Miljø- og Fødevareudvalget 2016-17
MOF Alm.del
Offentligt
1728174_0001.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
10. september 2015 11:30
Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Per Winther Christensen; Simon Christopher Bergulf; Jesper Stubkjær
Brev til ministeren vedr. Hong Kong konventionen
Fællesbrev til miljøminister Eva Kjer Hansen.pdf
Opfølgning
Afmærket
Kære Berit og Lissie,
Tak for et godt møde i tirsdags. Som aftalt og blot til orientering får I her brevet til ministeren, som går afsted i dag.
Dermed er kronikken også på trapperne.
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Phone: +45 3311 4088/Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0002.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
8. oktober 2015 09:28
Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Per Winther Christensen; Simon Christopher Bergulf
ShippingWatch: ophugning
Opfølgning
Afmærket
Kære begge,
Tak for et rigtig godt arrangement i mandags. Vi er - nok ikke så overraskende - ikke så tilfredse med ministerens
svar. Dansk Metal er også skuffede. SW bringer i dag nedenstående og vi beder nu om et møde med ministeren
snarest.
Dbh. Maria
Kvalitetsjournalistik kræver investeringer. Del venligst denne artikel med andre ved at bruge nedenstående link.
http://shippingwatch.dk/secure/Rederier/article8093262.ece#ixzz3nxV30H00
Kopier og videresend ikke artiklen. Det er i strid med ophavsretsloven og vores abonnementsbetingelser:
http://shippingwatch.dk/service/betingelser
Rederne: Regional enegang om ophug skaber global usikkerhed
REDERIER: <http://shippingwatch.dk/Rederier/>
Der er ingen grund til at vente på EU-regler, når implementeringen af Hongkong-konventionen har været i gang i
længere tid, er holdningen hos Danmarks Rederiforening oven på ministersvar om ophugning.
________________________________
AF CHRISTIAN BARTELS<mailto:[email protected]>
Offentliggjort 07.10.15 kl. 16:52
Det falder ikke i god jord hos Danmarks Rederiforening, at Miljø- og Fødevareminister Eva Kjer Hansen (V) først
ratificerer Hongkong-konventionen for bæredygtig ophugning, når EU-reglerne for ophugning er på plads.
Minister: EU-regler i vejen for Hongkong-konvention<http://shippingwatch.dk/eceRedirect?articleId=8088073>
Det siger underdirektør i Danmarks Rederiforening, Maria Bruun Skipper, til ShippingWatch.
"Vi behøver ikke at vente på implementering af EU-regler vedtaget i 2013, som kun gælder for EU-flagede skibe, når
Hongkong-konventionen, der dækker globalt, blev vedtaget i 2009," siger hun.
Miljøstyrelsen bebuder, at de i 2016 har en road map klar, der skal lede til ratifikation af Hongkong-konventionen.
Men den Road Map kommer ikke med svar på, hvornår den endelige ratificering finder sted, siger Maria Bruun
Skipper.
"Implementeringen af Hongkong-konventionen kan jo godt have lange udsigter, selv når der kommer en road map
fra Miljøstyrelsen i 2016. Det handler ikke kun om jura, men også om politisk vilje," siger hun.
Udmeldingen kommer i kølvandet på en korrespondance mellem Danmarks Rederiforening og Miljø- og
Fødevareminister Eva Kjer Hansen (V).
Rederne opfordrede i et brev ministeren til hurtigt at implementere Hongkong-konvention, men det vil ministeren
ikke tage hul på, før fælles EU-regler om ophugning er på plads i Danmark.
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0003.png
Politisk nøl skaber usikkerhed
Netop den politiske prioritering af EU-reglerne frem for Hongkong-konventionen er med til at skabe usikkerhed i
branchen, når den finder sted hos en af de store toneangivende søfartsnationer, argumenterer Maria Bruun Skipper.
"Det er jo netop regional enegang på EU-plan, der er med til at skabe usikkerhed og forsinkelse i det globale
regelværk. IMO er den rette regulator for skibsfarten, men leverer IMO's medlemslande ikke varen i form af
ratifikation af de regler, som de selvsamme lande har vedtaget, så ser vi desværre regionale særregler," siger hun.
Ifølge hendes oplysninger, arbejder nationer som Belgien, Tyskland, Spanien og Holland med at implementere
Hongkong-konventionen, som Frankrig, Congo og Norge på nuværende tidspunkt allerede har tiltrådt.
Lov i tre trin
Implementeringen af EU-regler volder øjensynligt de statslige instanser besvær.
I Miljøstyrelsen skal man ifølge svaret fra Eva Kjer Hansen (V) til Danmarks Rederiforening koordinere "juridiske
problemstillinger" med Udenrigsministeriet og Kammeradvokaten for at få implementeret de fælles EU-regler, der
grundlæggende set er en positivliste over værfter, der ophugger overvejende bæredygtigt.
Ifølge Miljøstyrelsens oplysninger til ShippingWatch, skal EU-reglerne implementeres i tre trin, hvoraf det andet skal
være implementeret færdig senest 31. december 2018.
Sidste trin finder senest anvendelse fra 31. december 2020 og handler om optegnelser over farlige materialer
ombord, oplyser Miljøstyrelsen.
Udfordringen med Hongkong-konventionen er, at den først træder i kraft to år efter, at den er ratificeret af 15
stater, der til sammen repræsenterer 40 procent af verdens samlede bruttotonnage. Og endelig skal de lande, der
har ratificeret, selv have en kapacitet til at hugge udtjente skibe op, der svarer til tre procent af
verdenshandelsflåden.
Sent from my iPhone
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0004.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Berit Hallam
17. april 2016 17:49
Maria Bruun Skipper
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Camilla Bjerre Søndergaard (MST); Berit Hallam
SV: Ship recycling: publication of the guidelines under Regulation (EU) No
1257/2013 on ship recycling
Kære Maria,
Ja, den har været længe undervejs. Vi har ikke nået at nærlæse kravene endnu, men er opmærksom på
Kommissionens fortolkning om, at alt affald skal behandles på fast underlag. Det ligger i hvert fald fast, at der er stor
usikkerhed om, hvad der oprindeligt var hensigten. Der er således flere af medlemslandenes oversættelser, der ser
ud til at afvige fra den engelske version, og hvor det i nogle tilfælde både kan læses som at det gælder alt affald eller
kun farligt... Et komma kan virkelig nogen gange have større betydning end man tror.
Vi mener umiddelbart, at det vil give mest mening, hvis kravet om fast underlag kun gælder for farligt affald og
farligestoffer/ materialer. På Estlands initiativ er der pt en dialog i gang mellem medlemslandene, Rådets juridiske
service og Parlamentet for at få afklaret, hvad der egentlig var intentionen bag de ændringer af forordningsudkastet,
som blev foretaget umiddelbart inden vedtagelsen, herunder også en drøftelse af muligheden for et eventuelt
corrigendum.
Vh
Berit
-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Maria Bruun Skipper [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 14. april 2016 10:38
Til: Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne: Fwd: Ship recycling: publication of the guidelines under Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 on ship recycling
Kære begge,
Så kom FAQ'en langt om længe. Som forventet har Kommissionen anlagt en meget restriktiv tilgang, hvilket betyder,
at ALT skal behandles på underlag - også det ikke farlige affald - den gamle kommadiskussion. Det har vi også været i
pressen og kritisere. Jeg husker, at I på vores sidste møde, også var af den opfattelse, at kun farligt affald skal
behandles på underlag.
Så jeg tænkte på, om I har en holdning til FAQ'en? Vi hører, at flere lande vil gøre indsigelser overfor Kommissionen.
Dbh. Maria
Sent from my iPhone
Start på videresendt besked:
Fra: <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Dato: 12. april 2016 kl. 10.47.06 GMT+1
Til: <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Emne: Ship recycling: publication of the guidelines under Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 on ship recycling
Dear colleague,
On Monday 4 April, the College of Commissioners has adopted a Commission Communication on Requirements and
procedure for inclusion of facilities located in third countries in the European List of ship recycling facilities. The
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0005.png
Communication is a technical guidance note under Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 on ship recycling<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:330:0001:0020:EN:PDF>;
it provides clarifications on the
requirements for ship recyclers.
The Communication was published today in the Official Journal of the European Union<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:128:FULL&from=EN>.
With the template for
applications<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D2398&from=EN> published
last December, ship recyclers outside the EU may now submit their formal applications for inclusion on the
European List to the European Commission. Section 1 of the Communication details the application procedure, while
sections 2 and 3 describe the environmental and administrative requirements respectively.
Best regards,
The Ship Recycling Regulation Team
[cid:[email protected]]
European Commission
Directorate-General for Environment
A2 - Waste Management & Recycling
Avenue de Beaulieu 9 – 5/107
B-1049 Brussels/Belgium
+32 229-91811
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Please note that all our remarks only reflect the opinion of the Commission services and are not legally binding. A
final binding legal interpretation of EU legislation can only be provided by the European Court of Justice. The above
remarks are without prejudice to the position the Commission might take should the issue arise in a procedure
before the Court of Justice.
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0006.png
!""!#
$
%" &
& '&
-
' & #." / '
123
4
3 566
5785
( )! # *
& & !0
(+
*
,
!
$
$
"
%
&
"
$
"
"
"
% $ "
#
"
!
%
" #$
&' & ' ( ' & &)
!( ' * + , ( &, ! "'& &' -
"
'
$
*
*
#
$
+
%
$
$
"
$
$
( $
!
"
,--.
%
$
$
#
)
+
$
"
/
01
234 56433373
8
(
234 39:,4:46
( $
%
'
6- ,39,
&
234 56 43 39 99
8
;;;
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0007.png
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0008.png
!"
" # " $
%
"" $
& '
(
) *+ + , $
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0009.png
Metode
- &
0% /
2
+& $ &
" .
.. %
/ & 1
3
"
.4
" '
.
&
% /
"!
4
"
&
3
%5#
3
."&
.! & $
6&& " " . '$
&
"&
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0010.png
Forbehold
- &
7 .
&
/
" $
&
. % / "!
3 "% "
" 7 &" 8 . 5 .
# "
!"
"
- ""
5
"
" . & "&5 " .
&
& .!
/
"
& &% /
"&5 " "
!
$
& $
#
&
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0011.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Jesper Stubkjær <[email protected]>
19. oktober 2016 20:24
Berit Hallam
Re: SV: Spørgsmål vedrørende ophugning af skibe
001-15448
5980650
Kære Berit
Ja, det er data pr. 1. Oktober 2016.
Bh Jesper
Den 19. okt. 2016 kl. 06.51 skrev Berit Hallam <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>:
Kære Jesper,
Mange tak for det tilsendte – jeg går ud fra at det er data fra 2016?
Fsva det andet spørgsmål, så er det naturligvis fint, at I finder frem til de data, som det nu er muligt. Det er i den
sammenhæng selvfølgelig også en væsentlig oplysning for os, hvilke data I ikke har.
Vh
Berit
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Mobil +45 40615652
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
l
www.mst.dk<http://www.mst.dk/>
Fra: Jesper Stubkjær [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 18. oktober 2016 23:21
Til: Berit Hallam
Cc: Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Rasmus With; Per Winther Christensen
Emne: SV: Spørgsmål vedrørende ophugning af skibe
Kære Berit
Vi har allerede nu et svar klar på det ene af dine spørgsmål – det om ikke-EU-flagede skibe. Jeg har vedhæftet tre
slides.
Det andet spørgsmål er langt sværere at svare på, og vi kommer kun til at kunne besvare det delvist. I bedste fald
kan vi give jer oplysninger om, hvilke danskejede skibe, der er sendt til ophugning – det er i sig selv en større opgave,
men burde være mulig. Til gengæld vil det ikke være muligt at inkludere skibe, som tidligere har været under dansk
ejerskab, og som er sendt til ophugning under ny ejer, da vi ganske enkelt ikke har data.
Bh Jesper
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0012.png
Fra: Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 18. oktober 2016 15:22
Til: Jesper Stubkjær
Cc: Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Berit Hallam
Emne: Spørgsmål vedrørende ophugning af skibe
Kære Jesper,
Som aftalt sender jeg her nogle spørgsmål til brug for Miljøstyrelsens redegørelse til miljø- og fødevareministeren,
som jeg gerne vil have jeres input til så hurtigt som muligt. Det drejer sig om følgende:
Har I nogen oplysninger om, hvor mange europæisk ejede skibe, som i dag sejler under ikke-europæisk flag?
Hvilke dansk-ejede skibe er – eventuel under anden ejer – siden 1998 ophugget på strande i Indien eller
Bangladesh?
Vh
Berit
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Mobil +45 40615652
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
l
www.mst.dk<http://www.mst.dk>
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0013.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
10. november 2016 11:16
Berit Hallam
Ophugning af dansk kontrollerede skibe 2010-2016
Kære Berit,
Vi har gennemgået IHS Fairplay database for dansk kontrollerede skib ophugget efter 1. Januar 2010 og resultatet
fremgår af listen nedenfor.
Listen er delt op således, at første del indeholder dansk kontrollerede skibe, der er hugget op af DRF medlemmer
(eller tidligere medlemmer som er gået konkurs).
Anden del indeholder dansk kontrollerede skibe der er hugget op af rederier, der ikke var DRF medlemmer på
tidspunktet for ophugningen.
I forhold til at vurdere om skibe, der er videresolgt fra dansk kontrol til fremmet flag, er hugget op kort tid efter, og hvor
denne ophugning er foregået, har vi ikke desværre ikke oplysninger til at kunne svare på.
Skibe solgt direkte til ophugning af danske rederier siden 2010 -2016 (oktober)
Ophugget af DRF medlemmer:
Indien
IMO
7222762
8311297
7430735
8000989
8107141
7813705
7359553
8100571
7736335
8501531
7716660
8820248
8122830
9057159
8108133
9232319
9105932
9155119
Bangladesh
7907348
9031466
9057458
Navn
SEA CORONA
SIGLOO MOSS
TOR MINERVA
SIGLOO F INN
SIGLOO POLAR
CHARLOTTENBURG
NAESBORG
SIAM PROJECT
NORD SCAN MUMBAI
SIGLOO STAR
MARIENBORG
CS GITTE
AALBORG
SELMA
PEGASUS
Clipper Concord
Maersk Wyoming
Maersk Georgia
Rederi
CS & P RoRo I
Camillo Eitzen
CS & P (DFDS)
EITZEN GAS
EITZEN GAS
DANNEBROG / NORDANA LINES
DANNEBROG / NORDANA LINES
DANNEBROG / NORDANA LINES
DANNEBROG / NORDANA LINES
EVERGAS
DANNEBROG/NORDANA
CONTAINER SHIPPING
DANNEBROG REDERI
REDERIET HANSEN OG LANGE I/S
J. Poulsen Shipping
Clipper Group
Maersk Line A/S
Maersk Line A/S
BT
12.110
10.075
21.215
8.630
8.878
31.007
32.173
9.019
5.280
10.195
32.875
8.777
24.869
14.619
1.161
6.714
50.698
50.698
Ophugget
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2016
2016
NINA
CS CHRISTINE
PIONEER ATLANTIC
K/S Nina Shipping (CS & Partnere)
CONTAINER LEASING A/S
Investeringsgruppen Danmark
1.713
14.848
37.978
2010
2012
2016
Ophugget af ikke DRF medlemmer:
Indien
IMO
Navn
1
BT
Ophugget
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0014.png
6606234
8800779
6608098
8500135
8800767
9014729
8908519
9004205
8415641
9153678
7516761
8812631
SPLIT 1700
BURGOS
ANCONA
EBONY
GORGONILLA
SEAPOWET
PHILIP
SUJIN
VOLOS
WILL
DALMATIA
MERAY ALAMAR
BLUE LINE INTERNATIONAL
SEAFLEX A/S
BLUE LINE INTERNATIONAL
TRANSSEA C/O SEAFLEX
SEAFLEX / TRANSSEA 1
DIFKO LXXIII
DANIA MARINE - PHILIP K/S
SUJIN K/S (DANIA MARINE)
DANIA MARINE ApS
Silver Valley Ltd
Blue Line International
Janchart Shipping A/S
6.474
4.959
12.394
7.915
4.959
41.189
10.868
10.396
10.282
9.068
12.087
17.126
2010
2010
2011
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2016
Bangladesh
Ingen
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0015.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
14. december 2016 12:42
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Berit Hallam
Simon Christopher Bergulf
Danske værfter nomineret til EU hvidlisten.
Opfølgning
Afmærket
Hej Berit og Lissie
På vores sidste møde om ophugning, talte vi om EU hvidlisten i fortalte at der var et af de to værfter der var
indstillet fra dansk side der ikke behandlede alt materiale på ”ikke gennemtrængeligt” underlag. Pointen var
at den danske fortolkning af komma problemet tillod, at danske værfter der ikke fortog alt behandling af
materiale på ”ikke gennemtrængeligt” underlag, stadig kunne optages på listen.
Jeg ved at det er Fornæs og Smedegaarden i Esbjerg der er optaget på listen, men hvilke af de to værfter
er værftet der ikke kører 100% på ”ikke gennemtrængeligt” underlag?
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danmarks Rederiforening / Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0016.png
Jord og Affald
Ref. BEHA
Den . januar 2017
Telefonnotat samtale med Per Winther Christensen (PWC), Danmarks
Rederiforening
PWC ringede som opfølgning på sin mail af 14. december 2016 om danske værfter nomineret
til EU hvidlisten.
Anlæggene Fornæs og Smedegaarden er godkendt til optag på listen af deres respektive
godkendelsesmyndigheder. Jeg oplyste, at Smedegaarden tilsyneladende opbevarer ikke-
farlige materialer/affald på ikke-fast underlag. Men at jeg regnede med, at der om
nødvendigt var vilkår i virksomhedens miljøgodkendelse eller den fysiske indretning af
pladsen, fx ved omfangsdræn eller lignende, der tog højde for det.
Miljøstyrelsen • Strandgade 29 • 1401 København K
Tlf. 72 54 40 00 • CVR 25798376 • EAN (drift)5798000863002 (tilskud)5798000863019 • [email protected] • www.mst.dk
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0017.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Jesper Stubkjær <[email protected]>
10. oktober 2016 08:36
Berit Hallam
SV: Minister skal forklare ophugning af Mærsk-skibe i Indien
Beklager, Det var ikke Ida Auken, der fik brevet, men derimod Eva Kjer.
Derfor ”Ida Auken” nu slettet nedenfor.
Jesper
Fra:
Jesper Stubkjær
Sendt:
10. oktober 2016 08:31
Til:
[email protected]
Emne:
SV: Minister skal forklare ophugning af Mærsk-skibe i Indien
Kære Berit
Ovenpå weekendens mediefokus på ophugning, og specifikt Pia Olsen Dyhrs udtalelser til Ritzau, regner vi med i dag
at sende en berigtigelse til Pia O.D., da hun har misforstået flere forhold omkring reglerne.
Nedenstående udkast er ikke godkendt her i Rederiforeningen endnu, så du får det bare til din egen orientering. Jeg
sender endelig version til dig, når vi forventeligt sender til Pia i dag.
Bh Jesper
_________________
Kære Pia Olsen Dyhr
På Ritzau i går er du citeret for at ville kalde miljøministeren i samråd for at afklare, om Mærsk har presset den
danske regering i sagen om ophugning af skibe i Alang.
Danmarks Rederiforening finder det vigtigt, at debatten foregår på et faktuelt korrekt grundlag, og jeg skriver derfor
til dig for at belyse fakta i sagen og for at gøre opmærksom på to vigtige forhold.
1. Rederiforeningen har siden 2009 anbefalet sine medlemmer at følge FN’s Hong Kong Konvention, selvom den
endnu ikke er trådt i kraft, og opfordrer til at flest muligt nationer, herunder Danmark, ratificerer konventionen
hurtigst muligt, så vi får et globalt regelsæt, der regulerer ophugningsindustrien. Rederiforeningen har i flere
omgange opfordret skiftende miljøministre til at sørge for dansk ratifikation af konventionen.
2. Rederiforeningen støtter EU's ophugningsforordning og arbejder for, at EU's kommende liste over godkendte
ophugningsfaciliteter tager hensyn til, at ophugningsindustrien er global, og at listen derfor ikke udelukker
faciliteter, der er certificeret efter Hong Kong Konventionen.
I forhold til dine citater hos Ritzau, er det vigtigt at bemærke følgende:
EU’s Ophugningsforordning
EU vedtog ophugningsforordningen i 2013. Den EU-lovgivning, der regulerer, hvordan EU-flagede skibe (samt skibe
med sidste anløb i EU-havn inden ophugning) skal ophugges, er således vedtaget knap 3 år inden, at Mærsk
besluttede at lade sine to skibe ophugge i Alang. Forordningen forholder sig ikke til,
hvor
i verden EU-skibe må
ophugges, men stiller derimod krav til,
hvordan
ophugningen foregår. Det er dermed ikke korrekt, at EU stiller krav
om ikke at ophugge på strande i Indien.
EU-reglerne er ikke trådt i kraft endnu, og ophugningen af skibe i Alang skal derfor ikke på nuværende tidspunkt ske
i henhold til EU-regler. EU-forordningen er baseret på Hong Kong konventionens krav.
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0018.png
FN’s Hong Kong Konvention
Den internationale konvention om ophugning, FN’s Hong Kong Konvention, blev vedtaget i 2009, men er ikke trådt i
kraft endnu, da for få lande har ratificeret. Den danske miljøminister har i september 2016 sendt et lovforslag i
høring, som skal muliggøre dansk ratifikation af konventionen, efter planen i foråret 2017. Hong Kong Konventionen
vil sikre miljø – og arbejdsforholdsmæssigt forsvarlig ophugning af skibe fra hele verden, og vil således have langt
mere vidtrækkende effekt end EU-forordningen.
Konventionen indebærer blandt andet, at skibe skal have en liste over farlige stoffer ombord, hvilket muliggør
forsvarlig håndtering under ophugningen. Derudover indebærer den, at forsvarlige miljø- og arbejdsforhold sikres på
ophugningsfaciliteterne.
Til din orientering vedhæfter jeg Danmarks Rederiforenings politik om ophugning.
Jeg vil meget gerne mødes med dig for at drøfte sagen nærmere, samt for at forklare Rederiforeningens tilgang til
sikring af forsvarlig ophugning.
Med venlig hilsen,
Anne H. Steffensen
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0019.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Camilla Bjerre Søndergaard (MST)
10. oktober 2016 11:54
Michel Schilling; Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
VS: Mulig mail til Pia Olsen Dyhr om ophugning
Policy Paper_Recycling_DK_oktober 2016.pdf
t.o. udkast til mail, som rederiforeningen overvejer at sende til SF.
Vh Camilla
Fra:
Jesper Stubkjær [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
10. oktober 2016 11:32
Til:
Camilla Bjerre Søndergaard (MST)
Emne:
Mulig mail til Pia Olsen Dyhr om ophugning
Kære Camilla
Til fortrolig orientering – brev der muligvis sendes afsted i dag.
Mvh. Jesper
Jesper Forup Stubkjær
Chefkonsulent, fg. underdirektør
Sikkerhed, Sundhed, Miljø og Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 København K
Telefon: 3311 4088 / Direkte: 3348 9237
Mobil: 3146 3246
E-mail:
[email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kære Pia Olsen Dyhr
På Ritzau i går er du citeret for at ville kalde miljøministeren i samråd for at afklare, om Mærsk har presset den
danske regering i sagen om ophugning af skibe i Alang.
Danmarks Rederiforening finder det vigtigt, at debatten foregår på et faktuelt korrekt grundlag, og jeg skriver derfor
til dig for at belyse fakta i sagen og for at gøre opmærksom på to vigtige forhold.
1. Rederiforeningen har siden 2009 anbefalet sine medlemmer at følge FN’s Hong Kong Konvention, selvom den
endnu ikke er trådt i kraft, og opfordrer til at flest muligt nationer, herunder Danmark, ratificerer konventionen
hurtigst muligt, så vi får et globalt regelsæt, der regulerer ophugningsindustrien. Rederiforeningen har opfordret
skiftende miljøministre til at sørge for dansk ratifikation af konventionen.
2. Rederiforeningen støtter EU's ophugningsforordning og arbejder for, at EU's kommende liste over godkendte
ophugningsfaciliteter tager hensyn til, at ophugningsindustrien er global, og at listen derfor ikke udelukker
faciliteter, der er certificeret efter Hong Kong Konventionen.
Følgende fakta værd at bemærke:
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0020.png
EU’s Ophugningsforordning
EU vedtog ophugningsforordningen i 2013. Den EU-lovgivning, der regulerer, hvordan EU-flagede skibe (samt skibe
med sidste anløb i EU-havn inden ophugning) skal ophugges, er således vedtaget for knap 3 år siden. Forordningen
forholder sig ikke til,
hvor
i verden EU-skibe må ophugges, men stiller derimod krav til,
hvordan
ophugningen
foregår. Det er dermed ikke korrekt, at EU stiller krav om ikke at ophugge på strande i Indien.
EU-reglerne er ikke trådt i kraft endnu, men vil gøre det senest i 2018. Ophugningen af skibe i Alang er derfor ikke på
nuværende tidspunkt underlagt EU-regler. EU-forordningen er baseret på Hong Kong konventionens krav, men
stiller nogle yderligere specifikke krav relateret til miljø og sikkerhed.
FN’s Hong Kong Konvention
Den internationale konvention om ophugning, FN’s Hong Kong Konvention, blev vedtaget i 2009, men er ikke trådt i
kraft endnu, da for få lande har ratificeret. Den danske miljøminister har i september 2016 sendt et lovforslag i
høring, som skal muliggøre dansk ratifikation af konventionen, efter planen i foråret 2017. Hong Kong Konventionen
vil sikre miljø – og arbejdsforholdsmæssigt forsvarlig ophugning af skibe fra hele verden, og vil således have langt
mere vidtrækkende effekt end EU-forordningen.
Konventionen indebærer blandt andet, at skibe skal have en liste over de farlige stoffer, der findes ombord, hvilket
muliggør forsvarlig håndtering under ophugningen. Derudover indebærer den, at forsvarlige miljø- og arbejdsforhold
sikres på ophugningsfaciliteterne.
Til din orientering vedlægger jeg Danmarks Rederiforenings politik om ophugning.
Jeg vil meget gerne mødes med dig for at drøfte sagen nærmere, samt for at forklare Rederiforeningens tilgang til
sikring af forsvarlig ophugning.
Med venlig hilsen,
Anne H. Steffensen
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0021.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
4. november 2016 10:17
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Spørgsmål til brochuren "skibsfarten i tal maj 2016"
Opfølgning
Fuldført
Kære Lissie,
661 er det rigtige tal.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
3. november 2016 15:51
Til:
Per Winther Christensen
Emne:
Spørgsmål til brochuren "skibsfarten i tal maj 2016"
Kære Per
Jeg håber du kan hjælpe med opklaring af, hvor mange skibe der er i den danske handelsflåde. Jeg har fundet 3
forskellige tal i brochuren.
På side 3 står der, at størrelsen på den danske handelsflåde er 661.
Men på side 6, tabel 2.7, fremgår det at 591 skibe, sejler under dansk flag
Og på s. 10, tabel 2.14 fremgår det at 691 skibe, sejler under dansk flag.
Har du mulighed for at oplyse mig om, hvilket af disse tal, der er den korrekte?
Jeg kunne også godt tænke mig at vide, hvilke skibe, der er omfattet af begrebet ”handelsflåde”
Jeg skal bruge informationen til ministerens beredskab, så hvis du har mulighed for at svare i morgen, vil jeg sætte
stor pris på det.
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0022.png
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0023.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
7. september 2016 07:10
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: EMSA Guidance on IHM_final.docx
Opfølgning
Fuldført
Kære Lissie,
Vi har gennemgået EMSA’s Best Practice Guidance on the Inventory of Hazardous Materials og har haft den i høring
hos vores medlemmer.
Konklusionen er at det er en udmærket og brugbar guideline, som giver en præcis instruktion til rederen om hvordan
en IHM skal udarbejdes, hvilke stoffer der skal inkluderes og hvordan den skal godkendes.
Samtidigt adskiller den sig ikke væsentligt fra RESOLUTION MEPC.269(68) - 2015 GUIDELINES FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, hvilket er meget vigtigt, da Hong Kong
Konventionens krav vil være udgangspunkt for mange rederier uden for EU.
Annex A er en vigtig del af guiden – her kunne man godt ønske sig en mere overskuelig fremstilling af de forskellige
deadlines.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
8. juli 2016 13:34
Til:
Per Winther Christensen
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
EMSA Guidance on IHM_final.docx
Kære Per
Jeg har netop modtaget denne IHM best practice guidance fra EMSA.
EMSA anmoder om at modtage eventuelle bemærkninger til den senest 9. september 2016.
Hvis du har bemærkninger til guiden, er du velkommen til at sende dem til mig inden 9. september.
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0024.png
Vh Lissie
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0025.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Berit Hallam
24. januar 2017 11:12
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Vs: ship recycling - EU list of approved facilities
Opfølgning
Afmærket
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]
Mobil +45 40615652
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]
l
www.mst.dk
Fra:
Per Winther Christensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
11. januar 2017 12:39
Til:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
VS: ship recycling - EU list of approved facilities
Hej Berit,
Hermed en oversigt over de europæiske værfters kapacitet.
European list of ship recycling facilities
Actual
34.000
30.000
20.000
16.000
18.000
5.500
0
1.500
3.910
20.140
52.000
9.300
4.000
1.900
0
66.340
Theoretical
50.000
50.000
50.000
18.000
23.000
10.000
15.000
15.000
6.000
45.000
100.000
45.000
10.000
60.000
230.000
1
Belgium
Denmark
Denmark
France
France
France
Latvia
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Spain
UK
Length
265,0
150,0
170,0
150,0
240,0
225,0
165,0
130,0
80,0
230,0
405,0
200,0
120,0
169,9
337,5
Width
36,0
25,0
40,0
18,0
37,0
34,0
22,0
35,0
16,0
55,0
90,0
33,0
20,0
Draught
12,5
6,0
7,5
7,0
17,0
27,0
7,0
10,0
6,0
14,0
11,6
6,0
6,0
Length >= 200 m
theoretical capacity
50.000
23.000
10.000
45.000
100.000
45.000
120,0
6,7
337,5
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0026.png
UK
UK
13.200
7.275
303.065
300.000
74.999
664.999
556,0
200,0
93,0
27,0
7,0
300.000
74.999
648.337
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0027.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
21. april 2016 22:06
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Maria Bruun Skipper
Hastehøring af nyt udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente
myndigheder og supplerende bestemmelser i henhold til forordning om ophugning
af skibe
Kære Lissie,
Rederiforeningen har ikke yderligere bemærkninger til fremsendte revideret udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning
af kompetente myndigheder og supplerende bestemmelser i henhold til skibsophugningsforordningen.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
18. april 2016 10:11
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Hastehøring af nyt udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder og supplerende
bestemmelser i henhold til forordning om ophugning af skibe
Kære høringsparter
I tillæg til høring af bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder og supplerende bestemmelser i
henhold til forordning om ophugning af skibe, udsendt den 18. marts 2016, udsendes nu en hastehøring af et nyt
udkast til bekendtgørelsen.
Miljøstyrelsen er blevet opmærksom på, at oplysninger om proceduren for godkendelse af de skibsspecifikke
skibsophugningsplaner skal oplyses til Kommissionen samtidig med meddelelse om, hvilke danske
skibsophugningsanlæg, der skal optages på den europæiske liste. Proceduren er derfor blevet indarbejdet i det
vedhæftede nye udkast til bekendtgørelse. Udkastet er derudover blevet præciseret et par steder.
Alle ændringer er markeret med rødt.
Høringsfristen er kort, fordi bekendtgørelsen skal træde i kraft hurtigst muligt.
Bemærkninger til vedhæftede bekendtgørelsesudkast sendes til
[email protected]
senest 21. april 2016
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0028.png
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Sendt:
18. marts 2016 07:04
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Høring af udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder i henhold til
skibsophugningsforordningen
Hermed fremsendes:
1) Udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder og supplerende bestemmelser i
henhold til Europa Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1257/2013 af 20. november 2013 om
ophugning af skibe
2) Høringsbrev
3) Høringsliste
Bemærkninger til udkastet bedes sendes til
[email protected]
senest 15. april 2016
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0029.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
6. oktober 2016 07:48
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Høring af udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af
havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse (Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-
konventionen)
MST-736-00014
5997469
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Kære Lissie,
Danmarks Rederiforening støtter Danmarks planer at ratificere af Hong Kong-konventionen om sikker og miljømæssig
forsvarlig ophugning af skibe. Dette er et meget vigtigt skridt mod en forbedring af sikkerheden og miljøforholdene på
verdens ophugningsfaciliteter.
Vi støtter således også lovforslaget der skal tilvejebringe hjemmelsgrundlag til at Danmark kan tiltræde Hong Kong-
konventionen og at havmiljølovens anvendelsesområde udvides således, at skibsophugningsforordningens krav til
skibe, kan administreres efter loven.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
6. september 2016 12:37
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Høring af udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse
(Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-konventionen)
Hermed fremsendes følgende dokumenter:
1) Udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse
(Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-konventionen)
2) Bilag 1 – Hong Kong-konventionen
3) Bilag 2 – Dansk oversættelse af konventionen
4) Høringsbrev
5) Høringsliste
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0030.png
Eventuelle bemærkninger til udkastet kan sendes til
[email protected]
senest fredag den 14. oktober 2016
Dokumenterne offentliggøres også på Høringsportalen.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0031.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
6. oktober 2016 07:48
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Høring af udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af
havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse (Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-
konventionen)
MST-736-00014
5997469
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Kære Lissie,
Danmarks Rederiforening støtter Danmarks planer at ratificere af Hong Kong-konventionen om sikker og miljømæssig
forsvarlig ophugning af skibe. Dette er et meget vigtigt skridt mod en forbedring af sikkerheden og miljøforholdene på
verdens ophugningsfaciliteter.
Vi støtter således også lovforslaget der skal tilvejebringe hjemmelsgrundlag til at Danmark kan tiltræde Hong Kong-
konventionen og at havmiljølovens anvendelsesområde udvides således, at skibsophugningsforordningens krav til
skibe, kan administreres efter loven.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
6. september 2016 12:37
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Høring af udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse
(Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-konventionen)
Hermed fremsendes følgende dokumenter:
1) Udkast til: Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om beskyttelse af havmiljøet og lov om miljøbeskyttelse
(Implementering af dele af Hong Kong-konventionen)
2) Bilag 1 – Hong Kong-konventionen
3) Bilag 2 – Dansk oversættelse af konventionen
4) Høringsbrev
5) Høringsliste
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0032.png
Eventuelle bemærkninger til udkastet kan sendes til
[email protected]
senest fredag den 14. oktober 2016
Dokumenterne offentliggøres også på Høringsportalen.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0033.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
13. januar 2017 15:02
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Spørgsmål i relation til skibsophugningsforordningen
MST-719-00155
6278348
Hej Lissie,
Jeg tror godt du kan bruge denne tilgang.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
13. januar 2017 14:47
Til:
Per Winther Christensen
Emne:
SV: Spørgsmål i relation til skibsophugningsforordningen
Hej igen
Nu har jeg tænkt lidt mere over det. Den situation du nævner, vil jeg men er dækket af forordningens art. 9, stk. 3,
litra c):
Administrationen eller den anerkendte organisation, som denne har godkendt, udsteder eller påtegner efter
omstændighederne og med forbehold af stk. 4 et fortegnelsescertifikat, hvis det periodiske syn er korrekt gennemført
mere end tre måneder inden det eksisterende fortegnelsescertifikats udløbsdato og det nye certifikat er gyldigt fra
datoen for afslutningen af det periodiske syn ind til en dato, der ikke overstiger fem år fra datoen for gennemførelsen
af det periodiske syn.
Art. 9, stk. 6, tror jeg handler om en situation, hvor skibet i en længere periode har været taget ud af drift som følge
af omfattende reparationer.
SFS har nemlig henvist mig til Resolution A.1104(29) SURVEY GUIDELINES UNDER THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF
SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION (HSSC), 2015, hvoraf følgende fremgår:
5.5 Application of "special circumstances"
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0034.png
References: SOLAS 74/88 regulation I/14(g), LLC 66/88 article 19(7), MARPOL Annex I, regulation 10.7, MARPOL
Annex II regulation 10.7, MARPOL Annex IV regulation 8.7, MARPOL Annex VI regulation 9.7, IBC Code regulation
1.5.6.7, IGC Code regulation 1.5.6.7 and BCH Code regulation 1.6.6.7.
The purpose of these regulations or article is to permit Administrations to waive the requirement that a certificate
issued following a renewal survey that is completed after the expiry of the existing certificate should be dated from
the expiry date of the existing certificate. The special circumstances when this could be permitted are where the ship
has been laid-up or has been out of service for a considerable period because of a major repair or modification.
Whilst the renewal survey would be as extensive as if the ship had continued in service, the Administration should
consider whether additional surveys or examinations are required depending on how long the ship was out of service
and the measures taken to protect the hull and machinery during this period. Where this regulation is invoked, it is
reasonable to expect an examination of the outside of the ship's bottom to be held at the same time as the renewal
survey when it would not be necessary to include any special requirements for cargo ships for the continued
application of SOLAS 74/88 regulation I/10(a)(v).
Hvad tænker du om det?
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
Fra:
Per Winther Christensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
13. januar 2017 08:40
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
SV: Spørgsmål i relation til skibsophugningsforordningen
Kære Lissie
Tak og godt nytår til dig også.
I forhold til nedenstående spørgsmål er den eneste situation jeg kan komme i tanke om, hvor en reder vil ønske en
kortere løbetid en 5 år, vil være i forbindelse med harmonisering af certifikater.
Hvis fx et skib får udstedt det første fortegnelsescertifikat 1/2/2017 og alle andre certifikater på skibet udløber fx
15/3/2020, så kunne rederen være interesseret i at få udløbsdatoen på fortegnelsescertifikat sat til 15/3/ 2020 og ikke
1/2/2022.
Rederen kunne selvfølgeligt vælge at lade certifikatet udløbe 1/2/ 2022 og så blot lave synet når de andre certifikater
udløber (i vinduet 15/1/2020 til 15/3/2020). Men problemet er hvis synet af alle certifikater fx laves den 20/2/2020 vil
alle certifikater få en ny udløbsdato den 15/3/2025 - undtagen fortegnelsescertifikat som vil få udløbsdatoen
20/2/2025.
Håber at dette giver mening – hvis ikke er du velkommen til at ringe.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0035.png
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
12. januar 2017 16:18
Til:
Per Winther Christensen
Emne:
Spørgsmål i relation til skibsophugningsforordningen
Kære Per
Godt nytår!
Jeg er i gang med et udkast til en bekendtgørelse, der skal fastsætte supplerende regler til den del af
skibsophugningsforordningen, der handler om skibe.
I artikel 9, stk. 6, i skibsophugningsforordningen fremgår følgende:
”Under særlige omstændigheder, der fastlægges af administrationen, behøver et nyt fortegnelsescertifikat ikke at
være dateret fra det eksisterende certifikats udløbsdato som fastsat i stk. 3, litra a) og b), og stk. 7 og 8. Under disse
særlige omstændigheder er det nye certifikat gyldigt for en periode, der ikke overstiger fem år fra datoen for
gennemførelsen af det periodiske syn.”
Hvis der findes sådanne særlige omstændigheder, skal de nævnes i bekendtgørelsen.
Kan I komme i tanker om særlige omstændigheder, der kan udløse denne undtagelse?
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0036.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Emne:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
5. april 2016 10:05
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
VS: Høring af udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder
i henhold til skibsophugningsforordningen
Kære Lissi,
Med reference til fremsendte hørring af udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder i
henhold til skibsophugningsforordningen, har Rederiforeningen umiddelbart følgende bemærkninger:
1. § 3, c) og § 4, d) dem maksimale skibsophugningsmængde bør opgives med en enhed – fx i tons stål/år.
2. § 6, Miljøstyrelsen opretter og ajourfører en liste …. Hvornår kan en facilitet søge om optagelse – er det en
kontinuerlig proces eller er det planen foretage årlige opdateringer af listen til kommissionen? Det er vigtigt for
Rederiforeningen at Kommissionen opdaterer listen så ofte som muligt, så en facilitet der er godkendt og klar
til at ophugge EU flagede skibe, kan starte arbejdet med det samme og ikke skal vente på at Kommissionen
får udgivet en opdateret liste.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
18. marts 2016 07:04
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Høring af udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder i henhold til
skibsophugningsforordningen
Hermed fremsendes:
1) Udkast til bekendtgørelse om udpegning af kompetente myndigheder og supplerende bestemmelser i
henhold til Europa Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1257/2013 af 20. november 2013 om
ophugning af skibe
2) Høringsbrev
3) Høringsliste
Bemærkninger til udkastet bedes sendes til
[email protected]
senest 15. april 2016
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0037.png
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0038.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
19. januar 2017 16:25
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Per Winther Christensen
Berit Hallam
SV: Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
Opfølgning
Afmærket
Kære Lissie,
Mange tak for meldingen. Dejligt med bred opbakning til dansk ratifikation.
Vi vender tilbage med bud på den økonomiske omkostning ved det nævnte mulige ændringsforslag.
Umiddelbart tænker jeg, at der er nogle juridiske implikationer ved at pålægge fremmedflagede skibe danske
særkrav. EU SRR omfatter af den grund netop kun EU flagede skibe. Er de juridiske implikationer noget, som MST ser
på?
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0039.png
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
19. januar 2017 14:35
Til:
Per Winther Christensen; Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
Kære Maria og Per
Førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget gik godt. Alle partier støttede det. EL, SF og AL vil dog gerne have strengere
regler, og vil formentlig fremsætte et ændringsforslag om, at alle danskejede skibe skal ophugges på den
europæiske liste.
Har I mulighed for at vurdere, hvilke økonomiske konsekvenser det ville have, eller hvor mange skibe, det ville dreje
sig om?
De skibe der kommer i spil er dem der ikke er omfattet af forordningens anvendelsesområdet allerede. Dvs:
1) Danskejede skibe, der ikke sejler under en EU medlemsstats flag
2) Danskejede skibe under 500 BT, statsejede etc.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0040.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
19. april 2016 14:23
Berit Hallam; Per Winther Christensen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Finansieringsfond for skibsophugning
Kære Berit,
Det synes jeg lyder som en fornuftig tilgang. Vi ser frem til at blive inviteret til et møde, hvor vi kan uddybe vores
synspunkter samt bidrage til en konkret strategi.
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
18. april 2016 14:27
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper; Per Winther Christensen
Cc:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Berit Hallam
Emne:
Finansieringsfond for skibsophugning
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0041.png
Kære Maria og Per
Som I ved, har Regeringens Implementeringsråd anbefalet, at der sker tidlig interessentinddragelse i processen op til
at Kommissionen senest d. 31. december 2016 skal forelægge en rapport for Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om en
finansieringsfond for skibsophugning.
Vi skal til Implementeringsrådets næste drøftelse heraf præsentere en procesplan for, hvordan og hvornår
interessentinddragelsen skal finde sted. Jeg vil derfor gerne tale med jer om det.
Umiddelbart vil jeg foreslå, at vi orienterer Implementeringsrådet om, at vi snarest muligt holder et møde med jer
og Danske Havne (som også har udtrykt interesse for emnet) og aftaler nærmere om, hvordan vi kan påvirke
Kommissionen og således at vi inden sommer får fastlagt en proces.
Jeg har modtaget bestillingen i dag med vanlig kort frist – Implementeringsrådets næste møde er i maj, men vi har
frist til onsdag til at levere input.
Vh
Berit
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]
l
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0042.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
13. juni 2016 11:21
Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Per Winther Christensen
Financial scheme - legal opinion
Legal Opinion - Ship Reycling License Scheme_Final.pdf
Opfølgning
Fuldført
Kære begge,
Tak for et godt møde i mandags. Jeg lovede jo ECSA’s policy papir med argumenter imod den finansielle mekanisme,
men det viste sig, at papiret ikke var klappet 100 % af blandt ECSA’s medlemmer. Til gengæld har vores tyske
kollegaer fra VDR fået udarbejdet vedlagte juridiske analyse af, hvorfor en sådan mekanisme rammer en række
juridiske udfordringer.
Glæder mig til at høre nærmere om dagens møder i Bruxelles.
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
The EU Ship Recycling
Financial Incentive
–
Legal Opinion on the Option under
Consideration by the European Commission of
a Combination of a Permit for Ships Calling at
EU Ports and a Public Fund
by:
Prof. Dr. Henning Jessen, LL.M. (Tulane)
Institute for Maritime Law and the Law of the Sea,
University of Hamburg
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0045.png
Table of Contents
Three-Page “Executive Summary” of this Legal Opinion................................................. 1
A.
EU Procedure and EU Competency in Implementing Article 29 EU Ship Recycling
Regulation .................................................................................................................... 4
1.
2.
3.
EU Procedure: Establishing an EU Ship Recycling License is a “primarily
fiscal
measure”
pursuant to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU ............................................................ 5
Conclusions on EU Procedure ................................................................................... 9
EU Competency: The EU Lacks Institutional Power to Directly Administer and Enforce
the Details of an EU Ship Recycling License .............................................................. 9
a. Procedural Autonomy of the EU members in Environmental Policy...................... 10
b. The Legal Rules for Designating Completely New Funds to the General EU
Budget .................................................................................................................11
4.
Conclusions on EU Competency ...............................................................................12
B.
Legal Tension with the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and General Rules of Public
International Law ........................................................................................................12
1.
An EU Ship Recycling License is Not Compatible With the UN Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS)..............................................................................................13
a. “Applicable
International Rules and Standards”
and “Discharge
Requirements”...
14
b. Enforcement of Legal Rules by Port States under UNCLOS ................................ 15
c. Unilaterally Enforcing an EU Ship Recycling License Would Represent “Excessive”
Port State Jurisdiction ..........................................................................................17
2.
Issues Relevant for General Public International Law ...............................................18
C.
Non-Compliance with WTO Law: Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article XXXVII:1 (c) (i)
GATT 1994 ...................................................................................................................19
1.
2.
3.
An EU Ship Recycling License Scheme Violates the Substance of Article
V:3 GATT 1994 ........................................................................................................ 20
Conclusion on the Violation of the Material Substance of Article V:3 GATT 1994......23
An EU Ship Recycling License Cannot be Justified Under Article V:3 GATT 1994 as
“Necessary” or “Reasonable” ....................................................................................23
II
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0046.png
a. The Test for a “Reasonable” Charge ....................................................................24
b. The Test for a “Necessary” Charge ......................................................................25
4.
Under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994, Developed WTO members “Shall
Refrain
From Imposing New Fiscal Measures”
......................................................................27
D.
Favouring EU-listed Ship Recycling Facilities Conflicts with the Principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) ..............................................30
E.
Conclusions on the Disproportionality and Non-Compliance with International
Law ..............................................................................................................................32
F.
Alternative Final Thoughts on a More Constructive Implementation of Article 29 of
Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2013 ..................................................................................33
Secondary Literature Used ................................................................................................38
III
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0047.png
Three-Page “Executive Summary” of this Legal Opinion
As mandated by the European Commission (DG Environment), a consortium led by
ECORYS Nederland B.V.
1
has extensively pondered various approaches on how to
implement – by 31 December 2016 – Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on ship recycling
and amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 and Directive 2009/16/EC.
2
The consortium has described a number of policy options for possible legislative ac-
tion, ranging from a passive approach (“Do
nothing”)
to different, more pro-active
concepts (e.g., a ship recycling guarantee, an escrow account, an insurance model
or a port levy). Ultimately, assessing the practical impact of different approaches and
considering the legal problems and challenges associated with each of the different
approaches, the consortium has generally favoured the introduction of a time-based
ship recycling license (i.e. an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme), possibly to be
combined with features of the previously pondered options (“Combined/hybrid
op-
tion”).
3
Based on an analysis of applicable EU law, this legal position paper first highlights
two specific issues associated with EU procedure and competency (section A.): First,
because of its “primarily fiscal” nature, the EU Ship Recycling License assumes tax-
like functions. Objective and verifiable factors, i.e., the aim and content of implement-
ing Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation mandate the application of Article
192(2)(a) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
4
as the cor-
rect legal ground for such a measure under EU procedural requirements. Conse-
quently, political unanimity among all EU members is required to introduce an EU
Ship Recycling License. Second, the EU lacks the institutional competency to auton-
omously designate completely new funds to the general EU budget. The exclusive
administration of an EU Ship Recycling Scheme by the EU itself would violate both
the principle of conferral (Article 5(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
5
as
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015).
2
OJ L330/1 of 10 December 2013, hereinafter: “EU Ship Recycling Regulation”.
3
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015), pp. 35.
4
Hereinafter: “TFEU”. The exact wording of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU and other applicable provisions of
the Lisbon Treaty are cited in Section A.
5
Hereinafter: “TEU“.
1
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0048.png
well as the rules established under Article 311 TFEU and the currently applicable
system of governing the EU’s own resources under Council Decision 2007/436/EC.
Furthermore, based on an analysis of legally-binding principles of the law of the sea,
international environmental law (section B.) as well as the applicable legal regime of
the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO, section C.), this legal opinion chal-
lenges the practicability, legality and proportionality of the conceptual approach
brought forward by the consortium. The legal possibilities for the EU to impose rules
on foreign ships are confined to those available under UNCLOS, under general inter-
national law and under WTO Law.
First, a proposed EU Ship Recycling License scheme measure is not “consistent
with
international law”,
in particular with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
6
The scheme would neither be discharge-related, nor related to the
construction, design, equipment and manning of vessels (“CDEM”) nor has it been
internationally accepted as reflecting a present or future international standard to be
prescribed and enforced by port States on behalf of the rest of the world. The limit on
enforcement jurisdiction of port States to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment is set out explicitly in Article 218 UNCLOS limiting this right to violations relating
to illegal discharges. The proposed scheme exceeds the legal limits of port States’
prescriptive jurisdiction and it is in excess of enforcement jurisdiction of port States as
recognized under UNCLOS. Second, the proposed scheme is disproportionate both
under general public international law and under WTO law. In addition, implementing
an EU Ship Recycling License scheme in EU ports is even illegal under WTO law
because it violates both Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994. The latter provision has been completely disregarded by the consortium.
With regard to Article V:3 GATT 1994, transit duties or charges cannot be justified by
considerations of necessity or reason under WTO law and are thus illegal. A fee im-
posed on vessels for implementing an EU Ship Recycling License scheme has no
correlation at all to actual transportation services or administrative expenses entailed
by transit. It would be levied on the mere occasion of traffic (i.e. vessels) in transit but
it would not serve transportation purposes. Rather, it would purely serve as a meas-
ure to build up capital for a future EU Ship Recycling fund. As such, fees arising un-
der the scheme fall under illegal “other
charges imposed in respect of transit”
as out-
lawed by Article V:3 GATT 1994. The scheme also fails the applicable legal justifica-
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, U.N.T.S., vol.
1833, p. 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
6
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0049.png
tion tests for establishing a “reasonable” or “necessary” charge. In addition, fees lev-
ied under an EU Ship Recycling License scheme would violate Article XXXVII:1(c)(i)
GATT 1994 which states that developed WTO members shall “refrain
from imposing
new fiscal measures”
to the detriment of developing WTO member countries. Three
WTO developing countries are currently global market leaders in the shipbreaking
business. In case ship recycling facilities are situated in those WTO developing coun-
tries and are not included in the future “European List”, an EU financial incentive
mechanism has similar economic effects like an antidumping duty or a countervailing
measure because it will directly detract ship dismantling business opportunities from
a more competitive and more price-efficient market. Rather the EU seeks to imple-
ment the “Polluter Pays Principle” (PPP) without any legal differentiation between
affected WTO developing countries.
In section D. it is finally argued that the EU approach – i.e. favouring exclusively EU-
listed ship recycling facilities – would completely ignore the established principle of
“Common
But Differentiated Responsibilities [for Developing Countries]”
(known as
CBDR). In the 21st century, CBDR is explicitly recognized in various areas of public
international law, including international regulation of waste and international ship-
ping. It needs to be acknowledged in the regulation of ship recycling as well, in par-
ticular, as the global resources and knowledge base of the global market leaders
cannot be supplemented on short notice. From a development cooperation perspec-
tive, some of the “polluters”, i.e., certain sub-standard recycling facilities in non-EU
countries, could also be identified as being in need of financial incentives to be able
to implement safe and sound ship recycling
in situ.
Ultimately, this leads to a call for
earmarking Official Development Aid (known as “ODA”) in order to make ship recy-
cling in South East Asia more environmentally sustainable. With Bangladesh, one
major ship recycling country is even eligible for funding under the WTO’s Aid for
Trade (AfT) package. The wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation
does not outlaw a much more development-law oriented view. To include the recy-
cling facilities into the debate on a possible financial instrument could also possibly
prevent an unstainable relocation of ship recycling services with a possible devastat-
ing effect for the affected third-country economies and it would not take several dec-
ades to feel any practical effects once an EU ship recycling license regime (comple-
mented by a publicly administered fund) has generated enough capital to become
operational.
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0050.png
A. EU Procedure and EU Competency in Implementing Article 29 EU Ship
Recycling Regulation
According to its opening statement, the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is – as a whole
– based on Article 192(1) TFEU.
7
In conjunction with Article 191 TFEU, this provision
sets out the objectives and rules concerning the delivery of EU environmental policy:
“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Union in
order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191 [TFEU].”
8
The reference of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation to Article 192(1) TFEU to estab-
lish the shared competency of the EU and its member States in this area represents
the common approach in EU environmental regulation.
9
However, a more specific
legal act to implement Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation by introducing a li-
cense scheme, including the creation of a fund mechanism, cannot be based on Arti-
cle 192(1) TFEU. Rather, it must be based on Article 192(2)(a) TFEU. This provision
states that:
“By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph
1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council acting unanimously in accordance
with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:
(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;
[…]
Hereinafter: “TFEU”.
In particular, Article 191(1) TFEU states that: “Union
policy on the environment shall contribute to
pursuit of the following objectives:
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment,
- protecting human health,
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources,
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems,
and in particular combating climate change.”
9
See generally
Hedemann-Robinson,
Protection of the marine environment and the European Union:
some critical reflections on law, policy and practice, Journal of International Maritime Law (10) 2004,
pp. 254 (263 et seq.).
8
7
4
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0051.png
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, may make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the
matters referred to in the first subparagraph.”
As a result, for certain environmental matters specifically addressed in Article 192(2)
TFEU, EU measures may only be adopted by the EU Council unanimously. “Primarily
fiscal measures”
are thus subject to the decision-making process which deviates from
the default decision-making procedure (i.e. the ordinary legislative procedure under
Article 294 TFEU).
10
1. EU Procedure: Establishing an EU Ship Recycling License is a
“primarily
fiscal measure”
pursuant to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU
According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,
11
the de-
termination of the correct legal basis of an EU act must be based on objective and
verifiable factors, most importantly, the aim and content of the act in question.
12
In
this context, the wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation and its
Recital (19) clearly indicate that the general aim of a future implementing act relating
to the provisions is
•
•
•
to create a “financial
mechanism”,
to initiate “financial
incentives”
and
“to
generate resources”.
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has confirmed that the EU should apply the
legal ground that correlates with the “principal” objective of an act while “accessory”
objectives should be disregarded.
13
Thus, it will not be enough for the EU to refer
only in very general terms to a governing principle of international environmental law,
This procedural provision extends over 13 paragraphs and is thus not reproduced here.
Hereinafter: CJEU.
12
See, e.g., Case 45/86, Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, para. 11; Case 62/88, Greece v
Council [1990] ECR 1527, para. 13; Case C-295/90, Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4193, para.
13.
13
See Case C-155/91, Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939. In this case, the CJEU concluded
that although the Directive on waste management had the potential to affect the internal market, Arti-
cle 192 TFEU (as of now) would still be the correct basis for the Directive.
11
10
5
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0052.png
i.e., the
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP)
14
as enshrined explicitly in Article 191(2)
TFEU.
15
Moreover, as early as 1997, the
Commission Communication on Envi-
ronmental Taxes and Charges in the Single Market
16
generally acknowledged
that:
“In the area of environmental taxation, different meanings are often given to similar
terms in different member States, and no precise definitions are offered by EU legisla-
tion. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that it is the characteristics and the effects
of a measure which determine how it will be judged with respect to Community law
and not the denomination[s …].”
17
Furthermore, the Communication has already identified “two main categories” of envi-
ronmental levies, i.e., “emission
levies”
and “product
levies”.
While it is natural that an
EU Ship Recycling License cannot be categorized as an “emission
levy”,
even the
practical examples of the Commission for “product
levies”
evidence that it is not legal-
ly appropriate to categorize an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme under estab-
lished criteria of environmental levies.
18
In particular, none of the traditional environ-
mental product levies is designed to accumulate capital for a potential later dis-
bursement via a public fund, under certain multiplied conditions and even with the
possibility of forfeiture of individual benefits accrued.
Building up on earlier OECD work, a
1996 study of the European Environment
Agency (EEA)
also adopted a classification of environmental taxes based on their
policy objectives, distinguishing between the main uses to which the revenues can be
put.
19
Even twenty years later, the ideas expressed in the EEA study have not lost
On the differences between a broad and a narrow understanding of PPP, see, with further refer-
ences,
Zhu,
Is the Polluter Paying for Vessel-Source Pollution?, Journal of Business Law 2015, pp.
348 (at 355): “In
its broad sense, the polluter’s responsibility also extends to other costs, including
charges, taxes, clean-up costs and compensation.”
15
This provision states that:
“Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environ-
mental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”
16
See Commission Communication (97/C 224/04) OJ No. C 224/6 of 23.07.1997.
17
Ibid, p. 10.
18
Ibid, p. 8: The practical examples for product levies referred to by the Commission are:
“[…] raw
materials and Intermediate inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, natural gravel, and ground water, and
on final consumer products such as batteries, one way packaging, car tyres and plastic bags. […]
taxes on gasoline, diesel and heating oils and electricity.”
19
European Environmental Agency (ed.): Environmental Taxes; Implementation and Environmental
Effectiveness, Brussels 1996.
14
6
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0053.png
their general legal relevance. It generally differentiates between three different types
of environmental taxes:
20
1. Cost-covering charges;
2. Incentive taxes;
3. Fiscal environmental taxes.
The authors of the EEA study admit that the three types of environmental taxes could
have overlapping features and are thus not mutually exclusive.
21
However, for the
purposes of this legal opinion, three main deductions can be inferred from an analy-
sis of the three general types of environmental taxes:
1. The proposed EU Ship Recycling License does not fall under the category of
cost-covering charges because the instrument will not be designed to cover a
specific (user-related) or otherwise earmarked public environmental service
(like, e.g. treating waste water, disposing of waste or toxic products).
2. Art. 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is officially entitled “Financial
In-
centive”.
Generally, incentive taxes are levied purely with the intention to
change an environmentally damaging behaviour, e.g., by consumers or trad-
ers, however, without any specific intention to raise revenues. If there are any
revenues, these are often used to further encourage behaviour change via
grants or tax incentives. The possibility of forfeiture of accrued rights and the
fact that an EU Ship Recycling fund will only make a payment to the last ship-
owner (who potentially never participated in the “incentive scheme” for years
before) do not support a pure legal categorization as an incentive tax.
3. Fiscal environmental taxes are mainly designed to raise “significant revenues”
– whether specifically earmarked for certain ends or not. The wordings of Arti-
cle 29 and Recital (19) of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation both evidence
that the general aim of a future implementing act is to create a “financial
mechanism”
and “to
generate resources”.
The proposed system cannot work
without accumulating significant revenues for some years/decades.
20
21
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0054.png
As a result, the proposed EU Ship Recycling License system combines both ele-
ments of the categories “incentive tax” and “fiscal environmental tax”. However, while
the protection of the environment might be a later effect of generating financial re-
sources, especially during the first years after a possible installation, both the imple-
mentation of an EU Ship Recycling License scheme and/or the creation of an EU
Ship Recycling public fund have the principal objective of building up a substantial
capital-stock via enforcing a primarily fiscal measure over a longer period of time.
Generating monetary resources via a primarily fiscal measure and creating a corre-
sponding financial mechanism will not protect the environment in itself. Rather, the
protection of the environment could possibly be an accessory long-term effect of
generating financial resources in the first place. In other words, the financial mecha-
nism is a long-term catalyst to contribute to the general objective of global environ-
mental protection.
This sequence of action cannot be disregarded as Article
192(2)(a) TFEU explicitly covers such “primarily fiscal measures” in an envi-
ronmental context.
Otherwise the provision would be rendered completely useless
and factually replaced by simply referring always and in any situation to the more
generally phrased Article 192(1) TFEU.
As a practical example of the past, the former Commission Proposal for a Council
Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy
22
had been
explicitly based on the legal predecessor of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU and resulted in
political failure due to lack of political unanimity among the member States. So far,
the EU has never introduced any “green tax” based on Article 192(2)(a) TFEU. As a
consequence, the Commission generally eschews legal references to Article
192(2)(a) TFEU. Rather, the Commission prefers to base all of its environmental le-
gal acts broadly on Article 192(1) TFEU.
The view that the proposed measures are of primarily fiscal nature is finally rein-
forced by the fact that the EU Ship Recycling License scheme shall also serve as a
penalty scheme in case of shipowners failing to comply which shall result in the forfei-
ture of accrued rights under the scheme.
23
Thus, in cases of forfeiture the scheme
works exactly like a purpose-built “eco tax” and not like a premium (where the user
usually acquires at least some advantage by adhering to the public payment obliga-
O.J. 1992 C 196/1, see also COM(92)246 final.
See Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Re-
port (30 October 2015), p. 35.
23
22
8
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0055.png
tions). Additionally, for all shipowners selling their vessels after some years of opera-
tion the scheme will not generate any return as the accrued rights under an EU Ship
Recycling License shall stick to the ship and not to its owner(s).
2. Conclusions on EU Procedure
In sum, the EU Ship Recycling License clearly assumes tax-like functions. The fact
that the scheme may also serve as a premium for those owners who categorically do
not intend to sell their vessels during their whole operational lifespan (which is a ra-
ther unpractical scenario) cannot nullify the tax-built purposes of the whole scheme.
As a result, objective and verifiable factors, i.e., the aim and content of implementing
Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation by introducing an EU Ship Recycling Li-
cense mandate the application of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU as the correct legal ground
for such a measure under EU procedural requirements. Consequently, political una-
nimity among EU members is required to introduce an EU Ship Recycling License.
3. EU Competency: The EU Lacks Institutional Power to Directly Ad-
minister and Enforce the Details of an EU Ship Recycling License
Even in case the EU Council should decide unanimously to implement Article 29 EU
Ship Recycling Regulation by way of introducing an EU Ship Recycling License
(and/or including the financial mechanism of a publicly administered EU Ship Recy-
cling fund),
the EU itself lacks the institutional power to enforce the relevant
rules directly.
According to Article 193 TFEU,
24
EU measures enacted under Article
192(2)(a) TFEU may only include minimum harmonization.
25
The call for minimum
harmonization is an expression of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
pursuant to Articles 5(3) and 5(4) TEU. It may be recalled that these paragraphs of
Article 5 TFEU mandate that:
Article 193 TFEU states that: “The
protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall not
prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such
measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They shall be notified to the Commission.”
25
Commentary on the TFEU by Calliess/Ruffert, EGV/EUV AEUV, Article 192, para. 20;
Der-
lén/Lindholm,
Not enough room for optimal choices? The European legal framework for green taxes,
pp. 167 (at 171 and 178), in:
Cullen/VanderWolk/Xu
(ed.), Green Taxation in East Asia.
24
9
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0056.png
(3) Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member States, either at central level or
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the pro-
posed action, be better achieved at Union level.
(4) Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
The EU and the member States share equal competency for all measures relating to
Title XX of the TFEU (Environment). The CJEU has explicitly recognized a principle
of procedural autonomy of EU member States reflected in the EU legal framework.
26
In particular, the CJEU has highlighted:
“In the absence of [EU] rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system
of each member state to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to
lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights
which individuals derive from the direct effect of [EU] law.”
27
a. Procedural Autonomy of the EU members in Environmental Policy
Precisely because of the applicable CJEU jurisprudence and in accordance with Arti-
cle 291(1) TFEU,
28
environmental measures relating to carbon dioxide reduction and
the EU-wide greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme (ETS) according to
Directive 2003/87/EC
29
are implemented and enforced by the member States. This
example evidences that the EU is competent to establish a general policy framework
for action in environmental matters.
However, only in exceptional circumstances (“duly
justified specific cases”
pursuant
to Article 291(2) TFEU),
30
this also involves a complementary EU power to directly
See, e.g., Case C-430/93 Van Schijndel.
Ibid., para. 17.
28
Article 291(1) TFEU states that “Member
States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary
to implement legally binding Union acts.”
29
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establish-
ing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending
Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32–46.
30
Article 291(2) TFEU states that: “Where
uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union
acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified
27
26
10
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0057.png
enforce the rules. Otherwise the following might be questioned: On the one hand, a
“global” topic like decarbonisation falls under the general distribution of institutional
competencies, i.e., the Union establishing the policy framework and the members
legally enforcing it. Why should ship recycling – on the other hand – be subject to an
exceptional understanding under EU competency rules as it represents a “global”
environmental challenge as well? Consequently, there is no practical substance to
argue that the general objectives of a financial incentive for environmentally sound
ship recycling are only achievable by exclusive administration by the EU and by en-
forcement of the EU itself.
b. The Legal Rules for Designating Completely New Funds to the Gen-
eral EU Budget
The EU lacks the institutional competency to autonomously designate completely
new funds to the general EU budget. Generally, this view stems from the principle of
conferral (Article 5(1) TEU) which means that the EU may only undertake an act if it
seeks to achieve an objective entrusted to it by the member States under the Trea-
ties.
31
The principle of conferral also results in the consequence that the EU has no
competency to “invent” new forms of taxation of any kind.
32
In contrast, tax sovereignty still lies with the member States. Article 311 TFEU explic-
itly states that
“the
Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and
carry through its policies. Without prejudice to other revenue, the budget shall be fi-
nanced wholly from own resources.”
Financial resources generated by a prospective EU Ship Recycling License, howev-
er, cannot be legally categorized as the EU’s “own
resources”:
Effective from 2007,
the basic rules for the own resources system are laid down in
Council Decision
specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on
the Council.”
31
The provision states that: “The
limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of confer-
ral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.”
32
See, e.g.,
Schmidt-Kötters/Held,
Die Kompetenzen der EG zur Erhebung von Umweltabgaben und
die „Emissionsüberschreitungsabgaben“ für PKW-Hersteller, NVwZ 2009, pp. 1390 (at 1393).
11
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0058.png
2007/436/EC.
33
This “system of the European Communities’ own resources” is still
legally applicable until today. Nowhere in the text does the relevant Council Decision
refer to environmental taxes or premiums as a possibility for generating revenue to
constitute “own
resources”
and to be entered in the general EU budget.
According to Article 311 TFEU new categories of “own
resources”
have to be ap-
proved by the member States in accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements. This institutional balance represents another reason why the EU lacks
the competency to administer and enforce the financial resources generated by a
future EU Ship Recycling License on its own. Rather, this task would fall into the pro-
cedural autonomy and remaining tax autonomy of the member States.
4. Conclusions on EU Competency
According to Article 291(1) TFEU, any specific environmental measures, also includ-
ing the implementation of financial rules on sustainable ship recycling, are to be im-
plemented by the EU members. The member States are also competent to enforce
any relevant rules.
The EU lacks the institutional competency to autonomously designate completely
new funds to the general EU budget. The exclusive administration of an EU Ship Re-
cycling Scheme by the EU itself would violate both the principle of conferral (Article
5(1) TEU) as well as the rules established under Article 311 TFEU and the currently
applicable system of governing the EU’s own resources under Council Decision
2007/436/EC.
B. Legal Tension with the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and General Rules of
Public International Law
UNCLOS is the legally-binding global
“constitution for the seas”.
34
Consequently, Ar-
ticle 15 of the IMO’s Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environ-
mentally Sound Recycling of Ships of 2009
35
explicitly addresses the relationship of
007/436/EC, Euratom: Council Decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communi-
ties’ own resources, OJ L 163/17, 23.06.2007.
34
Scott,
The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans, in:
Oude Elferink
(ed.), Sta-
bility and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention, pp. 9–38.
35
Hereinafter: Hong Kong Ship Recycling Convention.
33
12
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0059.png
the convention with the international law of the sea and other international agree-
ments.
36
However, the text of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation does not refer at all
to UNCLOS. This non-reference contrast the fact that the EU Ship Recycling Regula-
tion is intended to serve as implementation of the Hong Kong Ship Recycling Con-
vention.
37
The EU’s omission aggravates the presumption that the EU Ship Recycling Regula-
tion does not integrate into the applicable international rules and principles of the law
of the sea to prevent “excessive port State jurisdiction”. However, being a party to
UNCLOS, the jurisdictional framework established under UNCLOS has binding legal
effects on the EU.
38
Specifically, the role of the EU and its member States as flag
States/coastal States/port States is governed by UNCLOS provisions. Part XII of
UNCLOS addresses the protection of the marine environment although ship recycling
is not explicitly addressed by any UNCLOS provision because it was not conceived
as a problematic topic when the UNCLOS provisions were drafted between 1982 and
1994. However, UNCLOS lays down the jurisdiction of States to establish national
rules (prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction) and to give effect to those rules (en-
forcement jurisdiction) over foreign ships.
39
The legal possibilities for the EU to im-
pose rules on foreign ships are thus largely confined to those available under
UNCLOS and under general international law.
1. An EU Ship Recycling License is Not Compatible With the UN Law
of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)
The EU Ship Recycling Regulation and the implementation of its Article 29 shall ap-
ply to all vessels, regardless of the flag they are flying. While the access of (foreign)
vessels to ports may be subject to certain conditions
,
40
under UNCLOS,
the jurisdiction
of port States to impose requirements on foreign ships is legally limited. Taking into
account the hierarchy of the legal sources of public international law, the treaty provi-
Article 15.1 of the Hong Kong Convention states that
“[N]othing in this Convention shall prejudice
the rights and obligations of any State under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982, and under the customary international law of the sea.”
Article 15.2 of the Hong Kong Convention
clarifies that
“[N]othing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Parties under
other relevant and applicable international agreements.”
37
See, e.g.,
Hedemann-Robinson,
Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law, p. 469.
38
Engels,
European Ship Recycling Convention, p. 108.
39
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 4.
40
Lowe,
The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 San Diego Law Review 1977,
pp. 597–622.
36
13
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0060.png
sions of the UNCLOS represent the most important legal source of restraint. For ex-
ample, matters which are purely internal to the ship lie beyond the jurisdiction of port
States but are subject to exclusive flag State jurisdiction. As a result, for example, it is
a purely internal matter and a commercial decision of a current shipowner
-
-
“to
probably sell the vessel at some indefinite point of time in the future”
which could be followed by a buyer’s decision to re-sell the ship further for
dismantling purposes.
If at all, it is only relevant for information purposes of the flag State (in this case, the
flag State’s obligations under the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling once the
convention has entered into force). Additionally, the jurisdiction of the coastal State
where a recycling facility is located could be involved, (for example, if a vessel des-
tined for dismantling in the coastal State has not been sufficiently pre-cleaned and is
being towed into coastal waters in a problematic technical condition).
a. “
Applicable International Rules and Standards”
and “Discharge
Require-
ments”
The enforcement jurisdiction of port States is primarily governed by Article 218
UNCLOS. For example, the first two paragraphs of Article 218 UNCLOS prescribe:
“1. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that
State may undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, institute
proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters,
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable inter-
national rules and standards established through the competent international organi-
zation or general diplomatic conference.”
2. No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be instituted in respect of a dis-
charge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of
another State unless requested by that State, the flag State, or a State damaged or
threatened by the discharge violation, or unless the violation has caused or is likely to
cause pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the
State instituting the proceedings.”
14
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0061.png
These provisions evidence two important facts with regard to the enforcement pow-
ers of port States under UNCLOS: First, the system is generally characterized by ref-
erences to the applicable international rules and standards.
41
Under UNCLOS, port
States may both prescribe
42
and enforce those. International conventions as agreed
under the auspices of the IMO represent a legal establishment of “applicable
interna-
tional rules and standards”
under UNCLOS.
43
Consequently, once ratified by a suffi-
cient number of IMO members,
44
the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling will
represent some operational “applicable
international rules and standards”
as well.
Second, with regard to “applicable
international rules and standards”,
UNCLOS pro-
vides for universal jurisdiction of port States over violations of international discharge
requirements.
45
However, this is not the case with respect to other (i.e. non-
discharge related) requirements. As a consequence, the absence of explicit provi-
sions representing “generally
accepted rules and international standards“
establishes
excessive unilateral port State jurisdiction which is potentially illegal under public in-
ternational law.
b. Enforcement of Legal Rules by Port States under UNCLOS
Materially, UNCLOS differentiates between prescription and enforcement by port
States in relation to
-
-
discharge requirements (see Article 218 UNCLOS),
static “CDEM” requirements (i.e. “construction, design, equipment, manning”,
see, e.g., Articles 194(3) UNCLOS).
46
See
Keselj,
Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding, 30 Ocean Development and
International Law 1999, pp. 127 (at 133).
42
An example for a purely prescriptive provision, i.e. without any enforcement elements, is Article
211(3) UNCLOS. The first sentence of the provision reads: “States
which establish particular require-
ments for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition
for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their offshore terminals
shall give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the competent interna-
tional organization.”
43
See generally: Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, Study by the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), IMO Doc. LEG/MISC.7 of 19 January 2012.
44
See Article 17 of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
45
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 214.
46
The sub-provision states that: “The
measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources
of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to
minimize to the fullest possible extent:
41
15
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0062.png
Additionally, other operational requirements might be relevant for both port and
coastal States (as evidenced by the legal qualifications to “innocent passage” possi-
ble under Article 21 UNCLOS).
The Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling itself introduces some “CDEM” and
operational requirements, for example, by calling for each new ship to have on board
an
Inventory of Hazardous Materials
(IHM, see both Article 5 of the Hong Kong
Convention on Ship Recycling and Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013). Thus,
even though the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling is not yet in force, from
an UNCLOS perspective, it is not generally problematic if the EU prescribes and en-
forces accepted future international standards in advance (see Article 5 of the EU
Ship Recycling Regulation). However, this legal approval does not extend “endlessly”
to features and elements which are not an internationally agreed part of the applica-
ble rules and standards.
Like many other IMO conventions, the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling it-
self includes a provision which explicitly addresses the question under discussion
here. Residual jurisdiction of port States to legislate in matters regulated in the con-
ventions often refers to the fact that this has to be conducted “in
accordance with in-
ternational law”.
As a result, Article 1(2) of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recy-
cling states that “no
provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a
Party from taking, individually or jointly, more stringent measures consistent with in-
ternational law, […]”.
However, when it comes to the implementation of the EU Ship Recycling financial
incentive mechanism, the EU and its members – in their functions as port States –
would try to prescribe and enforce a feature which has already been explicitly reject-
ed in the forum of the competent international organisation by a majority of the inter-
national community. Thus, it is not possible to establish a legal link to “generally
ac-
cepted rules and international standards“
when the EU seeks to implement Article 29
of the Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013, i.e., the financial incentive mechanism, via an
EU Ship Recycling License. If port States were to have the unrestricted right to ex-
(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from
land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;
(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergen-
cies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and
regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels;
[(c) and (d) omitted].”
16
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0063.png
ceed any standard of applicable IMO Conventions, the multilateral objects and pur-
poses of those conventions would be defeated.
47
c. Unilaterally Enforcing an EU Ship Recycling License Would Repre-
sent “Excessive” Port State Jurisdiction
Specifically, in the area of ship recycling, the combination of two factors differentiates
the proposed financial incentive from all other potentially controversial “excessive”
instruments to be applied by port States (for example in the area of monitoring, re-
porting and verifying CO2 emissions where the EU just recently also implemented
unilateral measures):
48
An EU Ship Recycling License is neither discharge-
related, CDEM-related or in any other way operationally relevant nor has it been
internationally accepted as reflecting a present or future international standard
to be prescribed and enforced by port States on behalf of the rest of the world.
The proposed measure is, thus, not “consistent
with international law”
as prescribed
by Article 1(2) of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
Thus, a port State requirement which prescribes a certain type of conduct in respect
of foreign ships before, during or after their presence within the port States’ territorial
jurisdiction – in this case, payment of the EU Ship Recycling License fee – can ex-
ceed the limits of port State prescriptive jurisdiction as envisioned by UNCLOS. A
prospective EU Ship Recycling License scheme would thus be in excess of enforce-
ment jurisdiction of port States as recognized under UNCLOS.
Moreover, the EU and its member States have no enforcement jurisdiction under
UNCLOS to charge the fees for an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme when non-
EU flagged vessels voluntarily enter EU ports. The limit on enforcement jurisdiction of
port States to protect and preserve the marine environment is set out explicitly in Ar-
ticle 218 UNCLOS limiting this right to violations relating to illegal discharges. This is
also why, e.g., Australian rules on compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait have been
See generally, Article 31(1) of the VCLT which states that
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.”
48
Regulation (EU) 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions
from maritime transport OJ L123/55 of 19 May 2015.
47
17
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0064.png
identified as incompatible with Article 218 UNCLOS.
49
The same verdict would apply
to a prospective EU Ship Recycling License Scheme.
2. Issues Relevant for General Public International Law
The absence of particular provisions on “excessive enforcement jurisdiction” of port
States is generally treated as evidence that the matter is, if at all, rather regulated by
general public international law than by UNCLOS.
50
However, the right to impose
more stringent requirements is limited by certain generally accepted principles of
public international law. Among those are the principles of
-
-
-
-
non-discrimination,
good faith,
the prohibition of abuse of rights and
proportionality.
The issue of non-discrimination is not under discussion here as the EU intends to
implement its measures without any differentiation and regardless of any flag of ves-
sels entering EU ports. Additionally, it does not seem productive to discuss the issue
of good faith or the prohibition of abuse of rights which is also explicitly recognized by
Article 300 UNCLOS.
51
By implementing a prospective EU Ship Recycling License
scheme, the EU’s general intention is, above all, to incentivise the use of certified
ship recycling facilities, i.e. those included in the relevant European List.
52
This objec-
tive cannot be regarded as a breach of good faith or an abuse of rights in itself.
However, there is hardly any sub-area of public international law where the applica-
bility of the principle of proportionality could be denied.
53
The application of propor-
See
Beckmann,
PSSAs and Transit Passage – Australia’s Pilotage System in the Torres Strait Chal-
lenges the IMO and UNCLOS, 38 Ocean Development & International Law 2007, pp. 325 (at 345).
50
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 215.
51
The provision states that: „States
Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”
52
See Article 16 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation.
53
See
Delbrück,
Proportionality, in:
Bernhardt
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. III,
pp. 1140.
49
18
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0065.png
tionate enforcement measures is also applied by two UNCLOS provisions, namely its
Articles 221 and 232.
54
As a result, the means employed to achieve a certain objective have to be propor-
tionate to that objective, also in the area of legislative and prescriptive port State ju-
risdiction. However, the following discussion on the WTO incompatibility will ultimate-
ly highlight that the EU approach of institutionalizing a unilateral Ship Recycling Li-
cense Scheme is disproportionate.
55
Thus, whether the EU’s conceptual approach is
“reasonable” and “necessary” is discussed further and in more detail in the following
sub-sections of this opinion.
56
C. Non-Compliance with WTO Law: Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article
XXXVII:1 (c) (i) GATT 1994
For good reasons, the consortium questions whether the introduction of a financial
instrument and the creation of a new financial obligation accords with the existing
commitments of the EU and its member States under the legal order of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO).
57
The ongoing trade dispute “Russian
Federation — Re-
cycling Fee on Motor Vehicles”
–
inter alia
initiated by the EU – evidences that a re-
cycling instrument may potentially generate trade distorting effects which could even
be relevant for a WTO dispute.
58
Furthermore, the 1997 the Commission Communication on Environmental Taxes and
Charges in the Single Market
59
already warned that
“[…] The use of environmental taxes and charges may also affect obligations towards
third countries, e.g. in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). member
States need to take account of all these linkages in order to ensure that national envi-
ronmental taxes and charges are implemented in a way which is compatible with their
WTO [and Treaty] obligations.”
Article 221 UNCLOS addresses measures to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties and
Article 232 regulates the liability of States arising from enforcement measures.
55
Se generally on the issue proportionality under WTO law:
Mitchell,
Proportionality and Remedies in
WTO Disputes, The European Jounrnal of International Law (17) 2007, pp. 985.
56
See sections C. 2. a. and b.
57
See Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Re-
port (30 October 2015), Annex B, pp. 67.
58
For further details see
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds463_e.htm.
59
See
infra
Commission Communication (97/C 224/04) OJ No. C 224/6 of 23 July 1997.
54
19
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0066.png
While a prospective EU Ship Recycling License scheme applicable to all vessels
would not be problematic under the general concept of non-discrimination among all
WTO members, the mechanism as currently proposed would generally violate the
right to freedom of transit as guaranteed under Article V:3 GATT 1994. Moreover, as
part of the section on “Trade and Development” (Part IV GATT 1994), Article
XXXVII:1 (c) (i) GATT 1994 mandates all developed WTO members explicitly “to
re-
frain from imposing new fiscal measures”
which potentially have a negative trade ef-
fect on the economies of developing countries.
In the context discussed here, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan could be possible ap-
plicants for demanding dispute settlement negotiations and for further establishing a
panel against the EU, as a result of the negative commercial effects of an EU Ship
Recycling License on ship recycling facilities situated within their respective territo-
ries. It has to be recalled at this point that 50.000 people are directly employed in
ship recycling in Bangladesh while half a million people work in associated indus-
tries.
60
These numbers underline the domestic economic importance for Bangladesh
and a comparable economic assessment can also be made for Pakistan or India.
1. An EU Ship Recycling License Scheme Violates the Substance of
Article V:3 GATT 1994
As a whole, Article V GATT 1994 serves to protect WTO members from unnecessary
delays or restrictions, such as limitations on freedom of transit, or unreasonable
charges or delays (via paragraphs 2-4). Moreover, the provision extends the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment to WTO members' goods which are "traffic
in
transit"
(via paragraphs 2 and 5) or "have
been in transit"
(via paragraph 6). Vessels
as a means for the international transport of goods are explicitly mentioned in Article
V:1 GATT 1994 and,
argumentum e contrario,
the coverage of vessels is also evi-
denced by the explicit exclusion of aircraft in Article V:7 GATT 1994.
61
Article V:3 GATT 1994, however, has never been interpreted by any GATT or WTO
panel in the past. So far, Article V GATT 1994 has been subject to one single WTO
dispute, mainly concentrating on Article V:2, 6 GATT 1994.
62
As part of this dispute,
the panel has stressed that it is a difficult legal task to interpret Article V of the GATT
60
61
See Lloyd’s List of 15 February 2016 (“Making
recycling sustainable”),
p. 9.
See also Analytical Index of the GATT, Art. V GATT, p. 214.
62
Columbia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, 27 April 2009.
20
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0067.png
1994 “without
any meaningful guidance”.
63
Article V GATT 1994 represents a difficult
and complex article.
64
Nevertheless, both the panel report “Columbia
– Port of Entry
Measures”
and a legal analysis of the exact wording of the sub-provisions can still
provide some meaningful guidance for determining whether a future EU Ship Recy-
cling License would be in contradiction to Article V:3 GATT 1994. At the outset, Arti-
cle V:3 GATT 1994 reads:
“Any
contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered
at the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable
customs laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory of oth-
er contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions
and shall be exempt from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges
imposed in respect of transit, except charges for transportation or those commensu-
rate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services ren-
dered.” [emphasis added]
The panel report “Columbia
– Port of Entry Measures”
has generally confirmed a
broad understanding of Article V GATT 1994 where the reference to “freedom”
means “the
unrestricted use of something”,
in particular, because of the fact that nei-
ther “freedom” nor “transit” are defined anywhere in the WTO legal order.
65
In any
case, freedom of transit must also be provided to “traffic in transit”.
66
Moreover, the
general principles of treaty interpretation as set forth by the Appellate Body in
US –
Gasoline
are applicable to avoid interpretations that reduce WTO provisions to inutili-
ty.
67
In international trade law, Article V:3 GATT serves two main objectives: First, unless
there is a failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations, a WTO
member must not subject goods in transit coming from and going to another WTO
member to delays or restrictions. Limiting the substance, the provision proscribes
only delays or restrictions which are “unnecessary”. Second, by using the conjunction
“and”, the sub-provision further states that traffic coming from or going to the territory
of a WTO member shall be exempt from
The panel used the term “arduous”, ibid., para. 7.388.
Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT, p. 511.
65
Columbia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, 27 April 2009, paras.
7.399 and 7.456. However, Article V:1 GATT 1994 provides a fairly good concept of “transit”.
66
Ibid., para. 7.400.
67
Ibid., para. 7.467.
64
63
21
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0068.png
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
customs duties;
all transit duties; and
other charges imposed in respect of transit, except charges for (a) trans-
portation or (b) those commensurate with administrative expenses entailed
by transit or with the cost of services rendered.
Notably, the term “unnecessary” only appears directly before the reference to “delays
or restrictions”.
It does not re-appear after the conjunction “and” which opens up an-
other category of illegal inflictions with the freedom of transit. This implies a more
categorical and technical approach to customs duties, transit duties or other charges
where issues of political “necessity” do not seem to be part of the equation. In con-
trast, Article V:4 GATT 1994 does not refer to “unnecessary” but to the term “reason-
able”
stating that:
“All
charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or
from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to
the conditions of the traffic.”
Article V:4 GATT 1994 must refer to legitimate “charges
for transportation or those
commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of
services rendered”
as referred to in Article V:3 GATT 1994. Representing another
legal category, however, “customs
duties, transit duties and other charges imposed in
respect of transit”
are generally outlawed by Article V:3 GATT without any reference
to necessity or reason.
In other words: Reasonable transportation charges can be justified as legal measures
under the WTO system. Legitimate transportation charges and regulations as re-
ferred to in Article V GATT 1994 must be governmentally imposed as the relevant
measures are, e.g., defined as: “[…]
including charges for transportation by Govern-
ment-owned railroads or Government-owned modes of transportation”.
68
This defini-
68
Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Committee II,
Report of the Technical Sub-Committee, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1, 28 November 1946, p. 10.
22
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0069.png
tion serves to clarify that there must be some government ownership of the mode of
transport in question before a transportation charge can be levied.
69
As a consequence, privately-imposed harbour fees do not fall under the categories of
costs as regulated by Article V GATT 1994. Practical examples for reasonable trans-
portation charges are, e.g., train costs (as some WTO members require that traffic in
transit use alternative modes of transportation, for example, if applicable quotas for
trucks have already been filled).
70
A practical example for “charges
commensurate
with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered”
is, e.g., the filing of transit documents.
71
Consequently, this expression mainly relates
to physical goods in transit and not to the means for transporting the goods to enter
transit areas.
2. Conclusion on the Violation of the Material Substance of Article
V:3 GATT 1994
As evidenced by the practical examples for legal transportation charges, the annual
or monthly fee imposed on vessels for implementing an EU Ship Recycling License
scheme has no correlation at all to actual transportation services or administrative
expenses entailed by transit. Rather, it would be levied on the mere occasion of traf-
fic (i.e. vessels) in transit and it would not serve transportation purposes but as a
measure to build up capital for the financial administration of an EU Ship Recycling
fund. Thus, EU Ship Recycling License fees must fall under the catch-all category of
“other
charges imposed in respect of transit”
as mentioned in Article V:3 GATT 1994.
Transit duties or charges of that kind cannot be justified by considerations of
necessity or reason under WTO law and are thus illegal.
3. An EU Ship Recycling License Cannot be Justified Under Article
V:3 GATT 1994 as “Necessary” or “Reasonable”
Even if a WTO dispute panel should conclude that the categories of “necessary” and
“reasonable” should apply in examining a possible justification for EU Ship Recycling
69
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max Planck
Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5, para. 16.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
23
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0070.png
License fees as “other
charges imposed in respect of transit”,
the relevant test would
result in concluding that the financial obligations imposed on vessels in transit are
“unnecessary” and “unreasonable”. There is extensive jurisprudence on the meaning
of the word “necessary” in the relevant sub-paragraphs of Article XX GATT 1994. The
term “reasonable” has been interpreted less frequently, however, the panel report in
“Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes”
provides guidance as it con-
strued “reasonable” as mentioned in Article X GATT 1994.
72
a. The Test for a “Reasonable” Charge
Remarkably, the panel in “Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes”
turned to the “New Oxford English Dictionary” and noted that:
“[…] the ordinary
meaning of the word “reasonable” commonly refers to notions such as:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
“in
accordance with reason”,
“not
irrational or absurd”,
“proportionate”,
“having
sound judgement”,
“sensible”,
“not
asking for too much”,
“within
the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than might be thought like-
ly or appropriate”, and
“articulate”.
73
First, the inclusion of a financial mechanism into the legal framework of the Hong
Kong Convention on Ship Recycling was politically rejected by a majority of the IMO
members during the course of the negotiations on the convention.
74
Thus, to set up a
financial incentive mechanism in the area of ship recycling has been disapproved by
the majority of the international community as being disproportionate, unsound and
asking too much from shipowners and other stakeholders involved.
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Importation and Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.385.
Ibid.
74
See specifically:
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship
recycling practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340 (at 348): “Efforts
to implement a
ship recycling fund were sunk at the global level during HKC negotiations and have been put in the
dock at the EU level due to implementation difficulties.”
73
72
24
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0071.png
Second, a WTO panel could construe “reasonable
charges”
to mean those charges
that the market is willing to bear in the light of alternative routes of transportation
available.
75
There are no alternative routes of transportation available since avoiding
EU ports completely is not a commercially viable alternative for most shipping busi-
nesses. A market enquiry on whether shipowners (and private or public port authori-
ties) would be willing to bear the estimated costs (of about 16.000 EUR/year) and,
additionally, the administrative burdens of implementing an EU Ship Recycling Li-
cense scheme would, however, result in the obvious conclusion that this approach
should be rejected as being unreasonable.
b. The Test for a “Necessary” Charge
Testing the “necessity” element, the WTO Appellate Body has developed a "two-
tiered" approach in the context of Article XX GATT 1994 (as applied since the 1996
dispute “US
– Gasoline”).
76
The Appellate Body has explained that both elements
must be satisfied in order for a measure to be provisionally justified under a sub-
paragraph of Article XX GATT 1994:
First, there has to be a provisional justification by reason of characterisation of the
measure under the relevant sub-paragraph of Article XX GATT 1994. Additionally,
the measure must be one designed to 'secure compliance' with laws or regulations
that are not themselves generally inconsistent with the GATT 1994. However, it may
be recalled that the above analysis has evidenced that an EU Ship Recycling License
would be in conflict with the concept of Article V:3 GATT 1994, thus resulting in gen-
eral WTO-inconsistency.
Second, a further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of
Article XX GATT 1994 would follow.
77
This includes the test whether a measure must
be “necessary” to secure compliance with national laws or regulations. A WTO mem-
ber which invokes one of the sub-paragraphs of Article XX GATT 1994 as a justifica-
tion for a trade-distorting measure has the burden of demonstrating that both of these
75
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max Planck
Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5, para. 19.
76
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3.
77
Appellate Body Report,
US – Gasoline,
p. 22.
25
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0072.png
two requirements are met.
78
The Appellate Body – when examining the concept of
“necessary” (in the context of Article XX(d) GATT 1994 in
Korea – Various Measures
on Beef)
– concluded that, in order to be considered "necessary" to secure compli-
ance, a measure does not need to be “indispensable” but should constitute some-
thing more than strictly “making
a contribution to”:
"[…] the term 'necessary' refers, in our view to a range of degrees of necessity.
At one end of this continuum lies 'necessary' understood as 'indispensable'; at
the other end, is 'necessary' taken to mean as 'making a contribution to'. We
consider that a 'necessary' measure is, in this continuum, located significantly
closer to the pole of 'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a
contribution to
'."
79
[…] determination of whether a measure, which is not 'indispensable', may nev-
ertheless be 'necessary' […], involves in every case a process of weighing and
balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by
the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regula-
tion, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or ex-
ports."
80
In a more recent assessment of the meaning of the term "necessary" in connection
with a defense raised under Article XX(b), the Appellate Body indicated that a panel
may evaluate whether a measure is "necessary" based on the extent to which the
measure is "apt
to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objec-
tive".
81
Finally, the Appellate Body has clarified that a measure will not be considered "nec-
essary"
(in this case: within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994) "if
an
alternative measure which [a member] could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it".
82
However,
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 157.
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 161.
80
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
paras. 162-164.
81
Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 151.
82
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 165, citing to GATT Panel Report,
US – Section 337,
footnote 69, para. 5.26: “It
was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot
justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
79
78
26
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0073.png
here a complaining WTO member has the burden to identify possible alternatives to
the measure at issue that the respondent could have taken.
83
It is questionable why a financial measure like an EU Ship Recycling License and the
administration of a fund which needs several years (if not decades) to generate any
practical effects could be categorized as "apt
to produce a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective",
i.e. sustainable and sound ship recycling globally. The
possibility of accrued funds generated from the EU Ship Recycling License Scheme
being forfeited already anticipates that an undefined number of shipowners will not
change their approach to ship recycling. In fact, it would rather be a widespread ratifi-
cation of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling which could be categorized
as “apt
to produce a material contribution”
to the achievement of the objective of sus-
tainable ship recycling globally. Additionally, satisfying their burden of proof, com-
plaining WTO members like India, Pakistan or Bangladesh could point to the political
alternatives of having all EU members ratify the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Re-
cycling and to further utilize the instruments of official development aid (ODA) to
modernize ship recycling facilities in traditional ship recycling countries.
4. Under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994, Developed WTO Members
“Shall
Refrain From Imposing New Fiscal Measures”
As part of their deliberations on the alleged WTO consistency of an EU Ship Recy-
cling License,
84
the consortium has completely disregarded Part IV of the GATT 1994
(Trade and Development). However, Part IV GATT 1994 is not an insignificant “an-
nex” to Parts I - III GATT 1994. Rather, the three provisions of Part IV GATT postu-
late additional legal requirements which are legally binding for all WTO members in-
cluding the EU. Already before 1995, this has been confirmed by earlier GATT juris-
prudence stating that the provisions of Part IV GATT 1994 could be “breached”
85
and
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent
with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions."
83
Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 156.
84
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015), pp. 77.
85
GATT Panel, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, GATT BISD 27S/98 (117, paras.
4.22-4.23): “The
Panel examined the EEC measure in relation to the objectives and commitments
embodied in Articles XXXVI and XXXVII [...] Although the EEC measure did affect the ability of a de-
veloping country to export into the EEC market, the Panel noted that the EEC had taken certain ac-
27
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0074.png
that Article XXXVII GATT 1994 reflects “additional
obligations”.
86
For example, Brazil
has relied explicitly on Part IV GATT 1994 in a former dispute against the European
Community (EC).
87
Article XXXVII GATT 1994 is entitled “Commitments” (of developed WTO members
towards developing WTO members). The second paragraph of the provision intro-
duces so-called “stand
still provisions”.
In particular, Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994
states:
“1. The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible – that is, ex-
cept when compelling
[…]
(c) (i) refrain from imposing new fiscal measures,
[…]
which would hamper, or which hamper, significantly the growth of consumption of
primary products, in raw or processed form, wholly or mainly produced in the territo-
ries of less-developed contracting parties, and which are applied specifically to those
products.”
The final part of Article XXXVII GATT 1994 evidences that this provision is a purely
product-related provision. As such, it mainly focusses on fiscal measures applied to
primary products wholly or mainly produced by developing country WTO members.
However, the product-focus is true for the whole GATT system and the existence of a
variety of “special
and differential treatment (SDT) provisions”
in the WTO legal order
evidences that Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994 cannot be read in isolation.
In any case, the process of ship dismantling generates huge amounts of scrap metal
and raw steel plates. Thus, a dynamic interpretation of Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994 supports the view that the generation of raw steel/steel parts (and every product
on a vessel to be cut off or segmented in the process of ship dismantling) establish
tions, including bilateral consultations in order to avoid suspending imports of apples from Chile. After
a careful examination, the Panel could not determine that the EEC had not made serious efforts to
avoid taking protective measures against Chile. Therefore the Panel did not conclude that the EEC
was in breach of its obligations
under Part IV.“.
86
Ibid., (133-134, para. 12.32) „[...]
However, the Panel noted that the commitments entered into by
contracting parties under Article XXXVII were additional to their obligations under Parts I-III of the
General Agreement, and that these commitments thus applied to measures which were permitted
under Parts I-III. As the Panel had found the EEC's import restrictions to be inconsistent with specific
obligations of the EEC under Part II of the General Agreement, it therefore did not consider it neces-
sary to pursue the matter further under Article XXXVII.”
87
GATT Panel,
European Communities – Refunds on Exports of Sugar,
GATT BISD 27S/69 (80 et
seq.).
28
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0075.png
the necessary “product link” for triggering the general applicability of Article
XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994.
As evidenced by the above discussion relating to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU,
88
the finan-
cial mechanism as envisioned by Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation represents
a [primarily] “fiscal
measure”
as materially covered by Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994. The intended effect of this fiscal measure – which developed WTO members
shall refrain from in relation to WTO developing countries – is to incentivise shipown-
ers to contract with ship recycling facilities which are included in the “European List”
as set out in Article 16(2) EU Ship Recycling. However, if a ship recycling facility –
situated in a developing country like Bangladesh, Pakistan or India – would not be
included in the “European List” it will potentially lose a substantial amount of its for-
mer ship recycling business. This would be a simple causal result of the application
of the financial incentive mechanism implemented via an EU Ship Recycling License
(and via disbursements to shipowners from an EU Ship Recycling License fund).
Even before the creation of the WTO, Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994 was rein-
forced by Article XXXVII:3(c) GATT 1994 which reads:
3. The developed contracting parties shall:
[…]
c) have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting parties
when considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement
to meet particular problems and explore all possibilities of constructive remedies be-
fore applying such measures where they would affect essential interests of those con-
tracting parties.
In the context of Article XXXVII:3(c) GATT 1994 “other
measures”
covers, e.g.,
measures like antidumping duties or countervailing measures.
89
The basic compati-
bility with those measures is enough to affirm the existence of “other
measures”.
In
relation to ship recycling facilities – situated in WTO developing countries which are
not included in the “European List” – the financial incentive mechanism has similar
economic effects like an antidumping duty or a countervailing measure because it
has the direct effect of detracting ship dismantling business opportunities from a
more competitive and more price-efficient market. “Essential
interests”
of Bangla-
88
89
See supra, section A.1.
Analytical Index of the GATT, Art. XXXVII GATT, p. 1066.
29
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0076.png
desh, India and Pakistan would be affected. “Constructive
remedies”
to the benefit of
those countries have not been discussed. Rather the EU seeks to implement the
“Polluter Pays Principle” (PPP)
without any differentiation between affected WTO
developing countries.
The effect of losing ship breaking business as a result of a possible “non-inclusion”
would even be felt commercially – if affected ship recycling facilities were to be offi-
cially certified/accredited under the “global” Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recy-
cling system (once set in force) at the same time. As a result, implementing Article 29
EU Ship Recycling via the imposition of a new fiscal measure – detrimental to at least
three WTO developing countries as global market leaders in the shipbreaking busi-
ness – contradicts completely with the EU’s legal obligations under Part IV GATT, in
particular with its obligations under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994.
D. Favouring EU-listed Ship Recycling Facilities Conflicts with the Principle
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
The discussion so far also has to highlight an important variation in the legal defini-
tion of a “ship
recycling facility”
between the EU Ship Recycling Regulation on the
one hand and the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling on the other hand. The
latter defines the term “ship
recycling facility”
to mean “a
defined area that is a site,
yard or facility used for the recycling of ships”.
In contrast, the EU definition omits the
term “site” and defines a “ship
recycling facility”
to mean “a
defined area that is a yard
or facility located in a member State or in a third country and used for the recycling of
ships”.
The practical effects of the omission of “sites” could work against the inclusion of cer-
tain ship recycling companies in the “European List”.
90
By obviously demanding a
concrete structure (or other form of “defined
area”
which is not a “site”) the EU devi-
ates from the international accord and maximizes a domestic ship recycling standard
to be applied globally, neglecting the fact that environmentally sound and sustainable
See generally:
Tsimplis,
Recycling of EU Ships: From Prohibition to Regulation?, Lloyd’s Maritime
and Commercial Law Quarterly 2014, pp. 415 (433).
90
30
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0077.png
ship recycling cannot be generally outlawed from a standard-based approach (see
Regulation 3 of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling).
91
In particular with regard to the practical consequences, the EU’s approach would
completely ignore the principle of
“Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
[for Developing Countries]” (CBDR).
This principle has been developed over time
as an answer to developing country parties’ calls for fairer rules and procedures in
international environmental cooperation.
92
For example, in the context of trans-
boundary waste management, Article 11(1) of the Basel Convention explicitly recog-
nizes CBDR.
93
After decades of increasing international cooperation on environmen-
tal issues, the notion of CBDR has now evolved into a cardinal principle of interna-
tional environmental law, e.g., in the context of international negotiations under the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). CBDR is now not only
explicitly recognized under the UNFCCC but there are also manifestations in various
other areas of public international law, namely in:
-
-
-
-
-
The Convention on Biodiversity,
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification
the variety of “SDT” provisions in the WTO legal order
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
the Post-2015 negotiations and prospective Sustainable Development Goals.
In fact, CBDR is not an antagonist but simply an outgrowth of the PPP which is pro-
moted so broadly by the EU: “The
equitable considerations intrinsic to the polluter-
pays principle also suggest that it is appropriate for developed countries, whose de-
velopment is imposing significant negative externalities on the environment of both
The provision states that: “Parties
shall take measures to implement the requirements of the regula-
tions of this Annex, taking into account relevant and applicable standards, recommendations and
guidance developed by the International Labour Organization and the relevant and applicable tech-
nical standards, recommendations and guidance developed under the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.”
92
The starting point was, e.g., the formulation of Principle 7 of 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development; see also: The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and
Scope, A CISDL Legal Brief for the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Johannesburg;
DIE Discussion Paper No. 6/2014: Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities, p.7.
93
“
[
… ] Parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements regarding
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes with Parties or non-Parties provided
that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from the environmentally sound management
of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by this Convention. These agreements or ar-
rangements shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than those provided
for by this Convention in particular taking into account the interests of developing countries.”
91
31
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0078.png
developed and developing countries, to help developing countries meet their envi-
ronmental obligations.”
94
Remarkably, even in shipping, CBDR is now continuously recognized in practical dis-
cussions, for example, when it comes to bunker fuel emission control, as part of the
efforts to combat climate change: In the IMO, a recently formed group of “like-minded
developing countries”
95
has asked the IMO to work in accordance with the principles
and provisions of the UNFCCC, in particular with the principles of equity and
CBDR.
96
In sum, the principle of CBDR needs to be acknowledged in the practice of
regulating ship recycling as well, in particular, as the global resources and knowledge
base of the global market leaders cannot be supplemented on short notice. Ultimate-
ly, this would lead to a call for earmarking official development aid (ODA) more inten-
sively in order to make ship recycling in South East Asia more environmentally sus-
tainable – instead of using shipowners as a “cash cow” for a bureaucratic experiment
with unknown material and financial contributions.
E. Conclusions on the Disproportionality and Non-Compliance with Interna-
tional Law
A measure which is identified as being disproportionate in one sub-area of public in-
ternational law (here: WTO law) cannot be held to be clearly proportionate in other
sub-areas of public international law. The fact that developing countries, including
one least-developed country (Bangladesh), are economically affected by the EU’s
proposed measures adds some political sensitivity to weighing the balance between
proportionality and disproportionality.
In conclusion, an EU Ship Recycling License has to be categorized as disproportion-
ate under public international law due to its possible detrimental effects on the ship-
breaking business in case leading ship recycling facilities, located in developing
countries, are not included on the “European list”. This outcome, however, seems to
be pre-determined since the legal definition of “ship
recycling facility”
under EU law
Dernbach,
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 Case Western
Law Review (1998), p. 1.
95
The first meeting of the group on climate change was hosted by China in 2012.
96
Submission by Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India,
Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela, on
cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions in order to enhance the implementation of
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-
Article
4
paragraph
1(c)
of
the
Convention;
see
lca/application/pdf/submission_by_like-minded_countries_1.b.iv25may.pdf.
94
32
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0079.png
differs from the approach of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
97
Howev-
er, generally disregarding topographic conditions in major ship recycling countries
and excluding the possibility that a ship recycling facility could also be operated sus-
tainably and adhering to highest environmental standards from a “site” is dispropor-
tionate. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that, e.g., four Indian ship recycling
facilities also operating on “sites” have only recently been officially certified by classi-
fication societies under the criteria as governed by the Hong Kong Convention on
Ship Recycling.
98
F. Final Alternative Thoughts on a More Constructive Implementation of Ar-
ticle 29 of Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2013
The short description of the relevant European Commission tender which led to the
reports of the consortium led by ECORYS Nederland B.V. highlighted that
“[…]
shipowners may be tempted to avoid the new recycling-related requirements ap-
plicable to EU flag ships by re-flagging their ships to flag states which do not impose
similar rules. To address the issue, a financial mechanism to incentivise shipowners
to recycle ships in a safe and environmentally sound manner has been considered in
the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling and the EU Ship Recycling Regulation
contexts respectively. Under Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling, the Commission is
invited to table, if appropriate, a legislative proposal regarding the feasibility of estab-
lishing a financial incentive for the safe and sound recycling of ships. The contractor
will be tasked with investigating this feasibility, analysing earlier studies and advising
on potential ways forward.”
99
The inclusion of financial mechanisms to incentivise shipowners to recycle ships in a
safe and environmentally sound manner has been rejected politically as part of the
negotiations leading up to the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
100
Never-
theless, Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation still reads:
See supra, section D.
See Lloyd’s List of 16 December 2015 „Class
NK certifies two more ship recycling yards in India“;
Lloyd’s List of 29 September 2015, „Asian
shipowners welcome certification of Indian recycling yards”.
99
See
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:239689-2014:TEXT:EN:HTML.
100
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling prac-
tices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340 (at 348).
98
97
33
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0080.png
“The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, submit to the European Parliament and to
the Council a report on the feasibility of a financial instrument that would facilitate safe
and sound ship recycling and shall, if appropriate, accompany it by a legislative pro-
posal.”
However, the exact wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (as
well as the short description of the tender notice) do both not necessarily imply that “a
financial instrument that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”
must, in any
case, be directly connected to the operation of vessels. Rather, it is exclusively Re-
cital (19) of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation which establishes this link by stating:
„In
the interest of protecting human health and the environment and having regard to
the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the Commission should assess the feasibility of establish-
ing a financial mechanism applicable to all ships calling at a port or anchorage of a
member State, irrespective of the flag they are flying, to generate resources that
would facilitate the environmentally sound recycling and treatment of ships without
creating an incentive to out-flag.”
In the context of EU law, the purpose of using Recitals is to set out concise reasons
for the key provisions of a legal act, without reproducing or paraphrasing them.
101
However, the CJEU has confirmed that Recitals have no legal value as such.
102
It is
further claimed that they “cannot
be relied on as a ground for derogating from the
actual provisions of the act in question”.
103
Nevertheless, Recitals are often used in
interpretation by courts.
104
In any case, the text of the operative provision of a legal
act has higher legal authority as compared to the text of a Recital.
As a result, the substance of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation does not
generally outlaw other complementary ideas which could link “a
financial instrument
that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”
directly to existing ship recycling
facilities, both within the EU and, in particular, in third countries. This would not imply
a disconnection to the commercial operation of vessels since certain “CDEM” re-
quirements as established both under the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling
Joint Practical Guide for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation, p.20.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/techleg/KB0213228ENN.pdf.
102
ECJ Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 19 November 1998, Case C-162/97, Criminal Pro-
ceedings against Nilsson, Hagelgren & Arrborn, 1998 E.C.R. I-07477 para. 54.
103
Ibid.
104
Manual of precedents for acts established within the Council of the European Union, 2012 edition.
(“The
Court often refers to the recitals in order to interpret the enabling provision of an act.”).
101
34
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0081.png
and under the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (as discussed above)
105
would still re-
main valid.
However, the current understanding of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is based on
a strict desire to counter commercial “avoidance strategies” of ship owners, i.e., own-
ers of end-of-life ships and cash-buyers who are not as much concerned about repu-
tational issues (as compared to most other “active” shipowners) and who are willing
to detour to the most profitable recycling opportunity. The exact wording of Article 29
EU Ship Recycling Regulation, however, does not suggest a “quasi automatic” and
legally compelling link of a possible financial incentive to the operation of vessels call-
ing at EU ports. It is rather the broadest legal understanding of the “Polluter Pays
Principle” (PPP) which – in this case
ex ante
– seeks to identify and anticipate ship-
owners as “soon
to be polluters”
who should ultimately pay for the safe and sound
recycling of their vessels, not only once these have reached the end of their operat-
ing lifespan but already during the start and/or course of all of their commercial oper-
ations.
106
The preamble of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling also explicitly refers
to internationally accepted environmental principles, above all, to the “Precautionary
Principle”
(as set out also, e.g., in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development)
107
and referred to in IMO-Resolutions.
108
The precautionary
principle requires States to take measures to protect the environment where there is
evidence of serious environmental damage even if scientific certainty is lacking.
109
In contrast, it is striking that the Hong Kong Convention has eschewed to include
comparable explicit references to the PPP. Thus, in the context of ship recycling, the
EU Ship Recycling Regulation applies a much broader understanding of PPP as
compared to the global accord. However, for practical reasons, (e.g. “to
generate re-
sources”
[…] “without
creating an incentive to out-flag”),
it is, in fact, rather the ship
recycling facilities which buy end-of-life vessels to be dismantled – and not the ship-
ping companies – and which should thus be categorized as “co-polluters”.
See supra, section B.1.b. and c.
Admittedly, this “from the cradle to the grave approach” is also generally accepted by the Hong
Kong Convention on Ship Recycling via the inclusion of the rules on the “Inventory of Hazardous Ma-
terials” (IHM), Chapter 2, Regulation 5.
107
The principle states that: “In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversi-
ble damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
108
See, e.g., IMO Doc. MEPC 37/22/Add.1: Resolution MEPC.67(37) adopted on 15 September 1995
(“Guidelines
on incorporation of the precautionary approach in the context of specific IMO activities”).
109
See, e.g.,
Atapattu,
Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 204.
106
105
35
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0082.png
From a development cooperation perspective, some of those “polluters”, i.e., certain
sub-standard recycling facilities in non-EU countries, could also be identified as being
in need of financial incentives to be able to implement safe and sound ship recycling
in situ.
The wording of Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation (“a
financial instru-
ment that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”)
does not outlaw such a
view. To include the recycling facilities into the debate on a possible financial instru-
ment could also possibly prevent an unstainable relocation of ship recycling services
with a possible devastating effect for the affected third-country economies
110
and it
would not take several decades to feel any practical effects once a license regime
(complemented by a publicly administered fund) has generated enough capital to
become operational.
From a combined political, economic and legal perspective it is equally as important
to adhere to the CBDR principle as giving effect to the PPP. As a consequence, “to
generate resources”
could also imply that PPP – for reasons of EU development co-
operation objectives – should be converted and understood as a
“Demandeur Pays
Principle”.
A recent academic contribution in the area of ship recycling has explicitly
postulated this politically and economically appropriate modification of the PPP which
also takes account of the CBDR.
111
In the given context, the French term “demandeur” can be translated as “the re-
quester” or “the petitioner”. The EU in its role as
demanding
the implementation of
the highest environmental standards in global ship recycling is financially capable to
support its own desired environmental objectives. For example, the European Com-
mission on International Cooperation and Development finances several develop-
ment cooperation projects on “Integrated Solid Waste Management” (e.g. with Geor-
gia, Azerbaijan, Armenia or Kyrgyzstan), evidencing that ship recycling and sustaina-
ble waste management also represent project areas which could be earmarked for
the purposes of future EU development cooperation with Bangladesh, India or Paki-
stan.
This development-oriented approach would also integrate more effectively into the
most recent efforts of both ship recycling States (for example, the Bangladesh gov-
ernment has announced an intention to invest US$ 150 million to develop green ship
110
111
For the economic relevance for Bangladesh, see supra, note 60.
See
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling
practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340.
36
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0083.png
recycling facilities)
112
and their existing ship recycling facilities to adhere fully to the
requirements of the HKC and to be officially certified by classification societies or
other certification bodies.
113
Additionally, and precisely because of the fact that the legality of an EU financial in-
centive regime in implementation of Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation has
been challenged under the law of the WTO in this legal opinion, it has to be stressed
further that one major ship recycling country – which could be negatively affected by
the current understanding of Art. 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (i.e. Bang-
ladesh) – is even
eligible for funding under the WTO’s Aid for Trade (AfT) pack-
age
which is also part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The AfT initia-
tive was launched at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting in 2005 with the aim
of extending financial and technical support to least-developed countries (LDCs). Un-
der AfT such support is provided
inter alia
to counter a domestic lack of resources,
poor infrastructure, weak productive capacity and technological base, low competi-
tiveness, weak institutions, bureaucratic complexities and lack of trade-related pro-
fessional expertise. Bangladesh has already received support under the AfT initiative
in the past, namely in: economic infrastructure, building productive capacity, and
trade policy and regulation.
114
Thus, apart from the questionable legality of an EU Ship Recycling License under
WTO law, it may be generally questioned why the EU would have an interest in un-
dermining the international community’s AfT efforts based on the EU’s broadest un-
derstanding of PPP and via the currently proposed implementation of Article 29 EU
Ship Recycling Regulation. As a result, even an academic proponent of a global EU
Ship Recycling fund approach has already correctly stated that:
“The
fund should be utilised to assist national governments and recyclers in the
Third World to establish adequate green ship recycling measures and facilities.”
115
Hamburg, February 15, 2016 - signed: Prof. Dr. Henning Jessen, LL.M. (Tulane)
This is also highlighted by the final report of the consortium, see Ecorys et al., Financial instrument
to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30 October 2015), p. 77; see also
Lloyd’s List of 15 February 2016 (“Making
recycling sustainable”),
p. 8-9.
113
See Tradewinds of 20 November 2015, p. 22 (“A
clear line has been drawn in the Alang sand”).
114
European Report on Development 2014: Financing and other means of implementation in the post-
2015
context
Country
Illustration
Report:
Bangladesh,
available
at
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/erd5-country-illustration-bangladesh-2015_en.pdf
115
Puthucherril,
From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling, p. 205
112
37
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0084.png
Secondary Literature Used
(References to cases as well as EU and WTO documents are omitted.)
Atapattu,
Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (2006);
Beckmann,
PSSAs and Transit Passage – Australia’s Pilotage System in the Torres Strait
Challenges the IMO and UNCLOS, 38 Ocean Development & International Law 2007, pp.
325;
Calliess/Ruffert
(Commentary on the TFEU), EGV/EUV AEUV (2011);
Delbrück,
Proportionality, in:
Bernhardt
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.
III, pp. 1140 (1997);
Derlén/Lindholm,
Not enough room for optimal choices? The European legal framework for
green taxes, pp. 167 in:
Cullen/VanderWolk/Xu
(ed.), Green Taxation in East Asia (2011);
Dernbach,
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 Case
Western Law Review (1998), pp. 1;
DIE Discussion Paper No. 6/2014: Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities
(2014);
Ecorys et al.,
Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim
Report (2015);
Engels,
European Ship Recycling Convention (2013);
European Environmental Agency (ed.),
Environmental Taxes; Implementation and Environ-
mental Effectiveness, Brussels 1996
Hedemann-Robinson,
Protection of the marine environment and the European Union: some
critical reflections on law, policy and practice, Journal of International Maritime Law (10)
2004, pp. 254;
Hedemann-Robinson,
Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law (2015);
Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969);
Keselj,
Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding, 30 Ocean Devel-
opment and International Law 1999, pp. 127;
Lowe,
The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 San Diego Law Review
1977, pp. 597;
Mitchell,
Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, The European Jounrnal of Interna-
tional Law (17) 2007, pp. 985;
Puthucherril,
From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling (2010);
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law (2008);
38
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0085.png
Scott,
The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans, pp.9, in:
Oude
Elferink
(ed.), Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention
(2005).
Schmidt-Kötters/Held,
Die Kompetenzen der EG zur Erhebung von Umweltabgaben und die
„Emissionsüberschreitungsabgaben“ für PKW-Hersteller, NVwZ 2009, pp. 1390;
Tsimplis,
Recycling of EU Ships: From Prohibition to Regulation?, Lloyd’s Maritime and
Commercial Law Quarterly 2014, pp. 415;
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5 (2010);
WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT, available online at:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/gatt_ai_e.htm;
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling
practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340;
Zhu,
Is the Polluter Paying for Vessel-Source Pollution?, Journal of Business Law 2015, pp.
348.
39
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0086.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Per Winther Christensen <[email protected]>
1. september 2016 13:29
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Berit Hallam
SV: Anmodning om input til dansk holdning til licensmodel til fremme af sikker og
miljømæssig forsvarlig ophugning af skibe
Høringssvar til Miljøstyrelsen.pdf
Opfølgning
Fuldført
MST-719-00131
5846052
Kære Lissie,
Hermed Rederiforeningernes om input til dansk holdning til licensmodel til fremme af sikker og miljømæssig forsvarlig
ophugning af skibe.
Kind regards
Per Winther Christensen
Deputy Technical Director
Naval Architect, Master Mariner
Danish Shipowners’ Association
Amaliegade 33
DK-1256 Copenhagen K
Tel: +45 33 11 40 88 / +45 33 48 92 52
Mobile: +45 29 45 83 24
E-mail: [email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
5. juli 2016 14:06
Til:
[email protected];
Clea Henrichsen;
[email protected]; [email protected];
Maria Bruun Skipper;
Per Winther Christensen; Mads Røddik Christensen;
[email protected]; [email protected]
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
Anmodning om input til dansk holdning til licensmodel til fremme af sikker og miljømæssig forsvarlig
ophugning af skibe
Kære alle
Rapporten om ”financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling” er blevet offentliggjort på
Kommissionens hjemmeside:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/ships/studies_projects.htm
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0087.png
Rapporten anbefaler en licensmodel som økonomisk instrument til at fremme sikker og miljømæssig forsvarlig
ophugning af skibe.
Vi vil på baggrund af input fra jer, udarbejde en dansk holdning til licensmodellen, som skal sendes til Kommissionen
inden de udkommer med deres egen rapport. Hvis vi skal levere noget konstruktivt til Kommissionen, har vi brug for
konkret og præcis input fra jer. Det kunne f.eks. være information om konsekvenser, der ikke er belyst, eller
beskrevne konsekvenser, der ikke er retvisende (med argumentation for hvorfor de ikke er det). Konsekvensanalyse
af licensmodellen findes i rapportens kapitel 4.
I rapporten foreslås det, at en EU institution skal stå for administration af licensmodellen. Rapporten lister på s. 69
en række opgaver, som denne institution kunne have. Har I nogen bemærkninger til det?
I bedes sende jeres eventuelle bemærkninger til mig
senest 5. september 2016.
Hvis I fuldt ud eller delvis støtter modellen, hører vi også gerne fra jer.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0088.png
Cand. Jur. Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Jord og Affald
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
Strandgade 29
1401 København K
1 September 2016
scb
Reference is made to the final report on Financial instrument to facilitate safe and
sound ship recycling, issued June 2016 by ECORYS, DNV.GL and Erasmus.
Danish Environmental Protection Agency has called for comments to the report and
below is the reply from the Danish Shipowners’ Associations.
Executive Summary:
The Danish Shipowners’ Association cannot support the idea of a regional license for
ship recycling for the following reasons:
The financial mechanism is not necessary if the EU takes an inclusive
approach to its list of approved recycling facilities;
The European Union’s ship recycling regulation is yet to enter into force and
prove its worth. It is therefore premature to add another level of legislation
before assessing the impact that the EU’s own regulation will have. In addition,
it ignores the progress of the International Hong-Kong Convention and would
be made redundant once this Convention enters into force. This goes
completely against the EU’s own rules for better regulation;
Should it be introduced, the financial mechanism will not have full effect before
15-20 years and assumes that ship recycling will not evolve during this period;
The financial mechanism proposed does not base itself on the steel price,
which is the main driver behind the large changes in the scrap value of a
vessel;
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0089.png
The financial mechanism could distort competition and be anti-competitive;
The financial mechanism faces serious legal concerns and could be in breach
of WTO/GATT rules;
In its current format the license, even after 20 years of annual fee payments
will not suffice to cover the gap between advanced recycling and low-standard
recycling;
The imposition of such a regional burden on all vessels calling the EU
(irrespective of flag) will have an impact on international trade and will lead to
retaliatory actions by other regions.
I.
General European and international context of the proposal
The Danish Shipowners’ Association (DSA) would like to start by briefly outlining the
current context in which the discussions on the financial mechanism for ship recycling
are taking place. Indeed, the debate on potential fund cannot be separated from the
current implementation of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation
1
and the ratification of
the Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of
Ships.
At this point in time, the
European institutions
are yet to agree on the criteria for the
inclusion of a recycling facility on the EU list of approved facilities. This is mainly due
to discrepancies between the different linguistic versions of the adopted legislation.
These are, however, very important differences between the linguistic versions
(English and the Danish version for example), which in practice could lead to a de
facto exclusion of many advanced recycling facilities, should the most restrictive
approach be chosen. Indeed, the UK version of the text does not differentiate
between the treatment of hazardous and non-hazardous material, leading to a
situation whereby both have to be treated equally (i.e. on impermeable floors), whilst
the Danish version does make this rather logical distinction. As long as this has not
been clarified, it will be difficult to assess the applications sent by recycling facilities
on an equal and fair basis. But it also makes it difficult to assess the full impact of the
financial mechanism put forward by the consultants in their report.
For DSA, this fundamental point will have a profound effect on the actual need for
any financial mechanism and the impact of the European ship recycling legislation.
Should the EU chose to take an inclusive approach to its list of approved facilities
and for example include some of the yards in India, which have made substantial
Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November
2013 on ship recycling and amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 and Directive 2009/16/EC
Text with EEA relevance
1
2/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0090.png
progress to reach international standards, then the EU list could be the very tool
many have been calling for to raise the recycling standards globally.
At
international level,
the IMO has adopted the Hong-Kong Convention (HKC) for
the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships in 2009. This is an ambitious
text which will serve to raise the bar globally. Whilst it is yet to be ratified by a
sufficient amount of states, its impact can already be witnessed first-hand, not least in
India where four recycling yards have received certificates of compliance with the
HKC from reputable classification societies. It should be stressed that the HKC sets
up the necessary and ambitious framework to regulate all stakeholders at every
stage of the ship’s life, thereby delivering health, safety and environmental
improvements while ensuring the required sustainable level playing field in ship
recycling activities worldwide. The approach of the Hong Kong Convention is to
regulate the use of materials during the design, construction, operation and
maintenance of ships and also includes the requirement to maintain an inventory of
hazardous materials during the entire lifetime of a ship, is a radical progress from the
Basel framework. It is hoped that this forward looking approach (and notably one
which encompasses possible changes in ship designs and materials to address end
of life responsible recycling) might in the future completely eliminate the generation of
hazardous materials during the recycling process. Further, the Convention lays down
a uniform set of technical standards for ship recycling facilities and procedures as an
integral part of the instrument itself. In this way, the Hong Kong Convention will
standardise the ship-breaking process across jurisdictions. This has been welcomed
and acknowledged by the EU.
2
II.
Better regulation
The European institutions and the Commission in particular recently re-affirmed their
commitment to ensure that EU legislation is prepared, evaluated, drafted and
implemented always in accordance with the principles of “Better Regulation“ (the
“Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making”, signed on 13 April 2016). This
requires all of the EU institutions to observe general principles of EU law, including,
proportionality and legal certainty and to avoid overregulation and administrative
burdens.
Applying these principles to this proposal, it is apparent that much more needs to be
done to demonstrate the need for the proposed scheme, and that it would effectively
fulfil its objective. Indeed, the financial scheme suggested is analysed prior to the
2
Council Conclusions of 21 October 2009 on an EU Strategy for Better Ship Dismantling, also mentioned in
the Proposal of 23 March 2012 for a Council Decision requiring Member States to ratify or to accede to the
Hong Kong Convention.
3/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0091.png
EU’s own regulation entering into force and proving is worth (as highlighted supra).
Moreover, the scheme has been proposed against the background of an existing
international Convention that once implemented would make the proposed scheme
redundant.
III.
Lack of concrete effect and faulty basis for calculation
It is worth noting that the Report’s own estimation is that the financial incentive would
be available only after a period of 15-20 years when there will be sufficient funds to
make the financial incentive viable (page 85). The Hong Kong Convention on the
other hand is expected to be in force by 2020 (page 21). The Report therefore
completely ignores the substantial progress made over the past few years in several
ship recycling yards around the world and assumes that this progress will not
continue in the coming years. DSA firmly disagrees with this assumption and
questions the value of setting up an administratively heavy regional system which will
not deliver any impact before 15-20 years and would, in the meantime, be made
redundant by international rules.
Moreover, the amount of credit that is to be accumulated by ships under the Financial
Incentive Mechanism is to be based solely on the difference in operational recycling
costs between EU list and non-EU List facilities, with significant influencing factors
such as steel prices and labour costs ignored. Given the limitation of this scope it is
difficult to see how the financial instrument could succeed in bridging the anticipated
cost gap between recycling yards realistically given that the necessary capital to
accumulate may change significantly over the coming years when a greater number
of compliant facilities are competing or steel prices change. For example, DSA has
witnessed, first-hand, variations in recycling prices of over 50-60%
in the same yard
over the period of one year.
IV.
Distortion of competition
In addition to be ineffective, such a regional scheme could more worryingly lead to
substantial distortion of competition. Indeed, in the context of the transfer of ships to
non-EU flags, the proposed scheme would be to the detriment of the transferability of
ship’s ownership, creating a parallel market of ships that trade predominantly in
Europe and have to pay into the Fund. These ships would have a sum of money tied
to them within the fund as a consequence of their purchase of licenses in order to
operate. Owners would not sell their ships at a loss, and so the value of the money
tied in the European Mechanism will be included in the sale price of the ship, making
it more expensive than one which has not accrued the additional money tied into the
Mechanism.
4/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0092.png
As such the EU Regulation - compliant shipowner is at a disadvantage when selling
his ship in the wider global second hand ship market, because his competitor will be
able to sell ships at a comparative discount, thereby making them more attractive to
buyers. The negative effects on the competitiveness of European shipping are very
clear, and offer no incentive towards compliance with the EU Regulation – the stated
aim of the mechanism.
Furthermore, such a regional financial instrument imposed on non-EU flag ships
based on an EU Regulation that goes beyond international Hong Kong Convention
requirements would create a risk of retaliation measures on the part of non-EU
states.
V.
Legal questions raised by the proposed scheme
The Report explores the legal viability of the scheme and concludes that this is a
valid exercise of EU Member States’ territorial jurisdiction (page 130 of the Report)
but that it would entail imposing an obligation also on non-EU flag ships to comply
with it, requiring them also to obtain a license prior to calling at an EU port. However
an analysis of the relevant principles of international law raises questions as to
whether it is indeed possible for the EU to impose and enforce the ship recycling
license scheme on non-EU ships whether under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), general public international law or international
trade/WTO Law.
As a starting point, the issue of where and how the ship is to be finally recycled is a
ship operational matter, governance of which lies with the flag state of the ship. The
proposal put forward now would amount to an extra-territorial assumption of that flag
state competency. The proposal would require the ship to contribute to a fund
constituted by the EU designed to ensure compliance with the EU Regulation of safe
ship recycling. In order to recover the amounts contributed, the non EU flagged ship
would need to demonstrate that the ship was recycled in accordance with the EU
Regulation. This is naturally of concern for non EU ships which are not subject to EU
jurisdiction.
While it is accepted that ships that enter the port of a foreign state voluntarily submit
to the laws of that state, Port State jurisdiction tends not to impinge on matters that
are otherwise the domain of internal flag state jurisdiction other than to ensure
compliance with measures to prevent or avoid pollution by discharge (Art 218
UNCLOS) or to ensure compliance with internationally accepted law and standards.
5/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
The extent of Port State jurisdiction in these matters is regulated by the Memoranda
of Understanding (MoU) based on the original Paris MoU. The proposal however
relates to a regional rather than an international regulation, and is not related to
pollution by discharge. It would therefore be contrary to what is permitted by
UNCLOS and in excess of what is currently permitted under Port State Control under
the applicable Paris MOU.
The Report concludes, nonetheless, that the proposal is compliant with UNCLOS,
being made in “good faith” and is not “arbitrary or unreasonable” and furthermore,
that it is “justified as necessary” to achieve the public policy objectives of the EU in
the EU Regulation. DSA does share this analysis. As highlighted supra the proposal
is made without due regard to the Hong Kong Convention or even the
implementation of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation.
As regards WTO/GATT, aside from the problems of establishing proportionality,
reasonableness and necessity, implementing an EU Ship Recycling License scheme
in EU ports would be problematic under WTO law as it violates both Article V:3 and
Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994. Indeed, With regard to Article V:3 GATT 1994,
transit duties or charges can only be justified by considerations of necessity or
reason under WTO law: a fee imposed on vessels for implementing an EU Ship
Recycling License scheme has no correlation at all to actual transportation services
or administrative expenses entailed by transit. It would be levied on the mere
occasion of traffic (i.e. vessels) in transit but it would not serve transportation
purposes. It would purely serve in effect as a measure to build up capital for a future
EU Ship Recycling fund. Arguably therefore, the license fee would be considered
illegal being “other charges imposed in respect of transit” and which is not permitted
by Article V:3 GATT 1994. The proposed scheme also fails the applicable legal
justification tests for establishing a “reasonable” or “necessary” charge.
In addition, fees levied under an EU Ship Recycling License scheme may also be in
contravention of Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994 which states that developed WTO
members shall “refrain from imposing new fiscal measures” to the detriment of
developing WTO member countries. Three WTO developing countries are currently
global market leaders in the shipbreaking business. In the case where ship recycling
facilities are situated in those WTO developing countries and are not included in the
future “European List”, an EU financial incentive mechanism would have similar
economic effects to an anti-dumping duty or a countervailing measure because it
would directly divert ship dismantling business opportunities from a more competitive
and more price-efficient market.
6/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0094.png
VI.
Conclusion
It is apparent that the proposed scheme would require considerable legislation to
establish and maintain, inter alia: a European agency to administer the issuance of
licenses, an EU financial authority/agency to manage the accumulated capital, an EU
authority to monitor where ships are recycled in order to determine rights to accrued
funds, rules to decide payment/forfeiture of the funds, rules as to the use of forfeited
funds in the general purpose ship recycling fund, and measures to allow Port State
oversight of ships for license compliance. DSA questions whether the expected
results of such a financial mechanism (bearing in mind very long timeframe of 15-20
years) outweigh the many negative effects of the scheme as highlighted in this paper.
DSA therefore calls upon the European Commission not to follow the proposal of the
Consultants and refrain from devising a financial incentive scheme. Instead, the
European Commission should concentrate its efforts on getting EU Member States to
ratify the IMO Hong Kong Convention. In addition, the Commission should recognise
the efforts being made by recycling yards in Asia to gain certification in accordance
with IMO standards. These yards should be given a fair chance to be included in the
EU list of approved recycling facilities that is being established under the EU Ship
Recycling Regulation.
Kind regards
Simon C. Bergulf
Director EU Affairs
DANISH SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION
Brussels Representation
34, Avenue des Gaulois
1040 Bruxelles
7/7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0095.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
8. januar 2016 16:38
Berit Hallam
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: mødet med miljø- og fødevareministeren
Kære Berit,
Vi vil først og fremmest fokusere på udfordringen med den manglende DK ratifikation. Dernæst på EU hvidlisten og
endelig vil (dog ikke bekræftet endnu) vores formand, Claus V. Hemmingsen fortælle om Mærsks initiativ på Alang.
Dette skal jeg dog nok give endelig besked om.
God weekend,
Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Phone: +45 3311 4088/Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
8. januar 2016 10:28
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
mødet med miljø- og fødevareministeren
Kære Maria,
Vi er ved at lægge sidste hånd på materiale til ministerens møde med jer d. 21. januar.
I den forbindelse vil jeg høre om I under punktet om Hong Kong Konventionen udelukkende vil drøfte ratificering
eller om I kan tænkes at bringe andre emner vedrørende skibsophugning på bane?
Vh
Berit
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0096.png
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]
l
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0097.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
29. marts 2016 21:24
Berit Hallam
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Møde med Mærsk vedr. ophugning
Kære Berit,
Jo tak – dejligt med et par fridage. Håber også I har nydt ferien.
Meget fint med den 21. april – jeg har sendt en outlook invitation. Samtidig sender jeg jer (separat mail) også den
formelle invitation fra ECSA til fact finding turen til Alang. Sig endelig til, hvis det giver anledning til spørgsmål etc.
God aften,
Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0098.png
Fra:
Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
29. marts 2016 08:49
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
SV: Møde med Mærsk vedr. ophugning
Kære Maria,
Jeg håber, du har haft en god påske og mange tak for din mail og forslagene til møde-dato. Det vil passe os bedst
med et møde d. 21. april om formiddagen.
Vh
Berit
Fra:
Maria Bruun Skipper [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
23. marts 2016 15:12
Til:
Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Møde med Mærsk vedr. ophugning
Kære begge,
Som drøftet på telefonen med Berit i fredags, vil vi meget gerne invitere jer til et møde, hvor Mærsk vil fortælle om
deres ophugningsprojekt på Alang.
VI foreslår følgende datoer og tænker, at mødet maks vil vare en 1�½ time:
14/4: formiddag
15/4: hele dagen
21/4: hele dagen
Derudover har vi været i kontakt med ECSA (den europæiske rederiforening) vedr. besøget på Alang. I er som dansk
myndighed meget velkommen og der er stadig plads i delegationen. Se vedlagte mail og se bort fra deadline den 2.
marts.
Rigtig god påske!
Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0099.png
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0100.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
31. marts 2016 16:52
Berit Hallam
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
SV: Dan Watch er i gang med artikel om shipping - herunder skibsophugning
Kære Berit,
Fik aldrig svaret dig på denne. Tak for orienteringen. DanWatch har også kontaktet mig og været forbi til hvad, der
indtil videre er et baggrundsinterview.
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
18. marts 2016 16:49
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Dan Watch er i gang med artikel om shipping - herunder skibsophugning
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0101.png
Kære Maria,
Til din orientering har Lissie i dag talt med Dan Watch, som er i gang med researche til en artikel om shipping og
skibsophugning, og som i den forbindelse spurgte til en status på DKs tiltrædelse af Hong Kong-konventionen.
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l
[email protected]
l
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0102.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
5. april 2016 11:49
Berit Hallam
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fwd: SV: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
image001.jpg; image002.png; image001.jpg; image002.png; image003.jpg;
image001.jpg; image002.png
Kære Berit,
Se meldingen nedenfor fra min kollega i Bruxelles. Jeg håber, I har mulighed for at deltage i turen.
Dbh. Maria
Sent from my iPhone
Start på videresendt besked:
Fra: Simon Christopher Bergulf <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Dato: 5. april 2016 kl. 11.36.07 CEST
Til: Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Emne: SV: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Hej Maria,
Belgien, Frankrig og Tyskland har sagt de kommer med. Grækenland skal sende deres endelig bekræftelse. Og det er
desværre begrænset til en deltager per delegation.
Dbh.
Simon
Fra: Maria Bruun Skipper
Sendt: 4. april 2016 20:51
Til: Simon Christopher Bergulf
Emne: SV: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Super – tak :)
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk<http://www.shipowners.dk/>
[Footer om sexchikane uk] <https://www.shipowners.dk/en/arbejdsmarked/personalepolitik/mobning-og-
chikane/>
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
[igangværende:Projekter:Rederiforeningen:STATIONARY:logos:Logos together:DS_R10_BR_full.eps]
Fra: Simon Christopher Bergulf
Sendt: 4. april 2016 16:57
Til: Maria Bruun Skipper
Emne: SV: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Hej Maria,
Jeg mener også at Frankrig har udtrykt sin interesse og ja max en person. Jeg kan lige kontakte ECSA for at få seneste
deltagere liste.
Dbh.
Simon
Fra: Maria Bruun Skipper
Sendt: 4. april 2016 15:53
Til: Simon Christopher Bergulf
Emne: VS: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Hej Simon,
Det er Tyskland, Belgien, Frankrig og Grækenland ik’? Og ja, max én person?
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk<http://www.shipowners.dk/>
[Footer om sexchikane uk] <https://www.shipowners.dk/en/arbejdsmarked/personalepolitik/mobning-og-
chikane/>
[igangværende:Projekter:Rederiforeningen:STATIONARY:logos:Logos together:DS_R10_BR_full.eps]
Fra: Berit Hallam [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 4. april 2016 11:33
Til: Maria Bruun Skipper
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
Cc: Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Berit Hallam
Emne: SV: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Kære Maria,
Mange tak for invitationen til besøget på Alang. Vi er i intern dialog for at afklare om vi kan deltage – jeg antager, at
vi i givet fald skal begrænse vores deltagelse til 1 person? Har du i øvrigt nogen oplysninger om, hvilke andre
medlemsstater, som er inviteret?
Vh
Berit
Med venlig hilsen
Berit Hallam
Funktionsleder l Jord & Affald
+45 72544434 l [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen l Strandgade 29 l 1401 København K l Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 l [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> l
www.mst.dk<http://www.mst.dk>
Fra: Maria Bruun Skipper [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt: 29. marts 2016 21:26
Til: Berit Hallam
Cc: Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne: ECSA fact-finding visit to Alang, India
Dear Berit Hallam,
As ECSA, we have been actively involved on the ship recycling file. The shipping industry is committed to the global
efforts to improve the conditions applicable to recycling operations and has welcomed the fact that the
international Ship Recycling Hong Kong Convention (HKC) requirements are reflected in the European Union’s
Regulation on Ship Recycling. Our plea is that European Member States must as a matter of priority ratify the HKC
and, in conjunction with the EU, strive to ensure that key Recycling States and Flag States follow suit.
In this respect, it is worth noting that an increasing number of non-EU ship recyclers are engaged in establishing
standards equivalent to the Hong Kong Convention and are receiving statements of compliance from classification
societies, this is notably the case for some of the Indian yards.
Individual ECSA members that recently have undertaken similar visits on their own initiative, in particular to yards in
Alang, have brought home encouraging reports that would justify a full-scale European visit, involving the European
Commission and EU Member States. The aim of such an official visit is to see how ship recycling operations can take
place sustainably in intertidal zones, and can thus be potentially compliant with the provisions of the EU Regulation.
With this purpose, the ECSA secretariat has been in contact with the Indian authorities to organise a fact-finding visit
to ship recycling yards in Alang. We are pleased to inform you that the Indian Authorities have positively replied to
our request.
I would like herewith to inform you that the visit will take place from 27 April to 2 May 2016 (travel included).
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
For your information, the Commission DG ENV and MOVE have already informally confirmed their participation.
The reason I’m contatcting you is to seek the Danish authorities interest of participation in the ECSA delegation.
Please be advised that the Indian Authorities will proceed with the required official clearance for the visit. On the
basis of the list of participants that we will communicate soonest through the Indian Embassy in Brussels, the Indian
central Authorities will provide participants with an official invitation. The official invitation will allow participants to
proceed with the visa request.
As a first step, I would be grateful if you could inform us about the name of a representative and contact details of
your administration who would be interested to participate.
Any informal confirmation as soon as possible would be highly appreciated, so that we can already further proceed
with practical arrangements and clearance procedures for the visit.
For any additional information or clarification about the visit, please don’t hesitate to contact me.
I look forward to receiving your response.
Best regards,
Benoît Loicq
[ECSA]
Benoît Loicq
Director - Maritime Safety and Environment
Rue Ducale, Hertogstraat 67/B2, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
T +32 2 510 61 25 - [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> - www.ecsa.eu<http://www.ecsa.eu>
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk<http://www.shipowners.dk/>
4
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
[Footer om sexchikane uk] <https://www.shipowners.dk/en/arbejdsmarked/personalepolitik/mobning-og-
chikane/>
[igangværende:Projekter:Rederiforeningen:STATIONARY:logos:Logos together:DS_R10_BR_full.eps]
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
5
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0107.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
15. juni 2016 14:27
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Berit Hallam; Per Winther Christensen
SV: Opfølgning på mødet i ophugningskomitéen
Opfølgning
Fuldført
Kære Lissie,
Mange tak for opdateringen – meget interessant, at man måske kan bruge implementeringsakten som et værktøj
(dog uden at løse det grundlæggende problem). Det viser dog også vigtigheden af dialog med MEP’erne – noget som
vores CSR-udvalg bakker fuldt op omkring.
Tænker om vi kunne drøfte det lidt mere i dybden, inden sommerferien er over os alle. Jeg er på pinden til den 20.
juli, hvor jeg går på barsel. Så hvis I kunne komme med et forslag til mødetidspunkt, så vil det være super.
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0108.png
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
15. juni 2016 10:15
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
SV: Opfølgning på mødet i ophugningskomitéen
Kære Maria
Kommissionen oplyste til mødet i mandags at konsulenternes rapport vil blive cirkuleret i løbet af et par dage. På
baggrund af konsulentrapporten, vil Kommissionen udarbejde den rapport, som de i henhold til forordningen skal
forelægge Rådet og EP inden 31. december 2016. KOM oplyste at licensmodellen er blevet grundig analyseret i den
endelige konsulentrapport. KOM er ikke forpligtet til at bruge konsulentrapportens anbefalinger.
Angående muligheden for berigtigelse af forordningens art. 13(1)(g) (om det er alt affald eller kun farligt afflad, der
skal håndteres på et uigennemtrængeligt underlag) så kan en sådan kun blive gennemført, hvis der er enighed i
Rådet og hvis EP ikke gør indsigelser. Det er derfor ikke særligt sandsynligt, at en berigtigelse vil finde sted.
Som bekendt har Kommissionen i sin tekniske vejledning i henhold til forordning (EU) nr. 1257/2013 om ophugning
af skibe, hvor der fastlægges krav til og procedure for optagelse af anlæg beliggende i tredjelande på den
europæiske liste over skibsophugningsanlæg, valgt at fortolke forordningen således, at det er alt affald, der skal
håndteres på uigennemtrængeligt underlag.
Optagelse af anlæg sker ved gennemførelsesretsakter efter den såkaldte undersøgelsesprocedure, hvor et
kvalificeret flertal af MS skal støtte et forslag, for at det kan blive vedtaget og anlægget optaget på listen. EP skal
ikke stemme. Etablering af den europæiske liste, kan med andre ikke finde sted, hvis ikke et kvalificeret flertal af MS
støtter det, og på den måde kan MS presse Kommissionen på dennes fortolkning. Kommissionen har oplyst, at
optagelse af anlæg beliggende i MS vil ske ved en omnibus beslutning. Anlæg beliggende uden for EU vil blive
optaget enkeltvis. Der skal stemmes både om de anlæg, som Kommissionen vurderer skal på listen, og de anlæg,
som Kommissionen mener ikke skal på listen, fordi de ikke opfylder forordningens krav.
Vi får besøg af Ingvild fra Shipbreaking Platform på fredag.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
Fra:
Maria Bruun Skipper [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
15. juni 2016 10:02
Til:
Berit Hallam; Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Emne:
Opfølgning på mødet i ophugningskomitéen
Kære begge,
Har I mulighed for blot at give en kort indikation af hvordan mandagens møde gik – både hvad angår den finansielle
mekanisme og FAQ’en?
VI har møde i vores CSR-udvalg i eftermiddag, hvor emnet (status) er på dagsordenen og på mandag får vi besøg af
Shipbreaking Platform.
På forhånd mange tak,
Maria
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0109.png
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0110.png
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Fra:
Sendt:
Til:
Cc:
Emne:
Vedhæftede filer:
Opfølgningsflag:
Flagstatus:
Sag:
Sagsdokument:
Maria Bruun Skipper <[email protected]>
22. februar 2017 10:46
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Per Winther Christensen
Berit Hallam
SV: Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
2016-07-25 Ship Recycling Financial - Legal Opinion.pdf
Opfølgning
Afmærket
001-16015
6406101
Kære Lissie,
Vi har nu tjekket op på tallene ift. jeres forespørgsel om konsekvenserne af særkrav for danskejede skibe. Først de
specifikke tal:
Danskejede skibe, der ikke sejler under EU flag: 619
Danskejede skibe > 500 GT, der ikke sejler under EU flag: 430
Danskejede skibe < 500 GT: 389 (her er der ikke sondret mellem dansk og fremmed flag)
Tallene skal læses med forbehold for, at der kan være nogle statsejede skibe, der er > 500 GT og dermed ikke er
omfattet af forordningen.
Danske rederier ophugger generelt meget få skibe. Således har danske rederier i gennemsnit ophugget godt 10 skibe
årligt siden 2009 og dette på faciliteter både Danmark, Europa og tredjeverdens lande. Selv om danske rederier
grundet den generelle markedssituation i de kommende år forventes at ophugge flere skibe, vil de danskejede skibe
stadig udgøre en meget lille del af det samlede antal ophugninger på verdensplan.
De specifikke økonomiske konsekvenser er meget svære at sige noget om, idet vi hverken kender stålprisen eller
den endelige EU liste over godkendte faciliteter, hvilket må forventes at have indflydelse på stålprisen.
Så et dansk særkrav i tillæg til en international konvention vil kun have meget lille effekt i ophugningsindustrien, idet
danske rederier kun sender ganske få skibe til ophugning. Til gengæld er der ingen tvivl om, at et særkrav, som kun
vil gælde for danske rederier vil have en negativ effekt på det at drive rederivirksomhed fra Danmark. Der gøres i
disse år et stort arbejde fra regeringen og erhvervets side for at tiltrække rederier til Danmark og det danske flag.
Dertil kommer, at et sådant særkrav vil have karakter af overimplementering af EU regler, hvilket også strider imod
den siddende regerings målsætninger.
Endeligt er der nogle juridiske begrænsninger ift. at regulere skibe under fremmed flag. Denne problemstilling var
også til drøftelse under vedtagelsen af EU SRR, hvor den tyske rederiforening fik udarbejdet en juridisk analyse
(vedlagt), der belyser implikationerne af Havretskonventionen. Jeg mener, at vi i forbindelse med tidligere drøftelser
om det finansielle instrument, har delt et uddrag af analysen med jer, men I får således her den fulde rapport.
Giver dette anledning til yderligere spørgsmål, er I meget velkomne til at vende tilbage.
Dbh. Maria
P.S. Jeg har tidligere fået oplyst, at der er indkaldt til samråd den 2/3. Det fremgår dog ikke af FT’s hjemmeside. Er
samrådet udskudt eller?
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0111.png
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
20. januar 2017 11:29
Til:
Maria Bruun Skipper; Per Winther Christensen
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
SV: Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
Kære Maria
Vi vil bestemt kigge på, om der er juridiske implikationer ved forslaget. Men hvis I allerede ligger inde med sådanne
vurderinger, må I meget gerne dele dem med os.
God weekend!
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
Fra:
Maria Bruun Skipper [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
19. januar 2017 16:25
Til:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen; Per Winther Christensen
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
SV: Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0112.png
Kære Lissie,
Mange tak for meldingen. Dejligt med bred opbakning til dansk ratifikation.
Vi vender tilbage med bud på den økonomiske omkostning ved det nævnte mulige ændringsforslag.
Umiddelbart tænker jeg, at der er nogle juridiske implikationer ved at pålægge fremmedflagede skibe danske
særkrav. EU SRR omfatter af den grund netop kun EU flagede skibe. Er de juridiske implikationer noget, som MST ser
på?
Dbh. Maria
Maria Bruun Skipper
Underdirektør // Director
Security, Health, Environment and Innovation
Danmarks Rederiforening/Danish Shipowners' Association
Direct: +45 3348 9286
Mobile: +45 2128 4966
E-mail:
[email protected]
Twitter: @maria_skipper
www.shipowners.dk
Fra:
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sendt:
19. januar 2017 14:35
Til:
Per Winther Christensen; Maria Bruun Skipper
Cc:
Berit Hallam
Emne:
Opfølgning på førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget
Kære Maria og Per
Førstebehandlingen af lovforslaget gik godt. Alle partier støttede det. EL, SF og AL vil dog gerne have strengere
regler, og vil formentlig fremsætte et ændringsforslag om, at alle danskejede skibe skal ophugges på den
europæiske liste.
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0113.png
Har I mulighed for at vurdere, hvilke økonomiske konsekvenser det ville have, eller hvor mange skibe, det ville dreje
sig om?
De skibe der kommer i spil er dem der ikke er omfattet af forordningens anvendelsesområdet allerede. Dvs:
1) Danskejede skibe, der ikke sejler under en EU medlemsstats flag
2) Danskejede skibe under 500 BT, statsejede etc.
Venlig hilsen
Lissie Klingenberg Jørgensen
Cand Jur | Jord og Affald
+45 72 54 43 76 |
[email protected]
Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet
Miljøstyrelsen
| Strandgade 29 | 1401 København K | Tlf. +45 72 54 40 00 |
[email protected]
|
www.mst.dk
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
This email has been scanned by the Symantec Email Security.cloud service.
For more information please visit
http://www.symanteccloud.com
______________________________________________________________________
4
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
The EU Ship Recycling
Financial Incentive
–
Legal Opinion on the Option under
Consideration by the European Commission of
a Combination of a Permit for Ships Calling at
EU Ports and a Public Fund
by:
Prof. Dr. Henning Jessen, LL.M. (Tulane)
Institute for Maritime Law and the Law of the Sea,
University of Hamburg
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0115.png
Table of Contents
Three-Page “Executive Summary” of this Legal Opinion................................................. 1
A.
EU Procedure and EU Competency in Implementing Article 29 EU Ship Recycling
Regulation .................................................................................................................... 4
1.
2.
3.
EU Procedure: Establishing an EU Ship Recycling License is a “primarily
fiscal
measure”
pursuant to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU ............................................................ 5
Conclusions on EU Procedure ................................................................................... 9
EU Competency: The EU Lacks Institutional Power to Directly Administer and Enforce
the Details of an EU Ship Recycling License .............................................................. 9
a. Procedural Autonomy of the EU members in Environmental Policy...................... 10
b. The Legal Rules for Designating Completely New Funds to the General EU
Budget .................................................................................................................11
4.
Conclusions on EU Competency ...............................................................................12
B.
Legal Tension with the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and General Rules of Public
International Law ........................................................................................................12
1.
An EU Ship Recycling License is Not Compatible With the UN Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS)..............................................................................................13
a. “Applicable
International Rules and Standards”
and “Discharge
Requirements”...
14
b. Enforcement of Legal Rules by Port States under UNCLOS ................................ 15
c. Unilaterally Enforcing an EU Ship Recycling License Would Represent “Excessive”
Port State Jurisdiction ..........................................................................................17
2.
Issues Relevant for General Public International Law ...............................................18
C.
Non-Compliance with WTO Law: Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article XXXVII:1 (c) (i)
GATT 1994 ...................................................................................................................19
1.
2.
3.
An EU Ship Recycling License Scheme Violates the Substance of Article
V:3 GATT 1994 ........................................................................................................ 20
Conclusion on the Violation of the Material Substance of Article V:3 GATT 1994......23
An EU Ship Recycling License Cannot be Justified Under Article V:3 GATT 1994 as
“Necessary” or “Reasonable” ....................................................................................23
II
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0116.png
a. The Test for a “Reasonable” Charge ....................................................................24
b. The Test for a “Necessary” Charge ......................................................................25
4.
Under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994, Developed WTO members “Shall
Refrain
From Imposing New Fiscal Measures”
......................................................................27
D.
Favouring EU-listed Ship Recycling Facilities Conflicts with the Principle of
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) ..............................................30
E.
Conclusions on the Disproportionality and Non-Compliance with International
Law ..............................................................................................................................32
F.
Alternative Final Thoughts on a More Constructive Implementation of Article 29 of
Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2013 ..................................................................................33
Secondary Literature Used ................................................................................................38
III
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0117.png
Three-Page “Executive Summary” of this Legal Opinion
As mandated by the European Commission (DG Environment), a consortium led by
ECORYS Nederland B.V.
1
has extensively pondered various approaches on how to
implement – by 31 December 2016 – Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on ship recycling
and amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 and Directive 2009/16/EC.
2
The consortium has described a number of policy options for possible legislative ac-
tion, ranging from a passive approach (“Do
nothing”)
to different, more pro-active
concepts (e.g., a ship recycling guarantee, an escrow account, an insurance model
or a port levy). Ultimately, assessing the practical impact of different approaches and
considering the legal problems and challenges associated with each of the different
approaches, the consortium has generally favoured the introduction of a time-based
ship recycling license (i.e. an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme), possibly to be
combined with features of the previously pondered options (“Combined/hybrid
op-
tion”).
3
Based on an analysis of applicable EU law, this legal position paper first highlights
two specific issues associated with EU procedure and competency (section A.): First,
because of its “primarily fiscal” nature, the EU Ship Recycling License assumes tax-
like functions. Objective and verifiable factors, i.e., the aim and content of implement-
ing Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation mandate the application of Article
192(2)(a) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
4
as the cor-
rect legal ground for such a measure under EU procedural requirements. Conse-
quently, political unanimity among all EU members is required to introduce an EU
Ship Recycling License. Second, the EU lacks the institutional competency to auton-
omously designate completely new funds to the general EU budget. The exclusive
administration of an EU Ship Recycling Scheme by the EU itself would violate both
the principle of conferral (Article 5(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
5
as
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015).
2
OJ L330/1 of 10 December 2013, hereinafter: “EU Ship Recycling Regulation”.
3
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015), pp. 35.
4
Hereinafter: “TFEU”. The exact wording of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU and other applicable provisions of
the Lisbon Treaty are cited in Section A.
5
Hereinafter: “TEU“.
1
1
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0118.png
well as the rules established under Article 311 TFEU and the currently applicable
system of governing the EU’s own resources under Council Decision 2007/436/EC.
Furthermore, based on an analysis of legally-binding principles of the law of the sea,
international environmental law (section B.) as well as the applicable legal regime of
the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO, section C.), this legal opinion chal-
lenges the practicability, legality and proportionality of the conceptual approach
brought forward by the consortium. The legal possibilities for the EU to impose rules
on foreign ships are confined to those available under UNCLOS, under general inter-
national law and under WTO Law.
First, a proposed EU Ship Recycling License scheme measure is not “consistent
with
international law”,
in particular with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
6
The scheme would neither be discharge-related, nor related to the
construction, design, equipment and manning of vessels (“CDEM”) nor has it been
internationally accepted as reflecting a present or future international standard to be
prescribed and enforced by port States on behalf of the rest of the world. The limit on
enforcement jurisdiction of port States to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment is set out explicitly in Article 218 UNCLOS limiting this right to violations relating
to illegal discharges. The proposed scheme exceeds the legal limits of port States’
prescriptive jurisdiction and it is in excess of enforcement jurisdiction of port States as
recognized under UNCLOS. Second, the proposed scheme is disproportionate both
under general public international law and under WTO law. In addition, implementing
an EU Ship Recycling License scheme in EU ports is even illegal under WTO law
because it violates both Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994. The latter provision has been completely disregarded by the consortium.
With regard to Article V:3 GATT 1994, transit duties or charges cannot be justified by
considerations of necessity or reason under WTO law and are thus illegal. A fee im-
posed on vessels for implementing an EU Ship Recycling License scheme has no
correlation at all to actual transportation services or administrative expenses entailed
by transit. It would be levied on the mere occasion of traffic (i.e. vessels) in transit but
it would not serve transportation purposes. Rather, it would purely serve as a meas-
ure to build up capital for a future EU Ship Recycling fund. As such, fees arising un-
der the scheme fall under illegal “other
charges imposed in respect of transit”
as out-
lawed by Article V:3 GATT 1994. The scheme also fails the applicable legal justifica-
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, U.N.T.S., vol.
1833, p. 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
6
2
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0119.png
tion tests for establishing a “reasonable” or “necessary” charge. In addition, fees lev-
ied under an EU Ship Recycling License scheme would violate Article XXXVII:1(c)(i)
GATT 1994 which states that developed WTO members shall “refrain
from imposing
new fiscal measures”
to the detriment of developing WTO member countries. Three
WTO developing countries are currently global market leaders in the shipbreaking
business. In case ship recycling facilities are situated in those WTO developing coun-
tries and are not included in the future “European List”, an EU financial incentive
mechanism has similar economic effects like an antidumping duty or a countervailing
measure because it will directly detract ship dismantling business opportunities from
a more competitive and more price-efficient market. Rather the EU seeks to imple-
ment the “Polluter Pays Principle” (PPP) without any legal differentiation between
affected WTO developing countries.
In section D. it is finally argued that the EU approach – i.e. favouring exclusively EU-
listed ship recycling facilities – would completely ignore the established principle of
“Common
But Differentiated Responsibilities [for Developing Countries]”
(known as
CBDR). In the 21st century, CBDR is explicitly recognized in various areas of public
international law, including international regulation of waste and international ship-
ping. It needs to be acknowledged in the regulation of ship recycling as well, in par-
ticular, as the global resources and knowledge base of the global market leaders
cannot be supplemented on short notice. From a development cooperation perspec-
tive, some of the “polluters”, i.e., certain sub-standard recycling facilities in non-EU
countries, could also be identified as being in need of financial incentives to be able
to implement safe and sound ship recycling
in situ.
Ultimately, this leads to a call for
earmarking Official Development Aid (known as “ODA”) in order to make ship recy-
cling in South East Asia more environmentally sustainable. With Bangladesh, one
major ship recycling country is even eligible for funding under the WTO’s Aid for
Trade (AfT) package. The wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation
does not outlaw a much more development-law oriented view. To include the recy-
cling facilities into the debate on a possible financial instrument could also possibly
prevent an unstainable relocation of ship recycling services with a possible devastat-
ing effect for the affected third-country economies and it would not take several dec-
ades to feel any practical effects once an EU ship recycling license regime (comple-
mented by a publicly administered fund) has generated enough capital to become
operational.
3
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0120.png
A. EU Procedure and EU Competency in Implementing Article 29 EU Ship
Recycling Regulation
According to its opening statement, the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is – as a whole
– based on Article 192(1) TFEU.
7
In conjunction with Article 191 TFEU, this provision
sets out the objectives and rules concerning the delivery of EU environmental policy:
“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Union in
order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191 [TFEU].”
8
The reference of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation to Article 192(1) TFEU to estab-
lish the shared competency of the EU and its member States in this area represents
the common approach in EU environmental regulation.
9
However, a more specific
legal act to implement Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation by introducing a li-
cense scheme, including the creation of a fund mechanism, cannot be based on Arti-
cle 192(1) TFEU. Rather, it must be based on Article 192(2)(a) TFEU. This provision
states that:
“By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph
1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council acting unanimously in accordance
with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:
(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;
[…]
Hereinafter: “TFEU”.
In particular, Article 191(1) TFEU states that: “Union
policy on the environment shall contribute to
pursuit of the following objectives:
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment,
- protecting human health,
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources,
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems,
and in particular combating climate change.”
9
See generally
Hedemann-Robinson,
Protection of the marine environment and the European Union:
some critical reflections on law, policy and practice, Journal of International Maritime Law (10) 2004,
pp. 254 (263 et seq.).
8
7
4
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0121.png
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after con-
sulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions, may make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the
matters referred to in the first subparagraph.”
As a result, for certain environmental matters specifically addressed in Article 192(2)
TFEU, EU measures may only be adopted by the EU Council unanimously. “Primarily
fiscal measures”
are thus subject to the decision-making process which deviates from
the default decision-making procedure (i.e. the ordinary legislative procedure under
Article 294 TFEU).
10
1. EU Procedure: Establishing an EU Ship Recycling License is a
“primarily
fiscal measure”
pursuant to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU
According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,
11
the de-
termination of the correct legal basis of an EU act must be based on objective and
verifiable factors, most importantly, the aim and content of the act in question.
12
In
this context, the wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation and its
Recital (19) clearly indicate that the general aim of a future implementing act relating
to the provisions is
•
•
•
to create a “financial
mechanism”,
to initiate “financial
incentives”
and
“to
generate resources”.
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has confirmed that the EU should apply the
legal ground that correlates with the “principal” objective of an act while “accessory”
objectives should be disregarded.
13
Thus, it will not be enough for the EU to refer
only in very general terms to a governing principle of international environmental law,
This procedural provision extends over 13 paragraphs and is thus not reproduced here.
Hereinafter: CJEU.
12
See, e.g., Case 45/86, Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, para. 11; Case 62/88, Greece v
Council [1990] ECR 1527, para. 13; Case C-295/90, Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4193, para.
13.
13
See Case C-155/91, Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939. In this case, the CJEU concluded
that although the Directive on waste management had the potential to affect the internal market, Arti-
cle 192 TFEU (as of now) would still be the correct basis for the Directive.
11
10
5
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0122.png
i.e., the
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP)
14
as enshrined explicitly in Article 191(2)
TFEU.
15
Moreover, as early as 1997, the
Commission Communication on Envi-
ronmental Taxes and Charges in the Single Market
16
generally acknowledged
that:
“In the area of environmental taxation, different meanings are often given to similar
terms in different member States, and no precise definitions are offered by EU legisla-
tion. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that it is the characteristics and the effects
of a measure which determine how it will be judged with respect to Community law
and not the denomination[s …].”
17
Furthermore, the Communication has already identified “two main categories” of envi-
ronmental levies, i.e., “emission
levies”
and “product
levies”.
While it is natural that an
EU Ship Recycling License cannot be categorized as an “emission
levy”,
even the
practical examples of the Commission for “product
levies”
evidence that it is not legal-
ly appropriate to categorize an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme under estab-
lished criteria of environmental levies.
18
In particular, none of the traditional environ-
mental product levies is designed to accumulate capital for a potential later dis-
bursement via a public fund, under certain multiplied conditions and even with the
possibility of forfeiture of individual benefits accrued.
Building up on earlier OECD work, a
1996 study of the European Environment
Agency (EEA)
also adopted a classification of environmental taxes based on their
policy objectives, distinguishing between the main uses to which the revenues can be
put.
19
Even twenty years later, the ideas expressed in the EEA study have not lost
On the differences between a broad and a narrow understanding of PPP, see, with further refer-
ences,
Zhu,
Is the Polluter Paying for Vessel-Source Pollution?, Journal of Business Law 2015, pp.
348 (at 355): “In
its broad sense, the polluter’s responsibility also extends to other costs, including
charges, taxes, clean-up costs and compensation.”
15
This provision states that:
“Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environ-
mental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”
16
See Commission Communication (97/C 224/04) OJ No. C 224/6 of 23.07.1997.
17
Ibid, p. 10.
18
Ibid, p. 8: The practical examples for product levies referred to by the Commission are:
“[…] raw
materials and Intermediate inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, natural gravel, and ground water, and
on final consumer products such as batteries, one way packaging, car tyres and plastic bags. […]
taxes on gasoline, diesel and heating oils and electricity.”
19
European Environmental Agency (ed.): Environmental Taxes; Implementation and Environmental
Effectiveness, Brussels 1996.
14
6
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0123.png
their general legal relevance. It generally differentiates between three different types
of environmental taxes:
20
1. Cost-covering charges;
2. Incentive taxes;
3. Fiscal environmental taxes.
The authors of the EEA study admit that the three types of environmental taxes could
have overlapping features and are thus not mutually exclusive.
21
However, for the
purposes of this legal opinion, three main deductions can be inferred from an analy-
sis of the three general types of environmental taxes:
1. The proposed EU Ship Recycling License does not fall under the category of
cost-covering charges because the instrument will not be designed to cover a
specific (user-related) or otherwise earmarked public environmental service
(like, e.g. treating waste water, disposing of waste or toxic products).
2. Art. 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is officially entitled “Financial
In-
centive”.
Generally, incentive taxes are levied purely with the intention to
change an environmentally damaging behaviour, e.g., by consumers or trad-
ers, however, without any specific intention to raise revenues. If there are any
revenues, these are often used to further encourage behaviour change via
grants or tax incentives. The possibility of forfeiture of accrued rights and the
fact that an EU Ship Recycling fund will only make a payment to the last ship-
owner (who potentially never participated in the “incentive scheme” for years
before) do not support a pure legal categorization as an incentive tax.
3. Fiscal environmental taxes are mainly designed to raise “significant revenues”
– whether specifically earmarked for certain ends or not. The wordings of Arti-
cle 29 and Recital (19) of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation both evidence
that the general aim of a future implementing act is to create a “financial
mechanism”
and “to
generate resources”.
The proposed system cannot work
without accumulating significant revenues for some years/decades.
20
21
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
7
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0124.png
As a result, the proposed EU Ship Recycling License system combines both ele-
ments of the categories “incentive tax” and “fiscal environmental tax”. However, while
the protection of the environment might be a later effect of generating financial re-
sources, especially during the first years after a possible installation, both the imple-
mentation of an EU Ship Recycling License scheme and/or the creation of an EU
Ship Recycling public fund have the principal objective of building up a substantial
capital-stock via enforcing a primarily fiscal measure over a longer period of time.
Generating monetary resources via a primarily fiscal measure and creating a corre-
sponding financial mechanism will not protect the environment in itself. Rather, the
protection of the environment could possibly be an accessory long-term effect of
generating financial resources in the first place. In other words, the financial mecha-
nism is a long-term catalyst to contribute to the general objective of global environ-
mental protection.
This sequence of action cannot be disregarded as Article
192(2)(a) TFEU explicitly covers such “primarily fiscal measures” in an envi-
ronmental context.
Otherwise the provision would be rendered completely useless
and factually replaced by simply referring always and in any situation to the more
generally phrased Article 192(1) TFEU.
As a practical example of the past, the former Commission Proposal for a Council
Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy
22
had been
explicitly based on the legal predecessor of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU and resulted in
political failure due to lack of political unanimity among the member States. So far,
the EU has never introduced any “green tax” based on Article 192(2)(a) TFEU. As a
consequence, the Commission generally eschews legal references to Article
192(2)(a) TFEU. Rather, the Commission prefers to base all of its environmental le-
gal acts broadly on Article 192(1) TFEU.
The view that the proposed measures are of primarily fiscal nature is finally rein-
forced by the fact that the EU Ship Recycling License scheme shall also serve as a
penalty scheme in case of shipowners failing to comply which shall result in the forfei-
ture of accrued rights under the scheme.
23
Thus, in cases of forfeiture the scheme
works exactly like a purpose-built “eco tax” and not like a premium (where the user
usually acquires at least some advantage by adhering to the public payment obliga-
O.J. 1992 C 196/1, see also COM(92)246 final.
See Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Re-
port (30 October 2015), p. 35.
23
22
8
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0125.png
tions). Additionally, for all shipowners selling their vessels after some years of opera-
tion the scheme will not generate any return as the accrued rights under an EU Ship
Recycling License shall stick to the ship and not to its owner(s).
2. Conclusions on EU Procedure
In sum, the EU Ship Recycling License clearly assumes tax-like functions. The fact
that the scheme may also serve as a premium for those owners who categorically do
not intend to sell their vessels during their whole operational lifespan (which is a ra-
ther unpractical scenario) cannot nullify the tax-built purposes of the whole scheme.
As a result, objective and verifiable factors, i.e., the aim and content of implementing
Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation by introducing an EU Ship Recycling Li-
cense mandate the application of Article 192(2)(a) TFEU as the correct legal ground
for such a measure under EU procedural requirements. Consequently, political una-
nimity among EU members is required to introduce an EU Ship Recycling License.
3. EU Competency: The EU Lacks Institutional Power to Directly Ad-
minister and Enforce the Details of an EU Ship Recycling License
Even in case the EU Council should decide unanimously to implement Article 29 EU
Ship Recycling Regulation by way of introducing an EU Ship Recycling License
(and/or including the financial mechanism of a publicly administered EU Ship Recy-
cling fund),
the EU itself lacks the institutional power to enforce the relevant
rules directly.
According to Article 193 TFEU,
24
EU measures enacted under Article
192(2)(a) TFEU may only include minimum harmonization.
25
The call for minimum
harmonization is an expression of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
pursuant to Articles 5(3) and 5(4) TEU. It may be recalled that these paragraphs of
Article 5 TFEU mandate that:
Article 193 TFEU states that: “The
protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall not
prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such
measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They shall be notified to the Commission.”
25
Commentary on the TFEU by Calliess/Ruffert, EGV/EUV AEUV, Article 192, para. 20;
Der-
lén/Lindholm,
Not enough room for optimal choices? The European legal framework for green taxes,
pp. 167 (at 171 and 178), in:
Cullen/VanderWolk/Xu
(ed.), Green Taxation in East Asia.
24
9
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0126.png
(3) Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member States, either at central level or
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the pro-
posed action, be better achieved at Union level.
(4) Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
The EU and the member States share equal competency for all measures relating to
Title XX of the TFEU (Environment). The CJEU has explicitly recognized a principle
of procedural autonomy of EU member States reflected in the EU legal framework.
26
In particular, the CJEU has highlighted:
“In the absence of [EU] rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system
of each member state to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to
lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights
which individuals derive from the direct effect of [EU] law.”
27
a. Procedural Autonomy of the EU members in Environmental Policy
Precisely because of the applicable CJEU jurisprudence and in accordance with Arti-
cle 291(1) TFEU,
28
environmental measures relating to carbon dioxide reduction and
the EU-wide greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme (ETS) according to
Directive 2003/87/EC
29
are implemented and enforced by the member States. This
example evidences that the EU is competent to establish a general policy framework
for action in environmental matters.
However, only in exceptional circumstances (“duly
justified specific cases”
pursuant
to Article 291(2) TFEU),
30
this also involves a complementary EU power to directly
See, e.g., Case C-430/93 Van Schijndel.
Ibid., para. 17.
28
Article 291(1) TFEU states that “Member
States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary
to implement legally binding Union acts.”
29
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establish-
ing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending
Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32–46.
30
Article 291(2) TFEU states that: “Where
uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union
acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified
27
26
10
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0127.png
enforce the rules. Otherwise the following might be questioned: On the one hand, a
“global” topic like decarbonisation falls under the general distribution of institutional
competencies, i.e., the Union establishing the policy framework and the members
legally enforcing it. Why should ship recycling – on the other hand – be subject to an
exceptional understanding under EU competency rules as it represents a “global”
environmental challenge as well? Consequently, there is no practical substance to
argue that the general objectives of a financial incentive for environmentally sound
ship recycling are only achievable by exclusive administration by the EU and by en-
forcement of the EU itself.
b. The Legal Rules for Designating Completely New Funds to the Gen-
eral EU Budget
The EU lacks the institutional competency to autonomously designate completely
new funds to the general EU budget. Generally, this view stems from the principle of
conferral (Article 5(1) TEU) which means that the EU may only undertake an act if it
seeks to achieve an objective entrusted to it by the member States under the Trea-
ties.
31
The principle of conferral also results in the consequence that the EU has no
competency to “invent” new forms of taxation of any kind.
32
In contrast, tax sovereignty still lies with the member States. Article 311 TFEU explic-
itly states that
“the
Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and
carry through its policies. Without prejudice to other revenue, the budget shall be fi-
nanced wholly from own resources.”
Financial resources generated by a prospective EU Ship Recycling License, howev-
er, cannot be legally categorized as the EU’s “own
resources”:
Effective from 2007,
the basic rules for the own resources system are laid down in
Council Decision
specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on
the Council.”
31
The provision states that: “The
limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of confer-
ral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.”
32
See, e.g.,
Schmidt-Kötters/Held,
Die Kompetenzen der EG zur Erhebung von Umweltabgaben und
die „Emissionsüberschreitungsabgaben“ für PKW-Hersteller, NVwZ 2009, pp. 1390 (at 1393).
11
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0128.png
2007/436/EC.
33
This “system of the European Communities’ own resources” is still
legally applicable until today. Nowhere in the text does the relevant Council Decision
refer to environmental taxes or premiums as a possibility for generating revenue to
constitute “own
resources”
and to be entered in the general EU budget.
According to Article 311 TFEU new categories of “own
resources”
have to be ap-
proved by the member States in accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements. This institutional balance represents another reason why the EU lacks
the competency to administer and enforce the financial resources generated by a
future EU Ship Recycling License on its own. Rather, this task would fall into the pro-
cedural autonomy and remaining tax autonomy of the member States.
4. Conclusions on EU Competency
According to Article 291(1) TFEU, any specific environmental measures, also includ-
ing the implementation of financial rules on sustainable ship recycling, are to be im-
plemented by the EU members. The member States are also competent to enforce
any relevant rules.
The EU lacks the institutional competency to autonomously designate completely
new funds to the general EU budget. The exclusive administration of an EU Ship Re-
cycling Scheme by the EU itself would violate both the principle of conferral (Article
5(1) TEU) as well as the rules established under Article 311 TFEU and the currently
applicable system of governing the EU’s own resources under Council Decision
2007/436/EC.
B. Legal Tension with the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and General Rules of
Public International Law
UNCLOS is the legally-binding global
“constitution for the seas”.
34
Consequently, Ar-
ticle 15 of the IMO’s Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environ-
mentally Sound Recycling of Ships of 2009
35
explicitly addresses the relationship of
007/436/EC, Euratom: Council Decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communi-
ties’ own resources, OJ L 163/17, 23.06.2007.
34
Scott,
The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans, in:
Oude Elferink
(ed.), Sta-
bility and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention, pp. 9–38.
35
Hereinafter: Hong Kong Ship Recycling Convention.
33
12
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0129.png
the convention with the international law of the sea and other international agree-
ments.
36
However, the text of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation does not refer at all
to UNCLOS. This non-reference contrast the fact that the EU Ship Recycling Regula-
tion is intended to serve as implementation of the Hong Kong Ship Recycling Con-
vention.
37
The EU’s omission aggravates the presumption that the EU Ship Recycling Regula-
tion does not integrate into the applicable international rules and principles of the law
of the sea to prevent “excessive port State jurisdiction”. However, being a party to
UNCLOS, the jurisdictional framework established under UNCLOS has binding legal
effects on the EU.
38
Specifically, the role of the EU and its member States as flag
States/coastal States/port States is governed by UNCLOS provisions. Part XII of
UNCLOS addresses the protection of the marine environment although ship recycling
is not explicitly addressed by any UNCLOS provision because it was not conceived
as a problematic topic when the UNCLOS provisions were drafted between 1982 and
1994. However, UNCLOS lays down the jurisdiction of States to establish national
rules (prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction) and to give effect to those rules (en-
forcement jurisdiction) over foreign ships.
39
The legal possibilities for the EU to im-
pose rules on foreign ships are thus largely confined to those available under
UNCLOS and under general international law.
1. An EU Ship Recycling License is Not Compatible With the UN Law
of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)
The EU Ship Recycling Regulation and the implementation of its Article 29 shall ap-
ply to all vessels, regardless of the flag they are flying. While the access of (foreign)
vessels to ports may be subject to certain conditions
,
40
under UNCLOS,
the jurisdiction
of port States to impose requirements on foreign ships is legally limited. Taking into
account the hierarchy of the legal sources of public international law, the treaty provi-
Article 15.1 of the Hong Kong Convention states that
“[N]othing in this Convention shall prejudice
the rights and obligations of any State under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982, and under the customary international law of the sea.”
Article 15.2 of the Hong Kong Convention
clarifies that
“[N]othing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Parties under
other relevant and applicable international agreements.”
37
See, e.g.,
Hedemann-Robinson,
Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law, p. 469.
38
Engels,
European Ship Recycling Convention, p. 108.
39
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 4.
40
Lowe,
The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 San Diego Law Review 1977,
pp. 597–622.
36
13
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0130.png
sions of the UNCLOS represent the most important legal source of restraint. For ex-
ample, matters which are purely internal to the ship lie beyond the jurisdiction of port
States but are subject to exclusive flag State jurisdiction. As a result, for example, it is
a purely internal matter and a commercial decision of a current shipowner
-
-
“to
probably sell the vessel at some indefinite point of time in the future”
which could be followed by a buyer’s decision to re-sell the ship further for
dismantling purposes.
If at all, it is only relevant for information purposes of the flag State (in this case, the
flag State’s obligations under the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling once the
convention has entered into force). Additionally, the jurisdiction of the coastal State
where a recycling facility is located could be involved, (for example, if a vessel des-
tined for dismantling in the coastal State has not been sufficiently pre-cleaned and is
being towed into coastal waters in a problematic technical condition).
a. “
Applicable International Rules and Standards”
and “Discharge
Require-
ments”
The enforcement jurisdiction of port States is primarily governed by Article 218
UNCLOS. For example, the first two paragraphs of Article 218 UNCLOS prescribe:
“1. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that
State may undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, institute
proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters,
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable inter-
national rules and standards established through the competent international organi-
zation or general diplomatic conference.”
2. No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be instituted in respect of a dis-
charge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of
another State unless requested by that State, the flag State, or a State damaged or
threatened by the discharge violation, or unless the violation has caused or is likely to
cause pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the
State instituting the proceedings.”
14
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0131.png
These provisions evidence two important facts with regard to the enforcement pow-
ers of port States under UNCLOS: First, the system is generally characterized by ref-
erences to the applicable international rules and standards.
41
Under UNCLOS, port
States may both prescribe
42
and enforce those. International conventions as agreed
under the auspices of the IMO represent a legal establishment of “applicable
interna-
tional rules and standards”
under UNCLOS.
43
Consequently, once ratified by a suffi-
cient number of IMO members,
44
the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling will
represent some operational “applicable
international rules and standards”
as well.
Second, with regard to “applicable
international rules and standards”,
UNCLOS pro-
vides for universal jurisdiction of port States over violations of international discharge
requirements.
45
However, this is not the case with respect to other (i.e. non-
discharge related) requirements. As a consequence, the absence of explicit provi-
sions representing “generally
accepted rules and international standards“
establishes
excessive unilateral port State jurisdiction which is potentially illegal under public in-
ternational law.
b. Enforcement of Legal Rules by Port States under UNCLOS
Materially, UNCLOS differentiates between prescription and enforcement by port
States in relation to
-
-
discharge requirements (see Article 218 UNCLOS),
static “CDEM” requirements (i.e. “construction, design, equipment, manning”,
see, e.g., Articles 194(3) UNCLOS).
46
See
Keselj,
Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding, 30 Ocean Development and
International Law 1999, pp. 127 (at 133).
42
An example for a purely prescriptive provision, i.e. without any enforcement elements, is Article
211(3) UNCLOS. The first sentence of the provision reads: “States
which establish particular require-
ments for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition
for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their offshore terminals
shall give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the competent interna-
tional organization.”
43
See generally: Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, Study by the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), IMO Doc. LEG/MISC.7 of 19 January 2012.
44
See Article 17 of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
45
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 214.
46
The sub-provision states that: “The
measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources
of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to
minimize to the fullest possible extent:
41
15
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0132.png
Additionally, other operational requirements might be relevant for both port and
coastal States (as evidenced by the legal qualifications to “innocent passage” possi-
ble under Article 21 UNCLOS).
The Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling itself introduces some “CDEM” and
operational requirements, for example, by calling for each new ship to have on board
an
Inventory of Hazardous Materials
(IHM, see both Article 5 of the Hong Kong
Convention on Ship Recycling and Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013). Thus,
even though the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling is not yet in force, from
an UNCLOS perspective, it is not generally problematic if the EU prescribes and en-
forces accepted future international standards in advance (see Article 5 of the EU
Ship Recycling Regulation). However, this legal approval does not extend “endlessly”
to features and elements which are not an internationally agreed part of the applica-
ble rules and standards.
Like many other IMO conventions, the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling it-
self includes a provision which explicitly addresses the question under discussion
here. Residual jurisdiction of port States to legislate in matters regulated in the con-
ventions often refers to the fact that this has to be conducted “in
accordance with in-
ternational law”.
As a result, Article 1(2) of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recy-
cling states that “no
provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a
Party from taking, individually or jointly, more stringent measures consistent with in-
ternational law, […]”.
However, when it comes to the implementation of the EU Ship Recycling financial
incentive mechanism, the EU and its members – in their functions as port States –
would try to prescribe and enforce a feature which has already been explicitly reject-
ed in the forum of the competent international organisation by a majority of the inter-
national community. Thus, it is not possible to establish a legal link to “generally
ac-
cepted rules and international standards“
when the EU seeks to implement Article 29
of the Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013, i.e., the financial incentive mechanism, via an
EU Ship Recycling License. If port States were to have the unrestricted right to ex-
(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from
land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;
(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergen-
cies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and
regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels;
[(c) and (d) omitted].”
16
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0133.png
ceed any standard of applicable IMO Conventions, the multilateral objects and pur-
poses of those conventions would be defeated.
47
c. Unilaterally Enforcing an EU Ship Recycling License Would Repre-
sent “Excessive” Port State Jurisdiction
Specifically, in the area of ship recycling, the combination of two factors differentiates
the proposed financial incentive from all other potentially controversial “excessive”
instruments to be applied by port States (for example in the area of monitoring, re-
porting and verifying CO2 emissions where the EU just recently also implemented
unilateral measures):
48
An EU Ship Recycling License is neither discharge-
related, CDEM-related or in any other way operationally relevant nor has it been
internationally accepted as reflecting a present or future international standard
to be prescribed and enforced by port States on behalf of the rest of the world.
The proposed measure is, thus, not “consistent
with international law”
as prescribed
by Article 1(2) of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
Thus, a port State requirement which prescribes a certain type of conduct in respect
of foreign ships before, during or after their presence within the port States’ territorial
jurisdiction – in this case, payment of the EU Ship Recycling License fee – can ex-
ceed the limits of port State prescriptive jurisdiction as envisioned by UNCLOS. A
prospective EU Ship Recycling License scheme would thus be in excess of enforce-
ment jurisdiction of port States as recognized under UNCLOS.
Moreover, the EU and its member States have no enforcement jurisdiction under
UNCLOS to charge the fees for an EU Ship Recycling License Scheme when non-
EU flagged vessels voluntarily enter EU ports. The limit on enforcement jurisdiction of
port States to protect and preserve the marine environment is set out explicitly in Ar-
ticle 218 UNCLOS limiting this right to violations relating to illegal discharges. This is
also why, e.g., Australian rules on compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait have been
See generally, Article 31(1) of the VCLT which states that
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.”
48
Regulation (EU) 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions
from maritime transport OJ L123/55 of 19 May 2015.
47
17
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0134.png
identified as incompatible with Article 218 UNCLOS.
49
The same verdict would apply
to a prospective EU Ship Recycling License Scheme.
2. Issues Relevant for General Public International Law
The absence of particular provisions on “excessive enforcement jurisdiction” of port
States is generally treated as evidence that the matter is, if at all, rather regulated by
general public international law than by UNCLOS.
50
However, the right to impose
more stringent requirements is limited by certain generally accepted principles of
public international law. Among those are the principles of
-
-
-
-
non-discrimination,
good faith,
the prohibition of abuse of rights and
proportionality.
The issue of non-discrimination is not under discussion here as the EU intends to
implement its measures without any differentiation and regardless of any flag of ves-
sels entering EU ports. Additionally, it does not seem productive to discuss the issue
of good faith or the prohibition of abuse of rights which is also explicitly recognized by
Article 300 UNCLOS.
51
By implementing a prospective EU Ship Recycling License
scheme, the EU’s general intention is, above all, to incentivise the use of certified
ship recycling facilities, i.e. those included in the relevant European List.
52
This objec-
tive cannot be regarded as a breach of good faith or an abuse of rights in itself.
However, there is hardly any sub-area of public international law where the applica-
bility of the principle of proportionality could be denied.
53
The application of propor-
See
Beckmann,
PSSAs and Transit Passage – Australia’s Pilotage System in the Torres Strait Chal-
lenges the IMO and UNCLOS, 38 Ocean Development & International Law 2007, pp. 325 (at 345).
50
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, p. 215.
51
The provision states that: „States
Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”
52
See Article 16 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation.
53
See
Delbrück,
Proportionality, in:
Bernhardt
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. III,
pp. 1140.
49
18
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0135.png
tionate enforcement measures is also applied by two UNCLOS provisions, namely its
Articles 221 and 232.
54
As a result, the means employed to achieve a certain objective have to be propor-
tionate to that objective, also in the area of legislative and prescriptive port State ju-
risdiction. However, the following discussion on the WTO incompatibility will ultimate-
ly highlight that the EU approach of institutionalizing a unilateral Ship Recycling Li-
cense Scheme is disproportionate.
55
Thus, whether the EU’s conceptual approach is
“reasonable” and “necessary” is discussed further and in more detail in the following
sub-sections of this opinion.
56
C. Non-Compliance with WTO Law: Article V:3 GATT 1994 and Article
XXXVII:1 (c) (i) GATT 1994
For good reasons, the consortium questions whether the introduction of a financial
instrument and the creation of a new financial obligation accords with the existing
commitments of the EU and its member States under the legal order of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO).
57
The ongoing trade dispute “Russian
Federation — Re-
cycling Fee on Motor Vehicles”
–
inter alia
initiated by the EU – evidences that a re-
cycling instrument may potentially generate trade distorting effects which could even
be relevant for a WTO dispute.
58
Furthermore, the 1997 the Commission Communication on Environmental Taxes and
Charges in the Single Market
59
already warned that
“[…] The use of environmental taxes and charges may also affect obligations towards
third countries, e.g. in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). member
States need to take account of all these linkages in order to ensure that national envi-
ronmental taxes and charges are implemented in a way which is compatible with their
WTO [and Treaty] obligations.”
Article 221 UNCLOS addresses measures to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties and
Article 232 regulates the liability of States arising from enforcement measures.
55
Se generally on the issue proportionality under WTO law:
Mitchell,
Proportionality and Remedies in
WTO Disputes, The European Jounrnal of International Law (17) 2007, pp. 985.
56
See sections C. 2. a. and b.
57
See Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Re-
port (30 October 2015), Annex B, pp. 67.
58
For further details see
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds463_e.htm.
59
See
infra
Commission Communication (97/C 224/04) OJ No. C 224/6 of 23 July 1997.
54
19
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0136.png
While a prospective EU Ship Recycling License scheme applicable to all vessels
would not be problematic under the general concept of non-discrimination among all
WTO members, the mechanism as currently proposed would generally violate the
right to freedom of transit as guaranteed under Article V:3 GATT 1994. Moreover, as
part of the section on “Trade and Development” (Part IV GATT 1994), Article
XXXVII:1 (c) (i) GATT 1994 mandates all developed WTO members explicitly “to
re-
frain from imposing new fiscal measures”
which potentially have a negative trade ef-
fect on the economies of developing countries.
In the context discussed here, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan could be possible ap-
plicants for demanding dispute settlement negotiations and for further establishing a
panel against the EU, as a result of the negative commercial effects of an EU Ship
Recycling License on ship recycling facilities situated within their respective territo-
ries. It has to be recalled at this point that 50.000 people are directly employed in
ship recycling in Bangladesh while half a million people work in associated indus-
tries.
60
These numbers underline the domestic economic importance for Bangladesh
and a comparable economic assessment can also be made for Pakistan or India.
1. An EU Ship Recycling License Scheme Violates the Substance of
Article V:3 GATT 1994
As a whole, Article V GATT 1994 serves to protect WTO members from unnecessary
delays or restrictions, such as limitations on freedom of transit, or unreasonable
charges or delays (via paragraphs 2-4). Moreover, the provision extends the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment to WTO members' goods which are "traffic
in
transit"
(via paragraphs 2 and 5) or "have
been in transit"
(via paragraph 6). Vessels
as a means for the international transport of goods are explicitly mentioned in Article
V:1 GATT 1994 and,
argumentum e contrario,
the coverage of vessels is also evi-
denced by the explicit exclusion of aircraft in Article V:7 GATT 1994.
61
Article V:3 GATT 1994, however, has never been interpreted by any GATT or WTO
panel in the past. So far, Article V GATT 1994 has been subject to one single WTO
dispute, mainly concentrating on Article V:2, 6 GATT 1994.
62
As part of this dispute,
the panel has stressed that it is a difficult legal task to interpret Article V of the GATT
60
61
See Lloyd’s List of 15 February 2016 (“Making
recycling sustainable”),
p. 9.
See also Analytical Index of the GATT, Art. V GATT, p. 214.
62
Columbia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, 27 April 2009.
20
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0137.png
1994 “without
any meaningful guidance”.
63
Article V GATT 1994 represents a difficult
and complex article.
64
Nevertheless, both the panel report “Columbia
– Port of Entry
Measures”
and a legal analysis of the exact wording of the sub-provisions can still
provide some meaningful guidance for determining whether a future EU Ship Recy-
cling License would be in contradiction to Article V:3 GATT 1994. At the outset, Arti-
cle V:3 GATT 1994 reads:
“Any
contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered
at the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable
customs laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory of oth-
er contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions
and shall be exempt from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges
imposed in respect of transit, except charges for transportation or those commensu-
rate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services ren-
dered.” [emphasis added]
The panel report “Columbia
– Port of Entry Measures”
has generally confirmed a
broad understanding of Article V GATT 1994 where the reference to “freedom”
means “the
unrestricted use of something”,
in particular, because of the fact that nei-
ther “freedom” nor “transit” are defined anywhere in the WTO legal order.
65
In any
case, freedom of transit must also be provided to “traffic in transit”.
66
Moreover, the
general principles of treaty interpretation as set forth by the Appellate Body in
US –
Gasoline
are applicable to avoid interpretations that reduce WTO provisions to inutili-
ty.
67
In international trade law, Article V:3 GATT serves two main objectives: First, unless
there is a failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations, a WTO
member must not subject goods in transit coming from and going to another WTO
member to delays or restrictions. Limiting the substance, the provision proscribes
only delays or restrictions which are “unnecessary”. Second, by using the conjunction
“and”, the sub-provision further states that traffic coming from or going to the territory
of a WTO member shall be exempt from
The panel used the term “arduous”, ibid., para. 7.388.
Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT, p. 511.
65
Columbia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, 27 April 2009, paras.
7.399 and 7.456. However, Article V:1 GATT 1994 provides a fairly good concept of “transit”.
66
Ibid., para. 7.400.
67
Ibid., para. 7.467.
64
63
21
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0138.png
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
customs duties;
all transit duties; and
other charges imposed in respect of transit, except charges for (a) trans-
portation or (b) those commensurate with administrative expenses entailed
by transit or with the cost of services rendered.
Notably, the term “unnecessary” only appears directly before the reference to “delays
or restrictions”.
It does not re-appear after the conjunction “and” which opens up an-
other category of illegal inflictions with the freedom of transit. This implies a more
categorical and technical approach to customs duties, transit duties or other charges
where issues of political “necessity” do not seem to be part of the equation. In con-
trast, Article V:4 GATT 1994 does not refer to “unnecessary” but to the term “reason-
able”
stating that:
“All
charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or
from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to
the conditions of the traffic.”
Article V:4 GATT 1994 must refer to legitimate “charges
for transportation or those
commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of
services rendered”
as referred to in Article V:3 GATT 1994. Representing another
legal category, however, “customs
duties, transit duties and other charges imposed in
respect of transit”
are generally outlawed by Article V:3 GATT without any reference
to necessity or reason.
In other words: Reasonable transportation charges can be justified as legal measures
under the WTO system. Legitimate transportation charges and regulations as re-
ferred to in Article V GATT 1994 must be governmentally imposed as the relevant
measures are, e.g., defined as: “[…]
including charges for transportation by Govern-
ment-owned railroads or Government-owned modes of transportation”.
68
This defini-
68
Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, Committee II,
Report of the Technical Sub-Committee, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1, 28 November 1946, p. 10.
22
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0139.png
tion serves to clarify that there must be some government ownership of the mode of
transport in question before a transportation charge can be levied.
69
As a consequence, privately-imposed harbour fees do not fall under the categories of
costs as regulated by Article V GATT 1994. Practical examples for reasonable trans-
portation charges are, e.g., train costs (as some WTO members require that traffic in
transit use alternative modes of transportation, for example, if applicable quotas for
trucks have already been filled).
70
A practical example for “charges
commensurate
with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered”
is, e.g., the filing of transit documents.
71
Consequently, this expression mainly relates
to physical goods in transit and not to the means for transporting the goods to enter
transit areas.
2. Conclusion on the Violation of the Material Substance of Article
V:3 GATT 1994
As evidenced by the practical examples for legal transportation charges, the annual
or monthly fee imposed on vessels for implementing an EU Ship Recycling License
scheme has no correlation at all to actual transportation services or administrative
expenses entailed by transit. Rather, it would be levied on the mere occasion of traf-
fic (i.e. vessels) in transit and it would not serve transportation purposes but as a
measure to build up capital for the financial administration of an EU Ship Recycling
fund. Thus, EU Ship Recycling License fees must fall under the catch-all category of
“other
charges imposed in respect of transit”
as mentioned in Article V:3 GATT 1994.
Transit duties or charges of that kind cannot be justified by considerations of
necessity or reason under WTO law and are thus illegal.
3. An EU Ship Recycling License Cannot be Justified Under Article
V:3 GATT 1994 as “Necessary” or “Reasonable”
Even if a WTO dispute panel should conclude that the categories of “necessary” and
“reasonable” should apply in examining a possible justification for EU Ship Recycling
69
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max Planck
Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5, para. 16.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
23
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0140.png
License fees as “other
charges imposed in respect of transit”,
the relevant test would
result in concluding that the financial obligations imposed on vessels in transit are
“unnecessary” and “unreasonable”. There is extensive jurisprudence on the meaning
of the word “necessary” in the relevant sub-paragraphs of Article XX GATT 1994. The
term “reasonable” has been interpreted less frequently, however, the panel report in
“Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes”
provides guidance as it con-
strued “reasonable” as mentioned in Article X GATT 1994.
72
a. The Test for a “Reasonable” Charge
Remarkably, the panel in “Dominican
Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes”
turned to the “New Oxford English Dictionary” and noted that:
“[…] the ordinary
meaning of the word “reasonable” commonly refers to notions such as:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
“in
accordance with reason”,
“not
irrational or absurd”,
“proportionate”,
“having
sound judgement”,
“sensible”,
“not
asking for too much”,
“within
the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than might be thought like-
ly or appropriate”, and
“articulate”.
73
First, the inclusion of a financial mechanism into the legal framework of the Hong
Kong Convention on Ship Recycling was politically rejected by a majority of the IMO
members during the course of the negotiations on the convention.
74
Thus, to set up a
financial incentive mechanism in the area of ship recycling has been disapproved by
the majority of the international community as being disproportionate, unsound and
asking too much from shipowners and other stakeholders involved.
Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Importation and Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.385.
Ibid.
74
See specifically:
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship
recycling practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340 (at 348): “Efforts
to implement a
ship recycling fund were sunk at the global level during HKC negotiations and have been put in the
dock at the EU level due to implementation difficulties.”
73
72
24
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0141.png
Second, a WTO panel could construe “reasonable
charges”
to mean those charges
that the market is willing to bear in the light of alternative routes of transportation
available.
75
There are no alternative routes of transportation available since avoiding
EU ports completely is not a commercially viable alternative for most shipping busi-
nesses. A market enquiry on whether shipowners (and private or public port authori-
ties) would be willing to bear the estimated costs (of about 16.000 EUR/year) and,
additionally, the administrative burdens of implementing an EU Ship Recycling Li-
cense scheme would, however, result in the obvious conclusion that this approach
should be rejected as being unreasonable.
b. The Test for a “Necessary” Charge
Testing the “necessity” element, the WTO Appellate Body has developed a "two-
tiered" approach in the context of Article XX GATT 1994 (as applied since the 1996
dispute “US
– Gasoline”).
76
The Appellate Body has explained that both elements
must be satisfied in order for a measure to be provisionally justified under a sub-
paragraph of Article XX GATT 1994:
First, there has to be a provisional justification by reason of characterisation of the
measure under the relevant sub-paragraph of Article XX GATT 1994. Additionally,
the measure must be one designed to 'secure compliance' with laws or regulations
that are not themselves generally inconsistent with the GATT 1994. However, it may
be recalled that the above analysis has evidenced that an EU Ship Recycling License
would be in conflict with the concept of Article V:3 GATT 1994, thus resulting in gen-
eral WTO-inconsistency.
Second, a further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of
Article XX GATT 1994 would follow.
77
This includes the test whether a measure must
be “necessary” to secure compliance with national laws or regulations. A WTO mem-
ber which invokes one of the sub-paragraphs of Article XX GATT 1994 as a justifica-
tion for a trade-distorting measure has the burden of demonstrating that both of these
75
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max Planck
Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5, para. 19.
76
Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3.
77
Appellate Body Report,
US – Gasoline,
p. 22.
25
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0142.png
two requirements are met.
78
The Appellate Body – when examining the concept of
“necessary” (in the context of Article XX(d) GATT 1994 in
Korea – Various Measures
on Beef)
– concluded that, in order to be considered "necessary" to secure compli-
ance, a measure does not need to be “indispensable” but should constitute some-
thing more than strictly “making
a contribution to”:
"[…] the term 'necessary' refers, in our view to a range of degrees of necessity.
At one end of this continuum lies 'necessary' understood as 'indispensable'; at
the other end, is 'necessary' taken to mean as 'making a contribution to'. We
consider that a 'necessary' measure is, in this continuum, located significantly
closer to the pole of 'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a
contribution to
'."
79
[…] determination of whether a measure, which is not 'indispensable', may nev-
ertheless be 'necessary' […], involves in every case a process of weighing and
balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by
the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regula-
tion, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or ex-
ports."
80
In a more recent assessment of the meaning of the term "necessary" in connection
with a defense raised under Article XX(b), the Appellate Body indicated that a panel
may evaluate whether a measure is "necessary" based on the extent to which the
measure is "apt
to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objec-
tive".
81
Finally, the Appellate Body has clarified that a measure will not be considered "nec-
essary"
(in this case: within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994) "if
an
alternative measure which [a member] could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it".
82
However,
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 157.
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 161.
80
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
paras. 162-164.
81
Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 151.
82
Appellate Body Report,
Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 165, citing to GATT Panel Report,
US – Section 337,
footnote 69, para. 5.26: “It
was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot
justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
79
78
26
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0143.png
here a complaining WTO member has the burden to identify possible alternatives to
the measure at issue that the respondent could have taken.
83
It is questionable why a financial measure like an EU Ship Recycling License and the
administration of a fund which needs several years (if not decades) to generate any
practical effects could be categorized as "apt
to produce a material contribution to the
achievement of its objective",
i.e. sustainable and sound ship recycling globally. The
possibility of accrued funds generated from the EU Ship Recycling License Scheme
being forfeited already anticipates that an undefined number of shipowners will not
change their approach to ship recycling. In fact, it would rather be a widespread ratifi-
cation of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling which could be categorized
as “apt
to produce a material contribution”
to the achievement of the objective of sus-
tainable ship recycling globally. Additionally, satisfying their burden of proof, com-
plaining WTO members like India, Pakistan or Bangladesh could point to the political
alternatives of having all EU members ratify the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Re-
cycling and to further utilize the instruments of official development aid (ODA) to
modernize ship recycling facilities in traditional ship recycling countries.
4. Under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994, Developed WTO Members
“Shall
Refrain From Imposing New Fiscal Measures”
As part of their deliberations on the alleged WTO consistency of an EU Ship Recy-
cling License,
84
the consortium has completely disregarded Part IV of the GATT 1994
(Trade and Development). However, Part IV GATT 1994 is not an insignificant “an-
nex” to Parts I - III GATT 1994. Rather, the three provisions of Part IV GATT postu-
late additional legal requirements which are legally binding for all WTO members in-
cluding the EU. Already before 1995, this has been confirmed by earlier GATT juris-
prudence stating that the provisions of Part IV GATT 1994 could be “breached”
85
and
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent
with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions."
83
Appellate Body Report,
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 156.
84
Ecorys et al., Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30
October 2015), pp. 77.
85
GATT Panel, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, GATT BISD 27S/98 (117, paras.
4.22-4.23): “The
Panel examined the EEC measure in relation to the objectives and commitments
embodied in Articles XXXVI and XXXVII [...] Although the EEC measure did affect the ability of a de-
veloping country to export into the EEC market, the Panel noted that the EEC had taken certain ac-
27
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0144.png
that Article XXXVII GATT 1994 reflects “additional
obligations”.
86
For example, Brazil
has relied explicitly on Part IV GATT 1994 in a former dispute against the European
Community (EC).
87
Article XXXVII GATT 1994 is entitled “Commitments” (of developed WTO members
towards developing WTO members). The second paragraph of the provision intro-
duces so-called “stand
still provisions”.
In particular, Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994
states:
“1. The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible – that is, ex-
cept when compelling
[…]
(c) (i) refrain from imposing new fiscal measures,
[…]
which would hamper, or which hamper, significantly the growth of consumption of
primary products, in raw or processed form, wholly or mainly produced in the territo-
ries of less-developed contracting parties, and which are applied specifically to those
products.”
The final part of Article XXXVII GATT 1994 evidences that this provision is a purely
product-related provision. As such, it mainly focusses on fiscal measures applied to
primary products wholly or mainly produced by developing country WTO members.
However, the product-focus is true for the whole GATT system and the existence of a
variety of “special
and differential treatment (SDT) provisions”
in the WTO legal order
evidences that Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994 cannot be read in isolation.
In any case, the process of ship dismantling generates huge amounts of scrap metal
and raw steel plates. Thus, a dynamic interpretation of Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994 supports the view that the generation of raw steel/steel parts (and every product
on a vessel to be cut off or segmented in the process of ship dismantling) establish
tions, including bilateral consultations in order to avoid suspending imports of apples from Chile. After
a careful examination, the Panel could not determine that the EEC had not made serious efforts to
avoid taking protective measures against Chile. Therefore the Panel did not conclude that the EEC
was in breach of its obligations
under Part IV.“.
86
Ibid., (133-134, para. 12.32) „[...]
However, the Panel noted that the commitments entered into by
contracting parties under Article XXXVII were additional to their obligations under Parts I-III of the
General Agreement, and that these commitments thus applied to measures which were permitted
under Parts I-III. As the Panel had found the EEC's import restrictions to be inconsistent with specific
obligations of the EEC under Part II of the General Agreement, it therefore did not consider it neces-
sary to pursue the matter further under Article XXXVII.”
87
GATT Panel,
European Communities – Refunds on Exports of Sugar,
GATT BISD 27S/69 (80 et
seq.).
28
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0145.png
the necessary “product link” for triggering the general applicability of Article
XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994.
As evidenced by the above discussion relating to Article 192(2)(a) TFEU,
88
the finan-
cial mechanism as envisioned by Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation represents
a [primarily] “fiscal
measure”
as materially covered by Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT
1994. The intended effect of this fiscal measure – which developed WTO members
shall refrain from in relation to WTO developing countries – is to incentivise shipown-
ers to contract with ship recycling facilities which are included in the “European List”
as set out in Article 16(2) EU Ship Recycling. However, if a ship recycling facility –
situated in a developing country like Bangladesh, Pakistan or India – would not be
included in the “European List” it will potentially lose a substantial amount of its for-
mer ship recycling business. This would be a simple causal result of the application
of the financial incentive mechanism implemented via an EU Ship Recycling License
(and via disbursements to shipowners from an EU Ship Recycling License fund).
Even before the creation of the WTO, Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994 was rein-
forced by Article XXXVII:3(c) GATT 1994 which reads:
3. The developed contracting parties shall:
[…]
c) have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting parties
when considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement
to meet particular problems and explore all possibilities of constructive remedies be-
fore applying such measures where they would affect essential interests of those con-
tracting parties.
In the context of Article XXXVII:3(c) GATT 1994 “other
measures”
covers, e.g.,
measures like antidumping duties or countervailing measures.
89
The basic compati-
bility with those measures is enough to affirm the existence of “other
measures”.
In
relation to ship recycling facilities – situated in WTO developing countries which are
not included in the “European List” – the financial incentive mechanism has similar
economic effects like an antidumping duty or a countervailing measure because it
has the direct effect of detracting ship dismantling business opportunities from a
more competitive and more price-efficient market. “Essential
interests”
of Bangla-
88
89
See supra, section A.1.
Analytical Index of the GATT, Art. XXXVII GATT, p. 1066.
29
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0146.png
desh, India and Pakistan would be affected. “Constructive
remedies”
to the benefit of
those countries have not been discussed. Rather the EU seeks to implement the
“Polluter Pays Principle” (PPP)
without any differentiation between affected WTO
developing countries.
The effect of losing ship breaking business as a result of a possible “non-inclusion”
would even be felt commercially – if affected ship recycling facilities were to be offi-
cially certified/accredited under the “global” Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recy-
cling system (once set in force) at the same time. As a result, implementing Article 29
EU Ship Recycling via the imposition of a new fiscal measure – detrimental to at least
three WTO developing countries as global market leaders in the shipbreaking busi-
ness – contradicts completely with the EU’s legal obligations under Part IV GATT, in
particular with its obligations under Article XXXVII:1(c)(i) GATT 1994.
D. Favouring EU-listed Ship Recycling Facilities Conflicts with the Principle
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
The discussion so far also has to highlight an important variation in the legal defini-
tion of a “ship
recycling facility”
between the EU Ship Recycling Regulation on the
one hand and the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling on the other hand. The
latter defines the term “ship
recycling facility”
to mean “a
defined area that is a site,
yard or facility used for the recycling of ships”.
In contrast, the EU definition omits the
term “site” and defines a “ship
recycling facility”
to mean “a
defined area that is a yard
or facility located in a member State or in a third country and used for the recycling of
ships”.
The practical effects of the omission of “sites” could work against the inclusion of cer-
tain ship recycling companies in the “European List”.
90
By obviously demanding a
concrete structure (or other form of “defined
area”
which is not a “site”) the EU devi-
ates from the international accord and maximizes a domestic ship recycling standard
to be applied globally, neglecting the fact that environmentally sound and sustainable
See generally:
Tsimplis,
Recycling of EU Ships: From Prohibition to Regulation?, Lloyd’s Maritime
and Commercial Law Quarterly 2014, pp. 415 (433).
90
30
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0147.png
ship recycling cannot be generally outlawed from a standard-based approach (see
Regulation 3 of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling).
91
In particular with regard to the practical consequences, the EU’s approach would
completely ignore the principle of
“Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
[for Developing Countries]” (CBDR).
This principle has been developed over time
as an answer to developing country parties’ calls for fairer rules and procedures in
international environmental cooperation.
92
For example, in the context of trans-
boundary waste management, Article 11(1) of the Basel Convention explicitly recog-
nizes CBDR.
93
After decades of increasing international cooperation on environmen-
tal issues, the notion of CBDR has now evolved into a cardinal principle of interna-
tional environmental law, e.g., in the context of international negotiations under the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). CBDR is now not only
explicitly recognized under the UNFCCC but there are also manifestations in various
other areas of public international law, namely in:
-
-
-
-
-
The Convention on Biodiversity,
the UN Convention to Combat Desertification
the variety of “SDT” provisions in the WTO legal order
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
the Post-2015 negotiations and prospective Sustainable Development Goals.
In fact, CBDR is not an antagonist but simply an outgrowth of the PPP which is pro-
moted so broadly by the EU: “The
equitable considerations intrinsic to the polluter-
pays principle also suggest that it is appropriate for developed countries, whose de-
velopment is imposing significant negative externalities on the environment of both
The provision states that: “Parties
shall take measures to implement the requirements of the regula-
tions of this Annex, taking into account relevant and applicable standards, recommendations and
guidance developed by the International Labour Organization and the relevant and applicable tech-
nical standards, recommendations and guidance developed under the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.”
92
The starting point was, e.g., the formulation of Principle 7 of 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development; see also: The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and
Scope, A CISDL Legal Brief for the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Johannesburg;
DIE Discussion Paper No. 6/2014: Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities, p.7.
93
“
[
… ] Parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements regarding
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes with Parties or non-Parties provided
that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from the environmentally sound management
of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by this Convention. These agreements or ar-
rangements shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than those provided
for by this Convention in particular taking into account the interests of developing countries.”
91
31
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0148.png
developed and developing countries, to help developing countries meet their envi-
ronmental obligations.”
94
Remarkably, even in shipping, CBDR is now continuously recognized in practical dis-
cussions, for example, when it comes to bunker fuel emission control, as part of the
efforts to combat climate change: In the IMO, a recently formed group of “like-minded
developing countries”
95
has asked the IMO to work in accordance with the principles
and provisions of the UNFCCC, in particular with the principles of equity and
CBDR.
96
In sum, the principle of CBDR needs to be acknowledged in the practice of
regulating ship recycling as well, in particular, as the global resources and knowledge
base of the global market leaders cannot be supplemented on short notice. Ultimate-
ly, this would lead to a call for earmarking official development aid (ODA) more inten-
sively in order to make ship recycling in South East Asia more environmentally sus-
tainable – instead of using shipowners as a “cash cow” for a bureaucratic experiment
with unknown material and financial contributions.
E. Conclusions on the Disproportionality and Non-Compliance with Interna-
tional Law
A measure which is identified as being disproportionate in one sub-area of public in-
ternational law (here: WTO law) cannot be held to be clearly proportionate in other
sub-areas of public international law. The fact that developing countries, including
one least-developed country (Bangladesh), are economically affected by the EU’s
proposed measures adds some political sensitivity to weighing the balance between
proportionality and disproportionality.
In conclusion, an EU Ship Recycling License has to be categorized as disproportion-
ate under public international law due to its possible detrimental effects on the ship-
breaking business in case leading ship recycling facilities, located in developing
countries, are not included on the “European list”. This outcome, however, seems to
be pre-determined since the legal definition of “ship
recycling facility”
under EU law
Dernbach,
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 Case Western
Law Review (1998), p. 1.
95
The first meeting of the group on climate change was hosted by China in 2012.
96
Submission by Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India,
Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela, on
cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions in order to enhance the implementation of
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-
Article
4
paragraph
1(c)
of
the
Convention;
see
lca/application/pdf/submission_by_like-minded_countries_1.b.iv25may.pdf.
94
32
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0149.png
differs from the approach of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
97
Howev-
er, generally disregarding topographic conditions in major ship recycling countries
and excluding the possibility that a ship recycling facility could also be operated sus-
tainably and adhering to highest environmental standards from a “site” is dispropor-
tionate. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that, e.g., four Indian ship recycling
facilities also operating on “sites” have only recently been officially certified by classi-
fication societies under the criteria as governed by the Hong Kong Convention on
Ship Recycling.
98
F. Final Alternative Thoughts on a More Constructive Implementation of Ar-
ticle 29 of Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2013
The short description of the relevant European Commission tender which led to the
reports of the consortium led by ECORYS Nederland B.V. highlighted that
“[…]
shipowners may be tempted to avoid the new recycling-related requirements ap-
plicable to EU flag ships by re-flagging their ships to flag states which do not impose
similar rules. To address the issue, a financial mechanism to incentivise shipowners
to recycle ships in a safe and environmentally sound manner has been considered in
the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling and the EU Ship Recycling Regulation
contexts respectively. Under Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling, the Commission is
invited to table, if appropriate, a legislative proposal regarding the feasibility of estab-
lishing a financial incentive for the safe and sound recycling of ships. The contractor
will be tasked with investigating this feasibility, analysing earlier studies and advising
on potential ways forward.”
99
The inclusion of financial mechanisms to incentivise shipowners to recycle ships in a
safe and environmentally sound manner has been rejected politically as part of the
negotiations leading up to the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling.
100
Never-
theless, Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation still reads:
See supra, section D.
See Lloyd’s List of 16 December 2015 „Class
NK certifies two more ship recycling yards in India“;
Lloyd’s List of 29 September 2015, „Asian
shipowners welcome certification of Indian recycling yards”.
99
See
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:239689-2014:TEXT:EN:HTML.
100
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling prac-
tices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340 (at 348).
98
97
33
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0150.png
“The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, submit to the European Parliament and to
the Council a report on the feasibility of a financial instrument that would facilitate safe
and sound ship recycling and shall, if appropriate, accompany it by a legislative pro-
posal.”
However, the exact wording of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (as
well as the short description of the tender notice) do both not necessarily imply that “a
financial instrument that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”
must, in any
case, be directly connected to the operation of vessels. Rather, it is exclusively Re-
cital (19) of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation which establishes this link by stating:
„In
the interest of protecting human health and the environment and having regard to
the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the Commission should assess the feasibility of establish-
ing a financial mechanism applicable to all ships calling at a port or anchorage of a
member State, irrespective of the flag they are flying, to generate resources that
would facilitate the environmentally sound recycling and treatment of ships without
creating an incentive to out-flag.”
In the context of EU law, the purpose of using Recitals is to set out concise reasons
for the key provisions of a legal act, without reproducing or paraphrasing them.
101
However, the CJEU has confirmed that Recitals have no legal value as such.
102
It is
further claimed that they “cannot
be relied on as a ground for derogating from the
actual provisions of the act in question”.
103
Nevertheless, Recitals are often used in
interpretation by courts.
104
In any case, the text of the operative provision of a legal
act has higher legal authority as compared to the text of a Recital.
As a result, the substance of Article 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation does not
generally outlaw other complementary ideas which could link “a
financial instrument
that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”
directly to existing ship recycling
facilities, both within the EU and, in particular, in third countries. This would not imply
a disconnection to the commercial operation of vessels since certain “CDEM” re-
quirements as established both under the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling
Joint Practical Guide for persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation, p.20.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/techleg/KB0213228ENN.pdf.
102
ECJ Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 19 November 1998, Case C-162/97, Criminal Pro-
ceedings against Nilsson, Hagelgren & Arrborn, 1998 E.C.R. I-07477 para. 54.
103
Ibid.
104
Manual of precedents for acts established within the Council of the European Union, 2012 edition.
(“The
Court often refers to the recitals in order to interpret the enabling provision of an act.”).
101
34
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0151.png
and under the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (as discussed above)
105
would still re-
main valid.
However, the current understanding of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation is based on
a strict desire to counter commercial “avoidance strategies” of ship owners, i.e., own-
ers of end-of-life ships and cash-buyers who are not as much concerned about repu-
tational issues (as compared to most other “active” shipowners) and who are willing
to detour to the most profitable recycling opportunity. The exact wording of Article 29
EU Ship Recycling Regulation, however, does not suggest a “quasi automatic” and
legally compelling link of a possible financial incentive to the operation of vessels call-
ing at EU ports. It is rather the broadest legal understanding of the “Polluter Pays
Principle” (PPP) which – in this case
ex ante
– seeks to identify and anticipate ship-
owners as “soon
to be polluters”
who should ultimately pay for the safe and sound
recycling of their vessels, not only once these have reached the end of their operat-
ing lifespan but already during the start and/or course of all of their commercial oper-
ations.
106
The preamble of the Hong Kong Convention on Ship Recycling also explicitly refers
to internationally accepted environmental principles, above all, to the “Precautionary
Principle”
(as set out also, e.g., in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development)
107
and referred to in IMO-Resolutions.
108
The precautionary
principle requires States to take measures to protect the environment where there is
evidence of serious environmental damage even if scientific certainty is lacking.
109
In contrast, it is striking that the Hong Kong Convention has eschewed to include
comparable explicit references to the PPP. Thus, in the context of ship recycling, the
EU Ship Recycling Regulation applies a much broader understanding of PPP as
compared to the global accord. However, for practical reasons, (e.g. “to
generate re-
sources”
[…] “without
creating an incentive to out-flag”),
it is, in fact, rather the ship
recycling facilities which buy end-of-life vessels to be dismantled – and not the ship-
ping companies – and which should thus be categorized as “co-polluters”.
See supra, section B.1.b. and c.
Admittedly, this “from the cradle to the grave approach” is also generally accepted by the Hong
Kong Convention on Ship Recycling via the inclusion of the rules on the “Inventory of Hazardous Ma-
terials” (IHM), Chapter 2, Regulation 5.
107
The principle states that: “In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversi-
ble damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
108
See, e.g., IMO Doc. MEPC 37/22/Add.1: Resolution MEPC.67(37) adopted on 15 September 1995
(“Guidelines
on incorporation of the precautionary approach in the context of specific IMO activities”).
109
See, e.g.,
Atapattu,
Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law, p. 204.
106
105
35
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0152.png
From a development cooperation perspective, some of those “polluters”, i.e., certain
sub-standard recycling facilities in non-EU countries, could also be identified as being
in need of financial incentives to be able to implement safe and sound ship recycling
in situ.
The wording of Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation (“a
financial instru-
ment that would facilitate safe and sound ship recycling”)
does not outlaw such a
view. To include the recycling facilities into the debate on a possible financial instru-
ment could also possibly prevent an unstainable relocation of ship recycling services
with a possible devastating effect for the affected third-country economies
110
and it
would not take several decades to feel any practical effects once a license regime
(complemented by a publicly administered fund) has generated enough capital to
become operational.
From a combined political, economic and legal perspective it is equally as important
to adhere to the CBDR principle as giving effect to the PPP. As a consequence, “to
generate resources”
could also imply that PPP – for reasons of EU development co-
operation objectives – should be converted and understood as a
“Demandeur Pays
Principle”.
A recent academic contribution in the area of ship recycling has explicitly
postulated this politically and economically appropriate modification of the PPP which
also takes account of the CBDR.
111
In the given context, the French term “demandeur” can be translated as “the re-
quester” or “the petitioner”. The EU in its role as
demanding
the implementation of
the highest environmental standards in global ship recycling is financially capable to
support its own desired environmental objectives. For example, the European Com-
mission on International Cooperation and Development finances several develop-
ment cooperation projects on “Integrated Solid Waste Management” (e.g. with Geor-
gia, Azerbaijan, Armenia or Kyrgyzstan), evidencing that ship recycling and sustaina-
ble waste management also represent project areas which could be earmarked for
the purposes of future EU development cooperation with Bangladesh, India or Paki-
stan.
This development-oriented approach would also integrate more effectively into the
most recent efforts of both ship recycling States (for example, the Bangladesh gov-
ernment has announced an intention to invest US$ 150 million to develop green ship
110
111
For the economic relevance for Bangladesh, see supra, note 60.
See
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling
practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340.
36
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0153.png
recycling facilities)
112
and their existing ship recycling facilities to adhere fully to the
requirements of the HKC and to be officially certified by classification societies or
other certification bodies.
113
Additionally, and precisely because of the fact that the legality of an EU financial in-
centive regime in implementation of Article 29 EU Ship Recycling Regulation has
been challenged under the law of the WTO in this legal opinion, it has to be stressed
further that one major ship recycling country – which could be negatively affected by
the current understanding of Art. 29 of the EU Ship Recycling Regulation (i.e. Bang-
ladesh) – is even
eligible for funding under the WTO’s Aid for Trade (AfT) pack-
age
which is also part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The AfT initia-
tive was launched at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting in 2005 with the aim
of extending financial and technical support to least-developed countries (LDCs). Un-
der AfT such support is provided
inter alia
to counter a domestic lack of resources,
poor infrastructure, weak productive capacity and technological base, low competi-
tiveness, weak institutions, bureaucratic complexities and lack of trade-related pro-
fessional expertise. Bangladesh has already received support under the AfT initiative
in the past, namely in: economic infrastructure, building productive capacity, and
trade policy and regulation.
114
Thus, apart from the questionable legality of an EU Ship Recycling License under
WTO law, it may be generally questioned why the EU would have an interest in un-
dermining the international community’s AfT efforts based on the EU’s broadest un-
derstanding of PPP and via the currently proposed implementation of Article 29 EU
Ship Recycling Regulation. As a result, even an academic proponent of a global EU
Ship Recycling fund approach has already correctly stated that:
“The
fund should be utilised to assist national governments and recyclers in the
Third World to establish adequate green ship recycling measures and facilities.”
115
Hamburg, February 15, 2016 - signed: Prof. Dr. Henning Jessen, LL.M. (Tulane)
This is also highlighted by the final report of the consortium, see Ecorys et al., Financial instrument
to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim Report (30 October 2015), p. 77; see also
Lloyd’s List of 15 February 2016 (“Making
recycling sustainable”),
p. 8-9.
113
See Tradewinds of 20 November 2015, p. 22 (“A
clear line has been drawn in the Alang sand”).
114
European Report on Development 2014: Financing and other means of implementation in the post-
2015
context
Country
Illustration
Report:
Bangladesh,
available
at
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/erd5-country-illustration-bangladesh-2015_en.pdf
115
Puthucherril,
From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling, p. 205
112
37
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0154.png
Secondary Literature Used
(References to cases as well as EU and WTO documents are omitted.)
Atapattu,
Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (2006);
Beckmann,
PSSAs and Transit Passage – Australia’s Pilotage System in the Torres Strait
Challenges the IMO and UNCLOS, 38 Ocean Development & International Law 2007, pp.
325;
Calliess/Ruffert
(Commentary on the TFEU), EGV/EUV AEUV (2011);
Delbrück,
Proportionality, in:
Bernhardt
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.
III, pp. 1140 (1997);
Derlén/Lindholm,
Not enough room for optimal choices? The European legal framework for
green taxes, pp. 167 in:
Cullen/VanderWolk/Xu
(ed.), Green Taxation in East Asia (2011);
Dernbach,
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 Case
Western Law Review (1998), pp. 1;
DIE Discussion Paper No. 6/2014: Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities
(2014);
Ecorys et al.,
Financial instrument to facilitate safe and sound ship recycling, 2nd Interim
Report (2015);
Engels,
European Ship Recycling Convention (2013);
European Environmental Agency (ed.),
Environmental Taxes; Implementation and Environ-
mental Effectiveness, Brussels 1996
Hedemann-Robinson,
Protection of the marine environment and the European Union: some
critical reflections on law, policy and practice, Journal of International Maritime Law (10)
2004, pp. 254;
Hedemann-Robinson,
Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law (2015);
Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969);
Keselj,
Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding, 30 Ocean Devel-
opment and International Law 1999, pp. 127;
Lowe,
The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 San Diego Law Review
1977, pp. 597;
Mitchell,
Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, The European Jounrnal of Interna-
tional Law (17) 2007, pp. 985;
Puthucherril,
From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling (2010);
Ringbom,
The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law (2008);
38
 MOF, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Endeligt svar på spørgsmål 346: Spm. om ministeriets korrespondance vedrørende skibsophugning med Mærsk og Rederiforeningen siden regeringsskiftet 2015, til miljø- og fødevareministeren
1728174_0155.png
Scott,
The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans, pp.9, in:
Oude
Elferink
(ed.), Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention
(2005).
Schmidt-Kötters/Held,
Die Kompetenzen der EG zur Erhebung von Umweltabgaben und die
„Emissionsüberschreitungsabgaben“ für PKW-Hersteller, NVwZ 2009, pp. 1390;
Tsimplis,
Recycling of EU Ships: From Prohibition to Regulation?, Lloyd’s Maritime and
Commercial Law Quarterly 2014, pp. 415;
Valles,
Commentary on Article V GATT 1994, in:
Wolfrum/Stoll/Hestermayer
(eds.), Max
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5 (2010);
WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT, available online at:
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/gatt_ai_e.htm;
Yujuico,
Demandeur pays: The EU and funding improvements in South Asian ship recycling
practices, Transportation Research Part A 67 (2014) pp. 340;
Zhu,
Is the Polluter Paying for Vessel-Source Pollution?, Journal of Business Law 2015, pp.
348.
39