myong 1
Ji Song 6
Ko Song 1
Kum Gang 3
Kum Un San
Kum Un San 2
12
[Callsign HMYZ9]
13 Kum Un San 3
Ma Du San (a.k.a. Maducan or
14
Samma)
15 Nam San 8
16 Paek Ma
Rye Son Gang 1
17
(a.k.a. Ryesonggang)
Ryong Bong 1
18
(a.k.a. Ryongbong1)
19 Sam Jong 1
20 Sam Jong 2
21 Sam Ma 2 (a.k.a. Samma2)
22 Song Won (a.k.a. Songwon)
Tong Hung 5
23 (a.k.a. Tonghung5 or Kang Nam
3)
24 Yu Jong 2 (a.k.a. Yujong-2)
25 Yu Phyong 5 (a.k.a. Yupyong5)
26 Yu Son (a.k.a. Yuson)
Source: Member State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Name
(Korean)
안산
1
보천
청림
1
새별
청림
3
천마산
천명
1
지성
6
고성
1
금강
3
금은산
금은산
2
금은산
3
마두산
남산
8
백마
례성강
1
령봉
1
삼정
1
삼정
2
삼마
2
송원
동흥
5
유정
2
유평
5
유선
IMO
Number
7303803
8848276
n/a
8916293
8665131
8660313
8712362
8898740
8977900
8966535
8720436
n/a
8705539
8021579
8122347
9066978
7389704
8610461
8405311
7408873
8106496
8613360
8151415
8604917
8605026
8691702
Gross
Tonnage (GT)
1,757
1,996
n/a
1,595
1,377
2,808
1,220
841
498
815
1,023
n/a
1,995
418
1,914
1,181
1,757
999
1,038
1,676
962
996
283
748
795
2,228
132/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0133.png
S/2018/171
Annex 27: Italy: Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio
Version of website accessed on 26 September 2017
18-01593
133/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0134.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
Advertising as Western Representative Office of Mansudae Art
Studio
134/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0135.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
135/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0136.png
S/2018/171
Annex 28: DPRK prohibited activities in Mozambique
Examples of documentary evidence of military cooperation between
the DPRK and Mozambique
136/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0137.png
S/2018/171
Source: The Panel
18-01593
137/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0138.png
S/2018/171
Mr. Ri Chang Su, (Passport No. 927310139, DOB: 29 April 1967),
Third Economic and Commercial Secretary at the DPRK embassy
in South Africa, Haegumgang Trading Corporation representative
responsible for military cooperation with Mozambique
Source:
The Panel
138/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0139.png
S/2018/171
Single undated invoice for $6 million contract provided by Monte
Binga
Source:
Monte Binga
18-01593
139/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0140.png
S/2018/171
Images of the Susan 1 and Susan 2 with DPRK markings
Source:
The Panel
140/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0141.png
S/2018/171
Letter from the Mozambique Ministry of Defence to the DPRK
Ministry of Defence
18-01593
141/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0142.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Mozambique
142/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0143.png
S/2018/171
Annex 29: Contract between Crist and Armex
18-01593
143/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0144.png
S/2018/171
144/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0145.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
145/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0146.png
S/2018/171
Annex 30: Agreement between Armex and Rungrado
146/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0147.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
147/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0148.png
S/2018/171
148/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0149.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
149/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0150.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
150/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0151.png
S/2018/171
Annex 31: Extract of the specifications of project NB428 and associated
drawings
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
151/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0152.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
152/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0153.png
S/2018/171
Annex 32: Crist letter to the Panel dated 15 January 2018
18-01593
153/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0154.png
S/2018/171
154/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0155.png
S/2018/171
Annex 33: Extract of Nauta website
Source: http://nauta.pl/index.php?special-projects (accessed on 14 December 2017)
18-01593
155/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0156.png
S/2018/171
Annex 34: List of Exhibiters to the 20
th
PITF (Spring)
156/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0157.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
157/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0158.png
S/2018/171
158/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0159.png
S/2018/171
Source:
NK News
18-01593
159/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0160.png
S/2018/171
Annex 35: Chinese company’s brochure exhibited at its booth
Source:
NK News
160/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0161.png
S/2018/171
Annex 36: Syria
Letter from the Syrian Arab Republic
18-01593
161/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0162.png
S/2018/171
DPRK Corst Company invoice for shipment to SSRC front company Megatrade in 2017
Source:
The Panel
162/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0163.png
S/2018/171
Airway bill showing foreign company as shipper and DPRK Embassy in Damascus
as consignee
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
163/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0164.png
S/2018/171
Annex 37: Bills of lading of interdicted shipments
164/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0165.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
165/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0166.png
S/2018/171
Annex 38: Bills of lading of interdicted shipments
166/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0167.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
167/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0168.png
S/2018/171
168/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0169.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
169/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0170.png
S/2018/171
Annex 39: Information on General Company for Cable
Source:
http://arabengineeringindustries.org
170/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0171.png
S/2018/171
Annex 40: MINISO’s profile on its website (top) and its product sold in
Pyongyang (bottom)
Source:
http://www.miniso.com/getinfo.php?cid=186&top=1,
accessed on 12 December 20
Source:NK
News
18-01593
171/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0172.png
S/2018/171
Annex 41: Photos of Strategic Cooperation Signing Ceremony between
MINISO and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held on
18 January 2017
Source:
Panel
172/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0173.png
S/2018/171
Annex 42: Company profire on MINISO’s website (Left: English website, Right: Chinese
website)
18-01593
173/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0174.png
S/2018/171
Company profile page accessed on 11 October 2017
174/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0175.png
Annex 43: DPRK Bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)
Names /Alias
Title and activities **
Location **
Passport number / Expiry
UN Security Council designations where
applicable
Jang Bom Su: 15 April 1957. Under aka Jang Hyon U:
22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020
UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon
Commercial Bank Representative in Syria” on 2
March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
18 October 1976; PP No. 654210108;
PP No. 4721202031 (expires 21 February 2017); Jon
Yong Sang born 25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number
836110035, expires 1 January 2020
18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20
January 2020)
28 March 1964 PP No.: 836132137
18-01593
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang
Pom Su, Jang Hyon U)
장범수
Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB)
Representative. Also operates in and travels to
Lebanon under various aliases
Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB)
Representative in Syria. Also travels to and
operates in Lebanon under various aliases.
Representative of Korea Kumgang Group
Bank
Representative of Korea Kumgang Group
Bank
Transported money of DPRK laborers in the
Middle East to the DPRK
Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang
Group Bank
Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office
opened at least 5 accounts at Banque
International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia.
Two of them are in the name of a front
company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been
involved in transactions undertaken by
Daedong Credit Bank in China.
Unification Development Bank (or Korea
Unification Development Bank, UDB or
KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un’So’ng.
Choe Un Hyok’s KUDB business card with his
title of “Representative of KUDB, Moscow
Russia” with the same address as the Embassy
in Moscow is available in the Panel’s 2017
Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251.
Syria
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a.
Cho’n Myo’ng-kuk,
Jon Yong Sang)
전명국
Ryom Huibong (aka
Ryo’M Hu’I-Pong)
렴희봉
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song
Chol)
리선철
Kwak Chongchol (Aka
Kwak Jong-Chol)
�½정철
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim
Kyo'ng-il
김�½일
Syria
Dubai, UAE
Dubai, UAE
Dubai, UAE
1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Libya
1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy
chief representative in Libya” on 22 December
(KPi.067)
Choe, Un Hyok
최은혁
Moscow,
Russia
19 October 1985
PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)
S/2018/171
175/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0176.png
S/2018/171
176/292
Chu Hyo’k (Aka Ju Hyok)
주
혁
Russia replied it has no information that
DPRK citizen Chu Hyo’k [is] acting in Russia
on behalf of or on the instructions of any
DPRK financial institution. (see below)
Foreign Trade Bank Representative
Russia replied Chu Hyo’k is not currently
residing in Russia. (see below)
Korea Unification Development Bank
representative
Russia replied that Ri U’n-so’ng is not
currently residing in Russia. (see below)
Foreign Trade Bank Representative
Libya (also
travelled to
Tunisia,
UAE, and
Saudi
Arabia
2015-2017)
Ri U’n-so’ng (aka Ri Eun
Song; Ri Un Song)
리은성
23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct.
2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an “overseas
FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.065)
DPRK / DOB: 23 July 1969
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas
Korean Unification Development Bank
representative” on 22 December (KPi.078)
8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP
No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in
July 2016)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB chief
representative in Libya” on 22 December 2017
(Kpi.070)
11 March 1971; 645120378
Res 2321 (2016) designated him as “Representative
for Korea United Development Bank” on 30 Nov
(KPi.035)
Shenyang
China
25 July 1978
Res 2397(2017) designated him as “overseas FTB
Representative” on 22 December (KPi.064)
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku
Cha-hyo'ng)
구자형
Kim Chol Sam (aka
Jin Tiesan,
金铁三)
김철삼
Ch’oe So’k-min
최석민
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim
Tong-ch'o'l )
김동철
18-01593
Daedong Credit Bank Representative since
2006, and Treasurer for DCB. PoE reporting
on activities: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and
S/2017/742, paras 51-56.
China replied that he returned to the DPRK on
14 October 2016.
Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016,
Ch’oe So’k-min was the deputy representative
at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has
been associated with cash transfers from that
FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK
special organizations and RGB located
overseas.
China replied that he is blocked from entry and
that it requested Chinese banks to freeze the
assets of designated individuals
Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Shenyang,
China
28 January 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires: 26
September 2016)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB
representative” on 22 December (KPi.068)
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0177.png
18-01593
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko
Ch'o'l-man)
고철만
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka
Mun Kyo'ng-hwan)
문�½환
Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Bank of East Land Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Korea Daesong Bank Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Ilsim International Bank representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Korea Daesong Bank Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a
Euro account at International Arab Bank of
Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of
“Secretary’s Delegate of the DPRK’s Mission
to Tripoli”. Account was closed on 22 August
2013.
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo
Credit Development Bank. Reportedly
established front companies to procure items
Shenyang,
China
30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB
representative” on 22 December (KPi.069)
22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March
2016
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Bank
of East Land representative” on 22 December
(KPi.071)
22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb
2017
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas
Daesong Bank representative” on 22 December
(KPi.072)
06 May 1969
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Ilsim
International Bank representative” on 22 December
2017 (KPi.073)
DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509
(expires 27/8/2018)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas
official of Korea Daesong Bank” on 22 December
2017 (KPi.079)
21 August 1957’ PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May
2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB
representative” on 22 December (KPi.074)
30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11
March 2019)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB
representative” on 22 December (KPi.075)
Dandong,
China
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae
Wo'n-uk)
배원욱
Beijing,
China
Pak Bong Nam (aka
Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong
Nam; Pak Pong-nam)
박봉남
Pak Mun Il
박문일
Shenyang,
China
Yanji, China
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka
Ri Ch'un-hwan)
리춘환
Zhuhai,
China
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri
Ch'un-so'ng)
리춘성
Beijing,
China
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li
Cheng He)
리성혁
177/292
Beijing,
China
19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May
2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas
representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit
Development Bank” on 22 December (KPi.077)
S/2018/171
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0178.png
S/2018/171
178/292
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang
So-Nam, Pang Sunam)
방수남
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch’a
Su’ng-chun)
차승준
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka
Kim Kyo’ng-hyo’k)
김�½혁
Pak Ch’O’l-Nam
박철남
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho
Ch’o’l-So’ng)
조 성
철
and conduct financial transactions on behalf of
DPRK
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank
Representative
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative.
Has held several accounts in his name at
Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a
cover company.
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First
Credit Bank
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First
Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the
name “Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司
)”in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen,
China”
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Deputy Representative for the Korea
Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC)
Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as
“Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限
公司)”
and “Golden Tiger Investment Group (
Zhuhai,
China
1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Beijing,
China
4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Shanghai,
China
5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14
September 2016)
Beijing,
China
16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19
November 2020)
Dandong,
China
25 September 1984
PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019)
Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative
for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug
(KPi.058)
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0179.png
18-01593
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho’
Yo’ng-il)
허영일
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim
Mun-ch’o’l)
김문철
金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)”,
both
registered in Hong Kong.
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Hana Bank Representative
In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a
high volume of USD transactions for the FTB.
Representative for Korea United Development
Bank. Uses false entity names including
“Chongryu Technical Company” or “Kyong
Un Trading Company”
China replied that as a designated individual,
he has been blocked from entry and Chinese
banks requested to freeze his assets
Ilsim International Bank Representative
Dandong
China
Dandong,
China
DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
25 March 1957
Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative
for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug
(KPi.060)
Choe Chun Yong (Aka
Ch’oe Ch’un-yo’ng)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim
Myong Gi)
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative
Kang Min
강민
Kim Sang Ho
김상호
Daesong Bank representative who, in late
2016, held Chinese bank accounts.
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Representative, Korea Daesong Bank
As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39
official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading
Company representative in Yanji, China.
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
4
Transited
China,
Ethiopia,
UAE,
visited
Sudan
4
Beijing,
China
PP no: 654410078
Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative
for Ilsim International Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March
2018)
UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon
Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 2 March
(KPi.025)
07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February
2018)
Yanji, China
16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26
September 2018)
S/2018/171
179/292
__________________
See S/2017/150, p. 64
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0180.png
S/2018/171
180/292
18-01593
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim
Cho’ng Man)
김정만
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim
Hyo’k-Cho’l, Hyok Chol
Kim)
김혁철
Ri Song-Hyok
리성혁
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-
nam)
리호남
Pak Ch’O’l-Nam
박철남
Ms. Kim Su Gyong
김수�½
Representative, Korea Unification
Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office
39 official posted to Hong Kong.
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Deputy Representative, Korea Unification
Development Bank
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Koryo Bank Representative,
He has reportedly established several front
companies in order to procure items and
conduct financial transactions on behalf of
DPRK.
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch
representative (2014 to present)
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First
Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts using the
name “Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司
)”in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China
China replied that he is not designated by the
UN and that it does not have specific
information on his relationship with DPRK
financial institutions
Korea United Development Bank (KUDB)
Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips
around Europe, especially in France and Italy,
with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong
Zhuhai,
China
16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Zhuhai,
China
9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June
2017)
Beijing,
China
19 March 1965; PP No.: 654234735 (expires 19
May 2019)
Beijing,
China
DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires
21 February 2019
Beijing,
China
16 June 1971; PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19
November 2020)
Europe, also
transited
UAE and
16 January 1973; PP 745120374
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0181.png
18-01593
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l
문정철
Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB
agents who used their status as staff members
of international organizations to help her
obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou
Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See:
S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative.
Has facilitated transactions for TCB.
the Russian
Federation
5
Res 2094 (2013) designated him as “Tanchon
Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 7 March
(KPi.012)
DOB 08 Nov 1969; PP No. 745420176
HAN, Jang Su
HAN, Chang-su
Foreign Trade Bank Chief Representative
**Based on Member States information or UN documents
Sources: Information provided to the Panel by Member States and UN documents
S/2018/171
181/292
__________________
5
The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were “not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory”.
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0182.png
Member State replies to Panel inquiries on entry/exit data of the above-mentioned individuals and
any measures taken to expel them in accordance with the resolutions:
Russia letter to the Panel of 23 January 2018:
The Russian Federation has no information that DPRK citizens Chu Hyo’k, Choe Un Hyok, Ji Sang Jun
and Ri U’n So’ng are acting in Russia on behalf of or on the instructions of any DPRK financial
institution. Chu Hyo’k, Ji Sang Jun and Ri U’n-So’ng are not currently residing in Russia. We will
inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok”.
Reply by China to the Panel of 25 January 2018:
“China seriously checked the list provided by the Panel. The 12 DPRK individuals KIM TONG CHOL
in the list are designated individuals by the Security Council. After the relevant individuals were
designated in the Security Council list, the Chinese competent authorities immediately listed them as the
persons not allowed to enter China, and forbade their entry into China or transit through China for a third
country. The Chinese competent authorities further requested Chinese banks and financial institutions to
immediately freeze the assets of designated individuals and not to provide any fund, financial asset or
economic resource to designated individuals. The relevant measures have been stricted implemented.
The other 10 individuals including HO YOUNG IL in the list are not the individuals designated by the
Security Council. China does not have specific information about their relationship with the DPRK
financial instittions or entities designated by the Security Council resolutions. If the Panel obtains solid
evidence in this regard, it can be provided to China”.
S/2018/171
182/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0183.png
Annex 44 Information on DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives
(To assist in the identification of bank representatives)
18-01593
Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling
Foreign Trade Bank (FTB)
조선무역은행
朝鲜贸易银行
aka: Mooyokbank , Korea Trade Bank,
Mooyokbank,
Koryo Bank
고려은행
高�½银行
Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong
Credit Development Bank
[JV] (Aka.
Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global
Trust Bank)
고려신용개발은행
대성신용개발은행
(aka
고려글로벌신용은행)
Korea Daesong Bank
대성은행
/
조선 대성은행
大成银行
aka: Choson Taesong Unhaeng , Daesong
Bank, Taesong Bank
Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation
조선광선은행
朝鲜光鲜银行,
Korea Kwangson Finance
Company
HQ address / phone / fax/
SWIFT
FTB Building, Jungsong
dong, Central District,
Pyongyang
Tel: +850 2 18111
Fax: +850 2 3814467
SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY
Koryo Bank Building,
Pyongyang, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea
Yanggakdo International
Hotel, Pyongyang
Te;: +850 2 381 4100
Fax: +850 2 341 4013
Designations and information provided to Panel by Member States
and United Nations resolutions
Res 2371(2017) on 5 Aug (KPe.047)
State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK’s primary foreign exchange
bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson
Banking Corporation.
Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045)
Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by
Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo -
Global Bank.
Res 2371(2017) on 5 August (KPe.049)
Joint venture with Koryo Bank
Segori-dong, Gyongheung
Street, Pyongyang
+850 2 818221; Fax +850 2
814576
SWIFT/BIC:
KDBKKPPY
Jungsong-dong, Sungri
Street, Central District,
Pyongyang
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.035)
Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers’ Party.
Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB)
류�½상업은행/류상은행
Ryusang Bank,
柳京商业银行, 柳商银行
Changgwang Hotel, 5th
Floor; Beijing, China;
Dandong, China
Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016
Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and
Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea
Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate
funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, i ncluding
transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report
S/2017/150, p. 63.
Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang
Inn.
Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang
Foreign House, Suite #05-24
S/2018/171
183/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0184.png
S/2018/171
184/292
Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commerical
Bank
Korea Unification (United) Development
Bank
(조선)
통일발전은행
(朝鲜)统一发展银行
aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification
Development Bank, T’ongil Palchon Bank,
Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea
Reunification Development Bank
Hana Banking Corporation
하나은행
aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank,
Single-Minded International Bank,
KUDB Building, Pyongyang
SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY
UN POE report info: /S/2017/150, p 62.
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033)
USA on 16 March 2016
Ilsim International Bank
일심국제은행
日心�½际银行
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit
Bank
제일신용은행
第一信用银行
aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit
Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank
ISB Building, Pyongyang;
Haebangsan Hotel,
Jungsong-Dong, Sungri
Street, Central District,
Pyongyang, Dandong, China
SWIFT/BIC
BRBKKPPIXXX
Pyongyang, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea
SWIFT: ILSIKPPY
a) 3-18 Pyongyang
Information Center,
Potonggang District (as of
2016). b) i Rakrang
District, Jongbaek 1-dong
Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02-
433-1575)
SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX
Rakrang Tel: 961-3331,
961-0003
KCB Building,
Taedonggang District,
Pyongyang; ; Beijing,
China; Shenyang, China;
SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPP1
Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon
District, Pyongyang
Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card
product lines for domestic use
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034)
Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea
Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade
United Nations sanctions.
Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV
venture with Singapore’s Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO
William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with
the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources
and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank
고려상업은행
高�½商业银行
aka Korea Commercial Bank
Tanchon Commercial Bank
단천상업은행
端川商业银行
Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank
Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003)
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0185.png
18-01593
AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank,
(�½광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit
Bank (조선�½광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank
(용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank
(룡악산은행)
Bank of East Land
동방은행
aka: Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U’Nhaeng,
Tongbang Bank, Haedong Bank (해동은행)
Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic
missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such
weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of
KOMID.
BEL Building, Jonsung-
Dong, Pyongyang
Tel: +850 2 18111
Fax: +850 2 3814410
Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013)
Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para
61.
Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms
manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has
actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that
circumvents sanctions.
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033)
Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22
Korea United Development Bank (KUDB)
조선통일발전은행
(朝鲜）统一发展银行
aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification
Development Bank, T’ongil Palchon Bank,
Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea
Reunification Development Bank
Korea Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang
Bank
(조 )
금 은
선 강 행
金刚银行
aka: Kumgang Export and Import
Bank
Daedong Credit Bank
대동신용은행
大同信用银行
Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit
Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong
Development Bank
KUDB Building, Pyongyang
SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY
Kumgang Bank Building,
Central District, Pyongyang
Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External
Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading
Company
Suite 401, Potonggang
Hotel, Ansan-Dong,
Pyongchon District,
Pyongyang,
(b) Ansan-dong,
Botonggang Hotel,
Pongchon, Pyongyang,
+850 2 3814866
SWIFT: DCBK KPPY
Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023)
Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel:
S/2017/150, paras 225-230 andS/2017/742, paras 51-56.
Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN
(Singapore) International Distribution Ptd Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian
Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International
Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics.
S/2018/171
185/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0186.png
S/2018/171
186/292
18-01593
Tanchon Commercial Bank
Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon
Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003)
단천상업은행
District, Pyongyang
端川商业银行
Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic
AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank,
missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such
(�½광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit
weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of
Bank (조선�½광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank
KOMID.
(용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank
(룡악산은행)
Sources: Information provided to the Panel by Member States, United Nations resolutions, “The List established and
maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1718 (2006), UN Panel of Experts reports
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0187.png
S/2018/171
Annex 45: Jin Huixing (金辉星) and Ji Honghua (吉红花) bank account
opening documents showing address as DPRK Embassy Tripoli as
well as Chinese passports
18-01593
187/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0188.png
S/2018/171
188/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0189.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
189/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0190.png
S/2018/171
190/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0191.png
S/2018/171
Annex 46: Kim Su Gwang biodata and supplemental information
Name:
AKA
Kim Su Gwang
Kim Sou-gwang, Son-kwang KIM, KIM Son-gwang, KIM Su-kwang, KIM Sou
Kwang
DOB:
18 August 1976
Passport #
DPRK passport number 918220369, issued on 13 May 2008, expired on 13 May
2013; LP # A549083 exp15 Feb 2011. In possession of several forged passports.
Affiliations Officer of the Reconnaissance General Bureau with strong skills in IT, encryption and
and activities: communications.
Deputy Trade Representative, Minsk, Belarus from 24 September to 16 December
2017.
Former employee of an international organization
Son of RGB Official Kim Yong Nam, who also the cover of a position as international
civil servant to carry out activities in support of RGB itinerant officers working
undercover in Europe and worldwide.
Establishes bank accounts in the name of his wife, Kim Kyong Hui
Address no 1: 84 Viale della Grande Muraglia, 00144 Rome, Italy
Address 2: Via C.G. Viola 68, Rome, 00148, Italy
Telephone:
Work: 00390665131
Cell: 00393406777671
Address:
Supplemental information on Kim Su Gwang and his father, Kim Yong Nam’s,
educational and professional activities
According to information provided to the Panel, Mr. Kim Su Gwang served as an IT
officer for an international organization where he engaged in systems networking,
network design and programming, server and operating systems engineering,
telecommunications, and systems networking. He was hired to the headquarters of the
international orgnaization from Paris, where he received his Master ’s Degree in
Telecommunications from the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Telecommunic ations de
Paris (ENST) and another Master’s Degree in Information Systems from the Institut
Superieur d’electronique de Paris (ISEP). His projects at these universities included:
“laser technology in the military area”; “impact of comic ray on the earth and or/ of
radio activities on Very High Integrated Components ” and “Optimal Reception
Algorithms for Digital Audio Communications.” Kim Su Gwang previously worked
in Paris at the Manugistics as a systems engineer undertaking software development.
He regularly travelled to Paris both in the framework of his work and also as personal
deviations from work trips made to London.
At his work, Mr. Kim Su Gwang was given positions with significant responsibility
for the organization’s information systems and resources. He served as Team Leader
of Technical Infrastructure for the global information system used to track all the
organization’s activity worldwide, from planning projects and tracking food aid
shipments to managing finances and paying staff salaries. In the Haiti Country Office
18-01593
191/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0192.png
S/2018/171
of the organization at which he worked, he managed a multi -million ICT budget for
the 2010 post-earthquake recovery effort involving 6 sub offices for which he also
engaged in assets management.
With regard to Kim Su Gwang’s father, Mr. Kim Yong Nam, before taking up his
position at another international organization, he received his diploma as an
electronics engineer and served as the Head of the Computer Department at Kim
Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, where he d esigned a “Duplex
Computer System” for the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank, designed and constructed a
minicomputer Central Processing Unit. He also led research teams and lectured in
computer programming, computer systems, computer architecture, and
microcomputer design. Before taking up his position at UNESCO in Paris, Mr. Kim
Yong Nam also spent three years at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in
Dubna, Russian Federation, as part of a team developing a computer-based Data
Processing System for the data of nuclear reactors. While at UNESCO, Kim
implemented various IT projects including the establishment of a Computer Center
for Training and Telecommunications services in Azerbaijan, a “Regional Academy
of Advanced Network Administration and Design” in Kiev; a “Regional Academy for
Computer-assisted Teaching and Learning” in Ukraine; a “Technological University
of Tajikistan Computer Center for Training and Informatics Skill Development ”; a
“Computer Center for Training and Business Services” in Azerbaijan; a project
entitled, “Advanced Information Technology Development in partners with Kiev
Taras Shevchenko University in Ukraine; and “Advanced ICT Training sessions” in
the Republic of Korea.
Source: The Panel
192/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0193.png
S/2018/171
Annex 47: Passports of Kim Su Gwang (in name of Kim Sou Kwang)
(aka Kim Sou-gwang, Son-kwang KIM, KIM Son-gwang, KIM Su-kwang)
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
193/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0194.png
S/2018/171
Source: The Panel
194/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0195.png
S/2018/171
Annex 48: Copies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy Identity Cards for
Kim Su Gwang (in name of Kim Sou Kwang), his wife Kim Kyong
Hui
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
195/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0196.png
S/2018/171
Annex 49: Corporate registration documents for OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and T
Specialist International (Singapore) showing same address and Director, Ng Kheng Wah
(“Leo)
1. OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd Registration
196/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0197.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
197/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0198.png
S/2018/171
198/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0199.png
S/2018/171
2. T Specialist International (S) Ptd Ltd Corporate Registration
18-01593
199/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0200.png
S/2018/171
200/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0201.png
S/2018/171
18-01593
201/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0202.png
S/2018/171
202/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0203.png
S/2018/171
Annex 50: Biodata and Passport of Wang Zhi Guo (王志�½)
Name:
Wang Zhi Guo (王志�½)
DOB:
11 July 1962
Passport #
China passport E25486535 / 140254055 / Hong Kong registration documents lists
his “Chinese ID card number” as:
120102196207110550
Expiry :
PP expiry 2021.3.9
Affiliations:
Shareholder, Lagun Sari (along with OCN and OCN director Ng Kheng Wah
(“Leo”) and his daughter)
Former Director, Pinnacle International Distribution (HK)
Former Director, Pinnacle International Distribution (Singapore)
Representative of China operations for OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd
•
Used to direct Pinnacle International along with Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”), OCN
Director
Address:
Wang’s Chinese address in
Pinnacle International Distribution (HK)
registration
documents is: An Shan Xi Dao Nan Kai Tianjin 300193
Wang’s Chinese address in
Pinnacle International Distribution (Singapore)
registration documents is: No. 17 Jiangjia Hutong Li Gong Lou, Hedong District,
Tianjin, China, which is the same address listed in the Lagun Sari registration
documents
Travels
Telephone:
Between 5 January 2013 and 10 August 2017, Wang Zhi Guo made 25 trips in and out
of Singapore and spent a total of 1256 days in the country
+ 86 13802077316
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
203/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0204.png
S/2018/171
Annex 51: Singapore Entries and exists for Wang Zhi Guo (2 pages) 2015-2017
204/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0205.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
205/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0206.png
S/2018/171
Annex 52: Corporate registration documents for Pinnacle International Distribution
(Singapore) showing Wang Zhiguo (王志�½) Tianjin address
Source:
Singapore Corporate Registry
206/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0207.png
S/2018/171
Annex 53: Corporate registration documents for Pinnacle International Distribution
(Hong Kong) Company Ltd (高峰�½际营销（香港）有限公司) showing Wang
Zhiguo (王志�½) with another Tianjin address
18-01593
207/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0208.png
S/2018/171
208/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0209.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Hong Kong Corporate Registry
18-01593
209/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0210.png
S/2018/171
Annex 54: Two corporate registration documents for Lagun Sari
(Singapore) showing OCN Address, Ng Kheng Wah and Chew Ng Sew as
Directors and Wang Zhi Guo as shareholder as well as Wang Zhiguo (王志
�½)’s
second Tianjin address
210/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0211.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Singapore Corporate Registry
18-01593
211/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0212.png
S/2018/171
212/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0213.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Singapore Corporate Registry
18-01593
213/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0214.png
S/2018/171
Annex 55: Business card of OCN Singapore Purchasing / Distribution Manager also
showing T Specialist, Watari, and Ohayo International
Source: The Panel
Note: Ohayo International is a wholesaler of electrical appliances, liquor, and tobacco
to several countries, including the DPRK and was first registered nearly 13 years ago
by T Specialist. As of January/February 2017, Leo Ng’s daughters, Trina Ng, her
sister Tania, and OCN Pte are Ohayo’s shareholders; they and Leo Ng are listed as
directors in corporate filings along with another Singaporean national by the name of
Ko Fu Heng.
214/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0215.png
S/2018/171
Annex 56: Biodata and passport of Ri Ik (aka Li Ik)
Name:
DOB:
Passport number
A.k.a.:
Affiliations:
Li Ik
11 February 1963
DPRK Passport: 745420357, exp 11/11/2020
Ri Ik
Regional Business Development Manager,
OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd
OCN Representative, Pyongyang
Address:
Telephone:
Email:
28 Cuscaden Road #05-10 Cuscaden Residences Singapore
249723
+6591831221
[email protected]
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
215/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0216.png
S/2018/171
Annex 57: Singapore entries and exits for Ri Ik (Aka Li Ik) from 2015-2017
216/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0217.png
S/2018/171
Source:
The Panel
18-01593
217/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0218.png
S/2018/171
Annex 58: Screenshot from Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM, showing
address in Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24. (OCN address listed
on Bugsae Shop carrier bags is Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-01)
Source:
https://www.nknews.org/pro/exclusive-singapore-firm-still-denies-links-to-north-korea-
despite-new-evidence/
218/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0219.png
S/2018/171
Annex 59: Use of Ryugyong Commercial Bank card provides 5% discount in
Buksae shop
Source:
Jaka Parker
18-01593
219/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0220.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Jaka Parker (@JakaParker) instagram
220/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0221.png
S/2018/171
Annex 60: Shopping bag obtained from Bugsae Shop (alternative spelling of Buksae
Shop) in Pyongyang showing locations and “OCN Group” affiliation - June
2017
Source:
NK Pro
18-01593
221/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0222.png
S/2018/171
Annex 61: Shopping Bag obtained from Bugsae Shop (OCN Group) at Changgwang
Foreign House, Pyongyang, June 2017
Source:
NK Pro
222/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0223.png
S/2018/171
Annex 62: Ukrainian confectionary company export records for items shipped to the
address: “OCN Pyongyang Office 01-05 Changwang House, Pyongyang
DPRK” from April 2015 until January 2017
Screenshot of Import Genuis, source of trade data
Source:
Import Genius
18-01593
223/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0224.png
S/2018/171
List of exports to Bugsae shop at OCN Pyongyang address (exports of candy and confectionary
items)
224/292
18-01593
Source:
Import Genius
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0225.png
S/2018/171
Annex 63: OCN Singapore label affixed to a wine bottle at the Bugsae Shop in
Pyongyang, July 2017
Source:
NK Pro
18-01593
225/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0226.png
S/2018/171
Annex 64: Luxury-branded cosmetics, handbags, watches, leather goods and footwear
on display at the Buksae Shop in Pyongyang, July 2017
Source:
NK Pro
226/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0227.png
S/2018/171
Annex 65: Biodata on Han Hun Il (Edward Han)
Name:
DOB:
Passport #
Expiry:
A.k.a.:
Family
members
Han Hun Il
2 April 1957
836134879
2021/3/9
Edward Han; Dr. Edward Han Hun Il
Wife: Kim Mi-Kyong (김미�½)
• DOB: 1959/2/15
Son: Han Kumryong (한금룡)
•
•
•
•
Affiliations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Address:
aka “Han Song” (한
성)
aka: “Harvard Han”
DOB: 18 September 1984
Worked at MKP Myanmar until 2013
Sungri Economic Group (승리�½제연합회)
Dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 to serve as Malaysia Representative of Mansudae
Overseas Projects (MOP)
Established
a Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, in Singapore on 20 May 1994
until it was struck off the register on 30 September 2009.
In 2006 his tenure with MOP expired and he was given the status of “operative “in
the Reconnaissance General Bureau. He had
previously served as representative of
RGB in Africa before 1994.
On 20 June 2006 he registered
Malaysia Korea Partners (MKP) in Malaysia jointly
with
Yong Kok Yeap with each of them owning half the shares (175,000 Ringgit)
MKP signed a joint investment agreement in June 2009 with a DPRK China joint
bank called “High-Fund International bank” which had an affiliation with DPRK
Sungri Economic group.
MKP established the
International Consortium Bank (ICB)
MKP employs IT personnel from the DPRK state science academy in its subsidiary,
SOSIT are still working
MKP Capital LLC Berhd
Registered address: 24-B Jalan Landak Off Jalan Pudu KL
Business address:
Lot 5, Jalan Satu
Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya
43200 Balakong
Selangor Darul Ehsan
Malaysia
Traveled to other South East Asian countries in 2016, including the Lao People ’s
Democratic Republic in October. The Lao PDR has not responded to the Panel ’s
inquiry
603 9076 9678
603 9075 9678
[email protected]
www.mkpholdings.com.my
Travels
Telephone:
Fax :
Email
Website :
Source:
The Panel, Member States, Corporate Registry Documents
18-01593
227/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0228.png
S/2018/171
Annex 66: MKP network chart
228/292
18-01593
Source:
The Panel
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0229.png
Annex 67: MKP companies in Malaysia as of 15 December 2017
Company Name
1
M.K.P.
PROJECTS
SDN. BHD.
Corporate
Number
199448-D
Status
Address
Directors
Shareholders
Start
18-01593
Dissolved Rm.1 1st. Floor,
Lee Rubber Bldg 145,
Jalan Tun H.S. Lee
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan
Abdul kudus bin
datuk;
Lee Kung Wah;
Chong ah Kow @
Chong Ching Che;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Abdul Kudus
Bin Datuk;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Chong Ah Kow
@ Chong
Ching Che;
Lee Kung Wah
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
15 June
1990
2
MKP
BUILDERS
SDN. BHD
386207-P
Existing
2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara
Klh Business Centre 2,
Jalan Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan
Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 cheras, selangor
24-B, Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11, Batu 9
cheras, selangor
24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutuan
24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur,
wilayah Persekutuan
Han Hun Il;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
6 May
1996
3
MKP CAPITAL
BERHAD
738326-V
Winding
Up
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
20 June
2006
4
5
MKP CAPITAL
LLC BERHAD
980801-M
Existing
Winding
Up
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato'dr Amar
Singh;
MKP
619741-U
CORPORATION
BERHAD
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
2 March
2012
26 June
2003
S/2018/171
229/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0230.png
S/2018/171
230/292
Lot 5,Jalan 1kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11batu 9 Cherasselangor
Yong Kok Yeap;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan, Dato';
Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato'dr Amar
Singh;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Muhammad Danial
Bin Osman;
Karnail Singh
Nijhar Amar
Singh, Tansri
Dato'dr;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Soh Pui Hoon;
Han Hun Il;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Soh Pui Hoon;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan;
Karnail Singh
Nijhar Tansri
Dato'dr Amar
Singh
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
23 June
1998
31 May
2006
6
MKP
DYNAMIC
ENGINEERING
SDN. BHD
735910-W
Existing
2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan
Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,
wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor
7
MKP
DYNAMIC
SDN. BHD
779980-A
Existing
2-3-11 (3rd Floor), Menara
Klhbusiness Centre, 2, Jalan
Kasipillayoff Jalan Sultan
Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 cheras selangor
Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato'dr Amar
Singh;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan;
Muhammad Danial
Bin Osman @
Mddaud;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
7 July
2012
8
MKP
HOLDINGS
SDN. BHD
464492-W
Existing
2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah
Kuala Lumpur,
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0231.png
18-01593
Wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw.
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor
No. 3a-1, Jalan D'alpinia 10
taman D'alpinia, Puchong
Selangor
24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutua
Lot 5 Jalan 1kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11 Batu 9 Cheras,
Selangor
52 a, Jalan Landak
off Jalan Pudu
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan
C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras
Selangor)
2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 Jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan
Shahkuala Lumpur Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5 Jalan Satu kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras
Jayabalakong Selangor
S/2018/171
9
10
MKP SUPPLIES
SDN. BHD
MKP-WUI
LOONG
SYSTEM
SCAFFOLDS
SDN. BHD
1210818-M
577418-H
Existing
Existing
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Kong Kam Wang;
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap;
So Yu Shing;
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Yong Kok
Yeap; Fang
Chee Peng
Wui Loong
System
Scaffolds
Co.Ltd;
Mkp Holdings
Sdn. Bhd.
Jusoh Bin
Awang;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Sumairi Bin
Hashim
Chua Boon
Lain; Yong Kok
Yeap; Tee Eng
Soon
30
November
2016
17 April
2002
11
Nekad Ziplem
SDN. BHD
614359-U
Existing
7 May
2003
12
ELEMENT
FLASH (M)
SDN. BHD.
658573-V
Existing
Yong Kok Yeap;
Chua Boon Lain;
Tee Eng Soon;
6 July
2004
231/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0232.png
S/2018/171
232/292
18-01593
13
SOSIT SDN.
BHD.
749341-K
Existing
2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kaw.
Perusahaan Cheras Jaya Batu
11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor
Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il
3 October
2006
Source:
Malaysian corporate registry
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0233.png
S/2018/171
Annex 68: Singapore Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, registered by Han
Hun Il on 20 May 1994 until it was struck-off on 30 September
2009
Source:
ACRA
18-01593
233/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0234.png
S/2018/171
Annex 69: Countries in which MKP claims to operate
Figure 1: MKP’s homepage claimed it operated in Algeria, Angola, Australia,
Burundi, Cambodia, China, Congo, DRC, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, China, Kenya,
Libya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, Tanzania,
Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The map at the bottom of the site further
insinuates operations in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mideast/North Africa,
North America and Europe.
Source:
Archived version of the page:
https://web.archive.org/web/20120119212635/http://mkpholdings.com.my/index.php
234/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0235.png
S/2018/171
Figure 2: MKP claims completed construction projects in Malaysia, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Angola, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Russia, Hong Kong.
Source:
http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php
“Completed Project”)
(Page
under
tab,
18-01593
235/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0236.png
S/2018/171
Figure 3: MKP claims construction projects in Malaysia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda,
and Angola.
Source: http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php
“ongoing project”)
(page
under
tab,
236/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0237.png
S/2018/171
Annex 70: MKP claims to have Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP) “solid
and rich experience since 1964”
Source: MKP Website, http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/aboutus.php accessed 26
January 2018
18-01593
237/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0238.png
S/2018/171
Annex 71: MKP claims it constructed “National Heroes Acre” in Zimbabwe
(constructed by Mansudae Overseas Projects)
Source:
http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/subfile/construction/construction3.php,
Accessed 26 January 2018
238/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0239.png
S/2018/171
Annex 72: Zambian corporate registry list of companies with MKP in their
name
Source:
Zambia Patents & Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)
18-01593
239/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0240.png
S/2018/171
Annex 73: MKP catalogue showing companies in MKP Group including in
Angola, Zambia
Source:
2014 MKP Catalogue (same source for all ensuing photographs with the
exception of those another source)
240/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0241.png
S/2018/171
Annex 74: Yong Kok Yeap (MKP Chief Executive Officer) shaking hands with
former Zambian president
Source:
Page in catalogue devoted to important “partners” of MKP
18-01593
241/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0242.png
S/2018/171
Annex 75: MKP catalogue showing photos of MKP Zambia Director Yazid
Merzouk accompanying Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia on
visit to MKP Trust Medical Center in July 2008
Source:
MKP catalogue
242/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0243.png
S/2018/171
Annex 76: Yazid Merzouk and other MKP directors accompanying Deputy
Prime Minister of Malaysia on visit to Zambia MKP Trust Medical
Center in July 2008
Source:
MKP website
18-01593
243/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0244.png
S/2018/171
Annex 77: MKP Board of Directors (including Han Hun Il, Yong Kok Yeap,
and Yazid Merzouk of MKP-Zambia)
Image 1: Left to right: Ms. Siti Faridah Md. Lias, Mr Mohamad Fauzi Bin Othman,
Mr. Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, Dato’ Dr. Yong Kim Yeap, Admiral Datuk M. Ramly
Baker (Rtd), Dr. Edward Han Hun Il, Mr. Ismael bin Ariffin, Ms. Camy Soh Pui Hoon
Source:
MKP catalogue
244/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0245.png
S/2018/171
Image 2: Bottom to top: Dr. Edward Han Hun Il, Dato’ Dr. Yong Kim Yeap, Admiral
Datuk M. Ramly Baker (Rtd), Mr. Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, Mr. Ismael bin Ariffin,
Mr Mohamad Fauzi Bin Othman, Ms. Siti Faridah Md. Lias
Source:
MKP catalogue
18-01593
245/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0246.png
S/2018/171
Annex 78: MKP leadership from left: Yazid Merzouk and Yong Kok Yeap,
Han Hun Il to far right
Source: MKP catalogue
246/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0247.png
S/2018/171
Annex 79: Lawsuit between Yazid Merzouk and Commerical Capital Consortium Limited
18-01593
247/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0248.png
S/2018/171
248/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0249.png
S/2018/171
Annex 80:
Zambia corporate registry of MKP Holdings Ltd with Yazid
Merzouk and “Korea” national
Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency, www.pacra.org.zm
18-01593
249/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0250.png
S/2018/171
Annex 81:
Zambia corporate registry of MKP TMS Hospital Ltd with Yazid
Merzouk and “Korea” directors/shareholders
Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency
250/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0251.png
S/2018/171
Annex 82:
Zambia corporate registry of
Commercial Capital Corporation
Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency
18-01593
251/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0252.png
S/2018/171
Annex 83:
Zambia corporate registry of MKP-Lloyds Green Tech Ltd
Source: Zambia corporate registry
252/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0253.png
S/2018/171
Annex 84:
Zambia corporate registry of
MKP Security Systems Zambia Ltd
Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency,
www.pacra.org.zm
18-01593
253/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0254.png
S/2018/171
Zambia corporate registry of MKP-Irehab Limited
254/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0255.png
S/2018/171
Annex 85: Corporate Registry Documents for Commercial Capital Corporation (CCCL)
18-01593
255/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0256.png
S/2018/171
256/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0257.png
S/2018/171
Annex 86: Analysis of MKP claim that its website was hacked to create a false
impression of a link to a DPRK financial institution
MKP has claimed that its website was hacked, and that the hackers uploaded an image
and new content to create the impression of a false connection between MKP and a
DPRK financial institution (the International Consortium Bank, or ICB). MKP
claimed it discovered this alteration on 3 March 2017 and filed a report with the
police. Here is the webpge in question:
Figure 1 (see below) shows a screenshot of the page in question as it appeared 3
March 2017.
18-01593
257/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0258.png
S/2018/171
Figure 1: Screenshot of page in question dated 3 March 2017
Archived versions of the site provide evidence to the contrary. These versions help
determine approximately when the images and information appeared, and how it
changed over time. If MKP’s website was indeed hacked, then the hackers would
have had to begin their operation years ago and routinely update the allegedly planted
information multiple times, to conform to significant changes in MKP ’s website.
First, the image and information MKP claims hackers falsely inserted can be seen on
its website two years before its alleged discovery. Figure 2 (below) displays an
archived version of MKP’s website as it would have appeared on 14 April 2015.
258/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0259.png
S/2018/171
Figure 2: archived version of MKP’s website as it would have appeared on 14 April
2015
The page remained almost unchanged between this date and 30 March 2017 when
MKP filed its police report. Additionally, analysis of the exit data in the image which
MKP claims was hacked into their website, reveals a Photoshop time stamp dating
the most recent save (or resave with Photoshop) of this image back to 2012:07:06 at
17:53:54, predating MKP’s claimed discovery and the image’s supposed first
appearance on MKP's website. If MKP’s site was hacked and false information
implanted, MKP failed to discover it for at least two years and the Photoshopped
image itself is significantly older.
General information on ICB and MKP appeared far earlier on MKP ’s site, but in a
different form. Prior to the 14 April 2015 archived image, information appeared on
this page with identical text, albeit with another image. Figure 3 (see below) captures
the page as it appeared on MKP’s website on 31 August 2012. In both cases,
individuals appear to have been photoshopped against the background of the wall with
the ICB logo. As this is the case in both images, MKP’s claim that the photoshopping
of people onto the 2015 photo is evidence of recent hacking, does not stand up to
scrutiny.
18-01593
259/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0260.png
S/2018/171
Figure 3: page as it appeared on MKP’s website on 31 August 2012
On 19 January 2012, approximately seven months before the archived image of the
MKP website first appeared, the page tab still existed under a different name: “HIB
Bank”. Hi-Fund International Bank (HIB) is an alias for ICB – a fact which MKP
acknowledged in its response to the Panel. The image for the 31 August 2 012 page
was the same used for the HIB tab seen on 19 January 2012 (Figure 4, see below).
Figure 4: The image for the 31 August 2012 page as it appeared on 19 January 2012
260/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0261.png
S/2018/171
In addition to its claim about this false link to ICB, MKP also claims to have no
connection to IIDB Bank. However, in 2005 MKP included IIDB Bank on a list of
MKP companies and noted it owned a 50 percent stake in the company. Figure 5
(below) is an archived image of MKP’s website as it appeared in 2005. In the top
right, MKP lists the companies under its umbrella.
Figure 5: archived version of MKP's website as it appeared 26 October 2005
Figure 6 (below) is taken from the same page. It provides information on MKP ’s ties
to IIDB and makes the 50 percent ownership claim.
Figure 6: Another section of page as it appeared 26 October 2005
18-01593
261/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0262.png
S/2018/171
Annex 87: MKP catalogue showing company organigram
Source: MKP catalogue
262/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0263.png
S/2018/171
Annex 88: Uganda Corporate
registration documents with “Korean” nationals
for “MKP Builders San Bhd” (ID: F2220), “MKP Capital
Bernard” (ID: 106306), and “NH-MKP Builders Ltd” (ID:133404)
Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug
18-01593
263/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0264.png
S/2018/171
Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug
264/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0265.png
S/2018/171
NH-MKP BUILDERS LIMITED
Registration ID; -
133404
Incorporation Date; -
7
th
July 2011
Shareholders; -
Share holders
National Housing & Construction Company Ltd
MKP Builders SDN. BHD (MKP)
Total Shares
Directors and their nationality;-
Directors
Jane Bilek Langoya
Mhanmed A. Benomran
Henry Majoh Mukisa
Choi Dah Hwan
Nationality
Ugandan
Libyan
Ugandan
Korean
% share
holding
1,100,000
900,000
2,000,000
Trades as; - NATIONAL HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION Co. LIMITED
Company Address;-
National Housing & Construction Co
Ltd,
Plot 5, 7
th
street, Industrial Area,
P.O. BOX 659, Kampala.
Tel; +256414330002
Status;
- Existing
Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug
18-01593
265/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0266.png
S/2018/171
Annex 89: Corporate registration documents for “Vidas Engineering Services
Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug
266/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0267.png
S/2018/171
Annex 90: Linked in Profile linking Vidas Engineering to MKP Builders Sdn.
Source: The Panel
18-01593
267/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0268.png
S/2018/171
Annex 91: Projects involving “Vidas Engineering Services - Media article and
listing of projects on Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment
Website
NWSC Unveils Shs5oom Water Project in Hoima
By Johnbosco Tugume
National Water and Sewerage Corporation Hoima branch has unveiled Shs500 million
water extension project aimed at provision of clean piped water.
The project was awarded to Vidas Engineering Services limited and is expected to
have completed the work in three months period.
The National Water and Sewerage Corporation Hoima branch manager, Moses
Nandigobe said the project is set to connect over 200 households to clean piped water
in 20 villages of Mparo and Bujumbura divisions in Hoima Municipality.
Most of the beneficially villages have spent over six years without accessing piped
water while others had been connected but their taps had run dry because of their
geographical locations. Mr. Nandigobe said villages in hilly areas could hardly get
regular water access because of the too much pressure needed to pump water in those
areas saying this new water project has been established at Bakuumira hill hence
water flow to people's taps will be easy.
''This hill (Bakuumira) where our project is established is the highest of any intending
customer that we intend to serve and water problems in mostly upland areas are going
to be solved. Our plan is to ensure that every village in the municipality is supplied
with piped water by 2020," said Nandigobe.
He revealed that the corporation is covering 61 villages in the municipality out of the
existing 148 total villages.
The Chairman for Kyarwabuyamba cell, Hajji Ramathan Mugisa commended
government for the project saying it will boost household development.
"I commend government for this because my village has been water stressed for years
despite being in a municipality. Majority of my people had resorted to fetching water
from water sources because they couldn't afford daily water expenses where a
Jerrycan of water costs between ShsSOO to Shs700," he said.
Catherine Kato, a mother of three in Bujumbura cell called for the expedition of the
project but cautioned against charging exorbitant tariffs. The councilor, Manday
Magrette said once completed, it will boost sanitation and hygiene in the area.
"Sanitation has been a public concern here since people have flash toilets but couldn't
use them due to failure to access constant water supply," she said
She also asked National Water and Sewerage Corporation officials to use media in
sensitizing the public about piped water services like metre billing, unit
measurements among others.
The municipality mayor, Marry Grace Mugasa however cautioned residents a gainst
blocking their fellows from passing water pipes in their land for connection.
Source:
Kampala
Post,
17
October
2017,
accessed
via
https://kampalapost.com/content/news/nwsc-unveils-shs500m-water-project-hoim
268/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0269.png
S/2018/171
Annex 92: List of projects by Vidas Engineering Services on Ugandan
Ministry of Water and Environment Website
18-01593
269/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0270.png
S/2018/171
Source: Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment
270/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0271.png
S/2018/171
Annex 93: Mining licence and
Official September 2017 brochure and
promotion event for MKP mining in Uganda and other
information on Moroto Mine
Source: Uganda Investment Authority 2017, www.ugandainvest.co.ug
18-01593
271/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0272.png
S/2018/171
Source:
Uganda
Investment
Authority,
Bankable
http://ugandanconventionuk.org/Bankable_Projects_2017.pdf
Projects
2017,
272/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0273.png
S/2018/171
Source:
7th Uganda Investment Convention Programme, 16 September 2017,
http://www.ugandanconventionuk.org/2017_Brochure_UCUK.pdf
18-01593
273/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0274.png
S/2018/171
Annex 94: Omega Risk Solutions Organigramme showing Omega-MKP
Zambia Ltd as part of Omega International Associates LP
Source: Omegasol Risk Solutions Website,
content/uploads/2012/02/Slide1-1024x768.jpg
http://www.omegasol.com/wp -
274/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0275.png
S/2018/171
Annex 95: Photo of Omega MKP Zambia Ltd hosting 2013 board meeting of
Omega International Associates LP (from Omegasol catalogue)
showing Yazid Merzouk (Timothy Jim Kazembe in middle)
Source:
MKP Omega Risk Newsletter, March 2014, Issue 16, (page 22) ,
http://www.omegasol.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/SETHAGA-Mar-14.pdf
18-01593
275/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0276.png
S/2018/171
Annex 96: Omega – MKP Zambia Limited Corporate Registry Document
Source:
Zambia Corporate Registry
276/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0277.png
S/2018/171
Annex 97: Photos of MKP Omega Zambia
Archived versions of the MKP Services Division page show that the Omega -MKP tab posted online
since at least 3 January 2012 (no screengrabs are available between mid -2009 and January 2012).
The photo on the top right seems to depict a meeting between Yazid Merzouk (Zambia country
director for MKP), General Timothy Kazembe (MKP Security Systems), N ’gonga Oswald Goodson
Bwalya (MKP Security Systems), and several of the Omega senior leadership.
Photos of MKP Omega Zambia, including of Yazid Merzouk (top right photo), as they appeared on the MKP
website on 3 January 2012
Source:
MKP Services Division Website (http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php) on 3
January 2012, according to Internet Archive (Wayback Machine).
See also: http://www.omegasol.com/about-us/
18-01593
277/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0278.png
S/2018/171
Annex 98: Bulgaria’s letter to the Panel of 6 October 2017
278/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0279.png
S/2018/171
Source: Bulgaria
18-01593
279/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0280.png
S/2018/171
Annex 99: Ongoing use of DPRK Embassy space by “Terra Residence” in
Sofia, Bulgaria
Figure 1:
“Terra Residence” January 2018 advertisement from rental of its space (the DPRK
Ambassador’s former residence), listing a number of options (“weddings”,
“corporate, private and public, filming and advertising”) events (headings in yellow
bar in Bulgarian)
Source: https://www.terraresidence.com/, accessed on 10 January 2018
Figure 2”:
“Terra Group” logo (in Bulgarian) at “Terra Residence” gate
Source: Dimitar Katsarov/The New York Times/ © 2017 New York Times News
Service
280/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0281.png
S/2018/171
Annex 100: Contact information of companies renting DPRK Embassy space
in Warsaw, Poland
Figure 1:
4FUN MEDIA S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://4funmedia.pl/en/, accessed on 30 November 2017.
18-01593
281/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0282.png
S/2018/171
Figure 2:
SCREEN NETWORK S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://www.screennetwork.pl/, accessed on 30 November 2017
Figure 3: NCG S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: https://pracodawcy.pracuj.pl/ncg-s-a,8372, accessed on 30 November 2017
282/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0283.png
S/2018/171
Figure 4:
CM LUX MED contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://www.luxmed.pl/dla-pacjentow/centra-medyczne-grupy-lux-
med/centra-medyczne-grupy-lux-med/cm-warszawa/cm-lux-med-ul-bobrowiecka-
1.html, accessed on 30 November 2017
Figure 5:
GOLDEN MEDIA Polska Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://www.goldenmedia.tv/kontakt, accessed on 30 November 2017
18-01593
283/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0284.png
S/2018/171
Figure 6:
DIGITAL BEAST ESTATE Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://digitalbeastestate.pl/, accessed on 30 November 2017
Figure 7:
DIGITAL BEAST PRODUCTION Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://www.digitalbeast.pl/, accessed on 30 November 20
284/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0285.png
S/2018/171
Figure 8:
PROGRAM Sp. z o.o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://program.media/, accessed on 30 November 2017
Figure 9:
DREAMSOUND Sp. z o.o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland
Source:
http://www.dreamsound.pl/, accessed on 30 November 2017.
18-01593
285/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0286.png
S/2018/171
Annex 101: Poland’s correspondence to the Panel of 15 January 2018
286/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0287.png
S/2018/171
Source: Poland
18-01593
287/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0288.png
S/2018/171
Annex 102: Ongoing advertising of DRPK Embassy space in Warsaw, Poland
by DIGITAL BEAST ESTATE Sp. z o. o.
Figure 1:
Digital Beast Estate website advertises property management over an image of the
DPRK Embassy property in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://digitalbeastestate.pl/, accessed on 26 January 2018
Figure 2:
Digital Beast Estate’s clients sublet the DPRK Embassy’s space in Warsaw, Poland
Source: http://digitalbeastestate.pl/, accessed on 26 January 2018
288/292
18-01593
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0289.png
S/2018/171
Annex 103: Addendum to lease agreement signed 13 February 2017 with
DPRK Ambassador for space in the DPRK Embassy in Bucharest,
Romania by IMA Partners SRL
Source: The Panel
18-01593
289/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0290.png
S/2018/171
Annex 104: Recommendations
1.
The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future
sectoral sanctions measures, includes the relevant HS codes as it did in resolution
2397 (2017).
2.
The Panel recommends Member States exercise heightened vigilance over
their companies to ensure the prohibition of transfer of the items listed in 2321
(2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), including all industrial
machinery and transportation vehicles.
3.
Given that the same key individuals continue to feature in Panel reports
for a growing number of different types of violations, the Panel calls upon
Member States to take the appropriate action to ensure that these individuals
cease their prohibited activities.
4.
The Panel recommends that any Member State receiving coal shipments
for delivery or trans-shipment must take enhanced measures to validate the
documentation accompanying those shipments. To assist Member State efforts,
the Panel recommends the establishment of a regional cooperative mechanism to
share information on whether the relevant vessels actually docked and loaded
coal from the ports claimed in their documents of origin. At a minimum, Member
States should establish a point of contact for this purpose. The Panel will
continue to serve as a resource for Member States seeking information.
5.
Member States must be vigilant regarding vessel movements in the typical
areas for ship-to-ship transfers and report such transfers to the 1718 Committee.
6.
The Panel recommends that Committee designate (deny port entry for)
all vessels and their captains involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers to the
DPRK.
7.
The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following
individuals for violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017):
Shih-Hsien Chen, Boby Julian Akbari
6
and Wang Songchang.
7
8.
The Panel recommends that Member States strictly implement
resolutions pertaining to prohibited ship-to-ship transfers, including by enacting
enabling legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels and their
captains found to be conducting them, as well as actions against vessels such as
port entry denial (in force for at least six months with all costs borne by the
owners or charterers). In addition, flag states should deregister all vessels
reported as involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. Member States should
ensure that all contracts by petroleum industry companies registered or based in
their jurisdictions include a clause stipulating that all transfers involving
violations of the resolutions, in particular including prohibited ship-to-ship
transfers and petroleum products transferred to the DPRK, be voided.
9.
Member States hosting petroleum suppliers, brokers, importers and
tanker companies dealing in oil and petroleum products must heighten their
vigilance of the relevant entities to ensure that these are not re-directed to the
DPRK in violation of the resolutions. Countries serving as trans-shipment hubs
for petroleum products must undertake similar enhanced due diligence to
validate the origin and intended destination.
__________________
6
7
Captain of the
Billions No.18:
Seaman’s Book No. B2380031, DoB 30 July 1985.
Captain of the
Lighthouse Winmore:
Seaman’s Book No. G50001538, DoB 7 August 1973.
18-01593
290/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0291.png
S/2018/171
10. The Panel further recommends that maritime protection and indemnity
insurers include a clause in all contracts, stipulating that all transfers involving
violations of the resolutions, in particular prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and
petroleum products transferred to the DPRK, be voided.
11. The Panel reiterates its recommendations in previous reports for the
designation of Pan Systems.
8
The Panel further recommends the designation of
following individuals and entities: Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Ri Ho Nam, Ri Ik
(Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo, Pak In Su, Kim Chang Hyok, and Kim Su Gwang, as well
as International Global System and International Golden Services.
12. The Panel recommends that Member States, as part of their implementation of
the financial provisions of the resolutions, ensure that their financial institutions
implement a risk-based approach to identifying sanctions violations in their “Know
Your Customer” and compliance programs, including by ensuring more robust
scrutiny at the onboarding, transaction monitoring, and account review phases. To this
end, Member States should provide their financial institutions with more detailed and
regular information on sanctions evasion risks.
13. The Panel recommends that Member States include all Embassy personnel
within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) and ensure that diplomats
do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family members or front
companies, and to verify that bank accounts are closed when a diplomat ends his/her
tour in the country.
14. Given the pervasive use of front companies to evade financial sanctions, Member
States should ensure that their domestic corporate service providers implement
effective due diligence measures to capture detailed and accurate information on
clients and beneficial owners and file Suspicious Action Reports (SAR) in the case of
arrangements suspected of being used for illicit purposes.
15. Member States should take measures to ensure that financial sector supervisors
subject to their jurisdiction prioritize guidance, supervision and enforcement of
controls that support implementation of the resolutions.
16. Member States with appropriate knowledge and experience should offer
technical assistance to other Member States seeking assistance with their legal
frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the
resolutions.
17. The Panel recommends that Member States, in addition to ensuring an
appropriate legislative framework for combating proliferation financing,
require the establishment of robust information-sharing mechanisms among
financial supervisors, financial intelligence units, customs and strategic trade
control authorities, border control and security and intelligence agencies, and
with the private sector.
18. The Panel recommends that the relevant countries take the necessary measures
to ensure that all non-diplomatic activities taking place on DPRK Embassy property
as prohibited by paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) be terminated and all related
leases are cancelled.
19.
The Panel recommends Member States to report as part of their national
reporting to the 1718 Committee on the incorporation of the humanitarian exemptions
contained in the resolutions into their domestic legislation.
20. In line with the latest resolutions’ requests to provide the Panel with
additional resources, the Panel recommends that the Council request the
__________________
8
S/2017/742, para. 62.
18-01593
291/292
 FOU, Alm.del - 2017-18 - Bilag 75: Orientering om offentliggørelse af rapport fra FN's ekspertpanel for Nordkoreasanktioner, fra forsvarsministeren
1869425_0292.png
S/2018/171
Secretary-General to take specific measures to reinforce both the physical
security, information security, administrative support and other relevant
resources.
21.
The Panel recommends that the Committee update the existing list of desinated
individuals and entities as follows:
(a)
Ri Hong-Sop (KPi.004):
Designation:
Head of Nuclear Weapons Institute
(b) Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028):
Other information:
The MID oversees the DPRK’s nuclear program. The Nuclear
Weapons Institute is subordinate to the MID.
(c) Designate the following as being engaged in the DPRK’s nuclear-related program
Name:
Nuclear Weapons Institute
A.k.a.:na
Address:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Other information:
Nuclear Weapons Institute is engaged in the DPRK’s nuclear program
and led by Ri Hong Sop. It is a subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.
292/292
18-01593